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SOURCE BOOK 


OF THE 

PENINSULA CAMPAIGN 

IN 

VIRGINIA 

April to July , 1862 


t he general service schools 

1 UvJs. 

THE GENERAL STAFF SCHOOL 

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THE GENERAL SERVICE SCHOOLS PRESS 
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 
12 - 15 - 21—250 

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r LIBRARY OfT.ONGRF.SS ] 

RECEIVED 

OCT 9 1923 

DOCUMENTS DIVISION j 




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Y'na-Zi) odt 


INTRODUCTION 

This source book contains a series of extracts from 
documents relating to the Peninsula Campaign of 1862 , 
assembled for use of students studying that campaign, and 
brought together to avoid researches. It is especially in¬ 
tended for the Staff School during the course on Military 
History, to place before them in convenient form, copies of 
original sources of information, to supplement the invalua¬ 
ble Official Records of the War of the Rebellion. 

Conrad H. Lanza, 

Colonel, Field Artillery . 

The General Staff School. 

December 12, 1921. 


v 




INDEX 


Page 

Autobiography of Oliver Otis Howard __ l 

Battle of Williamsburg_ 7 

Battle of‘Fair Oaks _ 18 

McClellan’s Own Story_ 39 

Chapter XV, The Preliminary Operations_41 

Chapter XVI, Siege of Yorktown_ s _51 

Chapter XVII, Letters, April 6 to May 5_76 

Chapter XVIII, Private Letters, April 1 to May 5_ 88 

Chapter XIX, Battle of Williamsburg _96 

Chapter XX, Advance to Richmond_ _111 

Chapter XXI, Letters, May 6 to May 18_129 

Chapter XXII, The Fall of Richmond_134 

Chapter XXIII, Battle of Fair Oaks_ 151 

Chapter XXIV, Letters, May 28 to June 26_,_167 

Chapter XXV, Beginning of the Seven Days_177 

Chapter XXVI, End of the Seven Days_193 

Chapter XXVII, Letters, June 26 to August 23_208 

History of the Engineer Battalion, by Lieutenant Turtle_213 

The Engineer Battalion in the Civil War, by Gilbert Thomp¬ 
son _ 1 _217 

Military Bridges Over the Chickahominy,-" 1862 _229 

Telegraphing in Battle, by O’Brien___235 

History of the Civil War, by the Count of Paris_241 

Chapter I, Williamsburg___243 

Chapter II, Fair Oaks _ 280 

Chapter III, Gaines’ Mill_320 

Chapter IV, Glendale and Malvern _357 

Extracts from Battles and Leaders of the Civil War_403 

I. Peninsula Campaign, by General McClellan_405 

II. Yorktown and Williamsburg, by Goss_ &&& 9 ^'. 

III. Manassas to Seven Pines, by General Johnston_439 

IV. Two Days’ Battle of Seven Pines, by General Geo. 

W. Smith _460 

V. The Opposing Forces in the Seven Days’ Battles-507 

VI. Hanover Court House and Gaines’s Mill, by Fitz- 

John Porter _527 

VII. The Charge of the Cavalry at Gaines’s Mill, by 

General P. St. G. Cooke-559 

VIII. Recollections of a Participant in the Charge, by 

Hitchcock _566 

IX. Lee’s Attacks North of the Chickahominy, by 

General D. H. Hill _569 

X. On the Confederate Right at Gaines’s Mill, by , • 

General Law -587 

XI. The Cause of a Silent Battle, by Professor DePauw__593 

XII. Rear Guard Fighting, by General W. B. Franklin-596 

XIII. McClellan’s Change of Base, by General D. H. Hill __616 

XIV. The Seven Days, by General Longstreet-631 

XV. The Battle of Malvern Hill, by General Fitz- 

John Porter -642 

XVI. The Army of the Potomac at Harrison’s Landing, 

by Kilmer -664 

XVII. With the Cavalry, by General W. W. Averell-667 


vii 










































INDEX 


Page 


XVIII. The Rear Guard at Malvern Hill, by H. W. Smith, 

and' General Keyes- 680 

XIX. The Administration in the Peninsular Campaign, 

by Lt. Col. Irwin_685 

Fifty Years in Camp and Field, by General Hitchcock-695 

Life and Letters of General George Gordon Meade-705 

Life and Campaigns of Stonewall Jackson, by Professor 

Dabney _*-713 

Military Memoirs of a Confederate, by General Alexander-754 

Yorktown and Williamsburg_757 

Seven Pines or Fair Oaks_:_765 

Seven Days’ Campaign—The Attack _786 

Seven Days’ Campaign—The Pursuit_808 

The Escape—Battle of Malvern Hill_831 

Extracts from the Official Records of the Union and Con¬ 
federate Navies_ 849 

Four Years with the Army of the Potomac, by General de 

Trobriand _889 

Chapter IX, Yorktown_891 

Chapter X, Williamsburg_904 

Chapter XI, Days of Suffering_918 

The Battle of Williamsburg, by Colonel Maury___923 

Illustrative Solutions, by Colonel C. H. Lanza_947 

The Union Advance on April 4th-5th_949 

The Confederate Estimate of the Situation, May 3_958 

The Confederate Retreat from Yorktown_963 

The Union Estimate of the Situation, 7:00 AM, May 4_973 

The Union Cavalry Pursuit, May 4_977 

The Union Advance on Williamsburg_983 

Artillery Data_427 


























Autobiography" 


OF 


OLIVER OTIS HOWARD 

MAJOR GENERAL UNITED STATES ARMY 


VOLUME ONE 


New York 

THE BAKER & TAYLOR COMPANY 
1908 





Autobiography of Gen. 0. 0. Howard 


(EXTRACT) 

* * * * * * * 

Saturday evening, April 5th, brought us to the place 
of debarkation and I sent two regiments ashore. This was 
Ship Point intended just then for the main depot of supplies 
for the army. A dim twilight survey of this landing and 
the vicinity was my first introduction to the Virginia penin¬ 
sula. The landscape in the fading light appeared delight¬ 
ful-small openings amid variegated forests generally level, 
and the roads smooth and promising. A few days later I 
recorded: The ground is almost all quicksand. I have 

worked my brigade very hard, making roads and bridges, 
loading and unloading barges and wagons filled with com¬ 
missary and quartermaster’s stores. 

We took up our first camp a little to the south of the 
landing and in a pretty grove, making my own headquarters 
at Mr. Pomphrey’s house. Mr. Pomphrey passed for a poor 
man, yet he owned 200 acres of land, 15 slaves, and had a 
wife quite as much a slave, as the others, to the pipe which 
she incessantly smoked. 

One never saw more grateful people than Mr. Pom¬ 
phrey and his wife when I proposed to make his house my 
headquarters. He said with a sigh of relief: “I shall sleep 
to-night!” Their wilderness had been suddenly transformed 
into a strange city where soldiers, wagoners, negroes, and 
camp followers were constantly coming night and day, rum¬ 
maging and often seizing what they could lay their hands 
upon. I could not help thinking how my own mother would 
feel to have her cows shot, her chickens killed, the eggs 
stolen, and the cellar robbed of an entire winter’s supply. 
Such was the work of some characters who—hard to discover 
and control near that thickly populated landing—mingled 
with us. 

General McClellan paid us a visit on April 9th, making 
a brief stay at my headquarters, and a longer one at Rich¬ 
ardson’s. 


—3— 


The Peninsular Campaign Begun 


There my first knowledge of a difference between him 
and our much-loved President dawned upon me. His aide- 
de-camp, Colonel Colburn, complained bitterly to me of the 
action of the President in taking away over 50,000 troops 
which had been promised to McClellan. Of course, Mr. 
Lincoln’s promise had been contingent upon the safety of 
the capital, but at that time I did not know of the contin¬ 
gency and so could make no reply. 

I heard McClellan, during this visit, remark to another 
officer that he found Yorktown a very strong place. He 
said: “It cannot be carried without a partial siege.” 

He examined carefully our temporary wharves, struc¬ 
tures, and roadways‘along the shore. He talked very much 
to the point with our quartermaster in charge' and with 
others; while doing this he partook of a luncheon and in¬ 
dulged in a smoke at Richardson’s headquarters; then, with 
the small staff which had accompanied him, rode away to¬ 
ward Yorktown. I trusted McClellan and sympathized 
with his disappointments, but had misgivings when I heard 
the words, “a partial siege at Yorktown!” 

For a short time while we were waiting for men and 
material that belonged to our division to come by other 
steamers than the Spaulding , the days were mainly spent in 
constructing a “log road” from Ship Point to Yorktown. In¬ 
deed, after the first cold and drenching rain, we discovered 
that that whole vicinage was underlaid with “sinking sand.” 
We constantly beheld whole fields of poor, struggling mules 
more than half buried in front of heavy wagons with wheels 
sunken to the hubs. All the roads, which on our arrival 
had been beautiful and smooth, without rut or stone, had 
become miry and treacherous. We were toiling on with the 
vigor of men who knew how to work and were making com¬ 
mendable progress with our corduroying when, on April 
16th, the order came to proceed at once to Yorktown and 
join our corps. Before the close of the 17th all the brigades 
of Sumner’s command were together in “Camp Winfield 
Scott.” This force, usually from this time designated by 
its number “the Second Corps,” was not far from the center 
of the general line and pretty well back. 


4- 



Autobiography of Gen. 0. 0. Howard 

My private notes made after our arrival at Yorktown 
indicate a considerable impatience on my part because of the 
slowness of the army. The reasons given for so much 
delay seemed insufficient. A siege party was working on 
our right indicating circumvalation and regular approaches, 
and a detachment of our men were throwing up breastworks 
near the middle of our front line, as though we might have 
to resist an attack from Magruder. 

The morning of April 24th I rode to McClellan’s head¬ 
quarters to pay my respects to him and to some of his staff. 
The grandeur of that staff greatly impressed me. I had a 
long talk with my old friend Colonel Kingsbury, chief of 
ordnance in the field. He said in parting: “General McClel¬ 
lan wishes to get all his batteries in readiness before he 
opens fire. If our friends could realize the kind of country 
they are in they would not be impatient.” Thus Kingsbury 
gently rebuked my impatience. 

In the afternoon of the same day I went to the extreme 
left of McClellan’s lines and followed the Warwick River 
in that neighborhood as far as I could on horseback, along 
its swampy border and impenetrable thickets, and visited 
Generals Erasmus D. Keyes, Silas Casey, and other acquain¬ 
tances who were stationed near that flank. During my ride 
we were crossing a narrow ravine in the midst of which was 
a sluggish, muddy stream. Lieutenant Nelson A. Miles, 
my aide-de-camp, rode up and, though usually ardent, wisely 
checked his horse. Believing I could easily clear the stream 
at a bound I let my active horse, “Charlie,” have the reins. 
He sprang forward but was unable to make the leap—the 
ground at the starting point not being firm enough; in fact, 
the whole bank before and beneath him gave way and we 
sank to his shoulders in the yielding mud. I scrambled off 
as best I could and left “Charlie” to himself. After some 
floundering and few plunges he managed to catch the firm 
ground. My own mishap saved the remainder of the party 
from a mud bath. 

Warwick Court House consisted of a small, brick school- 
house, a building for the court, a jail of less size, and one 
other fair structure, probably intended for a store. Near 


-5- 


The Peninsular Campaign Begun 


at hand was a dilapidated dwelling house. These made up 
the little village which occupied one clearing. The intervale 
lands in the neighborhood at that season of springtime were 
beautiful. Apple and peach trees were in blossom, the grass 
was a bright green, and all the trees were putting forth their 
leaves. 


. CHAPTER XV 


The Battle of Williamsburg 

E' ROM April 17 to May 4, 1862, my brigade did not change 
^ its camp and was employed by detachments in con¬ 
structions for siege operations, such as fascines—long 
bundles of rods or twigs—or gabions—tall baskets without 
bottoms—for use in lining the openings or embrasures of 
earthworks through which cannon were to be fired. The 
men of the division not otherwise employed did picket and 
guard duty, and were exercised daily in company, regimental, 
and brigade drills. 

In order to be as familiar as possible with the places 
where I might have to take my command into action, I 
visited in turn the various portions of our front. On April 
26th, after I had set large detachments from my brigade at 
work and had seen them diligently constructing fascines 
and gabions, I rode over to the York River in order to ex¬ 
amine the water batteries. From that locality the Con¬ 
federate fort on Gloucester Point across the river was in 
plain sight, and we could also see the enemy’s water battery 
on the Yorktown side. From our own position to the op¬ 
posite shore the distance was two miles. Five of the guns 
in our Battery No. 1 were one hundred pounders, Parrott 
muzzle-loading rifles, and two two hundred pounders, Par¬ 
rott. They were mounted on wrought-iron carriages which 
appeared so slender as to be in danger of being broken by a 
single recoil. Other batteries had ten-, twenty-, and thirty- 
pounder Parrott and four and one-half-inch guns in place 
ready for work. Others had eight- and ten-inch mortars. 
The next morning I continued my visits and found near the 
center of our position—directly in front of Sumner’s corps— 
with a field battery having epaulements for six guns, my 
friend Lieutenant Edmund Kirby in charge; he had just 
recovered from a serious attack of typhoid fever. 

My next ride for information was made May 1st. It 
was along the front and to examine our first parallel, which 
was a trench twelve feet wide and three feet deep, the dirt 


—7— 


Autobiography of Gen. 0. 0. Howard 

being thrown toward the enemy. All along the parallel 
were openings in the embankment for batteries of siege 
guns. This trench was parallel to the enemy’s works and 
1,500 yards from them. Accompanied by my brother and 
aid, Lieutenant Howard, I continued back of the parallel 
eastward as far as the York River, and we took a good look 
at the waiting gunboats, some of which had come up the 
river to cooperate in the siege. We looked at each other 
and inquired: “How soon shall we do something ?” 

From day to day we read and wrote letters and had 
plenty of time to visit each other, as well as to study the 
slowly growing constructions. Occasionally the enemy 
would toss a shell over to our side, and now and then roll a 
ball of iron along our road with motion too swift to touch. 
A skirmish somewhere on the front line occasionally came 
off, and sometimes we were startled into abnormal activity 
by a false alarm; but on the whole we had a long and peace¬ 
ful sojourn near Yorktown. 

Near the end of “siege of Yorktown,” Franklin’s divi¬ 
sion was permitted to come to us from McDowell, and re¬ 
maining on transports, was waiting for the great bombard¬ 
ment before commencing to perform its appointed role. 
But the great bombardment never came. 

Sunday morning, May 4th, all at my headquarters had 
attended to ordinary military duties. Before breakfast I 
invited to my tent Captain Sewall, my adjutant general, 
Lieutenant Howard, Lieutenant Balloch, Orderly McDonald, 
and English manservant, and Charley Weis, a messenger 
whose sobriquet was “Bony.” We read that chapter of 
Daniel which tells the story of Shadroch, Meshach, and 
Abednego passing through the fiery furnace unscathed. 
Then followed, from one of the officers present, an earnest 
petition to the Lord of Hosts for protection, guidance, and 
blessing. As soon as breakfast was over I commenced a 
letter to Mrs. Howard, and, writing rapidly, had finished 
about two pages, when suddenly, without completing the 
sentence, I jotted down: “Yorktown is abandoned and our 
troops are marching in.” I added a little later: “I am now, 


—8— 


The Battle of Williamsburg 

quarter before eight a.m., under marching orders. Thank 
Him who doeth all things well.” 

It was Sumner’s entire corps which had received orders 
of march. Besides the two divisions, Richardson’s and 
Sedgwick’s, Sumner’s corps still included the Eighth Illinois 
Cavalry. Our division artillery had four batteries—twenty- 
four guns. Thus far no change had been made in the en¬ 
tire division, except the transfer of the cavalry to corps 
headquarters. 

From our location south of Yorktown in the rear of all, 
we were naturally long delayed in taking up the march 
toward Williamsburg, for the only through routes, already 
almost impassable after the Confederate columns had waded 
through them, were thronged with cavalry and the corps 
of Heintzelman and Keyes. We held ourselves in readiness, 
impatiently waiting all day the 4th. McClellan’s first plan, 
made known later in the day, designated our division with 
Sedgwick’s and Fitz-John Porter’s as the reserve, either to 
go to Williamsburg, if imperatively needed, or to follow 
Franklin’s division on transports up the York River and 
support him in his work, or take and hold a landing on the 
same side of the river twenty-five miles above. To carry 
out this plan, early on Monday, the 5th, Sedgwick’s and our 
division broke camp and marched to the immediate neigh¬ 
borhood of Yorktown. Here we bivouacked and completed 
all our preparations for close work—rations in the haver¬ 
sacks and ammunition on the person of each soldier. 

Owing to McClellan’s siege operations, General Johns¬ 
ton determined to withdraw his Confederate forces just be¬ 
fore the destructive bombardment should begin. His re¬ 
treat toward Richmond was ordered and carried steadily 
forward. Stuart’s cavalry curtained the moving forces on 
the Yorktown-Williamsburg road, and also on the Lee’s Mill 
and Williamsburg road, the two roads leading up the penin¬ 
sula. 

Critics accuse us in the Army of the Potomac of not 
being early risers, and not being keen to catch the first evi¬ 
dences of evacuation. It is, indeed, a just charge against 
McClellan’s information bureau; the want of information did 


—9— 


Autobiography of Gen. 0. 0. Howard 


enable Johnston to gain a coveted advantage during the first 
day of his difficult retreat. It was good generalship on his 
part to so blind McClellan as to his purpose. The withdrawal 
of the enemy, however, was discovered at dawn almost 
simultaneously at several points of the front. Heintzelman, 
in front of Yorktown, seeing fires reflected in the sky and 
hearing explosions which sounded like a skirmish, had him¬ 
self taken up in a balloon to make sure of the cause before 
ordering a general advance, and saw the destruction of 
magazines, and our pickets, unopposed sweeping over the 
works which had been so formidable. Hancock, then a 
brigade commander, was notified also at dawn by two ne¬ 
groes that the enemy had gone. 

McClellan, taken thus by surprise, needed time to think 
and time to intercept Johnston’s design. It might be a ruse. 
So he put Fitz-John Porter’s division in the Confederate 
works to hold them against a possible return. He got 
Franklin with his fine body of fresh men ready to send in 
transports up the York, with reserves to follow, and naval 
gunboats to aid. 

The orders to Heintzelman and Keyes were: “Draw in 
your guards, pickets, and outposts and replenish everything 
for a march.” 

Between the Warwick and Williamsburg was a belt of 
country in breadth from nine to thirteen miles. It was a 
country of swamps, tangled forests, and small farms here 
and there, like glades in the woods, connected by wretched 
lanes. There were only two roads from our front, and one 
of them the Lee’s Mill road, which was connected occasion¬ 
ally with the other, the Yorktown road; and it took watching 
and tacking to keep off the main thoroughfare from York¬ 
town to Williamsburg and yet travel toward the latter town. 
The men marching in the night and rain, on account of the 
effort required to lift their feet, heavy with adhesive mud, 
never exceeded one mile an hour. Our people during* that 
march, short as it appears, were like flocks of children play¬ 
ing at blindman’s buff. They wandered right and left; 
they ran into each other; they reached out tentatively for 
obstacles and gained ground slowly with extreme fatigue. 


—10— 


The Battle of Williamsburg 

There were other troubles. When our infantry began 
its march a warning came along our military telegraph line 
that everybody should look out for “buried bombs/' Tor¬ 
pedoes had been buried in the ground along the paths and 
roads which led to the Confederate works. Some were also 
found near wells and springs of water, a few in some flour 
barrels and sacks in the telegraph office, and one or more 
near a magazine. 

There was with us at Yorktown a young man by the 
name of D. B. Lathrop, from Springfield, Ohio. He was 
the son of a widow, and had been, before the war, study¬ 
ing for the ministry. When the war broke out, wishing to 
do something helpful to the Union cause, he joined that 
hard-worked and useful body, the telegraph corps. Mr. 
Lathrop was attached to General Heintzelman’s headquar¬ 
ters. As soon as Yorktown was opened, following the wires 
he hurried to the telegraph office. He sat down at the oper¬ 
ator’s table and touched the instrument. Instantly an ex¬ 
plosion of a percussion shell took place and young Lathrop 
was mortally wounded. 

A little later in the day when Davidson’s brigade was 
about to cross the Warwick at Lee’s Mill, Colonel E. C. 
Mason, of the Seventh Maine, receiving word concerning 
Lathrop, whom he knew, and fearing torpedoes, went him¬ 
self in advance of his column on the road beyond the dam. 
As he was walking slowly he crushed a percussion cap. 
Brushing away the dirt, he discovered the red wax at the top 
of the buried shell. Providentially for Mason, only the cap 
exploded. The colonel then called for volunteers. Upon 
their hands and knees they crept along and succeeded in 
uncovering more than a dozen shells. In the approaches 
to the Yorktown works the torpedoes were usually arranged 
with a narrow board, upon which a soldier’s or horse’s tread 
would effect an explosion. Several horses and men among 
the first passing troops were killed or wounded by them. 
McClellan soon set several Confederate prisoners of war to 
ferret them out. 

During Sunday General Stoneman with our cavalry and 
horse artillery worked his way forward, having small com- 


-11- 


Autobiography of Gen. 0. 0. Howard 


bats with Confederate cavalry under Stuart. Nothing very 
discouraging checked him, or any of our cavalry detach¬ 
ments, from a steady advance till he came upon the Wil¬ 
liamsburg outworks. About a mile and a half from Wil¬ 
liamsburg a considerable work called Fort Magruder was 
located so as to obstruct both the roads of which I have 
spoken. Fort Magruder had on its right and left several 
small redoubts, and the whole front was an open field for 
several hundred yards, except for the slashing of trees and 
other artificial obstructions. 

Stuart had been pressed so hard that the Confederate 
commander of the rear guard called back into the woods 
a division of infantry and considerable artillery. As soon 
as Stoneman’s men with a battery of artillery swept into 
the spaces before these formidable works, they encountered 
all along their front a terrific fire of both infantry and artil¬ 
lery. Stoneman, thus suddenly repelled, fell back a short 
distance and called for help, having suffered the loss of 
some forty men, one piece of artillery, and three caissons, 
which had sunk deeply in the mud, and the horses of which 
were nearly all killed or wounded by the prompt Confeder¬ 
ate fire. 

This partial success determined our enemy to remain 
a while longer and take advantage of this well-selected 
checking position. He might possibly overwhelm a part 
of McClellan’s forces before the remainder could wade 
through the ever-deepening mud to its relief, for the rain 
had poured down all the day; and, indeed, Johnston needed 
more time to secure a reasonably safe retreat. 

Sumner, being sent forward Sunday morning by McClel¬ 
lan to take care of everything at the front, heard the firing 
at Williamsburg. He hastened infantry from the heads of 
columns of both the other corps to Stoneman’s support, and 
at evening, himself being cut off by a sudden Confederate 
sally, passed the night with one of the brigade commanders. 
No aids or orderlies from Heintzelman or Keyes could find 
him. In fact, Heintzelman, judging from his own instruc¬ 
tions, thought himself to be in command. General Keyes, 
leading Casey’s and Couch’s divisions, had for himself a 


—12— 


The Battle of Williamsburg 

similar impression. Heintzelman’s head of column under 
Hooker, now nearest to the James River, had been the first 
to respond to Stoneman’s call for help. Early in the morn¬ 
ing of Monday the three not very harmonious corps com¬ 
manders succeeded in getting together. 

After ambitious contention, Sumner's rank was yielded 
to and his plan to turn the Confederates by our right agreed 
upon. Heintzelman set out for the left of our line, but was 
much delayed by ignorant guides. At last he reached Hooker. 
Hooker had worked up close to the redoubts the night be¬ 
fore with deployed lines. The instructions which had come 
to him were to support Stoneman and harass the enemy, 
and, if possible, cut off his retreat. Baldy Smith’s division 
he knew was on his right, and other troops in plenty some¬ 
where near. These circumstances were to “Fighting Joe 
Hooker” just those for winning laurels by a successful as¬ 
sault. 

Exactly contrary to Sumner’s plan Hooker, already on 
the ground by daylight, commenced a regular attack on the 
Confederate right at about 7:30. A fierce and noisy struggle 
went on there all day. Longstreet came back and brought 
more troops. Hooker’s men, reserves and all, pushed in, 
and were nearly exhausted, when, about 4 p.m., Phil 
Kearny managed to get up his division. Hooker’s division 
was at last relieved by Kearny’s and fell back to be a reserve. 
Hooker’s soldiers deserved this rest, for they had faced 
Fort Magruder and those strong redoubts well manned and 
actively firing for nine hours. Kearny’s men charged 
and cleared the outside point of woods, carried some rifle 
pits, and silenced troublesome light batteries, so that 
Kearny declared: “The victory is ours!” His men biv¬ 
ouacked where they had fought. 

Thus the battle went on contrary to all planning, work¬ 
ing along from left to right. While the operations just re¬ 
counted were progressing under Heintzelman’s eyes, Sum¬ 
ner and Keyes were trying to bring order out of confusion 
on the right of our line and back to the rear on the Yorktown 
road. 


—13— 


Autobiography of Gen. 0. 0. Howard 


A passageway across a stream and through the woods 
around the Confederate left flank having been discovered, 
Hancock’s brigade, somewhat reenforced, was selected to 
make a turning movement, and its commander fought with 
it a brilliant and successful engagement against Early, who 
was badly wounded in this action. Hancock’s victorious 
troops bivouacked on the field in a heavy rain. When this 
was going on beyond our extreme right, the enemy made 
strong counter attacks along the Yorktown road from the 
flanks of Fort Magruder. In resisting these attacks our 
men from New York and Pennsylvania received a heavy fire, 
and left many a poor fellow dead or dying upon a plowed 
field and among the felled timber which protected the fort. 
The whole conduct of this battle created among our generals 
so much dissatisfaction, bickering, and complaint that 
McClellan was induced about three o’clock in the afternoon 
to come to the front. The fighting was all over when he 
reached Sumner’s headquarters. He gathered what news 
he could from different points and sent to Washington a 
dispatch which put Hancock far in advance of all other par¬ 
ticipants in the engagement. 

He thought that General Johnston intended to fight a 
general battle at that point and that his own troops were 
outnumbered; so he at once ordered Sedgwick’s and Rich¬ 
ardson’s divisions to march from Yorktown to Williamsburg. 

Just before sunset that Monday evening, May 5th, my 
brigade received its marching orders. The rain still con¬ 
tinued to pour down. We set out as quickly as possible, my 
brigade following that of General French. I was obliged to 
march my men through a narrow roadway across the York¬ 
town works; the clay mud, which stuck to the men’s feet in 
lumps or masses, was frofri eight to ten inches in depth. 
Horses, wagons, mules, and footmen were coming and going 
both ways and often meeting in the narrow passage. As 
my brigade passed I remained for some time at the York¬ 
town sally port. The bits of board attached to torpedoes 
had not all been removed, but little flags were placed as a 
warning of the presence of explosives. Some of us became 
hoarse calling to the soldiers not to move to the right or 


—14— 


The Battle of Williamsburg 

left, and not to step on the boards where the small flags 
were seen. It was dark before I got my brigade past York- 
town. 

Almost the entire night was spent in struggling for¬ 
ward. I tried to walk now and then to rest my horse, and 
for quite a time to allow an officer who was taken suddenly 
ill to ride, but I found it necessary to hold on by the halter 
to keep on my feet. Our men straggled dreadfully that 
night, but as soon as the day dawned they worked their 
way on to the command. We had finally bivouacked for 
the night in a rough-plowed field till dawn. My adjutant 
general, a thin man, gloomily placed his hips between two 
rails; for myself, with crochets I constructed a wooden 
horse, fastened one end of a piece of canvas over it, and 
pulled the other end along the ground to my cheerful fire, 
and lay down against the canvas for a short, sweet rest. 

At last we were halted not far from the battlefield. 
With a few officers I went to the bloody ground. The Con¬ 
federates had departed in the night. The open muddy soil 
and the thickets were still strewn with the swollen dead, 
whose faces were generally toward the sky. I saw, as I 
moved along, a little headboard to mark the place of a Union 
soldier. His form and his face were carefully covered by 
a blanket. Near him was another in gray clothing left 
without care. In my heart I wished that he also had been 
covered. They seemed to be resting together in peace. 
I thought: “May God hasten us to the close of such a war!” 
This yearning was deepened by my visits to the hospitals 
filled with poor sufferers from both armies. United in pain 
and forced imprisonment, Confederate and Union soldiers 
there were at peace. But, receiving orders from General 
Richardson, I myself quickly returned from that gloomy 
region to my brigade and hurried it back to Yorktown, to 
wait there for transports which would enable us to follow 
Franklin up the York River to West Point. 

I have seen that, of the two armies, the Confederate 
brought into action at Williamsburg about ten thousand, 
and our army from twelve to thirteen thousand. Our ag¬ 
gregate loss, 2,239, was very large, as the troops in general 


— 15 — 


Autobiography of Gen. 0. 0. Howard 

fought against prepared works. The Confederate loss was 
from 1,300 to 1,500 men. 

Before and after the first battle of Bull Run it will be 
remembered that I was associated with General Franklin; 
he and I each commanded a brigade in Heintzelman’s divi¬ 
sion. His associates always respected his ability and had 
confidence in his judgment. Franklin’s division, composed 
of infantry and artillery, after its arrival had been disem¬ 
barked on May 3d, at Cheeseman’s Landing near Ship Point, 
with a view to take part in the proposed assault of York- 
town. The morning of the 4th, as soon as McClellan knew 
of the Confederate withdrawal, he instructed Franklin to 
reembark and take his division to Yorktown. Franklin 
commenced the work at once, finishing the reembarking, as 
quickly as it could be done, about one o’clock of the 5th. 
The difficulties of reembarking, owing to the weather, to 
the loading of supplies, and the putting on board of the ar¬ 
tillery carriages and other impedimenta, much of which 
had to be hoisted from rafts, were greater than anybody had 
estimated. At any rate, there was no unnecessary delay. 
Proceeding to Yorktown, Franklin received further orders 
and was ready the same evening to continue on to West 
Point accompanied by a naval convoy. The naval com¬ 
mander declined to start, owing to the increasing darkness 
and the danger of navigation during a furious storm. There¬ 
fore, the flotilla only left at daybreak on the 6th. Arriving 
at West Point, the disembarking was begun and the vicinity 
reconnoitered at three o’clock, but the landing of the artil- 
tery was not completed till the morning of the 7th. Canal 
boats, which were aground by the bank, were used as 
wharves. 

General Johnston suspected, on account of the fewness 
of our troops marshaled against him at Williamsburg, that 
McClellan was sending a flotilla up the York River, to seize 
a landing place in the vicinity of West Point, and attack 
from it the flank of his retreating army. The evening of 
Tuesday, the 6th, General G. W. Smith, commanding the 
Confederate reserve, had Whiting’s division not far from 
Barhamsville, opposite West Point, and three miles away. 


— 16 — 


The Battle of Williamsburg 

He reported to his chief, General Johnston, that a large 
body of United States troops had debarked from transports 
at Eltham’s Landing, a little above him, and were occupying 
not only the open spaces, but a thick wood stretching from 
the landing to the New Kent wagon road. As this menaced 
Johnston's line of march he instructed Smith to dislodge 
our troops. This work Smith directed General Whiting to 
do. Franklin had put his troops into position as they 
landed. His flanks were protected by the gunboats, which 
were at hand, to shell the woods beyond. Each flank rested 
on swampy creeks running into the river. Besides, he 
possessed himself, as far as his small force could do so, of 
the encircling woods. General H. W. Slocum commanded 
Franklin's left wing, while General John Newton, a loyal 
Virginian, commanded the right. Whiting, to cover Johns¬ 
ton's army in retreat, bivouacked in a line of battle facing 
Franklin, but did not attack that evening, as Franklin's 
troops appeared to be in a position hard to reach. He hoped 
to attack him as he moved out, ‘ but as Franklin did not 
advance Whiting attacked him furiously in position the next 
morning, the 7th, at ten o’clock. Franklin, however, in a 
three hours' conflict secured his landing, which was his ob¬ 
ject, and not, as Johnston feared, to attack him in flank 
during his retreat. West Point, the place where the Pamun- 
key and Mattapony unite to form the York River, and which 
is the terminus of the Richmond Railway, was now set 
apart for our new base of operations. 

Slowly and steadily through the abounding mud, or 
by water from Yorktown, the army worked its way to 
Franklin’s neighborhood, while General Johnston, with 
scarcely any further molestation, was suffered to draw in 
his forces to the vicinity of the Confederate capital. 


-17 


CHAPTER XVI 
The Battle of Fair Oaks 


T> Y May 16, 1862, McClellan’s force was reorganized so 
as to give to each of his corps commanders two divi¬ 
sions. We moved toward Richmond from our new depot at 
White House in this order: Porter with the Fifth Corps, 
Franklin with the Sixth, Sumner with the Second, Keyes 
with the Fourth, and Heintzelman with the Third. Our 
first move was to the Chickahominy, a stream flowing from 
right to left across our line of advance. At first, Heintzel¬ 
man and Keyes bivouacked near Bottom’s Bridge; Sum¬ 
ner’s corps, to which I belonged, a few miles up stream; 
Franklin not far from New Bridge, and Porter near Me- 
chanicsville. Meanwhile the main body of our cavalry, well 
out, guarded our right and rear with a view to clear the way 
to McDowell’s force, then in front of Fredericksburg, and 
protect our large depot at* the White House and the railroad 
line from that point to the army. 

Porter, with a slight reenforcement to his corps, moved 
out from our right and fought the successful small battle 
of Hanover Court House, May 27th, and returned to Me- 
chanicsville. McClellan had placed his own headquarters 
not far from Franklin, at Gaines Mills. A small detach¬ 
ment of cavalry had reconnoitered through the White Oak 
Swamp and up the south bank of the Chickahominy to Seven 
Pines and the Fair Oaks Station, five or six miles from 
Richmond, and had reported the ground clear of any con¬ 
siderable hostile force. On May 23d, four days prior to 
Porter’s movement, Keyes, and later, the 25th, Heintzel¬ 
man, had passed over Bottom’s Bridge. 

McClellan did not like to have his principal supplies 
dependent on the York River and the railway from the 
White House landing, and, further, he already meditated 
working over to the James River to thus secure by the 
help of the navy a safer base and, as he thought, a better 
approach to Richmond. He had now over 120,000 men, but 
his estimate of his enemy on data obtained by his informa- 


- 18 — 


The Battle of Fair Oaks 

tion bureau exceeded that number, so very naturally he 
wanted on the spot McDowell's entire corps which had been 
promised. With McDowell present he could move his army 
so as to draw his supplies from the James at once. With¬ 
out him and with instructions to cooperate with him, far 
off on his right, he could not do so. McClellan therefore sent 
only two corps over the Chickahominy instead of moving 
there with his whole force. This was called a river, but 
ordinarily it was no more than a creek with low banks, be¬ 
tween which water and swamp varied in width from two to 
three hundred feet. McClellan and his officers deprecated 
this division of his army even by so small a river, but it 
appeared a necessity and they sought to make amends for 
it by building bridges. Sumner's corps built two, one of 
which was constructed of large logs by the Fifth New Hamp¬ 
shire of my brigade. General Sumner, seeing the water 
rising from the rains and hoping to hasten the work, gave 
the men a barrel of whiskey—at the same time answering 
my objection to its use by saying: “Yes, general, you are 
right, but it is like pitch on fire which gets speed out of an 
engine though it burns out the boiler." The two structures 
were named Sumner's upper and Sumner’s lower bridge. 
Our engineers farther up, when the south bank had been 
seized by us, repaired the old bridges and threw across 
others till the Chickahominy appeared but a slight obstruc¬ 
tion. 

On May 25th Casey's division of Keyes’s corps moved 
forward to Seven Pines, a “crossroads" on the main pike 
from Williamsburg to Richmond, where the “nine-mile road" 
comes from New Bridge into that highway. Keyes, being 
ordered to hold Fair Oaks Railway station in advance of that 
position, moved again the 29th, placing Naglee’s brigade in 
advance and bringing up Casey’s other two brigades, Wes- 
sells’s and Palmer’s, in support, with pickets out in front of 
all. 

Here Casey’s division, really too far forward for safety, 
fortified as well as it could with the time and implements 
at hand. 


- 19 - 


Autobiography of Gen. 0. 0. Howard 

Keyes at first intrenched his other division, Couch’s, 
near Savage Station, but a little later brought it up to the 
vicinity of Seven Pines and there camped it as a second line 
to Casey facing toward Richmond. Field works were being 
constructed to cover every approach, particularly the nine- 
mile road, which, coming from the New Bridge, was joined 
by a road from Richmond at the Old Tavern. Couch’s divi¬ 
sion, as a reserved line, was arranged to hold the Seven 
Pines crossroads. His brigades were Peck’s, Abercrombie’s, 
and Devens’s. The entire corps of Keyes on the ground did 
not exceed 12,000 men, who stretched forward for more 
than two miles, and though partially intrenched, were not 
within very easy support of each other in case of attack by 
a larger force. On May 29th and 30th Confederate recon- 
noissances were made against Keyes’s corps in order to as¬ 
certain the position and strength of our troops in that 
vicinity. 

Heintzelman, when he had crossed the river with his 
corps, had moved Hooker’s division to the neighborhood of 
White Oak Swamp Bridge, three miles due south of Bot¬ 
tom’s Bridge, and Kearny’s division forward on the Rich¬ 
mond road about half as far, stopping it a little short of 
Savage Railway Station. Heintzelman in his own corps had 
for duty at the first symptoms of battle about 20,000 men. 
He was the ranking officer and in command of all the troops 
south of the Chickahominy. The Eighth Pennsylvania and 
part of the Eighth Illinois Cavalry were present to watch 
the flanks of Couch and Casey, but not able to do much in 
such a thickly wooded region. Casey evidently felt the 
weakness of his force, for when the Confederate reconnois- 
sance occurred on the 30th he sent at once to Keyes for help. 
Peck’s brigade was placed on his left during that alarm. 

Now came during that night a most terrific storm; the 
rain fell in torrents and it was accompanied by high winds. 
It was difficult to keep our tents standing and in that pe¬ 
culiarly soft soil the mud deepened and the discomforts 
were beyond description, so that the soldiers in every camp 
had little rest while the storm continued. The arms and 
ammunition were not improved by the pouring rain, though 


— 20 — 


The Battle of Fair Oaks 


in these respects one side suffered no more than the other. 
But for some reason those who stand on the defensive are 
more subject to discouragement and apprehension than 
those who are in movement. 

General Johnston, the Confederate commander, had a 
few days before planned a combined attack against our 
troops north of the Chickahominy, similar to that which the 
Confederates made a month later, but military reasons 
caused him to change his purpose. 

After his reconnoissance of the 30th he was ready to 
strike on the south bank. The Chickahominy, during the 
fearful succession of storm bursts, had risen and spread 
rapidly over all the low ground till the stream had become 
a broad river. 

What could be more favorable to his plan? True, the 
Confederate artillery might be hindered by the water and 
soft soil, but seemingly Keyes's corps of the Union army was 
now isolated and Johnston had in hand five strong divisions. 
McClellan could reenforce but slowly from the north of the 
river, for already some of the bridges had been carried 
away and the others would not long be safe to cross. 

The Confederate order of attack was: Hill to .concen¬ 
trate on the Williamsburg road and suddenly, vigorously 
assail with his division Keyes in front; Hill to be supported 
by Longstreet, who was to have the direction of all opera¬ 
tions from the Williamsburg road to the Confederate right, 
and whose own division was to follow Hill; Huger's division, 
starting early, was to move rapidly by the Charles City road, 
which was southward nearer the James River, and come up 
in rear of Keyes's position. G. W. Smith with his own and 
McLane’s divisions was intrusted with a double duty to 
serve as a general reserve and be ready to reenforce Long- 
street down the nine-mile road, and also to watch the New 
Bridge and all other approaches of our corps from the Chicka¬ 
hominy. 

Longstreet, despairing of Huger's cooperation, about 
12:30 p.m. ordered D. H. Hill to commence the assault. 
Hill’s strong division sprang forward in the road and on both 
sides of it with lines far overlapping Casey's front. They 


- 21 — 


Autobiography of Gen. 0. 0. Howard 


crowded forward with slight skirmishing, and at first with 
but few pieces of artillery and with as little noise as possible, 
hoping for a surprise. 

The capture that morning of Lieutenant Washington, 
one of Johnston’s aids, in front of the Union line, and his 
conduct after capture had satisfied Casey that an attack 
from some direction was about to be made. After that, 
General Casey increased his diligence, striving to finish his 
redoubts and intrenchments and extend his abatis. Large 
numbers of men were working with spades and axes when 
not long after noon two hostile shells cut the air and burst 
in their neighborhood. Thus Casey was warned and in a 
few minutes his line of skirmishers, with a fresh regiment 
in immediate support, became engaged. 

The assault was so abrupt and overwhelming that but 
little resistance was made by those in advance of the main 
line. The pickets and regiment just sent forward, leaving 
the dead and badly wounded, were quickly swept away by 
their advancing enemy. They assailed the center and both 
wings and had sufficient numbers to whip around the flanks. 

When Casey found his unfinished trenches too weak and 
his fighting force too small to hold back Hill’s brigades, his 
artillery and his musketry making but faint impression, he 
ordered a bayonet charge by four regiments. General 
Naglee led the charge and succeeded in pressing all the Con¬ 
federates in sight in the direct front back across the open 
space to the edge of the woods. That was, however, but a 
momentary respite; for from those woods Naglee’s men 
received a fire that they could not stand and quickly ran 
back to their intrenched lines. 

Many of Casey’s troops being new levies, after they had 
once had their ranks broken, scattered off to the rear, fall¬ 
ing back even beyond Couch’s position. Still, most of them 
preserved a show of order and were subsequently brought 
up by their officers as far as Seven Pines to renew the 
struggle. 

Hill, while he attacked with three brigades in front, sent 
Rains with his brigade to work around Casey’s left. He 
went under cover of the marshy forest, turned, and came up 


— 22 — 


The Battle of Fair Oaks 


behind Casey’s intrenchments. He thus had a large brigade 
enfilading our lines and pelting the backs of our soldiers. 
After losing heavily and inflicting a great loss upon his 
assailants Casey ordered the abandonment of that front. 
Our new regiments, which had fought hard till now, broke 
up badly in the retreat. A regiment from Peck’s brigade, 
sent forward from the left of Couch, delayed Rains suffi¬ 
ciently to enable Casey’s men to retire without destruction. 
Casey passed Couch and gathered up all the remnants he 
could behind him at Seven Pines. 

The line of rifle pits in front of Seven Pines could not 
long be held by Couch’s division—because Couch had first 
to reenforce Casey and then by the orders of his corps com¬ 
mander he was obliged to extend too much, even as far as 
he could reach along the nine-mile road. That line of three 
brigades, Abercrombie’s, Devens’s, and Peck’s, crossed the 
railroad near Fair Oaks Station. The contest at Couch’s 
new position was at times as fierce as at Casey’s, and the 
line with little or no cover for the defenders was kept till 
after four o’clock. 

As soon as the assailants recovered their breath and 
were reasonably reorganized by their leaders, they made 
another vigorous push to complete the destruction of Keyes’s 
corps. 

While all this fury of battle was in progress—and over 
two hours of it had passed—by some extraordinary circum¬ 
stance Heintzelman, whom McClellan looked to as the veri¬ 
table commander of all the forces on the Richmond side of 
the Chickahominy and whose headquarters were near Savage 
Station, received no word of the hostile attack, until too 
late to help Casey. At last he was on his way battleward, 
storming at criminal stragglers and hurrying forward Kear¬ 
ny’s division. 

With such a battlefield won, with much food, and eight 
captured cannon and hundreds of prisoners in hand, no 
wonder there was confidence and enthusiasm in Longstreet’s 
ranks. General Johnston and G. W. Smith at their junction 
of roads on the Confederate left, had failed to hear the 
musketry till after 4 p.m., and were at last informed by a 


— 23 — 


Autobiography of Gen. 0. 0. Howard 


returning messenger. Then they moved straight on toward 
the battlefield. It was a time for a great success which 
might bring Confederate independence. 

Phil Kearny, following his instructions literally, sent 
Birney’s small brigade to the railway, which took post far 
back of the staggering line of battle. 

After Birney had gone Kearny heard of Casey's retreat 
and Couch's danger, and received Heintzelman’s order for 
the other brigade with him. Passing through throngs of 
fugitives he joined Berry at the head of the brigade on the 
Richmond road and urged the utmost haste. He also sent 
to Bottom's Bridge for Jameson’s brigade left there as a 
guard. 

He now came up to Seven Pines with his head of column 
in an incredibly short time. The impulsive Kearny found 
Keyes and Casey together. Couch was with Abercrombie 
over the railway toward the Chickahominy. Kearny 
quickly took in the situation; the zigzag rifle trench shelter¬ 
ing crowded men, and the open space in front, from beyond 
which the Confederate riflemen were firing from both the 
felled and standing timber. Kearny eagerly asked: 
“Where is your greatest need?" Casey, cheered by the 
newcomers, said: “Kearny, if you will regain our late camp 
the day will still be ours." Kearny just then had only the 
Third Michigan up. The men moved forward with alacrity; 
they ran over the open space into the timber and begun a 
contest as determined as that of their foes, “heedless," said 
their general, “of the shell and ball that rained upon them." 
But even when Berry’s three other regiments had joined 
the fiercely fighting line Kearny found that after all his 
promptness he could effect but little. He gained some 
ground, then lost it, backing off in fairly good order toward 
the White Oak Swamp and Hooker, stoutly disputing the 
ground as he retired. 

About the time of Kearny's arrival, Hill's and Long- 
street's divisions of Confederates with some reenforcements 
from their reserves, having four brigade fronts abreast, 
stretching from the swamps of White Oak to and beyond 


— 24 — 


The Battle of Fair Oaks 


Abercrombie at the railroad, more than a mile of breadth, 
came surging on with cheering and musketry, the charge 
made the more formidable by the rapid use of our captured 
cannon turned against our irregular masses herded together 
at Seven Pines. 

It did not take many minutes to break our very at¬ 
tenuated opposing lines. Couch saw the blackness of the 
storm as it filled the air with fury and speed. Upon the 
break in what remained of his division he swung off a few 
regiments of his right, including Abercrombie’s brigade, till 
they were well north of the railroad and parallel to it, and 
then retired slowly toward Sumner’s upper bridge. In the 
edge of the wood he made a firm stand to check any hostile 
advance in that direction. As a thundercloud approaches, 
but stops at a river and passes harmlessly away, giving 
but a gentle sprinkling, so did this cloud of insurgents 
approach Couch and his men, touch the woods, and pass on 
along the railway beyond him. But this portion of Couch’s 
division was thus hopelessly cut off from the rest of its corps. 

Meanwhile, Kearny, finding a safe road via the saw 
mill back of his line, hastened his men to the rear in that 
way till he reached the defenses at Savage Station which 
had been constructed originally by General Couch. To 
this strong place were gathered all the regiments of Keyes 
except Couch’s detachment, and all of Heintzelman’s corps 
including Hooker, now arrived from White Oak Swamp. 

Longstreet’s forces, exhausted by six hours’ fighting, 
could get no farther. But he knew that for him heavy 
reenforcements were at hand. Five fresh brigades were 
partly behind him and partly on his left, extending beyond 
the Fair Oaks railway station. 

As the fresh Confederate troops were coming on 
cheering and confident there came from their left front, 
toward the Chickahominy, a sudden check. Some guns 
of a Union battery opened a cross fire. It was not safe 
to ignore them and their support. Smith ordered them 
to be taken at once. Two Confederate brigades attempt¬ 
ed that. Then others already somewhat ahead turned 


— 25 — 


\ 


Autobiography of Gen. 0. 0. Howard 

back and joined in the attack. Smith became impatient. 
He went to the railroad to discover what was the matter. 
The firing grew worse. No such stubborn resistance 
should come from that quarter. While Smith, and later, 
Johnston, are examining this flank interruption, I will 
explain its cause. 

Sumner’s corps, we know, lay along the Chickahominy, 
opposite the battlefield. An order from McClellan restraining 
him from moving without permission was received by Sum¬ 
ner that morning. We heard the first fitful sound from 
Casey’s guns, and before one o’clock we knew that a hard 
battle was going on. Sumner at once asked, by telegraph, 
permission to cross the river. He walked up and down like 
a caged lion. McClellan first telegraphed him to be ready. 
He was ready. But to save delay he sent Sedgwick’s divi¬ 
sion with three batteries to his uper bridge and our division 
to the lower. The order to cross came at last at 2:30 
p.m. As Sumner with Sedgwick approached, a part of 
the upper bridge rose with the water, starting to float off 
with the current. It was difficult to keep the green logs in 
place by ropes and withes; great cracks appeared. The 
engineer officer met Sumner and remonstrated: “General 
Sumner, you cannot cross this bridge!” 

“Can’t cross this bridge! I can, sir; I will, sir!’ 

“Don’t you see the approaches are breaking up and 
the logs displaced? It is impossible!” 

“Impossible! Sir, I tell you I can cross. I am or¬ 
dered.” 

The orders had come and that ended the matter with 
Sumner. 

When men and horses were once on the’ bridge they 
pressed down the logs and accomplished the task more 
easily than the engineer had believed possible. Beyond the 
bridge the water was sometimes up to the -thighs of Sedg¬ 
wick’s men. Our lower bridge was worse. As soon as 
French’s brigade had crossed, the bridge began to break so 
much that Richardson turned my brigade, followed by 
Meagher’s, to the upper one. The water was now deeper 


— 26 — 


The Battle of Fair Oaks 

on the flats and the mud was well stirred up from the 
bottom. 

Kirby’s battery of six light twelve-pounder smooth¬ 
bore brass guns, following Sedgwick’s leading brigade, had 
found the road a veritable quagmire. By unlimbering at 
times and using the prolonges, the cannoneers being up to 
their waists in water, at 4:45 p.m. three pieces with one 
caisson were landed on harder ground and put in place for 
action. A little later came two or more, and the sixth gun 
was at last dragged out by an abundance of men. Our 
other batteries were too late for the action. 

Couch had sent to Sumner for help, and of his emo¬ 
tion, as he saw our troops approaching, he has made this 
record: “I felt that God was with us and victory ours!” 

We found this command, four regiments and a bat¬ 
tery, astride a country road leaving from Fair Oaks Sta¬ 
tion via Mr. Courtney’s and Dr. Kent’s houses to the 
meadow r near our bridges, and holding on persistently 
against the fire of flankers of Smith’s Confederate col¬ 
umn. Of Sedgwick’s leading brigade under General Gor¬ 
man, Sully’s regiment, the First Minnesota, went to the 
right to secure that flank and the other three to the left 
of Couch’s line. Kirby’s guns, as fast as they arrived, 
and two guns under Lieutenant Fagan, of a Pennsylvania 
battery on the ground, went into action at once, facing 
toward Fair Oaks, i. e., in front of the left of Couch’s 
line with their own right at the corner of a grove; be¬ 
hind this grove Couch’s infantry line extended. Sedg¬ 
wick’s second brigade, W. W. Burps in command, was 
formed in reserve and the two regiments present of the 
third brigade, General Dana commanding, extended the 
front farther to the left from the flank of Gorman. 

Soon the firing was tremendous. This was the inter¬ 
ruption—the check to the advance of the Confederate left 
—which came to them so suddenly. Then there was a 
brief pause, when General Whiting with his own, Petti¬ 
grew’s, and Hampton’s brigades faced to the left and at¬ 
tacked our troops in line of battle from the nine-mile road. 


— 27 — 


Autobiography of Gen. 0. 0. Howard 

They advanced straight toward Sumner, firing as they came 
and shouting. 

Our infantry returned the fire in volleys, while the 
artillery discharges were continued with extraordinary 
rapidity and accuracy. This fearful fire stopped that 
first Confederate advance. 

Failing in the attempt directly upon the battery, the 
Confederates tried to reach it through the woods on its 
right. J3ut limbers brought up ammunition from the 
caissons buried in the mud of the swamp and returned 
for more. Each discharge buried the guns, thrails and 
all, to the axles in the soft soil. Yet, by the help of in¬ 
fantry men standing in rear, the pieces on the left of bat¬ 
tery were carried forward and the front changed to the 
right to meet the Confederates’ flank move as they emerged 
from the woods, and bring upon their front a tremendous 
fire of canister. 

At the same time the infantry on the left of the battery, 
under Sumner’s personal direction, was advanced, and 
charged the right of the Confederates as they came on. Two 
guns only could be soon enough extricated from the mud 
to follow up the enemy’s retreat. 

At the same time a fourth Confederate brigade, Hat¬ 
ton’s, was put in, and in the woods advanced to within a 
few yards of the Union line, but made no impression. 

Thus, all Smith’s wing of the Confederate army that 
night within reach as reenforcements for Longstreet, ex¬ 
cept Hood’s brigade, was diverted, and in this engagement 
of an hour and a half lost 1,283 men, including the brigade 
commanders, Hampton and Pettigrew, seriously wounded; 
the latter was left unconscious on the field and captured, 
and General Hatton killed. 

About sunset General Johnston himself was struck 
from his horse, severely wounded by a fragment of a shell, 
and carried from the field. The command of the entire 
Confederate army then devolved on General G. W. Smith; 
the defeat of his troops by Sumner did not soften the re¬ 
sponsibility of the morrow. 


— 28 — 


The Battle of Fair Oaks 


Our change from the lower to the upper bridge and 
the difficulties of the march brought my brigade to the 
battlefield nearly two hours after Sumner’s and Sedgwick’s 
timely arrival. 

As we approached the front a thick mist was setting 
in and a dark, cloudy sky was over our heads, so that it was 
not easy at twenty yards to distinguish a man from a 
horse. The heavy firing was over. As soon as Sedg¬ 
wick’s advance had pushed the enemy back beyond Fair 
Oaks Station, Lieutenant Nelson A. Miles, whom I had 
sent on ahead, returned from the battle, meeting me near 
the edge of a swampy opening over which the Confederates 
had charged and been swept back by the counter-charge. 

Miles, guiding us, remarked: “General, you had bet¬ 
ter dismount and lead your horses, for the dead and wounded 
are here.” 

A peculiar feeling crept over me as I put my feet on 
the soft ground and folldwed the young officer. Some 
stretchers were in motion. A few friends were searching 
for faces they hoped not to find. There were cries of 
delirium, calls of the helpless, the silence of the slain, 
and the hum of distant voices in the advancing brigade, 
with an intermittent rattle of musketry, the neighing of 
horses, and the shriller prolonged calls of the team mules, 
and soon the moving of lanterns guiding the bearers of the 
wounded to the busy surgeons: all these things made a 
weird impression and a desire to be freed from following 
in the wake of the ravages of war. 

I remember that the call of one poor fellow was in¬ 
sistent. He repeatedly cried: “Oh, sir! Kind sir! Come 
to me!” I walked over to where he lay and asked: “What 
regiment do you belong to ?” 

He answered: “The Fifth Mississippi.” 

I then said: “What do you want?” 

He replied: “Oh, I am cold!” 

I knew it was from the approach of death, but no¬ 
ticing that he had a blanket over him I said: “You have 
a good warm blanket over you.” 


— 29 — 


Autobiography of Gen. 0. 0. Howard 

He looked toward it and said gently: “Yes, some kind 
gentleman from Massachusetts spread his blanket over me, 
but, sir, I’m still cold.” 

A Massachusetts soldier had given his only blanket 
to a wounded man—a wounded enemy. 

We silently passed on to our allotted lines. I pon¬ 
dered over my instructions, prepared orders for others, 
and then, with mingled hope and apprehension and con¬ 
scious trust in God, lay down to dream of home. Only 
one of my regiments (the Fifth New Hampshire) was 
called to the front that evening. The Confederate and 
Union men were so mixed up by the conflict at dark that 
they often during the night unwittingly walked into the 
wrong camp. It had been a costly day to us, but the left 
wing of our army was not destroyed, and the Confeder¬ 
ate casualties were as many as ours. We waited for the 
morrow to renew the strife, believing that we had come 
to a decisive battle, maybe the last great struggle of the war. 

The sudden check by Sumner and the desperate wounds 
of Johnston had produced an astounding effect upon the 
Confederates. At 4 p.m. they were confident, jubilant; 
at dark they had lost their head and confusion reigned. 

General Smith, regarding the morrow, directed Gen¬ 
eral Longstreet to push his successes of the previous day 
as far as practicable,, pivoting his movement upon the 
position of General Whiting on his left. Whiting was to 
make a diversion, and in extreme case to hold at all hazards 
the junction of the New Bridge and nine-mile road. 

That point was so far back that Smith's orders prac¬ 
tically meant that Longstreet alone was to finish the battle. 
Longstreet, though reenforced, had a hard task, especially 
under his pivotal orders. He did not and could not do 
else but hold on a while and finally withdraw. 

On the morning of June 1st matters had shaped them¬ 
selves fairly well for us. From right to left in a bend, 
concave toward Smith and Longstreet, were the divisions 
of Sedgwick, Richardson, Kearny, and Hooker. Sumner’s 
troops were at the extreme right, parallel to the nine-mile 


— 30 — 


The Battle of Fair Oaks 


road. The Union line then ran along the railway, and 
finally crossing the railway and turnpike it continued on 
by the strong works near Savage Station to White Oak 
Swamp. 

Of our division, on Sedgwick’s left, French’s brigade 
of four regiments was the front line, my Fifth New Hamp¬ 
shire still covering the whole front as a picket guard. 
The remainder of my brigade (the Sixty-fourth New York, 
Colonel Parker; Sixty-first New Work, Colonel Barlow; 
and the Eighty-first Pennsylvania, Colonel Miller) formed 
a second line a few hundred yards back. 

General Meagher’s brigade of three regiments made 
a third line, and Hazzard’s, Frank’s and Petit’s batteries, 
belonging to the division, were located on convenient knolls 
near the front. Thus at dawn we stood ready for work. 

As soon as it was light the Fifth New Hampshire, 
under Colonel Cross, advanced slowly till it had seized 
the woods beyond the railroad near Fair Oaks Station. 
Hazzard quickly found a favorable place for the batteries, 
whence by a cross fire he commanded all the open spaces, 
over which the enemy would have to approach us. The 
guns and battery men were shielded by epaulements hur¬ 
riedly thrown up. 

The first noisy collision of this Sunday morning was 
about five o’clock; it became a smart reveille to all; first, 
a brisk skirmish, a few bullets whizzing through the tree 
tops. Colonel Cross had every man ready. The artil¬ 
lery officers with good field glasses were watching. There 
was always a strange thrill of interest at such a time. 
The movement was, however, only a Confederate recon- 
noissance. The reconnoiterers were hunting for the Fair 
Oaks Railroad Station, which, unknown to them, had 
changed occupants. For a brief period their cavalry and 
infantry showed in the openings along our front, but every¬ 
where found themselves met by Cross’s skirmishers, whose 
steady firing, supported by the rapid cross fire of our bat¬ 
teries, drove them beyond range. 


— 31 — 


Autobiography of Gen. 0. 0. Howard 

This event increased our caution. Too long an in¬ 
terval between French and Birney, of Kearny's division, 
was reported—only pickets connecting. French then gained 
ground to the left, thinning his ranks and taking greater 
distance from Sedgwick. Still he could not reach far 
enough, so by Richardson's order I sent Colonel Miller 
with the Eighty-first Pennsylvania. Miller promptly de¬ 
ployed his men and moved forward till abreast of Colonel 
Brooke, who commanded French’s left regiment. The 
reason for not connecting with Birney's brigade, now un¬ 
der command of Colonel Ward, was that it was much far¬ 
ther back from the enemy than French expected to find 
it, and the underbrush was too thick to see very far. 

Sumner was now the senior officer south of the Chick- 
ahominy, but in command of his own corps only, and Heint- 
zelman commanded his part of the line. The commander 
of the whole battle was McClellan at his headquarters 
several miles away. The day's work resulted in spasmodic 
activities at several points of our front, and no * general 
aggressive movement even after the Confederate partial 
attacks had been repulsed. 

The Fifth New Hampshire was relieved from the 
skirmish line and placed in reserve. There were but a 
few minutes to wait. Upon French's left front there 
came a Confederate attack with two deployed brigade 
fronts, Armstead's and Pickett’s. They moved at a quick 
walk and, owing to prevalence of the woodland, drew 
wonderfully near before they were discovered. Along the 
whole of our front line they opened a heavy rolling fire 
of musketry within fifty yards. French’s men instantly 
returned the fire, and the contest for over an hour was 
as severe as any in the war. 

At this time Miller, of my brigade, who, as we have 
seen, was to the left of French, saw through the trees the 
coming troops. He gave the word “Ready!” when some 
officer near him said: “No, no, colonel, they are our men!” 
Probably thinking them detached from Ward, Miller in 
his strong voice commanded: “Recover arms!” and called 


— 32 — 


The Battle of Fair Oaks 


out: “Who are you?” They cried: “Virginians!” and in¬ 
stantly fired a volley which killed Colonel Miller and so many 
of his men that the regiment lost its continuity. A captain, 
Robert M. Lee, Jr., sprang upon a stump near at hand and 
rallied six companies. At once I sent Lieutenant N. A. 
Miles to look up the other four. He soon found them and 
brought them together at the railroad where there was an 
open space, and then led them again into action. 

It was at this period of the Conflict that Richardson 
sent me to fill the interval made worse by the loss of Miller. 
I brought the two regiments into line at the railroad—the 
Sixty-first on the right and the Sixty-fourth to its left. 

Just as we were ready to advance the enemy’s fire began 
to meet us, cutting through the trees. My brown horse 
was wounded through the shoulder, and I had to dismount 
and wait for another. Turning toward the men, I saw that 
some had been hit and others were leaving their ranks. 
This was their first experience under fire. I cried out 
with all my might: “Lie down!” Every man dropped to 
the ground; then my staff and field officers aided me in 
sheltering the men by forming line behind the railroad em¬ 
bankment, but we could not fire yet without the danger 
of pouring shot into French’s line. 

In five minutes I had mounted my large gray horse, 
my brother riding my third and only other one, a beauti¬ 
ful “zebra.” In order to encourage the men in a forward 
movement I placed myself, mounted, in front of the Sixty- 
fourth New York, and my aid, Lieutenant Charles H. 
Howard, in front of the Sixty-first. Every officer was 
directed to repeat each command. I ordered: “For¬ 

ward !” and then “March!” I could hear the echo of these 
words and, as I started, the Sixty-fourth followed me with 
a glad shout up the slope and through the woods; the Sixty- 
first followed my brother at the same time. We moved 
forward finely, taking many prisoners as we went and 
gaining ground leftward, until we came abreast of French’s 
division. 


— 33 — 


Autobiography of Gen. 0. 0. Howard 

Before reaching French’s line I was wounded through 
the right forearm by a small Mississippi rifle ball. Lieu¬ 
tenant Howard just then ran to me on foot and said that 
the zebra horse was killed. He took a handkerchief, bound 
up my arm, and then ran back to the Sixty-first. 

As the impulse was favorable to charge I decided 
to go on farther, and, asking Brooke’s regiment on French’s 
left to lie down, called again: “Forward!” And on we went, 
pushing back the enemy and breaking through his nearest 
line. We pressed our way over uneven ground to the 
neighborhood of the crossroads at Seven Pines, where our 
men the day before had left their tents standing. Behind 
those tents was found a stronger force of Confederates, 
kneeling and firing. We approached within thirty or forty 
yards and, halting on as favorable ground as possible, 
promptly and efficiently returned their fire. 

When at last we halted near the standing tents and 
I had passed to the rear of the line which was rapidly firing, 
my gray had his left foreleg broken and though I was not 
then aware of it, I had been wounded again, my right elbow 
having been shattered by a rifle shot. Lieutenant Howard 
was missing. 

Lieutenant William McIntyre, of the Sixty-fourth, see¬ 
ing the condition of my horse, seized me, and put me in a 
sheltered place on the ground. I heard him say: “General, 
you shall not be killed:” McIntyre himself was slain near 
that spot, giving his life for mine. The bullets were just 
then raining upon our men, who without flinching were 
firing back. As a faintness warned me, I called to Colonel 
Barlow, who was not far away, to take command. He 
answered me in a cool, clear voice: “Shall I take command 
of the whole brigade, sir?” I replied: “No, only of this 
portion.” It would have broken Cross’s heart to have for¬ 
gotten even at such a time his seniority, and the colonel 
of the Sixty-fourth was also Barlow’s senior, but he had 
failed in the necessary physical strength that day. 

Barlow took command and stood his ground until 
Brooke, to whom I spoke on my way to the rear, brought 


— 34 — 


The Battle of Fair Oaks 


up his line. After a little further conflict in that vicinity 
the Confederates gave way and along our division front 
the victory was complete. 

Meanwhile, to the eastward the enemy passing through 
the thickets beyond my left flank crossed the railroad, 
encountering only such slight opposition as the remnants 
of the Eighty-first Pennsylvania under Lee and Miles could 
administer, caught sight of the right of Ward’s brigade 
and opened upon them a brisk fusilade. Ward threw back 
the right of my old regiment, the Third Maine, and moved 
his other regiments so as to come forward in echelon. He 
began by firing volleys, then inclining more to the right 
charged furiously. This was done at the same time Lieu¬ 
tenant Howard and I were leading our two regiments into 
the melee. Ward’s vigorous onset cleared that important 
quarter of the pressing army. 

To the left of Ward came Hooker, his front making 
a right angle with the railroad. He was ready for his 
part. His advance on account of thickets and swamps 
was slow but positive. 

Thus our division and portions of two others were 
brought into the Sunday battle. Finally, from the right 
of Richardson to the left of Hooker had been made a gen¬ 
eral advance, and the whole obscure and dreadful field 
of both days compassed by our men. Why was not that 
Confederate retreat followed up and the fruits of victory 
secured? After weighing up with care the many reasons 
which our commanding general has left recorded for not 
at this time pushing forward his whole strength, I still 
think that his headquarters were too far away, and that 
just then and there he lost a great opportunity. 

General French’s medical director, Surgeon Gabriel 
Grant, close up to the troops, was operating under fire 1 
beside a large stump. He there bound up my arm. I found 
my brother shot through the thigh, just able to limp along 
by using his empty scabbard for a cane. He had a fox skin 

lFor this, Dr. Grant received the Congress Medal of Honor. 


— 35 — 



Autobiography of Gen. 0. 0. Howard 

robe, which had been on his saddle, thrown across his free 
arm. 

“Why weary yourself, Charlie, with that robe?” I 
asked. 

“To cover me up if I should have to stop,” he smilingly 
answered. 

Dr. Grant dressed his leg and provided him with a 
stretcher. I prefered to walk. En route I encountered 
a soldier among the wounded with his fingers broken and 
bleeding. He cried out with pain. Seeing me he drew 
near with sympathy. “You are worse off than I,” he said, 
and putting his arm around me he let me share his strength. 
We wounded wanderers at last found Courtney’s house, 
a half mile or more north of the Fair Oaks Station. 

Dr. Hammond, my personal friend, met me near the 
house, saw the blood, touched my arm, and said with feeling: 
“General, your arm is broken.” The last ball had passed 
through the elbow joint and crushed the bones into small 
fragments. He led me to a negro hut, large enough only 
for a double bed. Here I lay down, alarming an aged negro 
couple who feared at first that some of us might discover 
and seize hidden treasure which was in that bed. 

My brigade surgeon, Dr. Palmer, and several others 
soon stood by my bedside in consultation. At last Dr. 
Palmer, with serious face, kindly told me that my arm 
had better come off. “All right, go ahead,” I said. 
“Happy to lose only my arm.” 

“Not before 5 p.m., general.” 

“Why not?” 

“Reaction must set in.” 

So I had to wait six hours. I had received the sec¬ 
ond wound about half-past ten. I had reached the Court¬ 
ney house about eleven, and in some weakness and dis¬ 
comfort occupied the negro cabin till the hour appointed. 
At that time Dr. Palmer came with four stout soldiers 
and a significant stretcher. They placed me thereon, 
and the doctor put around the arm close to the shoulder 
the torniquet, screwing it tighter and tighter above the 


— 36 — 


The Battle of Fair Oaks 

wound. They then bore me to the amputating room, a 
place a little grewsome withal from arms, legs, and hands 
not yet all carried off, and poor fellows with axious eyes 
waiting their turn. 

On the long table I was nicely bolstered; Dr. Grant, 
who had come from the front, relieved the too-tight tourn¬ 
iquet. A mixture of chloroform and gas was administered 
and I slept quietly. Dr. Palmer amputated the arm above 
the elbow. When I awoke I was surprised to find the heavy 
burden was gone, but was content and thankful. 


— 37 — 














MCCLELLAN’S OWN STORY 


THE WAR FOR THE UNION 


THE SOLDIERS WHO FOUGHT IT 


THE CIVILIANS WHO DIRECTED IT 

AND 

HIS RELATIONS TO IT AND TO THEM 


BY 

George B. McClellan 

LATE MAJOR-GENERAL COMMANDING THE ARMIES 


New York 

CHARLES L, WEBSTER & COMPANY 
1887 
































































































































































w 
























i a 

* 



CHAPTER XV 


The Peninsular campaign—Landing at Fortress Monroe—That place 
removed from his command—Secretary Stanton stops all recruiting 
—Advance on Richmond—Columns under fire—First corps with¬ 
drawn from the army. 

In the course of description of the operations prelimi¬ 
nary to the siege of Yorktown, attention is necessarily 
directed to the erroneous maps in our possession, and on 
which certain orders were based. This was but a single 
instance among many. In fact, it may be broadly stated 
that we had no military maps of any value. This was one 
of our greatest difficulties, and always seriously interfered 
with our movements in the early part of the war. When 
in presence of the enemy it was necessary to reconnoitre 
under fire, the accidents of the ground being entirely un¬ 
known to us. 

It was a peculiar feature of our staff departments be¬ 
fore the war that no measures were taken to collect topo¬ 
graphical information about our own or any neighboring 
country. I do not know to what extent this has now been 
rectified, but there certainly should be some bureau charged 
with the collection and arrangement of topographical and 
statistical information in regard to our own and adjacent 
countries. It is true that the Confederates were no better 
off for correct maps than ourselves, but they possessed the 
inestimable advantage of operating on their own ground, 
which they knew perfectly well; they had plenty of good 
guides; and as they usually conducted a defensive campaign, 
they had plenty of time to construct maps and acquaint 
themselves thoroughly with the ground in the interests of 
active operations. Moreover, the white people, at least, 
were usually in their favor and acted as scouts, guides, and 
spies. Even when the negroes were favorable to us they 
seldom possessed the intelligence required to give any value 
to their information. They rarely knew more of the coun¬ 
try than the plantations on which they had passed their 
lives, could give no accurate or intelligible description of 
roads or accidents of the ground, and their estimates of 


— 41 — 


McClellan's Own Story 


numbers were almost always ridiculously inaccurate. If a 
negro were asked how many Confederates he had seen at 
a certain point his answer was very likely to be: “I dunno, 
massa, but I guess about a million.” 

I went on board the steamer Commodore on the after¬ 
noon of the 1st of April, off Alexandria, and remained at 
anchor until an early hour next morning, being engaged all 
night in giving the necessary orders for the conduct of af¬ 
fairs in front of Washington, the movements of troops, sup¬ 
plies, etc. 

I reached Fort Monroe on the afternoon of the 2d, still 
under the delusion that I should have an active army of 
146,000 and the full control of my base of operations, and 
that I should receive efficient support from the navy. 

According to the best information in our possession in 
regard to the Peninsula, our main road extended from For¬ 
tress Monroe, through Hampton and Big Bethel, to York- 
town; while another existed from Newport News, nearly 
parallel with the James river, and passing through Warwick 
Court-House to the Halfway House, where it met the main 
road from Yorktown to Williamsburg. Both of these roads 
between Yorktown and the point of the Peninsula were in¬ 
tersected by many streams, and we had information to the 
effect that many of these crossings—as, for example, Big 
Bethel, Young’s Mill, Howard’s bridge, Cockletown, etc.— 
were strongly entrenched and would be obstinately defended. 

Our information seemed also to be clear that the War¬ 
wick river ran alongside of the Newport News road, which 
crossed only an insignificant branch, and that it presented 
no obstacle to a march on the Halfway House in rear of 
Yorktown. 

After the Fort Monroe movement was decided upon 
my first intention was to inaugurate the operation by des¬ 
patching the 1st corps in mass to the Sand-Box, three or 
four miles south of Yorktown, in order to turn all the en¬ 
trenched crossings referred to, and receive a base of supplies 
as near as possible to Yorktown; or else, should the condi¬ 
tion of affairs at the moment render it desirable, to land it 
on the Gloucester side of the York river at the mouth of 


— 42 — 


Map of the Peninsula 



— 43 — 







































McClellan’s Own Story 


the Severn, and throw it upon West Point. But transports 
arrived so slowly, and the pressure of the administration for 
a movement was so strong and unreasonable, that I felt 
obliged to embark the troops by divisions as fast as trans¬ 
ports arrived, and then determined to hold the 1st corps 
to the last, and land it as a unit whenever the state of 
affairs promised the best results. A few hours after I had 
determined to act upon this determination McDowell tele¬ 
graphed me from Washington, suggesting that the troops 
should be embarked by divisions, according to convenience, 
instead of awaiting the arrival of sufficient transports to 
move his whole corps. Soon after this I was more than 
once informed that Gen. McDowell and others in Washing¬ 
ton had instanced this decision to embark the troops by 
divisions as a proof that I had disobeyed the President’s 
order as to the formation of army corps, and that I intended 
to throw obstacles in the way of its fulfilment. 

Considerable delay occurred in the arrival of the sailing 
transports for horses, in consequence of an order being 
given, without my knowledge, for the steamers to come to 
Alexandria without them. 

The first division which had embarked was Hamilton’s, 
formerly Heintzelman’s, of the 3d corps, which sailed on the 
17th of March; it was followed by Gen. F. J. Porter’s divi¬ 
sion of the same corps on the 22d of March. Gen. Heintzel- 
man accompanied Porter’s division, and was instructed to 
get his corps in condition for an advance without delay. He 
was also ordered to encamp his two divisions some three or 
four miles out from Fort Monroe, in good defensive position, 
and to push out strong reconnoissances to ascertain the 
position and the strength of the enemy, without going so far 
as to destroy the impression that our movements might be 
intended against Norfolk. 

Qn the 27th he sent Porter towards Big Bethel and 
Howard’s bridge, and Smith towards Young’s Mill, on the 
James river road. 

Porter occupied Big Bethel and pushed one brigade four 
miles further, sending skirmishers on to Howard’s bridge, 
where they saw entrenchments occupied. Deserters re- 


— 44 — 


Advance Toward Richmond 

ported Magruder at the place with 800 men. Smith went as 
far as Watt's Creek, where he found no entrenchments, and 
gained information that the enemy held Young’s Mill in 
strong force. Both divisions returned to their camps after 
completing the reconnoissance. Heintzelman reported that, 
from the best information, Magruder had from 15,000 to 
20,000 men, and gave not the slightest indication that he 
thought he could take or invest Yorktown. On the 3d of 
April there were of my command in the vicinity of Fort 
Monroe the 3d Penn. Cavalry, the 2d, 5th, and a part of the 
1st U. S. Cavalry, a part of the reserve artillery, two divi¬ 
sions each of the 3d and 4th corps ready to move, one divi¬ 
sion of the 2d corps, Sykes’s brigade of U. S. Infantry. 
Casey’s division of the 4th corps was at Newport News, but 
totally unprovided with transportation. Richardson’s divi¬ 
sion of the 2d corps and Hooker’s of the 3d had not yet 
arrived. The troops ready to advance numbered about 
53,000 men and 100 guns—less than 45,000 effectives. The 
amount of wagon transportation arrived was altogether in¬ 
sufficient for a long movement, and it became necessary to 
advance in order to establish new depots on the shore more 
to the front. It was evident that to await any considerable 
accession of force and transportation would involve a delay 
of many days; I therefore determined to advance on the 4th 
of April. 

The following telegram of April 3 to Mr. Stanton re¬ 
quires no explanation: 

I expect to move from here to-morrow morning on Yorktown, 
where a force of some 15,000 of the rebels are in an entrenched posi¬ 
tion, and I think it quite probable they will attempt to resist us. No 
appearance of the Merrimac as yet. Commodore Goldsborough is 
quite confident he can sink her when she comes out. 

Before I left Washington an order had been issued by 
the War Department placing Fort Monroe and its depen¬ 
dencies under my control, and authorizing me to draw from 
the troops under Gen. Wool a division of about 10,000 men, 
which was to be assigned to the 1st corps. 

During the night of the 3d I received a telegram from 
the adjutant-general of the army stating that, by the Presi- 


— 45 — 


McClellan's Own Story 


dent’s order, I was deprived of all control over Gen. Wool 
and the troops under his command, and forbidden to detach 
any of his troops without his sanction. 

This order left me without any base of operations under 
my own control. 

On my arrival at Fortress Monroe I was informed that 
the enemy had been very active for some days past in 
crossing troops over the James river on the line of communi¬ 
cation between Yorktown and Norfolk. Reports were con¬ 
flicting as to the direction of this movement, but in any 
event it seemed proper under the circumstances to move on 
Yorktown as promptly as possible with the troops in hand, 
in order to invest the place before further reinforcements 
and supplies could reach it. 

On the same day, on the very eve of the advance of the 
Army of the Potomac into the enemy’s country, with the 
certainty of heavy losses by battle and disease, was issued 
the order putting a complete stop to the recruiting service 
for the volunteers and breaking up all the recruiting sta¬ 
tions : 

General Order No. 33. 

“Adjutant-General’s Office, U. S.A., 
“Washington, April 3, 1862. 

“III. The recruiting service for volunteers will be discontinued 
in every State from this date. The officers detached on the Volun¬ 
teer Recruiting Service will join their regiments without delay, tak¬ 
ing with them the parties and recruits at their respective stations. 

“The superintendents of the Volunteer Recruiting Service will 
disband their parties and close their offices, after having taken the 
necessary steps to carry out these orders. The public property belong¬ 
ing to the Volunteer Recruiting Service will be sold to the best advan¬ 
tage possible, and the proceeds credited to the fund for collecting, 
drilling, and organizing volunteers. 

“By order of the Secretary of War. 

“L. Thomas, 

“Adj.-Gen. U.S.A.” 

Common sense and the experience of all wars prove 
that when an army takes the field every possible effort should 
be made at home to collect recruits and establish depots, 
whence the inevitable daily losses may be made good with 
instructed men as fast as they occur, so that the fighting 
force may be kept up to their normal strength. Failure to 


— 46 — 


Recruiting Stopped 

do this proves either a desire for the failure of the campaign 
or entire incompetence. Between the horns of this dilemma 
the friends of Mr. Stanton must take their choice. 

During the preceding autumn I advocated a system of 
drafting, but was not listened to. Had it been adopted at 
that time, when recruiting was rapid and easy, it could have 
been established and well regulated without difficulty and 
without any shock to the country. The system as finally 
adopted was as bad as bad could be, and cannot be defended. 
It was unnecessary to disturb all the relations of society and 
the business interests of the country, and the numbers called 
out were absurdly large. 

The numbers of troops on foot in April, 1862, in the 
various parts of the country, were ample for the suppres¬ 
sion of the rebellion, if they had been properly handled and 
their numbers made good by a constant stream of recruits 
poured into the old regiments, so as to keep them always at 
their full strength. Instead of this, spasmodic calls for 
large numbers of men were made, and the general rule was 
to organize them into new regiments, often allowing the 
invaluable old regiments to die out. This system was in¬ 
finitely more expensive, but gave the opportunity to promote 
personal or political favorites. The new regiments required 
a long time to make them serviceable, while the same men 
placed in the old regiments, under experienced officers and 
surrounded by veterans would in a few days become efficient 
soldiers. Another grave defect of this system was the de¬ 
structive effects on the esprit de corps of the old officers 
and men—an invaluable adjunct in war. 

Out of these wholesale drafts grew the system of sub¬ 
stitutes and bounties, which cost so many unnecessary mil¬ 
lions to the country, and so seriously affected the quality 
of the troops in the latter years of the war. 

Never in the whole history of nations was anything 
more absurdly and recklessly managed than the whole sys¬ 
tem of recruiting, drafting, and organization under the re¬ 
gime of Secretary Stanton. When his actions are coolly 
criticised, apart from the influence of party feeling, his ad¬ 
ministration will be regarded as unparallel in history for 


— 47 — 


McClellan’s Own Story 


blunders and ignorant self-assertion. He unnecessarily pro¬ 
longed the war at least two years, and at least tripled its 
cost in blood and treasure. 

The movement was made by the two roads already 
mentioned: the two divisions of the 4th corps from Newport 
News via Warwick Court-House; the two divisions of the 
3d, supported by Sedgwick’s division of the 2d corps, Sykes’s 
brigade, and the reserve artillery, by the road from Hampton 
and Big Bethel to Yorktown. The advance on Big Bethel 
would turn the works at Young’s Mill and open the way for 
the 4th corps; while, in turn, the advance of the latter corps 
on Warwick Court-House would turn the works at Howard’s 
bridge and Ship Point, and open the road of the right column 
to the immediate vicinity of Yorktown. 

Smith’s division (4th corps) encamped on the 4th of 
April at Young’s Mill, with one brigade in advance on the 
road from Big Bethel to Warwick; Couch’s division on 
Fisher’s creek. 

Porter, on the same day, occupied Cockletown with Mor¬ 
rell’s division and a battery, his pickets a mile in advance 
near Pavis’s house; the other brigades of the division less 
than two miles in rear of Morrell. Averill’s cavalry found 
the Ship Point batteries abandoned. They were strong and 
well constructed, with deep wet ditches; they had platforms 
and magazine for siege-guns, all the guns withdrawn; there 
were excellent quarters for three regiments of ten companies 
each. Hamilton’s division encamped about two miles in 
rear of Howard’s creek. The reserve cavalry, artillery, and 
infantry bivouacked with headquarters at Big Bethel. Gen. 
Heintzelman learned during the evening that there were no 
batteries between Porter and Yorktown; that Yorktown was 
strongly fortified; that its garrison until recently consisted 
of 10,000 men, but was then increased to 20,000 or 25,000; 
that there were more troops at Williamsburg, and batteries 
about two miles south of it, and that reinforcements were 
said to have come from Richmond. Gen. Heintzelman con¬ 
cluded that the enemy had no idea of abandoning Yorktown. 
During the same afternoon Gen. Keyes, commanding the left 
column, received information that from 5,000 to 8,000 of the 


Advance Movements 


enemy were strongly entrenched at Lee's Mill. Still ignor¬ 
ant of the true course of the Warwick and its relations to 
the entrenchments at Lee’s Mill, and alive to the necessity of 
preventing further reinforcements to the garrison at York- 
town, I, on the evening of the 4th, ordered the movements 
for the 5th as follows: 

Smith’s division to move at six a.m. via Warwick Court- 
House to the Halfway House on the Yorktown and Williams¬ 
burg road; Couch’s division to move at the same hour and 
close up on Smith at the Halfway House; any positions of 
the enemy met with on the way to be carried by assault 
without delay; on reaching the Halfway House the corps to 
occupy the narrow dividing ridge at that point, so as to 
prevent the escape or reinforcement of the garrison of York¬ 
town. 

Porter’s division to close up on its advanced guard at 
six A.M., and move forward to an intersection of roads about 
two and three-quarters miles from Yorktown, there to halt 
and send out reconnoitering parties, to cover the reconnois- 
sances of the engineer officers, etc. 

Hamilton’s division to move at the same hour and close 
up on Porter. Sedgwick, temporarily attached to headquar¬ 
ters, to move with the reserves to Dr. Pavis’s house, where 
the road to Lee’s Mill diverged, and there await orders. 

If Heintzelman found it possible to assault the works 
at Yorktown immediately, the reserves were in a position 
to support him; if he found an assault impracticable, and 
Keyes needed assistance in carrying out his orders, the re¬ 
serves were in position to move at once to his support. If 
Keyes had succeeded in passing Lee’s Mill and reaching the 
Halfway House, I should at once have gone to his support 
with all the reserves and one of Heintzelman’s divisions, 
thus holding the key-point of the operation with four divi¬ 
sions of infantry, the brigade of regulars, the cavalry and 
artillery reserves. 

In consequence of the heavy rains the roads were very 
bad and the troops moved with difficulty, so that little of 
Keyes’s artillery and none of the ammunition, forage, and 
provision trains could be brought up. Heintzelman early in 


— 49 — 


McClellan's Own Story 


the day came under the artillery-fire of the works of York- 
town, and soon saw that an assault was impracticable. 
Keyes also found himself brought to a halt by the artillery- 
fire of the Lee’s Mill works, and discovered that they were 
covered by the Warwick river, rendering any attempt at 
assault utterly out of the question. 

It was at this moment, with the leading division of each 
column under a hot artillery-fire, and the skirmishers of the 
3d corps engaged, being myself with Porter’s division, that 
I received the telegram informing me of the withdrawal of 
the 1st corps (McDowell’s) from my command: 

“Adjutant-General's Office, 
“April 4, 1862. 

“Gen. McClellan: 

“By direction of the President Gen. McDowell's army corps has 
been detached from the force under your immediate command, and 
the general is ordered to report to the Secretary of War; letter by 
mail. 

“L. Thomas, 

“Adj.-Gen.” 


— 50 — 


CHAPTER XVI 


Effects of reduction of the army—Overthrow of the campaign—New 
campaign with reduced army—Siege of Yorktown. 

Soon after receiving the telegram I sent the following 
to the Secretary of War, dated April 5: 

The enemy are in large force along our front, and apparently 
intend making a determined resistance. A reconnoissance just made 
by Gen. Barnard shows that their line of works extends across the 
entire Peninsula from Yorktown to Warwick river. Many of them 
are formidable. Deserters say that they are being reinforced daily 
from Richmond and from Norfolk. Under the circumstances I beg 
that you reconsider the order detaching the 1st corps from my com¬ 
mand. 

In my deliberate judgment the success of our cause will be im¬ 
periled by so greatly reducing my force when it is actually under 
the fire of the enemy and active operations have commenced. Two 
of my divisions have been under fire of artillery during most of the 
day. I am now of the opinion that I shall have to fight all the 
available force of the rebels not far from here. Do not force me 
to do so with diminished ranks; but whatever your decision may be, 

I will leave nothing undone to obtain success. 

If you cannot leave me the whole of the 1st corps, I urgently 
ask, as a military necessity, that I may not lose Franklin and his 
division. 

On the same day, at ten A.M., I sent the following to 
Secretary Stanton: 

Since Gen. Woodbury’s brigade of volunteer engineer troops was ' 
only temporarily attached to the 1st corps for special service, and is 
much needed here, I have directed Gen. Woodbury to bring it here 
at once. Their services are indispensable. 

The following letter was written during the evening of 
April 5: 

Headquarters, Army of Potomac. 

Camp near Yorktown, April 5, 1862. 

Brig.-Gen. L. Thomas, Adj.-Gen. U.S.A.: 

General: I have now a distinct knowledge of the general posi¬ 
tion of the enemy in my front. His left is in Yorktown; his line 
thence extends along and in rear of the Warwick river to its mouth. 
That stream is an obstacle of great magnitude. It is fordable at 
only one point (so far as I yet know) below its head, which is near 
Yorktown; is for several miles unfordable, and has generally a very 
marshy valley. His batteries and entrenchments render this line 
an exceedingly formidable one, entirely too much so (so far as I 
understand it) to be carried by a single assault. I shall employ to¬ 
morrow in reconnaissance, repairing roads, establishing a depot at 
Ship’s Point, and in bringing up supplies. 


— 51 — 


McClellan’s Own Story 


Porter, the head of the right column, has moved as close upon 
the town as the enemy’s guns will permit; he is encamped there, 
supported by Hamilton’s division. Porter has been under fire all 
the afternoon. But five men killed. His rifled field-guns and sharp¬ 
shooters have caused some loss to the enemy. Keyes, with two divi¬ 
sions, is in front of Lee’s Mill, where the road from Newport News 
to Williamsburg crosses Warwick river. He has been engaged in 
an artillery combat of. several hours’ duration losing some five killed. 
At Lee’s Mill we have a causeway covered by formidable batteries. 
The information obtained at Fort Monroe in regard to the topography 
of the country and the position and strength of the enemy has been 
unreliable. He is in strong force and very strong position. If the 
reconnoissances of tomorrow verify the observations of to-day, we 
shall be obliged to use much heavy artillery before we can force their 
lines and isolate the garrison of Yorktown. I omitted to state that 
I hold the reserves in a central position until I can learn more of 
the condition of affairs. The present aspect of affairs renders it 
exceedingly unfortunate that the 1st corps has been detached from 
my command. It is no longer in my power to make a movement 
from the Severn river upon Gloucester and West Point. I am re¬ 
duced to a front attack upon a very strong line. I still hope that 
the order detaching the 1st corps may be reconsidered. I do not feel 
that without it I have force sufficient to accomplish the objects- I have 
proposed in this campaign with that certainty, rapidity, and complete¬ 
ness which I had hoped to obtain. The departments will, I trust, 
realize that more caution will be needed on my part after having been 
so unexpectedly deprived of so very large a portion of my force when 
actually having my troops under fire. I have frankly stated what I 
now consider to be the strength of the enemy’s position; the reconnois¬ 
sances of to-morrow may modify my opinion. Whatever the facts 
may be, I shall make the best use I can of the force at my disposal, de¬ 
termined to gain my point as completely and as rapidly as may be. 

Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 

Geo. B. McClellan., 

Maj.-Gen. Commanding. 

P. S. All my movements up to this evening were predicated 
upon the expectation that no more troops would be detached from my 
command. I have involved my troops in actual conflict upon that 
supposition, and calculating upon the prompt arrival of the 1st corps 
as a part of the programme. It has just occurred to me to say that 
the maps of the Peninsula I sent to the President and secretary are 
perfectly unreliable; the roads are wrong, and the Warwick river 
crosses the Newport News and Williamsburg road some three miles 
above Warwick Court-House, which latter place is about one mile from 
the road. 

Geo. B, McClellan, 

Maj.-Gen. 

This, then, was the situation in which I found myself 
on the evening of April 5: Flag-Officer Goldsborough had in¬ 
formed me that it was not in his power to control the navi¬ 
gation of the James river so as to enable me to use it as a 
line of supply, or to cross it, or even to cover my left flank; 
nor could he, as he thought, furnish any vessels to attack 


— 52 — 


Effects of Reduction of Army 

the batteries of Yorktown and Gloucester, or to run by them 
in the dark and thus cut off the supplies of the enemy by 
water and control their land-communication. I was thus 
deprived of the co-operation of the navy and left to my own 
resources. 

I had been deprived of five infantry divisions, and out 
of the four left to me there were present at the front five 
divisions of volunteer regiments, the weak brigade of regu¬ 
lars, Hunt’s artillery reserve, and a small cavalry force. 

Owing to the lack of wagons Casey did not reach Young’s 
Mill until the 16th. Richardson’s division reached the front 
on the same day. Hooker’s division commenced arriving 
at Ship’s Point on the 10th. The roads were so bad and 
wagons so few that it was with the utmost difficulty supplies 
could be brought up, and the field-artillery moved with great 
difficulty. Even the headquarters wagons could not get up, 
and I slept in a deserted hut with my saddle blanket for a 
bed. 

My telegram of April 7 to the President shows that 
only 53,000 men had joined me, so that I had not more than 
44,000 effectives, and found myself in front of a position 
which apparently could not be carried by assault. The force 
was too small to attempt any movement to turn Gloucester 
without the assistance of the navy, and I was obliged to 
abandon the plan of rapid turning movements which I had 
intended to carry out. 

All that could be done was to halt where we were, and 
by close reconnoissance ascertain whether there were any 
weak points which we could assault, or, failing in that, de¬ 
termine what could be effected with the aid of siege-artillery 
to cover the attack. 

Next day, April 6, I sent the following telegram to his 
excellency the President: 

The order forming new departments, if rigidly enforced, deprives 
me of the power of ordering up wagons and troops absolutely neces¬ 
sary to enable me to advance to Richmond. I have by no means the 
transportation I must have to move my army even a few miles. I 
respectfully request that I may not be placed in this position, but 
that my orders for wagons, trains, and ammunition, and other ma¬ 
terial that I have prepared and necessarily left behind me, as well as 
Woodbury’s brigade, may at once be complied with. The enemy is 


— 53 — 


McClellan’s Own Story 


strong in my front, and I have a most serious task before me, in the 
fulfilment of which I need all the aid the government can give me. I 
again repeat the urgent request that Gen. Franklin and his division 
may be restored to my command. 

I received the following reply from Secretary Stanton: 

“The President directs me to say that your despatch to him has 
been received. Gen. Sumner’s corps is on the road to you and will 
go forward as fast as possible. Franklin’s division is now on the 
advance towards Manassas. There is no means of transportation 
here to send it forward in time to be of service in your present opera¬ 
tions. Telegraph frequently, and all in the power of the government 
shall be done to sustain you as occasion may require.” 

And this from the President: 

“Yours of eleven a.m. today received. Secretary of War informs 
me that the forwarding of transportation, ammunition, and Wood¬ 
bury’s brigade under yoilr order has not and will not be interfered 
with. You now have over one hundred thousand troops with you, 
independent of Gen. Wool’s command. I think you had better break 
the enemy’s line from Yorktown to Warwick river at once. This 
will probably use time as advantageously as you can. 

“A. Lincoln, 

“President.” 

To this I replied, April 7, to the President: 

Your telegram of yesterday received. In reply I have the honor 
to state that my entire force for duty only amounts to about eighty- 
five thousand (85,000) men. Gen. Wool’s command, as you will ob¬ 
serve from the accompanying order, has been taken out of my 
control, although he has most cheerfully co-operated with me. The 
only use that can be made of his command is to protect my communi¬ 
cations in rear of this point. At this time only fifty-three thousand 
(53,000) men have joined me, but they are coming up as rapidly as 
my means of transportation will permit. Please refer to my despatch 
to the Secretary of War of to-night for the details of our present 
situation. 


I find on the back of my retained copy of this despatch 
the following memorandum made at the time by myself: 


Return 

of March 31, 1862, shows men present for duty 

171,602 

Deduct 

1st corps, infantry and 

artillery, 

. 32,119 

H 

Blenker, 

8,616 


a 

Banks, . 

. 

. 21,739 


a 

Wadsworth, 

. 

19,318 


a 

Cavalry of 1st corps, etc., 

# # 

1,600 


a 

“ “ Blenker, . 


800 


a 

Van Alen and Wyndham, 

• * 

1,600 

85,792 

85,792 


Officers, about 3,900. 

Total absent from whole command, 23,790. 


85,810 


— 54 — 






Despatch to Washington 

As this memorandum was a calculation to ascertain 
only the number of troops left under my command, it did 
not take into consideration all the troops left behind which 
did not compose parts of the total of 171,602 for duty. My 
letters of April 1, show that many more were left in addi¬ 
tion to those mentioned in this memorandum. 

The telegram referred ta in my despatch to the Presi¬ 
dent was the following, of April 7, to Secretary Stanton: 

Your telegram of yesterday arrived here while I was absent 

examining the enemy’s right, which I did pretty closely. 

The whole line of the Warwick, which really heads within a mile of 
Yorktown, is strongly defended by detached redoubts and other fortifi¬ 
cations, armed with heavy and light guns. The approaches, except 
at Yorktown, are covered by the Warwick, over" which there is but 
one, or at most two, passages, both of which are covered by strong 
batteries. It will be necessary to resort to the use of heavy guns 
and some siege operations before we assault. All*the prisoners state 
that Gen. J. E. Johnston arrived at Yorktown yesterday with strong 
reinforcements. It seems probable that I shall have the whole force of 
the enemy on my hands—probably not less than (100,000) one hun¬ 
dred thousand men, and possibly more. In consequence of the loss 
of Blenker’s division and the 1st corps my force is possibly less than 
that of the enemy, while they have all the advantage of position. 

I am under great obligations to you for the offer that the whole 
force and material of the government will be as fully and as speedily 
under my command as heretofore, or as if the new departments had 
not been created. 

Since my arrangements were made for this campaign at least 
(50,000) fifty thousand men have been taken from my command. 
Since my despatch of the 5th instant five divisions have been in close 
observation of the enemy, and frequently exchanging shots. When 
my present command all joins I shall have about (85,000) eighty- 
five thousand men for duty, from which a large force must be taken 
for guards, scouts, etc. With this army I could assault the enemy’s 
works, and perhaps carry them. But were I in possession of their 
entrenchments, and assailed by double my numbers, I should have 
no fears as to the result. 

Under the circumstances that have been developed since we 
arrived here, I feel fully impressed with the conviction that here is 
to be fought the great battle that is to decide the existing contest. I 
shall, of course, commence the attack as soon as I can get up my 
siege-train, and shall do all in my power to carry the enemy’s works; 
but to do this with a reasonable degree of certainty requires, in my 
judgment, that I should, if possible, have at least the whole of the 
1st corps to land upon the Severn river and attack Gloucester in the 
rear. 

My present strength will not admit of a detachment sufficient for 
this purpose without materially impairing the efficiency of this column. 
Flag-Officer Goldsborough thinks the works too strong for his avail¬ 
able vessels unless I can turn Gloucester. I send by mail copies of 
his letter and one of the commander of the gunboats here. 


— 55 — 



McClellan's Own Story 


Gen. Keyes, commanding 4th army corps, after the ex¬ 
amination of the enemy’s defences on the left, addressed the 
following letter to the Hon. Ira Harris, U. S. Senate, and 
gave me a copy. It describes the situation at that time in 
some respects so well that I introduce it here: 

“Headquarters, 4th Corps, 
“Warwick. Court-House, Va., April 7, 1862. 

“My dear Senator: The plan of campaign on this line was 
made with the distinct understanding that four army corps should 
be employed, and that the navy should co-operate in the taking of 
Yorktown, and also (as I understood it) support us on our left by 
moving gunboats up James river. 

“To-day I have learned that the 1st corps, which by the Presi¬ 
dent’s order was to embrace four divisions, and one division (Blen- 
ker’s) of the 2d corps, have been withdrawn altogether from the Army 
of the Potomac. At the same time, as I am informed, the navy has 
not the means to jattack Yorktown, and is afraid to send gunboats 
up James river for fear of the Merrimac. 

“The above plan of campaign was adopted unanimously by Maj.- 
Gen. McDowell and Brig.-Gens. Sumner, Heintzelman, and Keyes, and 
was concurred in by Maj.-Gen. McClellan, who first proposed Urbana 
as our base. 

“This army being reduced by forty-five thousand troops, some 
of them among the best in the service, and without the support of 
the navy, the plan to which we are reduced bears scarcely any resem¬ 
blance to the one I voted for. 

“I command the James river column, and I left my camp near 
Newport News the morning of the 4th instant. I only succeeded 
in getting my artillery ashore the afternoon of the day before, and 
one of my divisions had not all arrived in camp the day I left, and 
for the want of transportation' has not yet joined me. So you will 
observe that not a day was lost in the advance, and in fact we marched 
so quickly and so rapidly that many of our animals were twenty-four 
and forty-eight hours without a ration of forage. But, notwith¬ 
standing the rapidity of our advance, we were stopped by a line of 
defence nine or ten miles long, strongly fortified by breastworks., 
erected nearly the whole distance behind a stream or succession of 
ponds, nowhere fordable, one terminus being Yorktown and the other 
ending in the James river, which is commanded by the enemy’s gun¬ 
boats. Yorktown is fortified all around with bastioned works, and 
on the water-side it and Gloucester are so strong that the navy are 
afraid to attack either. 

“The approaches on one side are generally through low, swampy 
or thickly wooded ground, over roads which we are obliged to repair 
or to make before we can get forward our carriages. The enemy 
is in great force, and is constantly receiving reinforcements from 
the two rivers. The line in front of us is therefore one of the strong¬ 
est ever opposed to an invading force in any country. 

“You will, then, ask why I advocated such a line for our oper¬ 
ations? My reasons are few, but, I think,, good. 

“With proper assistance from the navy we could take Yorktown, 
and then with gunboats on both rivers we could beat any force 
opposed to us on Warwick river, because the shot and shell from 
the gunboats would nearly overlap across the Peninsula; so that if 


—56 


Letter of Gen. Keyes 


the enemy should retreat—and retreat he must—he would have a 
long way to go without rail or stream transportation, and every soul 
of his army must fall into our hands or be destroyed. 

“Another reason for my supporting the new base and plan was 
that this line, it was expected, would furnish water-transportation 
nearly to Richmond. 

“Now, supposing we succeed in breaking through the line in 
front of us, what can we do next? The roads are very bad, and if 
the enemy retains command of James river, and we do not first re¬ 
duce Yorktown, it would be impossible for us to subsist this army three 
marches beyond where it is now. As the roads are at present, it is 
with the utmost difficulty that we can subsist it in the position it now 
occupies. 

“You will see, therefore, by what I have said, that the force 
originally intended for the capture of Richmond should be all sent 
forward. If I thought the four army corps necessary when I sup¬ 
posed the navy would co-operate, and when I judged of the obstacles 
to be encountered by what I learned from the maps and the opinions 
of officers long stationed at Fort Monroe, and from all other sources, 
how much more should I think the full complement of troops requi¬ 
site now that the navy cannot co-operate, and now that the strength 
of the enemy’s lines and the number of his guns and men prove to 
be almost immeasurably greater than I had been led to expect! The 
line in front of us, in the opinion of all the military men here who 
are at all competent to judge, is one of the strongest in the world, 
and the force of the enemy capable of being increased beyond the 
numbers we now have to oppose to him. Independently of the strength 
of the lines in front of us, and of the force of the enemy behind them, 
we cannot advance until we get command of either York river or 
James river. The efficient co-operation of the navy is, therefore, 
absolutely essential, and so I considered it when I voted to change 
our base from the Potomac to Fort Monroe. 

“An iron-clad boat must attack Yorktown; and if several strong 
gunboats could be sent up James river also, our success will be cer¬ 
tain and complete, and the rebellion will soon be put down. 

“On the other hand, we must butt against the enemy’s works 
with heavy artillery and a great waste of time, life, and material. 

“If we break through and advance, both our flanks will be assailed 
from two great water-courses in the hands of the enemy; our sup¬ 
plies would give out, and the enemy, equal, if not superior, in num¬ 
bers, would, with the other advantages, beat and destroy this army. 

“The greatest master of the art of war has said that ‘if you would 
invade a country successfully, you must have one line of operations 
and one army, under one general.’ But what is our condition? The 
State of Virginia is made to constitute the command, in part or wholly, 
of some six generals, viz.: Fremont, Banks, McDowell, Wool, Burn¬ 
side, and McClellan, besides the scrap, over the Chesapeake, in the 
care of Dix. 

“The great battle of the war is to come off here. If we win it 
the rebellion will be crushed. If we lose it the consequences will be 
more horrible than I care to foretell. The plan of campaign I voted 
for, if carried out with the means proposed, will certainly succeed. If 
any part of the means proposed are withheld or diverted, I deem it 
due to myself to say that our success will be uncertain. 

“It is no doubt agreeable to the commander of the 1st corps to 
have a separate department, and, as this letter advocates his return 
to Gen. McClellan’s command, it is proper to state that I am not at 


— 57 — 


McClellan’s Own Story 


all influenced by personal regard or dislike to any of my senior in 
rank. If I were to credit all the opinions which have been poured 
into my ears, I must believe that, in regard to my present fine com¬ 
mand, I owe much to Gen. McDowell and nothing- to Gen. McClellan. 
But I have disregarded all such officiousness, and I have from last 
July to the present day supported Gen. McClellan and obeyed all his 
orders with as hearty a good will as though he had been my brother 
or the friend to whom I owed most. I shall continue to do so to the 
last and so long as he is my commander, and I am not desirous to 
displace him, and would not if I could. He left Washington with 
the understanding that he was to execute a definite plan of campaign 
with certain prescribed means. The plan was good and the means 
sufficient, and, without modification, the enterprise was certain of suc¬ 
cess. But, with the reduction of force and means, the plan is entirely 
changed, and is now a bad plan, with means insufficient for certain 
success. 

“Do not look upon this communication as the offspring of des¬ 
pondency. I never despond; and when you see me working the hard¬ 
est you may be sure that fortune is frowning upon me. I am work¬ 
ing now to my utmost. 

“Please show this letter to the President, and I should like also 
that Mr. Stanton should know its contents. Do me the honor to write 
me as soon as you can, and believe me, with perfect respect, 

“Your most obedient servant, 

“E. D. Keyes, 

“Brig-Gen. Commanding Uth Army Corps. 

“Hon. Ira Harris, 

“U. S. Senate.” 

The reconnoissances of the 6th and 7th and following 
days, pushed with great vigor and with some loss, confirmed 
the impressions gained on the 5th. I verified all these recon¬ 
noissances in person, going everywhere beyond our lines of 
pickets, and resuming my old trade of reconnoitering officer, 
so anxious was I to find a practicable point of attack. In 
fact, during the whole siege I exposed myself more in this 
way than was proper for a general commanding an army; 
but I had had far more personal experience in sieges than 
any of those under my command, and trusted more to my 
own knowledge and experience than I then could to theirs. 

It was found that the Warwick valley headed within 
two thousand yards of the enceinte of Yorktown, and within 
half that distance of the White Redoubt, or Fort Magruder, 
a strong work, essentially a part of the main works at York¬ 
town, which were so strong—having ditches from eight to 
ten feet deep, and more than fifteen feet wide at the top—and 
so heavily armed with siege and garrison guns, as to render 
an assault hopeless. The interval between Yorktown and 


— 58 — 


Letter of Gen. Barnard 


the Warwick was occupied by strong works, and all the open 
ground in front, as well as the direct approaches to the town 
itself, so thoroughly swept by the direct fire of more than 
fifty guns of the heaviest calibres then known as to render 
it an act of madness to assault without first silencing the 
fire of the enemy’s artillery. From its head to Lee’s Mill 
the Warwick was flooded by means of artificial inundations, 
which rendered it unfordable. The dams constructed for 
this purpose were all covered by strong works so situated 
as to be unassailable until their artillery-fire was reduced. 
Below Lee’s Mill the river was a tidal stream, not fordable 
at any stage of the tide. That portion, moreover, was 
controlled by the fire of the Confederate gunboats in the 
James river. The valley of the Warwick was generally low 
and swampy, the approaches to the dams were through dense 
forests and deep swamps, and every precaution had been 
taken by £he enemy, in the way of felling timber and con¬ 
structing works, to make a crossing as difficult as possible. 

In his report of the 6th of May, immediately after the 
occupation of Yorktown, Gen. Barnard, chief-engineer of 
the Army of the Potomac, says: 

“They (referring to the groups of works covering the Warwick) 
are far more extensive than may be supposed from the mention of 
them that I make, and every kind of obstruction which the country 
affords, such as abattis, marsh, inundation, etc., was skillfully used. 
The line is certainly one of the most entensive known to modern times. 
The country on both sides the Warwick from near Yorktown down 
is a dense forest with few clearings. It was swampy, and the roads 
impassable during the heavy rains we have constantly had, except 
where our own labors had corduroyed them. If we could have broken 
the enemy’s line across the isthmus we could have invested Yorktown, 
and it must, with its garrison, have soon fallen into our hands. It 
was not deemed practicable, considering the strength of that line and 
the difficulty of handling our forces (owing to the impracticable 
character of the country), to do so. If we could take Yorktown or 
drive the enemy out of that place, the enemy’s line was no longer 
tenable. This we could do by siege operations. It was deemed too 
hazardous to attempt the reduction of the place by assault. The 
operations of the siege required extensive preparations. 

“I regret that there is not time and means to prepare a complete 
plan of this enormous system of defences. They should form part of 
the record of the operations of the Army of the Potomac. The forc¬ 
ing of such a line with so little loss is in itself an exploit, less bril¬ 
liant, perhaps, but more worthy of study, than would have been a 
murderous assault, even had it proved successful.” 


— 59 — 


McClellan's Own Story 


I need only add to this that Gen. Barnard never ex¬ 
pressed to me any opinion that an assault was practicable 
upon any part of the enemy’s defences. Frftm the first re- 
connoissances he was decidedly of the opinion that the use 
of heavy guns was necessary. More than this, I never, at 
the time, heard of any contrary opinion from any one, and, 
so far as I know, there was entire unanimity on the part of 
the general officers and chiefs of staff departments that the 
course pursued was the only one practicable under the cir¬ 
cumstances. 

From Lee’s Mill a line of works extended to the enemy’s 
rear to Skiff’s creek, so that if we had forced the passage of 
the Warwick below that point we would have found a new 
line of defence in front of us, completely covering the ene¬ 
my’s communications. 

During the progress of these reconnoissances every ef¬ 
fort was made to bring up supplies and ammunitioh. A vio¬ 
lent storm beginning on the 6th, and continuing without 
cessation for three or four days, almost entirely interrupted 
the water-communication between Fortress Monroe and Ship 
Point, and made the already bad roads terrible beyond de¬ 
scription. In those days I more than once thought of a 
reply- made to me by an old general of Cossacks, who had 
served in all the Russian campaigns against Napoleon. I 
had asked how the roads were in those days, to which he 
replied: “My son, the roads are always bad in war.” 

It was not until the 10th that we were able to establish 
a new depot on Cheeseman’s creek, which shortened the haul 
about three miles. The rains continued almost incessantly, 
and it was necessary not only to detail large working par¬ 
ties to unload supplies, but details of some thousands of 
men were required to corduroy the roads, as the only 
means of enabling us to get up supplies. 

As illustrating the condition of things, I insert the fol¬ 
lowing despatch from Mr. John Tucker, Assistant Secretary 
of War, dated near Yorktown, April 10, to Hon. E. M. Stan¬ 
ton, Secretary of War: 

“I reached Gen. McClellan’s headquarters at seven this evening, 
having had an accident to the steamer on the way from Fortress Mon¬ 
roe to Ship Point. I was five hours on horseback (making about five 


— 60 — 


Yorktown 



—61 












































McClellan’s Own Story 


miles), the roads being almost impassable and so entirely occupied 
with army wagons I frequently had to leave the road and take to 
the woods. The severe storm at Fortress Monroe prevented trans¬ 
ports from leaving for several days. The facilities for landing at 
Ship Point are very poor, and for several days it must have been 
next to impossible to move artillery over such roads. I learn that 
twelve thousand men are engaged in repairing and building new 
roads. The difficulties of transportation have been so great that 
some of the cavalry horses had to be sent back to keep them from 
starving. I will report my observations of army movements to¬ 
morrow, but I see an earnest determination to lose no time in attack¬ 
ing the enemy. 

“John Tucker, 

“Assistant Secretary of War.” 

The following telegram was sent as indicated, on April 
10, to Brig.-Gen. Thomas, adjutant-general: 

I examined the works on enemy’s left very carefully to-day. They 
are very strong, the approaches difficult; enemy in force and confident. 
Water-batteries at York and Gloucester said to be much increased; 
have not seen them myself. Have not yet received reports of engi¬ 
neer officers. I go to-morrow to examine our left. Sharp firing on 
our right for some time to-day while I was there; no harm done, 
although their shells burst handsomely. Am receiving supplies from 
Ship Point, repairing roads, getting up siege artillery, etc. 

It seems now almost certain that we must use mortars and heavy 
guns freely before assaulting. The naval officers urge an attack 
in rear of Gloucester; I think they are right, but am now too weak 
to attempt it, unless new circumstances come to my knowledge. The 
affair will be protracted in consequence of the diminution of my 
force. 


The following was sent to Hon. E. M. Stanton, Secretary 
of War, on April 8: 

Weather terrible; raining heavily last twenty-eight hours; roads 
and camps in awful condition; very little firing to-day. Reconnois- 
sances being continued under disadvantageous circumstances. Gen. 
Sumner has arrived. Most of Richardson’s division at Ship Point. 
I cannot move it from there in present condition of roads until I get 
more wagons. I need more force to make the attack on Gloucester. 

To Brig.-Gen. L. Thomas on April 9: 

Weather still execrable; country covered with water; roads ter¬ 
rible. It is with the utmost difficulty that I can supply the troops. 
We are doing an immense deal of work on the roads. Cannot land 
siege-train until wind moderates. Reconnoissances being pushed 
and point of attack pretty well determined. Rebels have thrown ten- 
inch and twelve-inch shells yesterday and to-day without effect. I 
have now placed all the troops in bivouac just out of shell range, 
holding all our advanced positions with strong detachments well shel¬ 
tered. I shall not lose an unnecessary hour in placing our heavy 
guns in battery, and will assault at the earliest practicable moment. 
The conduct of the troops is excellent. 


— 62 — 


Letter from the President 


At this time I received the following letter from the 
President: 


“Washington, April 9, 1882. 

“My dear Sir: Your despatches complaining that you are not 
properly sustained, while they do not offend me, do pain me very 
much. 

“Blenker’s division was withdrawn from you before you left here, 
and you know the pressure under which I did it, and, as I thought, 
acquiesced in it—certainly not without reluctance. 

“After you left I ascertained that less than 20,000 unorganized 
men, without a single field-battery were all you designed to be left 
for the defence of Washington and Manassas Junction, and part of 
this even was to go to Gen. Hooker’s old position. Gen. Banks’s 
corps, once designed for Manassas Junction, was diverted and tied 
up on the line of Winchester and Strasburg, and could not leave it 
without again exposing the upper Potomac and the Baltimore and 
Ohio Railroad. This presented, or would present when McDowell 
and Sumner should be gone, a great temptation to the enemy to turn 
back from the Rappahannock and sack Washington. My implicit 
order that Washington should, by the judgment of all the comman¬ 
ders of army corps, be left entirely secure, had been neglected. It 
was precisely this that drove me to detain McDowell. 

“I do not forget that I was satisfied with your arrangement to 
leave Banks at Manassas Junction; but when that arrangement 
was broken up, and nothing was substituted for it, of course I was 
constrained to substitute something for it myself. And allow me to 
ask, Do you really think I should permit the line from Richmond via 
Manassas Junction to this city to be entirely open, except what resis¬ 
tance could be presented by less than 20,000 unorganized troops? This 
is a question which the country will not allow me to evade. 

“There is a curious mystery about the number of troops now 
with you. When I telegraphed you on the 6th, saying you had over 
a hundred thousand with you, I had just obtained from the Secretary 
of War a statement, taken, as he said, from your own returns, mak¬ 
ing 108,000 then with you and en route to you. You now say you 
will have but 85,000 when all en route to you shall have reached you. 
How can the discrepancy of 23,000 be accounted for? 

“As to Gen. Wool’s command, I understand it is doing for you 
precisely what a like number of your own would have to do if that 
command was away. 

“I suppose the whole force which has gone forward for you is 
with you by this time. And if so, I think it is the precise time for 
you to strike a blow. By delay the enemy will relatively gain upon 
you—that is, he will gain faster by fortifications and reinforcements 
than you can by reinforcements alone. And once more let me tell 
you, it is indispensable to you that you strike a blow. I am power¬ 
less to help this. You will do me the justice to remember I always 
insisted that going down the bay in search of a field, instead of fight¬ 
ing at or near Manassas, was only shifting, and not surmounting, a 
a difficulty; that we would find the same enemy and the same or equal 
entrenchments at either place. The country will not fail to note, 
is now noting, that present hesitation to move upon an entrenched 
enemy is but the story of Manassas repeated. 


— 63 — 


McClellan’s Own Story 


“I beg to assure you that I have never written you or spoken to 
you in greater kindness of feeling than now, nor with a fuller pur¬ 
pose to sustain you, so far as, in my most anxious judgment, I 
consistently can. But you must act. 

“Yours very truly, 

“A. Lincoln.” 

The portions of this letter referring to the arrange¬ 
ments for the defence of Washington and the Shenandoah 
have already been fully answered and need not be alluded 
to again in this place. 

As regards the discrepancy of 23,000 men, it is sufficient 
to say that my estimate was made from the actual latest re¬ 
turns of the men present for duty, and was correct. I have 
no doubt that the number furnished the President was the 
aggregate present and absent—a convenient mistake not 
unfrequently made by the Secretary of War. 

The number I gave was correct; that furnished the 
President was incorrect. 

In regard to the employment of Wool’s command, the 
authorities in Washington failed to perceive the irony of 
my remark in my telegram of April 7, to the effect that the 
only use that could be made of his command was to protect 
my communications in rear of the point I then occupied. 
There were no communications to protect beyond Ship Point, 
and there was no possibility of the roads to Fortress Monroe 
being troubled by the enemy. Wool’s troops were of no 
possible use to me beyond holding Fortress Monroe, and 
would have been of very great use if the surplus had been 
incorporated with the Army of the Potomac. 

The whole force sent forward had not joined me at the 
date of this letter; it was not until seven days later that 
Casey, Hooker, and Richardson reached the front line; they 
could not be brought up earlier. I have already shown the 
impossibility of attacking earlier or otherwise than we ac¬ 
tually did. 

When in front of Sebastopol in 1855 I asked Gen. Mar- 
timprey, chief of staff of the French army in the Crimea, 
how he found that the cable worked which connected the 
Crimean with the European lines of telegraph. He said 
that it worked admirably from the Crimea to Paris, but 


— 64 — 


Impatience 


very badly in the opposite direction; and by way of explana¬ 
tion related the following anecdote: He said that immediately 
after the failure of the assault of June, 1855, the emperor 
telegraphed Pelissier to renew the assault immediately. 
Pelissier replied that it was impossible without certain pre¬ 
liminary preparations which required several weeks. The 
emperor repeated the peremptory order to attack at once. 
Pelissier repeated his reply. After one or two more inter¬ 
changes of similar messages Pelissier telegraphed: “I will 
not renew the attack until ready; if you wish it done, come 
and do it yourself.” That ended the matter. 

Referring for a moment to the President’s despatch of 
April 6, it is well to recall the facts that at that time, in¬ 
stead of 100,000 men, I had—after deducting guards and 
working parties—much less than 40,000 for attack, and that 
the portion, of the enemy’s lines which he thought I had 
better break through at once was about the strongest of the 
whole, except, perhaps, the town itself. 

The impatience displayed at that time, after so greatly 
reducing my force, is in remarkable contrast with the pa¬ 
tience which permitted Grant to occupy months in front 
of the lines of Petersburg, far inferior in strength to those 
of Yorktown. 

Oh the 22d of March I had prepared the following: 

CONFIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM 

For the operations against Yorktown, Richmond, etc., where we 
will probably find extensive earthworks heavily garrisoned, we shall 
require the means of overwhelming them by a vertical fire of shells. 

I should therefore be glad to have disposable at Fortress Monroe: 

I. 1st. 20 10-inch mortars complete. 

2d. 20 8-irtch mortars complete. 

II. 20 8-inch siege-howitzers. 

III. 20 41-inch wrought-iron siege-guns. 

IV. 40 20-pounder Parrotts. 

V. — 24-pounder siege-guns. 

The 20-pounder Parrotts with the batteries will, of course, be 
counted as available. 

I do not know the number of 4i-inch guns available; if not so 
many as I have indicated, something else should be substituted. I 
wish Gen. Barry and Col. Kingsbury to consult with Gen. Marcy, to 
make suggestions as occur to them, and ascertain at once to what ex¬ 
tent this memorandum can be filled. It is possible we cannot count 
upon the navy to reduce Yorktown by their independent efforts; we 


- 65 — 


McClellan’s Own Story 

must therefore be prepared to do it by our own means. There are 
said to be at Yorktown from 27 to 32 heavy guns, at Gloucester 14 
Columbiads. The probable armament of Yorktown, when exterior 
guns are drawn in, will be from 40 to 50 heavy guns, from 24-pounders 
to 8-inch and perhaps 10-inch Columbiads. 

Before leaving Washington I detailed Col. Robert Tyler’s 
1st Conn, regiment as heavy artillery, and placed the siege- 
train in their charge; it will be seen, as the narrative pro¬ 
ceeds, how admirably this splendid regiment performed 
their most important duties at all times and under the most 
trying circumstances. 

As soon as it became clear that no aid was to be had 
from the navy, and that we must reduce Yorktown by a 
front attack, I took steps to increase the number of heavy 
guns and mortars to the extent shown by the statement of 
batteries given hereafter. The number of officers of the 
corps of engineers and of the topographical engineers at my 
disposal was so small that it was necessary to supplement 
them by civilian employees kindly furnished by Prof. Bache, 
of the U. S. Coast Survey, and by details from the line. 
These civilian employees vied with the officers of the army 
in the courage, devotion, and intelligence with which they 
performed the dangerous and important duties devolving 
upon them. There were but twelve officers of the engin¬ 
eers, including four on duty with the three companies of 
engineer troops, and six of the topographical engineers. 
These officers at once proceeded to ascertain by close recon- 
noissances the nature and strength of the enemy’s defences 
and the character of the ground, in order to determine the 
points of attack and the nature of the necessary works of 
attack. Meanwhile the troops were occupied in construct¬ 
ing roads to the depots. Gen. Sumner reached the front on 
the 9th of April, and was placed in command of the left 
wing, consisting of his own and the 4th corps. He was in 
front of the line of the Warwick, while the 3d corps was 
charged with the operations against Yorktown itself. The 
following despatch to Secretary Stanton shows the condition 
of affairs at its date, April 11: 

The reconnoissances of to-day prove that it is necessary to in¬ 
vest and attack Gloucester Point. Give me Franklin’s and McCall’s 
divisions under command of Franklin, and I will at once undertake 


— 66 — 


Letter of F. P. Blair 


it. If circumstances of which I am not aware make it impossible 
for you to send me two divisions to carry out the final plan of 
campaign, I will run the risk and hold myself responsible for the 
results if you will give me Franklin’s division. If you still confide 
in my judgment I entreat that you will grant this request. The fate 
of our cause depends upon it. Although willing, under the pressure 
of necessity, to carry this through with Franklin alone, I wish it to 
be distinctly understood that I think two divisions necessary. Frank¬ 
lin and his division are indispensable to me. Gen. Barnard concurs 
in this view. I have determined upon the point of attack, and am 
at this moment engaged in fixing the position of the batteries. 

The same day the following reached me: 

“By direction of the President, Franklin’s division has been 
ordered to march back to Alexandria and immediately embark for 
Fortress Monroe. 

“L. Thomas, 

“Adj-Gerc.” 

I replied to the secretary: “I am delighted with Frank¬ 
lin’s orders, and beg to thank you.” 

I insert the following letter from my venerable friend, 
Francis P. Blair, as an indication of the state of feeling at 
the time: 

“Washington, April 12, 1862. 

“Maj.-Gen. G. B. McClellan: 

“My dear Sir: There is a prodigious cry of ‘On to Richmond!’ 
among the carpet-knights of our city, who will not shed their blood 
to get there. I am one of those who wish to see you lead a triumph 
in the capital of the Old Dominion, but am not so eager as to hazard 
it by hurrying on too fast. The veterans of Waterloo filled the 
trenches of Gen. Jackson at New Orleans with their bodies and their 
blood. If you can accomplish your object of reaching Richmond 
by a slower process than storming redoubts and batteries in earth¬ 
works, the country will applaud the achievement which gives success 
to its arms with greatest parsimony of the blood of its children. 
The envious Charles Lee denounced his superior, Washington, as 
gifted too much with that ‘rascally virtue prudence .’ Exert it and 
deserve his fame. 

“Your friend, 

“F. P. Blair, 

“Silver Springs.” 

My retained copy of the following letter is not dated, 
but it must have been written somewhere about the 20th of 
April: 

Headquarters, Army of the Potomac, 
Before Yorktown, 

Hon. E. M. Stanton , Secretary of War: 

Sir: I received to-day a note from Assistant Secretary Watson 
enclosing an extract from a letter the author of which is not men¬ 
tioned. I send a copy of the extract with this. I hope that a copy 


— 67 — 


McClellan’s Own Story 


has also been sent to Gen. McDowell, whom it concerns more nearly, 
perhaps, than it does me. 

At the risk of being thought obtrusive I will venture upon some 
remarks which perhaps my position does not justify me in making, 
but which I beg to assure you are induced solely by my intense desire 
for the success of the government in this struggle. 

You will, I hope, pardon me if I allude to the past, not in a 
captious spirit, but merely so far as may be necessary to explain my 
own course and my views as to the future. 

From the beginning I had intended, so far as I might have the 
power to carry out my own views, to abandon the line of Manassas 
as the line of advance. I ever regarded it as an improper one; my 
wish was to adopt a new line, based upon the waters of the lower 
Chesapeake. I always expected to meet with strong opposition on 
this line, the strongest that the rebels could offer, but I was well aware 
that upon overcoming of this opposition the result would be de¬ 
cisive and pregnant with great results. 

Circumstances, among which I will now only mention the un¬ 
certainty as to the power of the Merrimac, have compelled me to 
adopt the present line, as probably safer, though far less brilliant, 
than that by Urbana. When the movement was commenced I coun¬ 
ted upon an active and disposable force of nearly 150,000 men, and 
intended to throw a strong column upon West Point either by York 
river, or, if that proved impracticable, by a march from the mouth 
of the Severn, expecting to turn in that manner all the defences of 
the Peninsula. Circumstances have proved that I was right, and 
that my intended movements would have produced the desired re¬ 
sults. 

After the transfer of troops had commenced from Alexandria 
to Fort Monroe, but before I started in person, the division of Blen- 
ker was detached from my command—a loss of nearly 10,000 men. 
As soon as the mass of my troops were fairly started I embarked 
myself. Upon reaching Fort Monroe I learned that the rebels were 
being rapidly reinforced from Norfolk and Richmond. I therefore 
determined to lose no time in making the effort to invest Yorktown, 
without waiting for the arrival of the divisions of Hooker and Rich¬ 
ardson and the 1st corps, intending to employ the 1st corps in mass 
to move upon West Point, reinforcing it as circumstances might ren¬ 
der necessary. 

The advance was made on the morning of the second day after I 
reached Fort Monroe. When the troops reached the immediate vi¬ 
cinity of Yorktown the true nature of the enemy’s position was for 
the first time developed. While my men were under fire I learned 
that the 1st corps was removed from my command. No warning 
had been given me of this, nor was any reason then assigned. I 
should also have mentioned that the evening before I left Fort Monroe 
I received a telegraphic despatch from the War Department inform¬ 
ing me that the order placing Fort Monroe and its dependent troops 
under my command was rescinded. No reason was given for this, nor 
has it been to this day. I confess that I have no right to know 
the reason. This order deprived me of the support of another di¬ 
vision which I had been authorized to form for active operations from 
among the troops near Fort Monroe. 

Thus when I came under fire I found myself weaker by five di¬ 
visions than I had expected when the movement commenced. It is 
more than probable that no general was ever placed in such a position 
before. 


- 68 - 


Letter to Secretary Stanton 


Finding myself thus unexpectedly weakened* and with a power¬ 
ful enemy strongly entrenched in my front, I was compelled to change 
my plans and become cautious. Could I have retained my original 
force I confidentially believe that I would now have been in front 
of Richmond instead of where I am now. The probability is that 
that city would now have been in our possession. 

But the question now is in regard to the present and the future 
rather than the past. 

The enemy, by the destruction of the bridges of the Rappahan¬ 
nock, has deprived himself of the means of a rapid advance on Wash¬ 
ington. Lee will never venture upon a bold movement on a large 
scale. 

The troops I left for the defense of Washington, as I fully ex¬ 
plained to you in the letter I wrote the day I sailed, are ample for its 
protection. 

Our true policy is to concentrate our troops on the fewest pos¬ 
sible lines of attack; we have now too many, and an enterprising 
enemy could strike us a severe blow. 

I have every reason to believe that the main portion of the rebel 
forces are in my front. They are not “drawing off” their troops 
from Yorktown. 

Give me McCall’s division and I will undertake a movement on 
West Point which will shake them out of Yorktown. As it is, I will 
win, but I must not be blamed is success is delayed. I do not feel 
that I am answerable for the delay of victory. 

I do not feel authorized to venture any suggestions as to the 
disposition of the troops in other departments, but content myself 
with stating the least that I regard as essential to prompt success here. 
If circumstances render it impossible to give what I ask, I still feel 
sure of success, but more time will be required to achieve the result. 

Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 

Geo. B. McClellan, 

Maj.-Gen. Commanding. 

The affair known as the one-gun battery is explained 

by the following instructions and statement: 

Headquarters, Army of the Potomac, 
Camp Winfield Scott, April 15, 1862. 

Brig.-Gen. W. F. Smith , Commanding Division : 

Sir: You will please advance to-morrow morning to stop the 
work now being carried on by the enemy near and in rear* of the 
“one-gun battery.” This can probably be most readily accomplished 
by throwing sharpshooters well forward to the edge of the stream, 
leaving in front of the work a clear interval through which four to 
six guns can shell the working parties and adjacent woods. Your 
flank towards Lee’s Mill should be carefully watched, also towards 
Wynn’s Mill, communicating with Gen. Gorman, who will have orders 
to prevent an attack upon your right flank from Wynn’s Mill. It is 
probable that by placing your guns near the burned chimneys, as 
well under cover as possible, they will accomplish the result. 

If the enemy are driven entirely away, advance cautiously a few 
skirmishers across the dam to penetrate the woods and ascertain 
whether there is any clearing near at hand where you can hold your 
own. In this event cross over and send for immediate assistance, 


— 69 — 


McClellan’s Own Story 


which will be promptly afforded. If you find the position across 
the stream dangerous and untenable, cut the dam. 

In any event exercise the utmost caution before crossing the 
stream. The great object is to stop the work, and merely to take ad¬ 
vantage after that of any opportunity that may offer itself to push 
the advantage. I should prefer stopping the work and attacking 
when our preparations elsewhere are more advanced. I would prefer 
making the attack at the one-gun battery a part of a more general 
plan involving the use of batteries against Lee’s Mill and other con¬ 
tiguous points. From the statement of Capt. Hope (had since I wrote 
the foregoing) I imagine a position can be found on the road at a 
distance of some twelve hundred yards, whence their works can be 
shelled with 10-pound Parrotts and probably spherical case from the 
Napoleon guns. I would be glad to learn that the work is stopped 
and the enemy taught a lesson. 

Please inform Gen. Gorman of your instructions, and inform me 
as early as possible of your arrangements. 

Very truly yours, 

Geo. B. McClellan, 

Maj.-Gen. Commanding. 

P. S. I send this direct to you for the reason that it is too late 
to communicate it through the commander of the 4th army corps and 
give time to execute the movement at a sufficiently early hour. 

Upon reflection I think it will, under present circumstances, be 
wiser to confine the operation to forcing the enemy to discontinue 
work. 

In compliance with these instructions Gen. Smith placed 
two brigades and three batteries on his left to guard against 
any attack from Lee’s Mill, and commenced operations with 
his remaining brigade and battery. He posted Mott’s bat¬ 
tery opposite the dam at a distance of about eleven hundred 
yards from the works, sent in one regiment through the 
woods on the right with instructions to open fire on any 
working parties they might observe, another regiment on 
the left with similar orders, and held the remaining three 
regiments in reserve. As soon as our infantry opened fire 
the enemy replied with shell, upon which Mott opened and 
kept up a sharp fire for about an hour until he silenced the 
enemy. 

About three o’clock Gen. Smith had placed eighteen guns 
in position about five hundred yards from the works, sup¬ 
ported on either flank by Brook’s Vermont brigade, Han¬ 
cock’s being brought up in support. Our guns then opened, 
the enemy replying for some time with rapidity; when their 
fire slackened Smith ordered four companies of the 3d Ver¬ 
mont to cross the dam and feel the enemy. On arriving at 


— 70 — 


The One-Gun Battery 

the crest of the work they were met by the enemy in force, 
who had lain secreted, and were forced to retire with a loss 
of about 20 killed and wounded, after having held the work 
for some minutes. 

Later in the day, after I had left the ground, another 
reconnoissance was made, under cover of the artillery-lire, 
by the 4th Vermont on the right, the 5th and 6th on the left, 
but it was found inpracticable to push further than to the 
dam, which ground was held. During the night strong en¬ 
trenchments were thrown up, on the right for four guns 
within three hundred yards of the work, on the left one with 
eight embrasures, and in the centre one with four embra¬ 
sures, the last two within five hundred yards’ range. This 
reconnoissance was conducted with skill and great gallantry, 
the Vermont troops thus early giving earnest of the high 
qualities'they so often displayed during all the war. 

The losses in killed, wounded, and missing amounted to 
about 150. The objects of the operation were completely 
achieved: we prevented further work at this point, pre¬ 
vented the enemy from using the crossing, and ascertained 
that the line could not be broken there without further pre¬ 
paration in the way of artillery, etc. 

The general plan of operations determined upon was to 
establish batteries of heavy guns and mortars bearing upon 
Yorktown and Gloucester, their water-batteries, a line of 
works between Yorktown and the Warwick river, Wynn’s 
Mill, and the “one-gun battery” about a mile lower down the 
Warwick. 

The general order regulating the details of the siege 
operations, as well as the instructions issued by Gen. Fitz- 
John Porter, who, on the 26th of April, was assigned to 
duty as director of the siege, are for the present omitted. 
I issued all orders relating to the siege through him, making 
him commandant of the siege operations, and at the same 
time chief of staff for that especial work. Under the cir¬ 
cumstances of the case such arrangement was necessary to 
relieve me of too much labor, and it worked admirably. 

Ground was broken on the night of the 17th of April 
upon batteries 1, 2, and 3, it being only at that date that 


— 71 — 


McClellan's Own Story 


the necessary roads and bridges were completed and the re¬ 
quisite material collected. The first parallel was commenced 
on the morning of the 25th. 

The work was pushed with so much energy that by the 
night of May 3 all the batteries were completed and nearly 
all armed; the armament would have been completed on the 
night of the 5th, and fire opened the next morning. 

In all sixteen batteries were constructed, their full ar¬ 
mament being two 200-pounder rifled guns, twelve 100- 
pounder rifled, ten 13-inch mortars, twenty-five 10-inch mor¬ 
tars, seven 8-inch mortars, twelve 44-inch rifled siege-guns, 
twelve 30-pounder rifled guns, thirty-two 20-pounder rifled 
guns, and two 8-inch siege-howitzers, being 114 heavy guns 
and mortars in all. 

In order to conceal our purposes and complete the work 
with the least possible exposure, none of the batteries were 
opened, except No. 1, which on the 30th of April opened 
with excellent effect upon the wharves of Yorktown and 
Gloucester, in order to prevent the landing of supplies and 
men. 

It was intended to open with all the 114 guns and mor¬ 
tars at once, in order to create the greatest possible moral 
and physical effect. 

Towards the close of the siege it was apparent that the 
works at Gloucester could not be carried by assault from the 
rear without some preliminary work in the way of reduc¬ 
ing the fire of their batteries on the land side—a matter re¬ 
quiring a good deal of time, and force greater than a single 
division. 

With the force at my disposal it was impossible to re¬ 
inforce Franklin for that purpose, and I determined, late on 
the 2d of May, to disembark that division and move it to the 
front, in order to employ all my force in the assault about 
to be given, and thus render the result as sure as human 
foresight could make it. On the 3d, then, Franklin's divi¬ 
sion was disembarked, and was to have moved to the front 
on the 4th. 

As soon as the fire of the water-batteries was silenced 
the gunboats, reinforced by the Galena under the gallant 


— 72 — 


The One-Gun Battery 

John Rodgers, were to run by and take up a position in 
rear, whence they could get a nearer fire on the defences 
and control the road leading from Yorktown to Williamsburg. 

When this was effected, the artillery of the land de¬ 
fences silenced, and the garrison demoralized by the shell¬ 
fire, the columns of assault were to advance from the nearest 
cover. 

The principal assault was to have been upon the line 
between the Warwick and Yorktown, a column being ready 
to assault the latter if the effect of the batteries justified it. 
The enfilading and two counter batteries were prepared 
against Wynn’s Mill, which, with the dam next above it, 
would also have been assaulted at the same time with the 
main attack. 

The counter batteries against Wynn’s Mill enfiladed 
the lines stretching thence towards the “one-gun” battery, 
against which latter a mortar battery was also prepared; 
under cover of these and the fire of the field-batteries an 
assault was also to be made on the “one-gun” battery. 
Under cover of the field-guns of the 4th corps a feint was to 
be made upon Lee’s Mill, to be converted into a real attack 
if the effect of the operations at other points opened the 
way thereto. 

The fire of our batteries would probably have enabled 
us to assault about noon. As the enemy were practically 
without bomb-proof shelters, the fire of our forty-two mor¬ 
tars, ten of which were 13-inch and twenty-five 10-inch, 
should in five or six hours have blown up their magazines 
and rendered the works untenable for the garrisons. As 
many of their guns, all in the water-batteries, were en bar¬ 
bette, the fire of our seventy-two heavy guns should in the 
same space of time have dismounted most of their guns; 
and as the mortars could well continue their fire until the 
assaulting columns had reached the immediate vicinity of 
the works, the success of the assault, with very little loss, 
was reasonably certain. 

In order to diminish the risk to the gunboats as much 
as possible, I proposed to Flag-Officer Goldsborough and to 
Capt. Smith, commanding the gunboats, that the gunboats 


— 73 — 


McClellan's Own Story 


and the Galena should run the batteries the night after we 
opened fire. If the effect of our fire had equalled our ex¬ 
pectations so as to justify an assault during the first day’s 
firing, I am very sure that Capt. Smith would have run by 
.the batteries in broad daylight, without awaiting the cover 
of darkness. I have no doubt whatever that at the latest 
the dawn of the second day would have seen the gunboats in 
the rear of the defences, and the assault delivered with en¬ 
tire success and without any heavy loss on our side. 

Gen. Johnston told me in Washington, during the win¬ 
ter of 1882 and 1883, that one of his strong objections to 
holding Yorktown was his apprehension that the gunboats 
would force the batteries at night and thus render the posi¬ 
tion untenable. Other Confederate general officers serving 
there have told me that in their opinion, at the time, the 
gunboats could easily have effected this on any dark night. 

Early in the morning of the 4th of May it was found 
that the enemy had during the night evacuated all his posi¬ 
tions, very wisely preferring to avoid the experiment of 
withstanding a bombardment and assault. We captured 
in the works, including Gloucester, seventy-seven guns and 
mortars, supplied with the ordinary complements, and seven¬ 
ty-six rounds of ammunition to each. 

The captured pieces were as follows: one 10-inch Colum- 
biad, thirteen 9-inch Dahlgren guns, sixteen 8-inch Colum- 
biads, two 7-inch heavy guns, one 6^-inch rifle, one 4J-inch 
rifle, one 2%o-inch rifle, two rifled 32-pounders, one 8-inch 
siege-howitzer, three 64-pounders, eight 42-pounders, seven¬ 
teen 32-pounders, four 24-pounders, one 42-pound carron- 
ade, two 8-inch mortars, two 12-pounders, one 6-pounder. 

They had evidently removed such guns as they could, 
probably light guns. 

I have been much criticised for not assaulting York¬ 
town immediately. Perhaps the point has been made clear 
enough, but at the risk of repetition I will say something 
more on the subject. 

Before starting from Fortress Monroe the best infor¬ 
mation in our possession clearly indicated that the Warwick 
river ran nearly parallel with the James, instead of heading 


— 74 — 


Plan of Advance 


at Yorktown, and it seemed certain that the road from New¬ 
port News to Williamsburg did not cross that stream, at 
least any important branch of it, and that it presented no 
obstacle to an advance. Upon these data were predicated 
the orders of April 4 (for the march of the next day, the 
5th), according to which Heintzelman was to move into posi¬ 
tion close to Yorktown, while Keyes was to take up a posi¬ 
tion in rear of Yorktown, at the Halfway House; Keyes was 
also ordered to attack and carry whatever he found in front 
of him. Now, let it be observed that at all points (on the 
right, centre, and left), we found the enemy’s works fully 
garrisoned and provided with artillery, and that Keyes and 
his general officers reported that they found the position in 
their front so strong and so well provided with tropos and 
artillery that it was impossible to assault with any hope of 
success. The same state of things was clearly the case in 
front of the right column, where I was. Now, it is very 
certain that the only thing to be done was to make close 
reconnoissances of the enemy’s position, in order to dis¬ 
cover a vulnerable point. This course was followed, and 
the unanimous opinion of all was that certain preliminary 
siege operations were necessary. I assert without fear of 
contradiction that no one at that time thought an assault 
possible; moreover, that when we saw the works abandoned 
by the enemy it remained the conviction of all that, with 
the raw troops we had, an assault would have resulted in 
simply an useless butchery with no hope of success. The 
statements made long afterwards by such men as Barnard 
were simply ex-post-facto opinions, gotten up for political 
purposes, and never could have been really entertained by 
them. The only fault to be found with the operations at 
Yorktown is in regard to the slowness with which some of 
the engineer officers operated. I was often obliged to make 
just such reconnoissances as I did at Vera Cruz (when a 
brevet second lieutenant of engineers) to expedite matters. 
Had Duane been chief-engineer, operations would have pro¬ 
gressed much more rapidly. The co-operation of the navy 
amounted to little or nothing. 


- 75 - 


CHAPTER XVII 


Despatches and letters to subjects treated in the foregoing and 
following chapters. 


“April 6, Sunday, 4 p.m. 

“My dear General: I have received your favor of this date by 
Col. Key, and hasten to say that I have already written you—-via 
Shipping Point—in reply, giving my reason for not having joined 
you. The time you proposed to proceed with me had elapsed, and 
particularly the difficulties of my leaving my vessel owing to the want 
of officers of experience to take care of her. 

“I have explained in my note of to-day, and have repeated to 
Col. Key, the greatly increased strength of the fortifications as seen 
from this position. The forts at Gloucester are very formidable 
indeed, and the water-batteries of Yorktown have evidently been 
increased in dimensions within a few days, as indicated by the new 
earth. 

“As I pointed out to you in our interview, the works to be 
most apprehended (though they are all too formidable for our vessels, 
or three or four times their numbers and class) are the guns in mask 
about one-quarter to one-half of a mile this side of Yorktown, which 
position I point out to Col. Key. 

“The enemy are still on Gloucester Point—how strong I can¬ 
not say. So long as he holds that formidable work (or, indeed, 
upper and lower work) we surely cannot command the York river. 
All the gunboats of the navy would fail to take it, but would be 
destroyed in the attempt. Yet I will not hesitate to try the ex¬ 
periment, if required to do so, with this force, however inadequate. 

“I have explained to Col. Key that if you turn the masked 
work, which I fired on to-day and received its fire in return, the 
guns would command the next water-battery, which is about one- 
fifth of a mile from it towards Yorktown, as it appears from this 
ship. 

“With those two batteries carried, this force might approach 
near enough to shell Yorktown at long range, but nothing more. 
These vessels of this class are not calculated for closer or heavier 
work. 

“As I could not go in time to reach you to-day, as requested, 
I sent, after despatching my letter to you, the second in rank, Lieut.- 
Com. Clitz, to confer with you. And now, with Col. Key, I proceed 
to Wormsley’s creek to meet you or Gen. Heintzelman. 

“Very truly yours, 

“J. F. Missroom, 

“Com. 

“To Maj-Gen. McClellan.” 

“ Wachusett , April 10, 1862. 

“My dear General: Enclosed is the report upon the landing 
from this part of the river at ‘Sand-Box,’ where it was intended 
to land troops. Capt. Nicholson says he found a good picket-guard 
house for cavalry, stables, etc., within the Box, and some cattle 
near Too’s Point. A steamer also penetrated a mile up Back' 
creek to-day—which is within the Sand-Box, and whose entrance 


— 76 — 


Letters and Despatches 


is to the eastward of Too’s Point, as shown by the chart, and over 
which is good eight feet—to within one and a half miles of Worms- 
ley’s creek. 

“It has been observed to-day that large numbers of infantry 
have been transported from Yorktown to Gloucester Point. And 
this afternoon a number of what seemed to be laborers with en¬ 
trenching tools went to the same point; we conclude either to 
strengthen the works there or to throw up works opposite to and 
within long rifle-range of this anchorage. I have been expecting 
some such movement, and wondering why they did not try it from 
some point back from the beach so far that our guns (shell) could 
not reach them. It cannot be prevented by us. 

“Very truly yours, 


“To Maj-Gen. McClellan.” 


“J. F. Missroom. 


“April 11, 6 a.m. 

“The enemy very busy last night between Yorktown and Glou¬ 
cester Point. Schooners observed to be going continually. Enemy 
may have notice of intention to land troops at Severn and are 
fortifying its entrance. Ten schooners now in sight. 

“J. F. Missroom. 

“To Maj.-Gen. G. B. McClellan.” 

Headquarters, Army of Potomac, 
Near Yorktown, April 8, 1862. 

My dear Flag-Officer: Your kind letter received. From the 
information received thus far I am inclined to think that the 
“masked battery” on the river-bank below Yorktown is not in ex¬ 
istence, but that the gun fired upon Missroom was upon the ad¬ 
vanced bastion of the place itself. Porter thinks that he has found 
a place from which we can enfilade their water-batteries. I go 
there in a few minutes to look at it. Should it prove to be so, we 
can enable the gunboats to take an effective part in the contest. 
The weather is infamous (has been raining hard for the last eigh¬ 
teen hours, and still continues), the roads are horrid, and we have 
the devil’s own time about supplies. 

I have made strong representations as to the withdrawal of 
the 1st corps, which has forced me to abandon the turning' move¬ 
ment, and hope that the President may be induced to change his 
order. . . . The position of the enemy is immensely strong, but we 
are learning more of it every hour. Our men behave splendidly— 
brave and patient as men can be. 

G. B. McClellan, 
Maj.-Gen. Commanding. 

Flag-Officer L. M. Goldsborough, Minnesota. 

“Washington, April 16. 

“To Gen. McClellan: 

“Good for the first lick! Hurrah for Smith and the one-gun 
battery! Let us have Yorktown, with Magruder and his gang, 
before the 1st of May, and the job will be over. 

“Edwin M. Stanton, 

u Secretary of War.” 


— 77 — 



McClellan’s Own Story 


“U. S. Steamer Wachusett.” 
“York River, April 17, 1862. 

“My dear General: In accordance with your request to have 
shell thrown into Yorktown yesterday, the Sebago (side-wheel) 
was ordered on that service, she being the only vessel here provided 
with long-range rifle. 

“Her fire was returned by two guns of equal range from the 
enemy with surprising accuracy. One shell passed directly be¬ 
tween the ‘smoke-stack’ and mainmast, a few feet above her deck 
and another within a few feet of the wheel-house, throwing the 
water over the vessel, and both within a short distance of her boilers 
and machinery, which are altogether exposed. Had she been 
crippled the attempt to withdraw her might and probably would, 
have caused the sacrifice of other vessels also. 

“The Sebago is the vessel capable of rendering the most im¬ 
portant service in covering the landing of troops, and I submit 
whether it would not be advisable to defer any attempt to throw 
shell in Yorktown till night while she can operate on Gloucester 
with impunity at any time. She draws six feet of water. A sin¬ 
gle shot in the midship section of that vessel especially, or indeed 
of either of these gunboats, disables if it do not destroy her. 

“Would it not be possible for your cannon to dismount those 
two rifles with which the enemy fired at the Sebago yesterday? 
They will inflict much damage on our people when Gloucester is 
held by them, as well as on our vessels. 

“The Sebago threw shells into Gloucester last night three several 
times. I am advised that another light-draught steamer, similar 
to the Sebago, is to come here. We cannot have the accuracy of 
fire from a vessel that the enemy exhibited yesterday. 

“Many thanks for the loan of fuses. 

“I am, very truly, your obedient servant, 

“J. F. Missroom, Com. 

“To Maj.-Gen. G. B. McClellan.” 


“Washington, April 18. 

“To Maj.-Gen. G. B. McClellan: 

“Your dispatch of this morning received and communicated to 
the President. He directs me to ask you whether the indications 
do not show that they are inclined to take the offensive. Banks 
has moved to Mount Jackson yesterday and to New Market to-day; 
has taken some locomotives and prisoners. 

“Edwin M. Stanton, 

“Secretary of War.” 

Headquarters, Army of the Potomac, 
April 18, 10 p.m. 

Hon. E. M. Stanton, Secretary of War: 

Despatch received. I cannot hope such good-fortune as that 
the enemy will take the offensive. I am perfectly prepared for 
any attack the enemy may make. He will do nothing more than 
sorties. I beg that the President will be satisfied that the enemy 
cannot gain anything by attacking me; the more he does attack 
the better I shall be contented. All is well. I am glad to hear 
of Banks’s good-fortune. 

G. B. McClellan, 

Maj.-Gen. 


Confidential. 


- 78 -- 


Letters and Despatches 


His Excellency the 


President: 


Headquarters, Army of the Potomac, 
April 18, 11:30 p.m. 


If compatible with your impressions as to the security of the ’ 
capital, and not interfering with operations of which I am ignorant, 

I would be glad to have McCall’s division, so as to be enabled to 
make a strong attack upon West Point to turn the position of the 
enemy. After all that I have heard of things which have occurred 
since I left Washington and before, I would prefer that Gen. McDowell 
should not again be assigned to duty with me. 


G. B. McClellan, 
Maj.-Gen. Commanding. 


“Washington, April 27, 1862. 

“Maj.-Gen. McClellan : 

“I am rejoiced to learn that your operations are progressing 
so rapidly and with so much spirit and success and congratulate 
you, and the officers and soldiers engaged, upon the brilliant affair 
mentioned in your telegram, repeating the assurance that every¬ 
thing in the power of the departments is at your service. I hope 
soon to congratulate you upon a splendid victory that shall be the 
finishing stroke of the war in every quarter. The work goes bravely 
on. 

“Your truly, 

“Edwin M. Stanton, 

“Secretary of War.” 


“Washington, May 1, 2 p.m. 

Maj.-Gen. G. B. McClellan: 

“Your call for Parrott guns from Washington alarms me, chiefly 
because it aims indefinite procrastination. Is anything to be done? 

“A. Lincoln, 

“President.” 


Headquarters, Army of the Potomac, 
May 1, 9:30 p.m. 

His Excellency the President: 

I asked for the Parrott guns from Washington for the reason 
that some expected had been two weeks, nearly, on the way and 
could not be heard from. They arrived last night. My arrange¬ 
ments had been made for them, and I thought time might be saved 
by getting others from Washington. My object was to hasten, 
not procrastinate. All is being done that human labor can accom¬ 
plish. 

G. B. McClellan, 

Maj.-Gen. 

Headquarters, Army of the Potomac, 
May 3, 1862. 

Hon. E. M. Stanton, Secretary of War\ 

I regret to learn that Col. Campbell, 5th Penn. Cavalry, has 
been placed in arrest by Maj.-Gen. McDowell for endeavoring to 
comply with my positive order to him to report with his regiment 
for duty at this place. This regiment was never assigned to Gen. 


— 79 — 


McClellan’s Own Story 


McDowell’s army corps, but was detailed by me to Gen. Keyes’s 
corps. I, of course, expected it to follow me as soon as transpor¬ 
tation could be provided, and am not a little surprised to learn 
that my instructions have been interfered with and my force di¬ 
minished by the action of the commanding officer of the Department 
of the Rappahannock, in violation of G. 0. 29, War Department, 
adjutant-general’s office, March 22, 1862. Under these circum¬ 
stances I beg the immediate interposition of the War Department 
to relieve from arrest a meritorious officer, against whom there 
appears to be no complaint save that of obedience to the orders 
of his rightful superior. I also ask that the regiment, as well as 
the 1st N. J., Col. Wyndham, may be permitted to join the army 
under my command without further delay. 

G. B. McClellan, 
Maj.-Gen. Commanding. 


“Wachusett, York River, 
“April 22, 1862. 

“My dear General: The carriage on board the Sebago is 
weak. Two carriage-makers are coming to us from Washington; 
I fear not in time. I am promised, if she come in time, a steamer 
with 100-pounder rifle. 

“The Corwin has no battery but a 20-pounder and two sixes, 
being only a surveying-craft. 

“When you commence attack the 100-pounder rifle can assist 
from the beginning. But I fear our stock of ammunition, espe¬ 
cially shell and ‘thirty’ fuses, will fail us soon. 

“I have failed to get what I have asked for from Hampton 
Roads. Can you loan us some 100-pounder shell and some more 
‘thirty’ fuses for the Sebago ? She has only about thirty-six fuses 
of that kind now. Our stock at Hampton Roads was sent to North 
Carolina. 

“Please see the despatch I have just sent Com. Poor. I sent 
a steamer to land your mortars at two a.m. with tackle. 

“I ought to see you more before you open fire on Yorktown, 
to have a clear understanding. Say when I shall go to you, and 1 
will do so any time at any day after four p.m. 

“The enemy’s troops showing themselves now near spot last 
driven from, abreast anchorage. 

“Yours very truly, 

“J. F. Missroom. 

“To Maj.-Gen. G. B. McClellan.” 


“We got eleven-inch shell into Yorktown 
night. 


and Gloucester last 
“J. F.' Missroom.” 


“Maj.-Gen. McClellan: 

“With my whole heart I do 
your brilliant and important 
accompany you up York river. 


“Fortress Monroe, May 4. 

most cordially congratulate you on 
achievement. The gunboats shall 

“L. M. Goldsborough, 

“ Flag-Officer” 


—80 


Letters and Despatches 


“Washington, May 4, 1862. 

“Maj.-Gen. McClellan: 

“Accept my cordial congratulations upon the success at York- 
town, and I am rejoiced to hear that your forces are in active 
pursuit. Please favor me with the details as far as they are acquired, 
and I hope soon to hear your arrival at Richmond. 

“Edwin M. Stanton, 

“Secretary of War.” 


“Fort Monroe, May 5, 1862. 

“Maj.-Gen. McClellan: 

“The Secretary of War telegraphs me to inform him how many 
transports of all descriptions I can command. Please place at my 
disposal all you can release, expect such as are required for the 
transportation of stores. . . . 


“John Tucker, 
“Assistant Secretary of War.” 


“Camp Near Yorktown, May 5. 
“F. Tucker, Assistant Secretary of War, Fortress Monroe: 

“In reply to a part of your despatch which the time for the 
departure of the boat did not admit of answering, and in the ab¬ 
sence of Gen. McClellan to the front, I have to inform you that the 
general has ordered all the available transports to carry troops to 
West Point and a part of them have started for Cheeseman’s creek. 
Your despatch will be laid before the general this evening. 

“R. B. Marcy, 

“Chief of Staff” 


Near Williamsburg, May 5, 11:45 p.m. 
Hon. E. M. Stanton, Secretary of War: 

Mr. Tucker’s telegram relating to the vessels was received 
after Franklin’s division had embarked and on the way to West 
Point. Another division goes in the morning and the last is ab¬ 
solutely necessary to support the first. This movement is of the 
greatest importance. I will release the vessels just as soon as the 
troops are landed. Nothing new except what I told you in my last 
despatch. 

Geo. B. McClellan, 
Maj.-Gen. Commanding. 

P.S. Some of the main works of the enemy are in our possession, 
and I am pushing troops forward, but the roads are horrible. 

Geo. B. McClellan, 

Maj.-Gen. Commanding. 


Williamsburg, May 6, 3 p.m. 

A portion of the army has left upper York, and it would be 
destruction to deprive me of the water-transportation now. It is 
absolutely necessary that I should complete the movement now com¬ 
menced, or the consequences will be fatal. 

G. B. McClellan, 
Maj.-Gen. Commanding . 

Hon. E. M. Stanton, 

Secretary of War . 

— 81 — 


McClellan’s Own Story 


Headquarters, Army of the Potomac, 
Camp Winfield Scott, May 4, 1862. 

Brig.-Gen, Heintzelman, Commanding 3d Corps: 

I have received information from Gen. Smith that the enemy 
are still in front of him in some force of infantry and cavalry. 
Gen. Stoneman has been ordered to move as rapidly as possible 
to the Halfway House, and to take possession of the cross-road 
near that place, to cut off this command, and also to send a strong 
reconnoissance towards Blen’s wharf. 

I wish Hooker to follow this movement with the utmost rapidity. 
When he reaches the point where the road branches off near the 
Halfway House, to leave a portion of his force there, and with the 
rest to gain the Lee’s Mill and Williamsburg road, so as to support 
Stoneman and aid him in cutting off the retreat of the enemy. 
The division should move simply with its ambulances and some re¬ 
serve ammunition, with not more than two days’ rations. Should 
further information from Smith render it necessary to move Kear¬ 
ny’s division also, I would be glad to have you take control of the 
entire movement. Smith is in possession of their works, and the 
enemy referred to are some distance in rear of them—how far I 
do not yet know. 

Geo. B. McClellan, 
Maj.-Gen. Commanding. 


May 4, 1862. 

“Col. A. V. Colburn: 

“Sir: Smith has reported that the enemy is in some force in 
his front. Keyes has advanced two brigades and a regiment of 
horse, with three batteries. They have seen no enemy, but have 
had a few men injured by the bursting of shells left by the enemy. 

“I leave immediately to take command on the left. Telegraph 
me at Smith’s, with duplicates for me at Keyes’s headquarters. 

“Very respectfully, 

“E. 0. Sumner, 

“ Brig.-Gen. Commanding the Left Wing.” 


“Two Miles Beyond Yorktown. 

“Gen. Marcy, Chief of Staff: 

“Gen. Stoneman has met the enemy about three miles beyond the 
Halfway House, and has sent back for the infantry to support him. 
Two brigades are ahead of me. 

“Yours etc., 

“S. V. Heintzelman, 
“Brig.-Gen. Commanding 3d Corps.” 


“Headquarters, 3d Corps in Sight of Williamsburg, 

“6 P.M., Sunday, May 4, 1862. 

“Gen. R. B. Marcy: 

“I have just arrived here, and find Gens. Sumner and Smith 
here. We will soon have three divisions, and are preparing to 
attack the rebels, who are entrenched in our front with two pieces 
of artillery, a regiment or so of cavalry, four or five regiments of 


— 82 — 


Letters and Despatches 


infantry. Our cavalry have been repulsed with a loss of near 40 
men and horses killed and wounded. We will soon carry the works. 
The infantry are only halting a moment to take a bite and rest. 

“Yours, etc., 

“S. V. Heintzelman, 

“ Brig.-Gen .” 

The following is a fragment of a letter of instructions 
sent to Gen. Sumner on the morning of the 4th, when he 
went to assume command on the left; and the condition of 
affairs then was that the enemy’s infantry and cavalry were 
reported by Smith to be about one and one-half miles in his 
front in force. I had ordered Stoneman, supported by 
Hooker, to gain the Halfway House by a rapid march, and 
thus cut off the retreat of this force in front of Smith. Sum¬ 
ner was ordered to repair the bridges over the Warwick, etc., 
as quickly as possible, and then to 

“Cross the stream with the 5th Cavalry, Smith’s and Couch’s 
divisions, and Casey’s .if necessary. It is possible that Sedgwick’s 
and Richardson’s divisions may be needed to reinforce the right. 
Please hold them subject to the general’s orders for that purpose. 
Should you be informed that they are not needed here you will 
be at liberty to substitute one of them for Couch’s or Casey’s 
division. It is hoped to get Stoneman’s command in rear of the 
enemy before you attack. Watch the enemy closely with your 
cavalry, and should he retreat attack him without further instruc¬ 
tions. The gunboats have gone up the York river, and Frank¬ 
lin’s, and perhaps one other division, will follow up to-day. As 
soon as the bridges are finished you can cross * your command and 
bring them into position, but do not attack unless the enemy re¬ 
treat or you receive orders from me. 

“A. V. Colburn, 

“A. A. G.” 

It is unnecessary to say that the object of forbidding an 
attack unless the enemy retreated was to enable Stoneman 
to get in their rear and thus cut off the entire command. 

After the orders to Stoneman, Sumner, and Heintzel¬ 
man had been issued and were being carried out I received 
the following: 

“Headquarters, Smith’s Division, May 4. 

“Gen. McClellan: 

“Gen. Hancock is in front, and, from what I have learned, 
presume it is nothing but the rear-guard. I will obey his orders 
as far as engaging them is concerned. The enemy is one and a 
half miles in front, and it is probably nothing but cavalry cover¬ 
ing the retreat. 


— 83 — 


“W. F. Smith, 

“ Brig.-Gen 


McClellan's Own Story 

“Headquarters, Smith’s Division, 
“May 5, 10:30 p.m. 

“Gen. McClellan : 

“There is a direct road from here to Williamsburg behind the 
big fort. If you send a good man to command, and these men 
don’t leave to-night, we can capture them all in the morning and 
be at Williamsburg by eight o’clock. If they don’t leave to-night 
they will give us a big fight in the morning, and we shall whip 
them. 

“Don’t risk yourself any more, or your commanders, and don’t 
send Richardson to command this column. As far as I can see 
it is open country for cavalry, but the rain has made the ground 
soft. I have more troops—or shall have with Brooks—than I need 
to defend myself, but it is my earnest opinion that your advance up 
the James should be this way. 

“W. F. Smith.” 

On the back of a pencil-sketch of the ground is the fol¬ 
lowing : 

“Two companies garrison each fort. Fort Magruder is the 
far one from here—one and a quarter miles; second fort occupied; 
third fort, near York, is yet unfinished. They seem to be quiet 
now. Please order Brooks and Ayres to me in the morning at 
daylight. I have plenty of troops, but wish our own. 

“W. F. S.” 


“Mount Zion Church, 
May 5, 3 p.m. 

“Gen. McClellan: 

“Owing to delays in the troops coming forward, I have come 
down here to hasten their march, by direction of Gen. Sumner. 
Within the last thirty minutes he has sent me two messengers to 
say that the enemy was gaining ground on him. I fear nothing 
except a panic amongst our troops, for I am certain we are vastly 
superior in strength to the enemy. I went myself with a brigade 
of my corps, which took possession of two works on the left of 
the enemy. I convinced myself that the enemy commenced his 
audacious attack upon us to cover a retreat, but, finding that he 
forces us back, he may convert his feint into something more 
serious than was at first intended. It may be advisable, if you 
have troops to spare, to set some of them in motion for this point; 
but, above all, come yourself. 

“The rear of Gen. Kearny has just passed this point on his 
way to reinforce Gen. Hooker, and the head of his column has 
probably reached the scene of action; and the firing has ceased 
for the last ten minutes. 

“I write this note because the badness of the road, preventing 
the rapid concentration of troops, makes me anxious to take pre¬ 
caution against the possibility of reverses. As the roads must soon 
become absolutely impassable for supplies, otir troops must starve 
unless you can send provision by boats to skirt the shore, and to 


— 84 — 


Letters and Despatches 


be put ashore in small boats. Our position is accessible to York 
river. The men can live on bread and bacon. 

“In haste, your obedient servant, 

“E. D. Keyes, 

“ Brig.-Gen. J+th Corps. 

“P.S. An officer from Gen. Hooker’s division reports this moment 
that three of his batteries have been taken by the pieces miring and 
the horses being killed. This officer reports that the men are ex¬ 
hausted for the want of proper food.” 


“In Front of Williamsburg, 
“May 5, 1862. 11:20 a.m. 

“Capt. Chauncey McKeever, A. A. G.: 

“I have had a hard contest all morning, but do not despair of 
success. My men are hard at work, but a good deal exhausted. 
It is reported to me that my communication with you by the York- 
town road is clear of the enemy. Batteries, cavalry, and infantry 
can take front by the side of mine to whip the enemy. 

“Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 

“Hooker, 

“ Brig.-Gen, 


“May 5, late at night. 

“My dear General: I did the best I could after getting your 
order, which was after dark some time. I sent a brigade (Martin- 
dale’s) to occupy the front of York. The roads were horrible and 
blocked up by wagons, so that they were impassable. The brigade 
reached York. I sent some of Hunt’s batteries; they got there 
and halted. The remainder I kept ready to march at two o’clock 
or as soon as light enough. All are rested and fresh. Sykes’s and 
my other brigades are in camp, also Blake. Franklin, I think, got 
off. I hope you have got order out of chaos. Capt. Norton says 
Ingalls told him he had received an order from the secretary to fit 
out a sea expedition, which would derange his plans considerably. 
A telegram can always reach me from York. We are ready to 
move quickly. I have directed Martindale to camp at York. 

“Yours ever, 

“F. J. Porter.” 


Headquarters, Army of the Potomac, 
Williamsburg, May 7, 1862, 12:30 p.m. 
Gen. R. B. Marcy, Chief of Staff , Camp Winfield Scott: 

General: Headquarters will be moved at once to this place; 
wagons light. Porter will complete his embarkation as rapidly 
as possible and join Franklin. The artillery of the divisions Franklin, 
Sedgwick, and Porter will proceed by water, with the least possible 
delay to join their divisions, also Franklin’s cavalry and as many 
wagons as possible. Hunt’s heavy batteries will move to Brick 
House landing by water. I will give orders in regard to the rest of 
Hunt’s batteries, the regular infantry, Roach’s and Gregg’s cavalry 
shortly. 


McClellan’s Own Story 


Please send me last news from Franklin, and if necessary, 
send a fast special boat to learn state of affairs, and communicate 
on return with signal party at Queen’s creek, as well as via York- 
town by telegraph. The orders for Sumner and Richardson will 
be given to-day; in the meantime let neither embark without special 
orders from me: this is imperative. 

How soon can the artillery of Franklin, Sedgwick, and Porter 
be embarked? How soon Franklin’s cavalry? How soon will 
transports be ready for the regular infantry and Richardson? How 
soon can water-transportation be furnished for Duane and his train? 
For Woodbury and his trains? How soon for Gregg and Rush? How 
many wagons has Van Vliet in reserve (for general purposes? 
If you send steamer to Franklin, inform him that Stoneman was 
some fourteen miles from here a couple of hours ago, and will try 
to communicate with him via Hockaday’s Spring this evening. I 
start Smith’s division this evening, and hope to get most of the 
column in motion by the morning. Will move in person to-morrow 
morning. Would like to have a gunboat examine Moody’s wharf, 
to see whether burned. 

G. B. McClellan, 
Maj.-Gen. Commanding. 

\ 

“Brick House Point, May 6, 1862. 

“Gen. G. B. McClellan: 

“I am landing at Brick House Point. It is, however, a bad land¬ 
ing; the water shoal for a long distance out—a quarter of a mile 
from shore. One brigade is landed. The enemy is said to be in 
force on the road, watching this point; I do not believe it, however. 

I hope to get the artillery and two other brigades off before morning. 

“W. B. Franklin, 

“Brig.-Gen.” 


“Brick House, May 7, a.m. 

“Gen. G. B. McClellan: 

“All of my division has landed except the cavalry. The night 
passed with nothing unusual except the killing of one picket. We 
have two prisoners, taken when we first arrived; they belong to a 
Texan regiment, are very intelligent, but lie, I think. I send them 
to Yorktown by the Spaulding. Dana’s brigade is here and will be 
landed this morning. The indications are that the enemy is in 
the vicinity. 

“W. B. Franklin, 

“Brig.-Gen.” 


“Brick House, May 7, 1862. 

“Gen. G. B. McClellan: 

“The road from Brick House Point to the main road is not 
as laid down on the photographic or C. S. maps. The right flank 
and rear are surrounded by a creek, and the left flank has another 
creek, leaving a small opening through which the road winds. I 
have ordered an examination to determine more accurately these 
points, but it is a slow business on account of want of cavalry. I 
still think that it may be an open question between this point and West 
Point. 

“W. B. Franklin, 

“Brig.-Gen.” 


— 86 — 


Letters and Despatches 


“Headquarters, Franklin’s Division, 
“Brick House, May 7, 1862. 

“Gen. R. B. Marcy, Chief of Staff: 

“General: I have the honor to report that this morning, about 
seven o’clock, our pickets were driven in on our left flank, and that 
after skirmishing for about two hours the action became quite 
sharp at the right extremity of that flank. Our reserves were 
driven in several times, but returned to their position each time 
with ardor. Finally we held the position which we had taken in 
the morning, and at several points of the line advanced our position. 

“Wherever we advanced the enemy was found in rifle-pits. The 
day has been a success, and but for the extreme want of forage 
and provisions owing to the deficiency of transportation and the 
difficulty of landing, we might have followed it up. As it is, I 
congratulate myself that we have maintained our position. Gen. 
Newton’s command was most severely engaged, and his conduct 
and that of Gen. Slocum, who had charge respectively of the left 
and right wings, was admirable. All of the officers and men be¬ 
haved admirably, and with transportation and forage we could move 
on to-morrow. 

“I respectively request that instructions may be given to send 
up forage and transportation immediately, as we are entirely tied 
down for want of them. Gen. Sedgwick’s infantry has arrived. The 
killed and wpunded amount to nearly a hundred. A more detailed 
report will be given as soon as possible. 

“Very respectfully, 

“W. B. Franklin, 

“Brig.-Gen.” 

Camp 19 Miles from Williamsburg, 
May 11, 1862. 

Hon. E. M. Stanton , Secretary of War , Fortress Monroe: 

Without waiting for further official reports which have not 
yet reached me, I wish to bear testimony to the splendid conduct 
of Hooker’s and Kearny’s divisions, under command of Gen. Heint- 
zelman, in the battle of Williamsburg. Their bearing was worthy 
of veterans. Hooker’s division for hours gallantly withstood the 
attack of greatly superior numbers with very heavy loss. Kearny’s 
arrived in time to restore the fortunes of the day, and came most 
gallantly into action. I shall probably have occasion to call at¬ 
tention to other commands, and do not wish to do injustice to them 
by mentioning them now. If I had had the full information I now 
have in regard to the troops above-named when I first telegraphed, 
they would have been specially mentioned and commended. I spoke 
only of what I knew at the time, and shall rejoice to do full justice 
to all engaged. 

G. B. McClellan, 
Maj.-Gen. Commanding. 


—87 — 


CHAPTER XVIII 

Private Letters. 

[April 1 to May 5, 1862.] 

Steamer “Commodore,” April 1, 1862, Potomac River, 4:15 p.m. 
—As soon as possible after reaching Alexandria I got the Commodore 
under way and “put off.” I did not fell safe until I could fairly 
see Alexandria behind us. I have brought a tug with us to take 
back despatches from Budd’s Ferry, where I shall stop a few hours 
for the purpose of winding up everything. I found that if I remained 
at Alexandria I would be annoyed very much, and perhaps be sent for 
from Washington. . . . Officially speaking, I feel very glad to 

get away from that sink of iniquity. 

8 p.m. —-I have just returned from a trip in one of the naval 
vessels with Capt. Seymour to take a look at the rebel batteries 
(recently abandoned) at shipping Point, etc. They were pretty 
formidable, and it would have given us no little trouble to take 
possession of them had they held firm. It makes only the more evident 
the propriety of my movements by which Manassas was forced to be 
evacuated and these batteries with it. The trip was quite interesting. 

Steamer “Commodore,” April 3, Hampton Roads, 1:30 P.M.— 
... I have been up to my eyes in business since my arrival. We 
reached here about four yesterday p.m., ran into the wharf and 
unloaded the horses, then went out and anchored. Marcy and I 
at once took a tug and ran out to the flag-ship Minnesota to see 
Goldsborough, where we remained until about nine, taking tea with 
him. 

On our return we found Gen. Heintzelman, soon followed by 
Porter and Smith, all of whom remained here all night. I sat up 
very late arranging movements, and had my hands full. I have 
been hard at work all the morning and not yet on shore. Dine with 
Gen. Wool to-day at four, and go thence to our camp. We move 
to-morrow a.m. Three divisions take the direct road to Yorktown, 
and will encamp at Howard’s Bridge. Two take the James River 
road and go to Young’s Mill. The reserve goes to Big Bethel, where 
my headquarters will be to-morrow night. 

My great trouble is in the want of wagons—a terrible draw¬ 
back; but I cannot wait for them. I hope to get possession, before 
to-morrow night, of a new landing-place some seven or eight miles 
from Yorktown, which will help us very much. It is probable that 
we shall have some fighting to-morrow; not serious, but we may 
have the opportunity of drubbing Magruder. The harbor here is 
very crowded; facilities for landing are bad. I hope to get posses¬ 
sion of Yorktown day after to-morrow. Shall then arrange to make 
the York river my line of supplies. The great battle will be (I 
think) near Richmond, as I have always hoped and thought. I see 
my way very clearly, and with my trains once ready, will move 
rapidly. . . . 

Telegram — Great Bethel, April 4, 1862, 6 p.m.— My advanced 
guard five miles from Yorktown. Some slight skirmishing to-day. 
Our people driving rebels. Hope to invest Yorktown to-morrow. 
All well and in good spirits. 

Big Bethel, April 5, 2 a.m.— . . . Have just got through with 
the orders for to-morrow; have been working very hard, and have 

? 


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Private Letters 


sent off officers and orderlies in every direction. I feel sure of 
to-morrow. I have, I think, provided against every contingency, 
and shall have the men well in hand if we fight to-morrow. . . . 
I saw yesterday a wonderfully cool performance. Three or our men 
had gone close down to the enemy’s position after a sheep, which they 
killed, skinned, and started off with. They were, of course, fired 
at frequently, and in the course of their travels a 12-pound shot 
struck directly by them. They quietly picked up the shot, 
held on to the sheep, and brought the shot to me, yet warm. I 
never saw so cool and gallant a set of men; they do not seem to 
know what fear is. 

Near Yorktown/ April 6, 1 a.m. — ... I find the enemy in 
strong force and in very strong position, but will drive him out. 
Fitz-John is in the advance on the right, Baldy on the left; they are 
doing splendidly. Their divisions have been under fire all the 
afternoon; have lost only about five killed in each, and have pun¬ 
ished secesh badly. Thus far it has been altogether an artillery 
affair. 

While listening this p.m. to the sound of the guns I received 
an order detaching McDowell’s corps from my command. It is 
the most infamous thing that history has recorded. I have made 
such representations as will probably induce a revocation of the 
order, or at least save Franklin to me. The idea of depriving a 
general of 35,000 troops when actually under fire! 

To-morrow night I can tell you exactly what I intend doing. 
We have no baggage to-night, our wagons being detained by the 
bad roads. I have taken possession of a hut in a deserted secesh 
camp; found a table therein, and sleep on a horse-blanket, if I 
find time to “retire.” Colburn is copying a long letter; Seth, stand¬ 
ing by the fire, looking very sleepy. He wakes up and sends his 
kindest regards, in which Colburn asks to participate. I am sorry 
to say that your father is snoring loudly in a corner. 

April 6, 1:40 p.m.— . . . Did not get to bed until 3:30, and 
then my bed was a rather rough one, as our wagons did not arrive. 
Things quiet to-day; very little firing; our people are pushing their 
reconnoissances and getting up supplies. I shall take the place, but 
may be some time in effecting it. 

April 8, 8 A.M. —Raining hard all night, and still continues to 
do so. Am now encamped about five miles from Yorktown; have 
been here two or three days. Have now visited both the right and 
left, and, in spite of the heavy rain, must ride to Ship Point and 
our right immediately after breakfast. All I care for about the 
rain is the health and comfort of the men. They are more fond of 
me than ever; more enthusiastic than I deserve; wherever I go it 
seems to inspire the fullest confidence. . . . 

I have raised an awful row about McDowell’s corps. The 
President very coolly telegraphed me yesterday that he thought 
I had better break the enemy’s lines at once! I was much tempted 
to reply that he had better come and do it himself. 

April 9, near Yorktown , 8 a.m.— .... Last night returned late 
and was fully occupied with reports of reconnoissances, etc., until 
very late. 

It rained nearly every moment yesterday, all the night before, 
all last night, but has now stopped, though likely to commence 
again at any moment. It is execrable weather; everything knee- 
deep in mud; roads infamous: but we still get through it. I have 


— 89 — 



McClellan’s Own Story 


had great difficulty in arranging about supplies—so few wagons 
and such bad roads. Rode down to Ship Point yesterday morning. 

9 a.m.—I nterrupted and unable to finish. Have been bothered 
all the evening, but am getting things straightened out. . . . Start 
for the Point in a few minutes. 

/ 

April 10, 10 p.m.—H ave had a pretty long ride to-day. Sec¬ 
retary Fox spent last night, with me. As. soon as he had gone I 
rode to Porter’s camp, thence to the river-bank to meet Capt. Miss- 
room, commanding the gunboats. Have had an excellent view of 
the water defences of Yorktown, as well as of Gloucester. The 
enemy is very strong and is adding to his w.orks and the number 
of his men. I could see them coming in on schooners. But as my 
heavy guns are not yet landed, and the navy do not feel strong 
enough to go at them, I can only hurry forward our preparations 
and trust that the more they have the more I shall catch. . . . 

Yesterday I also spent on the right, taking, under cover of the 
heavy rain, a pretty good look at the ground in front of York and 
its defences. I got back about dark, pretty wet and tired out. 
. . . To-morrow we move headquarters to a much better and more 
convenient camp further to the front. . . . The present camp is a 
little too far from the scene of the most important operations. 

April 11.—I am just recovering from a terrible scare. Early 
this morning I was awakened by a despatch from Fitz-John’s head¬ 
quarters stating that Fitz had made an ascension in the balloon 
this morning, and that the balloon had broken away and come to 
the ground some three miles southwest, which would be within the 
enemy’s lines. You can imagine how I felt. I at once sent off to 
the various pickets to find out what they knew and try to do some¬ 
thing to save him, but the order had no sooner gone than in walks 
Mr. Fitz just as cool as usual. He had luckily come down near my 
own camp after actually passing over that of the enemy. You may 
rest assured of one thing: you won’t catch me in the confounded 
balloon, nor will I allow any other generals to go up in it. 

Don’t worry about the wretches; they have done nearly their 
worst, and can’t do much more. I am sure that I will win in the 
end, in spite of all their rascality. History will present a sad 
record of these traitors who are willing to sacrifice the country and 
its army for personal spite and personal aims. The people will 
soon understand the whole matter. 

April 14, 11 p.m., Camp Winfield Scott. — ... I believe I now 
know who instigated the attack upon me and the country. ... So 
Fox told you all about our troubles. They were severe for some 

time, but we are pretty well over the worst of them.I do not 

expect to lose many men, but to do the work mainly with artillery 
and so avoid much loss of life. Several brave fellows have already 
gone to their long home, but not a large number. 

I can’t tell you how soon I will attack, as it will depend upon 
the rapidity with which certain preliminary work can be done and 
the heavy guns brought up. I do not fear a repulse. I shall not 
quit the camp until I do so to continue the march on Richmond. If 
I am repulsed once, will try again, and keep it up until we succeed. 

But I do not anticipate a repulse; am confident of success.I 

received to-day a very kind letter from old Mr. Blair, which I enclose 
for you to keep for me. . . . Remained at home this morning, doing 
office-work, but rode out all the afternoon; rode to the front and took 
another look at secesh. . . . 


? 


— 90 — 




Private Letters 


8:30 A.M., 15th .—Am about starting for the gunboats, which 
are anchored near here, to take a better look at the opposite 
shore. ... It is raining a little this morning—not much more than 
a drizzle. . . . 


April 18, 1:15 a.m.— . . . About a half-hour ago the accus¬ 
tomed intermittent sound of artillery was varied in its monotony 
by a very heavy and continued rattle of musketry, with the ac¬ 
companiment of a very respectable firing of artillery. I started 
at once for the telegraph-office, and endeavored in vain for some 
ten or fifteen minutes to arouse the operators at the stations in 
the direction of the firing. So I ordered twenty of the escort 
to saddle up, and started off Hudson, Sweitzer, and the Due de 
Chartres to learn the state of the case. The firing has ceased 
now for some minutes, and I am still ignorant as to its where¬ 
abouts and cause. Of course I must remain up until I know what 
it is. I had had Arthur, Wright, Hammerstein, Radowitz, and 
the Comte de Paris, as well as Colburn, also up, with some of the 
escort ready to move or carry orders, as the case may be, but just 
now told them to lie down until I sent for them. It is a beautiful 
moonlight night, clear and pleasant—almost too much so for sleeping. 
Poor Wagner, of the Topogs, lost an arm this afternoon by the 
bursting of a shell; he is doing well, however. 

Merrill was severely but not dangerously wounded in the arm 
yesterday. In Smith’s affair yesterday we lost, I fear, nearly 
200 killed and wounded. The object I proposed had been fully 
accomplished with the loss of about 20, when, after I left the ground, 
a movement was made in direct violation of my orders, by which 
the remainder of the loss was uselessly incurred. I do not yet 
know the details nor who is responsible. We have a severe task 
before us, but we will gain a brilliant success. . . . Colburn is 
my stand-by—so true and faithful. Many of my aides are excellent. 
No general ever labored under greater disadvantages, but I will 
carry it through in spite of everything. I hope Franklin will be 
here to-morrow or next day. I will then invest Gloucester and 
attack it at the same time I do York. When the Galena arrives 
I will cause it to pass the batteries, take them in reverse, and cut 
off the enemy’s communications by York river. As I write I hear 
our guns constantly sounding and the bursting of shells in Secession. 

9 p.m.— The firing of last night was caused by the attempt of 
a part of the enemy to cross the stream in Smith’s front. They 
were repulsed at once; tried it later, and were again driven back. 

April 19, 10:30 p.m.— .... To-day it has been very quiet; 
our batteries have merely fired enough to keep the enemy en¬ 
tirely silent at his work in front of Smith and at Wynn’s Mill. 
Last night we commenced a battery, at Farnholdt’s house, for five 
100-pounder Parrotts and one 200-pounder Parrott; also one for 
fifteen heavy guns about two thousand yards from the enemy’s 
main defences; another for six and one for five close by. Another 
for six was armed to-day, and kept down the enemy’s fire at Wynn’s 
Mill. To-morrow evening we commence batteries for thirteen mortars. 
About Monday night we will construct the first parallel and several 
other batteries in exposed positions, leaving those already commenced 
to cover the work and render it more safe. We shall soon be raining 
down a terrible tempest on this devoted place. To-day the enemy 
sent a flag of truce to Smith, asking a suspension of hostilities to bury 
the killed of the 16th. The officer who met with Sweitzer acknowledged 


■ 91 — 


McClellan’s Own Story 


that their loss was very severe and the bearing of our men admirable. 
I received to-day a letter from Burnside, which I enclose. . . . 

Franklin arrived yesterday and spent the night in my tent. 
He is at Ship Point to-night; I expect his division to-morrow. . . . 

. . . . Don’t be at all discouraged; all is going well. I know exactly 
what I am about. I can’t go “with a rush” over strong posts. 
I must use heavy guns and silence their fire; all that takes much 
time, and I have not been longer than the usual time for such things— 
much less than the usual, in truth. . . . 

I can’t tell you when Yorktown is to be attacked, for it de¬ 
pends on circumstances that I cannot control. It shall be at¬ 
tacked the first moment I can do it successfully. But I don’t intend 
to hurry it; I cannot afford to fail. I may have the opportunity 
of carrying the place next week, or may be delayed a couple of 
weeks; much, of course, depends on the rapidity with which the 
heavy guns and ammunition arrive. Never mind what such people 

as - say; they are beneath contempt. ... I will put in a 

leaf of holly from the bower some of the men have made in front 
of my tent to-day. They have made quite an artistic thing of it— 
holly and pine; it adds much, too, to my comfort, as it renders the 
tent more private and cool. 

April 20, 7:30 A.M.— ... It has been raining more or less 
all night, and if it were not for the men I would enjoy the rain, 
for I rather like to hear it patter on the tent. 

I have a fire in my stove this morning, so it is quite comfort¬ 
able. My tent is the same the aides use for an office; it has a 
floor of pine boughs—a carpet of boughs, I suppose I ought to say 
—a table in the middle, a desk in one corner, my bed in another, 
my saddle in another, a wood pile, etc., in the last. I have a 
splendid two-legged washstand which Charles’ ingenuity devised. Then 
I have a clothes-rack, consisting of a sappling with the stumps of 
the branches projecting. So you see I am living quite eri prince. 

April 21.—Yesterday was rather unpleasant; rained a good 
deal. To-day about the same; not raining much yet, but a kind 
of drizzle. Had a letter yesterday from Francis B. Cutting, of 
New York, hoping that I would not allow these treacherous hounds 
to drive me from my path. Have just replied to it. 

April 22, 11:15 p.m.— . . . The enemy has been blazing away 
a good deal to-day, but hurt nothing, however; he tried his best 
at a skirmish with some of Smith’s men this morning, but was 
repulsed with loss. It is said that some of his troops were blacks. 
I do not however, give full credit to this. It seems too improbable 
to be true. The navy have been firing this morning at long range. 

April 23, 7 a.m.— . . . Some few shots fired already, but not 
many: secesh don’t mean to get up very early. I am rather anx¬ 
ious to hear the results of last night’s work; for I am in hopes that 
I can get all the batteries that have been commenced well aimed 
to-night, so that the first parallel may be commenced at once. 
The weather has cleared off beautifully again, so that I am in 
strong hopes we shall have no more rain for some time. You 
have no idea of the effect of a couple of days’ rain in this country; 
roads, camps, etc., become impassable. . . . 

11:30 p.m.— . . . Have been working hard all day, but not in 
the saddle; it has been head-work in my tent to-day. I am getting 
on splendidly with “slow preparations.” The prince is delighted 
and thinks my work gigantic. I do believe that I am avoiding 


— 92 — 



Private Letters 


the fault of the Allies at Sebastopol, and quietly preparing the 
way for great success. I have brought forty heavy guns in bat¬ 
tery; to-morrow night I hope to have twelve new guns and five 
to ten heavy mortars in battery. I begin in the morning the 
redoubts to cover the flank of the first parallel, which will be con¬ 
structed to-morrow night. I will not open fire unless the enemy 
annoys us, hoping to get all the guns in battery and the trenches weil 
advanced before meeting with serious opposition. We have done 
much more than they suspect. Have ordered a forced reconnojs- 
sance of a dangerous point in the morning; it may cost several 
lives, but I have taken all possible precautions, and hope to gain 
the information necessary with but little loss. There is no other 
choice than to run the risk. . . . Everything is as quiet now as if 
there were no enemy within a hundred miles of us. The Galena, 
under Rodgers, will be here by day after to-morrow. 

April 26.—Again raining, and has been all the morning. Grover 
carried a redoubt of the rebel-s most handsomely this morning. It 
was one from which they had it in their power to annoy the left 
of our parallels, and it was an object to get rid of it. The work 
was handsomely done; the work carried by assault, and then so much 
destroyed that it can be of no further use to the rebels. Fifteen 
prisoners were taken in the affair. We lost three killed, one mor¬ 
tally and about ten others slightly wounded; have not all the details 
yet. We got eight immense mortars up by water last night; 
but a canal-boat loaded with empty shells ran aground in 
sight of secesh, who has been blazing away at them; sent one shot 
through. He has stopped firing now, probably because he can¬ 
not see on account of the rain. To-night we complete the first par¬ 
allel, which will be nearly four thousand yards long—an immense 
work. From the manner in which our men pitched into the little 
redoubt this morning it is clear that the morale is on our side. The 
men found quite a deep and broad ditch in front of the affair, but 
over it they went without a moment’s hesitation! 

April 27, midnight .— ... Was engaged with Barnard, Porter, 
etc., until about one, when I rode to the trenches. Then, of course, 
had to walk; a good deal was muddy, so it was tiresome. Went over 
the whole extent and saw everything with care. The enemy have 
fired a good deal to-day, but the men are now so well covered that 
no one has been hurt to-day. Commenced to-day batteries for fif¬ 
teen 10-inch mortars, and to-night another battery for heavy guns; 
another for ten mortars to-morrow morning; an extension of the 
parallel on the left commenced to-night. By to-morrow night the 
parallel shall be finished in all its details, as well as the two cover¬ 
ing redoubts on the left. Some time day after to-morrow I hope to 
have thirty-five mortars in battery. To-morrow night will open a 
tuyau in advance leading to a new gun-battery fast getting ready 
to blow secesh up. He will have a bad time of it when we open. 
Have news this evening via Richmond that New Orleans is in our 
possession. I presume it is true. So the work goes bravely on. . . . 
Yesterday made Fitz Porter “Director of the Siege”—a novel title, 
but made necessary by the circumstances of the case. I give all 
my orders relating to the siege through him, making him at the same 
time commandant of the siege operations and a chief of staff for that 
portion of the work. This new arrangement will save me much 
trouble, and relieve my mind greatly, and save much time. In go¬ 
ing over the line of trenches yesterday I found so many blunders 
committed that I was very thankful to put Porter on duty at once. . . . 


— 93 — 


/ 


McClellan’s Own Story 


The good fellow (Colburn) never leaves me; wherever I ride he 
sticks close after me. He is one of the very best men I ever knew, 
so thoroughly honest and reliable. His judgment is excellent and he 
is perfectly untiring. Day and night are about the same to him, and 
he will start on a long ride at midnight in a pitch-dark or rainy 
night with as much good-humor as at midday. “Kentuck” (horse) 
is still at Fort Monroe sick; will rejoin in a few days, I hope. Marsh 
is with him, and I am sometimes half-wicked enough to suspect that 
Marsh finds Fort Monroe more comfortable than camp would be. 

April 28, 11:45 p.m. . . . Rode out this p.m., and went over 
most of the ground from right to left. Commenced some new work 
still more to the front to-night; as it was exposed and dangerous, 
and required noiseless and rapid working, I as usual gave it to the 
regulars to do. Have this moment heard that although the rebels 
have been firing a great deal (there goes another gun), they have 
wounded but one man; the men should be well covered by this time, 
so I fancy the work is safe. I have also (there goes another gun) 
ordered a lot of rifle-pits for sharpshooters to be pushed out well 
to the front; we will, I hope, gain a good deal of ground to-night. 
Am getting on nicely. Will have some more batteries ready for their 
guns by to-morrow p.m., and will very shortly be able to open on se- 
cesh. He tried to annoy one of our working parties this morning 
with a couple of guns; I sent out a field-battery and silenced him 
after four rounds. 

8 a.m. —Colburn came back from the trenches after midnight, 
and reported all going on well; the regulars had covered themselves 
well by that time, and the fire of the enemy had only wounded one 
man, and that not badly. Clitz was in command of the working 
party last night. To-day weather good; will not rain. Hope to 
make good progress this morning. Good deal of firing going on now. 

April 30, A.M. —Had a quiet night; very little firing; drove them 
out of an orchard whence they had been annoying us, and pushed 
them still further in towards their works. A good deal of firing 
on their part yesterday; did very little harm, killing some three and 
wounding four or five of our people. Scarcely a gun fired to-day as 
yet; we are working like horses and will soon be ready to open. It 
will be a tremendous affair when we do begin, and will, I hope, make 
short work of it. . . . Have put the regulars on the exposed por¬ 
tions of the work, they work so much better. A raw, disagreeable 
day; I fear it will rain—unless it snows; wind from east. . . . 

10:30 p.m. —After I got through my morning work went down to 
see the opening of Battery No. 1. It worked handsomely; drove all 
the rebel schooners away from the wharf, and made a general scat- 
teration. The effect was excellent. Shall not open the general fire 
for some four days—I hope on Monday a.m. 

Next Morning (May 1).—Another wet, drizzly, uncomfortable 
sort of day. Good deal of firing during the night. I shall be very 
glad when we are really ready to open fire, and then finish this 
confounded affair. I am tired of public life; and even now, when 
I am doing the best I can for my country in the field, I know that 
my enemies are pursuing me more remorselessly than ever, and “kind 
friends” are constantly making themselves agreeable by informing 
me of the pleasant predicament in which I am—the rebels on one 
side, and the abolitionists and other scoundrels on the other. I be¬ 
lieve in my heart and conscience, however, that I am walking on the 
ridge between the two gulfs, and all that I have to do is to try to 


— 94 — 



Private Letters 


keep the path of honor and truth, and that God will bring me safely 
through. At all events I am willing to leave the matter in His 
hands, and will be content with the decision of the Almighty. 

May 3, 12:30 p.m.— After the hot firing of to-day everything is 
so unusually still that I am a little suspicious that our friends may 
intend a sortie; so I have taken all the steps necessary to be ready 
for them, and am sitting up for a while to await developments. I 
feel much better satisfied when they are firing than when they are 
silent. To-day they have wasted about a thousand rounds and have 
done us no harm worth speaking of, except (Irish) bursting one of 
their own guns. We are now nearly ready to open; shall begin, I think, 
on Monday morning, certainly by Tuesday. If all works well it is 
not impossible that we shall have Yorktown by Wednesday or Thurs¬ 
day. The task is a difficult one, yet I am sure we have taken the 
right way to accomplish our purpose, and that we will soon win. I 
fear that we are to have another storm to-night. We want 
no more rain, but will make the best of it if it comes. Had plenty 
of work to do at home all the morning, and in the afternoon rode 
down to “Shield’s House” to meet tlie new commander of the flotilla, 
Capt. Smith. ... I don’t half like the perfect quietness which reigns 
now. I have given orders to take advantage of it and push our ap¬ 
proaches as far forward as possible. It don’t seem natural. It looks 
like a sortie or an evacuation. If either, I hope it may be the for¬ 
mer. I do not want these rascals to get away from me without a 
sound drubbing, which they richly deserve and will be sure to get 

if they remain.I feel that the fate of a nation depends upon me, 

and I feel that I have not one single friend at the seat of govern¬ 
ment. Any day may bring an order relieving me from command. 
If they will simply let me alone I feel sure of success; but will they 
do it? 

May 5, 9:30 a.m. — . . . You will have learned ere this that York¬ 
town is ours. It is a place of immense strength, and was very 
heavily armed. It so happened that our preparation for the attack 
was equally formidable, so that Lee, Johnston, and Davis confessed 
that they could not hold the place. They evacuated it in a great 
hurry, leaving their heavy guns, baggage, etc. I sent the cavalry 
after them at once, and our advance is now engaged with them at 
Williamsburg. The weather is infamous; it has been raining all 
night, and is still raining heavily; no signs of stopping; roads awful. 
I hope to get to West Point to-day,, although the weather has delayed 
us terribly. It could not well be worse, but we will get through never¬ 
theless. The villians (secesh) have scattered torpedoes everywhere— 
by springs, wells, etc. It is the most murderous and barbarous thing 
I ever heard of. 


- 95 - 



CHAPTER XIX 


Confederate Retreat—Pursuit towards Williamsburg—Battle of 
Williamsburg—The horse Dan Webster. 

It appears that Gen. Johnston, the Confederate com¬ 
mander, regarded the position of Yorktown and the War¬ 
wick as easily held against a simple assault, but as unten¬ 
able against siege operations, or when we could pass up the 
York or James rivers; therefore he withdrew as soon as 
satisfied that we were on the point of using our heavy guns. 

He directed the movement to commence at dusk on the 
4th of May, Magruder’s command to move by the Lee’s Mill 
road, to halt at the junction of roads on the Yorktown side 
of Williamsburg, and occupy the line of fortifications; Long- 
street’s division to follow Magruder’s; D. H. Hill’s and G. 
W. Smith’s divisions to march by the Yorktown road. Long- 
street, Hill, and Smith were to pass through Williamsburg, 
Smith halting on the Barhamsville road far enough out 
to leave room for the other troops between himself and 
the town. It was expected that Magruder and Hill would 
clear the way to enable Longstreet and Smith to start at 
nine P.M., so that the whole army could reach Williams¬ 
burg soon after midnight; but it was sunrise of the 5th 
before Smith’s road was clear, and his rear reached the 
fortifications near Williamsburg about noon. He found 
that the fortifications were unoccupied; and as skirmish¬ 
ing was taking place about two miles back, he halted a 
small body whom he found between the works and Williams¬ 
burg, and reported the state of affairs to Gen. Johnston, 
who ordered back McLaw’s brigade and Stuart’s cavalry. 

Early in the morning of the 4th of May, the moment 
I learned that our troops were in possession of Yorktown 
and the line of the Warwick, I ordered Gen. Stoneman in 
pursuit with all the available force of cavalry and horse- 
artillery, supported by infantry, on both the Lee’s Mill and 
Yorktown roads to Williamsburg. 

The next, and by far the most important, step was to 
throw Franklin’s division, supported promptly and strongly, 


— 96 — 


Pursuit of the Enemy 

as rapidly as possible up the York river by water, to land 
on its right bank opposite West Point, in order to take in 
reverse whatever works might exist between that point and 
Yorktown, and to cut off, if possible, the enemy’s trains 
and troops still south of the mouth of the Pamunkey. 

While keeping steadily in view Stoneman’s operations 
and his proper support, I at once turned my attention to 
expediting the movement up the York river by water. The 
weather was so bad and the wharf facilities at Yorktown 
so deficient that it was very difficult to bring order out of 
chaos, and Franklin’s division did not reach its destination 
until the 6th of May. 

On the morning of the 4th, then, Stoneman moved out 
of Yorktown with four batteries of horse-artillery, the 1st 
and 6th U. S. Cavalry, the 8th Ill. Cavalry, and Barker’s 
squadron of Ill. cavalry. Hooker’s division was ordered 
to move as rapidly as possible by the same road in support, 
and Heintzelman was ordered to hold himself in readiness 
to follow with Kearny’s division if necessary. 

Smith having reported the enemy’s infantry and cav¬ 
alry in force about one and a half miles in rear of Lee’s Mill, 
Stoneman was ordered to cut off their retreat in the vicin¬ 
ity of the Halfway House. At the same time Sumner, in 
command of the left, was ordered to restore the bridges 
over the Warwick and place Smith’s and Couch’s divisions 
of the 4th corps, and Casey’s if necessary, in front of the 
reported battle force, endeavoring to hold them where they 
were until Stoneman could gain their line of retreat; but 
attacking if they fell back. His pursuit was to be by the 
Lee’s Mill road, with Smith leading. The remaining divi¬ 
sions—those of Porter, Sedgwick, Richardson, and Sykes— 
were held in readiness to support either Keyes, Heintzelman, 
or Franklin, as might prove most advantageous. Stoneman 
was thus ordered not only to pursue and harass the enemy’s 
rear-guard, but also to endeavor to cut off those on the 
Lee’s Mill road in front of Sumner. 

About six miles from Yorktown Stoneman came upon 
the enemy’s pickets; two miles further on he came up with 
their rear-guard, a regiment of cavalry, posted on the fur- 


— 97 — 


McClellan's Own Story 


ther bank of a difficult ravine. Gibson’s battery soon drove 
them out of this position. At this point he sent Gen. Emory, 
with Benson’s battery, the 3d Penn., and Barker’s squad¬ 
ron, across to the Lee’s Mill road to cut off the force in 
front of Sumner, who was supposed to be advancing by 
that road. With the remainder of his force Stoneman 
pushed on as rapidly as safety permitted to occupy the junc¬ 
tion of the Yorktown and Lee’s Mill roads, about two miles 
south of Williamsburg. Before detaching Emory, Stone- 
man had communicated with Sumner’s advanced guard, 
and had also learned that Hooker was close behind on the 
Yorktown road. Gen. P. St. G. Cooke, commanding the 
advanced guard, consisting of a section of Gibson’s battery 
and a part of the 1st U. S. Cavalry, upon debouching from 
the wood found himself at the junction of the two roads 
immediately in front of a strong earthwork (Fort Ma- 
gruder) flanked by redoubts, and in presence of a strong 
rear-guard, consisting of a regiment of cavalry, one battery, 
and three regiments of infantry. With his small force 
Cooke made immediate dispositions to attack, and Stone- 
man hastened up the remainder of the 1st Cavalry and of 
Gibson’s battery. 

The cleared ground available for the operations of 
cavalry and artillery was so limited that only about three 
hundred cavalry and one battery could be brought into ac¬ 
tion. Foreseeing that he must soon retreat unless promptly 
supported by the infantry—some two miles in rear at last 
accounts—Stoneman formed the remainder of his force 
in a clearing half a mile in rear, in order to cover the with¬ 
drawal of his advanced guard, when that became neces¬ 
sary, and sent to hurry up the infantry. With great diffi¬ 
culty, so deep was the mud and so thick the abattis, Gib¬ 
son got his battery in position, and Col. W. A. Grier formed 
his regiment (1st U. S.) to support it. Meanwhile the 
enemy, strongly reinforced from his main body, had thrown 
himself into the abandoned works, and several regiments 
of infantry were seen moving in a direction threatening 
to turn Stoneman’s right, on which he directed Maj. L. Wil¬ 
liams, commanding the 6th U. S. Cavalry, to make a demon- 


— 98 — 


Williamsburg 

stration through the woods on the right in order to check 
the enemy until the infantry could arrive. 

The fire of Fort Magruder upon Cooke’s command was 
producing serious effects, and the 6th Cavalry had come up¬ 
on a strong force of infantry and cavalry, and was saved 
from destruction by a gallant charge made by Capt. Saun¬ 
ders, commanding the rear squadron, during the withdrawal 
of the regiment. 

Col. Grier had made two brilliant charges; men and 
horses were falling rapidly, and the enemy was receiving 
reinforcements every moment. After having held the posi¬ 
tion for about three-quarters of an hour Stoneman learned 
that Hooker could not get up for two hours. Under these 
circumstances, having done all in his power to hold his 
position, he fell back upon the clearing already occupied by 
his reserves, prepared to hold it to the utmost. He at least 
held the enemy to their works, and gave us the opportunity 
of fighting the battle of the next day. 

As already stated, Gen. Emory was detached at the 
Halfway House, and on reaching the Lee’s Mill road en¬ 
countered an equal force of the enemy, whom he drove back 
on the Lee’s Mill road, whence they escaped by a circuit¬ 
ous route along the banks of the James. Their escape was 
accounted for by the fact that Emory could not follow them 
without abandoning the road he was ordered to hold, and 
leaving his battery there unprotected, as he had no infantry. 
Smith’s advance reached Skiff’s creek at about 11:30, to 
find the bridge in flames and the road impassable. He 
therefore, by direction of Gen. Sumner, moved across to 
the Yorktown road, and following it, reached Stoneman’s 
position at about 5:30 o’clock, Gen. Sumner arriving with 
him and assuming command of all the troops at the front. 

Hooker’s division had encountered Smith’s filing into 
the Yorktown road, and was obliged to halt for some three 
or four hours until it had passed. Subsequently, on its ar¬ 
rival at Chesapeake Church, Gen. Heintzelman turned it off 
by a cross-road into the Lee’s Mill road, thus changing 
places with Smith. Marching part of the night, he came in 
sight of Fort Magruder early on the 5th. As soon as Smith 


— 99 — 


McClellan's Own Story 


reached the front his division was deployed and directed 
by Gen. Sumner to attack the works in front of him; but 
confusion arising in the dense forest, and darkness com¬ 
ing on, the attempt was deferred to the next day. 

The troops bivouacked in the woods, and a heavy rain 
began, which lasted till the morning of the 6th, and made 
the roads, already terribly cut up by the enemy’s troops 
and trains, almost impassable. Early in the evening of the 
4th I learned that Smith had reached the front, and that at 
six P.M. two more divisions would soon be ready, and were 
only waiting to rest the men and let them take a little food 
before attacking; and that the works would soon be carried, 
as they were then reported to be held only by a rear-guard 
of a regiment of cavalry, two guns, and four or five regi¬ 
ments of infantry. 

I therefore pushed with redoubled energy the arrange¬ 
ments to throw a force by water to the mouth of the Pa- 
munkey, and had not the slightest reason to suppose that 
my presence was at all necessary at the front. 

The position is about four miles in extent, the right 
resting on College creek, and the left on Queen’s creek; 
nearly three-fourths of its front being covered by tribu¬ 
taries of these two creeks, upon which there are ponds. 

The ground between the heads of the boundary streams 
is a cultivated plain, across which a line of detached works 
had been constructed, consisting of Fort Magruder, a large 
work in the centre with a bastion front, and twelve other 
redoubts and epaulments for field guns. 

The parapet of Fort Magruder is about six feet high 
and nine feet thick; the ditch nine feet wide and nine feet 
deep, filled with water. The length of the interior crest 
is about six hundred yards. The redoubts have strong pro¬ 
files, but are of small dimensions, having faces of about 
forty yards. The woods in front of the position were felled, 
and the open ground in front of the works was dotted with 
numerous rifle-pits. 

The roads leading from the lower part of the Penin¬ 
sula towards Williamsburg, one along the York river (the 
Yorktown road) and the other along the James (the 


— 100 — 


Battle of Williamsburg 

Lee’s Mill road), unite between the heads of the tributary 
streams a short distance in front of Fort Magruder, by 
which they are commanded, and debouch from the woods 
just before uniting. A branch from the James river road 
leaves it about one and three-fourths of a mile below Fort 
Magruder and unites with the road from Allen’s landing 
to Williamsburg, which crosses the tributary of College 
creek over a dam at the outlet of the pond, and passes just 
in rear of the line of works, being commanded by the three 
redoubts on the right of the line. At about the same dis¬ 
tance from Fort Magruder a branch leaves the York river 
road and crosses the tributary of Queen’s creek on a dam, 
and, passing over the position and through the woods in its 
rear, finally enters Williamsburg. This road was com¬ 
manded by redoubts on the left of the line of works. 

On the morning of the 5th the position of our troops 
was as follows: On the extreme left, Emory holding the 
road to Allen’s farm; next, on his right, Hooker’s division; 
next, in the centre, Stoneman, holding the main road; on 
his right Smith’s division. Kearny, Couch and Casey were 
still in rear, having bivouacked where the night overtook 
them. Couch and Casey were ordered to march at day¬ 
light to support Smith; at about nine o’clock Kearny was 
ordered up in support of Hooker. 

The battle of Williamsburg was an accident, brought 
about by the rapid pursuit of our troops. The enemy were 
very anxious to get beyond West Point before we could 
reach it by water. Late in the afternoon of the 4th Gen. 
G. W. Smith was ordered to march at 2:30 a.m. of the 5th, 
and place his position north of Barhamsville to check any 
attempt on the Confederate line of retreat from the upper 
York river. Longstreet and Hill were to follow Smith on 
the Barhamsville road for about six miles, and then turn 
off at the Burned Tavern and take the Charles City road to 
Richmond via Long bridge. Magruder was to move by New 
Kent Court-House and Bottom bridge. From Barhamsville 
Smith was to follow Magruder. Smith commanded the 
troops on the New Kent Court-House* road, Longstreet 
those on the Charles City road. The rain made the roads 


— 101 — 


McClellan’s Own Story 


so bad that when we caught up with their rear-guard they 
were forced to reinforce it from their main body, and hold 
the works as long as possible, in order to enable their trains 
to escape. 

On the afternoon of the 4th Longstreet’s division, six 
brigades, had halted near Williamsburg, four brigades at 
or in rear of the line of works, two brigades, Wilcox and 
Colston, on the Richmond side. About seven next morn¬ 
ing Wilcox was ordered to return to the line of works and 
report to Gen. Anderson. Wilcox was placed on the right 
and about one thousand yards in front of Fort Magruder, 
and at the time held the right of the Confederate line, 
posted in the pine-woods with occasional clearings. He sup¬ 
posed that there was nothing but cavalry in his front, but, 
sending two companies into the woods, they captured three 
of our infantry soldiers; whereupon he sent in a Missis¬ 
sippi regiment, deployed as skirmishers with orders to ad¬ 
vance until forced to halt, and to find out what was in front. 
Up to this time there had been merely a dropping fire of 
skirmishers, giving the impression that the woods were 
held by dismounted cavalry; but now heavy firing followed, 
and the report came back to Wilcox that three United States 
brigades were there in position. These brigades composed 
Hooker’s division. And all this must have taken place 
between nine and ten A.M. 

Wilcox immediately sent for reinforcements, and the 
rest of Longstreet’s division gradually came to his support, 
mostly being placed on his right, Gen. Richard Anderson 
finally taking command. Early in the afternoon, being 
apprehensive for his right, Anderson again attacked, took 
five guns of Webber’s battery, and brought Hooker to a 
standstill, inflicting heavy losses. 

Between three and four o’clock Kearny reached the 
front. He had received the order to advance at nine o’clock, 
but, from the condition of the roads and their being 
blocked with troops, with all his energy and exertions he 
was unable to reach Hooker until the time mentioned. He 
at once relieved Hooker’s exhausted troops, and, promptly 
attacking, drove back the enemy at every point. Hooker’s 


— 102 — 


Battle of Williamsburg 

losses were severe, and when I saw him, a day or two after¬ 
wards, he was much depressed and thought that he had 
accomplished nothing, so much so that I felt it necessary 
to encourage him. It was not until some time afterwards 
that he came to the conclusion that he had accomplished a 
brilliant feat of arms. 

Emory had been left to guard the road leading to Allen’s 
farm, near the James. Being informed on the morning 
of the 5th that the enemy’s right could be turned, he called 
upon Gen. Heintzelman for infantry to enable him to make 
the attempt. Late in the afternoon one of Kearny’s bri¬ 
gades and two batteries were sent to him for that pur¬ 
pose, “but that was found impracticable from the nature 
of the locality, the lateness of the evening, and the want of 
a guide.” 

While all this was going on our left Sumner recon- 
noitered the position in the centre and on our right. Find¬ 
ing that one of the redoubts on the Confederate left was 
unoccupied, ; he, at about eleven o’clock, ordered Hancock’s 
brigade, of Smith’s division, to cross by a dam at the foot 
of one of the large ponds and take possession of it. This 
he did with five regiments of the division, and, finding the 
next redoubt also unoccupied, he promptly seized it, and 
sent for reinforcements to enable him to advance further 
and take the next redoubt, which commanded the plain be¬ 
tween his position and Fort Magruder, and would have 
enabled him to take in reverse and cut the communication 
of the troops engaged with Gens. Hooker and Kearny. 

The enemy soon began to show himself in strength 
before him, and, as his rear and right flank were some¬ 
what exposed, he repeated his request for reinforcements. 
Gen. Smith was twice ordered to join him with the rest 
of his division, but each time the order was countermanded 
at the moment of execution, Gen. Sumner not being willing 
to weaken the centre. At length, in reply to Gen. Han¬ 
cock’s repeated messages for more troops, Gen. Sumner 
sent him an order to fall back to his first position, the ex¬ 
ecution of which Gen. Hancock deferred as long as pos¬ 
sible, being unwilling to give up the advantage already 


— 103 — 


McClellan’s Own Story 

gained, and fearing to expose his command,by such a move- 
ment. 

As the head of Couch’s division did not arrive until one 
o’clock, it was entirely proper for Gen. Sumner to hesi¬ 
tate about weakening his centre until that hour. The re¬ 
maining brigades of Couch followed the first immediately, 
Casey arriving early in the afternoon. Couch’s 1st brigade, 
Peck’s, was deployed on Hooker’s right, and promptly re¬ 
pulsed the attack made upon it, thus affording Hooker sen¬ 
sible relief. Soon after it was relieved by the other two 
brigades, who remained undisturbed. 

As already stated, as soon as our troops were in pos¬ 
session of the enemy’s works, on the morning of the 4th, 
I gave the necessary orders for the pursuit, and, when all 
that was accomplished, drove into Yorktown in an ambu¬ 
lance. The enemy had made a free distribution of torpe¬ 
does in the roads, within the works, and in places where 
our men would be apt to go—for instance, near wells and 
springs, telegraph-offices, and store-houses—so that some 
of our men were killed. To place mines or torpedoes in 
the path of assaulting columns is admissible under the 
customs of war, but such use of them as was made here is 
barbarous in the extreme. When I entered Yorktown our 
progress was much delayed by the caution made neces¬ 
sary by the presence of these torpedoes. I at once ordered 
that they should be discovered and removed by the Confed¬ 
erate prisoners. They objected very strenuously, but were 
forced to do the work. After Williamsburg one of the Con¬ 
federate surgeons, sent in to offer to take care of their 
wounded in our hands, told me that these torpedoes were 
planted at the close of the evacuation, and mentioned the 
name of an officer whom he saw engaged in this work. 

As soon as we had possession of Yorktown the gun¬ 
boats started up the York river to ascertain whether the 
transports with Franklin’s division could safely ascend, 
and to capture any of the enemy’s transports they could 
find. 

If the condition of affairs near Williamsburg justified 
it, I intended going to West Point by water myself. Early 


— 104 — 


“That Devil Dan” 


on the 5th I sent Col. Sweitzer and Maj. Hammerstein, of 
my staff, to the front, to keep me informed of the condi¬ 
tion of affairs and the progress of events. I went to York- 
town to expedite the movement by water, and to provide 
for the transportation of supplies to the troops in advance. 

Until about one P.M. I learned nothing indicating that 
the affair at Williamsburg was more than a simple attack 
upon a rear-guard, but at that hour I received intelligence 
that the state of the contest was unfavorable and that my 
presence was urgently required. Sedwick’s division was 
then held ready to embark in support of Franklin. But I 
ordered him to move beyond Yorktown a short distance, 
ready to move to the front if ordered. Porter and Richard¬ 
son were also instructed to be ready to obey whatever orders 
they might receive. 

I returned at once to my camp to give these and other 
necessary orders, and, remaining there only a few minutes, 
started with half a dozen aides and a few orderlies for the 
front. The distance was more than fourteen miles, over 
terrible roads, much obstructed by trains; but as I had my 
most trustworthy horse, Dan Webster, I made better pro¬ 
gress than was agreeable to the escort, most of whom had 
been left behind when I reached the field of battle. 

Dan was one of those horses that could trot all day 
long at a very rapid gait which kept all others horses at 
a gallop. I think it was on this ride that he earned from 
the aides the title of “that Devil Dan”—a name which he 
justified on many another long and desperate ride before 
I gave up the command of the Army of the Potomac. 

Dan was the best horse I ever had; he never was ill 
for an hour, never fatigued, never disturbed under fire, and 
never lost his equanimity or his dignity, except on one oc¬ 
casion. That was when we abandoned the position at Har¬ 
rison’s Bar under the orders to return to Washington. From 
a very natural feeling I remained there until all the trains 
and troops had left, and, sending forward all the escort and 
staff, remained alone in the works for a little time, my 
mind full of the fatal consequences of the order I was 
forced to carry into execution. At length I mounted and 


— 105 — 


McClellan's Own Story 


rode out to join the escort; as I passed through the aban¬ 
doned works Dan, for the first time in his life, gave vent 
to his feelings by a series of most vicious plunges and kicks. 
It was possible that the flies, who had enjoyed a whole 
army to feed upon, concentrated all their energies upon 
Dan; but I have always more than suspected that, in his 
quiet way, Dan understood the condition of affairs much 
better than the authorities at Washington, and merely 
wished to inform me in his own impressive manner that 
he fully agreed with my views as to the folly of abandon¬ 
ing the position, and that he, at least, had full confidence 
in his master. 

Dan and I never quarreled, and the dear old fellow 
survived the war for many years, dying at a ripe old age 
in 1879. No matter how long we might be parted—once 
for nearly four years—he always recognized me the mo¬ 
ment we met again, and in his own way showed his pleasure 
at seeing me. Even on the day of his death, which was 
a painless one from old age, whenever I entered his stall 
he tried to rise and greet me, but, unable to do that, would 
lean his head against me and lick my hand. No soldier 
ever had a more faithful or better horse than I had in Dan 
Webster. 

Riding through mud and water, often obliged to 
turn into the woods, but never slackening the pace when 
the road permitted, I reached the front between four and 
five o’clock. I found everything in a state of chaos and de¬ 
pression. Even the private soldiers saw clearly that, with 
force enough in hand to gain a victory, we, the pursuers, 
were on the defensive and content with repulsing attacks, 
and that there was no plan of action, no directing head. 
The front line was formed along the nearer edge of the 
woods, and the rest massed inactive in the clearings. The 
troops were weary and discouraged; but my presence at 
once restored their confidence, and, as they recognized me 
passing rapidly through their ranks, their wild and joyful 
cheers told the enemy, as well as our own people, that some¬ 
thing unusual had occurred, and that the period of uncer¬ 
tainty and inaction was at an end. 


• 106 — 


Gen. Hancock 


I at once gathered the general officers around me, called 
upon them for a brief statement of affairs, and promptly 
made up* my mind as to what should be done. This occurred 
in the clearing, close to the Whittaker House. I found that, 
owing t6 some marshy ground, there was no direct com¬ 
munication with the two divisions under Heintzelman on 
our left; the troops forming the front of our centre were 
on the hither edge of the woods intervening between us 
and the enemy, and no one knew whether the enemy were 
in the woods, and, if so, what force. Hancock, with his 
unsupported brigade, was still in possession of the aban¬ 
doned works on the enemy’s left; one of Smith’s remain¬ 
ing brigades was in line on our right centre, the other and 
Casey’s- division massed in rear; two of Couch’s brigades 
formed the centre, with one in reserve. 

I ordered a party to move in to the left to reopen com¬ 
munication with Heintzelman. Just then heavy firing began 
at Hancock’s position, which was two miles from the near¬ 
est support, and, grasping at once the fact that he held the 
key of the field of battle, I ordered Smith, who was chafing 
like a caged lion, to move as rapidly as possible to Hancock’s 
support with his two remaining brigades and Naglee’s. 
Within five minutes of the time I reached the field Smith 
was off as rapidly as his men could move; Naglee, with his 
brigade of Casey’s division, following the leading regiment 
of Smith’s division. As soon as the head of Smith’s col¬ 
umn started I ordered the centre to advance into the woods 
and gain the more distant edge, driving out any of the 
enemy who might be there. This was promptly done, and 
I rode in with them, and into the cleared ground in front, 
in close view of the enemy’s works. There were none of 
the enemy in the woods, but they held the works in con¬ 
siderable force. 

Their position was so strong that when my reconnois- 
sance was completed I did not think proper to attack with¬ 
out making arrangements to use our artillery and carefully 
arrange our columns of attack. 

I therefore returned to the Whittaker House, quickly 
gave orders for the proper posting of the troops in the 


— 107 — 


McClellan's Own Story 


centre, and started rapidly for Hancock's position. A little 
before reaching the dam by which he had crossed I met 
the column of prisoners whom he had taken. 

Before Gens. Smith and Naglee could reach the field 
of Gen. Hancock’s operations, although they moved with 
great rapidity, he had been confronted by a superior force. 
Feigning to retreat slowly, he awaited their onset, and then 
turned upon them, and, after some terrific volleys of mus¬ 
ketry, he charged them with the bayonet, routing and dis¬ 
persing their whole force, killing, wounding, and captur¬ 
ing from 500 to 600 men, he himself losing only 31 men. 

This was one of the most brilliant engagements of the 
war, and Gen. Hancock merited the highest praise for the 
soldierly qualities displayed and his perfect appreciation 
of the vital importance of his position. 

Hancock’s command consisted of the 5th Wis., 6th Me., 
and 49th Penn, regiments of volunteers of his own brigade, 
and the 7th Me. and 30th N. Y. of Davidson’s brigade. 
Keeping on to Hancock’s brigade, I remained there long 
enough to thank them for their gallant conduct, to appreci¬ 
ate the importance of the position and the value of the 
success gained. I sent some of the approaching reinforce¬ 
ments to occupy a dangerous mass of woods on the right, 
and, there being no indication of any new attack by the 
enemy, I left as soon as Smith arrived with sufficient troops 
to render the position secure. By the time Smith’s troops 
all arrived and were properly posted it was too dark to at¬ 
tempt any new operations until the next morning. 

It was raining heavily and nearly dark when I re¬ 
turned to the Whittaker House, so that nothing more could 
be done than to arrange for security during the night and 
a prompt resumption of operations in the morning. All 
the troops slept on the muddy field, in the rain, with what 
protection their shelter-tents gave them, and many without 
food. I was not much better off, for, with the exception 
of a piece of biscuit for breakfast on the morning of the 
6th, I had nothing to eat from the early morning of the 
5th until late in the day on the 6th. The night was a hor¬ 
rible one. The little Whittaker House was crowded with 


■ 108 — 


Gen. Hancock 


several general officers and their staffs, so that sleep or rest 
was impossible. It rained hard, and I passed much of the 
evening among the men, by way of encouraging them, who 
think little of hardship when their general shares it with 
them. 

It was unfortunate that the absolute necessity of ex¬ 
pediting the movement of troops and supplies up the York 
river detained me so long at Yorktown, and that I did not 
receive earlier information of the necessity for my pres¬ 
ence at the front. All the reports up to those that took me 
so rapidly to the field, represented the affair as simply one 
against an ordinary rear-guard, and with good reasons 
I expected every moment to learn that the enemy was de¬ 
feated and his works occupied, as the troops on the field of 
battle were more than enough for the purpose. Could I 
have arrived at one o’clock it is very certain that Smith, 
supported by Couch and afterwards by Casey, would have 
at once debouched from Hancock’s ground, and have cut 
off the retreat of the greater part of the troops engaged 
against Hooker. Up to the time of Couch’s arrival it would 
probably have been imprudent to move the whole of Smith’s 
division in support of Hancock, but the moment the head of 
Couch’s column appeared near the front it was proper to 
push Smith forward as rapidly as possible. In fact, Hook¬ 
er’s repulse was of no consequence, except for the loss of 
life it involved, and his falling back somewhat would only 
facilitate the decisive advance by our right. When I 
reached the field the commanding general gave me the im¬ 
pression that, far from our having a simple rear-guard to 
deal with, the enemy was present in very heavy force. 
Therefore, to guard against all eventualities, I sent back 
orders to Porter to occupy Yorktown, and to Sedgwick and 
Richardson to advance by land in the morning. 

During the night Heintzelman reported to me that 
Hooker’s division had suffered so much that it could not 
be relied on for the next day, and that Kearny could do no 
more than hold his own unless reinforced. But, after fully 
considering the state of affairs during the evening, I was 
so confident of the advantage to be derived from Smith’s 


-— 109 — 


McClellan's Own Story 


possession of the decisive point that I determined to carry 
on our operations with the force then in hand, even were 
the enemy superior in numbers. If the enemy held their 
ground and were not superior in numbers, it was certain 
that an advance by Smith and Casey, with the cavalry, 
direct on Williamsburg, supported by Couch as the centre 
was cleared, would cut off all the troops in front of Heintzel- 
man. Even if the enemy proved to be superior in numbers 
this advance would no doubt cause them to withdraw their 
right and thus enable Hooker and Kearny to come into 
line on Smith’s left, and I could perfectly well hold my own 
and keep the enemy in position while the movement to West 
Point was being carried out. Therefore, during the night, 
I countermanded the orders to Sedgwick and Richardson, 
and directed them to return to Yorktown and, together with 
Porter, embark as rapidly as possible in support of Frank¬ 
lin. 

Early on the morning of the 6th it was found that the 
enemy had abandoned his positions during the night; we 
at once occupied them and the town of Williamsburg, which 
was filled with the enemy’s wounded, for whose assistance 
eighteen of the Confederate surgeons were sent by Gen. 
J. E. Johnston, the Confederate commander. 


— 110 — 


CHAPTER XX 


Advance from Williamsburg—Franklin’s movement—Alarm of pris¬ 
oners in Williamsburg—Plan of the campaign—Orders to move 
towards north of Richmond—Fatal to the campaign—Movements 
on this line. 

It became clear that we had been opposed by only a 
portion of the Confederate army, at first by a single rear¬ 
guard, which was subsequently considerably reinforced by 
troops brought back during the first night and the next day 
to hold the works as long as possible and enable their trains 
to escape. Longstreet's and D. H. Hill's divisions, more 
than half their army, were engaged. Their losses were 
heavy, and we captured eight guns and many caissons and 
wagons, which the deep mud prevented them from carry¬ 
ing off. 

Wilcox's Confederate brigade, having received no or¬ 
ders, found itself at half-past ten p.m. of the 5th entirely 
alone, and moved back beyond Williamsburg, being the last 
to leave the field. It has been stated that G. W. Smith had 
been ordered to move at half-past two a.m. of the 5th and 
take a position north of Barhamsville. He moved at the 
hour designated, just as a heavy rain commenced. The 
roads soon became axle-deep in mud, and extraordinary 
efforts were required to get the wagons along. Late in the 
afternoon, when the head of the column had nearly reached 
Barhamsville, Smith received an order from Gen. Johnston 
to suspend the movement, as a heavy attack had been made 
on the fortifications at Williamsburg, in which Longstreet’s 
and D. H. Hill's divisions had been engaged. On the two 
following days Gen. Johnston, learning of Franklin’s dis¬ 
embarkation at Brick House, concentrated the greater part 
of his army near Barhamsville. 

It has already been stated that Franklin's division was 
disembarked on the 3d of May to take part in the approach¬ 
ing assault of Yorktown. Gen. Franklin passed the night 
of the 3d at general headquarters, his division remaining 
at Cheeseman's landing. As soon as the evacuation was 
known I instructed him to re-embark his division immedi¬ 
ately and bring it by water to Yorktown, where he would 


—ill— 


McClellan's Own Story 


receive further orders. He at once returned to it and com¬ 
menced the work, which he carried on with all possible 
speed, completing it about one o’clock on the 5th. The- em¬ 
barkation was much delayed by the atrocious weather; by 
the facts that all the ordinary means for loading and un¬ 
loading were fully occupied with putting supplies ashore 
for the rest of the army, so that Gen. Franklin was obliged 
to improvise his own means; that forage and provision 
for several days had to be reloaded; but most of all by the 
difficulty of re-embarking the artillery, all the carriages of 
which had to be unlimbered and floated out on rafts and 
then hoisted upon the transports. Gen. Franklin’s letter 
explains this subject in detail, and I need only say that the 
delay was unavoidable and that Gen. Franklin did not 
lose an unnecessary moment in carrying his order into effect: 

“Hartford, Feb. 8, 1884. 

“Gen. G. B. McClellan, New York: 

“My dear General: It so happens that I have just had a cor¬ 
respondence with Howard about the West Point landing in May, 1862, 
and, as it covers the greater part of the ground indicated in your 
letter of the 5th inst., I enclose it with this. 

“The long time taken to re-embark my division at Poquosin, or 
Cheeseman’s creek, was due— 

“1st. To the weather, which you will remember, was atrocious; 

“2d. To the fact that such landing facilities as were at hand 
were fully occupied with getting supplies ashore for the army at 
Yorktown, leaving me to my own crude devices for getting things 
aboard; and, 

“3d. To the absolute necessity there was for unlimbering all 
artillery vehicles, in order to pack them in the limited deckspace of 
the transports that were available. 

“This loading the artillery was the great cause of delay. Get¬ 
ting the carriages on the transports was a tedious and exasper- 
atingly slow process. They had to be floated on rafts from the shore 
to the transports and then lifted several feet to the deck. I do not 
now remember how the horses were got aboard, but I know that 
everything was done as quickly as it could be done. 

“Then, too, the provisions and forage for several days had to 
be reloaded in the infantry transports—a tedious process under the 
circumstances. Towing the artillery transports was a very slow 
process. These transports were each made of two canal barges 
placed about as far apart as the width of beam of a single barge, 
the whole space being decked over, thus. They had been so arranged 

for the landing that it was con¬ 
templated I was to make when 
I first arrived. They made ex¬ 
cellent transports for a short 
run in smooth water, but they 
would not steer and were heart¬ 
breaking to tow. So we finally 
started for Yorktown, when an- 
— 112 — 







Franklin at West Point 


other unlooked-for delay occurred by the grounding of many of the 
transports, which were of all draughts of water. I stayed by until 
I saw that all would get off, and then started for Yorktown, where 
I met you in the afternoon and received my instructions. Of course, 
after arriving at West Point, the landing was slow, although not 
nearly so slow as the loading. The infantry and artillery were got 
off during the night, and a line was formed which was rectified and 
strengthened after daylight. I returned to my headquarters boat 
to hurry off the transports, which were very slow in moving, and 
while I was engaged in this business an attack was made on Newton’s 
brigade. I hurried ashore and found that a sharp attack had been 
made, by Hampton’s brigade, I think. They drove Newton out of 
the woods at first, but the brigade soon retook its position, driving 
the enemy back; and as the gunboats were in position to shell the 
woods in front of our line, a few shots from them drove the enemy 
off and ended the fight. Both lines, however, remained within mus¬ 
ket-shot of each other until well on in the afternoon, when the trans¬ 
ports returned, bringing Sedgwick’s division, I think it was. As my 
orders only directed me to hold my position, and as my right flank 
was necessarily in the air and ought to have been turned by the 
enemy, I was in no condition to have advanced into the interior, and, 
in fact, under your orders I had no business to make the attempt. 

“Truly your friend, 

“Wm. B. Franklin.” 

The flotilla experienced great difficulty in reaching 
Yorktown, which it effected about four o’clock on the 5th. 
Meanwhile Gen. Franklin, when the greatest difficulties had 
been overcome, preceded it, and must have reached York¬ 
town before one o’clock, where he received his final instruc¬ 
tions from me. 

When the flotilla arrived Gen. Franklin visited Com. 
Missroom on his flagship and informed him that he was 
ready to start. The commodore replied that he would not 
consent to go up the river on a night as dark as that ap¬ 
proaching (it was then raining in torrents), and the joint 
expedition, therefore, waited until the next morning. The 
commander was entirely correct in this decision to await 
the morning, for I have not the slightest doubt that the 
result of an effort to move on such a night would have 
been the loss of many transports and lives, and the dis¬ 
organization of the whole expedition. 

The flotilla.started at daybreak of the 6th; the infan¬ 
try transports arrived off West Point about noon, and the 
landing commenced at once. The artillery transports did 
not arrive until nearly night, and were unloaded without 
wharves during the night and early in the morning of the 


— 113 — 


McClellan's Own Story 


7th. The process of landing was necessarily slow, but not 
so much so as that of loading up. 

At about seven a.m. of the 7th the pickets of Newton's 
brigade, forming at the left of the line, were driven in, but 
soon regained the ground. 

Skirmishing continued for a couple of hours, when a 
sharp attack was made by Whiting’s division; this was re¬ 
pulsed, and everything then became quiet, our people hav¬ 
ing regained their original positions, and at some points 
having made considerable advances. 

Franklin’s orders were simply to hold his position until 
reinforced sufficiently to justify an advance. That this was 
a wise decision is shown by the fact that G. W. Smith wit¬ 
nessed the disembarkation, and, refraining from opposing 
it, suggested to Gen. Johnston to take measures to cut him 
off if he advanced beyond the protection of the gunboats. 
G. W. Smith’s entire division, much stronger than Frank¬ 
lin’s, was in his front, and soon after the greater part of the 
Confederate army, ready to overwhelm Franklin had he 
advanced. 

By the time Sedgwick’s division was in position to 
support him, the morning of the 8th, the enemy’s rear 
had passed on towards Richmond; but Franklin’s move¬ 
ment had fully served its purpose in clearing our front 
to the banks of the Chickahominy. 

Qn my way to Williamsburg on the morning of the 
6th I passed a cluster of barracks, and, seeing some men 
lying in them, I dismounted to see who they were. They 
were filled with our own and the enemy’s wounded. The 
first man I spoke to was one of ours. I asked him who the 
men around him were. “Oh! that’s a secesh; that is one 
of our men; that’s a secesh,” and so on. In reply to my 
question as to how they had been treated by the enemy he 
said: “Just like their own men.” Here were these poor 
fellows lying together in perfect amity who had met in 
mortal combat the day before. 

The College and other large buildings in Williamsburg 
were crowded with wounded, almost all Confederates. While 
in one of the larger hospitals one of my aides came to me 


— 114 — 


Confederate Wounded 


and said that a wounded Confederate desired to speak to 
me. I went there and found a wounded private soldier 
belonging to a Virginia regiment, an intelligent, honest- 
looking man, who said that he had been deputed by his 
comrades to beg me to spare their lives. I told him that 
I did not understand him, whereupon he repeated his peti¬ 
tion, and I again said that I could not imagine what he 
meant. He then said that they had been told that we 
Northern men had come down there to destroy and slay, and 
that our intention was to kill all the prisoners, wounded and 
unw r ounded alike; but that they had been told that I had 
treated kindly the prisoners I had taken in West Virginia 
the year before, and thought that perhaps I might be in¬ 
duced to spare their lives. I then relieved his mind by tell¬ 
ing him that, although I was perhaps the most brutal among 
the Northern generals, I would treat them precisely as I 
did my own wounded. 

The poor fellows stretched on the floor around him 
followed the conversation with keen interest, and I saw by 
the expression of their faces that they felt much relieved 
when my final answer came. I was told, after the battle 
of Fair Oaks, that when the Confederates were for a time 
in possession of the Camp of Casey’s division, Gen. Roger 
Pryor went around among the wounded, giving them whis¬ 
key and water, and that he told them it was a repayment 
of the kindness with which their wounded were treated 
at Williamsburg. 

During the forenoon of the 6th Confederate surgeons 
came in (as before stated), under a flag of truce, to offer 
their services in tending their own wounded. I entertained 
them as well as could be done without baggage or supplies, 
and found them to be very agreeable gentlemen. Their 
services were not needed. 

Having gained possession of Williamsburg, the first 
thing to be done was to get up supplies for the troops, to 
care for the wounded, to hasten supports to Franklin by 
water, and to force the pursuit by land in order to open 
direct communication with Franklin, or to bring the enemy 
to battle if he halted south of the mouth of the Pamunkey. 


— 115 — 


McClellan's Own Story 


The frightful condition of the roads rendered the supply 
question very difficult, but by repairing the nearest land¬ 
ings on the York river, and by the energy of the quarter¬ 
master’s department, that task was soon accomplished. 

So great were the difficulties of land-transportation 
that even the headquarters wagons did not reach Williams¬ 
burg until the forenoon of the 9th, up to which time I was 
absolutely without baggage of any kind. Sedgwick’s di¬ 
vision reached Franklin during the 7th; one brigade of 
Porter’s division got off from Yorktown by water on the 
afternoon of the 7th, the rest on the 8th, without cavalry 
or artillery; two brigades of Richardson’s division got off 
on the 11th, the remaining brigade on the 12th. The reg¬ 
ular infantry, Duane’s engineer battalion, and the light 
batteries of the reserve artillery marched from Yorktown on 
the 8th. 

Immediately upon our arrival in Williamsburg Gen. 
Averill was sent forward with a cavalry force to push the 
enemy’s rear-guard. He found several guns abandoned, 
and captured a number of stragglers. But the roads were 
so bad and his supplies so scanty that he was obliged to 
return after marching a few miles. On the next day, the 
7th, Stoneman moved with the advanced guard, consisting 
of the cavalry, horse-batteries, and two regiments of in¬ 
fantry, the 2d R. I. and the 98th Penn. 

At ten A.M. his artillery and cavalry had reached a 
point only two and a half to three miles from Williamsburg; 
the infantry had not yet joined him. At half-past one P.M. 
he had come up with the enemy’s rear-guard, at about six 
miles from Williamsburg, and while here he heard heavy 
firing in the direction of Franklin’s position. Stoneman’s 
infantry joined him here, coming up at the double-quick. 

He encamped for the night at a church about ten miles 
from Williamsburg, having been delayed by the condition 
of the roads and the necessity of procuring and cooking 
meat for the infantry, who were almost in a famished condi¬ 
tion. 

At nine A.M. of the 8th he had reached a point fourteen 
miles from Williamsburg. At half-past three P.M. he reached 


— 116 — 


Stoneman’s Pursuit 

with his main body Hockaday’s Springs, about six miles 
and a half from Franklin’s position, and there learned that 
his advanced guard had communicated with Franklin’s 
pickets. 

Stoneman learned here that a Confederate force of 
ten regiments of infantry, one battery, and some cavalry 
had encamped the night before at Hockaday’s Springs, and 
left that morning via Diascund Bridge, and that the enemy 
were in full retreat upon the Chickahominy. He sent cav¬ 
alry in pursuit to harass the enemy until dark. This de¬ 
tachment found the enemy at dark strongly posted at 
New Kent Court-House, and, in accordance with instruc¬ 
tions, then returned to the main body of the advanced guard. 

On the 9th Stoneman occupied and held the junction 
of the West Point and Williamsburg roads, about three 
miles from New Kent Court-House. The occupation of this 
place occurred as the result of a brisk skirmish in which a 
portion of the 6th U. S. Cavalry, under Maj. Williams, and 
Robinson’s battery took part; one squadron of the 6th, un¬ 
der the personal command of Maj. Williams, made two 
very handsome charges. 

On the 10th Stoneman sent Farnsworth’s 8th Ill. Cav¬ 
alry some six miles beyond New Kent Court-House, and 
with his main body moved to Cumberland, leaving New 
Kent Court-House occupied by two New Jersey regiments 
and four guns from Franklin’s division. 

On the 11th he sent Maj. Williams with six companies 
of cavalry to occupy the railroad-crossing at White 
House and scout the surrounding country. He was again 
delayed on the 11th by the necessity of awaiting provisions 
from Franklin. Stoneman says: “The men have had no 
sugar or coffee since leaving Williamsburg, and but a very 
limited amount of hard bread and pork. We have lived 
principally on fresh meat, sometimes without salt, for the 
past week; but I have not heard a complaint or murmur.” 

D. R. Jones’s division constituted the rear-guard of the 
enemy. It consisted of ten regiments of infantry, sixteen 
pieces of artillery, and the 1st Va. Cavalry. The rear of 
the rear-guard consisted of one regiment of infantry, three 


— 117 — 


McClellan's Own Story 


pieces of artillery, and three squadrons, with which they 
would check us at every difficult place and then leave. Ow¬ 
ing to the peculiar nature of the country, admirably adapted 
for the operations of an active and vigorous rear-guard, 
which we had in our front, we could get but one chance 
to attack him and make it tell—this at Slatesville, from 
which he was driven with loss. Three miles from Slates¬ 
ville, at New Kent Court-House, the whole division was 
drawn up in line of battle, and I thought it expedient to 
retain with me the New Jersey brigade (two regiments 
and four guns) and Farnsworth’s cavalry. 

As soon as a reasonable amount of supplies were re¬ 
ceived and the roads improved somewhat I resumed the 
movement by land from Williamsburg. Smith’s division 
marched on the afternoon of the 8th, Couch, Casey, and 
Kearny on the morning of the 9th. The reserves came 
up to Williamsburg on the morning of the same day. Dur¬ 
ing the night of the 9th headquarters were four miles in 
front of Williamsburg with the regulars, the other divi¬ 
sions just mentioned in advance, Hooker at Williamsburg. 

On the evening of the 10th headquarters were at 
Roper’s Church, nineteen miles beyond Williamsburg, in 
easy communication with Franklin; the regulars, Smith, 
Couch, Casey, and Kearny near headquarters. We now 
began to draw supplies from Elthan. 

Headquarters remained at Roper’s Church until the 
morning of the 13th, while the troops were moving in such 
a manner that at the close of that day the disposition was 
as follows: headquarters, with the division of Porter, 
Franklin, Sykes (regulars), and the artillery reserves, at 
Cumberland, now a temporary depot; Couch and Casey 
at New Kent Court-House; Hooker and Kearny near Ro¬ 
per’s Church; Richardson and Sedgwick near Elthan. Gen. 
Van Alen was left, with a small force, as military gover¬ 
nor of Yorktown; Col. Campbell with his regiment, the 
5th Pa. Cavalry, at Williamsburg. 

On the 14th and 15th it rained heavily and continu¬ 
ously, and somewhat on the 16th. On the 15th and 16th 
the divisions of Porter, Franklin, and Smith were with 


— 118 — 


Movements of Army 

great difficulty advanced to White House. The roads were 
so bad, narrow, and infrequent as to render the movements 
of large masses very slow and difficult; so much so that 
in the movement to White House on the 15th and 16th it 
required forty-eight hours to move two divisions and their 
trains five miles. 

On the 16th headquarters advanced to White House; 
and on that day and the next Sykes and the reserve artil¬ 
lery moved up to the same point with no little difficulty, 
and a permanent depot was established. The weather 
changed on the night of the 16th, so that the 17th and 18th 
were clear, warm days. 

The 17th and 18th were occupied, while the roads were 
drying, in closing up all the troops and trains, with the 
final preparations to advance, and in numerous and exten¬ 
sive reconnoissances pushed in all directions. 

It was at this moment, May 18, 1862, that, in conse¬ 
quence of my earnest representations, the President author¬ 
ized me to organize two provisional army corps, the 5th 
and 6th, which soon became permanent corps, and the or¬ 
ganization of the Army of the Potomac was now as follows: 

2d Corps—Gen. Sumner. Consisting of the divisions Sedgwick and 
Richardson. 

3d Corps—Gen. Heintzelman. Consisting of the divisions Kearny 
and Hooker. 

4th Corps—Gen. Keyes. Consisting of the divisions Couch and Casey. 
5th Corps—Gen. Fitz-John Porter. Consisting of the divisions Mor- 
ell, Sykes, and Hunt’s reserve artillery. 

6th Corps—Gen. Franklin. Consisting of the divisions W. F. Smith 
and Slocum. 

The organization of the cavalry remained unchanged, 
and, as no new regiments were assigned to the Army of the 
Potomac except Col. Campbell’s, which remained at Wil¬ 
liamsburg, we suffered very much during the subsequent 
operations from the glaring deficiency of the cavalry force 
in point of numbers. 

On the 18th of May headquarters were at White House; 
the advanced guard held the country nearly to the Chicka- 
hominy and well to the north of the railway. The 5th and 
6th corps were at White House; the 2d, 3d, and 4th corps 
were near New Kent Court-House. 


— 119 — 


McClellan's Own Story 


The enemy had withdrawn across the Chickahominy, 
having his main force between New bridge and Richmond. 
Bottom’s, Long, and Jones’s bridges were merely watched 
by small cavalry patrols, and there were no indications even 
of this with regard to the last two. 

The necessity of following the enemy until he was 
fairly across the Chickahominy, and the question of sup¬ 
plies, had naturally brought the Army of the Potomac into 
the positions just described, for the James river was not 
open until the 12th, when the Merrimac was destroyed. 

The question was now to be decided as to the ultimate 
line of operations of the army. 

Two courses were to be considered; first, to abandon 
the line of the York, cross the Chickahominy in the lower 
part of its course, gain the James, and adopt that as the 
line of supply; second, to use the railroad from West Point 
to Richmond as the line of supply, which would oblige us 
to cross the Chickahominy somewhere north of White Oak 
Swamp. The army was perfectly placed to adopt either 
course. 

Masking the movement by the advanced guard, the 
army could easily have crossed the Chickahominy by Jones’s 
bridge, and at Coles’s ferry and Barret’s ferry by pontoon 
bridges, while the advanced guard, and probably one or 
two corps, could have followed the movement by Long 
bridge and under cover of the White Oak Swamp, and the 
army would have been concentrated at Malvern Hill, ready 
either to advance upon Richmond by the roads near the left 
bank of the James, or to cross that river and place itself 
between Richmond and Petersburg. 

With all the aid of the gunboats and water-transporta¬ 
tion I am sure that I could have occupied Petersburg and 
placed the army in position between that place and Rich¬ 
mond, so that the enemy would have been obliged to abandon 
his capital or to come out to attack in a position of my 
own choosing, where, with the whole army concentrated, 
success would not have been doubtful and Richmond would 
have been the prize of victory. 


— 120 — 


Reinforcements Asked For 


Moreover, the water line of transportation would have 
insured the prompt and safe arrival of the 1st corps, or 
such other reinforcements as might have been sent me. 

It is needless to state that the army was well placed 
to follow the second line of operations indicated. 

Up to the 18th my repeated and urgent demands for 
reinforcements by water had been met in such a way as 
to render it probable that if the 1st corps were ordered up 
to my support at all, the overland route would have been 
selected by the authorities in Washington. Among other 
despatches calling for reinforcements I sent the following: 

Camp at Cumberland, May 14, 1862. 

I have more than twice telegraphed to the Secretary of War, 
stating that, in my opinion, the enemy were concentrating all their 
available force to fight this army in front of Richmond, and that 
such ought to be their policy. I have received no reply whatever 
to any of these telegrams. I beg leave to repeat their substance to 
your excellency, and to ask that kind consideration which you have 
ever accorded to my representations and views. All my information 
from every source accessible to me establishes the fixed purpose of the 
rebels to defend Richmond against this army by offering us battle 
with all the troops they can collect from east, west, and south, and 
my own opinion is confirmed by that of all my commanders whom 
I have been able to consult. 

Casualties, sickness, garrisons, and guards have much weakened 
my force, and will continue to do so. I cannot bring into actual 
battle against the enemy more than 80,000 men at the utmost, and 
with them I must attack in position, probably entrenched, a much 
larger force, perhaps double my numbers. It is possible that Rich¬ 
mond may be abandoned without a serious struggle; but the enemy 
are actually in great strength between here and there, and it would 
be unwise, and even insane, for me to calculate upon anything but 
a stubborn and desperate resistance. If they should abandon Rich¬ 
mond it may well be that it is done with the purpose of making the 
stand at some place in Virginia south or west of there, and we should 
be in condition to press them without delay. The Confederate leaders 
must employ their utmost efforts against this army in Virginia, and 
they will be supported by the whole body of their military officers, 
among whom there may be said to be no Union feeling, as there 
is also very little among the higher class of citizens in the seceding 
States. 

I have found no fighting men left in this Peninsula. All are 
in the ranks of the opposing foe. 

Even if more troops than I now have should prove unneccessary 
for purposes of military occupations, our greatest display of impos¬ 
ing force in the capital of the rebel government will have the best 
moral effect. I most respectfully and earnestly urge upon your ex¬ 
cellency that the opportunity has come for striking a fatal blow at 
the enemies of the Constitution, and I beg that you will cause this 
army to be reinforced without delay by all the disposable troops of 
the government. I ask for every man that the War Department can 
send me. Sent by water they will soon reach me. Any commander 


— 121 — 


McClellan’s Own Story 


of the reinforcements whom your excellency may designate will be 
acceptable to me, whatever expression I may have heretofore ad¬ 
dressed to you on that subject. 

I will fight the enemy, whatever their force may be, with what¬ 
ever force I may have; and I firmly believe that we shall beat them, 
but our triumph shall be made decisive and complete. The soldiers 
of this army love their government, and will fight well in its sup¬ 
port. You may rely upon them. They have confidence in me as 
their general, and in you as their President. Strong reinforcements 
will at least save the lives of many of them. The greater our force 
the more perfect will be our combinations and the less our loss. 

For obvious reasons I beg you to give immediate consideration 
to this communication, and to inform me fully at the earliest moment 
of your final determination. 

Geo. B. McClellan, 

Major-General. 

His Excellency Abraham Lincoln, 

President of the United States. 


To which, on the 18 th of May, I received this reply: 

“Washington, May 18, 2 p.m. 

“General: Your despatch to the President, asking reinforce¬ 
ments, has been received and carefully considered. 

“The President is not willing to uncover the capital entirely; and 
it is believed that, even if this were prudent, it would require more 
time to effect a junction between your army and that of the Rappa¬ 
hannock by the way of the Potomac and York river than by a land 
march. In order, therefore, to increase the strength of the attack 
upon Richmond at the earliest moment, Gen. McDowell has been 
ordered to march upon that city by the shortest route. 

“He is ordered, keeping himself always in position to save the 
capital from all possible attack, so to operate as to put his left wing 
in communication with your right wing, and you are instructed to 
co-operate so as to establish this communication as soon as possible, 
by extending your right wing to the north of Richmond. 

“It is believed that this communication can be safely established 
either north or south of the Pamunkey river. 

“In any event you will be able to prevent the main body of the 
enemy’s forces from leaving Richmond and falling in overwhelming 
force upon Gen. McDowell. He will move with between thirty-five 
(35) and forty thousand (40,000) men. 

“A copy of the instructions to Gen. McDowell are with this. The 
specific task assigned to his command has been to provide against 
any danger to the capital of the nation. 

“At your earnest call for reinforcements he is sent forward to 
co-operate in the reduction of Richmond, but charged, in attempting 
this, not to uncover Jthe city of Washington, and you will give no 
order, either before or after your injunction, which can put him out 
of position to cover this city. You and he will communicate with 
each other, by telegraph or otherwise, as frequently as may be neces¬ 
sary for frequent co-operation. When Gen. McDowell is in position 
on your right his supplies must be drawn from West Point, and you 
will instruct your staff-officers to be prepared to supply him bv that 
route. J 


— 122 — 


Stanton’s Fatal Order 

“The President desires that Gen. McDowell retain the command 
of the Department of the Rappahannock and of the forces with which 
he moves forward. 

“By order of the President. 

“Edwin M. Stanton, 

“Secretary of War. 

“Maj.-Gen. Geo. B. McClellan.” 

This order rendered it impossible for me to use the 
James river as a line of operations, forced me to establish 
our depots on the Pamunkey, and to approach Richmond 
from the north. 

Herein lay the failure of the campaign. 

The order obliged me to extend and to expose my right 
in order to secure the junction. As it was impossible to 
get at Richmond and the enemy’s army covering it without 
crossing the Chickahominy, I was obliged to divide the Army 
of the Potomac into two parts, separated by that stream. 
As the order for Gen. McDowell’s advance was soon sus¬ 
pended, I incurred great risk, of which the enemy finally 
took advantage and frustrated the plan of campaign. 

Had Gen. McDowell joined me by water I could have 
approached Richmond by the James, and thus have avoided 
the delays and losses incurred in bridging the Chickahominy, 
and could have had the army united in one body instead 
of being necessarily divided by that stream. 

McDowell’s movement by water would not have jeopar¬ 
dized Washington in the slightest degree. There were 
troops enough without him to hold the works against any¬ 
thing that the enemy could have sent against them, and the 
more they sent the easier would my task have been in front 
of Richmond. But Jackson’s movement was merely a 
feint, and if McDowell had joined me on the James the 
enemy would have drawn in every available man from 
every quarter to make head against me. A little of the 
nerve at Washington which the Romans displayed during 
the campaign against Hannibal would have settled the 
fate of Richmond in very few weeks. 

The following telegram was received at headquarters, 
Army of the Potomac, May 24, 1862: 


— 123 — 


McClellan’s Own Story 


“Headquarters, Department of Rappahannock, 
“Opposite Fredericksburg, May 22, 1862. 

“Maj.-Gen. Geo. B. McClellan: 

“I have received the orders of the President to move with the 
army under my command and co-operate with yours in the reduc¬ 
tion of Richmond, and also a copy of his instructions to you in re¬ 
lation to that co-operation. Maj.-Gen. Shields will join me to-day. 

“As far (soon) as the necessary preparations for the march can 
be completed, which I think will be by the twenty-fourth (24th) inst., 
we shall set forth as (in) the general direction ordered. There is 
in front of us to impede our advance the secession Army of the Rap¬ 
pahannock, so called, under the command of Joseph R. Anderson, of 
the Tredegar Iron-Works. 

“His force is from 12,000 to 15,000 men, mostly South Carolina 
and Georgia troops. We shall engage this force on our first day’s 
march, as they are within from six to eight miles of us, posted on 
and to the right and left of the Fredericksburg and Richmond Rail¬ 
road, and in a position of considerable strength. It is my purpose to 
try and turn this position by throwing a force on their left flank, 
and cut off their opportunity of receiving any reinforcements from 
the direction of Gordonsville, and at the same time endeavor to save 
the railroad bridges. If this can be done another channel of supply 
can be had for the forces going against Richmond that cannot fail 
to give great relief to the quartermaster’s and commissary depart¬ 
ments of your army, and thus facilitate your operations. We can¬ 
not rely on this at first, because they now occupy the line, and, I 
am told, are prepared to destroy the bridges if they are forced to 
fall back. I beg to ask to what extent can I rely on co-operation from 
you in my present movement in the way of your cutting off the 
retreat of the enemy upon Richmond, where they would add 12,000 
to the forces against you, and in saving the railroad bridge across 
the Pamunkey, and to what point on the Pamunkey can you extend 
your right to join me, and to what point can you cause supplies to 
be placed for my command, and by what date can I count on finding 
them ready for me? I shall require subsistence for thirty-eight 
thousand (38,000) men, and forage for eleven thousand (11,000) 
animals. 

“Irwin McDowell, 

“Maj.-Gen.” 

The following is a copy of the instructions to Gen. Mc¬ 
Dowell : 

“War Department, 
“Washington, May 17, 1862. 

“General: Upon being joined by Gen. Shield’s division you 
will move upon Richmond by the general route of the Richmond and 
Fredericksburg Railroad, co-operating with the forces under Gen. 
McClellan, now threatening Richmond from the line of the Pamun¬ 
key and York rivers. 

“While seeking to establish as soon as possible a communica¬ 
tion between your left wing and the right wing of Gen. McClellan, 
you will hold yourself always in such position as to cover the capi¬ 
tal of the nation against a sudden dash of any large body of the rebel 
forces. 


— 124 — 


McDowell Coming 


“Gen McClellan will be furnished with a copy of these instruc¬ 
tions, and will be directed to hold himself in readiness to establish 
communication with your left wing, and to prevent the main body 
of the enemy’s army from leaving Richmond and throwing itself 
upon your column before a junction of the two armies is effected. 

“A copy of his instructions in regard to the employment of your 
force is annexed. 

“By order of the President. 

“Edwin M. Stanton, 

“Secretary of War. 

“Gen. McDowell, 

“Commanding Department of Rappahannock” 


Having some doubts, from the wording of the fore¬ 
going orders, as to the extent of my authority over the 
troops of Gen. McDowell, and as to the time when I might 
anticipate his arrival, on the 21st of May I sent this de¬ 
spatch to President Lincoln: 

May 21, 1862, 11 p.m. 

Your despatch of yesterday respecting our situation and the 
batteries of Fort Darling was received while I was absent with the 
advance, where I have been all this day. I have communicated 
personally with Capt. Goldsborough, and by letter with Capt. Smith. 
The vessels can do nothing without co-operation on land, which I 
will not be in condition to afford for several days. Circumstances 
must, determine the propriety of a land-attack. 

It rained again last night, and rain on this soil soon makes the 
roads incredibly bad for army transportation. I personally crossed 
the Chickahominy to-day at Bottom’s bridge ford, and went a mile 
beyond, the enemy being about half a mile in front. I have three 
regiments on the other bank guarding the rebuilding of the bridge. 
Keyes’s corps is on the New Kent road, near Bottom’s birdge. Heintzel- 
man is on the same road, within supporting distance. Sumner is 
on the railroad, connecting right with left. Stoneman, with ad¬ 
vanced guard, is within one mile of New bridge. Franklin, with 
two divisions, is about two miles this side of Stoneman. Porter’s 
division, with the reserves of infantry and artillery, is within sup¬ 
porting distance. Headquarters will probably be at Cold Harbor 
to-morrow, one mile this side of Franklin. All the bridges over the 
Chickahominy are destroyed. The enemy are in force on every road 
leading to Richmond, within a mile or two west of the stream. Their 
main body is on the road from New bridge, encamped along it for 
four or five miles, spreading over the open ground on both sides. 
Johnson’s headquarters are about two miles beyond the bridge. 

All accounts report their numbers as greatly exceeding our own. 
The position of the rebel forces, the declaration of the Confederate 
authorities, the resolutions of the Virginia legislature, the action of 
the city government, the conduct of the citizens, and all other sources 
of information accessible to me, give positive assurance that our ap¬ 
proach to Richmond involves a desperate battle between the oppos¬ 
ing armies. 

All our divisions are moving towards the foe. I shall advance 
steadily and carefully, and attack them according to my best judg¬ 
ment, and in such manner as to employ my greatest force. 


— 125 — 


McClellan’s Own Story 


I regret the state of things as to Gen. McDowell’s command. We 
must beat the enemy in front of Richmond. One division added to 
this army for that effort would do more to protect Washington than 
his whole force can possibly do anywhere else in the field. The rebels 
are concentrating from all points for the two battles at Richmond 
and Cornith. I would still, most respectfully, suggest the policy of 
our concentrations here by movements on water. I have heard noth¬ 
ing as to the probability of his contemplated junction of McDowell’s 
forces with mine. I have no idea when he can start, what are his 
means of transportation, or when he may be expected to reach this 
vicinity. I fear there is little hope that he can join me overland in 
time for the coming battle. Delays on my part will be dangerous. 

I fear sickness and demoralization. This region is unhealthy for 
Northern men, and, unless kept moving, I fear that our soldiers may , 
become discouraged. At present our numbers are weakening from 
disease, but our men remain in good heart. 

I regret also the configuration of the Department of the Rappa¬ 
hannock. It includes a portion even of the city of Richmond. I 
think that my own department should embrace the entire field of 
military operations designed for the capture and occupation of that 
city. 

Again, I agree with your excellency that one bad general is 
better than two good ones. 

I am not sure that I fully comprehend your orders of the 17th 
instant addressed to myself and Gen. McDowell. If a junction is 
effected before we occupy Richmond it must necessarily be east of 
the railroad to Fredericksburg and within my department. This 
fact, my superior rank, and the express language of the sixty-second 
Article of War will place his command under my orders, unless it is 
otherwise specially directed by your excellency; and I consider that 
he will be under my command, except that I am not to detach any 
portion of his forces, or give any orders which can put him out of 
position to cover Washington. If I err in my construction I desire 
to be at once set right. Frankness compels me to say, anxious as I 
am for an increase of force, that the march of McDowell’s column 
upon Richmond by the shortest route will, in my opinion, uncover 
Washington, as to any interposition by it, as completely as its move¬ 
ment by water. The enemy cannot advance by Fredericksburg on 
Washington. 

Should they attempt a movement which to me seems utterly im¬ 
probable, their route would be by Gordonsville and Manassas. I 
desire that the ^extent of my authority over McDowell may be clearly 
defined, lest misunderstandings and conflicting views may produce 
some of those injurious results which a divided command has so often 
caused. I would respectfully suggest that this danger can only be 
surely guaredr against by explictly placing Gen. McDowell under my 
orders in the ordinary way, and holding me strictly responsible for 
the closest observance of your instructions. I hope, Mr. President, 
that it is not necessary for me to assure you that your instructions 
would be observed in the utmost good faith, and that I have no 
personal feeling which would influence me to disregard them in any 
particular. 

I believe that there is a great struggle before this army, but I 
am neither dismayed nor discouraged. I wish to strengthen its force 
as much as. I can, but in any event I shall fight it with all the skill, 
caution, and determination that I possess, and I trust that the result 


126 — 


McDowell’s Corps Coming 

may either obtain for me the permanent confidence of my govern¬ 
ment or that it may close my career. 

Geo. B. McClellan, 

Maj.-Gen. Commanding. 

His Excellency Abraham Lincoln, 

President of the United States. 

On the 24th I received the following reply: 

“May 24, 1862 (from Washington, 24th). 

“I left Gen. McDowell’s camp at dark last evening. Shields’s 
command is there, but it is so worn that he cannot move before Mon¬ 
day morning, the twenty-sixth (26th). *We have so thinned our line 
to get troops for other places that it was broken yesterday at Fort 
Royal, with a probable loss to us of one (1) regiment infantry, two 
(2) companies cavalry, putting Gen. Banks in some peril. 

The enemy’s forces, under Gen. Anderson, now opposing Gen. 
McDowell’s advance have, as their line of supply and retreat, the 
road to Richmond. 

“If, in conjunction with McDowell’s movement against Ander¬ 
son, you could send a force from your right to cut off the enemy’s 
supplies from Richmond, preserve the railroad bridges across the 
two (2) forks of the Pamunkey, and intercept the enemy’s retreat, 
you will prevent the army now opposed to you from receiving an 
accession of numbers of nearly fifteen thousand (15,000) men; and 
if you succeed in saving the bridges you will secure a line of railroad 
for supplies in addition to the one you now have. Can you not do 
this almost as well as not while you are building the Chickahominy 
bridges? McDowell and Shields both say they can, and positively will 
move Monday morning. I wish you to move cautiously and safely. 

“You will have command of McDowell, after he joins you, pre¬ 
cisely as you indicated in your long despatch to us of the twenty- 
first (21st). 

“A. Lincoln, 

“President.” 

This information, that McDowell’s corps would march 
for Fredericksburg on the following Monday (the 26th), 
and that he would be under my command, as indicated in 
my telegram of the 21st, was cheering news, and I now 
felt confident that we would on his arrival be sufficiently 
strong to overpower the large army confronting us. 

At a later hour on the same day I received the follow¬ 
ing: 

“May 24, 1862 (from Washington, 4 p.m.). 

“In consequence of Gen. Bank’s critical position I have been com¬ 
pelled to suspend Gen. McDowell’s movements to join you. The enemy 
are making a desperate push upon Harper’s Ferry, and we are try¬ 
ing to throw Gen. Fremont’s force and part of Gen. McDowell’s in 
their rear. 

“A. Lincoln, 

“ President. 

“Maj.-Gen. Geo. B. McClellan.” 


— 127 — 


McClellan’s Own Story 


From which it will be seen that I could not expect Gen. 
McDowell to join me in time to participate in immediate 
operations in front of Richmond, and on the same evening 
I replied to the President that I would make my calculations 
accordingly. 


— 128 — 


CHAPTER XXI 

Private Letters 
[May 6, to May 18, 1862] 

Williamsburg, May 6, 1862.—I telegraphed you this morning that 
we had gained a battle. Every hour its importance is proved to be 
greater. On Sunday I sent Stoneman in pursuit with the cavalry and 
four batteries of horse-artillery. He was supported by the divisions 
of Hooker, Smith, Couch, Casey, and Kearny, most of which arrived 
on the ground only yesterday. Unfortunately I did not go with the 
advance myself, being obliged to remain to get Franklin and Sedg¬ 
wick started up the river for West Point. Yesterday I received press¬ 
ing private messages from Smith and others begging me to go to the 
front. I started with half a dozen aides and some fifteen orderlies, 
and found things in a bad state. Hancock was engaged with a vastly 
inferior force some two miles from any support. Hooker fought nearly 
all day without assistance, and the mass of the troops were crowded 
together where they were useless. I found everybody discouraged, 
officers and men; our troops in wrong positions, on the wrong side of 
the woods; no system, no co-operation, no orders given, roads blocked 
up. As soon as I came upon the field the men cheered like fiends, 
and I saw at once that I could save the day. I immediately reinforced 
Hancock and arranged to support Hooker, advanced the whole line 
across the woods, filled up the gaps, and got everything in hand for 
whatever might occur. The result was that the enemy saw that he 
was gone if he remained "in his position, and scampered during the 
night. His works were very strong, but his loss was very heavy. The 
roads are in such condition that it is impossible to pursue except with 
a few cavalry. It is with the utmost difficulty that I can feed the 
men, many of whom have had nothing to eat for twenty-four hours 
and more. I had no dinner yesterday, no supper; a cracker for break¬ 
fast, and no dinner yet. I have no baggage; was out in the rain all 
day and until late at night; slept in my clothes and boots, and could 
not even wash my face and hands. I, however, expect my ambulance 
up pretty soon, when I hope for better things. I have been through 
the hospitals, where are many of our own men and of the rebels. One 
Virginian sent for me this morning and told me that I was the only 
general from whom they expected any humanity. I corrected this 
mistake. This is a beautiful little town; several very old houses and 
churches, pretty gardens. I have taken possession of a very fine house 
which Joe Johnston occupied as his headquarters. It has a lovely 
flower-garden and convervatory. If you were here I should be much 
inclined to spend some weeks here. G. W. was one of the whipped 
community, also Joe Johnston, Cadmus, Wilcox, A. P. Hill, D. H. Hill, 
Longstreet, Jeb Stuart, Early (badly wounded); and many others that 
we know. We have all their wounded; eight guns so far. In short, 
we have given them a tremendous thrashing, and I am not at all 
ashamed of the conduct of the Army of the Potomac. 

Telegram— Williamsburg, May 6, 1862, 11 p.m.— The battle of 
Williamsburg has proved a brilliant victory. None of your friends 
injured, though our loss considerable. That of the enemy severe. 
The Quaker army is doing very well. Hancock was superb yesterday. 

Williamsburg, May 6, midnight .— . . . Am very tired; had but 
little sleep last night, and have not had my clothes off; besides, was 


— 129 — 


McClellan’s Own Story 


pretty well wet last night. I have not a particle of baggage with me; 
nothing but a buffalo-robe and horse-blanket, not even a hair-brush 
or tooth-brush. . . 

Monday, 1 p.m. (8th). — ... I hope to get Smith’s division off 
this afternoon, followed by others in the morning. Stoneman is some 
fifteen miles in advance, and will, I hope, communicate with Franklin 
to-night, although I am not yet sure that the enemy may not still be 
between the two. I shall start to-morrow morning and overtake 
Smith. I have ordered up headquarters and the accompanying para¬ 
phernalia at once, so I hope to get within a few miles of my tooth¬ 
brush in a day or two. It is not very pleasant, this going entirely 
without baggage, but it could not be helped. I find that the results 
of my operations are beginning to be apparent. The rebels are evacu¬ 
ating Norfolk, I learn. Your two letters of Sunday and Monday 
reached me last night. It would have been easy for me to have sacri¬ 
ficed 10,000 lives in taking Yorktown, and I presume the world would 
have thought it more brilliant. I am content with what I have done. 
The battle of Williamsburg was more bloody. Had I reached the field 
three hours earlier I could have gained far greater results and have 
saved a thousand lives. It is, perhaps, well as it is, for officers and 
men feel that I saved the day. . . . 

I don’t know where the next battle will occur; I presume on the 
line of the Chickahominy, or it may be to-morrow in effecting a junc¬ 
tion with Franklin. It may suit the views of the masses better, as 
being more bloody. I hope not, and will make it as little so as pos¬ 
sible. . . . 

Williamsburg, May 8, 2 p.m.— ... I have moved four divisions 
already. The reserves have arrived. My wagons have arrived, and 
in an hour or two I will move myself. ... I rather think that we 
have a very severe battle to fight before reaching Richmond, but the 
men are just in the humor for it. . . . Carpet-bag has at last arrived. 

Camp No. 1, May 9, 8:30 p.m. —We are fairly started on the march 
again; my camp is only about four miles from Williamsburg. The 
road was so much blocked up with wagons that I did not start till 
late. Smith, Couch, Casey, and Kearny are well in front of me, the 
regulars close by. To-morrow headquarters start at five A.M., and 
will pass all but Smith, encamping with or just in rear of him. I 
hope to see Franklin to-morrow night and learn more of the enemy. 
. . . The secesh prisoners strongly protested against being obliged 
to remove the torpedoes at Yorktown, but without avail, for they had 
to do it. I think they may be more careful next time. I heard this 
afternoon from Stoneman that they (secesh) had murdered some of 
our men after they were taken prisoners. I have given orders to hold 
all their people we have responsible for it. If it is confirmed to¬ 
morrow I will send a flag to Joe Johnston and quietly inform him that 
I will hang two of his officers for every one of our men thus murdered; 
and I will carry the threat into execution. I will pay them in their 
own coin, if they wish to carry on war in that manner. I hope there 
is some mistake about the murders, for I do not wish to make re¬ 
prisals. It is a sad business at best. . . . 

May 10, Saturday, 11:45 P.M., camp 19 miles from Williamsburg. 
— ... Am encamped now at an old wooden church, and am in easy 
communication with Franklin, Porter, etc. Fitz came over to see me 
this afternoon, and I go over to see him and Franklin to-morrow. To¬ 
morrow being Sunday, I give the men a rest, merely closing up some 
of the troops in rear. I begin to find some Union sentiment in this 


■ 130 — 


Private Letters 


country. ... I expect to fight a very severe battle on the Chicka- 
hominy, but feel no doubt as to the result. I saw the effect of my 
presence the other day in front of Williamsburg. The men behaved 
superbly, and will do better, if possible, next time. To-morrow I 
will get up supplies, reorganize, arrange details, and get ready for 
the great fight, feeling that I shall lose nothing by respecting Sunday 
as far as I can. Secesh is gathering all he can in front of me. So 
much the better. I have implicit confidence in my men, and they have 
in me. What more can I ask? . . . 

Sunday, 8 a.m. (same letter as last ).— ... As I told you last 
night, I am giving my men some rest to-day. They need it much for 
they have for some time been living on long marches, short rations, 
and rainy bivouacs. . . . My cavalry were within six miles of the upper 
Chickahominy yesterday. Norfolk is in our possession, the result of 
my movements. . . . 

May 12, Monday p.m. (same letter ).— . . . While I write the 
2d Dragoons’s band is serenading, and about fifty others are playing 
tattoo at various distances—a grand sound in this lovely moonlight 
night. My camp is at an old frame church in a grove. I differ from 
most of the generals in preferring a tent to a house. I hope not to 
sleep in a house again until I see you. . . . Are you satisfied now with 
my bloodless victories? Even the Abolitionists seem to be coming 
round; judging, at least, from the very handsome resolutions offered 
by Mr. Lovejoy in the House. I look upon that resolution as one of 
the most complimentary I know of, and that, too, offered by my bitter¬ 
est persecutors. But the union of civic merit with military success is 
what pleases me most; to have it recognized that I have saved the 
lives of my men and won success by my own efforts is to me the height 
of glory. I hope that the result in front of Richmond will cause still 
greater satisfaction to the country. I still hope that the God who has 
been so good to me will continue to smile upon our cause, and enable 
me to bring this war to a speedy close, so that I may at last have the 
rest I want so much. ... I do need rest. You know I have had but 
little in my life. But the will of God be done! What is given me to 
do I will try to do with all my might. ... I think one more battle 
here will finish the work. I expect a great one, but feel that confi¬ 
dence in my men and that trust in God which makes me very sanguine 
as to the result. They will fight me in front of Richmond, I am con¬ 
fident. Defeat there is certain destruction to them, and I think will 
prove the ruin of their wretched cause. They are concentrating every¬ 
thing for the last death-struggle. My government, alas! is not giving 
me any aid. But I will do the best I can with what I have, and trust 
to God’s mercy and the courage of my men for the result. ... We 
march in the morning to Cumberland, gradually drawing nearer to 
Richmond. 

May 15, Cumberland , 2:30 p.m.—A nother wet, horrid day! It 
rained a little yesterday morning, more in the afternoon, much during 
the night, and has been amusing itself in the same manner very per¬ 
sistently all day. I had expected to move headquarters to White 
House to-day; but this weather has put the roads in such condition that 
I cannot do more than get Franklin and Porter there to-day. Head¬ 
quarters cavalry and Hunt will move there to-morrow; perhaps one or 
two other divisions as well. We had quite a visitation yesterday in 
the shape of Secretary Seward, Gideon Welles, Mr. Bates, F. Seward, 
Dahlgren, Mrs. Goldsborough and one of her daughters, Mrs. F. Sew¬ 
ard, and some other ladies whose names I did not catch. I went on 
board their boat; then had some ambulances harnessed up and took 


— 131 — 


McClellan’s Own Story 


them around camps. We are just about twenty-five miles from Rich¬ 
mond here, the advance considerably nearer. I don’t yet know what 
to make of the rebels. I do not see how they can possibly abandon 
Virginia and Richmond without a battle; nor do I understand why 
they abandoned and destroyed Norfolk and the Merrimac, unless they 
also intended to abandon all of Virginia. There is a puzzle there 
somewhere which will soon be solved. ... I am heartily tired of this 
life I am leading—always some little absurd thing being done by 
those gentry in Washington. I am every day more and more tired of 
public life, and earnestly pray that I may soon be able to throw down 
my sword and live once more as a private gentleman. ... I confess 
I find it difficult to judge whether the war will soon be at an end or 
not. I think that the blows the rebels are now receiving and have 
lately received ought to break them up; but one can do no more than 
speculate. Yes, I can imagine peace and quietness reigning once 
more in this land of ours.—It is just that I am fighting for! . . . . 
Still raining hard and dismally; an awful time for the men; the only 
comfort is that they all have plenty to eat. 

9 p.M. ( same day). — . . . Have received to-day the official copy 
of the resolutions of the House. I learn that the Abolitionists begin 
to think that I am not such a wretch after all, or else that it is best 
to say so. 

It was all humbug about my being struck by a piece of a shell at 
Williamsburg. That reminds me of a joke of the youngsters played 

upon-at Yorktown. They sent him to see an immense “shell” 

that had fallen in our headquarters camp. He found a larger oyster- 
shell. . . . 

I send you a photograph which I have just received from Gen. 
Blume, chief of artillery in the Prussian army. I knew him abroad, 
and the old gentleman writes to me occasionally. 

Telegram —May 16, 1862, White House .—Have just arrived over 
horrid roads. No further movement possible until they improve. 
This house is where Washington’s courtship took place and where he 
resided when first married. I do not permit it to be occupied by any 
one, nor the grounds around. It is a beautiful spot directly on the 
banks of the Pamunkey. All well and in fine spirits. Hope to get 
our baggage up by water, otherwise will fare badly to-night. 

May 16, 11:30 p.m. White House .— ... I rode over a horrid 
road to this place this morning; spent some time at Washington’s 
house, or at least his wife’s, and afterwards rode to the front, visiting, 
in the course of my ride the old church (St. Peter’s) where he was 
married. It is an old brick church with a rather pretentious tower, 
more remarkable for its situation than for anything else. The situa¬ 
tion is very fine, on a commanding hill. A tablet in the interior 
records the death of some one in 1690. As I happened to be there 
alone for a few moments, I could not help kneeling at the chancel and 
praying that I might serve my country as truly as he did. . . . 

May 17, 8:30 a.m. (same letter). — . . . We have a change in the 
weather. It is clear and very hot, so I presume the roads will improve 
much to-day. I am pushing on the advanced guard and reconnois- 
sances in various directions. We gain some ground every day; but our 
progress has been slow on account of the execrable nature of the roads, 
as well as their extreme narrowness and fewness in number, making 
it a very difficult matter to move large masses of men with any rap¬ 
idity or convenience. I expect to have our advanced parties near 
enough to Bottom’s bridge to-day to ascertain whether the enemy is 


— 132 — 




Private Letters 


there in much force or not, and by to-morrow or next day to obtain 
similar information about the other bridges—all of which, bye the bye, 
are burned, I believe. But the river is fordable, so the difficulty is 
not insuperable by any means. It is very difficult to divine whether 
secesh, will fight a great battle in front of Richmond or not; I still 
think they ought to, but there are some circumstances which look 
somewhat as if they would evacuate. Time only will show, and the 
trial cannot be long deferred. I am very sorry that we could not have 
advanced more rapidly; my only consolation is that it has been im¬ 
possible. Just think of its requiring forty-eight hours to move two 
divisions with their trains five miles! Nothing could be much worse 
than that. The fastest way to move is never to move in wet weather. 

Midnight — ... I am now at this present moment involved in 
a great many different orders for parties to move out at daybreak on 
reconnoissances. . . . 

May 18, Sunday, 6 P.M., White House — . . . We leave here in the 
morning. Porter and Franklin march at four and eight A.M., head¬ 
quarters at seven. We will go to Tunstall’s, or perhaps a little be¬ 
yond it, and will now soon close up on the Chickahominy and find out 
what secesh is doing. I think he will fight us there, or between that 
and Richmond; and if he is badly thrashed (as I trust he will be), 
incline to believe that he will begin to cry peccavi and say that he has 
enough of it, especially if Halleck beats him at Corinth. . . . 

Midnight ( same letter). — ... I start early in the morning. . . . 
Those hounds in Washington are after me again. 


— 133 — 


CHAPTER XXII 


White House—The Chickahominy river—Bridges—Battle of Hanover 

Court-House—Porter’s victory—Neglect at Washington—McDow¬ 
ell’s retention useless. 

White House was a very fine plantation belonging to 
Mrs. Gen. Lee. It was the residence of Mrs. Custis when 
she was married to Washington. The ceremony took place 
in St. Peter’s Church, a lonely old building beautifully placed 
on a commanding hill. I observed within it a tablet com¬ 
memorating a death which took place in 1690. Finding 
one’s self alone without that historic building, it was a 
natural impulse to invoke the aid of God to enable me to 
serve the country as unselfishly and truly as did the great 
man who had often worshipped there. 

The residence at White House was not the original build¬ 
ing of the time of Washington—that had been destroyed by 
fire; but the existing one was constructed on the same foun¬ 
dations. 

I neither occupied it myself nor permitted any others 
to do so, but placed a guard to preserve it. For this natural 
act of respect for the memory of the greatest man our 
country has produced I was most violently attacked and 
maligned by the extreme radicals. I am willing that pos¬ 
terity shall judge between them and myself. 

On the 19th headquarters and the 5th and 6th corps 
advanced to Tunstall’s Station, six miles from White House. 
The rain recommenced on this day, and through it I rode to 
Bottom’s bridge and made a short reconnoissance. The ene¬ 
my were there, but not in great force. The advanced guard 
was near New bridge. 

The camp at Tunstall’s was the most beautiful we oc¬ 
cupied during the campaign. Headquarters were on the 
summit of a hill, commanding a superb view in all directions. 
The country was highly cultivated, being covered with fine 
plantations. Towards Richmond large masses of troops were 
bivouacked, while towards the Pamunkey there were no 
signs of an army. The contrast between war and peace was 


— 134 — 


The Advance 


vivid and most impressive. At night when the countless 
bivouac-fires were lighted the scene w T as grand and brilliant 
beyond description. But he must have been devoid of feel¬ 
ing who could regard this magnificent spectacle without a 
sentiment of most sincere regret that human madness and 
folly should have made it necessary to march armies through 
this fair and peaceful land. The Army of the Potomac 
was mainly composed of good men, who took up arms from 
the noblest motives; and I doubt whether any troops ever 
did so little needless damage in a hostile country. But at 
best a large army leaves a wide swath in its rear, and can 
not move without leaving the marks of its passage. 

On the 20th it again rained heavily. On the evening of 
the 21st the army was posted as follows: 

The advanced guard within a mile of New bridge; the 
6th corps three miles from New bridge, with the 5th corps 
at supporting distance in its rear; the 2d corps on the rail¬ 
way, about three miles from the Chickahominy, connecting 
the right with the left; the 4th corps on the New Kent road, 
near Bottom's bridge, having three regiments across the 
stream covering the rebuilding of the bridge; the 3d corps 
within easy supporting distance of the 4th corps. 

On the 22d headquarters were advanced to Cold Harbor, 
and on the 26th the railway was in operation as far as the 
Chickahominy, and the railway bridge across the stream 
nearly completed. 

The Chickahominy river rises some fifteen miles to the 
northward of Richmond, and unites with the James about 
forty miles below that city. Our operations embraced the 
part of the river between Meadow’s and Bottom’s bridges, 
covering the approaches to Richmond from the east. In 
this vicinity the river, in its ordinary stage, is about forty 
feet wide, fringed with a dense growth of heavy forest trees, 
and bordered by low, marshy bottom-lands varying from 
half a mile to a mile in width. 

Within the limits above-mentioned the firm ground lying 
above high-water mark seldom approaches the river on 
either bank, and no place was found, within this section, 
where the high ground came near the stream on both banks. 


— 135 — 


McClellan's Own Story 


It was subject to frequent, sudden, and great variations 
in the volume of water, and a single violent rain-storm of 
brief duration would cause a rise of water which overflowed 
the bottom-lands on both sides, and for many days made the 
river absolutely impassable without bridges. 

When our light troops approached the river on the 20th 
of May it was found that all the bridges had been destroyed 
by the enemy on our approach, except that at Mechanics- 
ville, and it became necessary not only to rebuild the old 
bridges, but also to construct several additional ones. The 
west bank of the river, opposite New, Mechanicsville, and 
Meadow bridges, was bordered by high bluffs, which af¬ 
forded the enemy commanding positions on which to estab¬ 
lish his batteries, to enfilade the approaches by the prin¬ 
cipal roads leading to Richmond on our right, and to prevent 
the reconstruction of these important bridges. We were 
thus obliged to select other less exposed points for our 
crossings. 

Had the 1st corps effected its promised junction we 
might have turned the head-waters of the Chickahominy 
and attacked Richmond from the north and northwest, while 
we preserved our line of supply from West Point; but with 
the force actually at my disposal such an attempt would 
simply have exposed the Army of the Potomac to destruc¬ 
tion in detail, and the total loss of its communications. It 
is hardly necessary to say that the country in which we 
operated could supply nothing for the wants of the army, 
and that were our communications with the depots cut and 
held by the enemy nothing but starvation awaited us. 

When we arrived opposite Bottom’s bridge on the 20th 
the enemy was there in only small force, and, as it was of 
the utmost importance to secure a lodgment on the right 
bank before he could concentrate his forces and resist the 
passage of the stream, I ordered Casey’s division of the 4th 
corps to ford the river at once and occupy the heights on 
the further bank. This was promptly done, and reconnois- 
sances were immediately pushed forward, while instant steps 
were taken to rebuild the bridge. The troops were directed 


— 136 — 


McDowell Expected 

to throw up defences to secure our left flank, and the 3d corps 
was moved up in support. 

Meanwhile our centre and right were advanced to the 
river, and on the 24th Mechanicsville was carried, the enemy 
being driven out by our artillery and forced across the 
bridge, which they destroyed. Gen. Naglee, of Casey’s divi¬ 
sion of the 4th corps, on the same day dislodged a force of 
the enemy from the vicinity of Seven Pines, and the advance 
of our left secured a strong position near that place. All the 
information obtained from negroes, deserters, prisoners, and 
spies indicated that the enemy occupied in force all the ap¬ 
proaches to Richmond from the east, and that he intended 
to dispute every step of our advance beyond the Chicka- 
hominy on our left, and to resist the passage of the stream 
opposite our right. That their army was superior to ours 
in numbers seemed certain. Strong entrenchments had 
been constructed around the city. Up to this time I had 
every reason to expect that McDowell would commence his 
march from Fredericksburg on the # morning of the 26th, and 
it was only during the evening of the 24th that I received 
from the President the telegram, already given, announcing 
the suspension of his movement. 

So far, then, as immediate operations were concerned, 
it only remained for me to make the best use of the forces 
at my disposal, and to avail myself of all possible artificial 
auxiliaries, to compensate as far as possible for the inade¬ 
quacy of numbers. I concurred fully with the President 
in his injunction, contained in his telegram of the 24th, 
that it was necessary, with my limited force, to move “cau¬ 
tiously and safely.” 

In view of the peculiar character of the Chickahominy, 
and the liability to sudden inundations, it became necessary 
to construct eleven bridges, all long and difficult, with ex¬ 
tensive logway approaches, and often built under fire. 

It will be remembered that the order for the co-opera¬ 
tion of McDowell was only suspended, not revoked; and, 
therefore, I could not abandon the northern approach and 
my communications with West Point. To cover these com¬ 
munications, and be prepared to effect the junction with the 


— 137 — 


McClellan’s Own Story 


1st corps when it advanced, it was necessary to retain a 
portion of the army on the left bank of the Chickahominy, 
and I could not make any serious movement with the forces 
on the right bank until the communications between the 
two parts of the army were firmly and securely established 
by strong and sufficiently numerous bridges. 

As the entrenchments around Richmond were strong 
and heavily garrisoned, it would have been an act of madness 
and folly had I temporarily abandoned my communications 
and thrown the entire army across the stream (trusting to 
the chances of carrying the place by assault) before the 
troops had exhausted the supplies carried with them. 

I was not responsible for the fact that I was obliged 
to select a faulty and dangerous plan as the least objection¬ 
able of those from which I could choose. 

On the 24th a very spirited and successful reconnois- 
sance took place near New bridge, which first brought Lieut, 
(afterwards Gen.) Custer to my notice. His commanding 
officers commended him .highly for his conduct, and I sent 
for him to thank him. He was then a slim, long-haired boy, 
carelessly dressed. I thanked him for his gallantry, and 
asked what I could do for him. He replied very modestly 
that he had nothing to ask, and evidently did not suppose 
that he had done anything to deserve extraordinary reward. 
I then asked if he would like to serve on my personal staff 
as an aide-de-camp. Upon this he brightened up, and as¬ 
sured me that he would regard such service as the most 
gratifying he could perform; and I at once gave the necessary 
orders. He continued on my staff until I was relieved from 
the command. 

In those days Custer was simply a reckless, gallant boy, 
undeterred by fatigue, unconscious of fear; but his head 
was always clear in danger, and he always brought me clear 
and intelligible reports of what he saw when under the 
heaviest fire. I became much attached to him. In the later 
days of the war, when he commanded cavalry troops, he dis¬ 
played a degree of prudence and good sense, in conducting 
the most dangerous expeditions, that surprised many who 
thought they knew him well. 


— 138 — 


Gen. Custer 


In the battle of the Rosebud, against the Sioux, where 
he lost his life and the whole of his immediate command was 
destroyed, no one survived to tell the story of the disaster. 
On that fatal day he simply repeated the tactics that he had 
so often successfully used against large bodies of Indians; 
and it is probable that he was deceived as to the strength 
and fighting capacity of his opponents, and that, from his 
want of knowledge of the details of the ground where the 
tragedy occurred, he was suddenly surrounded by over¬ 
whelming masses of well-armed warriors, against whom the 
heroic efforts of his command wasted themselves in vain. 

Those who accused him of reckless rashness would, per¬ 
haps, have been the first to accuse him of timidity if he had 
not attacked, and thus allowed the enemy to escape unhurt. 
He died as he had lived, a gallant soldier; and his whole 
career was such as to force me to believe that he had good 
reasons for acting as he did. 

With the exception of the 25th, it rained heavily every 
day from the 22d to the battle of Fair Oaks, and during the 
day and night of the 30th an unusually violent storm oc¬ 
curred, accompanied by torrents of rain. The valley of the 
Chickahominy was flooded more than ever; all work on the 
bridges was suspended, and they became well-nigh imprac¬ 
ticable. 

The enemy seized the occasion and determined to attack 
the part of the army that had crossed the Chickahominy, 
when it would be very difficult or impossible to support it. 
Exposure and fatigue had brought upon me a violent attack 
of illness, which confined me to my bed on the 30th and the 
morning of the 31st. I left my bed to go to the field of 
battle as soon as I was satisfied of the importance of the 
crisis. Two corps, the 3d and the 4th, were across the 
Chickahominy, three on the left bank. 

The 4th corps was in position near Fair Oaks and Seven 
Pines. Kearny’s division of the 3d corps was on and near 
the railroad in advance of Savage’s Station. Hooker’s divi¬ 
sion was on the left, near White Oak Swamp. The 2d corps 
was on the left bank of the Chickahominy, at and near the 


— 139 — 


McClellan's Own Story 

Grapevine bridge, in position to support either wing of the 
army. 

The 5th and the 6th corps were also on the left bank, 
between Mechanicsville and New bridge. 

Having been informed late on the 24th that McDowell's 
advance was suspended, I caused work upon the bridges to 
be commenced immediately and pushed forward with the 
greatest vigor; but heavy rains continued to fall from day 
to day, which flooded the valley and raised the water to a 
greater height than had been known for twenty years. 

The bridges first made, together with their approaches, 
which were not arranged for such unprecedented high 
water, were carried away or rendered impassable. It thus 
became necessary, with immense labor, to build others much 
larger, more elevated and stable. Our men worked in the 
water, exposed to the fire of the enemy from the opposite 
bank. 

On the 25th of May I received the following telegram: 

‘‘Your despatch received. Gen. Banks was at Strasburg with 
about six thousand (6,000) men, Shields having been taken from him 
to swell a column for McDowell to aid you at Richmond, and the rest 
of his force scattered at various places. On the 23d a rebel force of 
from 7,000 to 10,000 fell upon one regiment and two companies guard¬ 
ing the bridge at Front Royal, destroying it entirely; crossed the 
Shennandoah, and on the 24th—yesterday—pushed on to get north of 
Banks on the road to Winchester. Gen. Banks ran a race with them, 
beating them into Winchester yesterday evening. This morning a 
battle ensued between the two forces, in which Gen. Banks was beaten 
back into full retreat towards Martinsburg, and probably is broken up 
into a total rout. Geary, on the Manasses Gap Railroad, just now 
reports that Jackson is now near Front Royal with 10,000 troops, fol¬ 
lowing up and supporting, as I understand, the force now pursuing 
Banks. Also, that another force of 10,000 is near Orleans, following 
on in the same direction. Stripped bare, as we are here, I will do all 
we can to prevent them crossing the Potomac at Harper’s Ferry or 
above. McDowell has about 20,000 of his forces moving back to the 
vicinity of Front Royal, and Fremont, who was at Franklin, is moving 
to Harrisonburg; both these movements intended to get in the enemy’s 
rear. 

“One more of McDowell’s brigade is ordered through here to Har¬ 
per’s Ferry; the rest of his forces remain for the present at Freder¬ 
icksburg. We are sending such regiments and dribs from here and 
Baltimore as we can spare to Harper’s Ferry, supplying their places 
in some sort, calling in militia from the adjacent States. We also 
have eighteen cannon on the road to Harper’s Ferry, of which arm 
there is not a single one at that point. This is now our situation. 

“If McDowell’s force was now beyond our reach we should be 
entirely helpless. Apprehension of something like this, and no un- 


— 140 — 


Messages From the President 


willingness to sustain you, has always been my reason for withholding 
McDowell’s forces from you. 

“Please understand this, and do the best you can with the forces 
you have. 

“A. Lincoln, 

“President.” 

On the 25th the following was also received: 

“The enemy is moving north in sufficient force to drive Gen. Banks 
before him; precisely in what force we cannot tell. He is also threat¬ 
ening Leesburg, and Geary on the Manassas Gap Railroad, from both 
north and south; in precisely what force we cannot tell. I think the 
movement is a general and concerted one, such as would not be if he 
was acting upon the purpose of a very desperate defence of Rich¬ 
mond. I think the time is near when you must either attack Rich¬ 
mond or give up the job and come to the defence of Washington. Let 
me hear from you instantly. 

“A. Lincoln, 

“ President .” 


To which I replied as follows: 

Telegram received. Independently of it, the time is very near 
when I shall attack Richmond. The object of the movement is prob¬ 
ably to prevent reinforcements being sent to me. All the information 
obtained from balloons, deserters, prisoners, and contrabands agrees 
in the statement that the mass of the rebel troops are still in the im¬ 
mediate vicinity of Richmond, ready to defend it. I have no knowledge 
of Bank’s position and force, nor what there is at Manassas; therefore 
cannot form a definite opinion as to the force against him. 

I have two corps across Chickahominy, within six miles of Rich¬ 
mond; the others on this side at other crossings within same distance, 
and ready to cross when bridges are completed. 


On the 26th I received the following: 

“We have Gen. Banks’s official report. He has saved his army and 
baggage, and has made a safe retreat to the river, and is probably safe 
at Williamsport. He reports the attacking force at fifteen thousand 
(15,000). 

“A. Lincoln, 

“ President .” 

Also the following: 


“Can you not cut the Acquia Creek Railroad? Also, what im¬ 
pression have you as to entrenched works for you to contend with in 
front of Richmond ? Can you get near enough to throw shells into the 
city? 

“A. Lincoln, 

“ President .” 


On the same day I sent the following: 

Have cut the Virginia Central Road in three places between Han¬ 
over Court-House and the Chickahominy. Will try to cut the other. 
I do not think Richmond entrenchments formidable; but am not cer- 


— 141 — 


McClellan’s Own Story 


tain. Hope very soon to be within shelling distance. Have railroad 
in operation from White House to Chickahominy. Hope to have 
Chickahominy bridge repaired to-night. Nothing of interest to-day. 

The interruption of the railroad here referred to was 
effected by the command of Brig.-Gen. Stoneman, and was 
intended to prevent the enemy from drawing supplies by 
that route or from sending reinforcements to Anderson or 
Jackson. At ten A.M. I telegraphed to the President: 

I am glad to know affairs are not so bad as might have been. I 
would earnestly call your attention to my instructions to Gen. Banks 
of March 16, to Gen. Wadsworth of same date, and to my letter of 
April 1 to the adjutant-general. I cannot but think that a prompt 
return to the principles there laid down would relieve all probability 
of danger. I will forward copies by mail. I beg to urge the impor¬ 
tance of Manassas and Front Royal in contradistinction to Fredericks¬ 
burg. 


On the same day I received intelligence that a very con¬ 
siderable force of the enemy was in the vicinity of Hanover 
Court-House, to the right and rear of our army, thus threat¬ 
ening our communications, and in a position either to rein¬ 
force Jackson or to impede McDowell’s junction, should he 
finally move to unite with us. On the same day I also re¬ 
ceived information from Gen. McDowell, through the Secre¬ 
tary of War, that the enemy had fallen back from Freder¬ 
icksburg towards Richmond, and that Gen. McDowell’s ad¬ 
vance' was eight miles south of the Rappahannock. 

“Washington, May 26, 1862. 

“Gen. McClellan: 

“Following despatch received late last night: 

“ ‘ Falmouth , 25 th.—To Hon. E. M. Stanton: I have just examined 
a lieutenant, three sergeants, and a corporal who came in from the 
army as deserters this morning. They are, with the exception of one 
Frenchman, from the North, pressed into service. They are all men 
of fine intelligence. The lieutenant and the sergeants, who came from 
the same battery, are positive the army has fallen back to Richmond. 
The first order was to go at 1:30 p.m. to Hanover Junction, they hav¬ 
ing heard of McClellan’s right wing being at Hanover Court-House 
and having destroyed the railroad to Gordonsville at that place, which 
made them fear for their communications. 

“ ‘This was suddenly revoked, and an order was read on parade 
directing the command back to Richmond to take part in the great 
battle now about to take place there. Two other men thought that 
the force was going to join Jackson, who was going to get in the 
rear of my army, and was going into Maryland. This was only sur¬ 
mise; the order for Richmond was written and published. My advance 
is eight miles beyond Fredericksburg. I hope soon to be able to tell 
you more precisely where the enemy is. One thing is certain: that, 


— 142 — 


Hanover Court-House 

whether they left here to join Jackson or not, they have not done so 
yet, and that all the grand masses Geary reports must have come from 
some other place than here. They left here by stealth, and with dread 
of being attacked. They went at night, and for a distance by railroad. 
They thought I had sixty thousand men. (Signed) Irwin McDowell/ 

“E. M. Stanton, 
“Secretary of War.” 

It was thus imperative to dislodge or defeat this force, 
independently even of the wishes of the President as ex¬ 
pressed in his telegram of the 26th. I entrusted this task 
to Brig.-Gen. Fitz-John Porter, commanding the 5th corps, 
with orders to move at daybreak on the 27th. 

Through a heavy rain and over bad roads that officer 
moved his command as follows: 

Brig.-Gen. W. H. Emory led the advance with the 5th 
and 6th regiments U. S. Cavalry and Benson's horse-battery 
of the 2d U. S. Artillery, taking the road from New bridge 
via Mechanicsville to Hanover Court-House. 

Gen. Morell’s division, composed of the brigades of Mar- 
tindale, Butterfield, and McQuade, with Berdan's regiment 
of sharpshooters and three batteries under Capt. Charles 
Griffin, 5th U. S. Artillery, followed on the same road. 

Col. G. K. Warren, commanding a provisional brigade 
composed of the 5th and 13th N. Y., the 1st Conn. Artillery 
acting as infantry, the 6th Penn. Cavalry, and Weeden’s 
R. I. Battery, moved from his station at Old Church by a 
road running to Hanover Court-House, parallel to the Pamun- 
key. 

After a fatiguing march of fourteen miles through the 
mud and rain, Gen. Emory at noon reached a point about 
two miles from Hanover Court-House, where the road forks 
to Ashland, and found a portion of the enemy formed in line 
across the Hanover Court-House road. 

Gen. Emory had, before this, been joined by the 25th 
N. Y. (of Martindale's brigade) and Berdan's sharpshooters; 
these regiments were deployed with a section of Benson's 
battery, and advanced slowly towards the enemy until rein¬ 
forced by Gen. Butterfield with four regiments of his brigade, 
when the enemy was charged and quickly routed, one of his 
guns being captured by the 17th N. Y., under Col. Lansing, 


- 143 — 


McClellan's Own Story 


after having been disabled by the fire of Benson’s battery. 
The firing here lasted about an hour. The cavalry and Ben¬ 
son’s battery were immediately ordered in pursuit, followed 
by Morell’s infantry and artillery, with the exception of 
Martindale’s brigade. Warren’s brigade, having been de¬ 
layed by repairing bridges, etc., now arrived, too late to par¬ 
ticipate in this affair; a portion of this command was sent 
to the Pamunkey to destroy bridges, and captured quite a 
number of prisoners; the remainder followed Morell’s divi¬ 
sion. In the meantime Gen. Martindale, with the few re¬ 
maining regiments of his brigade and a section of artillery, 
advanced on the Ashland road, and found a force of the ene¬ 
my’s infantry, cavalry, and artillery in position near Beake’s 
Station on the Virginia Central Railroad; he soon forced 
them to retire towards Ashland. 

The 25th N. Y. having been ordered to rejoin him, Gen. 
Martindale was directed to form his brigade and move up 
the railroad to rejoin the rest of the command at Hanover 
Court-House. 

He sent one regiment up the railroad, but remained with 
the 2d Me., afterwards joined by the 25th N. Y., to guard the 
rear of the main column. 

The enemy soon returned to attack Gen. Martindale, 
who at once formed the 2d Me., 25th N. Y., and a portion of 
the 44th N. Y., with one section of Martin’s battery, on the 
New bridge road, facing his own position of the morning, 
and then held his ground for an hour against odds until 
reinforced. 

Gen. Porter was at Hanover Court-House, near the head 
of his column, when he learned that the rear had been at¬ 
tacked by a large force. He at once faced the whole column 
about, recalled the cavalry sent in pursuit towards Ashland, 
moved the 13th and 14th N. Y. and Griffin’s battery direct 
to Martindale’s assistance, pushed the 9th Mass, and 62d 
Penn., of McQuade’s brigade, through the woods on the right 
(our original left), and attacked the flank of the enemy, 
while Butterfield, with the 83d Penn, and 16th Mich., has¬ 
tened towards the scene of action by the railroad and through 
the wood, further to the right, and completed the rout of the 


— 144 — 


Hanover Court-House 

enemy. During the remainder of this and the following day 
our cavalry was active in the pursuit, taking a number of 
prisoners. 

Capt. Harrison, of the 5th U. S. Cavalry, with a single 
company, brought in as prisoners two entire companies of 
infantry with their arms and ammunition. A part of Rush's 
lancers also captured an entire company with their arms. 

The immediate results of these affairs were some 200 
of the enemy's dead buried by our troops, 730 prisoners sent 
to the rear, one 12-pound howitzer, one caisson, a large num¬ 
ber of small arms, and two railroad trains captured. 

Our loss amounted to 53 killed, 344 wounded and miss¬ 
ing. 

Their camp at Hanover Court-House was taken and de¬ 
stroyed. 

Having reason to believe that Gen. Anderson, with a 
strong force, was still at Ashland, I ordered Gen. Sykes's 
division of regulars to move on the 28th from New bridge 
towards Hanover Court-House, to be in position to support 
Gen. Porter. They reached a point within three miles of 
Hanover Court-House, and remained there until the evening 
of the 29th, when they returned to their original camp. 

On the 28th Gen. Stoneman's command of cavalry, 
horse-artillery, and two regiments of infantry were also 
placed under Gen. Porter’s orders. 

On the same day I visited Hanover Court-House, whence 
I sent the following despatch to the Secretary of War: 

May 28 , 2 p.m. 

Porter's action of yesterday was truly a glorious victory; too much 
credit cannot be given to his magnificent division and its accomplished 
leader. The rout of the rebels was complete; not a defeat, but a 
complete rout. Prisoners are constantly coming in; two companies 
have this moment arrived with excellent arms. 

There is no doubt that the enemy are concentrating everything 
on Richmond. I will do my best to cut off Jackson, but am doubtful 
whether I can. 

It is the policy and duty of the government to send me by water 
all the well-drilled troops available. I am confident that Washington 
is in no danger. Engines and cars in large numbers have been sent 
up to bring down Jackson’s command. 

I may not be able to cut them off, but will try; we have cut all 
but the Fredericksburg and Richmond Railroad. The real issue is in 
the battle about to be fought in front of Richmond. All our available 


— 145 — 


McClellan’s Own Story 


troops should be collected here—not raw regiments, but the well- 
drilled troops. It cannot be ignored that a desperate battle is before 
us; if any regiments of good troops remain unemployed it will be an 
irreparable fault committed. 

Having ascertained the state of affairs, instructions 
were given for the operations of the following day. 

On the 28th a party under Maj. Williams, 6th U. S. 
Cavalry, destroyed the common road bridges over the Pa- 
munkey, and Virginia Central Railroad bridge over the South 
Anna. 

On the 29th he destroyed the Fredericksburg and Rich¬ 
mond Railroad bridge over the South Anna, and the turn¬ 
pike bridge over the same stream. 

On the same day, and mainly to cover the movement of 
Maj. Williams, Gen. Emory moved a column of cavalry to¬ 
wards Ashland from Hanover Court-House. The advance 
of this column, under Capt. Chambliss, 5th U. S. Cavalry, 
entered Ashland, driving out a party of the enemy, de¬ 
stroyed the railroad bridge over Stony creek, broke up the 
railroad and telegraph. 

Another column of all arms, under Col. Warren, was 
sent on the same day by the direct road to Ashland, and 
entered it shortly after Gen. Emory’s column had retired, 
capturing a small party there. 

Gen. Stoneman on the same day moved on Ashland by 
Leach’s Station, covering well the movements of the other 
columns. 

The objects of the expedition having been accomplished, 
and it being certain that the 1st corps would not join us at 
once, Gen. Porter withdrew his command to their camps 
with the main army on the evening of the 29th. 

On the night of the 27th and 28th I sent the following 
despatch to the Secretary of War: 

Porter has gained two complete victories over superior forces, yet 
I feel obliged to move in the morning with reinforcements to secure 
the complete destruction of the rebels in that quarter. In doing so 
I run some risk here, but I cannot help it. The enemy are even in 
greater force than I had supposed. I will do all that quick movements 
can accomplish, but you must send me all the troops you can, and 
leave to me full latitude as to choice of commanders. It is absolutely 
necessary to destroy the rebels near Hanover Court-House before I 
can advance. 


— 146 — 


Hanover Court-House 


In reply to which I received the following from the 
President: 

“Washington, May 28, 1862. 

“I am very glad of Gen. F. J. Porter’s victory; still, if it was a 
total rout of the enemy, I am puzzled to know why the Richmond and 
Fredericksburg Railroad was not seized again, as you say you have 
all the railroads but the Richmond and Fredericksburg. I am puzzled 
to see how, lacking that, you can have any, except the scrap from 
Richmond to West Point. The scrap of the Virginia Central from 
Richmond to Hanover Junction, without more, is simply nothing. That 
the whole of the enemy is concentrating on Richmond I think cannot 
be certainly known to you or me. Saxton, at Harper’s Ferry, informs 
us that large forces, supposed to be Jackson’s and Ewell’s, forced his 
advance from Charlestown to-day. Gen. King telegraphs us from 
Fredericksburg that contrabands give certain information that 15,000 
left Hanover Junction Monday morning to reinforce Jackson. I am 
painfully impressed with the importance of the struggle before you, 
and shall aid you all I can consistently with my view of due regard to 
all points.” 

In regard to this telegram of the President it may be 
remarked that it would have been dangerous and foolish in 
the extreme to leave Porter at Ashland and Hanover Court- 
House to hold the railways. I knew that McDowell would 
not advance for some time, if at all. I could not reinforce 
Porter sufficiently to enable him to remain in his advanced 
position without drawing so largely from the main army 
as to endanger its safety and reduce it to inaction. More¬ 
over, there was no object in running this risk. I had broken 
the direct line of communication between Richmond and 
Jackson; had cleared the front of Fredericksburg, so that 
McDowell could advance unopposed, and had relieved my 
own right flank and rear from immediate danger. 

At 6 P.M. of the 29th I telegraphed the Secretary of 
War: 

Gen. Porter has gained information that Gen. Anderson left his 
position in vicinity of Fredericksburg at four a.m. Sunday with the 
following troops: 1st S. C., Col. Hamilton; one battalion S. C. Rifles, 
34th and 38th N. C., 45th Ga., 12th, 13th, and 14th S. C., 3d La., two 
batteries of four guns each—namely, Letcher’s Va. and McIntosh’s S. 
C. batteries. Gen. Anderson and his command passed Ashland yes¬ 
terday evening en route for Richmond, leaving men behind to destroy 
bridges over the telegraph road which they travelled. This informa¬ 
tion is reliable. It is also positively certain that Branch’s command 
was from Gordonsville, bound for Richmond, whither they have now 
gone. 

It may be regarded as positive, I think, that there is no rebel force 
between Fredericksburg and Junction. 


— 147 — 


McClellan's Own Story 


The following was also sent on the same day by Gen. 
Marcy: 

“A detachment from Gen. F. J. Porter's command, under Maj. 
Williams, 6th Cavalry, destroyed the South Anna railroad bridge at 
about nine a.m. to-day; a large quantity of Confederate public pro¬ 
perty was also destroyed at Ashland this morning.” 

In reply to which the following was received from the 
President: 

“Your despatch as to the South Anna and Ashland being seized 
by our forces this morning is received. Understanding these points 
to be on the Richmond and Fredericksburg Railroad, I heartily con¬ 
gratulate the country, and thank Gen. McClellan and his army for 
their seizure.” 

On the 30th I sent the following to Secretary Stanton: 

From the tone of your despatches and the President's I do not 
think that you at all appreciate the value and magnitude of Porter’s 
victory. It has entirely relieved my right flank, which was seriously 
threatened; routed and demoralized a considerable portion of the rebel 
forces; taken over 750 prisoners; killed and wounded large numbers; 
one gun, many small arms, and much baggage taken. It was one of 
the handsomest things in the war, both in itself and in its results. 
Porter has returned, and my army is again well in hand. Another 
day will make the probable field of battle passable for artillery. It 
is quite certain that there is nothing in front of McDowell at Freder¬ 
icksburg. I regard the burning of South Anna bridges as the least 
important result of Porter's movement. 

The results of this brilliant operation of Gen. Porter 
were the dispersal of Gen. Branch’s division and the clearing 
of our right flank and rear. It was rendered impossible for 
the enemy to communicate by rail with Fredericksburg, or 
with Jackson via Gordonsville, except by the very circuitous 
route of Lynchburg, and the road was left entirely open for 
the advance of McDowell had he been permitted to join the 
Army of the Potomac. His withdrawal toward Front Royal 
was, in my judgment, a serious and fatal error; he could do 
no good in that direction, while, had he been permitted to 
carry out the orders of May 17, the united forces would have 
driven the enemy within the immediate entrenchments of 
Richmond before Jackson could have returned to its succor, 
and probably would have gained possession promptly of that 
place. 

It is very clear that the arrangements I directed in 
March and on the 1st of April for the defence of Washington 


— 148 — 


McDowell 


and the Shenandoah would have proved ample to check 
Jackson without delaying the advance of McDowell. The 
total disregard of these instructions led to the actual condi¬ 
tions of affairs. 

On the 25th of May McDowell’s advance was eight miles 
beyond Fredericksburg. If he had marched on the 26th, 
as first ordered, he would have found no enemy in his front 
until he reached the South Anna, on the 27th or early on the 
28th. For his telegram of the 25th shows that they had 
hastily fallen back during the night of the 24th and 25th, 
and Porter found them at Hanover Court-House and Ash¬ 
land on the 27th; so that, as things were, Porter’s division 
alone would have insured McDowell’s junction with the 
Army of the Potomac without the slightest difficulty. 

Had McDowell advanced, however, my own movements 
would naturally have been modified. 

I would have placed the 3d corps in position to hold 
Bottom’s bridge and the railroad bridge, and to guard our 
left and communications with West Point. The 4th corps 
would have been placed near New Cold Harbor, with one 
division a couple of miles to the westward to watch the 
crossings of the Chickahominy from Grapevine bridge to 
Beaver Dam creek, ready to support either the 4th or the 
2d corps, as might be necessary. 

The 2d corps near Mechanicsville, to hold the crossing 
opposite thereto and that at Meadow bridge, and prepared 
to move instantly to the support of the 5th and 6th corps. 

The 6th corps through Atlee’s Station to the Fredericks¬ 
burg and Richmond turnpike, to occupy the Virginia Central 
Railroad and Winston’s bridge, and, leaving a sufficient force 
to hold that point, to move either direct upon the line of the 
Fredericksburg and Richmond Railroad south of Ashland, 
or to support the 5th corps in the direction of Hanover Court- 
House, as circumstances might have required. 

The 5th corps would have followed the line of march 
which Morell’s division pursued on the 27th, sending a de¬ 
tached brigade direct from Old Church to Hanover Court- 
House; and having reached the Central Railroad and the 
Fredericksburg turnpike, about four miles south of Han- 


449 — 


McClellan's Own Story 


over Court-House, the mass of the corps would either have 
moved on Hanover Court-House or in conjunction with the 
6th corps on Ashland, as the movements of the enemy might 
have required. Thus our old positions would have been 
securely held, McDowell’s junction would have been secured 
in spite of any movements of the enemy, and the chances 
would have been in favor of our destroying any force of the 
enemy between the Chickahominy and the South Anna. 

The moment these objects were accomplished the 5th 
and 6th corps would have returned to the vicinity of Me- 
chanicsville. It would then have been easy for McDowell 
to advance by the Fredericksburg turnpike far enough to 
turn the batteries covering the Mechanicsville crossings, so 
that the two armies could unite on the right bank of the 
Chickahominy, and the capture of Richmond could have been 
accomplished long before Jackson could return to reinforce 
the garrison. 


— 150 — 


CHAPTER XXIII 


Operations on the Chickahominy—Battle of Fair Oaks—McDowell’s 
corps is coming—Still stretching the right wing—Floods of the 
Chickahominy—Movement on Old Tavern. 

On the 20th of May a reconnoissance had been ordered 
on the south side of the Chickahominy towards James river. 
This was accomplished by Brig.-Gen. H. M. Naglee, who 
crossed his brigade near Bottom’s bridge and pushed forward 
to within two miles of James river without serious resis¬ 
tance or finding the enemy in force. The rest of the 4th 
corps, commanded by Gen. E. D. Keyes, crossed the Chicka¬ 
hominy on the 23d of May. 

On the 24th, 25th, and 26th a very gallant reconnois¬ 
sance was pushed by Gen. Naglee, with his brigade, beyond 
the Seven Pines, and on the 25th the 4th corps was ordered 
to take up and fortify a position in the vicinity of the Seven 
Pines. The order was at once obeyed, a strong line of rifle- 
pits opened, and an abatis constructed a little in the rear of 
the point where the nine-mile road comes into the Williams¬ 
burg road. 

On the same day Gen. Heintzelman was ordered to cross 
with his corps (the 3d) and take a position two miles in ad¬ 
vance of Bottom’s bridge, watching the crossing of White 
Oak Swamp, and covering the left and the rear of the left 
wing of the army. Being the senior officer on that side of 
the river, he was placed in command of both corps and or¬ 
dered to hold the Seven Pines at all hazards, but not to. 
withdraw the troops from the crossings of White Oak Swamp 
unless in an emergency. 

On the 28th Gen. Keyes was ordered to advance Casey’s 
division to Fair Oaks, on the Williamsburg road, some three- 
quarters of a mile in front of the Seven Pines, leaving Gen. 
Couch’s division at the line of rifle-pits. A new line of rifle- 
pits and a small redoubt for six field-guns were commenced, 
and much of the timber in front of this line was felled on the 
two days following. The picket-line was established, reach¬ 
ing from the Chickahominy to White Oak Swamp. 


— 151 — 


McClellan's Own Story 


On the 30th Gen. Heintzelman, representing that the 
advance had met with strong opposition in taking up their 
position, and that he considered the point a critical one, 
requested and obtained authority to make such a disposition 
of his troops as he saw fit to meet the emergency. He im¬ 
mediately advanced two brigades of Kearny’s division about 
three-fourths of a mile in front of Savage’s Station, thus 
placing them within supporting distance of Casey’s divi¬ 
sion, which held the advance of the 4th corps. 

On the 30th the troops on the south side of the Chicka- 
hominy were in position as follows: Casey’s division on the 
right of the Williamsburg road, at right angles to it, the 
centre at Fair Oaks; Couch’s division at the Seven Pines; 
Kearny’s division on the railroad, from near Savage’s Sta¬ 
tion towards the bridge; Hooker’s division on the borders of 
White Oak Swamp. Constant skirmishing had been kept 
up between our pickets and those of the enemy. While these 
lines were being taken up and strengthened large bodies of 
Confederate troops were seen immediately to the front and 
right of Casey’s position. 

During the day and night of the 30th of May a very 
violent storm occurred. The rain falling in torrents ren¬ 
dered work on the rifle-pits and bridges impracticable, made 
the roads almost impassable, and threatened the destruc¬ 
tion of the bridges over the Chickahominy. 

The enemy perceiving the unfavorable position in which 
we were placed, and the possibility of destroying that part 
of our army which was apparently cut off from the main body 
by the rapidly rising stream, threw an overwhelming force 
(grand divisions of Gens. D. H. Hill, Huger, Longstreet, and 
G. W. Smith) upon the position occupied by Casey’s divi¬ 
sion. 

It appears from the official reports of Gen. Keyes and his 
subordinate commanders that at ten o’clock a.m. on the 31st 
of May an aide-de-camp of Gen. J. E. Johnston was captured 
by Gen. Naglee’s pickets. But little information as to the 
movements of the enemy was obtained from him, but his 
presence so near our lines excited suspicion and caused in¬ 
creased vigilance, and the troops were ordered by Gen. Keyes 


— 152 — 


Fair Oaks 


to be under arms at eleven o’clock. Between eleven and 
twelve o’clock it was reported to Gen. Casey that the enemy 
were approaching in considerable force on the Williamsburg 
road. At this time Casey’s division was disposed as fol¬ 
lows: Naglee’s brigade extending from the Williamsburg 
road to the Garnett field, having one regiment across the 
railroad; Gen. Wessells’s brigade in the rifle-pits, and Gen. 
Palmer’s in the rear of Gen. Wessels’s; one battery of ar¬ 
tillery in advance with Gen. Naglee; one battery in rear of 
the redoubt, and another battery unharnessed in the redoubt. 
Gen. Couch’s division, holding the second line, had Gen. 
Abercrombie’s brigade on the right, along the nine-mile 
road, with two regiments and one battery across the rail¬ 
road near Fair Oaks Station; Gen. Peck’s brigade on the right 
and Gen. Devens’s in the centre. 

On the approach of the enemy Gen. Casey sent forward 
one of Gen. Palmer’s regiments to support the picket-line; 
but this regiment gave way without making much, if any, 
resistance. Heavy firing at once commenced, and the pick¬ 
ets were driven in. Gen. Keyes ordered Gen. Couch to move 
Gen. Peck’s brigade to occupy the ground on the left of the 
Williamsburg road, which had not before been occupied by 
our forces, and thus to support Gen. Casey’s left, where the 
first attack was the most severe. The enemy now came on 
in heavy force, attacking Gen. Casey simultaneously in front 
and on both flanks. Gen. Keyes sent to Gen. Heintzelman 
for reinforcements, but the messenger was delayed, so that 
orders were not sent to Gens. Kearny and Hooker until 
nearly three o’clock, and it was nearly five P.M. when Gens. 
Jameson’s and Berry’s brigades of Gen. Kearny’s division 
arrived on the field. Gen. Birney was ordered up the rail¬ 
road, but by Gen. Kearny’s order halted his brigade before 
arriving at the scene of action. Orders were also despatched 
for Gen. Hooker to move up from White Oak Swamp, and he 
arrived after dark at Savage’s Station. 

As soon as the firing was heard at headquarters orders 
were sent to Gen. Sumner to get his command under arms 
and be ready to move at a moment’s warning. His corps, 
consisting of Gens. Richardson’s and Sedgwick’s divisions. 


— 153 - 


McClellan’s Own Story 


was encamped on the north side of the Chickahominy some 
six miles above Bottom’s bridge. Each division had thrown 
a bridge over the stream opposite to its own position. 

At one o’clock Gen. Sumner moved the two divisions to 
their respective bridges, with instructions to halt and await 
further orders. At two o’clock orders were sent from head¬ 
quarters to cross these divisions without delay and push 
them rapidly to Gen. Heintzelman’s support. This order 
was received and communicated at half-past two, and the 
passage was immediately commenced. In the meantime 
Gen. Naglee’s brigade, with the batteries of Gen. Casey’s 
divison, which Gen. Naglee directed, struggled gallantly to 
maintain the redoubt and rifle-pits against the overwhelming 
masses of the enemy. They were reinforced by a regiment 
from Gen. Peck’s brigade. The artillery, under command 
of Col. G. D. Bailey, 1st N. Y. Artillery, and afterwards of 
Gen. Naglee, did good execution on the advancing column. 
The left of this position was, however, soon turned, and a 
sharp cross-fire opened upon the gunners and men in the 
rifle-pits. Col. Bailey, Maj. Van Yalkenberg, and Adj. Ram¬ 
sey, of the same regiment, were killed; some of the guns 
in the redoubt were taken, and the whole line was driven 
back upon the position occupied by Gen. Couch. The bri¬ 
gades of Gens. Wessells and Palmer, with the reinforcements 
which had been sent them from Gen. Couch, had also been 
driven from the field with heavy loss, and the whole position 
occupied by Gen. Casey’s division was taken by the enemy. 

Previous to this time Gen. Keyes ordered Gen. Couch 
to advance two regiments to relieve the pressure upon Gen. 
Casey’s right flank. In making this movement Gen. Couch 
discovered large masses of the enemy pushing towards our 
right and crossing the railroad, as well as a heavy column 
which had been held in reserve and which was now making 
its way towards Fair Oaks station. Gen. Couch at once 
engaged this column with two regiments; but, though re¬ 
inforced by two additional regiments, he was overpowered, 
and the enemy pushed between him and the main body of his 
division. With these four regiments and one battery Gen. 
Couch fell back about half a mile towards the Grapevine 


— 154 — 


Fair Oaks 


bridge, where, hearing that Gen. Sumner had crossed, he 
formed line of battle facing Fair Oaks Station and prepared 
to hold the position. 

Gens. Berry's and Jameson’s brigades had by this time 
arrived in front of the Seven Pines. Gen. Berry was ordered 
to take possession of the woods on the left and push forward 
so as to have a flank-fire on the enemy’s lines. This move¬ 
ment was executed brilliantly, Gen. Berry pushing his regi¬ 
ments forward through the woods until their rifles com¬ 
manded the left of the camp and works occupied by Gen. 
Casey’s division in the morning. Their fire on the pursuing 
columns of the enemy was very destructive, and assisted 
materially in checking the pursuit in that part of the field. 
He held his position in these woods against several attacks 
of superior numbers, and after dark, being cut off by the 
enemy from the main body, he fell back towards White Oak 
Swamp, and by a circuit brought his men into our lines in 
good order. 

Gen. Jameson, with two regiments (the other two of 
his brigade having been detached—one to Gen. Peck and one 
to Gen. Birney), moved rapidly to the front on the left of the 
Williamsburg road, and succeeded for a time in keeping the 
abatis clear of the enemy. But large numbers of the enemy 
pressing past the right of his line, he too was forced to re¬ 
treat through the woods towards White Oak Swamp, and in 
that way gained camp under cover of night. 

Brig.-Gen. Devens, who had held the centre of Gen. 
Couch’s division, had made repeated and gallant efforts to 
regain portions of the ground lost in front, but each time 
was driven back, and finally withdrew behind the rifle-pits 
near Seven Pines. 

Meantime Gen. Sumner had arrived with the advance 
of his corps, Gen. Sedgwick’s division, at the point held by 
Gen. Couch with four regiments and one battery. The roads 
leading from the bridge were so miry that it was only by 
the greatest exertion Gen. Sedgwick had been able to get one 
of his batteries to the front. 

The leading regiment (1st Minn., Col. Sully) was im¬ 
mediately deployed to the right of Couch to protect the flank, 


— 155 — 


McClellan's Own Story 


and the rest of the division formed in line of battle, Kirby's 
battery near the centre in an angle of the woods. One of 
Gen. Couch’s regiments was sent to open communications 
with Gen. Heintzelman. No sooner were these dispositions 
made than the enemy came in strong force and opened a 
heavy fire along the line. He made several charges, but 
was each time repulsed with great loss by the steady fire 
of the infantry and the splendid practice of the battery. 
After sustaining the enemy’s fire for- a considerable time 
Gen. Sumner ordered five regiments (the 34th N. Y., Col. 
Sinter; 82d N. Y., Lieut.-Col. Hudson; 15th Mass., Lieut.- 
Col. Kimball; 20th Mass., Col. Lee; 7th Mich., Maj. Rich¬ 
ardson—the three former of Gen. Gorman’s brigade, the two 
latter of Gen. Dana’s brigade) to advance and charge with 
the bayonet. This charge was executed in the most bril¬ 
liant manner. Our troops, springing over two fences which 
were between them and the enemy, rushed upon his lines and 
drove him in confusion from that part of the field. Dark¬ 
ness now ended the battle for that day. 

During the night dispositions were made for its early 
renewal. Gen. Couch’s division, and so much of Gen. Casey’s 
as could be collected together, with Gen. Kearny’s, occupied 
the rifle-pits near Seven Pines. Gen. Peck, in falling back 
on the left, had succeeded late in the afternoon in rallying a 
considerable number of stragglers, and was taking them once 
more into the action, when he was ordered back to the en¬ 
trenched camp by Gen. Kearny. Gen. Hooker brought up 
his division about dark, having been delayed by the heavi¬ 
ness of the roads and the throng of fugitives from the field, 
through whom the colonel of the leading regiment (Starr) 
reports he “was obliged to force his way with the bayonet.” 
This division bivouacked for the night in rear of the right 
of the rifle-pits on the other side of the railroad. Gen. 
Richardson’s division also came upon the field about sunset. 
He had attempted the passage of the Chickahominy by the 
bridge opposite his own camp, but it was so far destroyed 
that he was forced to move Gens. Howard and Meagher’s 
brigades, with all his artillery, around by Gen. Sedgwick’s 
bridge, while Gen. French’s brigade with the utmost diffi- 


— 156 — 


Fair Oaks 


culty crossed by the other. Gen. Sedgwick's division, with 
the regiments under Gen. Couch, held about the same posi¬ 
tion as when the fight ceased, and Gen. Richardson on his 
arrival was ordered to place his division on the left to con¬ 
nect with Gen. Kearny. Gen. French's brigade was posted 
along the railroad, and Gens. Howard's and Meagher’s bri¬ 
gades in second and third lines. All his artillery had been 
left behind, it being impossible to move it forward through 
the deep mud as rapidly as the infantry pushed towards the 
field, but during the night the three batteries of the divi¬ 
sion were brought to the front. 

About five o'clock on the morning of the 1st of June 
skirmishers and some cavalry of the enemy were discovered 
in front of Gen. Richardson's division. Capt. Pettit's bat¬ 
tery (B, 1st N. Y.), having come upon the ground, threw 
a few shells among them, when they dispersed. There was 
a wide interval between Gen. Richardson and Gen. Kearny. 
To close this Gen. Richardson’s line was extended to the 
left and his first line moved over the railroad. Scarcely 
had they gained the position when the enemy, appearing in 
large force from the woods in front, opened a heavy fire of 
musketry at short range along the whole line. He ap¬ 
proached very rapidly, with columns of attack formed on two 
roads which crossed the railroad. These columns were sup¬ 
ported by infantry in line of battle on each side, cutting Gen. 
French’s line. He threw out no skirmishers, but appeared 
determined to carry all before him by one crushing blow. 
For nearly an hour the first line of Gen. Richardson's divi¬ 
sion stood and returned the fire, the lines of the enemy be¬ 
ing reinforced and relieved time after time, till finally Gen. 
Howard was ordered with his brigade to go to Gen. French's 
assistance. He led his men gallantly to the front, and in 
a few minutes the fire of the enemy ceased and his whole 
line fell back on that part of the field. On the opening 
of the firing in the morning Gen. Hooker pushed forward 
on the railroad with two regiments (5th and 6th N. J.), 
followed by Gen. Sickles’s brigade. It was found impossible 
to move the artillery of this division from its position on 
account of the mud. On coming near the woods, which 


— 157 — 


McClellan’s Own Story 

were held by the enemy in force, Gen. Hooker found Gen. 
Birney’s brigade, Col. J. Hobart Ward in command, in line 
of battle. He sent back to hasten Gen. Sickles’s brigade, 
but ascertained that it had been turned off to the left by 
Gen. Heintzelman to meet a column advancing in that direc¬ 
tion. He at once made the attack with the two New Jersey 
regiments, calling upon Col. Ward to support him with Gen. 
Birney’s brigade. This was well done, our troops advanc¬ 
ing into the woods under a heavy fire, and pushing the ene¬ 
my before them for more than an hour of hard fighting. A 
charge with the bayonet was then ordered by Gen. Hooker 
with the 5th and 6th N. J., 3d Me., and 38th and 40th N. Y., 
and the enemy fled in confusion, throwing down arms and 
even clothing in his flight. Gen. Sickles, having been or¬ 
dered to the left, formed line of battle on both sides of the 
Williamsburg road and advanced under a sharp fire from the 
enemy, deployed in the woods in front of him. After a 
brisk interchange of musketry-fire while crossing the open 
ground, the Excelsior Brigade dashed into the timber with 
the bayonet and put the enemy to flight. 

On the right the enemy opened fire after half an hour’s 
cessation, which was promptly responded to by Gen. Rich¬ 
ardson’s division. Again the most vigorous efforts were 
made to break our line, and again they were frustrated by 
the steady courage of our troops. In about an hour Gen. 
Richardson’s whole line advanced, pouring in their fire at 
close range, which threw the line of the enemy back in some 
confusion. This was followed up by a bayonet-charge, led 
by Gen. French in person, with the 57th and 66th N. Y., 
supported by two regiments sent by Gen. Heintzelman, the 
71st and 73d N. Y., which turned the confusion of the enemy 
into precipitate flight. One gun captured the previous day 
was retaken. 

Our troops pushed forward as far as the lines held by 
them on the 31st before the attack. On the battle-field there 
were found many of our own and the Confederate wounded, 
arms, caissons, wagons, subsistence stores, and forage, aban¬ 
doned by the enemy in his rout. The state of the roads and 
impossibility of maneuvering artillery prevented further 


— 158 — 


Fair Oaks 


pursuit. On the next morning a reconnoissance was sent 
forward, which pressed back the pickets of the enemy to 
within five miles of Richmond; but again the impossibility 
of forcing even a few batteries forward precluded our hold¬ 
ing permanently this position. The lines held previous to 
the battle were therefore resumed. 

On the 31st, when the battle of Fair Oaks commenced, 
we had two of our bridges nearly completed; but the rising 
waters flooded the log-way approaches and made them 
almost impassable, so that it was only by the greatest efforts 
that Gen. Sumner crossed his corps and participated in 
that hard-fought engagement. The bridges became totally 
useless after this corps had passed, and others on a more 
permanent plan were commenced. 

On my way to headquarters, after the battle of Fair 
Oaks, I attempted to cross the bridge where Gen. Sumner 
had taken over his corps on the day previous. At the time 
Gen. Sumner crossed this was the only available bridge 
above Bottom’s bridge. I found the approach from the right 
bank for some four hundred yards submerged to the depth 
of several feet, and, on reaching the place where the bridge 
had been, I found a great part of it carried away, so that I 
could not get my horse over, and was obliged to send him to 
Bottom’s bridge, six miles below, as the only practicable 
crossing. 

The approaches to New and Mechanicsville bridges were 
also overflowed, and both of them were enfiladed by the ene¬ 
my’s batteries established upon commanding heights on the 
opposite side. These batteries were supported by strong 
forces of the enemy, having numerous rifle-pits in their 
front, which would have made it necessary, even had the 
approaches been in the best possible condition, to have 
fought a sanguinary battle, with but little prospect of suc¬ 
cess, before a passage could have been secured. 

The only available means, therefore, of uniting our 
forces at Fair Oaks for an advance on Richmond soon after 
the battle was to march the troops from Mechanicsville and 
other points on the left bank of the Chickahominy down to 
Bottom’s bridge, and thence over the Williamsburg road 


— 159 — 


McClellan's Own Story 


to the position near Fair Oaks, a distance of about twenty- 
three miles. In the condition of the roads at that time this 
march could not have been made with artillery in less than 
two days, by which time the enemy would have been secure 
within his entrenchments around Richmond. In short, the 
idea of uniting the two wings of the army in time to make 
a vigorous pursuit of the enemy, with the prospect of over¬ 
taking him before he reached Richmond, only five miles 
distant from the field of battle, is simply absurd, and was, 
I presume, never for a moment seriously entertained by any 
one connected with the Army of the Potomac. An advance 
involving the separation of the two wings by the impassable 
Chickahominy would have exposed each to defeat in detail. 
Therefore I held the position already gained, and completed 
our crossings as rapidly as possible. 

In the meantime the troops at Fair Oaks were directed 
to strengthen their positions by a strong line of entrench¬ 
ments, which protected them while the bridges were being 
built, gave security to the trains, liberated a larger fighting 
force, and offered a safer retreat in the event of disaster. 

On June 2 the Secretary of War telegraphed: “The in¬ 
dications are that Fremont or McDowell will fight Jackson 
to-day, and as soon as he is disposed of another large body 
of troops will be at your service.” 

On the 3d the President telegraphed: “With these con¬ 
tinuous rains I am very anxious about the Chickahominy—so 
close in your rear, and crossing your line of communication. 
Please look to it.” 

To which I replied: “Your despatch of five P.M. just 
received. As the Chickahominy has been almost the only 
obstacle in my way for several days, your excellency may 
rest assured that it has not been overlooked. Every effort 
has been made, and will continue to be, to perfect the com¬ 
munications across it.” 

My views of the condition of our army on the 4th were 
explained to the President as follows: 

Terrible rain-storm during the night and morning; not yet cleared 
off. Chickahominy flooded; bridges in bad condition. Are still hard 
at work at them. I have taken every possible step to insure the 
security of the corps on the right bank, but I cannot reinforce them 


— 160 — 


McDowell Again Promised 


here until my bridges are all safe, as my force is too small to insure 
my right and rear, should the enemy attack in that direction, as they 
may probably attempt. I have to be very cautious now. Our loss in 
the late battle will probably exceed (5,000) five thousand. I have not 
yet full returns. On account of the effect it might have on our own 
men and the enemy, I request that you will regard this information as 
confidential for a few days. I am satisfied that the loss of the enemy 
was very considerably greater; they were terribly punished. I men¬ 
tion these facts now merely to show you that the Army of the Potomac 
has had serious work, and that no child’s play is before it. 

You must make your calculations on the supposition that I have 
been correct from the beginning in asserting that the serious opposi¬ 
tion was to be made here. 

And to the Secretary of War on the same day: 

June 4.—Please inform me at once what reinforcements, if any, 
I can count upon having at Fortress Monroe or White House within 
the next three days, and when each regiment may be expected to ar¬ 
rive. It is of utmost importance that I should know this immediately. 
The losses in the battle of the 31st and 1st will amount to (7,000) seven 
thousand. Regard this as confidential for the present. 

If I can have five new regiments for Fort Monroe and its depen¬ 
dencies, I can draw three more old regiments from there safely. I can 
well dispose of four more raw regiments on my communications. I can 
well dispose of from fifteen to twenty well-drilled regiments among 
the old brigades in bringing them up to their original effective 
strength. Recruits are especially necessary for the regular and volun¬ 
teer batteries of artillery, as well as for the regular and volunteer 
regiments of infantry. After the losses in our last battle I trust that 
I will no longer be regarded as an alarmist. I believe we have at 
least one more desperate battle to fight. 

On the 5th the Secretary telegraphed me: 

“I will send you five (5) new regiments as fast as transportation 
can take them; the first to start to-morrow from Baltimore. I intend 
sending you a part of McDowell’s force as soon as it can return from 
its trip to Front Royal, probably as many as you want. The order 
to ship the new regiments to Fort Monroe has already been given. 
I suppose that they may be sent directly to the Fort. Please advise 
me if this be as you desire.” 

On the 7th of June I telegraphed as follows: 

In reply to your despatch of two p.m. to-day, I have the honor 
to state that the Chickahominy river has risen so as to flood the entire 
bottoms to the depth of three and four feet. I am pushing forward 
the bridges in spite of this, and the men are working night and day, 
up to their waists in water, to complete them. 

The whole face of the country is a perfect bog, entirely impass¬ 
able for artillery, or even cavalry, except directly in the narrow roads, 
which renders any general movement, either of this or the rebel army, 
entirely out of the question until we have more favorable weather. 

I am so glad to learn that you are pressing forward reinforce¬ 
ments so vigorously. 

I shall be in perfect readiness to move forward and take Rich¬ 
mond the moment McCall reaches here and the ground will admit the 


— 161 — 


McClellan’s Own Story 


passage of artillery. I have advanced my pickets about a mile to-day, 
driving off the rebel pickets and securing a very advantageous posi¬ 
tion. 

The rebels have several batteries established, commanding the 
debouches from two of our bridges, and fire upon our working parties 
continually; but as yet they have killed but very few of our men. 

As I did not think probable that any reinforcements 
would be sent me in time for the advance on Richmond, I 
stated in the foregoing despatch that I should be ready to 
move when Gen. McCall's division joined me; but I did not 
intend to be understood by this that no more reinforcements 
were wanted, as will be seen from the following despatch: 

June 10.—I have again information that Beauregard has arrived, 
and' that some of his troops are to follow him. No great reliance— 
perhaps none whatever—can be attached to this; but it is possible, and 
ought to be their policy. 

I am completely checked by the weather. The roads and fields are 
literally impassable for artillery, almost so for infantry. The Chicka- 
hominy is in a dreadful state; we have another rain-storm on our 
hands. 

I shall attack as soon as the weather and ground will permit; but 
there will be a delay, the extent of which no one can foresee, for the 
season is altogether abnormal. 

In the view of these circumstances, I present for your considera¬ 
tion the propriety of detaching largely from Halleck’s army to 
strengthen this; for it would seem that Halleck has now no large 
organized force in front of him, while we have. If this cannot be 
done, or even in connection with it, allow me to suggest the move¬ 
ment of a heavy column from Dalton upon Atlanta. If but the one 
can be done it would better conform to military principles to strengthen 
this army. And even although the reinforcements might not arrive 
in season to take part in the attack upon Richmond, the moral effect 
would be great, and they would furnish valuable assistance in ulterior 
movements. 

I wish to be distinctly understood that, whenever the weather per¬ 
mits, I will attack with whatever force I may have, although a larger 
force would enable me to gain much more decisive results. 

I would be glad to have McCall's infantry sent forward by water 
at once, without waiting for his artillery and cavalry. 

If Gen. Prim returns via Washington, please converse with him 
as to the condition of affairs here. 

Our work upon the bridges continued to be pushed for¬ 
ward vigorously until the 20th, during which time it rained 
almost every day, and the exposure of the men caused much 
sickness. 

On the 11th the Secretary of War telegraphed: 

“Your despatch of three-thirty (3:30) yesterday has been re¬ 
ceived. I am fully impressed with the difficulties mentioned, and 
which no art or skill can avoid, but only endure, and am striving to 
the uttermost to render you every aid in the power of the government. 


— 162 — 


Reinforcements 


. . . McCall s force was reported yesterday as having embarked and 
on its way to join you. It is intended to send the residue of McDowell’s 
force also to join you as speedily as possible. 

“Fremont had a hard fight, day before yesterday, with Jackson’s 
force at Union Church, eight miles from Harrisonburg. He claims 
the victory, but was pretty badly handled. It is clear that a strong 
force is operating with Jackson for the purpose of detaining the forces 
here from you. I am urging as fast as possible the new levies. 

“Be assured, general, that there has never been a moment when 
my desire has been otherwise than to aid you with my whole heart, 
mind, and strength, since the hour we first met; and whatever others 
may say for their own purposes, you have never had, and never can 
have, any one more truly your friend, or more anxious to support you, 
or more joyful than I shall be at the success which I have no doubt 
will soon be achieved by your arms.” 

On the 12th and 13th Gen. McCall's division arrived. 

On the 13th of June two squadrons of the 5th U. S. 
Cavalry, under the command of Capt. Royal, stationed near 
Hanover Old Church, were attacked and overpowered by a 
force of the enemy's cavalry numbering about 1,500 men, 
with four guns. They pushed on towards our depots, but 
at some distance from our main body, and, though pursued 
very cleverly, made the circuit of the army, repassing the 
Chickahominy at Long bridge. The burning of two schoon¬ 
ers laden with forage and fourteen government wagons, the 
destruction of some sutlers' stores, the killing of several of 
the guard and teamsters at Garlick's landing, some little 
damage done at Tunstall's Station, and a little eclat, were 
the precise results of this expedition. 

On the 14th I telegraphed to the Secretary of War: 

June 14, midnight .—All quiet in every direction. The stampede 
of last night has passed away. Weather now very favorable. I hope 
two days more will make the ground practicable. I shall advance as 
soon as the bridges are completed and the ground fit for artillery to 
move. At the same time I would be glad to have whatever troops can 
be sent to me. I can use several new regiments to advantage. 

It ought to be distinctly understood that McDowell and his troops 
are completely under my control. I received a telegram from him 
requesting that McCall’s division might be placed so as to join him 
immediately on his arrival. 

That request does not breathe the proper spirit. Whatever troops 
come to me must be disposed of so as to do the most good. I do not 
feel that, in such circumstances as those in which I am now placed, 
Gen. McDowell should wish the general interests to be sacrificed* for 
the purpose of increasing his command. 

If I cannot fully control all his troops I want none of them, but 
would prefer to fight the battle with what I have, and let others be 
responsible for the results. 


— 163 — 


McClellan’s Own Story 


The department lines should not be allowed to interfere with me; 
but Gen. McD., and all other troops sent to me, should be placed com¬ 
pletely at my disposal, to do with them as I think best. In no other 
way can they be of assistance to me. I therefore request that I may 
have entire and full control. The stake at issue is too great to allow 
personal considerations to be entertained; you know that I have none. 


On the 20th I telegraphed to the President: 

There is not the slightest reason to suppose that the enemy in¬ 
tends evacuating Richmond; he is daily increasing his defences. I 
find him everywhere in force, and every reconnoissance costs many 
lives, yet I am obliged to feel my way, foot by foot, at whatever cost, 
so great are the difficulties of the country; by to-morrow night the 
defensive works covering our position on this side of the Chickahominy 
should be completed. I am forced to this by my inferiority in numbers, 
so that I may bring the greatest possible numbers into action and 
secure the army against the consequence of unforeseen disaster. 

All the information I could obtain, previous to the 24th 
of June, regarding the movements of Gen. Jackson led to 
the belief that he was at Gordonsville, where he was receiv¬ 
ing reinforcements from Richmond via Lynchburg and 
Staunton; but what his purposes were did not appear until 
the date specified, when a young man, very intelligent but 
of suspicious appearance, was brought in by our scouts from 
the direction of Hanover Court-House. He at first stated 
that he was an escaped prisoner from Col. Kenley’s Mary¬ 
land regiment, captured at Front Royal, but finally confessed 
himself to be a deserter from Jackson’s command, which 
he left near Gordonsville on the 21st. Jackson’s troops 
were then, as he said, moving to Frederick’s Hall, along the 
Virginia Central Railroad, for the purpose of attacking my 
rear on the 28th. I immediately despatched two trusty 
negroes to proceed along the railroad and ascertain the truth 
of the statement. They were unable, however, to get be¬ 
yond Hanover Court-House, where they encountered the 
enemy’s pickets, and were forced to turn back without ob¬ 
taining the desired information. On that day I sent the 
following despatch to Secretary Stanton: 

June 24.—A very peculiar case of desertion has just occurred from 
the .enemy. The party states that he left Jackson, Whiting, and 
Ewell (fifteen brigades) at Gordonsville on the 21st; that they were 
moving to Frederick’s Hall, and that it was intended to attack my rear 
on the 28th. I would be glad to learn, at your earliest convenience, 
the most exact information you have as to the position and movements 


— 164 — 


Mr. Stanton's News 


of Jackson, as well as the sources from which your information is 
derived, that I may the better compare it with what I have. 

Geo. B. McClellan, 

Maj.-Gen. 

The following is his reply: 

“June 25.—We have no definite information as to the numbers or 
position of Jackson’s force. Gen. King yesterday reported a deserter’s 
statement that Jackson’s force was, nine days ago, 40,000 men. Some 
reports place 10,000 rebels under Jackson at Gordonsville; others, that 
his force is at Port Republic, Harrisonburg, and Luray. Fremont 
yesterday reported rumors that Western Virginia was threatened, and 
Gen. Kelley that Ewell was advancing to New creek, where Fremont 
has his depots. The last telegram from Fremont contradicts this 
rumor. The last telegram from Banks says the enemy’s pickets are 
strong in advance at Luray; the people decline to give any information 
as to his whereabouts. Within the last two (2) days the evidence is 
strong that for some purpose the enemy is circulating rumors of 
Jackson’s advance in various directions, with a view to conceal the 
real point of attack. Neither McDowell, who is at Manassas, nor 
Banks and Fremont, who are at Middleton, appear to have any accur¬ 
ate knowledge of the subject. A letter transmitted to the department 
yesterday, purported to be dated Gordonsville on the fourteenth (14th) 
instant, stated that the actual attack was designed for Washington 
and Baltimore as soon as you attacked Richmond, but that the report 
was to be circulated that Jackson had gone to Richmond, in order to 
mislead. This letter looked very much like a blind, and induces me 
to suspect that Jackson’s real movement now is towards Richmond. It 
came from Alexandria, and is certainly designed, like the numerous 
rumors put afloat, to mislead. I think, therefore, that while the warn¬ 
ing of the deserter to you may also be a blind, that it could not safely 
be disregarded. I will transmit to you any further information on 
this subject that may be received here.” 

On the 25th, our bridges and entrenchments being at 
last completed, an advance of our picket-line of the left was 
ordered, preparatory to a general forward movement. 

Immediately in front of the most advanced redoubt on 
the Williamsburg road was a large, open field; beyond that 
a swampy belt of timber, some five hundred yards wide, 
which had been disputed ground for many days. Further 
in advance was an open field, crossed by the Williamsburg 
road and the railroad, and commanded by a redoubt and rifle- 
pits of the enemy. 

It was decided to push our lines to the other side of 
these woods, in order to enable us to ascertain the nature of 
the ground, and to place Gens. Heintzelman and Sumner in 
position to support the attack to be made on the Old Tavern, 
on the 26th or 27th, by Gen. Franklin, by assailing that 
position in the rear. 


— 165 — 


McClellan's Own Story 


Between eight and nine o'clock on the morning of the 
25th the advance was begun by Gen. Heintzelman’s corps. 
The enemy were found to be in strong force all along the 
line, and contested the advance stubbornly, but by sunset 
our object was accomplished. 

The following telegram was sent to the Secretary of 
War on the same day: 

25th, 6:15 p.m.— I have just returned from the field, and found 
your despatch in regard to Jackson. 

Several contrabands just in give information confirming supposi¬ 
tion that Jackson’s advance is at or near Hanover Court-House, and 
that Beauregard arrived with strong reinforcements in Richmond yes¬ 
terday. 

I incline to think that Jackson will attack my right and rear. 
The rebel force is stated at two hundred thousand, including Jackson 
and Beauregard. I shall have to contend against vastly superior odds 
if these reports be true. But this army will do all in the power of men 
to hold their position and repulse any attack. 

I regret my great inferiority in numbers, but feel that I am in no 
way responsible for it, as I have not failed to represent repeatedly 
the necessity of reinforcements; that this was the decisive point, and 
that all the available means of the government should be concentrated 
here. I will do all that a general can do with the splendid army I 
have the honor to command, and, if it is destroyed by overwhelming 
numbers, can at least die with it and share its fate. 

But if the result of the action, which will probably occur to-mor¬ 
row or within a short time, is a disaster, the responsibility cannot be 
thrown on my shoulders; it must rest where it belongs. 

Since I commenced this I have received additional intelligence 
confirming the supposition in regard to Jackson’s movements and 
Beauregard’s arrival. I shall probably be attacked to-morrow, and 
now go to the other side of the Chickahominy to arrange for the de¬ 
fence on that side. 

I feel that there is no use in my again asking for reinforcements. 


— 166 — 


CHAPTER XXIV 
Private Letters 
[May 20 to June 26, 1862] 

May 20, 12:30 a.m., Tunstall’s Station. — ... I moved head¬ 
quarters and four divisions here to-day, about six miles from the White 
House. I rode myself to Bottom’s bridge in the rain, and made a 
short reconnoissance of it. Found the enemy there, though not in 
great force. The engineers will make a close examination to-morrow 
morning, driving the enemy’s pickets. The advanced guard also 
is near New bridge. We are gradually drawing near the rascals. 
I think they intend to fight us in front of Richmond; if they do it 
will be a decisive battle. Our camp here is one of the most beauti¬ 
ful I ever saw. The country is lovely, and the view from the high 
hill on which are headquarters is really magnificent. This evening, 
when the bivouac-fires were lighted, the scene was grand beyond 
description. There are some very fine plantations in this vicinity. 
What fools their owners are to submit themselves to the necessity 
of being overrun and devastated! An army leaves a wide swath in 
its rear, but my men are generally behaving very well. 

May 21, 1:30 A.M., TunstalVs Station. — . . . Headquarters will 
move tomorrow some seven or eight miles more to the front. 

Wednesday morning (same letter).— .... Porter’s troops have 
been marching past for a couple of hours, and the rumbling of wag¬ 
ons has been going on for some time. . . . 

A little later. —I have just learned that some of our troops have 
succeeded in crossing the Ghickahominy at Bottom’s bridge. 

May 22, 6:30 p.m., camp near Chickahominy .— .... I have just 
returned from a ride to the front, where I have taken a good look 
at the rebel lines. I suppose I must have ridden some thirty miles 
or less to-day. 

Some one just brought me a bouquet of wild white flowers—a 
negro at that. I clutched it most eagerly, as reminding me of 
one who two years ago became my wife. It is on the table in front 
of me as I write; in a tin tumbler, to be sure, but none the less pure 
and white. 

May 23, p.m. (continuation of same letter). Soon after I finished 
the last page I was taken quite sick, and continued so most of the 
night. I have remained in my tent all day, feeling quite miserable, 
but will be all right and able to ride out in the morning. . . . The 
occurences of the next few days are quite uncertain. I have secured 
one passage of the Chickahominy, and hope to get two more to-morrow. 
I have been within six miles of the rebel capital, and our balloonists 
have been watching it all day. The intentions of the enemy are still 
doubtful. I go on prepared to fight a hard battle, but I confess that 
the indications are not now that he will fight. Unless he has some 
deep-laid scheme that I do not fathom, he is giving up great advan¬ 
tages in not opposing me on the line of the Chickahominy. He could 
give me a great deal of trouble and make it cost me hundreds or 
thousands of lives. . . . God knows that I am sick of this civil war, 
although no feeling of the kind unsteadies my hand or ever makes 
me hesitate or waver. It is a cruel necessity. I am very glad that 


- 167 - 




McClellan’s Own Story 


the President has come out as he did about Hunter’s order. ... If 
I succeed in getting the two additional passages of the river to-mor¬ 
row I will move next day. In fact, I hope to have a strong advanced 
guard within a couple of miles of Richmond to-morrow evening. 
Then I shall be able to examine the enemy’s position and arrange for 
the battle. I will not fight on Sunday if I can help it. If I am 
obliged to do so I will still have faith that God will defend the 
right, and trust that we have the right on our side. How freely 
I shall breathe when my long task of months is over and Richmond 
is ours! I know the uncertainty of all human events. I know that 
God may even now deem best to crush all the high hopes of the 
nation and this army. I will do the best I can to insure success, 
and will do my best to be contented, with whatever result God sees 
fit to terminate our efforts. I am here on the eve of one of the 
great historic battles of the world—one of those crises in a nation’s 
life that occur but seldom. Far more than my fate is involved in 
the issue. I have done the best I could; I have tried to serve my 
country honestly and faithfully. All I can now do is to commit 
myself to the hands of God and pray that the country may not be 
punished for my sins and shortcomings. 

11 p.m. Have had some skirmishes and cannonading to¬ 

day. Successful in all. 

May 25, Sunday , 3:30 p.m., Cold Harbor .— . . . Have been 
rather under the weather the last three days. Had to ride out in 
the rain yesterday, and was kept up very late last night, so I was 
not so well as I might have been this morning. ... It cleared off 
about sunset yesterday, and to-day has been bright and pleasant, 
drying up the roads rapidly. They have been so cut and bad as to 
prevent any movements in force or with rapidity. Fortunately the 
ground dries rapidly here, and will soon be in such condition that 
we can move anywhere. I have this moment received a despatch 
from the President, who is terribly scared about Washington, and 
talks about the necessity of my returning in order to save it. Heaven 
save a country guided by such counsels! I must reply to his tele¬ 
gram, and finish, this by and by. ... I feel much better this after¬ 
noon—quite myself again. ... If I should find Washington life as 
bad after the war as it was when I was there, I don’t think I could 
be induced to remain in the army after peace. 

10 p.m. (same letter ).—It seems, from some later despatches I 
have received, that Banks has been soundly thrashed, and that they 
are terribly alarmed in Washington. A scare will do them good, and 
may bring them to their senses. ... I have a fire in my tent to-night. 

May 26, 8 P.M., camp near New bridge .— . . . We broke up the 
last camp about two and moved to this place, which is quite on the 
banks of the Chickahominy and very near New bridge. It, of course, 
commenced raining about an hour after we started; but as it was 
not a very heavy rain, we got on very well. ... I have been troubled 
by the old Mexican complaint, brought on, I suppose, by exposure 

to the wet, but I am really substantially well again.Fitz starts 

off in the morning on a trip that will take a day to go and one to 
return; the object being to cut off and disperse a force of the enemy 
threatening my right and rear, also to destroy the railroad bridges. 
When this is done I will feel very comfortable in that direction, and 
shall be quite ready to attack. My men are in such excellent condi¬ 
tion and such good spirits that I cannot doubt the result. The people 
here have not much Union feeling, but are becoming heartily tired 


168 — 




Private Letters 


of the war, especially as they now feel its evils in their midst—a fate 
from which I pray that God may deliver our own Northern States. 

My camp is about four and a half to five miles from Richmond. 

Had the instructions I left for Banks and Wadsworth been complied 
with we should have been spared the shame of Banks’s stampede. . . I 
feared last night that I would be ordered back for the defence of 
Washington! 

May 27, 11:45 P.M.— ... I sent Fitz-John out this morning 
to “pick up” a large force of the enemy who were threatening my 
right and rear, also to burn the bridges of the two railways of the 
South Anna. The old fellow has done splendidly. Thrashed 13,000 
badly, and I am momentarily expecting to hear the details of his 
second attack. We are getting on splendidly. I am quietly clearing 
out everything that could threaten my rear and communications, 
providing against the contingency of disaster, and so arranging as 
to make my whole force available in the approaching battle. The 
only fear is that Joe’s heart may fail him. . . . 

New bridge, May 29, 8 P.M.— ... I rode some forty-odd miles 
yesterday, got wet, and had nothing to eat all day, and returned to 
camp about two o’clock this morning, noble old Dan taking me 
through most splendidly. Found myself quite sick this morning— 
my old Mexican enemy. I had been fighting against it for several 
days with more or less success. But this morning I gave up and 
sent for the doctor, in whose hands I placed myself. . . . Feel a 
great deal better to-night; the pain gone and my head clearer. . .-. 
Fitz did his work nobly, as I expected. I rode to his battle-field 
yesterday and several miles beyond it. The railroad bridge across 
the South Anna was burned yesterday and to-day, thus effectually 
cutting off railroad communication between Richmond and the North. 
Lawrence Williams arranged both affairs very handsomely. The 
country around Hanover Court-House is very beautiful. . . . 

June 2, 8 P.M., New bridge. — It has been impossible for me to 
write to you for the last two or three days. I was quite sick on 
Friday and Saturday; on the last day rose from my bed and went 
to the field of battle; remained on horseback most of the time until 
Sunday evening. I came back perfectly worn out and exhausted; 
lay down at once, and, though I could not sleep much I got some rest. 
I think to-night will bring me quite up again; I am not anxious. 
The Chickahominy is now falling, and I hope we can complete the 
bridges to-morrow. I can do nothing more until that is accomplished. 
The enemy attacked on Saturday and Sunday with great ferocity 
and determination; their first attack alone was successful. Casey’s 
division broke. As the other divisions came up they checked the 
enemy, and we gradually got the better of him; he was badly handled 
before night. On Sunday morning he renewed the attack and was 
everywhere repulsed in disorder with heavy loss. We had regained 
all the ground lost, and more, last night; to-day we are considerably 
in advance of the field of battle. It is certain that we have gained 
a glorious victory; I only regret that the rascals were smart enough 
to attack when the condition of the Chickahominy was such that I 
could not throw over the rest of the troops to follow up the success; 
but the weather now seems settled, and I hope the river will be low 
enough to-morrow to enable me to cross. I am tired of the sickening 
sight of the battle-field, with its mangled corpses and poor suffering 
wounded! Victory has no charms for me when purchased at such 
cost. I shall be only too glad when all is over and I can return where 


169 — 



McClellan’s Own Story 


I best love to be. . . . Your father is quite well; so are all the staff. 
I don’t think any of your friends were hurt in the battle; several 
colonels killed and some wounded. 

June 3, 10 a.m., New bridge .— .... There has been some heavy 
cannonading within the last hour, and I learned that the enemy were 
advancing on Sumner. I am awaiting further news before going 
to the front; in the meantime working hard at the bridges over the 
confounded Chickahominy. We may have another fight at any hour 
now; I can’t tell when or where. I expect some 5,500 troops from 
Fortress Monroe to-night, which will go some ways towards replacing 
my losses; hope that one regiment arrived last night. If the enemy 
will give me time to get fresh troops in line I will be obliged to them 
exceedingly; I am none too strong, I can assure you. But all will 
go well. . . . 

June 5, 9 a.m. (Thursday), New bridge .—We have had a terrible 
time during the last few days; torrents of rain constantly falling; 
ground a sea of mud; the Chickahominy a booming river; bridges 
swept away; the railroad pretty much used up—in short, about all 
the troubles that armies fall heir to, except defeat! But I am so 
grateful that God gave us the victory that I will not complain of 
minor evils. The enemy must have been very badly whipped not to 
have renewed his attack under the very favorable circumstances of 
the last few days. 

p.M.—Have been, as usual, interrupted. . . . The enemy has 
opened from two or three batteries, and is blazing away upon our 
working parties at the bridges; some of our heavy batteries have 
opened upon him, and will, I hope, soon silence them. I feel much 
better to-day, and if secesh will permit me to remain quiet until to¬ 
morrow morning I am sure that I shall be quite well. My head feels 
clearer to-day, and I feel generally better, though somewhat weak. 
My report of the battle (telegraphic) was incorrectly printed in 
some respects in the papers, and, of course, raises a tempest in a 
teapot. I never saw so much selfishness and petty feeling in my life 
as I have seen developed during this unhappy war. . . . This camp 
life in the mud is becoming tedious; yet here I am tied up, the con¬ 
founded river running like mad, and no present chance of crossing 
the rest of the troops, although we are doing all that can be done. . . . 
The artillery still keeps up its firing. I must send again for news. . . 

June 6.— .... The bad weather still continues, horrid in the ex¬ 
treme. ... It seems that Joe Johnston was seriously, if not danger¬ 
ously, wounded in the last battle. I had occasion to write him some 
letters to-day which ought to be answered, so I can probably tell by 
the reply how it really is. ... I am receiving reinforcements now 
which will soon repair our losses and enable me to act with freedom 
of motion. . . . 

10 p.m.— . . . Have been, as usual, very quiet to-day, lying down 
almost all the time, and leaving my tent scarcely at all. ... It has 
at last cleared up, and for some days, I think. It is now 
quite certain that Joe Johnston was severely wounded last Satur¬ 
day—now said to be in the shoulder by a rifle-ball. I think there 
is very little doubt that it is so. That places Smith, G. W., in com¬ 
mand. I have drawn nine regiments from Fort Monroe—the first 
use I made of the command given me of that place; the last of them 
will be up to-morrow. These will go far towards filling our ranks. 
The losses in the late battle were about 5,500; of course we have 
lost many by disease. I am promised either McCall’s or King’s di- 


— 170 — 


Private Letters 


vision in a very few days. If I learn to-morrow that they will surely 
be here in three or four days I will wait for them, as it would make 
the result certain and less bloody. I can’t afford to have any more 
men killed than can be avoided. . . . 

June 7, 8:30 a.m. ( same letter). — . . . The sun is struggling 
very hard this morning with the clouds; thus far the latter has 
rather the better of him, but I hope the old fellow will persevere 
and beat them out in an hour or two. I presume the mystery of the 
two telegraphic messages has been cleared up before this. I said 
that none of your acquaintances were killed. The operator must have 
been unmanned by excitement, for my official despatches were terribly 
bungled in many ways. One of the two similar despatches must 
have been sent on the operator’s own account. I think I sent you but 
two altogether that day. Did not that solution occur to you? 

June 8, 1862.—Gen. Prim and staff, some nine or ten in number, 
have arrived. They went direct to the battle-field from the railway, 
so I will be spared until evening, when I shall be in for it. How 
Charles will make out I cannot imagine. It is a terrible nuisance 
to take care of these parties in camp. They always come entirely 
unprovided, and it puts every one to great inconvenience to take care 
of them. I had sense enough, when I went to the Crimea, to take 
tents, messing apparatus, servants, horses, etc., so that I was per¬ 
fectly independent. But none of these foreigners seem to follow so 
good an example. 

I had occasion day before yesterday to send a letter to Joe 
Johnston in reply to a request of us for permission to send in and 
get the bodies of a couple of generals and half a dozen colonels 
supposed to be killed. An answer came yesterday apologizing for 
the delay in replying to my communication (which involved other 
matters), and also apologizing for some of his people firing at Sweit- 
zer, who carried the flag of truce. Well, whom do you think 'the 
letter came from? From no one else than A. P. Hill, major-general 
commanding the Light Division. ... I hope we shall have clear 
weather for a few days, so that it will be possible to move and use 
artillery, as well as to get it over the river. You have no idea of the 
state of the ground now; just as much as a horse can do to make 
his way! We have pretty quiet times; a little artillery firing and 
picket-skirmishing by way of breaking the monotony— voila tout! 
I suppose both sides are gathering for the great battle. I have re¬ 
ceived ten regiments since the battle, nine of which from Fort Mon¬ 
roe, one from Baltimore; and one from Washington will arrive to¬ 
night. I am also promised McCall’s division at once. If the promise 
is kept I shall be quite strong again. . . . Am much better to-day— 
quite myself. 

June 9.— ... A large dose of Spaniards yesterday. Gen. Prim 
and staff arrived and are quartered on us, some seven in all—a rather 
inconvenient addition to the mess. On the other hand, however, they 
are very gentlemanly and a very nice set of people. Gen. Prim 
speaks only French and Spanish. He is a dark-faced, black-haired, 
bright, young-looking man of forty-five. I like him much. His 
chief of staff, Gen. Milans, is a perfect old trump, who speaks Eng¬ 
lish and looks for all the world like a French marquis of the stage. 
His hair and beard are iron gray; his moustache of the most approved 
pattern of the Spanish cavaliers of old; a cane suspended to his 
button-hole; red pants tucked in high boots; a loose green coat 
covered with silver embroidery; the funniest little hat imaginable— 


— 171 — 


McClellan’s Own Story 


on the whole a most peculiar picture, such as I never saw before. 
They are delighted with what they have seen (I hear the funny little 
fellow’s voice now: “G’d-mornin’, sir; hope yo’ well”), fully appreci¬ 
ate the great difficulties under which we have been laboring, 
and will do much, I think, towards giving a just idea in Europe of 
the difficulties we have to contend against in this most singular of 
all campaigns. ... I had a telegram from McDowell last evening 
stating that he was ordered down here with his command, and assur¬ 
ing me that he received the order with great satisfaction. The 
secretary and President are becoming quite amiable of late; I am 
afraid that I am a little cross to them, and that I do not quite 
appreciate their sincerity and good feeling. “Timeo Danaos et dona 
ferentes.” How glad I will be to get rid of the whole lot! I had 
another letter from our friend A. P. H. yesterday in reply to mine 
to Joe Johnston; so I am now confident that Joe is badly wounded. 
In my reply sent this morning I ignore Hill entirely, and address 
mine to the “Commanding General, etc.,” so G. W. will have to come 
out this time. I hope to arrange for a general exchange of prisoners, 
and thus relieve our poor fellows who have been so long confined. 
I must do secesh the justice to say that they now treat our wounded 
and prisoners as well as they can. . . . 

June 10, 7:30 a.m. — ... It is again raining hard, and has been 
for several hours! I feel almost discouraged—that is, I would do 
so did I not feel that it must all be for the best, and that God has 
some great purpose in view through all this. It is certain that 
there has not been for years and years such a season; it does not 
come by chance. I am quite checked by it. First, the Chickahominy 
is so swollen and the valley so covered with water that I cannot es¬ 
tablish safe communications over it; then, again, the ground is so 
muddy that we cannot use our artillery: the guns sink up to their 
ax}e-trees. I regret all this extremely, but take comfort from the 
thought that God will not leave so great a struggle as this to 
mere chance. If He ever interferes with the destinies of men and 
nations, this would seem to be a fit occasion for it. So whenever 
I feel discouraged by adverse circumstances I do my best to fall 
back on this great source of confidence, and always find that it gives 
me strength to bear up against anything that may occur. I do not 
see how any one can fill such a position as I do without being con¬ 
stantly forced to think of higher things and the Supreme Being. 
The great responsibility, the feeling of personal weakness and in¬ 
competency of entire dependence on the will of God, the thousand 
circumstances entirely beyond our control that may defeat our best- 
laid plans, the sight of poor human suffering—all these things will 
force the mind to seek rest above. ... I feel quite well to-day, by 
far better than at any time before. I think that if I can stand the 
test of this rainy day all must be right. I will not go out while 
it rains, if I can help it. . . . The Spaniards are still here, and I 
fear will remain some time, unless this rain drives them off. Prim 
is very well, but it is a nuisance to be obliged to be polite when one’s 
head is full of more important things. . . . Still raining very hard. 
I don’t know what will become of us! 

June 11, New bridge, A.M.— . . . Am very well to-day, and the 
weather is good. . . . Will start in half an" hour or so for the 
other side of the river. It threatens rain again, so that I do not 
believe I can make the entire tour—probably only on Smith and Sum¬ 
ner; do the rest to-morrow. Besides, I do not care to ride too far to¬ 
day, as I have not been on horseback before since the day of the 


—172 


Private Letters 


battle. I must be careful, for it would be utter destruction to this 
army were I to be disabled so as not to be able to take command. 

Burnside left yesterday; thinks there is a great deal of Union 
feeling in North Carolina, and that our gaining possession of Rich¬ 
mond will at once bring North Carolina back into the Union. . . . 
.1 half-doubt whether there is much Union feeling south of North 
Carolina. . . . McCall’s division has commenced arriving; some of 
them reached the White House last night. This relieves me very 
much. 

June 12, 8 A.M., New bridge .— . . . Am about to break up this 
camp and move over the Chickahominy to Dr. Trent’s house; to the 
vicinity, at least, for I abominate houses when on the field. In ad¬ 
dition have to take a farewell ride some seven or eight miles up this 
side of the river to look again at the ground and give the last in¬ 
structions to Porter and Franklin for their guidance on this side of 
the river. I took quite a ride_ yesterday, the first since the battle, 
and got through with it nicely, I am about as nearly well now as I ex¬ 
pect to be in this climate; bright and strong enough to fight a much 
better battle than any yet. I had a wonderful telegram from the 
Secretary of War last night; he declares that he is and ever has 
been my best friend! 

June 14, camp at Dr. Trent's, Saturday A.M. — . . . Your letters 
reached me yesterday morning just as I was starting out on a hot 
ride around the lines. Did not return until late, and then they got 
up a stampede on the other side of the Chickahominy which kept me 
busy until bed-time. Some of the enemy’s cavalry got in to the 
railroad, cut the telegraph-wires, and burned some wagons. I do 
not know the particulars yet, but the cavalry and some infantry are 
out after them, and will, I hope, repay secesh for his impudence. 
As it is, the telegraph is broken and may not be re-established for 
several hours. ... It is terribly hot, so much so that one can hardly 
exist. I was up before six this morning, and even then found it 
overpowering; the sun bakes down. I have the best possible place 
for a camp, right on the summit of a high hill, under the shade of 
a couple of large walnut-trees, but the trouble this morning is that no 
air whatever is stirring. Am quite well now; took a long ride in the hot 
sun yesterday and did not feel it very much; am not quite strong 
yet, and have to be a little careful. . . . Yesterday morning secesh 
commenced a very warm fire of artillery quite early, but killed only 
one man. By and by, however, Smith got some of his sharpshooters 
near their guns, drove off the gunners and kept them off all day, 
so that there was no more firing. There has been none to-day. I 
learn that the enemy moved away their guns during the night; this 
is probably true. A couple of days more of this weather will dry 
the roads and fields so as to render them practicable and enable me 
to try it again. I am heartily tired of inactivity, and shall be only 
too glad to settle this matter, have the battle, and get through with 
our work. . . . Senator Rice was here this morning. . . . 

June 15, 10:15 p.m., Camp Lincoln .— . . . We have had several 
skirmishes. The rebels have attacked our pickets on several points, 
but were everywhere beaten back with the loss of several killed and 
a respectable number of prisoners. 

The worst interruption of all was a “party” of ladies and gentle¬ 
men that - had no more sense than to insist upon coming up 

here, Senator - and a lot of others. All of whom I was really 

.glad to see, although this was no place for them. I am sorry to say 


—173 





McClellan’s Own Story 


that when I heard of their arrival I “swore” a little internally, and 
sent Russell flying out of my tent, declaring that I would not see 

any of them. But soon afterwards Senator - came here, and 

he was so kind and friendly that I was at once mollified. I talked 
with him for some time, and he went back to Van Vliet’s tent. I 
then gave to Averill my orders for a surprise-party to-morrow, to. 
repay secesh for his raid of day before yesterday. Then went over 

to call on Mrs.-. There I was in for it. I was presented to 

all the ladies, listened to Mrs. —’s version of her trip to Rich¬ 
mond, and very rapidly beat a retreat, giving business as an-excuse. 
Charles got up a lunch for the party, a rainstorm coming on in the 
meanwhile. When they were nearly through I took Averill over and 
talked with them for a while. Then they adjourned to my tent. 
The two dear old mesdames were just as good as they could be; can 
I say more? When they left they asked me to give them sprigs from 
the bower in front of my tent, so I send you one, too. ... I do not 
think our rain of to-day will do much harm. The chances now are 
that I will make the first advance on Tuesday or Wednesday. By 
that time I think the ground will be fit for the movements of artillery 
and that all our bridges will be completed. I think the rebels will 
make a desperate fight, but I feel sure that we will gain our point. 
Look on the maps I sent you a day or two ago, and find “Old Tavern,” 
on the road from New bridge to Richmond; it is in that vicinity that 
the next battle will be fought. I think that they see it in that light, 
and that they are fully prepared to make a desperate resistance. 
I shall make the first battle mainly an artillery combat. As soon 
as I gain possession of the “Old Tavern” I will push them in upon 
Richmond and behind their works; then I will bring up my heavy 
guns, shell the city, and carry it by assault. I speak very confi¬ 
dently, but if you could see the faces of the troops as I ride among 
them you would share my confidence. They will do anything I tell 
them to do. I could not help laughing when, on the day of the last 
battle; I was riding along in front, a man jumped out in an interval 
of the cheering and addressed me quite familiarly, saying: “Halloo, 
George! how are you? You are the only one of the whole crowd 

of generals that is worth a -.” I won’t fill up the last word, 

but the whole command shouted, “That’s so!” . . . I think there is 
scarcely a man in this whole army who would not give his life for me, 
and willingly do whatever I ask. I have tried them more than once, 
and whenever I am near they never fail me. The next battle will 
doubtless be a desperate one, but I think that I can so use our artil¬ 
lery as to make the loss of life on our side comparatively small. . . . 

June 17, 4 p.m. —The weather yesterday and to-day has been 
splendid. It was clear and bright, but a delightfully cool breeze has 
been blowing constantly. The roads and fields are drying beauti¬ 
fully. The river is falling rapidly; our bridges are nearly finished, 
and we shall soon be on the move. 

Camp at Trent's House , June 21, 1862, 10 A.M.— . . . We have 
had good weather for the last few days, and have been improving 
it as best we could. Both parties are active, but the nature of the 
country is such as to make our progress difficult in the extreme. I 
hope to knock secesh out of Old Tavern and its vicinity within a 
couple of days; shall try it, at all events. ... I see the Aboli¬ 
tionists have got a new dodge in my behalf—the White House busi¬ 
ness! In the first place, I never saw Col. Lee in my life, and, of 
course, never made any arrangement with him. The house was 
guarded simply from motives of respect for the memory of Washing- 


— 174 — 






Private Letters 


ton, which I thought would be appreciated by every honest person 
in the country. The adjacent property has been freely used for all 
necessary purposes. The house has never been needed for a hospital, 
and would not accommodate over thirty or forty persons anyhow. The 
“spring” alluded to is one of a great many. There are plenty there, 
and this one is prohibited only because access to it brings people too 
near the house. I was not even sure that it was guarded, and do 
not even now know whether it is anything more than the guard 
placed over all springs near camps to prevent them from being mis¬ 
used by the men. So you have the truth of the White House story, 
all of which was in the possession of the secretary some ten days 
ago. I yesterday sent Tripler down to investigate the whole matter, 

and when I receive his report will nail the lie to the counter. - 

wrote a letter to the secretary, in which he repeats the spring story 
as of his own knowledge; that is, he asserts it is a fact! One thing 
is certain: I will some day or other repay some of these people 
with interest, and make them feel ashamed of themselves, if there 
is such a thing in their composition, which I rather doubt. I can’t 
tell you how sick I am of this kind of life. I suppose that it is 
the “cross” that it is my lot to bear, and that I should not repine. 
I know it is wrong, and I do my best to bear everything contentedly; 
but sometimes the old, impatient spirit will break out and I lose my 
temper. But I will keep on trying to do my best. . . . 

June 22, Sunday, 3 p.m. — . . . By an arrival from Washington 
to-day I learn that Stanton and Chase,have fallen out; that McDowell 
has deserted his friend C. and taken to S.! Alas! poor country that 
should have such rulers. I tremble for my country when I think of 
these things; but still can trust that God in His infinite wisdom will 
not punish us as we deserve, but will in His own good time bring 
order out of chaos and restore peace to this unhappy country. His 
will be done, whatever it may be! I am anxious as any human being 
can be to finish this war. Yet when I see such insane folly behind 
me I feel that the final salvation of the country demands the utmost 
prudence on my part, and that I must not run the slightest risk of 
disaster, for if anything happened to this army our cause would be 
lost. I got up some heavy guns to-day, and hope to give secesh a 
preliminary pounding to-morrow and to make one good step next 
day. The rascals are very strong, and out-number me very consider¬ 
ably; they are well entrenched also, and have all the advantages of 
position, so I must be prudent; but I will yet succeed, notwithstanding 
all they do and leave undone in Washington to prevent it. I would 
not have on my conscience what those men have for all the world. 
I am sorry that I shall lose the dear old Prince de Joinville in a few 
days; he is obliged to return to Europe. Gen. Prim has sent me his 
photograph. . . . 

It is quite hot this afternoon. ... It is almost time for our even¬ 
ing skirmish. Secesh has been very quiet to-day; scarcely fired a 
shot. I am very glad of it, as it has enabled me to give my men a 
good, quiet rest for Sunday. 

June 23, 3 p.m. —I am delighted that you are so much pleased at 
Orange. It must be a lovely place from your description. Will 
the doctor invite me to pay you a visit there, do you think? How 
do you occupy yourself? Or are you contented just to rest and be 
quiet? That is my idea of happiness now—rest with you and the 
baby. We have had rather an exciting day of it. The enemy has 
been making some rather mysterious movements, and I have taken 
advantage of them to push forward our pickets considerably on the 


- 175 - 



McClellan’s Own Story 


left. I don’t yet know exactly what it means, but so far it has been 
of advantage to us, and you may be sure that I won’t be caught in 
any trap. We have had a sharp thunder-shower this afternoon, and 
it will be of benefit by cooling and clearing the air. There has not 
been rain enough to do any harm yet. 

10:30 p.m.— . . . You may be sure that no man in this army is 
so anxious as its general to finish the campaign. Every poor fellow 
that is killed or wounded almost haunts me! My only consolation is 
that I have honestly done my best to save as many lives as possible, 
and that many others might have done less towards it. 

I have had a rather anxious day, the movements of the enemy 
being mysterious; but I have gained something, and am ready for 
any eventuality, I think, I have a kind of presentiment that to¬ 
morrow will bring forth something — what , I do not know. We will 
see when the time arrives. I expect to be able to take a decisive 
step in advance day after to-morrow, and, if I succeed, will gain 
a couple of miles towards Richmond. It now looks to me as if the 
operations would resolve themselves into a series of partial attacks 
rather than a general battle. 

24Jh, 10 a.m.— I was interrupted just here by some stampede 
telegrams that kept me up until 1:30 or 2 this morning. In the 
meantime a terrible storm came up and blew this unhappy sheet into 
the mud and rain. I send it as it is, however, as a slight specimen 
of the “sacred soil,” also because I am about starting out on a ride, 
from which I am not likely to return before the mail leaves camp. 
Nothing of interest this morning; all quiet; weather cloudy, and may 
rain to-day again. 

Telegram —June 26, 1862.— . . . Did not write yesterday; was 
on the battle-field all day. Have been up and in the saddle all night, 
and do not expect to be able to write more than a line to-day. Will 
probably be up all night again. . . . Our affair yesterday perfectly 
successful. 


176 - 


CHAPTER XXV 


Beginning of the Seven Days—McDowell coming, but not yet—Mc¬ 
Clellan resolves on flank movement to the James river—Prepara¬ 
tions—Battle of Gaines’s Mill—The movement goes on—McClellan 

charges Stanton with intent to sacrifice the army. 

On the 26th, the day upon which I had decided as the 
time for our final advance, the enemy attacked our right in 
strong force, and turned my attention to the protection of 
our communications and depots of supply. 

The event was a bitter confirmation of the military 
judgment which had been reiterated to my superiors from 
the inception and through the progress of the Peninsular 
campaign. 

I notified the Secretary of War in the following des¬ 
patch : 

12 m.— I have just heard that our advanced .cavalry pickets on 
the left bank of the Chickahominy are being driven in. It is probably 
Jackson’s advanced guard. If this be true you may not hear from 
me for some days, as my communications will probably be cut off. 
The case is perhaps a difficult one, but I shall resort to desperate 
measures, and will do my best to outmanoeuvre, outwit, and outfight 
the enemy. Do not believe reports of disaster, and do not be dis¬ 
couraged if you learn that my communications are cut off, and even 
Yorktown in possession of the enemy. Hope for the best, and I will 
not deceive the hopes you formerly placed in me. 

On the same day I received the following despatches 
from the Secretary of War: 

‘‘6 p.m.— Arrangements are being made as rapidly as possible to 
send you five thousand (5,000) men as fast as they can be brought 
from Manassas to Alexandria and embarked, which can be done 
sooner than to wait for transportation at Fredericksburg. They will 
be followed by more, if needed. McDowell, Banks, and Fremont’s 
force will be consolidated as the Army of Virginia, and will operate 
promptly in your aid by land. Nothing will be spared to sustain you, 
and I have undoubting faith in your success. Keep me advised fully 
of your condition.” 

“11:20 p.m.— Your telegram of 6:15 has just been received. The 
circumstances that have hitherto rendered it impossible for the govern¬ 
ment to send you any more reinforcements than has been done, have 
been so distinctly stated to you by the President that it is needless 
for me to repeat them. 

“Every effort has been made by the President and myself to 
strengthen you. King’s division has reached Falmouth; Shields’s 
division and Rickets’s division are at Manassas. The President designs 
to send a part of that force to aid you as speedily as it can be done.” 


— 177 — 


McClellan’s Own Story 


The following was sent at 2:30 p.m. : 

Your dispatch and that of the President received. Jackson is 
driving in my pickets, etc., on the other side of the Chickahominy. It 
is impossible to tell where reinforcements ought to go, as I am yet 
unable to predict result of approaching battle. It will probably be 
better that they should go to Fort Monroe, and thence according to 
state of affairs when they arrive. 

It is not probable that I can maintain telegraphic communication 
more than an hour or two longer. 

But 5,000 of the reinforcements spoken of in these com¬ 
munications came to the Army of the Potomac, and these 
reached us at Harrison’s Bar after the Seven Days. 

In anticipation of a speedy advance on Richmond, to 
provide for the contingency of our communications with the 
depot at the White House being severed by the enemy, and at 
the same time to be prepared for a change of the base of our 
operations to James river, if circumstances should render 
it advisable, I had made arrangements more than a week 
previous (on the 18th) to have transports with supplies of 
provisions and forage, under a convoy of gunboats, sent 
up James river. They reached Harrison’s Landing in time 
to be available for the army on its arrival at that point. 
Events soon proved this change of base to be, though most 
hazardous and difficult, the only prudent course. 

Early on the 25th Gen. Porter was instructed to send 
out reconnoitering parties towards Hanover Court-House to 
discover the position and force of the enemy, and to destroy 
the bridges on the Tolopotamy as far as possible. 

Up to the 26th of June the operations against Rich¬ 
mond had been conducted along the roads leading to it and' 
from the east and northeast. The superiority of the James 
river route, as a line of attack and supply, is too obvious to 
need exposition. My own opinion on that subject had been 
early given. The dissipation of all hope of the co-operation 
by land of Gen. McDowell’s forces, deemed to be occupied 
in the defence of Washington, their inability to hold or de¬ 
feat Jackson, disclosed an opportunity to the enemy, and a 
new danger to my right, and to the long line of supplies from 
the White House to the Chickahominy, and forced an im¬ 
mediate change of base across the Peninsula. To that end, 


— 178 — 


Preparations on James River 

from the evening of the 26th, every energy of the army was 
bent. 

Such a change of base, in the presence of a powerful 
enemy, is one of the most difficult undertakings in war, 
but I was confident in the valor and discipline of my brave 
army, and knew that it could be trusted equally to retreat 
or advance, and to fight the series of battles now inevitable, 
whether retreating from victories or marching through de¬ 
feats ; and, in short, I had no doubt whatever of its ability, 
even against superior numbers, to fight its way through to 
the James, and get a position whence a successful advance 
upon Richmond would be again possible. Their superb con¬ 
duct through the next seven days justified my faith. 

On the same day (26th) Gen. Van Vliet, chief-quarter¬ 
master of the Army of the Potomac, by my orders tele¬ 
graphed to Col. Ingall’s quartermaster at the White House, 
as follows: 

“Run the cars to the last moment, and load them with provisions 
and ammunition. Load every wagon you have with subsistence, and 
send them to Savage’s Station by way of Bottom’s bridge. If you 
are obliged to abandon White House burn everything that you cannot 
get off. You must throw all our supplies up the James river as soon 
as possible, and accompany them yourself with all your force. It 
will be of vast importance to establish our depots on James river 
without delay, if we abandon White House. I will keep you advised 
of every movement so long as the wires work; after that you must 
exercise your own judgment.” 

All these commands were obeyed. On the 26th orders 
were sent to all the corps commanders on the right bank of 
the Chickahominy to be prepared to send as many troops 
as they could spare on the following day to the left bank 
of the river. Gen. Franklin received instructions to hold 
Gen. Slocum’s division in readiness by daybreak of the 27th, 
and, if heavy firing should at that time be heard in the direc¬ 
tion of Gen. Porter, to move at once to his assistance without 
further orders. 

At noon on the 26th the approach of the enemy, who 
had crossed above Meadow bridge, was discovered by the 
advanced pickets at that point, and at 12:30 P.M. they were 
attacked and driven in. All the pickets were now called in, 
and the regiment and battery at Mechanicsville withdrawn. 


— 179 — 


McClellan's Own Story 


Meade’s brigade was ordered up as a reserve in rear of 
the line, and shortly after Martindale’s and Griffin’s bri¬ 
gades, of Morell’s division, were moved forward and deployed 
on the right of McCall’s division, towards Shady Grove 
church, to cover that flank. Neither of these three brigades, 
however, were warmly engaged, though two of Griffin’s regi¬ 
ments relieved a portion of Reynolds’s line just at the close 
of the action. 

The position of our troops was a strong one, extending 
along the left bank of Beaver Dam creek, the left resting 
on the Chickahominy and the right in thick woods beyond 
the upper road from Mechanicsville to Cold Harbor. The 
lower or river road crossed the creek at Ellison’s Mill. Sey¬ 
mour’s brigade held the left of the line from the Chicka¬ 
hominy to beyond the mill, partly in woods and partly in 
clear ground, and Reynolds’s the right, principally in the 
woods and covering the upper road. The artillery occupied 
positions commanding the roads and the open ground across 
the creek. 

Timber had been felled, rifle-pits dug, and the position 
generally prepared with a care that greatly contributed to 
the success of the day. The passage of the creek was diffi¬ 
cult along the whole front, and impracticable for artillery, 
except by the two roads where the main efforts of the ene¬ 
my were directed. 

At three P.M. he formed his line of battle, rapidly ad¬ 
vanced his skirmishers, and soon attacked our whole line, 
making at the same time a determined attempt to force the 
passage of the upper road, which was successfully resisted 
by Gen. Reynolds. After a severe struggle he was forced 
to retire with very heavy loss. 

A rapid artillery-fire, with desultory skirmishing, was 
maintained along the whole front, while the enemy massed 
his troops for another effort at the lower road about two 
hours later, which was likewise repulsed by Gen.. Seymour 
with heavy slaughter. 

The firing ceased and the enemy retired about nine P.M., 
the action having lasted six hours, with entire success to 
our arms. But few, if any, of Jackson’s troops were en- 

— 180 — 


The Seven Days 

gaged on this day. The portion of the enemy encountered 
were chiefly from the troops on the right bank of the river, 
who crossed near Meadow bridge and at Mechanicsville. 

The information in my possession soon after the close 
of this action convinced me that Jackson was really ap¬ 
proaching in large force. The position on Beaver Dam 
creek, although so successfully defended, had its right flank 
too much in the air and was too far from the main army to 
make it available to retain it longer. I therefore determined 
to send the heavy guns at Hogan’s and Gaines’s houses 
over the Chickahominy during the night, with as many of 
the wagons of the 5th corps as possible, and to withdraw the 
corps itself to a position stretching around the bridges, 
where its flank would be reasonably secure and it would be 
within supporting distance of the main army. Gen. Porter 
carried out my orders to that effect. 

It was not advisable at that time, even had it been 
practicable, to withdraw the 5th corps to the right bank of 
the Chickahominy. Such a movement would have exposed 
the rear of the army, placed as between two fires, and en¬ 
abled Jackson’s fresh troops to interrupt the movement to 
James river by crossing the Chickahominy in the vicinity 
of Jones’s bridge before we could reach Malvern Hill with 
our trains. I determined then to resist Jackson with the 
5th corps, reinforced by all our disposable troops in the 
new position near the bridge-heads, in order to cover the 
withdrawal of the trains and heavy guns, and to give time 
for the arrangements to secure the adoption of the James 
river as our line of supplies in lieu of the Pamunkey. 

The greater part of the heavy guns and wagons having 
been removed to the right bank of the Chickahominy, the 
delicate operation of withdrawing the troops from Beaver 
Dam creek, was commenced shortly before daylight and 
successfully executed. 

Meade’s and Griffin’s brigades were the first to leave 
the ground. Seymour’s brigade covered the rear, with the 
horse-batteries of Capts. Robertson and Tidball; but the 
withdrawal was so skilful and gradual, and the repulse of 
the preceding day so complete, that, although the enemy 


— 181 — 


McClellan's Own Story 


followed the retreat closely and some skirmishing occurred, 
he did not appear in front of the new line in force till about 
noon of the 27th, when we were prepared to receive him. 

About this time Gen. Porter, believing that Gen. Stone- 
man would be cut off from him, sent him orders to fall back 
on the White House and afterwards rejoin the army as 
best he could. 

On the morning of the 27th of June, during the with¬ 
drawal of his troops from Mechanicsville to the selected posi¬ 
tion already mentioned, Gen. Porter telegraphed as follows: 

“I hope to do without aid, though I request that Franklin or some 
other command be held ready to reinforce me. The enemy are so close 
that I expect to be hard pressed in front. I hope to have a portion in 
position to cover the retreat. This is a delicate movement, but, rely¬ 
ing on the good qualities of the commanders of divisions and brigades, 
I expect to get back and hold the new line.” 

This shows how closely Porter’s retreat was followed. 

Notwithstanding all the efforts used during the entire 
night to remove the heavy guns and wagons, some of the 
siege-guns were still in position at Gaines’s house after 
sunrise, and were finally hauled off by hand. The new posi¬ 
tion of the 5th corps was about an arc of a circle, covering 
the approaches to the bridges which connected our right 
wing with the troops on the opposite side of the river. 

Morell’s division held the left of the line in a strip of 
woods on the left bank of the Gaines’s Mill stream, resting 
its left flank on the descent to the Chickahominy, which was 
swept by our artillery on both sides of the river, and ex¬ 
tending into open ground on the right towards New Cold 
Harbor. In this line Gen. Butterfield’s brigade held the ex¬ 
treme left; Gen.. Martindale’s joined his right, and Gen. 
Griffin, still further to the right, joined the left of Gen. 
Sykes’s division, which, partly in woods and partly in open 
ground, extended in rear of Cold Harbor. 

Each brigade had in reserve two of its own regiments; 
McCall’s division, having been engaged on the day before, 
was formed in a second line in rear of the first; Meade’s 
brigade on the left, near the Chickahominy; Reynolds’s 
brigade on the right, covering the approaches from Cold 
Harbor and Despatch Station to Sumner’s bridge, and Sey- 


— 182 — 


The Seven Days 

mour’s in reserve to the second line still further in rear. 
Gen. P. St. G. Cooke, with five companies of the 5th Regular 
Cavalry, two squadrons of the 1st Regular Cavalry, and 
three squadrons of the 1st Penn. Cavalry (lancers), were 
posted behind a hill in rear of the position, and near the 
Chickahominy, to aid in watching the left flank and de¬ 
fending the slope to the river. 

The troops were all in position by noon, with the ar¬ 
tillery on the commanding ground, and in the intervals be¬ 
tween the divisions and brigades. Besides the division bat¬ 
teries there were Robertson’s and Tidball’s horse-batteries 
from the artillery reserve; the latter posted on the right of 
Sykes’s division, and the former on the extreme left of the 
line, in the valley of the Chickahominy. 

Shortly after noon the enemy was discovered approach¬ 
ing in force, and it soon became evident that the entire posi¬ 
tion was to be attacked. The skirmishers advanced rapidly 
and soon the fire became heavy along our whole front. At 
two P.M. Gen. Porter asked for reinforcements. Slocum’s 
division of the 6th corps was ordered to cross to the left 
bank of the river by Alexander’s bridge, and proceed to his 
support. 

Gen. Porter’s first call for reinforcements, through Gen. 
Barnard, did not reach me, nor his demand for more axes 
through the same officer. By three P.M. the engagement 
had become so severe, and the enemy were so greatly super¬ 
ior in numbers, that the entire second line and reserves had 
been moved forward to sustain the first line against re¬ 
peated and desperate assaults along the whole front. 

At 3:30 Slocum’s division reached the field, and was im¬ 
mediately brought into action at the weak points of our line. 

On the left the contest was for the strip of woods run¬ 
ning almost at right angles to the Chickahominy, in front 
of Adams’s house, or between that and Gaines’s house. The 
enemy several times charged up to this wood, but were 
each time driven back with heavy loss. The regulars of 
Sykes’s division, on the right, also repulsed several strong 
attacks. 


— 183 — 


McClellan's Own Story 


But our own loss under the tremendous fire of such 
greatly superior numbers was very severe, and the troops, 
most of whom had been under arms more than two days, 
were rapidly becoming exhausted by the masses of fresh 
men constantly brought against them. 

When Gen. Slocum’s division arrived on the ground it 
increased Gen. Porter’s force to some 35,000, who were 
probably contending against about 70,000 of the enemy. The 
line was severely pressed in several points; and as its being 
pierced at any one would have been fatal, it was unavoidable 
for Gen. Porter, who was required to hold his position until 
night, to divide Slocum’s division, and send parts of it, even 
single regiments, to the points most threatened. 

About five P.M., Gen. Porter having reported his posi¬ 
tion as critical, French’s and Meagher’s brigades, of Rich¬ 
ardson’s division (3d corps), were ordered to cross to his 
support. The enemy attacked again in great force at six 
P.M., but failed to break our lines, though our loss was very 
heavy. 

About seven p.m. they threw fresh troops against Gen. 
Porter with still greater fury, and finally gained the woods 
held by our left. This reverse, aided by the confusion that 
followed an unsuccessful charge by five companies of the 
5th Cavalry, and followed, as it was, by more determined 
assaults on the remainder of our lines, now outflanked, 
caused a general retreat from our position to the hill in rear 
overlooking the bridge. 

French’s and Meagher’s brigades now appeared, driv¬ 
ing before them the stragglers who were thronging towards 
the bridge. 

These brigades advanced boldly to the front, and by 
their example, as well as by the steadiness of their bearing, 
reanimated our own troops and warned the enemy that 
reinforcements had arrived. It was now dusk. The enemy, 
already repulsed several times with terrible slaughter, and 
hearing the shouts of the fresh troops, failed to follow up 
their advantage. This gave an opportunity to rally our men 
behind the brigades of Gens. French and Meagher, and they 
again advanced up the hill, ready to repulse another attack. 


— 184 — 


The Seven Days 

During the night our thin and exhausted regiments were 
all withdrawn in safety, and by the following morning all 
had reached the other side of the stream. The regular in¬ 
fantry formed the rear-guard, and about six o’clock on the 
morning of the 28th crossed the river, destroying the bridge 
behind them. 

Although we were finally forced from our first line after 
the enemy had been repeatedly driven back, yet the objects 
sought for had been obtained. The enemy was held at bay. 
Our siege-guns and material were saved, and the right wing 
had now joined the main body of the army. 

The number of guns captured by the enemy at this 
battle was twenty-two, three of which were lost by being 
run off the bridge during the final withdrawal. 

Great credit is due for the efficiency and bravery with 
which this important arm of the service (the artillery) was 
fought, and it was not until the last successful charge of the 
enemy that the cannoneers were driven from their pieces 
or struck down and the guns captured. Dietrich’s, Kauer- 
hem’s, and Grimm’s batteries took position during the en¬ 
gagement in the front of Gen. Smith’s line on the right of 
the stream, and, with a battery of siege-guns served by the 
1st Conn. Artillery, helped to drive back the enemy in front 
of Gen. Porter. 

So threatening were the movements of the enemy on 
both banks of the Chickahominy that it was impossible to 
decide until the afternoon where the real attack would be 
made. Large forces of infantry were seen during the day 
near the Old Tavern, on Franklin’s right, and threatening 
demonstrations were frequently made along the entire line 
on this side of the river, which rendered it necessary to hold 
a considerable force in position to meet them. 

On the 26th a circular had been sent to the corps com¬ 
manders on the right bank of the river, asking them how 
many of their troops could be spared to reinforce Gen. 
Porter after retaining sufficient to hold their positions for 
twenty-four hours. 


— 185 — 


McClellan’s Own Story 


Gen. Heintzelman replied: 

“I think I can hold the entrenchments with four brigades for 
twenty-four hours. That would leave two brigades disposable for 
service on the other side of the river, but the men are so tired and 
worn out that I fear they would not be in ai condition to fight after 
making a march of any distance. . . .” 

Telegrams from Gen. Heintzelman on the 25th and 26th 
had indicated that the enemy was in large force in front of 
Gens. Hooker and Kearny, and on the Charles City road 
(Longstreet, Hill, and Huger), and Gen. Heintzelman ex¬ 
pressed the opinion on the night of the 25th that he could 
not hold his advanced position without reinforcements. 

Gen. Keyes telegraphed: 

“As to how many men will be able to hold this position for twenty- 
four hours, I must answer, All I have, if the enemy is as strong as 
even in front, it having at all times appeared to me that our forces on 
this bank are small enough.” 

On the morning of the 27th the following despatch was 
sent to Gen. Sumner: 

“Gen. Smith just reports that ‘six or eight regiments have moved 
down to the woods in front of Gen. Sumner. 

At eleven o’clock a.m. Gen. Sumner telegraphed: 

“The enemy threatens an attack on my right near Smith.” 

At 12:30 P.M. he telegraphed: 

“Sharp shelling on both sides.” 

At 2:45 P.M.: 

“Sharp musketry-firing in front of Burns. We are replying with 
artillery and infantry. The man on the look-out reports some troops 
drawn up in line of battle about opposite my right and Smith’s left; 
the number cannot be made out.” 

In accordance with orders given on the night of the 
26th, Gen. Slocum’s division commenced crossing the river, 
to support Gen. Porter, soon after daybreak on the morn¬ 
ing of the 27th; but, as the firing in front of Gen. Porter 
ceased, the movement was suspended. At two P.M. Gen. 
Porter called for reinforcements. I ordered them at once, 
and at 3:25 P.M. sent him the following: 


— 186 — 


The Seven Days 

“Slocum is now crossing Alexander’s bridge with his whole com¬ 
mand. Enemy has commenced an infantry attack on Smith’s left. 
I have ordered down Sumner’s and Heintzelman’s reserves, and you 
can count on the whole of Slocum’s. Go on as you have begun.” 

During the day the following despatches were received, 
which will show the condition of affairs on the right bank 
of the Chickahominy: 

Gen. Franklin telegraphed: 

“Gen. Smith thinks the enemy are massing heavy columns in the 
clearings to the right of James Garnett’s house and on the other side 
of the river opposite it. Three regiments are reported to be moving 
from Sumner’s to Smith’s front. The arrangements are very good 
made by Smith.” 

Afterwards he telegraphed: 

“The enemy has begun an attack on Smith’s left with infantry. I 
know no details.” 

Afterwards the following: 

“The enemy has opened on Smith from a battery of three pieces 
to the right of the White House. Our shells are bursting well, and 
Smith thinks Sumner will soon have a cross-fire upon them that will 
silence them.” 

Afterwards (at 5:50 p.m.) the following was sent to 
Gen. Keyes: 

“Please send one brigade of Couch’s division to these headquarters 
without a moment’s delay. A staff officer will be here to direct the 
brigade where to go.” 

Subsequently the following was sent to Gens. Sumner 
and Franklin: 

“Is there any sign of the enemy being in force in your front? 
Can you spare any more force to be sent to Gen. Porter? Answer at 
once.” 

At 5:15 P.M. the following was received from Gen. 
Franklin: 

“I do not think it prudent to take any more troops from here at 
present.” 

Gen. Sumner replied: 

“If the general desires to trust the defence of my position to my 
front line alone, I can send French with three regiments and Meagher, 
with his brigade, to the right; everything is so uncertain that I think 
it would be hazardous to do it.” 


— 187 — 


McClellan’s Own Story 


These two brigades were sent to reinforce Gen. Porter, 
as has been observed. 

At 5:25 p.m. I sent the following to Gen. Franklin: 

Porter is hard pressed; it is not a question of prudence, but of 
possibilities. Can you possibly maintain your position until dark with 
two brigades? I have ordered eight regiments of Sumner’s to sup¬ 
port Porter; one brigade of Couch’s to this place. 

Heintzelman’s reserve to go in rear of Sumner. If possible, send 
a brigade to support Porter. It should follow the regiments ordered 
from Sumner. 

* 

At 7:35 p.m. the following was sent to Gen. Sumner: 

“If it is possible, send another brigade to reinforce Gen. Smith; 
it i& said three heavy columns of infantry are moving on him.” 

From the foregoing despatches it will be seen that all 
disposable troops were sent from the right bank of the river 
to reinforce Gen. Porter, and that the corps commanders 
were left with smaller forces to hold their positions than they 
deemed adequate. To have done more, even though Por¬ 
ter’s reverse had been prevented, would have had the still 
more disastrous result of imperilling the whole movement 
across the Peninsula. 

The operations of this day proved the numerical super¬ 
iority of the enemy, and made it evident that while he had 
a large army on the left bank of the Chickahominy, which 
had already turned our right and was in position to inter¬ 
cept the communications with our depot at the White House, 
he was also in large force between our army and Richmond. 
I therefore effected a junction of our forces. 

This might probably have been executed on either side 
of the Chickahominy, and if the concentration had been ef¬ 
fected on the left bank it is possible we might, with our 
entire force, have defeated the enemy there; but at that 
time they held the roads leading to the White House, so 
that it would have been impossible to have sent forward 
supply-trains in advance of the army in that direction, and 
the guarding of those trains would have seriously embar¬ 
rassed our operations in the battle we would have been com¬ 
pelled to fight, if concentrated on that bank of the river. 
Moreover, we would at once have been followed by the ene¬ 
my’s forces upon the Richmond side of the river operating 


— 188 — 


The Seven Days 

upon our rear; and if, in the chances of war, we had been 
ourselves defeated in the effort, we would have been forced 
to fall back to the White House, and probably to Fort 
Monroe; and, as both our flanks and rear would then have 
been entirely exposed, our entire supply-train, if not the 
greater part of the army itself, might have been lost. 

The movements of the enemy showed that they ex¬ 
pected this, and, as they themselves acknowledged, they 
were prepared to cut off our retreat in that direction. 

I therefore concentrated all our forces on the right 
bank of the river. 

During the night of the 26th and morning of the 27th 
all our wagons, heavy guns, etc., were gathered there. 

It may be asked why, after the concentration of otir 
forces on the right bank of the Chickahominy, with a large 
part of the enemy drawn away from Richmond upon the 
opposite side, I did not, instead of striking for James river, 
fifteen miles below that place, at once march directly on 
Richmond. 

It will be remembered that at this juncture the enemy 
was on our rear, and there was every reason to believe that 
he would sever our communications with the supply-depot 
at the White House. 

We had on hand but a limited amount of rations, and if 
we had advanced directly on Richmond it would have re¬ 
quired considerable time to carry the strong works around 
that place, during which our men would have been destitute 
of food; and even if Richmond had fallen before our arms 
the enemy could still have occupied our supply communica¬ 
tions between that place and the gunboats, and turned the 
disaster into victory. If, on the other hand, the enemy had 
concentrated all his forces at Richmond during the progress 
of our attack, and we had been defeated, we must in all 
probability have lost our trains before reaching the flotilla. 

The battles which continued day after day in the pro¬ 
gress of our flank movement to the James, with the excep¬ 
tion of the one at Gaines’s Mill, were successes to our arms, 
and the closing engagement at Malvern Hill was the most 
decisive of all. 


■ 189 — 


McClellan's Own Story 


On the evening of the 27th of June I assembled the 
corps commanders at my headquarters, and informed them 
of the plan, its reasons, and my choice of route and method 
of execution. 

Gen. Keyes was directed to move his corps, with its 
artillery and baggage, across the White Oak Swamp bridge, 
and to seize strong positions on the opposite side of the 
swamp, to cover the passage of the other troops and trains. 

This order was executed on the 28th by noon. Before 
daybreak on the 28th I went to Savage’s Station, and re¬ 
mained there during the day and night, directing the with¬ 
drawal of the trains and supplies of the army. 

Orders were given to the different commanders to load 
th*eir wagons with ammunition and provisions, and the ne¬ 
cessary baggage of the officers and men, and to destroy all 
property which could not be transported with the army. 
Orders were also given to leave with those of the sick and 
wounded who could not be transported a proper complement 
of surgeons and attendants, with a bountiful supply of 
rations and medical stores. 

The large herd of 2,500 beef cattle was, by the chief 
commissary, Col. Clark, transferred to the James river with¬ 
out loss. 

On the morning of the 28th, while Gen. Franklin was 
withdrawing his command from Golding’s farm, the enemy 
opened upon Gen. Smith’s division from Garnett’s Hill, from 
the valley above, and from Gaines’s Hill on the opposite 
side of the Chickahominy, and shortly afterwards two Geor¬ 
gia regiments attempted to carry the works about to be 
evacuated, but this attack was repulsed by the 23d N. Y., 
and the 49th Penn. Volunteers on picket, and a section of 
Mott’s battery. 

Porter’s corps was moved across White Oak Swamp 
during the day and night, and took positions covering the 
roads leading from Richmond towards White Oak Swamp 
and Long bridge. McCall’s division was ordered, on the 
night of the 28th, to move across the swamp and take a 
proper position to assist in covering the remaining troops 
and trains. 

— 190 — 


McClellan to Stanton 


During the same night the corps of Sumner and Heint- 
zelman and the division of Smith were ordered to an inter¬ 
ior line, the left resting on Keyes’s old entrenchments and 
curving to the right so as to cover Savage’s Station. 

General Slocum’s division, of Franklin’s corps, was or¬ 
dered to Savage’s Station in reserve. 

They were ordered to hold this position until dark of 
the 29th, in order to cover the withdrawal of the trains, and 
then to fall back across the swamp and unite with the re¬ 
mainder of the army. 

On the 28th I sent the following to the Secretary of 
War: 

Headquarters, Army of the Potomac, 
Savage’s Station, June 28, 1862, 12:20 a.m. 

Hon. E. M. Stanton, Secretary of War: 

I now know the full history of the day. On this side of the river 
(the right bank) we repulsed several strong attacks. On the left 
bank our men did all that men could do, all that soldiers could ac¬ 
complish, but they were overwhelmed by vastly superior numbers, 
even after I brought my last reserves into action. The loss on both 
sides is terrible. I believe it will prove to be the most desperate battle 
of the war. The sad remnants of my men behave as men. Those 
battalions who fought most bravely and suffered most are still in the 
best order. My regulars were superb, and I count upon what are left 
to turn another battle in company with their gallant comrades of the 
volunteers. Had I twenty thousand (20,000), or even ten thousand 
(10,000), fresh troops to use to-morrow, I could take Richmond; but I 
have not a man in reserve, and shall be glad to cover my retreat and 
save the material and personnel of the army. 

If we have lost the day we have yet preserved our honor, and no 
one need blush for the Army of the Potomac. I have lost this battle 
because my force was too small. 

I again repeat that I am not responsible for this, and I say it with 
the earnestness of a general who feels in his heart the loss of every 
brave man who has been needlessly sacrificed to-day. I still hope to 
retrieve our fortunes; but to do this the government must view the 
matter in the same earnest light that I do. You must send me very 
large reinforcements, and send them at once. I shall draw back to 
this side of the Chickahominy, and think I can withdraw all our ma¬ 
terial. Please understand that in this battle we have lost nothing 
but men, and those the best we have. 

In addition to what I have already said, I only wish to say to the 
President that I think he is wrong in regarding me as ungenerous 
when I said that my force was too weak. I merely intimated a truth 
which to-day has been plainly proved. If, at this instant, I could 
dispose of ten thousand (10,000) fresh men, I could gain the victory 
to-morrow. 

I know that a few thousand more men would have changed this 
battle from a defeat to a victory. As it is, the government must not 
and cannot hold me responsible for the result. 


— 191 — 


McClellan’s Own Story 


I feel too earnestly to-night. I have seen too many dead and 
wounded comrades to feel otherwise than that the government has not 
sustained this army. If you do not do so now the game is lost. 

If I save this army now, I tell you plainly that I owe no thanks 
to you or to any other persons in Washington. 

You have done your best to sacrifice this army. 

Geo. B. McClellan. 


— 192 — 


CHAPTER XXVI 


Continuation of the Seven Days’ battles—Allen’s field—Savage’s Sta¬ 
tion—White Oak Swamp—Charles City cross-roads—Glendale— 

Malvern Hill—The army at Harrison’s Landing. 

The headquarters camp at Savage’s Station was broken 
up early on the morning of the 29th and moved across White 
Oak Swamp. As the essential part of this day’s operation 
was the passage of the trains across the swamp, and their 
protection against attack from the direction of New Market 
and Richmond, as well as the immediate and secure estab¬ 
lishment of our communications with the gunboats, I passed 
the day in examining the ground, directing the posting of 
troops, and securing the uninterrupted movement of the 
trains. 

In the afternoon I instructed Gen. Keyes to move dur¬ 
ing the night to James river and occupy a defensive position 
near Malvern Hill, to secure our extreme left flank. 

Gen. F. J. Porter was ordered to follow him and pro¬ 
long the line towards the right. The trains were to be 
pushed on towards James river in rear of these corps, and 
placed under the protection of the gunboats as they arrived. 

A sharp skirmish with the enemy’s cavalry early this 
day on the Quaker road showed that his efforts were about 
to be directed towards impeding our progress to the river, 
and rendered my presence in that quarter necessary. 

The difficulty was not at all with the movement of the 
troops, but with the immense trains, that were to be moved 
virtually by a single road and required the whole army for 
their protection. With exception of the cavalry affair on 
the Quaker road, we were not troubled during this day south 
of the swamp, but there was severe fighting north of it. 

Gen. Sumner vacated his works at Fair Oaks on June 
29, at daylight, and marched his command to Orchard Sta¬ 
tion, halting at Allen’s field, between Orchard and Savage’s 
Stations. 

The divisions of Richardson and Sedgwick were formed 
on the right of the railroad, facing towards Richmond, 


— 193 — 


McClellan’s Own Story 


Richardson holding the right, and Sedgwick joining the right 
of Heintzelman’s corps. The first line of Richardson's divi¬ 
sion was held by Gen. French, Gen. Caldwell supporting in 
the second. A log building in front of Richardson’s division 
was held by Col. Brooks with one regiment (53d Penn. Vol¬ 
unteers), with Hazzard’s battery on an elevated piece of 
ground a little in rear of Col. Brooks’s command. 

At nine A.M. the enemy commenced a furious attack on 
the right of Gen. Sedgwick, but were repulsed. The left of 
Gen. Richardson was next attacked, the enemy attempting 
in vain to carry the position of Col. Brooks. Capt. Hazzard’s 
battery, and Pettit’s battery, which afterwards replaced it, 
were served with great effect, while the 53d Penn, kept up 
a steady fire on the advancing enemy, compelling them at 
last to retire in disorder. The enemy renewed the attack 
three times, but were as often repulsed. 

Gen. Slocum arrived at Savage’s Station at an early 
hour on the 29th, and was ordered to cross White Oak Swamp 
and relieve Gen. Keyes’s corps. As soon as Gen. Keyes was 
thus relieved he moved towards James river, which he 
reached in safety, with all his artillery and baggage, early 
on the morning of the 30th, and took up a position below 
Turkey creek bridge. 

During the morning Gen. Franklin heard that the ene¬ 
my, after having repaired the bridges, was crossing the 
Chickahominy in large force and advancing towards Savage’s 
Station. He communicated this information to Gen. Sum¬ 
ner, at Allen’s farm, and moved Smith’s division to Savage’s 
Station. A little after noon Gen. Sumner united his forces 
with those of Gen. Franklin and assumed command. 

I had ordered Gen. Heintzelman, with his corps, to hold 
the Williamsburg road until dark, at a point where were 
several field-works, and a skirt of timber between these 
works and the railroad. 

Through a misunderstanding of his orders, and being 
convinced that the troops of Sumner and Franklin at Sav¬ 
age’s Station were ample for the purpose in view, Heintzel¬ 
man withdrew his troops during the afternoon, crossed the 


— 194 — 


The Seven Days 

swamp at Brackett’s ford, and reached the Charles City 
road with the rear of his column at ten p.m. 

On reaching Savage’s Station Sumner’s and Franklin’s 
commands were drawn up in line of battle in the large open 
field to the left of the railroad, the left resting on the edge 
of the woods and the right extending down to the railroad. 
Gen. Brooks, and his brigade, held the wood to the left of 
the field, where he did excellent service, receiving a wound, 
but retaining his command. 

Gen. Hancock’s brigade was thrown into the woods on 
the right and front. At four P.M. the enemy commenced 
his attack in large force by the Williamsburg road. It was 
gallantly met by Gen. Burns’s brigade, supported and rein¬ 
forced by two lines in reserve, and finally by the N. Y. 69th, 
Hazzard’s and Pettit’s batteries again doing good service. 
Osborn’s and Bramhall’s batteries also took part effectively 
in this action, which was continued with great obstinacy 
until between eight and nine p.m., when the enemy were 
driven from the field. 

Immediately after the battle the orders were repeated 
for all the troops to fall back and cross White Oak Swamp, 
which was accomplished during the night in good order. 
By midnight all the troops were on the road to White Oak 
Swamp bridge, Gen. French, with his brigade, acting as 
rear-guard, and at five A.M. on the 30th all had crossed and 
the bridge was destroyed. 

On the afternoon of the 29th I gave to the corps com¬ 
manders their instructions for the operations of the follow¬ 
ing day. Porter’s corps was to move forward to James 
river, and, with the corps of Gen. Keyes, to occupy a posi¬ 
tion at or near Turkey Bend, on a line perpendicular to the 
river, thus covering the Charles City road to Richmond, 
opening communication with the gunboats, and covering 
the passage of the supply-trains, which were pushed forward 
as rapidly as possible upon Haxall’s plantation. The remain¬ 
ing corps were pressed onward, and posted so as to guard 
the approaches from Richmond, as well as the crossings of 
the White Oak Swamp over which the army had passed. 
Gen. Franklin was ordered to hold the passage of White 


- 195 — 


McClellan's Own Story 


Oak Swamp bridge, and cover the withdrawal of the trains 
from that point. His command consisted of his own corps, 
with Gen. Richardson's division and Gen. Naglee's brigade, 
placed under his orders for the occasion. Gen. Slocum's 
division was on the right of the Charles City road. 

On the morning of the 30th I again gave to the corps 
commanders within reach instructions for posting their 
troops. I found that, notwithstanding all the efforts of my 
personal staff and other officers, the roads were blocked by 
wagons, and there was great difficulty in keeping the trains 
in motion. 

The engineer officers whom I had sent forward on the 
28th to reconnoitre the roads had neither returned nor sent 
me any reports or guides. Gen. Keyes and Porter had been 
delayed—one by losing the road, and the other by repairing 
an old road—and had not been able to send any information. 
We then knew of but one road for the movement of the troops 
and our immense trains. 

It was therefore necessary to post the troops in ad¬ 
vance of this road as well as our limited knowledge of the 
ground permitted, so as to cover the movement of the trains 
in the rear. 

I then examined the whole line from the swamp to the 
left, giving final instructions for the posting of the troops 
and the obstruction of the roads towards Richmond, and all 
corps commanders were directed to hold their positions until 
the trains had passed, after which a more concentrated posi¬ 
tion was to be taken up near the James river. 

Our force was too small to occupy and hold the entire 
line from the White Oak Swamp to the river, exposed, as 
it was, to be taken in reverse by a movement across the 
lower part of the swamp, or across the Chickahominy below 
the swamp. Moreover, the troops were then greatly ex¬ 
hausted, and required rest in a more secure position. 

I extended my examinations of the country as far as 
Haxall’s, looking at all the approaches to Malvern, which 
position I perceived to be the key to our operations in this 
quarter, and was thus enabled to expedite very considerably 


— 196 — 


The Seven Days 

the passage of the trains and to rectify the positions of the 
troops. 

Everything being then quiet, I sent aids to the different 
corps commanders to inform them what I had done on the 
left, and to bring me information of the condition of affairs 
on the right. I returned from Malvern to Haxall’s, and, 
having made arrangements for instant communication from 
Malvern by signals, went on board of Com. Rodgers’s gun¬ 
boat, lying near, to confer with him in reference to the con¬ 
dition of our supply-vessels and the state of things on the 
river. It was his opinion that it would be necessary for the 
army to fall back to a position below City Point, as the chan¬ 
nel there was so near the southern shore that it would not 
be possible to bring up the transports, should the enemy 
occupy it. Harrison’s Landing was, in his opinion, the near¬ 
est suitable point. Upon the termination of this interview 
I returned to Malvern Hill, and remained there until shortly 
before daylight. 

On the morning of the 30th Gen. Sumner was ordered 
to march with Sedgwick’s division to Glendale (“Nelson’s 
farm”). Gen. McCall’s division (Pennsylvania reserves) 
was halted during the morning on the New Market road, 
just in advance of the point where the road turns off to 
Quaker church. This line was formed perpendicularly to 
the New Market road, with Meade’s brigade on the right, 
Seymour’s on the left, and Reynolds’s brigade, commanded 
by Col. S. G. Simmons, of the 5th Penn., in reserve; Randall’s 
regular battery on the right, Kern’s and Cooper’s batteries 
opposite the centre, and Dietrich’s and Kauerhem’s batter¬ 
ies of the artillery reserve on the left—all in front of the 
infantry line. The country in Gen. McCall’s front was an 
open field, intersected towards the right by the New Market 
road and a small strip of timber parallel to it; the open front 
was about eight hundred yards, its depth about one thou¬ 
sand yards. 

On the morning of the 30th Gen. Heintzelman ordered 
the bridge at Brackett’s ford to be destroyed, and trees to 
be felled across that road and the Charles City road. Gen. 
Slocum’s division was to extend to the Charles City road: 


— 197 — 


McClellan's Own Story 


Gen. Kearny’s left to connect with Gen. Slocum’s left; Gen. 
McCall’s position was to the left of the Long bridge road, in 
connection with Gen. Kearny’s left; Gen. Hooker was on the 
left of Gen. McCall. Between twelve and one o’clock the 
enemy opened a fierce cannonade upon the divisions of Smith 
and Richardson and Naglee’s brigade at White Oak Swamp 
bridge. This artillery-fire was continued by the enemy 
through the day, and he crossed some infantry below our 
position. Richardson’s division suffered severely. Captain 
Ayres directed our artillery with great effect. Capt. Haz- 
zard’s battery, after losing many cannoneers, and Capt. Haz- 
zard being mortally wounded, was compelled to retire. It 
was replaced by Pettit’s battery, which partially silenced the 
enemy’s guns. 

Gen. Franklin held his position until after dark, re¬ 
peatedly driving back the enemy in their attempt to cross 
the White Oak Swamp. 

At two o’clock in the day the enemy were reported ad¬ 
vancing in force by the Charles City road, and at half-past 
two o’clock the attack was made down the road on Gen. 
Slocum’s left, but was checked by his artillery. After this 
the enemy, in large force, comprising the divisions of Long- 
street and A. P. Hill, attacked Gen. McCall, whose division, 
after severe fighting, was compelled to retire. 

Gen. McCall, in his report of the battle, says: 

“About half-past two my pickets were driven in by a strong ad¬ 
vance, after some skirmishing, without loss on our part. 

“At three o’clock the enemy sent forward a regiment on the left 
centre and another on the right centre to feel for a weak point. They 
were under cover of a shower of shells and boldly advanced, but were 
both driven back—on the left by the 12th regiment, and on the right 
by the 7th regiment. 

“For nearly two hours the battle raged hotly here. ... At 
last the enemy was compelled to retire before the well-directed mus¬ 
ketry-fire of the reserves. The German batteries were driven to the 
rear, but I rode up and sent them back. It was, however, of little 
avail, and they were soon after abandoned by the cannoneers. . . . 

“The batteries in front of the centre were boldly charged upon, 
but the enemy was speedily forced back. . . . 

“Soon after this a most determined charge was made on Randall’s 
battery by a full brigade, advancing in wedge-shape without order, 
but in perfect recklessness. Somewhat similar charges had, I have 
stated, been previously made on Cooper’s and Kern’s batteries by 
single regiments, without success, they having recoiled before the 


— 198 — 


The Seven Days 

storm of canister hurled against them. A like result was anticipated 
by Randall's battery, and the 4th regiment was requested not to fire 
until the battery had done with them. 

“Its gallant commander did not doubt his ability to repel the 
attack, and his guns did, indeed, mow down the advancing host; but 
still the gaps were closed, and the enemy came in upon a run to the 
very muzzles of his guns. 

“It was a perfect torrent of men, and they were in his battery 
before the guns could be removed. Two guns that were, indeed, suc¬ 
cessfully limbered had their horses killed and wounded, and were over¬ 
turned on the spot, and the enemy, dashing past, drove the greater part 
of the 4th regiment before them. 

“The left company (B), nevertheless, stood its ground, with its 
captain, Fred A. Conrad, as did likewise certain men of other com¬ 
panies. I had ridden into the regiment and endeavored to check them, 
but with only partial success. . . . 

“There was no running. But my division, reduced by the pre¬ 
vious battles to less than six thousand (6,000), had to contend with the 
divisions of Longstreet and A. P. Hill, considered two of the strongest 
and best among many of the Confederate army, numbering that day 
18,000 or 20,000 men, and it was reluctantly compelled to give way 
before heavier force accumulated upon them. . . . ” 

Gen. Heintzelman states that about five o’clock p.m. 
Gen. McCall’s division was attacked in large force, evidently 
the principal attack; that in less than an hour the division 
gave way, and adds: 

“Gen. Hooker, being on his left, by moving to his right repulsed 
the rebels in the handsomest manner with great slaughter. Gen. 
Sumner, who was with Gen. Sedgwick in McCall’s rear, also greatly 
aided with his artillery and infantry in driving back the enemy. They 
now renewed their attack with vigor on Gen. Kearny’s left, and were 
again repulsed with heavy loss. . . . 

“This attack commenced about four P.M., and was pushed by heavy 
masses with the utmost determination and vigor. Capt. Thompson’s 
battery, directed with great precision, firing double charges, swept 
them back. The whole open space, two hundred paces wide, was filled 
with the enemy; each repulse brought fresh troops. The third attack 
was only repulsed by the rapid volleys and determined charge of the 
63d Penn., Col. Hays, and half of the 37th N. Y. Volunteers.” 

Gen. McCall’s troops soon began to emerge from the 
woods into the open field. Several batteries were in position 
and began to fire into the woods over the heads of our men 
in front. Capt. De Russy’s battery was placed on the right 
of Gen. Sumner’s artillery, with orders to shell the woods. 
Gen. Burns’s brigade was then advanced to meet the enemy, 
and soon drove him back. Other troops began to return 
from the White Oak Swamp. Late in the day, at the call 
of Gen. Kearny, Gen. Taylor’s 1st N. J. brigade, Slocum’s 


— 199 — 


McClellan's Own Story 


division, was sent to occupy a portion of Gen. McCall's de¬ 
serted position, a battery accompanying the brigade. They 
soon drove back the enemy, who shortly after gave up the 
attack, contenting themselves with keeping up a desultory 
tiring till late at night. Between twelve and one o'clock at 
night Gen. Heintzelman commenced to withdraw his corps, 
and soon after daylight both of his divisions, with Gen. Slo¬ 
cum’s division and a portion of Gen. Sumner's command, 
reached Malvern Hill. 

On the morning of the 30th Gen. Sumner, in obedience 
to orders, had moved promptly to Glendale, and upon a call 
from Gen. Franklin for reinforcements sent him two brigades 
which returned in time to participate and render good ser¬ 
vice in the battle near Glendale. Gen. Sumner says of this 
battle: 

“The battle of Glendale was the most severe action since the 
battle of Fair Oaks. About three o’clock p.m. the action commenced, 
and after a furious contest, lasting till after dark, the enemy was 
routed at all points and driven from the field.” 

The rear of the supply-trains and the reserve artillery 
of the army reached Malvern Hill about four P.M. At about 
this time the enemy began to appear in Gen. Porter's front, 
and at five o'clock advanced in large force against his left 
flank, posting artillery under cover of a skirt of timber, 
with a view to engage our force on Malvern Hill, while his 
infantry and some artillery attacked Col. Warren’s brigade. 
A concentrated fire of about thirty guns was brought to 
bear on the enemy, which, with the infantry-fire of Col. 
Warren’s command, compelled him to retreat, leaving two 
guns in the hands of Col. Warren. The gunboats rendered 
most efficient aid at this time, and helped to drive back the 
enemy. 

It was very late at night before my aides returned to 
give me the results of the day’s fighting along the whole 
line and the true position of affairs. While waiting to hear 
from Gen. Franklin, before sending orders to Gens. Sumner 
and Heintzelman, I received a message from the latter that 
Gen. Franklin was falling back; whereupon I sent Col. Col¬ 
burn, of my staff, with orders to verify this, and, if it were 


— 200 — 


The Seven Days 

true, to order in Gens. Sumner and Heintzelman at once. He 
had not gone far when he met two officers sent from Gen. 
Franklin’s headquarters with the information that he was 
falling back. Orders were then sent to Gens. Sumner and 
Heintzelman to fall back also, and definite instructions were 
given as to the movement which was to commence on the 
right. The orders met these troops already en route to 
Malvern. Instructions were also sent to Gen. Franklin as 
to the route he was to follow. 

Gen. Barnard then received full instructions for posting 
the troops as they arrived. 

I then returned to Haxall’s, and again left for Malvern 
soon after daybreak. Accompanied by several general offi¬ 
cers, I once more made the entire circuit of the position, and 
then returned to Haxall’s, whence I went with Com. Rodgers 
to select the final location for the army and its depots. I 
returned to Malvern before the serious fighting commenced, 
and after riding along the lines, and seeing most cause to 
feel anxious about the right, remained in that vicinity. 

The position selected for resisting the further advance 
of the enemy on the 1st of July was with the left and centre 
of our lines resting on Malvern Hill, while the right curved 
backwards through a wooded country towards a point be¬ 
low Haxall’s, on James river. Malvern Hill is an elevated 
plateau about a mile and a half by three-fourths of a mile 
in area, well cleared of timber, and with several converging 
roads running over it. In front are numerous defensible 
ravines, and the ground slopes gradually towards the north 
and east to the woodland, giving clear ranges for artillery in 
those directions. Towards the northwest the plateau falls 
off more abruptly into a ravine which extends to James 
river. From the position of the enemy his most obvious 
lines of attack would come from the direction of Richmond 
and White Oak Swamp, and would almost of necessity strike 
us upon our left wing. Here, therefore, the lines were 
strengthened by massing the troops and collecting the prin¬ 
cipal part of the artillery. Porter’s corps held the left of 
the line (Sykes’s division on the left, Morell’s on the right), 
with the artillery of his two divisions advantageously posted, 


- 201 — 


McClellan's Own Story 


and the artillery of the reserve so disposed on the high 
ground that a concentrated fire of some sixty guns could be 
brought to bear on any point in his front or left. Col. 
Tyler also had, with great exertion, succeeded in getting ten 
of his siege-guns in position on the highest point of the hill. 

Couch’s division was placed on the right of Porter; next 
came Kearny and Hooker; next Sedgwick and Richardson; 
next Smith and Slocum; then the remainder of Keyes’s corps, 
extending by a backward curve nearly to the river. The 
Pennsylvania reserve corps was held in reserve, and sta¬ 
tioned behind Porter’s and Couch’s position. One brigade 
of Porter’s was thrown to the left on the low ground to 
protect that flank from any movement direct from the Rich¬ 
mond road. The line was very strong along the whole front 
of the open plateau, but from thence to the extreme right 
the troops were more deployed. This formation was im¬ 
perative, as an attack would probably be made upon our left. 
The right was rendered as secure as possible by slashing the 
timber and by barricading the roads. Com. Rodgers, com¬ 
manding the flotilla on James river, placed his gunboats so 
as to protect our flank and to command the approaches from 
Richmond. 

Between nine and ten a.m. the enemy commenced feel¬ 
ing along our whole left wing, with its artillery and skir¬ 
mishers, as far to the right as Hooker’s division. 

About two o’clock a column of the enemy was observed 
moving towards our right, within the skirt of woods in front 
of Heintzelman’s corps, but beyond the range of our artil¬ 
lery. Arrangements were at once made to meet the antici¬ 
pated attack in that quarter; but, though the column was 
long, occupying more than two hours in passing, it disap¬ 
peared and was not again heard of. The presumption is 
that it retired by the rear, and participated in the attack 
afterwards made on our left. 

About three P.M. a heavy fire of artillery opened on 
Kearny’s left and Couch’s division, speedily followed up by 
a brisk attack of infantry on Couch’s front. The artillery 
was replied to with good effect by our own, and the in¬ 
fantry of Couch’s division remained lying on the ground 


— 202 — 


Malvern Hill 


until the advancing column was within short musket-range, 
when they sprang to their feet and poured in a deadly volley 
which entirely broke the attacking force and drove them in 
disorder back over their own ground. This advantage was 
followed up until we had advanced the right of our line 
some seven or eight hundred yards, and rested upon a thick 
clump of trees, giving us a stronger position and a better 
fire. 

Shortly after four o’clock the firing ceased along the 
whole front, but no disposition was evinced on the part of 
the enemy to withdraw from the field. Caldwell’s brigade, 
having been detached from Richardson’s division, was sta¬ 
tioned upon Couch’s right by Gen. Porter, to whom he had 
been ordered to report. The whole line was surveyed by 
the general, and everything held in readiness to meet the 
coming attack. At six o’clock the enemy suddenly opened 
upon Couch and Porter with the whole strength of his ar¬ 
tillery, and at once began pushing forward his columns of 
attack to carry the hill. Brigade after brigade, formed 
under cover of the woods, started at a run to cross the open 
space and charge our batteries, but the heavy fire of our 
guns, with the cool and steady volleys of our infantry, in 
every case sent them reeling back to shelter and covered the 
ground with their dead and wounded. In several instances 
our infantry withheld their fire until the attacking column, 
which rushed through the storm of canister and shell from 
our artillery, had reached within a few yards of our lines. 
They then poured in a single volley and dashed forward with 
the bayonet, capturing prisoners and colors, and driving the 
routed columns in confusion from the field. 

About seven o’clock, as fresh troops were accumulating 
in front of Porter and Couch, Meagher and Sickles were sent 
with their brigades, as soon as it was considered prudent 
to withdraw any portion of Sumner’s and Heintzelman’s 
troops, to reinforce that part of the line and hold the posi¬ 
tion. These brigades relieved such regiments of Porter’s 
corps and Couch’s division as had expended their ammuni¬ 
tion, and batteries from the reserve were pushed forward to 
replace those whose boxes were empty. Until dark the ene- 


— 203 — 


McClellan's Own Story 


my persisted in his efforts to take the position so tenaciously 
defended; but, despite his vastly superior numbers, his re¬ 
peated and desperate attacks were repulsed with fearful 
loss, and darkness ended the battle of Malvern Hill, though 
it was not until after nine o’clock that the artillery ceased 
its fire. The result was complete victory. 

During the whole battle Com. Rodgers added greatly 
to the discomfiture of the enemy by throwing shell among 
his reserves and advancing columns. 

It was necessary to fall back still further, in order to 
reach a point where our supplies could be brought to us 
with certainty. As before stated, in the opinion of Com. 
Rodgers, commanding the gunboat flotilla, this could only be 
done below City Point; concurring in his opinion, I selected 
Harrison’s Bar as the new position of the army. The ex¬ 
haustion of our supplies of food, forage, and ammunition 
made it imperative to reach the transports immediately. 

The greater portion of the transportation of the army 
having been started for Harrison’s Landing during the 
night of the 30th of June and 1st of July, the order for the 
movement of the troops was at once issued upon the final 
repulse of the enemy at Malvern Hill. The order prescribed 
a movement by the left and rear, Gen. Keyes’s corps to cover 
the manoeuvre. It was not carried out in detail as regards 
the division on the left, the roads being somewhat blocked 
by the rear of our trains. Porter and Couch were not able 
to move out as early as had been anticipated, and Porter 
found it necessary to place a rear-guard between his com¬ 
mand and the enemy. Col. Averill, of the 3d Penn. Cavalry, 
was entrusted with this* delicate duty. He had under his 
command his own regiment and Lieut.-Col. Buchanan’s bri¬ 
gade of regular infantry and one battery. By a judicious 
use of the resources at his command he deceived the enemy 
so as to cover the withdrawal of the left wing without being 
attacked, remaining himself on the previous day’s battle¬ 
field until about seven o’clock of the 2d of July. Meantime 
Gen. Keyes, having received his orders, commenced vigorous 
preparations for covering the movement of the entire army 
and protecting the trains. It being evident that the im- 


— 204 — 


Harrison’s Landing 


mense number of wagons and artillery-carriages pertaining 
to the army could not move with celerity along a single road, 
Gen. Keyes took advantage of every accident of the ground 
to open new avenues and to facilitate the movement. He 
made preparations for obstructing the roads after the army 
had passed, so as to prevent any rapid pursuit, destroying 
effectually Turkey bridge, on the main road, and rendering 
other roads and approaches temporarily impassable by fell¬ 
ing trees across them. He kept the trains well closed up, 
and directed the march so that the troops could move on each 
side of the roads, not obstructing the passage, but being in 
good position to repel an attack from any quarter. His dis¬ 
positions were so successful that, to use his own words, “I 
do not think more vehicles or more public property were 
abandoned on the march from Turkey bridge than would 
have been left, in the same state of the roads, if the army 
had been moving toward the enemy instead of away from 
him. And when it is understood that the carriages and 
teams belonging to this army, stretched out in one line, would 
extend not far from forty miles, the energy and caution 
necessary for their safe withdrawal from the presence of an 
enemy vastly superior in numbers will be appreciated.” 
The last of the wagons did not reach the site selected at Har¬ 
rison’s Bar until after dark on the 3d of July, and the rear¬ 
guard did not move into their camp until everything was 
secure. The enemy followed up with a small force, and on 
the 3d threw a few shells at the rear-guard, but were quickly 
dispersed by our batteries and the fire of the gunboats. 

Great credit must be awarded to Gen. Keyes for the 
skill and energy which characterized his performance of the 
important and delicate duties entrusted to his charge. 

High praise is also due to the officers and men of the 
1st Conn. Artillery, Col. Tyler, for the manner in which they 
withdrew all the heavy guns during the Seven Days and 
from Malvern Hill. Owing to the crowded state of the roads 
the teams could not be brought within a couple of miles of 
the position, but these energetic soldiers removed the guns 
by hand for that distance, leaving nothing behind. 


— 205 — 


McClellan's Own Story 


So long as life lasts the survivors of those glorious days 
will remember with quickened pulse the attitude of that army 
when it reached the goal for which it had striven with such 
transcendent heroism. Exhausted, depleted in numbers, 
bleeding at every pore, but still proud and defiant, and 
strong in the consciousness of a great feat of arms heroically 
accomplished, it stood ready to renew the struggle with un¬ 
diminished ardor whenever its commander should give the 
word. It was one of those magnificent episodes which dig¬ 
nify a nation's history and are fit subjects for the grandest 
efforts of the poet and the painter.* 

This movement was now successfully accomplished, and 
the Army of the Potomac was at last in position on its true 
line of operations, with its trains intact, no guns lost save 
those taken in battle when the artillerists had proved their 
heroism and devotion by standing to their guns until the 
enemy's infantry were in their midst. 

During the Seven Days the Army of the Potomac con¬ 
sisted of 143 regiments of infantry, 55 batteries, and less 
than 8 regiments of cavalry all told. The opposing Confed¬ 
erate army consisted of 187 regiments of infantry, 79 bat¬ 
teries, and 14 regiments of cavalry. The losses of the two 
armies from June 25 to July 2 were: 

Killed Wounded Missing Total 

Confederate Army_2,823 13,703 3,223 19,749 

Army of the Potomac 1,734 8,062 6.053 15,849 

The Confederate losses in killed and wounded alone were 
greater than the total losses of the Army of the Potomac in 
killed, wounded, and missing. 

No praise can be too great for the officers and men who 
passed through these seven days of battle, enduring fatigue 
without a murmur, successfully meeting and repelling every 
attack made upon them, always in the right place at the 

*In the evening, before his sudden death in the night, Gen. McClel¬ 
lan had been occupied in preparing, from his memoirs, an article for 
the Century Mazazine. Among the manuscript, which we found next 
morning lying as he left it, the paragraph above, commencing with 
the words, “So long as life lasts,” appeared to be the last work of his 
pen. The last words he wrote were thus this final expression of his 
admiration for the Army of the Potomac. I have thought fit to insert 
them here. W. C. P. 


— 206 — 




Harrison's Landing 

right time, and emerging from the fiery ordeal a compact 
army of veterans, equal to any task that brave and discip¬ 
lined men can be called upon to undertake. They needed 
now only a few days of well-earned repose, a renewal of am¬ 
munition and supplies, and reinforcements to fill the gaps 
made in their ranks by so many desperate encounters, to be 
prepared to advance again, with entire confidence, to meet 
their worthy antagonists in other battles. It was, how¬ 
ever, decided by the authorities at Washington, against my 
earnest remonstrances, to abandon the position on the James, 
and the campaign. The Army of the Potomac was accord¬ 
ingly withdrawn. 

It was not until two years later that it again found it¬ 
self under its last commander at substantially the same 
point on the bank of the James. It was as evident in 1862 
as in 1865 that there was the true defence of Washington, 
and that it was on the banks of the James that the fate of 
the Union was to be decided. 


— 207 — 


CHAPTER XXVII 

Private Letters 
[June 26 to Aug. 23, 1862] 

June 26, 2 p.m., Trent's .— . . . Yesterday I wished to advance our 
picket-line, and met with a good deal of opposition. We succeeded 
fully, however, and gained the point with but little loss. The enemy 
fought pretty hard, but our men did better. I was out there all day 
taking personal direction of affairs, and remained there until about 
5:30 p.m., when I returned to camp, and met on my way the news that 
Stonewall Jackson was on his way to attack my right and rear. I rode 
over to Porter’s soon after I reached camp, and returned about 2:30 
A.M. At three I started off again and went to the front, where an at¬ 
tack was expected by some. Finding all quiet, I rode all along the 
lines and returned here. You may imagine that I am rather tired 
out. I think that Jackson will attempt to attack our rear. . . . 

Have just received the positive information that Jackson is en 
route to take us in rear. You probably will not hear for some days; 
but do not be at all worried. . . . 

Gen. McClellan's headquarter's, June 26, 1862—Telegram, in ci¬ 
pher, care of Mr. Eckert, ivho will regard it as private and strictly 
confidential, and forward it privately to my wife .— Dear Nell: I 
may not be able to telegraph or write to you for some days. There 
will be a great stampede, but do not be alarmed. There will be severe 
fighting in a day or two, but you may be sure that your husband 
will not disgrace you, and I am confident that God will smile upon 
my efforts and give our arms success. You will hear that we are 
pursued, annihilated, etc. Do not believe it, but trust that success 
will crown our efforts. I tell you this, darling, only to guard against 
the agony you would feel if you trusted the newspaper reports. . . . 

Telegram —June 27, 1:15 p.m.—H eavy firing in all directions. So 
far we have repulsed them everywhere. I expect wires to be cut any 
moment. All well and very busy. Cannot write to-day. 

Telegram— McClellan's Headquarters, June 27.—Have had a ter¬ 
rible fight against vastly superior numbers. Have generally held 
our own, and we may thank God that the Army of the Potomac has 
not lost its honor. It is impossible as yet to tell what the result is. 

I am well, but tired out; no sleep for two nights, and none to-night. 
God bless you! 

Telegram— McClellan's Headquarters, June 28.—We are all well 
to-night. I fear your uncle has been seriously hurt in the terrible 
fight of yesterday. They have outnumbered us everwhere, but we 
have not lost our honor. This army has acted magnificently. I 
thank my friends in Washington for our repulse. 

June 29, 3 P.M., in the field. — I send you only a line to say that I 
still think God is with us. We have fought a terrible battle against 
overwhelming numbers. We held our own, and history will show 
that I have done all that man can do. . . . 

June 30, 7 p.m., Turkey bridge. —Well, but worn out; no sleep for 
many days. We have been fighting for many days, and are still at 
it. ... We have fought every day for five days. . . . 


— 208 — 


Private Letters 


July 1, Haxall’s Plantation. — . . . The whole army is here; worn 
out and war worn, after a week of daily battles. I have still very 
great confidence in them, and they in me. The dear fellows cheer me 
as of old as they march to certain death, and I feel prouder of them 
than ever. 

July 2, ... Berkley, James river. — ... I have only energy 

enough left to scrawl you a few lines to say that I have the whole 
army here, with all its material and guns. We are all worn out and 
haggard. . . . My men need repose, and I hope will be allowed to 
enjoy it to-morrow. . . . Your poor uncle was killed at the battle of 
Gaines’s Mills on Friday last. We are well, but very tired. . . . 

July 2, 11 p.m. —I will now take a few moments from the rest 
which I really need, and write at least a few words. . . . We have 
had a terrible time. On Wednesday the serious work commenced. 
I commenced driving the enemy on our left, and, by hard fighting, 
gained my point. Before that affair was over, I received news that 
Jackson was probably about to attack my right. I galloped back to 
camp, took a fresh horse, and went over to Porter’s camp, where I 
remained all night making the best arrangements I could, and re¬ 
turned about daybreak to look out for the left. On Thursday after¬ 
noon Jackson began his attack on McCall, who was supported by 
Porter. Jackson being repulsed, I went over there in the afternoon 
and remained until two or three A.M. I was satisfied that Jackson 
would have force enough next morning to turn Porter’s right, so I 
removed all the wagons, heavy guns, etc., during the night, and 
caused Porter to fall back to a point nearer the force on the other 
side of the Chickahominy. This was most hansomely effected, all 
our material being saved. The next day Porter was attacked in his 
new position by the whole force of Jackson, Longstreet, Ewell, Hill, 
and Whiting. I sent what supports I could, but was at the same 
time attacked on my own front, and could only spare seven brigades. 
With these we held our own at all points after most desperate fight, 
ing. It was on this day that your poor uncle [Col. Rossell] was 
killed, gallatitly leading his regiment. He was struck in the breast, 
and died in a few hours. Clitz fell that day also. John Reynolds 
was taken prisoner. I was forced that night to withdraw Porter’s 
force to my side of the Chickahominy, and therefrom to make a very 
dangerous and difficult movement to reach the James river. I must 
say good-night, now, for I am very tired, and may require all mjf ener¬ 
gies for to-morrow. 

July 4, Berkley. — . . . You will understand before this reaches 
you the glorious yet fearful events which have prevented me from 
writing. We have fine weather to-day, which is drying the ground 
rapidly. I was quite stampeded yesterday just before your father 
left. A report came to me that the enemy were advancing in over¬ 
whelming numbers, and that none of my orders for placing the troops 
in position and reorganizing them had been carried out. I at once 
rode through the camps, clear in front of them, to let them see that 
there was no danger. They began to cheer as usual, and called out 
that they were all right and would fall to the last man “for Little 
Mac!” I saw where the trouble was, halted all the commands, looked 
at the ground, and made up my mind what the true position was. 
Started Smith at a double-quick to seize the key-point, followed by 
a battery of horse-artillery at a gallop. They went up most beauti¬ 
fully, opened on the enemy, drove him off after eighteen rounds, and 
finally held the place. I pushed Slocum’s division up in support, 


— 209 — 


McClellan’s Own Story 


hurried off Heintzelman’s corps to take its position on Franklin’s 
left, supported by Keyes still further to the left, and came back to 
camp a little before dark with a light heart for the first time in 
many days. I am ready for an attack now; give me twenty-four 
hours even, and I will defy all secession. The movement has been a 
magnificent one; I have saved all our material, have fought every day 
for a week, and marched every night. You can’t tell how nervous 
I became; everything seemed like the opening of artillery, and I had 
no rest, no peace, except when in front of my men. The duties of 
my position are such as often to make it necessary for me to re¬ 
main in the rear. It is an awful thing. 

I have re-established the playing of bands, beating the calls, etc., 
by way of keeping the men in good spirits, and have ordered the 
national salute to be fired to-day at noon from the camp of each 
corps. I have some more official letters to write so I must close this, 
and must soon start to ride around the lines. 

July — , Monday, 7:30 a.m. —I have had a good, refreshing night’s 
sleep. . . . We are to have another very hot day; it is already ap¬ 
parent. I am writing in my shirt-sleeves and with tent-walls raised, 
etc. . . . Our army has not been repulsed; we fought every day 
against greatly superior numbers, and were obliged to retire at night 
to new positions that we could hold against fresh troops. The army 
behaved magnificently; nothing could have been finer than its con¬ 
duct. . . . 

July 8.— . . . The day is insufferably hot, intense, so much so 
that I have suspended all work on the part of the men. I have writ¬ 
ten a strong, frank letter to the President, which I send by your father. 
If he acts upon it the country will be saved. I will send you a copy 
to-morrow, as well as of the other important letters which I wish 
you to keep as my record. They will show, with the others you have, 
that I was true to my country, that I understood the state of affairs 
long ago, and that had my advice been followed we should not have 
been in our present difficulties. ... I have done the best I could. 
God has disposed of events as to Him seemed best. I submit to His 
decrees with perfect cheerfulness, and as sure as He rules I believe 
that all will yet be for the best. . . . 

Midnight. —Everything is quiet now; none awake save the sen¬ 
tinels# I am alone with you and the Almighty, whose good and power¬ 
ful hand has saved me and my army. The terrible moments I have 
undergone of late I regard as a part of the cross I have to bear, and, 
with God’s help, will endure to the end when my task is finished. 
I place myself in His hands, and with a sincere heart say His will 
be done. Oh! how ardently I pray for rest. Rest with you. I care 
not where, only that I may be alone with you. We are to have ser¬ 
vice at headquarters to-morrow morning, and I will endeavor to have 
it every Sunday hereafter.* 


*The following order will be read with interest in this connection: 
General Orders, No. 7. 

Headquarters, Army of the Potomac, 
Washington, Sept. 6, 1861. 

The major-general commanding desires and requests that in 
future there may be a more perfect respect for the Sabbath on the 
part of his command. 


— 210 — 



Private Letters 


July 9, 9:30 p.m., Berkley. — I telegraphed you briefly this after¬ 
noon that I thought Secesh had retired. This opinion seems to be 
fully confirmed, at least to the extent of his having fallen back a 
certain distance. He is not within six or seven miles of us even 
with his cavalry, and considerably further with his infantry. I am 
not sorry, on the whole, that he has gone, for the reason that it will 
enable my men to rest tranquilly—just what they need. I do not 
expect to receive many reinforcements for some time. Even Burn¬ 
side’s men are halted at Fortress Monroe by order of the President. 
His excellency was here yesterday and left this morning. He found 
the army anything but demoralized or dispirited; in excellent spirits. 
I do not know to what extent he has profited by his visit; not much, 
I fear. I will enclose with this a copy of a letter I handed him, which 
I would be glad to have you preserve carefully as a very important 
record. . . . My camp is now immediately on the banks of the James 
river, in the woods. . . . 

7 a.m. (10th ).— . . . Rose a little before six. ... I do not know 
what paltry trick the administration will play next. ... I have 
h'onestly done the best I could. I shall leave it to others to decide 
whether that was the best that could have been done," and, if they 
find any one who can do better, am perfectly willing to step aside 
and give way. I would not for worlds go through that horrid work 
again, when with my heart full of care, I had to meet everybody with a 
cheerful smile and look as lighthearted as though nothing were at 
stake. . . . 

Telegram— Berkely , July 10, 1862.—We are all very well and in 
good spirits. Secesh has gone off and left us for the present. Clitz 
is certainly in Richmond, recovering from his wounds. If properly 
supported I will yet take Richmond. Am not in the least discouraged; 
am in better health than for many months. Your father returned 
to Washington two days ago. 

July 12.—I am sure that God will bring us together again in 
this world; but, whether so or not, we will try to so live that we may 
be reunited in that world where we can be happy for ever and never 
again be parted. ... In this weary world I. have seen but little 
happiness save what I have enjoyed with you. How very happy our 
first year of married life was, when we were together! So the baby 
has more teeth! I suppose when I come back I shall find her hand¬ 
ling a knife and fork. When will she begin to say a word or two? 
I hope she will not begin to do much before I come home. I want 
to have the fun and satisfaction of watching her progress in life 


We are fighting in a holy cause, and should endeavor to deserve 
the benign favor of the Creator. 

Unless in the case of an attack by the enemy, or some other ex¬ 
treme military necessity, it is commended to commanding officers that 
all work shall be suspended on the Sabbath; that no unnecessary 
movements shall be made on that day; that the men shall, as far as 
possible, be permitted to rest from their labors; that they shall attend 
divine service after the customary Sunday morning inspection, and 
that officers and men shall alike use their influence to insure the 
utmost decorum and quiet on that day. The general commanding 
regards this as no idle form; one day’s rest in seven is necessary to 
men and animals; more than this, the observance of the holy day of 
the God of Mercy and of Battles is our sacred duty. 

George B. McClellan, 

Maj.-Gen. Commanding. 


— 211 — 



McClellan’s Own Story 


and the development of her accomplishments. ... I enclose with 
this a letter from Stanton and my reply, which I want you to pre¬ 
serve very carefully with my other “archives,” as it may be impor¬ 
tant. *. . . 

July 13, Sunday , 7:45 a.m. —I have ordered all labor suspended 
to-day to give the men a chance to think of all they have gone through. 
We are to have service to-day by the chaplain of Gregg’s regiment 
Penn, cavalry. Next Sunday I think I will invite Mr. Neal to preach 
for us, provided there is any attendance to-day. 

I enclose this in an envelope with some letters I send you; one from 
Bishop Mcllvaine, which will gratify you, I know; another from 
some poor fellow in Indiana who has named his child after me. If 
you choose to send out some little present to it, well and good. 

1:30 p.m. — . . . Had service this morning by the chaplain of 
Gregg’s regiment, the Rev. Mr. Egan, an Episcopal clergyman of 
Philadelphia. . . . There never was such an army; but there have 
been plenty of better generals. When I spoke about being repulsed 
I meant our failure to take Richmond. In no battle were we re¬ 
pulsed. We always at least held our own on the field, if we did not 
beat them. ... I still hope to get to Richmond this summer, unless 
the government commits some extraordinarily idiotic act; but I have 
no faith in the administration, and shall cut loose from public life 
the very moment my country can dispense with my services. Don’t 
be alarmed about the climate. It is not at all bad yet, and we are 
resting splendidly. The men look better every day. So you want 
to know how I feel about Stanton, and what I think of him now? 
I will tell you with the most perfect frankness. I think ... I may 
do the man injustice. God grant that I may be wrong! For I hate 
to think that humanity can sink so low. But my opinion is just as 
I have told you. He has deceived me once; he never will again. Are 
you satisfied now, lady mine? I ever will hereafter trust your judg¬ 
ment about men. Your woman’s tact and your pure heart make you 
a better judge than my dull apprehension. I remember what you 
thought of Stanton when you first saw him. I thought you were 
wrong. I now know you were right. Enough of the creature! 

Since I reached here I have received about 8,500 or 9,000 fresh 
troops. My losses in the battles will not be over 12,000. Burnside 
has 8,000 (about) at Fortress Monroe, where he was detained by 
order of the President. He has been in Washington and will prob¬ 
ably be here himself to-night when I will know the views of the 
President. The probability is that I will attack again very soon—as 
soon as some losses are supplied. I also wish to get off all the sick 
and wounded. 

11:30 p.m.— Have just been at work dictating my report of the 
recent operations; got as far as bringing Porter back across the 

Chickahominy. . . . Please reply to Mr. - and say that I thank 

him and feel deeply grateful for his trust and kind feeling, and that 
I am glad to say that there is no reason for despondency on account 
of my present position. I flatter myself that this army is a greater 
thorn in the side of the rebellion than ever, and I most certainly 
(with God’s blessing) intend to take Richmond with it. ... I trust 
that we have passed through our darkest time, and that God will 
smile upon us and give us victory. . . . 


— 212 — 



HISTORY OF THE 
ENGINEER BATTALION 


A paper read before the 
“Essayons Club ” of the Corps of Engineers, 
Dec. 21, 1868 


BY 

THOMAS TURTLE 

First Lieutenant, Engineers 












Extract 


****** * 

By act of Congress of August 6, 1861, the U. S. Engi¬ 
neer troops were increased by the addition of three compan¬ 
ies of 150 enlisted men each. This latter company was not 
organized until after the war and the men enlisted for it 
(only some half dozen) were sent to the engineer companies. 

Of the additional companies of engineers, one (Com¬ 
pany C) was organized at Boston, and one (Company B) 
at Portland. These joined the old company (A), at Washing¬ 
ton in the fall of 1861. The third additional company 
(Company D), was organized by transfer from Companies 
A, B and C, while the Army of the Potomac lay at Harri¬ 
son's Landing (July 4, 1862). 

During the winter of 1861-62 the engineer troops were 
engaged in the construction of works in the vicinity of 
Washington and in building a ponton bridge at Harper’s 
Ferry. 

From this time to the close of the war the engineer 
troops were on duty with the Army of the Potomac. 

At the siege of Yorktown: 

“The Battalion was engaged on the trenches and com¬ 
munications, from the beginning to the end of operations. 
It furnished superintending and instructing details for parts 
of the entire line. The Battalion also assisted in making 
roads, and laid several bridges of pontons, three of the most 
important of which were composed of batteaux and crossed 
the north branch of Wormley Creek. The troops of the 
line at this early period of the war had received no practical 
instruction in making batteries and throwing up breast¬ 
works. The Battalion was drawn upon heavily in conse¬ 
quence, to furnish men, who always performed the duty of 
laying out the works, and imparting instruction to the troops 
of the line. Almost the entire line of trenches was in 
charge of Duane and his officers and men of the Battalion.”* 

*Letter of Bvt. Brig.-Gen. C. B. Reece, Major, U. S. Corps of 
Engineers. 


— 215 — 



History of Engineer Battalion 


At Fair Oaks the Battalion was under arms during 
the entire night at New Bridge on the Chickahominy, await¬ 
ing orders to throw a bridge; and next morning was en¬ 
gaged in building one bridge and part of another, and in 
constructing the roads leading to the same. During the 
construction of these bridges the rebel sharpshooters had 
possession of the opposite bank of the river. 

A portion of the Battalion at the battle of Mechanics- 
ville was ordered to New Bridge for the purpose of tearing 
up the bridge at that point as soon as the army had crossed. 
The Battalion was subsequently ordered to Gaines’ Mills, 
where it threw up intrenchments on the right of Gaines’ 
house. Portions of the Battalion were stationed at the 
different bridges to destroy them as soon as the army should 
finish crossing. They were under arms all night, and de¬ 
stroyed the bridges just after daylight on June 28, the enemy 
appearing on the opposite bank before the work of demoli¬ 
tion was fairly over. The roads to the rear were also put 
in proper condition for use, a portion of them being impass¬ 
able. After the battle of Gaines’ Mills the Battalion was 
ordered to White Oak Swamp in advance of the army to 
repair the roads and crossing, which were impassable, and 
to again render them impassable after the army had passed. 
At Malvern Hill the Engineer Battalion was posted on the 
edge of a piece of woods to act as infantry. It received 
orders to slash this piece of timber in such a manner that 
by cutting a few trees the whole would fall. In this it was 
assisted by the 4th Maine Volunteers. After the army had 
left Harrison’s Landing the Engineer Battalion, assisted by 
the Volunteer Engineers, built the bridge near the mouth 
of the Chickahominy. This bridge was about 2,000 feet 
in length. 


— 216 — 


THE ENGINEER 
BATTALION IN THE 
CIVIL WAR 


By 

GILBERT THOMPSON 

Private and Corporal in the Battalion during 
the Civil War. Major, Corps of 
Engineers, D. C. N. G. 

1890-1898 


Revised and Rewritten under the Direction of 
the Commandant Engineer School, U.S. Army 


By 

JOHN W. N. SCHULZ 

Second Lieut., Corps of Engineers 
Occasional Papers No. 44, 
Engineer School, 1910 


WASHINGTON BARRACKS, D. C. 
Press of the Engineer School 

19 10 






. 







. . 


% 









The Peninsula Campaign 

******* 

From March 16 the Battalion was employed in loading 
steamers and boats with bridge and engineering material, 
preparatory to the movement of the Army of the Potomac 
to Fort Monroe. 

On the 17th the companies fell in ready for marching, 
with teams hitched up, and everything in order for a move. 

But it was not until the 26th that the Army finally 
embarked for its trip down the river. Never had .there 
been seen on the Potomac at Washington such a brilliant 
spectacle as was presented at night by the hundreds of ves¬ 
sels, with lights at the mastheads—the whole resembling 
a floating city. The myriad sounds of a vast populace 
filled the air and echoed along the water. To transport 
such an army, with its materials, was of itself a prodigious 
undertaking, and in its successful execution deserving of 
much admiration. 

On March 27, the Battalion on the steamers Herald 
and Maryland , with cargoes in tow, left Washington. A 
small detachment under Sergt. Robert Ayres, of A Com¬ 
pany, was left behind to look after some property. 

On March 28 we arrived at Fort Monroe, and anchored 
between the fort and the rip-raps (now Fort Wool) close 
to the famous Monitor , which had steam up, ready for 
action. 

March 29. Reveille at 5 a.m. We disembarked at 
Hampton Creek, pitched tents, and unloaded material. 

April 1. A man of Company C died of pleurisy. The 
carpenters pulled the boards from a house to make his 
coffin. He was buried in a cemetery north of the fort. 

The forward movement toward Yorktown began the 
4th. The Battalion had reveille at 3:30 A. M. We marched 
at noon, and camped on Big Bethel battle ground. The 
next day, the Battalion started out early, and although we 
made but little progress, on account of the terrible condi- 


— 219 — 


Engineer Battalion in Civil War 

tion of the roads, we kept on until after midnight, when we 
lay down by the road. After an hour’s rest we moved on 
until noon. The Battalion camped at Camp McClellan. 
Company B was ordered to Ship Point, and detachments 
were sent out to fix roads. 

April 7. Moved forward and camped on Dr. Power’s 
plantation. Lieutenant Comstock, with a detachment of 
the Battalion, examined the enemy’s position. Hard rains 
set in and the roads were in a terrible condition. 

On April 10 we made gabions, and on the 11th moved 
to near Wormsley Creek, marching 5 miles. No drums 
were allowed to be beaten. The detachment under Ser¬ 
geant Ayres, which had remained in Washington until 
April 2, arrived in camp, having marched from Hampton 
by way of Ship Point. The officers made examinations at 
the front, while the construction of siege material was 
actively carried on by the Battalion. 

During the night of April 14 we built a ponton bridge 
across Black Creek, but, as we were short of boats, we did 
not reach the opposite bank. The boats were unloaded in 
the creek near camp, and under cover of darkness were 
rowed as quietly as possible out to the open water of York 
River, and then into the creek where the bridge was to be 
laid. 

On the 17th one of our rafts was caught out on the 
river and shelled; one boat was smashed, but no one was 
hurt. 

A working detail of New York Zouaves took part in 
making gabions on April 18th. Details from the companies 
went to the front and threw up a 16-gun battery on the 
left; and Battery No. 1, commanding York River, was also 
started. 

Detachments were out at night, in charge of working 
details of infantry. Although it was expected that the 
infantry would protect the Engineer parties, arms were 
generally taken along, and on several occasions, at the pros¬ 
pect of a brush on the picket line, the detail formed into 
line and loaded for an attack. 


- 220 — 


The Peninsula Campaign 

April 19. Threw a ponton bridge at night across 
Wormsley Creek. It was very dark. The enemy's pickets 
were near, and no noise was made; not even a match was 
struck. Our troops crossed at daylight. 

As the work progressed on the batteries, considerable 
artillery fire was indulged in. On May 2 work had to be 
suspended at Batteries 10, 13, and 14 for a while on account 
of the heavy fire. This unnecessary fusillade, at all times 
and in all directions, made us think, as afterwards proved 
to be correct, that Yorktown was being evacuated. 

The night of May 3, parties were at work on batteries 
at various points along the line. The magazines of some 
had to be enlarged, and repairs of embrasures, etc., had 
to be looked after. 

Sunday morning, May 4, fatigue parties were started 
out as usual, one to make scaling ladders at the sawmill. 
A detachment was ordered to Battery 10, and on its arrival 
found two companies of the Twenty-second Massachusetts 
Volunteers deployed as skirmishers and ready to advance, 
as the pickets had reported that Yorktown was evacuated. 
These companies charged forward with a cheer, and planted 
their flag on the works, but the Engineer party was not 
allowed to follow them. 

May 5, in a heavy rain, we put the boat train in order, 
and loaded thirty-four boat wagons. The Battalion was 
placed in charge of one ponton train complete. 

May 8, at 2 P. M., we moved out, and camped on the 
field where the surrender of Cornwallis had occurred on 
October 20, 1781. ‘ 

May 9. The Battalion marched through Yorktown. The 
next few days we followed the Army, camping as best we 
could, sometimes without tents or cooked food, as frequently 
the wagons were not up until after midnight. 

May 13. We marched all day, and at dark Company B 
started out to clear the road of trees which had been felled 
across it by the enemy. Fires had to be built before any 
cutting or clearing could be done. The boat train was 
taken along. Occasionally the boats had to be extricated 
from the mud by hand, and the road corduroyed in places 


— 221 — 


Engineer Battalion in Civil War 

to get them through. At daylight every one was so fatigued 
that to stop even for a moment caused one to fall down 
asleep. Just as the firm ground at Cumberland Landing 
was reached, the advance of the infantry came along under 
command of Brigadier-General Slocum, United States Vol¬ 
unteers, who, not knowing that they had had no rest for 
twenty-four hours, and angry at their supposed lazy condi¬ 
tion, put “Duane’s men” under arrest en masse. They were 
quickly released on arrival at headquarters. 

May 14. Starting out at 6 P. M., we marched all night, 
and reached White House Landing at 8 A. M., the 15th. We 
were inspected at retreat, and ordered to lay on our arms, 
ready for an attack. This was the great camp of the Army 
of the Potomac. 

May 20. Camp was moved to near Tunstalls Station, 
on York River Railroad. 

May 21. Lieutenant Comstock made examinations at 
Bottom Bridge. 

May 22. The Battalion moved to Cold Harbor, camp¬ 
ing near the junction of the roads. The officers were con¬ 
stantly making surveys and examinations as far as the 
Chickahominy River, taking men along to assist. The Bat¬ 
talion ponton train was turned over to the Fifteenth and 
Fiftieth New York Volunteer Engineers. 

May 25. Fatigue parties were out all day. At dark, 
Company B went down to the Chickahominy River, at New 
Bridge, and, under the cover of the heavy growth of timber 
along its banks, unloaded a boat train. The work was done 
so quietly that at 20 yards the noise of the unloading could 
scarcely be heard. A heavy shower occurred during the 
night, and the men returned to camp soaked.* 

May 27th, at 4 A. M., Companies A and C marched to 
New Bridge, and threw a pontoon bridge, afterwards taken 
up, as the enemy’s pickets made an advance. While the bridge 
was being laid, the enemy’s pickets were in plain sight, but 

*New Bridge was an old road crossing, and this was its local de¬ 
signation. The wooden bridge at this crossing was destroyed on our 
advance, probably by fire, as the uprights remained and were an 
annoyance in our later bridge work. 


— 222 — 



The Peninsula Campaign 

they offered no opposition, not a shot being fired. A portion 
of Company A, in going out, got mixed up with General 
Porter’s infantry column, and came very near getting into 
the fight that day at Hanover Court House. After return¬ 
ing to camp, the Battalion moved forward and camped near 
W. Gaines’ house. 

On May 31st occurred the Battle of Fair Oaks. The 
beginning of the battle could be plainly seen from near the 
Engineer camp. At 5:30 P.M., the Battalion, under arms, 
went to New Bridge, loaded rifles, and then tried to build 
a bridge, but without success.* 

The work was resumed at daylight, June 1, and two 
bridges were finally laid by the Battalion.f The valley of 
the Chickahominy was flooded with water, and extra guy 
lines were required to hold the boats in position. The Bat¬ 
tle of Fair Oaks could be still heard raging below. General 
Barnard, the Chief Engineer Officer of the Army of the Po¬ 
tomac, ordered Lieutenant Babcock to make an examination 
of the approaches on the far side. He started across with 
Sergeant Ayres and twelve men, but they had not proceeded 
far when, as they turned a bend in the road, they were fired 
upon by the enemy’s pickets; one man, Austin, J of Company 
A, was shot. This detachment was the only one to cross 
the stream at New Bridge. At night, the church bells at 
Richmond could be clearly heard—a distance of six and 
one-third miles. 

On June 2, 3, and 4, details were out at the bridges on 
the Chickahominy. 

On the 5th, some of the ponton boats at New Bridge 
were smashed by shells. At Lower Trestle Bridge, 1 mile 

*The night was intensely dark and the dense foliage of the 
swamp excluded any little light that was in the heavens. The 
stream . . . rose rapidly during the night. Captain Duane, who at 
New Bridge had the simplest task of all—that of bringing his pon¬ 
tons into position between existing abutments—found the darkness, 
the powerful current, and the rising stream too much to contend with, 
and postponed his operations until daylight .—Report of Brig. Gen. J. 
G. Barnard. 

fSee Appendix II for an account of the military bridges over 
the Chickahominy. 

$ Austin was the first to receive a serious injury, although the 
men of the Battalion had had close calls at Yorktown. 


— 223 — 



Engineer Battalion in Civil War 

below New Bridge, where the swamp was still flooded waist 
deep, long corduroy approaches were built. 

June 6. Lieutenant Cross had a party at Lower Trestle 
Bridge. The end of the corduroy approach was in sight of 
the enemy’s pickets, and Lieutenant Cross, going out to ex¬ 
amine the road, drew their fire, a few of the detachment 
being wounded. 

Details were out every day, also at night. The con¬ 
stant work in the water of the Chickahominy became very 
trying; the water had fallen; dead animals and filth were 
encountered; heavy showers at night rendered a dry sleep 
impossible, and the health of the command suffered. 

On June 11 the construction of Duane’s Bridge was be¬ 
gun. This was one of the most important bridges on the 
river, located just westward of the mouth of Boatswain 
Swamp, and work continued upon it night and day. In 
places the water was over one’s head, but this in some re¬ 
spects was an advantage, as the heavy logs could be floated 
in place for the stringers. The stream was also examined 
for some distance by a boat party. A favorable point for a 
foot bridge was found a short distance upstream, at an old 
beaver dam. 

June 13. The Battalion moved camp to just beyond 
Dr. Gaines’. Work was continued on the bridges. About 
this time also, two batteries were laid out near the Hogan 
house, and a battery close to and covering the approach to 
New Bridge. 

June 17. Duane’s Bridge was completed. It was about 
900 feet long, was built in a very substantial manner of 
cribs and corduroy, and was strong enough for the heaviest 
artillery and trains. 

June 19. We moved across Duane’s Bridge to “Camp 
Lincoln,” near Dr. Trent’s. Orders were very strict about 
leaving camp. Details were out building batteries near Dr. 
Gaines’ house. The battery at the head of New Bridge re¬ 
ceived a pounding each day, involving repairs and revetting 
each night. Lieutenant Comstock with orderlies, accom¬ 
panied scouting parties which examined the country be¬ 
tween the position of the Army and the James River. 


— 224 — 


The Peninsula Campaign 

June 20. Strict orders were issued about leaving camp, 
except on pass. A hospital for our sick was fixed up, near 
a spring, at the edge of the woods adjoining camp. 

June 22. A detail of Company B laid out some forti¬ 
fications at New Bridge, and some new works were also 
built near Dr. Gaines' house. 

June 26. The Battle of Mechanicsville. The Battal¬ 
ion made gabions in the forenoon. In the afternoon we 
heard the heavy firing and saw the ambulances going to 
the rear. Detachments were sent out at dark to the bridges, 
and one large party under Sergeant Pratt, of Company C, 
left at midnight. He reported to Lieutenant Reese at Dr. 
Gaines' house, receiving orders to proceed to New Bridge, 
in order to dismantle the ponton bridge,. put the material 
into the boats, and float the whole down the stream. The 
men stacked arms at New Bridge, and were under way when 
they encountered a number of large trees felled across the 
channel, which had either to be sawed or cut away. They 
had to work very carefully, as the enemy's pickets had 
closed down to the bank and could have entered the boats 
if so disposed, while our own pickets were withdrawn from 
our shore, at New Bridge, when the ponton bridge was 
taken up. It was now daylight, and the men were in a 
critical position, but they continued work, Sergeant Pratt 
giving them orders to defend themselves with their axes 
and oars if attacked. Shortly after, orders were received 
to get the material out on the bank and burn it, and to 
scuttle the ponton boats, leaving the anchors in them. This 
was speedily done, and, just as it was completed, an order 
came to take arms and get away as quickly as possible. 
During this affair the detachment was for a time caught 
between the lines, the Battle of Gaines' Mill breaking out 
while they were taking arms. 

The same morning, June 27, a detail under charge of 
Corporal Flood, of Company A, superintended the construc¬ 
tion of a line of rifle pits on the crest of the hill to the front 
of Smith's Division. A brigade of the enemy moved out to 
attack, and the Engineer detachment loaded rifles and 
joined in the defense; the affair turned out, however, to be 


— 225 — 


Engineer Battalion in Civil War 

only a feint, intended to cover the real movement across 
New Bridge. From the position on the hill, the smoke of 
our burning ponton boats could be seen. When the rifle pit 
was finished, the detail took position in a redoubt at the 
rear, and finally marched to Savage Station. Detachments 
were on duty at the bridges to keep them in order. At dark 
a detail under Lieutenant Reese went to the Grapevine 
Bridge, with orders to destroy it after the troops had re¬ 
tired to the south bank of the Chickahominy. Another de¬ 
tail, under Lieutenant Cross, was to go to the Woodbury and 
Alexander Bridge, for a similar purpose. 

Toward daylight, the 28th, Brig. Gen. Fitz-John Porter, 
commanding the Fifth Corps, gave orders personally to 
Lieutenant Reese: “As soon as this brigade has passed, you 
will destroy the bridge.” But stragglers and small detach¬ 
ments continued to come along, and, more than all else to 
excite sympathy, the wounded; so that the last span was 
kept partly in place, or relaid, occasionally, until an hour 
or more after sunrise. The enemy's skirmishers finally 
appeared, when the structure was destroyed by cutting the 
few remaining supports. The axe proved to be a more 
certain destructive agent than gunpowder. It was a trying 
all night's task, and almost without rest. 

The detachment of twelve men under Lieutenant Cross, 
going to the Woodbury and Alexander Bridge at daylight, 
found themselves without infantry support. A skirmish 
line was made up of half the men, the other half being 
equipped with axes. A squad of the enemy’s cavalry came 
down upon the party, but was fired upon by the skirmishers 
and driven back. The bridge was finally destroyed. 

Late in the afternoon the Battalion marched to White 
Oak Swamp, and bivouacked at the head of the corduroy 
crossing which had been constructed by the volunteer en¬ 
gineers. 

June 29. The Army was still on the retreat, bound for 
the James. During the day the Battalion kept White Oak 
Crossing in condition. This required unremitting care, as 
the wagon trains kept moving without a break. It was in¬ 
tensely hot and suffocating in the dense swamp, and as hard 

— 226 — 


The Peninsula Campaign 

on the men as if the Battalion had been in battle. The re¬ 
tiring troops threw away blankets and coats, at this point, 
to such an extent that one miry spot was repaired by spread¬ 
ing blankets over light brush. By making layers in this 
way, and adding earth, a heavy wagon would go over as 
though on a rubber carpet. At dark, we marched to Charles 
City Cross Roads, and camped, thoroughly worn out. Our 
sick were left at Savage Station and captured.* 

June 30. The Battalion marched with trains, and 
reached the James River at Haxall’s Landing. We re¬ 
paired roads and aided in keeping the trains moving. The 
men were worn out with fatigue and lack of food. 

July 1. We moved out early, and marched out to the 
right so far that the sound of the battle at Malvern Hill was 
at our left. Lieutenant Babcock posted a picket near the 
junction of some roads while the Battalion loaded rifles and 
deployed across the road in line of battle, then lay down on 
our arms. After remaining at this point for nearly an 
hour, the Battalion marched back and cut a heavy abattis, 
which is shown on the maps between Carters Mill Pond and 
the pike. Brig. Gen. Samuel P. Heintzelman, the command¬ 
er of the Third Army Corps, personally examined this posi¬ 
tion, and was emphatic in his demand that it be made ab¬ 
solutely impenetrable. A section of a battery was put in 
position, with an infantry support, and we made a thorough 
entanglement in their front. This completed, we returned 
to our camp at Haxalls, and at dark started on the march 
down the river. At first we were taken on a wrong road for 
several miles, so that it was long after daylight when we 
reached Harrisons Landing. This night's march was the 
darkest time the Battalion, and probably the whole Army of 
the Potomac, experienced. It was a sore disappointment 
to leave in the night, with the knowledge that the enemy 
had been beaten back in every charge that day at Malvern 
Hill. 


*These men were taken to Richmond, where they saw our cap¬ 
tured ponton boats driven in triumph through the city, a brass band 
in front. 


— 227 — 



Engineer Battalion in Civil War 

The famous “Seven Days’ Retreat” was at an end, and 
the Army settled down at Harrisons Landing. It was not, 
however, a period of inaction for the Engineer troops. 
Hardly had we finished some coffee the morning of July 2, 
than we were ordered out to slash a range through the 
timber, to enable the gunboats to throw shell to protect the 
camp. We were aided in this by some fresh troops from 
the Shenandoah Valley.* 

July 5. Company D was organized by details of picked 
men, every one in good health, from the other companies. 

*Our sick list at Harrisons Landing was so large that it was a 
problem to get a detail for fatigue duty. One day Sergeant Gerber 
admonished the last and only man of Company A in camp, as follows: 
“Ven I calls out ‘Tur-rn out, Company A,’ you Private Rue, tur-rn out.” 


— 228 — 



Appendix II. 


Military Bridges Over the Chickahominy, 1 862 

(Extracts from a paper by 
Major Gilbert Thompson, C. E., D. C. N. G.) 


There were a number of bridges and crossings, of the 
Chickahominy, which were destroyed upon the approach of 
General McClellan, in May, 1862. Some of them date back 
to the time of the American Revolution, and the rebuilding 
of these, together with the construction of a few new bridges, 
caused considerable confusion in their designations, as ap¬ 
pears from the official reports and maps of the operations in 
that vicinity. I have had occasion to unravel some puzzles 
in which these crossings were involved, and will offer an ac¬ 
count of them which I trust will be of interest. 

I will begin with the one known as “Bottom Bridge,” at 
the crossing of the Williamsburg stage road to Richmond, 
about 1 mile below the bridge of the Richmond and York 
River Railroad. The name is probably derived from the 
bottom lands characteristic of the Chickahominy. 

The division of General Casey reached this place on 
May 20th, and crossed without opposition, by fording, the 
next day. The volunteer engineers put the bridge in order 
for crossing, as also the railroad bridge, over which a loco¬ 
motive crossed the 27th at 7 p.m. Forty Government bridge 
builders assisted in the work. 

About 2 miles above the railroad bridge another cross¬ 
ing was prepared, designated as “Summer’s Lower Bridge.” 
About li miles farther upstream was constructed a bridge 
on the old site of “Grape-Vine Bridge,” and designated 
sometimes as “Summer’s Upper Bridge.” This was destined 
to be the historic bridge of the Army of the Potomac. I 
know of nothing more heroic or thrilling in the varied 


— 229 — 




Engineer Battalion in Civil War 




230 — 







Military Bridges Over Chickahominy, 1862 

records of that Army than when General Sumner’s men, at 
the time of the floods and Battle of Fair Oaks, ahead of 
orders, marched so closely over this bridge to the relief of 
their advance division as to hold the flooring down by their 
weight—as soon as the last man had crossed, the bridge 
floated away. The railroad bridge for several days was 
the only means of communication between the main body of 
the Army and its left wing. The other bridges were re¬ 
built, however, with the exception of Sumner’s Lower 
Bridge, after the floods subsided. 

The character of the bottom lands along the Chicka¬ 
hominy River necessitated the construction of long ap¬ 
proaches of corduroy, some of which were raised, above the 
general level, upon stringers. At Sumner’s Upper Bridge 
the solid ground came in comparatively close to the stream. 
And, although there were stronger and better bridges after¬ 
wards built, which I shall mention, this bridge was probably 
the only one available for the crossing of General Porter’s 
command to the south side of the river after the Battle of 
Gaines Mill, June 27th. 

It is stated in reports, however, that two bridges were 
used. If so, the second bridge was the one known as the 
“Woodbury and Alexander Bridge,” situated about one quar¬ 
ter of a mile upstream from the former. Upon some maps 
and in some statements, this bridge is given the single name 
of “Woodbury,” or “Alexander,” more frequently the latter. 
It was named for Brig. Gen. D. P. Woodbury,, commanding 
the Engineer Brigade of the Army of the Potomac, and for 
Lieut. Col. B. S. Alexander, of the Corps of Engineers, who 
selected its site. This was a fine structure, finished June 
17th, and built by the volunteer engineers, with working 
parties from the Ninth and Twenty-second Massachusetts 
and the Third Vermont Regiments. It crossed the stream 
at right angles, and then made a turn upstream, along the 
northern bank. It had a total length of 1,080 feet, and was 
constructed entirely upon cribs and stringers, so that it 
would be above, and able to withstand any danger from, 
floods. 


— 231 — 


Engineer Battalion in Civil War 

About 2 miles above was a small bridge, suitable for 
infantry only, known as “Woodbury’s Bridge,” or as the 
“Infantry Bridge.” This was built by the volunteer engin¬ 
eers, and was situated southward from the Adam’s house. 

A short distance above this was “Duane Bridge,” con¬ 
structed by the United States Engineer Battalion, under 
command of Capt. J. C. Duane, assisted by details from Gen¬ 
eral Porter’s and Gen. W. F. Smith’s commands. This was 
a first-class structure, in all respects, and about 1,200 feet 
in length. While it was being built the water had not en¬ 
tirely subsided, and the very heavy stringers could be floated 
to their place. This bridge was nearly straight, and was 
the main line of travel from the vicinity of Dr. Gaines’ house 
to the south bank. It was finished June 17th, and, on the 
19th, General Headquarters was moved across it and “Camp 
Lincoln” established, at Dr. Trent’s. 

Just above this, the Regular Engineers made a cross¬ 
ing, known as the “Foot Bridge,” over what looked like an 
old beaver dam. Only infantry, in single file, could cross it. 

The bridges which I have mentioned were the only ones 
over which regular communication was held by the Army 
of the Potomac, over the Chickahominy River. 

Eight miles above Bottom Bridge, where the main road 
crossed the Chickahominy, from Cold Harbor to Richmond, 
was “New Bridge.” The original structure was built upon 
piles, and destroyed when the advance reached there on May 
22d. The volunteer engineers took possession of Dr. Gaines’ 
sawmill, and got out sawed timber and framed it for a 
bridge, 114 feet long, to replace the original “New Bridge.” 
This material was hauled down to the site of the bridge after 
dark, but was never used. The Regular Engineers, after¬ 
wards, built corduroy approaches, and put in two ponton 
bridges. The material that had been collected for bridges 
was swept away by the floods of May 31st, but by heroic 
work, at 8:15 A.M., June 1st, New Bridge was available for 
crossing by all arms of the service. This was accomplished 
more easily at this point than elsewhere, because of the 
fact that the original approaches were by way of a raised 
earth causeway. 


— 232 — 


Military Bridges Over Chickahominy, 1862 

A little over a mile below was built a corduroy bridge, 
with a couple of pontons in the stream. This was known as 
the “Lower Trestle Bridge.” And at about the same dis¬ 
tance above New Bridge was built the “Upper Trestle 
Bridge,” a crib and corduroy structure, located southward 
from Ellisons Mill, the scene of the Battle of Mechanics- 
ville, June 26th. The approaches to these two bridges were 
never completed to the firm ground, on the south side, but 
infantry could have crossed at any time, and if required 
they could have been made ready in two hours for artillery. 
In this portion of the Chickahominy bottom it was more 
open, there being only patches of timber and a fringe of 
mixed growth along the stream. Consequently, the Engin¬ 
eers and working details were frequently driven from their 
work by sharpshooters and artillery fire. All these bridges 
were made available for crossing to the south bank in eigh¬ 
teen days after their almost total destruction by the flood, 
a considerable portion of this work in the vicinity of New 
Bridge being accomplished at night. 

To add something about the value of these bridges, and 
of their destruction, during the Seven Days’ Battle: 

The Upper Trestle Bridge was destroyed by the volun¬ 
teer engineers, the afternoon of June 26th, during the Bat¬ 
tle of Mechanicsville. The same night, Lieutenant Reese, 
with a detachment of the Regular Engineers, destroyed New 
Bridge and the Lower Trestle Bridge. 

Duane’s Bridge, with the approval of General Franklin, 
was destroyed by Col. B. S. Alexander the afternoon of June 
27th, using an infantry regiment for the purpose. The 
heavy siege pieces mounted at Hogan’s and Dr. Gaines’ 
were taken over this bridge, however, before its destruction. 
It is stated that these guns were drawn away by hand, and 
that, if a strong bridge had not been in reaching distance, 
they would have been captured. They were finally put in 
position on the south side, and covered General Porter’s 
left flank, the afternoon of the 27th, during the Battle of 
Gaines Mill. 

Colonel Alexander found that the work of destruction of 
Duane’s Bridge had been already begun by a small detach- 


-23a— 


Engineer Battalion in Civil War 

ment, but by whose orders is unknown., This bridge and 
the “Foot Bridge,” were completely destroyed at sunset. 

The Railroad Bridge and the two ponton bridges at Bot¬ 
tom Bridge were probably destroyed, and the boats removed, 
during the 27th. Therefore, at the close of the Battle of 
Gaines Mill, the Grape-Vine Bridge and the Woodbury and 
Alexander Bridge alone remained available for crossing to 
the south bank. Captain Duane had orders to destroy these 
bridges after General Porter’s troops had crossed, and their 
destruction has already been recorded in the main part of 
this History. 

A number of regiments are credited with the destruc¬ 
tion of some of the foregoing bridges, and by high authori¬ 
ties. It is a safe statement to make, however, that not one 
of these bridges were destroyed except under the direction 
of a regular or volunteer Engineer officer, and, with few ex¬ 
ceptions, by Engineer troops alone. 


— 234 — 


TELEGRAPHING IN 
BATTLE 


Reminiscenses of the 
Civil War 


BY 

JOHN EMMET O’BRIEN, M.D. 

Operator and Cipher-Operator , U. S. 
Military Telegraph 
1862-1866 


Scranton, Pennsylvania 

19 10 





Extract 


******* 


General Wool had missed and kindly inquired for me, 
and requested Mr. Sheldon to bring me back to Fort Monroe. 
McClellan being now on the Peninsula with the army advanc¬ 
ing on Yorktown, the telegraph work at Fort Monroe was 
becoming heavy, so Mr. Sheldon requested that I be returned, 
and Major Eckert so directed. Richard, Sheldon, Jim Nor¬ 
ris and myself were then the operators who, at Fort Mon¬ 
roe, handled and repeated McClellan’s business with Wash¬ 
ington. With McClellan, in the field, were Harper Cald¬ 
well, chief operator; Jesse Bunnell, C. W. Jacques, and 
others whose names may be found in Plum’s history. 
Jacques and Bunnell were the particularly fast senders at 
the front, and, in view of the fact that Major Eckert had 
at first judged my telegraphic skill apparently rather by 
my youth than by trial, it was amusing when, many times, 
as I was receiving fast business from those boys, to hear 
Sheldon, as he looked on, swear till all was blue that never 
before was such fast stuff taken without a break. 

On the single wire and cable above described, pulsed 
and throbbed, during McClellan’s campaign, the hurried 
orders for supplies, the sharp words about McDowell’s 
Corps, withheld for the defense of Washington, fateful lists 
of killed and wounded, news of victory and defeat—all the 
tidings of glory and of horror that pertain to war. 

The telegraph worked not only through sea and land, 
but invaded the clouds, carrying a light wire skyward by 
balloon near Washington, at Pohick Church, Virginia, .and 
on the Peninsula. I will let Jesse Bunnell tell, in the follow¬ 
ing letter to me, how Park Spring, who was foreman of 
line construction with the Army of the Potomac, made these 
ascensions, and also describe the evacuation of Yorktown. 
(“M.C.” was the telegraphic call for McClellan’s head¬ 
quarters.) 


— 237 — 


Telegraphing in Battle 


“New York, Nov. 1, 1864. 


“Dr. J. E. O'Brien, Scranton , Pa. 

“My dear Comrade: Yours received. The aeronaut who took 
our wire up on the Peninsula was Professor Lowe, better known 
amongst us boys as ‘Lo! the poor Indian.’ So far as I (at ‘M C’) 
knew at the time, we were in telegraphic communication with the 
elevated balloon only two or three times. Park Spring, who was a 
fair operator, was, I believe, the only one who made these ascensions 
with Lowe. A double conductor flexible cable looped into the ‘M C’ 
wire and we worked direct with Park, who sat in the balloon with a 
pocket instrument, while Professor Lowe did the rope business, 
swearing at the men down below, etc. Nothing of any consequence 
was reported or transacted, however. I think there were no other 
wired ascensions on the Peninsula. 

“At Yorktown, or, rather, before Yorktown, the night it was 
evacuated, May 4th, I was on duty at ‘M C’ from 2 a.m. until 8 a.m. 
The previous evening had been made unusually lively for us by 
shells from the enemy, who seemed to have determined to give it 
to us very hot all along the line. We accounted for this by supposing 
that they were aware that all our heavy guns had at last been gotten 
into position and that the order was issued to open a terriffic fire the 
next day. The fact was, they were evacuating Yorktown and shell¬ 
ing us to divert our attention, in which they succeeded perfectly. 
The tumult kept me awake long after I had turned in at my tent at 
8 o’clock p.m., and when Jacques woke me at 2, all was still as 
death. 

“About 3 o’clock I was sitting in the rustic bower which had 
been built in front of the telegraph tent door, when I saw a light in 
the sky over Yorktown. It grew larger and appeared to be from 
a burning building in the town. Then I heard over the wires ques¬ 
tions going between the different operators stationed in the front 
nearest that point, as to ‘what was the fire?’ Then a few moments 
later, an order was telegraphed Professor Lowe, at one of these 
stations, directing him to ascend, observe and report immediately. 
Then I could dimly see the balloon as it was allowed to rise a hundred 
feet or more. The report was indefinite, stating that the fire was 
either a sloop at the wharf or a building in town. But very soon, 
about 4 o’clock, a sharp, sudden call at the instrument for ‘M C’ 
brought a message from, I forget where, stating that a deserter had 
come in reporting Yorktown evacuated! By the time I had aroused 
the General and some of his staff and returned to the instrument, 
several more messages to the same purport from other points were 
waiting for me, and ‘M C’ was being frantically called by every one 
who could get in. The General came to the instrument half-dressed, 
the staff crowded in and about the tent, telegrams were written or 
scrawled and rushed to every point on the line, with the result that, 
in about two hours, our whole army was rushing pell-mell from every 
point and along every road after the enemy. ’Twas a quick job for 
‘before breakfast.’ They found the enemy, I believe, at Williamsburg. 
(Near Fort Magruder, two miles before Williamsburg.— J. E. O’B.) 

“I always recollect this episode as one of the striking occurrences 
connected with my early experience in the U. S. M. T. I was then but 
seventeen years old, and felt proud to have been the medium for the 
transmissions which caused that great army to spring, as one man, 
from its sleep to pursue the enemy. 

“Yours truly, 

“J. H. Bunnell.” 


• 238 — 


Extract 


Our wires at the siege of Yorktown connected all the 
corps headquarters. The two operators, D. B. Lathrop and 
H. L. Smith, in the intrenchments nearest the town, rushed 
in with the first of our troops and hastened to the telegraph 
office to try the Richmond wire. The wires had been cut 
and left hanging from the pole, and in going to the pole 
Lathrop trod on a buried torpedo, which exploded, tear¬ 
ing a leg almost off and otherwise injuring him. He died 
within a few hours. Lathrop was beloved by his comrades, 
who had his body embalmed and taken to his home at Mount 
Vernon, Ohio, and erected a monument over his grave. It 
may be considered a serious charge to say that torpedoes 
were planted at Yorktown, but this account was attested 
to me by my comrades at that point, two of whom, Tom 
Morrison and another, accompanied Lathrop’s remains; 
and, so far as I know, was never doubted by any one at the 
time. It is, of course, not believed that the treachery was 
known to, or authorized by, any Confederate officer or any 
one acquainted with the rules of civilized warfare. 

In the rush of McClellan’s Corps after the retreating 
enemy, they encountered them at Fort Magruder, two miles 
before reaching Williamsburg, and here the Confederates, 
aided by their fortifications and the nature of the ground, 
made a determined stand, resulting in the battle of Williams¬ 
burg. More vividly than the dispatches of McClellan and 
his corps commanders, the reports and battle-orders, which 
I heard on the wire or handled, do I remember the names 
and regiments of fifteen hundred of our killed and wounded 
which I “took” from Bunnell or Jacques for transmission 
North, while the tears were in my eyes and the telegraphic 
speed was too great to give me time to brush them away. 

After Yorktown, the construction party kept the main 
line up with the troops as they marched, stringing wire 
loops to corps headquarters when they halted, stringing 
the wires on poles or trees as the exigencies of the route 
permitted. Comte de Paris, who was then an aid on Gen¬ 
eral McClellan’s staff, attests, in his excellent history of 
our Civil War, that the Generals were surprised and de¬ 
lighted to find the telegraph at hand at the end of each day’s 


— 239 — 


Telegraphing in Battle 


march, giving them communication with one another and 
with the base of operations (Fort Monroe). 

The instruments of slight resistance and currents of 
small electro-motive force employed on the well-insulated 
lines of to-day would hardly have recorded signals or over¬ 
come the “escapes” of our field lines of that time. We used 
“relays” of high resistance and nitric acid batteries of the 
strongest kind, though these were improved upon in portable 
apparatus as the war progressed. The operators at the 
front, too, were experts. Seated perhaps under fire on a 
stump or cracker-box, while troops and artillery swept by, 
they would send or take thousands of words of military 
dispatches at the rate of forty words per minute, without 
an error. From the battle of Williamsburg to that of Fair 
Oaks, and in the seven days’ fighting, the telegraph assisted 
largely in handling the several corps of the Army of the 
Potomac. 

At Gaines’ Mill, Porter obtained reenforcements at the 
critical juncture through the promptness of Jesse Bunnell, 
who tapped the wire as our line of battle receded, and trans¬ 
mitted the necessary dispatches under a heavy fire which 
killed some of his mounted messengers. 


— 240 — 


HISTORY OF 
THE CIVIL WAR IN 
AMERICA 

Source Book 

Part II 

BY 

THE COMTE DE PARIS 


Published by special arrangement with the author 


VOLUME II 

• Book I 


Copyright, 1876, by Joseph H. Coates 


PHILADELPHIA 
Porter & Coates 




























The Civil War in America 


VOL. II 

BOOK I.—.RICHMOND 


CHAPTER I 
Williamsburg 

We concluded the former volume with the narrative 
of the first year of the war, having brought down our review 
of the campaigns which were being prosecuted in the East 
and West to within a few days of the anniversary of the 
bombardment of Fort Sumter. Those campaigns were but 
the prelude to the far more extensive operations and san¬ 
guinary conflicts which we are about to relate. 

We shall begin by speaking of the army of the Potomac, 
of which we have described the slow formation during the 
autumn and winter of 1861, and of its first movements in 
the spring of 1862. Whilst the armies of the west have 
already overrun several States and fought great battles, 
the former has not yet had an opportunity to seek revenge 
for the conquerors of Bull Run. In the last chapters of 
the preceding volume the reader has seen the difficulties 
of every kind which embarrassed its movements, prevented 
it from taking the field at an earlier day, and jeopardized 
the success of the plan of operations so happily conceived 
by its chief. Nevertheless, after the unlooked-for evacua¬ 
tion of Manassas by the Confederates, after the combats 
which kept in the valley of Virginia, troops that would 
have been more useful elsewhere, after Mr. Lincoln’s inter¬ 
ference in reducing his force to strengthen the garrison of 
Washington, that army finally embarked at Alexandria, in 
the last days of March, for the great expedition which was 
to transfer the seat of war to the vicinity of the enemy’s 
capital; and General McClellan, when he landed upon the 


— 243 — 




Civil War in America 


peninsula of Virginia, notwithstanding all these drawbacks, 
had still a fine army under his command—a numerous army, 
however imprudently reduced, composed of ardent, vigor¬ 
ous, brave, and intelligent men, although without experience. 
Recruited among all classes of society, the ranks of this 
army contained many men of military ability, as yet un¬ 
known to the world, and even to themselves, some of whom 
were about to be sacrificed before they could have a chance 
of asserting their full worth, whilst others were to be called 
to direct its long and painful labors. Consequently, de¬ 
spite the mistakes of the government, this army could hope 
to run a brilliant career upon the ground, classic in the 
history of the United States, where it was at last to en¬ 
counter the elite of the slavery troops. It was, in fact, in 
the peninsula where the soldiers of Washington and Roch- 
ambeau completed the glorious work of American eman¬ 
cipation. It was around Yorktown, already made celebrated 
by the capitulation of Lord Cornwallis, that the armf» of the 
Potomac was about to fight its first battles; and if it may be 
permitted to an obscure member of that army to indulge 
here in a personal reflection, it was the remembrance of the 
victory achieved by France and America conjointly upon 
this very soil which caused a throb in the heart of exiles so 
generously received under the shadow of the flag of the 
young republic. 

Notwithstanding the historical associations which clus¬ 
ter around it, this locality was but little known; and in view 
of its peculiar configuration, we deem a detailed description 
necessary to a proper understanding of the operations we 
are about to relate. Fortress Monrde, situated at the 
extremity of the peninsula, lies one hundred and fifteen 
kilometres from Richmond, in a direct line. The route which 
the Army of the Potomac had to follow was all laid down; 
it stretched out, bounded on the south by the James River— 
which is a river (fleuve) at Richmond, and a vast estuary 
at Newport News—and at the north, first by an arm of the 
sea called York River, and then by the Pamunky, its prin¬ 
cipal tributary. The region lying between these water¬ 
courses may be divided into two parts. The first, by far 


— 244 — 


Williamsburg 

the more important, forms a real peninsula between the 
salt tide-waters which ascend York River as far as West 
Point, and the James beyond City Point. This flat country, 
which is both sandy and marshy, intersected by countless 
bays, extremely wooded, poor, and thinly peopled, forms 
the peninsula of Virginia. The second, extending, between 
the Pamunky and the James proper, to a distance far above 
Richmond, very undulating, covered with magnificent for¬ 
ests, a little better cultivated than the former, and enlivened 
here and there by the residences of a few wealthy planters, 
is divided longitudinally by the Chickahominy, a river ren¬ 
dered famous in the annals of American colonization by the 
romantic adventures of the traveller John Smith and the 
Indian maid Pocahontas. This water-course, of little im¬ 
portance from its ordinary volume of water, flows through 
wooded swamps, where impenetrable thickets alternate 
with groves of tall white oak, a tree admirably adapted for 
naval Construction, the feet of which are buried in the 
ooze, while the trunks, as straight as the mast of a ship, rise 
to extraordinary heights. After a rain-storm, the Chicka¬ 
hominy not only overflows its wooded banks, but, spreading 
over the adjacent plains, forms a sheet of water which at 
times is a kilometre in width. This, therefore, was a for¬ 
midable obstacle in the way of military operations. The 
river runs parallel with the Pamunky, and cutting off a 
corner of the peninsula, empties into the estuary of the 
James at an equal distance from City Point and Newport 
News. The James on one side, the York River and the 
Pamunky on the other, form two magnificent lines of com¬ 
munication. The former is navigable as far as Richmond, 
but the Virginia debarred the Federals from using it. The 
latter may be ascended as far as White House, a plantation 
which had formerly belonged to Washington, and was now 
the property of General Lee. But at the entrance of York 
River, the two banks of this arm of the sea draw closer, 
forming a strait commanded by the guns of Yorktown, and 
batteries erected opposite, at Gloucester Point. Hence the 
importance which has always attached to the place of York¬ 
town, around which some slight undulations covered with 


— 245 — 


Civil War in America 


rich turf still indicate the trace of the parallel thrown up 
by the French and American soldiers of 1781. The penin¬ 
sula itself upon which Yorktown stands is narrowed by a 
swampy stream, Warwick Creek, which taking its rise at 
less than two kilometres from the old bastions of this town, 
empties into the James perpendicularly to its course. It 
was here that nature had marked out for the Confederates 
their true line of defence. Having control of James River, 
thanks to the Virginia, and of York River, owing to the 
batteries of Gloucester Point, they could not be turned by 
the Federal navy. The two rivers supplied them with pro¬ 
visions, instead of furnishing the means of attack to their 
adversaries, and so long as they preserved the line of War¬ 
wick Creek, Yorktown could not be invested. All these 
points, therefore, supported each other mutually. Thirty- 
two kilometres separated Yorktown from Fort Monroe. 
Sixteen kilometres farther, another contraction of the penin¬ 
sula occurs, even narrower than that caused by Warwick 
Creek, formed by two streams called College Creek and 
Queen’s Creek; one running toward the James, the other 
toward York River. Near this place stands the oldest uni¬ 
versity in America, William and Mary College, founded 
during the reign of William the Third, the spacious building 
of which, of red and gray brick, together with the court¬ 
yards and pavilions, remind one of the English edifices of 
the eighteenth century, and have an air of antiquity seldom 
met with in the New World. Around the university is 
grouped the pretty little town of Williamsburg, the houses 
of which are surrounded by gardens and shaded by beauti¬ 
ful trees. It was for a time the capital of the colony, when 
Virginia was richer and had a larger population than at 
the present day. 

Between Fort Monroe and Richmond there is but a 
single line of railway, which, starting from the latter city, 
crosses the upper Chickahominy, then the Pamunky at White 
House, and terminates at West Point, where the latter river 
and the Mattapony both empty into the salt waters of York 
River. 


— 246 — 


Williamsburg 

Such was the new ground upon which the army of the 
Potomac was about to fight. The transportation of this 
army was a difficult task, and was accomplished in a remark¬ 
able manner. The first vessels were chartered on the 27th 
of February; on the 17th of March the first soldier was 
embarked; and on the 6th of April, all the troops which had 
not been withdrawn from General McClellan’s command 
were landed upon the peninsula. During this short period 
of time, four hundred ships, steamers, and sailing vessels, 
had been collected and taken to Alexandria, and had trans¬ 
ported a distance of eighty leagues, 109,419 men, 14,502 
animals, 44 batteries, with all the immense material which 
generally follows such an army, leaving nothing behind them 
except nine stranded lighters and eight drowned mules. 

McClellan had not waited for the end of this operation 
to take the field. Out of the one hundred thousand men, or 
thereabouts, he was to have under his command,* he found 
on the day of his arrival fifty-eight thousand, accompanied 
with one hundred cannon, in a condition to march. The 
remainder had either not landed or were without the neces¬ 
sary transportation to take part in a forward movement. 
Many teams were yet wanting for the numerous wagons, 
without which troops could not venture among the marshy 
roads which they were to encounter. 

The army was put in motion on the 5th of April, and 
arrived before Yorktown and Warwick Creek the next day 


*This was the status 


Second corps, Sumner_ 

Third corps, Heintzelman 

Fourth corps, Keyes- 

Regular infantry - 

Regular cavalry - 

Reserve artillery- 

Of different corps_ 

Total _ 


the army April 1, 1862: 


° £ 

. - w 

73 

•gs 



-4-> 

§ 0) 

ft 

c 


OT > 
o> T5 

Ph 

> M 

wot o ^3 

0 

w 

rO 

< 

Tota 

26,778 

1,129 

3,130 

31,037 

___ 33,047 

2,795 

3,010 

38,852 

32,924 

1,874 

3,112 

37,910 

3,905 

237 

623 

4,765 

2,001 

170 

370 

3,141 

___ 2,731 

175 

210 

3,116 

910 

73 

161 

1,144 

. _ _102,896 

6,453 

10,616 

119,956 


— 247 — 














Civil War in America 


without having seen the enemy. The latter had hastily 
abandoned the few works erected at Big Bethel, in the firm 
belief that the Federals, who had control of the sea as far 
as Yorktown, could easily turn all those defences. This 
first march was not accomplished without some difficulty. 
The roads were in a deplorable condition. The maps were 
bad, which was even worse than not having any. They had 
relied upon those which the officers stationed at Fortress 
Monroe had taken all winter to prepare, and the several 
columns, thus misled by false information, could hardly 
preserve their order of march. Deceived by these incor¬ 
rect charts as to the direction of Warwick Creek, General 
McClellan was led to believe that Yorktown could be easily 
invested. On the 5th, when his right wing appeared before 
that place, his left encountered the unforeseen obstacle 
which imparted so much strength to the position of the 
Confederates. The latter, under General Magruder, had 
long been preparing for the defence of the peninsula. The 
fortifications erected by Lord Cornwallis around Yorktown 
in 1781, within which he had defended himself with a ten¬ 
acity worthy of the English army, were still in existence. 
These works were not revetted with masonry, but their 
profile was considerable. They had been put in order, en¬ 
larged, and completed. They were mounted with fifty-six 
guns, some of very heavy calibre. Batteries had been 
erected, some along the water’s edge and others on the hil¬ 
locks commanding the river, all of which crossed their fire 
with that of a large redoubt occupying the sandy promon¬ 
tory of Gloucester Point. 

The bastioned fortifications of Yorktown completely 
enclosed that small town. The line of Warwick Creek 
which Magruder had selected at the last moment was not 
so well fortified by art as by nature. The source of this 
brook lies at twenty-four hundred metres from the bastions, 
of Yorktown, the space between these two points (for the 
most part open country) being commanded by a lunette, a 
few breastworks, and an unfinished redoubt. The course of 
Warwick Creek is bordered throughout by dense forests, 
through which wind tortuous roads difficult to find, laid 


— 248 — 


Williamsburg 

out on a spongy and broken soil. The upper part of this 
stream is slow and muddy, about twenty metres in breadth, 
with marshy banks, and commanded on both sides by slight 
undulations in the ground. It was intersected by five dams, 
two of which were formerly used to collect the water for 
milling purposes, the three others having been constructed 
by Magruder. They produced, by retaining the waters, an 
artificial inundation, which is the best of all defences. In 
the rear of each of these dams, the only accessible points 
to an assailant, rose a small redan. The lower part of the 
Warwick, subject to the influence of the tide, was surrounded 
by a triple enclosure of hardened mud, impenetrable cane- 
brakes, and swampy forests, which forbade approach even 
to the boldest hunter. This line presented all those peculi¬ 
arities which render offensive war so difficult in America; 
but Magruder was not in a condition to dispute its pos¬ 
session for any length of time with the powerful army which 
had at length encountered his pickets on the 5th of April. 
The division with which he had been charged to protect the 
peninsula since the preceding autumn numbered only eleven 
thousand men. The military authorities of the Confederacy 
had not guessed or known in advance, as it was pretended 
at the time, the change of base of the army of the Potomac, 
or they were singularly careless and improvident, for after 
McClellan had embarked the greatest portion of his troops 
at Alexandria, Johnston with all his forces was still wait¬ 
ing for him on the Rapidan. Disturbed by the same fears 
which had beset Mr. Lincoln, the cabinet of Mr. Davis dared 
no more than he to uncover their capital; so that on the 
arrival of McClellan before Yorktown with his fifty-eight 
thousand men, not a single soldier had as yet been sent to 
reinforce Magruder. These facts, which have been official¬ 
ly proved since the close of the war, afford the most con¬ 
clusive evidence in favor of the plan which the commander- 
in-chief of the army of the Potomac had undertaken to carry 
out. If the line of defence selected by Magruder was natur¬ 
ally strong, it was too much extended, since the Confederate 
general had only eleven thousand soldiers to occupy about 
twenty kilometres. He had placed six thousand men at 


— 249 — 


Civil War in America 


Gloucester Point and at Yorktown, and in a small work situ¬ 
ated on the James, so that he had only five thousand left 
to defend the whole course of Warwick Creek. Consequently, 
the Richmond authorities, being fully convinced that he 
would not be able to maintain himself in that position, sent 
him a formal order to evacuate Yorktown and to abandon 
the entire peninsula. But Magruder’s obstinacy was pro¬ 
verbial among his old comrades. He refused to obey, and 
prepared to resist the enemy by placing his troops near the 
dams and among the few clearings adjacent to the stream, 
so as to deceive the Federals regarding his real strength. 
The latter, being received by a well-sustained fire on their 
appearance, imagined themselves confronted by the skir¬ 
mishers of an army concealed by the forest; and General 
Keyes, commanding a column of more than twenty-five thou¬ 
sand men which had thus unexpectedly encountered Warwick 
Creek, did not consider himself strong enough to force a 
passage. General McClellan, equally deceived by appear¬ 
ances, thought he had again found behind those mysterious 
forests the Confederate army which had evacuated Man- 
asses one month before, and did not dare to thrust his sword 
through the slight curtain which his able adversary had 
spread before his vision. A vigorous attack upon either 
of the dams, defended by insignificant works, would have 
had every chance of success. The enemy could have been 
kept in suspense by several feints; there were men enough 
to attempt three of four principal attacks at once; it was 
easy, in short, to harass him in such a manner that his line 
of defense would inevitably have been pierced at the expira¬ 
tion of twenty-four hours. In that case Magruder would 
have paid dear for his audacious resolution, the defenders 
of Warwick Creek would have been scattered, and Yorktown 
invested on every side. This place could have been masked 
until a vigorous bombardment should have compelled it to 
surrender, and by pressing Magruder close, the whole penin¬ 
sula would have fallen into the possession of the Federals 
in a few days. This is what McClellan would not have 
failed to do if he had known the situation of his adversaries 
as their published reports have revealed it since. But at 


— 250 — 


Williamsburg 


that critical moment no information was received either 
from spies or from other sources to convey to him the faint¬ 
est idea of their weakness. The line of defense they had 
adopted rendered it impossible for him to feel his way before 
assaulting them seriously. He could not compel them to 
show themselves except by crossing the narrow dams which 
intersected Warwick Creek. To attempt this operation he 
had deemed it proper to wait for the arrival of McDowell’s 
three divisions, which were to turn the enemy’s line by the 
left flank of York River. But on the very evening he re- 
connoitered the positions of his adversaries he was apprised 
of the deplorable decision by which the President withdrew 
from him this entire army corps. An independent com¬ 
mand, comprising Fort Monroe and the very country in 
which the army of the Potomac was then operating, had 
been created a short time before in favor of General Wool. 
Finally, the naval force which had been relied upon to assist 
in the attack on the batteries of Yorktown declared that 
the necessity of keeping a watch over the Virginia did not 
permit the detachment of a sufficient number of vessels for 
that service. This was, indeed, a succession of disappoint¬ 
ments, and at a time when it was too late to draw back. It 
may be argued that this should have been considered as an 
additional reason for hastening operations, as the chance 
of obtaining an important success was well worth the risk 
that might be incurred. The army needed a daring stroke 
(coup d’ audace). Its morale would have suffered less from 
a sanguinary check than from the fruitless fatigues of a 
prolonged siege; such a success, in short, would have secured 
to General McClellan the efficient co-operation of his govern¬ 
ment. But he would not compromise the young army en¬ 
trusted to his care in an enterprise which he considered too 
hazardous. Thinking that the national cause could endure 
delays and slow movements but not such another disaster 
as that of Bull Run, he preferred to rely upon the superi¬ 
ority of his artillery in order to dislodge the enemy from his 
lines. 

The Confederates, always under arms, exhausted by 
continuous service, did not understand what could delay an 


— 251 — 


Civil War in America 


attack the issues of which they had such good cause to dread. 
In the meantime, behind the trees which limited their view, 
on the southern bank of the Warwick, the whole Federal 
army was at work, erecting batteries and constructing long 
solid corduroy causeways through the marshy forests, to 
make a practicable passage for cannon. But the time which 
was thus spent was entirely to the advantage of the Con¬ 
federates. In fact, Magruder’s disobedience had been at 
once acquiesced in. Johnston, leaving the large Federal 
garrison of Washington to prepare for imaginary combats, 
quitted the borders of the Rapidan, sending a portion of his 
forces into the peninsula, while he concentrated himself 
with the remainder around Richmond. 

Some regiments, assembled in haste, had already been 
forwarded to Yorktown, and Magruder had begun to receive 
his first reinforcements two days after the arrival of the 
Federals before that place. When, therefore, after eleven 
days of reconnaissances and preparatory labors, McClellan 
determined at last to attack him, his forces were doubled, 
and his line of defence completed. The numerical dispro¬ 
portion between the two parties, however, was nearly as 
great as before; for the one hundred thousand men embarked 
at Alexandria were at last assembled on the narrow extrem¬ 
ity of the peninsula, and the President had just informed 
General McClellan that one of the divisions of McDowell’s 
corps was restored to him; this was Franklin’s division, 
which had been earnestly asked for, and granted as a kind 
of compromise between the various campaign plans which 
had been urged upon the acceptance of Mr. Lincoln. 

On the 16th of April General McClellan decided to attack 
the one of the three dams constructed by the enemy which 
was the lowest on Warwick Creek. Situated at about one 
thousand metres above Lee’s Mills, it formed the centre, and, 
according to the avowal of the Confederates, the weakest 
point of their line. A general cannonade was opened, from 
Yorktown to Lee’s Mills, so as not to draw the enemy’s 
attention exclusively to the point where it was intended to 
begin by silencing his artillery. But instead of making the 
assault immediately after, the cannonade was prolonged for 


— 252 — 


Williamsburg 

six hours, and thus Magruder was given ample time to pre¬ 
pare for defense wherever he might be menaced. At last, 
towards four o’clock, four companies of the Third Vermont, 
supported by the fire of twenty-two cannon which had al¬ 
ready dismounted two of the three guns in the enemy’s work, 
bravely rushed to the assault of that work. The Federals, 
crossing Warwick Creek with great boldness below the dam, 
took possession of the breastworks which commanded it, 
after an engagement in which they put to flight two regi¬ 
ments of the enemy, the Fifteenth North Carolina and the 
Sixteenth Georgia. The most difficult part of the task was 
accomplished, a foothold having been obtained on the other 
side of the creek; all that remained to be done was to take 
advantage of the surprise of the enemy to push regiment 
after regiment as rapidly as possible across the ford, to pass 
beyond the breastworks, to take possession of the redoubt, 
and thus, to pierce the enemy’s line; but the generals of 
various grades who had organized this demonstration had 
failed to agree beforehand as to the importance it was to 
assume, and much precious time was lost. 

For an hour the foremost assailants exhausted them¬ 
selves without receiving any other reinforcement than five 
or six hundred men of the Fourth and Sixth Vermont. The 
enemy took advantage of this delay to mass all his available 
forces upon the point menaced: that is to say, more than 
two divisions. The small body of Federal troops could not 
attack the redoubt, where the Confederates were increasing 
in number at every instant, but they made a stubborn de¬ 
fence in the breastworks they had conquered. Being finally 
overwhelmed by numbers, they were obliged to retire, and 
recross the river after losing more than two hundred killed 
and wounded. 

Although the Confederates were in a much better condi¬ 
tion to repulse that attack on the 16th of April than they 
would have been on the 6th or 7th, still, if the Federals 
had followed up the success of the Third Vermont, they 
would probably have pierced the line of Warwick Creek, 
and compelled Magruder to fight, without any point of sup- 


—253 


Civil War in America 


port, the forty thousand men they could have massed on 
that strip of land. 

This unfortunate affair produced a bad impression on 
the mind of the soldiers who had seen their comrades sacri¬ 
ficed without any orders being given to go to their assist¬ 
ance. It was moreover, the signals for new delays. On 
the following day, General McClellan decided to resort to 
the sure but slow means of a regular siege. The surround¬ 
ings of Yorktown alone afforded means of approach well 
adapted for this kind of attack; and on the 17th of April, 
the first parallel was opened at the head of a ravine situated 
about two thousand metres from one of the bastions. The 
inventive and laborious genius of the Americans had there 
an oportunity to signalize itself. The whole army set to 
work to cut roads, to construct bridges, to prepare places 
d’armes, to establish wharves, to dig trenches, and to erect 
batteries. Nothing was to be seen except manufactures 
of gabions and fascines. The siege equipage was landed, 
by dint of patience and exertion; cannon weighing as much 
as 10,000 kilogrammes, and thirteen-inch mortars, were 
placed in position. These immense labors, superintended 
in detail by the general-in-chief, who gave himself up en¬ 
tirely to his old specialty as an engineer officer, were prosecu¬ 
ted with the greatest activity. The woods and some un¬ 
dulations in the ground concealed them from the Confede¬ 
rates, whose shells, thrown at random, generally passed 
above the workmen, shattering the tall trees of the forest 
in their career.* 

Nevertheless, in spite of all their diligence, the time 
was passing away, precious time for military operations, 
for the winter rains were over, and the great summer had 
not yet set in. The army was impatiently waiting for the 
moment when all the guns which had been placed in position 
with so much trouble should finally break the silence, and, 
crushing the enemy with their fire, compel him to a precipi- 

*For one month the headquarters of the army were within reach 
of the enemy’s projectiles. The latter tried in vain to discover their 
locality, and during that entire month but one single Confederate 
cannon-ball whistled above the tents of the general staff. 


— 254 — 



Williamsburg 


tate retreat. The commanders contemplated the new works 
which were being thrown up as if by magic along the whole 
Confederate line, by great gangs of negroes and soldiers; 
they thought of the assault which would probably follow the 
bombardment, and were measuring with some uneasiness 
the vast space of ground swept by the fire of the adversary, 
which their young soldiers would have to pass over. 

The decisive moment was drawing near, and both sides 
seemed to be preparing for it with equal ardor. Indeed, 
the combat of Lee’s Mills had fully vindicated Magruder 
in the councils of the President of the Confederacy, and 
notwithstanding the advice of Lee, his chief of staff, and of 
Johnston himself, who were in favor of waiting for the 
enemy in front of Richmond, Mr. Davis had sent the last- 
mentioned general into the peninsula with all his army, 
where he was to hold out at least until all the valuable 
material accumulated in Norfolk could be placed in safety. 

On the other hand, Franklin’s division had rejoined 
McClellan on the 22d of -April. It had at first been intended 
for the investment of Gloucester Point, but instead of at¬ 
tempting a sudden assault in that direction, McClellan had 
preferred to leave it for a few days on board the transports 
which had brought it over, in order that it might take ad¬ 
vantage of the effect of the bombardment to ascend York 
River at the first signal. Everything was to be ready for 
the 5th of May; but the day before, at dawn, the Confederate 
army had disappeared; it had evacuated Yorktown during 
the night. This movement had been determined upon since 
the 30th of April, at a council of war held in Yorktown by 
Jefferson Davis, Lee, Johnston, and Magruder. The evacu¬ 
ation of Norfolk, which followed as a result, was to be 
effected at the same time. 

To ascertain the range of some one-hundred and two- 
hundred pounders which had just been placed in position, 
a few projectiles had been thrown into Yorktown. The 
sight of the damage they had caused was a wholesome 
warning to the Confederate chiefs, who, knowing themselves 
to be on the eve of a bombardment, had no desire to wait 
for its effects. When this decision had been adopted, Johns- 


— 255 — 


Civil War in America 


ton emptied his magazines, moved away his material and 
wagons, and established at the halting-places designated in 
his line of retreat such provisions as his army would need 
every evening after a rapid march. In order to conceal 
his movements, he had sacrificed his heavy artillery, which 
had kept up a continuous fire upfin the besiegers to the last 
moment, the intensity of which had even been doubled on 
the evening of the 3d of May so as to deceive them more 
thoroughly. Seventy-one guns of various calibres were the 
only trophies abandoned to the Federals. The only thing 
which distracted from the merit of this able retreat was 
the commission of certain barbarous acts which the usages 
of war do not justify. Bombshells and infernal machines 
were placed in the huts and storehouses, so that they would 
explode under the feet of the first persons who might be 
drawn thither by curiosity. A few unfortunate individuals 
having been killed in this manner, General McClellan very 
properly employed the Confederate prisoners in ridding 
Yorktown of these dangerous snares. 

When the Federal artillerists beheld the first rays of 
the sun lighting up the abandoned entrenchments, they felt 
for a moment stupified. So much labor should at least 
have ended in a fight, and they had not even the satisfaction 
of trying those new guns from which they had expected 
such powerful effects. It was a serious disappointment to 
all. They were compensated, however, by the immediate 
prospect of a forward march and a campaign which prom¬ 
ised to be thenceforth full of activity. 

In evacuating Yorktown the Confederates abandoned 
York River to the Federals. The latter, therefore, had 
control of one of the flanks of the peninsula, and were able, 
by means of a landing, to demolish all the defences by which 
the enemy might have attempted to stop them between York¬ 
town and West Point. The army of the Potomac could not 
allow Johnston to escape a second time, as he had already 
done at Manassas. It was important to overtake him at 
all hazards, in order if possible to turn his retreat into a 
rout, or at least not to allow him leisure to interpose a new 
barrier against the Federal army on its march upon the 


._ 256 — 


Williamsburg 

Confederate capital. The peninsula is so narrow that in 
many places the roads, which passed through it longitudin¬ 
ally, are merged into a single road—a road where wagons 
can only proceed in single file, and where, as it is impossible 
for more than four men to march abreast, the troops are 
obliged to break by the flank. To make an army of one hun¬ 
dred and twenty thousand men, accompanied by immense 
material, follow this single road, was simple impossibility; 
the head would have reached West Point before the rear had 
left Yorktown; it became necessary to take advantage of 
the opening of York River to transport a part of the army 
by water. Franklin’s division was already embarked, and 
the numerous transports which performed the victualling 
service for the army took three others on board, to land 
them near the mouth of the Pamunky in York River, so as 
to menace seriously the line of retreat of the Confederate 
army. The land route was reserved by McClellan for the 
remainder of the army. The advance-guard consisted of 
Stoneman’s division, comprising a little over four regiments 
of cavalry, two of which were regulars, and four batteries 
of regular horse artillery. Hooker’s division followed on 
the direct road from Yorktown to Williamsburg, while 
Smith, crossing Warwick Creek at Lee’s Mills, struck into 
a cross-road to the left leading to within sixteen hundred 
metres of Williamsburg, where it again joined the main 
road. Kearney’s division held itself in readiness to follow 
Hooker, and those of Couch and Casey to march in rear of 
Smith. 

Meanwhile, the retreat of the Confederate army, which 
had been carefully planned, was conducted with the great¬ 
est order. A large quantity of the material had been trans¬ 
ported to West Point by water, whence it could be forwarded 
to Richmond by rail, and a considerable portion of the army 
was one or two days’ march in advance of the rear-guard. 
The task of covering this retreat had been entrusted to Long- 
street’s corps, whose chief had already given token of those 
remarkable qualities which made him the best of Lee’s 
lieutenants. The Hampton legion closed up the march; 
this name was given to a brigade of cavalry, accompanied 


— 257 — 


Civil War in America 


by a few pieces of artillery, which had been raised in South 
Carolina by the general whose name it bore. The small 
space of ground on which Williamsburg is built was desig¬ 
nated by nature to have an important bearing on the re¬ 
treat of the Confederates. It was a narrow gate, easily 
kept closed, through which the whole army had to file in 
a single column, and which it was necessary to guard against 
the seizure of the enemy until the last man had passed. 

Defensive works of considerable strength had been con¬ 
structed there. The two streams, College Creek and Queen’s 
Creek, which as they wind through the dense woods, form 
numerous ponds in their course, take their rise at a distance 
of one kilometre from each other. The swamps by which 
they are surrounded soon render them impassable even for 
infantry. The space intervening between these two water¬ 
courses was for the most part occupied by a cultivated 
clearing. The woods had been cut down, and the skirt of 
the forest, being thus extended farther to the south-east 
by this abatis, described a concave arc of a circle enveloping 
this small open plateau at the south from one stream to 
the other. It was here that the two roads from Lee’s Mills, 
on the south, and from Yorktown, on the east, met. A 
large work closed at the gorge, called Fort Magruder, rose 
at a distance of three or four hundred metres in the rear 
of this intersection; it commanded both roads and the en¬ 
tire isthmus. To the north-east and to the south-west the 
Confederates had constructed, on the west bank of the two 
streams where the forest had been cut down, a chain of 
small redoubts, which defended the few passages practic¬ 
able for infantry. These passages consisted of three dams, 
two on Queen’s Creek and one on College Creek, so narrow 
that a few men lying in ambush would have barred their 
approaches to a whole column. 

Longstreet, after evacuating Yorktown during the night 
of the 3d-4th of May, proceeded rapidly toward Williams¬ 
burg, situated two thousand seven hundred metres beyond 
Fort Magruder, on the road to Richmond, for he intended 
to make there his first halt on the journey. The Federals 
allowed him to gain a precious advance during the first 


— 258 - 


Williamsburg 

hours of that difficult retreat, for they were not early risers 
in the Union armies. The disappointment was so great 
at the sudden departure of the Confederates that at first 
it could not be believed and when the evidence was con¬ 
clusive, everything had to be organized for an advance, 
which had not been contemplated. The troops had eaten 
nothing; the rations had not been distributed; many regi¬ 
ments had sent their wagons to a distance of several leagues 
to obtain them. In short, the cavalry division only took up 
its line of march between ten and eleven o’clock, Hooker at 
one o’clock, Smith a little later, and the other three divi¬ 
sions only at the close of the day. With a little more celer¬ 
ity the Confederate detachments which fell back upon 
Williamsburg from Lee’s Mills would have been intercepted 
by the Federal cavalry before they could have reached that 
town. 

In spite of all his activity, Stoneman was unable to 
repair the delay, which could not be imputed to him. Stimu¬ 
lated by certain indications which revealed to him the recent 
passage of the enemy, such as bivouac fires still burning, 
he hurried the march of his division; but the Confederate 
troops who followed the Lee’s Mills road had too much 
start. They were overtaken only by a small detachment 
led by the Due de Chartres, which was not strong enough 
to check the enemy’s column; the Federal cavalry, however, 
had the good fortune to pick up a few prisoners on its flanks. 
Whatever might have been Stoneman’s diligence in other 
respects, he could not have seriously embarrassed Long- 
street’s march; for unforeseen accidents supervened to 
delay still further the infantry destined to sustain him, and 
thus deprived him of the last chance of overtaking the enemy 
in time. There was an entire ignorance of the country at 
the Federal headquarters, the ground already occupied, of 
which the engineers had made some rough sketches, being 
the only section known; consequently, mistakes were un¬ 
avoidable. Having reached the forks of one of the numerous 
roads which pursue their winding course from clearing to 
clearing, Smith’s division, which kept to the left, took a 
wrong direction, and struck again into the principal road 


— 259 — 


Civil War in America 


between Yorktown and Williamsburg. It thus passed in 
front of Hooker’s division, to which this road had been 
assigned, stopped its heads of column, and threw confusion 
into the march of the troops who were huddled together 
with their artillery and baggage on a single road. From this 
moment it became impossible to compel the enemy to fight 
in front of the pass he had fortified; for while the Federal 
columns were advancing very slowly along the crowded 
road on the right, on the left the advance guard, consisting 
of Emory’s brigade of cavalry, having no infantry to sup¬ 
port it, was forced to watch the enemy at a distance. The 
latter, plunging finally into the forest which connected 
Queen’s and College Creeks, reached Fort Magruder and the 
chain of adjoining works. The artillery of the Hampton 
Legion, together with a few regiments of infantry which 
formed the rear-guard, finding this formidable line of de¬ 
fences very convenient, hastened to occupy it in order to 
hold the Federals in check, who were pressing them very 
close; and when the latter appeared on the edge of the forest, 
they were received by a tremendous fire. In the mean¬ 
time, the Sixth Cavalry, having discovered a fordable cross¬ 
ing of Queen’s Creek, vigorously charged upon the Confed¬ 
erates, drove them from their advanced positions, and cap¬ 
tured their first redoubt; but the latter, having taken refuge 
in the second, soon obliged the assailants to fall back. The 
sight of the numerous works occupied by the enemy was a 
real discovery to the Federals; they had no more idea of 
their existence than they had of Warwick Creek a month 
before. The Confederates, on their part, fearing, no doubt, 
to be taken in flank by the landing of troops on York River, 
had no thought at first of availing themselves of these 
works; they had made no preparations for defending them, 
and it was only when Hampton was closely pressed that, 
finding them in his path on the evening of the 4th, he occu¬ 
pied a portion of them in order to retard the march of the 
Federals. As will be seen presently, the Confederate gen¬ 
erals whose duty it was to cover the retreat were themselves 
very little acquainted with the position and importance of 
some of these entrenchments. 


— 260 — 


Williamsburg 

Stoneman had lost about forty men by the fire of the 
redoubts, and one of his guns remained immovable in the 
swamp. He had retired on this side of the forest to wait 
for the infantry, which was slow in coming up; General 
Sumner, whose rank gave him the command, had stopped 
this infantry, within five kilometers of Fort Magruder, not 
being then aware that the enemy was so near him. When 
the din of battle struck the ear of that old and valiant sol¬ 
dier, he immediately pushed forward Smith's division; but 
it was already getting dark, and before these troops could 
be deployed for battle the increasing darkness compelled 
them to postpone the fight till the next day. Sumner him¬ 
self having insisted, despite the obscurity of the night, upon 
reconnoitering the enemy's position in person, fell among 
their pickets, was fired upon at short range, became lost 
in a swamp, from which he was unable to extricate him¬ 
self, and passed the entire night at the foot of a tree between 
the two hostile lines. In the meanwhile, Hooker, finding 
the road he followed obstructed by Smith, took the one to 
the left, which had originally been assigned to the latter. 
His intention was to turn the enemy's works and enter 
Williamsburg the same evening. But after marching a 
considerable distance in the night, he was obliged, like the 
rest, to halt his columns to avoid going astray. 

The dawn of the next day, the 5th of May, was sad and 
gloomy. Torrents of rain had during the whole night de¬ 
luged the bivouacs of the young Federal soldiers, most of 
whom were without rations and covering. The wet roads 
had become frightful mud-holes. On the left the division 
of Hooker, on the right that of Smith, with Stoneman’s 
cavalry, were in the presence of the enemy; but these troops 
had waited in vain during the entire night for orders from 
Sumner, their common chief, of whose misadventures they 
had no knowledge; the three divisions of Kearny, Couch, 
and Casey, designed to support them, could only communi¬ 
cate with them through an almost impassable road from 
twelve to fifteen kilometres in length; finally, the remainder 
of the troops were slowly embarking at Yorktown under 
the direction of the general-in-chief. Such was the situa- 


— 261 — 


Civil War in America 

tion of the army of the Potomac on the morning of the 5th 
of May. 

The Confederates had all the advantage of position on 
their side. Longstreet had been made aware of the error 
he had committed in not occupying and strengthening the 
lines of defence around Williamsburg by the engagement 
of his rear-guard on the evening of the 4th. During the 
night he countermanded the march of his whole corps and 
brought it back into these lines; this time he was determined 
to dispute their possession with the Federals with the ut¬ 
most vigor, and to keep the latter in check sufficiently long 
to place the rest of the army out of reach of their attacks. 

Only a portion of his troops had arrived and taken 
position inside of the works, when, toward seven o’clock 
in the morning, Hooker, emerging out of the Lee’s Mills 
road, attacked his right. Longstreet’s artillery, posted in¬ 
side of Fort Magruder and in the adjacent redoubts, crossed 
its fire with that of the Confederate infantry over the nar¬ 
row open space which the assailants had to cross. The 
latter, being actually afraid to maneuver under such a fire, 
had deployed their battalions before crossing the forest. 
But the thickness of the undergrowth having broken their 
ranks, they no longer possessed that compactness which is 
required for a vigorous charge; and instead of pushing 
forward, they halted on the edge of the wood. Unable to 
overcome this obstacle, they ambushed themselves in the 
abatis, from whence they opened fire upon the enemy. The 
three batteries of the division came to their assistance and 
boldly took position at the point most exposed, which was 
at the outlet of the road; but the enemy’s missiles were 
soon concentrated upon them, overthrowing gunners and 
horses before they were able to fire a single shot. The 
Federals were not discouraged on this account; willing hands 
came forward to serve the guns; they even succeeded in 
gaining an advantage over the Confederate cannon and in 
silencing the fire of Fort Magruder. At the juncture the 
Confederates seemed to be wavering; but Hooker’s soldiers, 
who had been under more fire than they, had suffered too 
seriously to take advantage of this momentary hesitation. 


— 262 — 


Williamsburg 

The remainder of Longstreet’s corps reached the scene of 
action and assumed the offensive in its turn. In order to 
preserve his position, Hooker was obliged to engage his 
very last man. A desperate struggle took place in the aba¬ 
tis ; the two hostile lines wavered in front of each other; 
the Federals were driven back several times, but their lost 
ground was as often recovered. It was now one o’clock. 
Hooker had been sustaining the fight alone since morning; 
no reinforcements had reached him, no order, no message; 
while along the rest of the line the utmost silence prevailed. 
To the left he had sent Emory with his cavalry and three 
regiments of infantry to try to attack the Confederate line 
by crossing the dam which intersects College Creek; but 
Emory, afraid of going astray, proceeded with the utmost 
caution, and wasted the whole day without reaching the 
enemy. On the right of Hooker, Smith’s division was drawn 
up across the Yorktown road, in the rear of the wood, very 
narrow at this place, which intercepts the view of Fort 
Magruder; but although this division was only separated 
by fourteen or fifteen metres from that which is engaged, 
there was no connecting link between them, the wood which 
stretches between the two roads they had followed remained 
unoccupied, and even unexplored. 

Smith had not yet fired a single shot. The three corps 
commanders of the army of the Potomac, whom chance had 
brought together, had established their headquarters along¬ 
side of his division; they held a conference; and as is 
almost invariably the case under similar circumstances, 
they secured no concert of action to the Federal Army. 
There was but one movement ordered to be made in the 
course of the morning. Having been informed of the ex¬ 
istence of the dams which obstruct the passage of Queen’s 
Creek, they sent to seize it one of Smith’s brigades, com¬ 
manded by General Hancock, a young officer but little known 
at the time. There yet remained Smith’s two other bri¬ 
gades, his artillery and that of the cavalry division, about 
six or seven thousand men, with thirty pieces of cannon. 
Notwithstanding the constantly increasing din of battle in 
which Hooker was engaged on the left, despite the urgent 


— 263 — 


Civil War in America 


messages of the latter, Sumner refused to bring his troops 
under fire, and confined himself to hastening the arrival 
of those already on the march. Doubtless he had then 
but a very small force at his disposal to cover the outlet 
of the Yorktown road—an outlet which it was essential 
to defend at all hazards; for the least symptom of a retreat 
would have thrown the long column which crowded that 
road into indiscribable confusion. But the surest way 
of maintaining his ground would have been to engage 
the fight along the whole line, thereby dividing the forces 
of the enemy instead of allowing his adversary to con¬ 
centrate his troops, to crush one of his wings, as he was 
actually doing. Indeed the repeated efforts of the Confed¬ 
erates succeeded at last in shaking the confidence of Hooker’s 
soldiers, who felt themselves unsupported; they lost the 
abatis where they had held out so long, and while still 
fighting, slowly fell back across the woods which they 
had occupied in the morning. Two batteries, the horses 
of which have all been killed, are left upon the ground. 
In falling back Hooker uncovers the left flank of the 
troops who had remained under arms on the Yorktown 
road while he was fighting. The wood by which they are 
surrounded shut out the enemy from view, but the balls 
whistling among the trees and dealing destruction in their 
ranks announce his approach. Consequently, a certain 
amount of disquietude is manifested among these young 
soldiers who are preparing for battle under the blows of an 
adversary yet invisible. 

The situation was becoming serious; but the critical 
moment was selected by fortune for a sudden change. Stim¬ 
ulated less by Sumner’s pressing orders than by the 
sound of cannon which called him to the field, Kearney 
comes at last to Hooker’s assistance. Pushing his division 
along the road, which is encumbered with wagons, he has 
turned to the left, like the latter, and after making his men, 
fatigued by a long march, throw off their knapsacks, he 
deploys them with as much precision as if on a drill-ground. 
Of a character difficult to manage, of a quick temper, of a 


— 264 — 


Williamsburg 

sharp and satirical turn of mind, this admirable soldier 
became a different man as soon as he found himself in the 
presence of the enemy. His calmness, his piercing glance, 
his clear voice, his orders, always precise, inspired the con¬ 
fidence of all those who served under him. Deploying two 
brigades in line of battle and holding the third in reserve, 
he allows Hooker’s soldiers to pass between the intervals 
of his battalions, and takes up the battle in the wood in 
their place. He arrives in time to rescue one of the two 
batteries abandoned a moment before, which the enemy was 
about to seize. The latter, after a stubborn resistance, is 
driven back as far as the abatis; but he maintains himself 
a long time on that difficult ground, being supported by the 
fire from his own works. A final effort on the part of the 
entire division wrests at last a portion of the abatis from 
the Confederates, at the very time that the darkness of the 
evening is beginning to spread over the long-contested battle¬ 
field. 

On the right the Federals have at last decided to take 
part in the battle. Toward four o’clock, just as Kearny was 
coming to Hooker’s assistance, the head of the long column 
which followed the Yorktown turnpike emerges into the 
clearing where Smith’s troops are drawn up. Peck’s bri¬ 
gade, which is the first to make its appearance, enters the 
wood and vigorously attacks the left of the forces opposed 
to Hooker and Kearney, thus making a valuable diversion 
in favor of the latter. The first to reach the scene of con¬ 
flict at this opportune moment are the Lafayette Guards; 
encouraged by their commander, Colonel de Trobriand, and 
sustained by their French animation, they have overcome 
all the obstacles in the road. They penetrate into the wood, 
seeking with a damp smoke, where the balls whistle through 
the thick foliage of the forests, and gaily rush forward in 
search of that baptism of fire the honor of which is reserved 
to all, but for which many among them will have to pay 
with their lives. In the meanwhile, on the extreme right, 
Hancock with his brigade had crossed Queen’s Creek in 
the morning, and finding a small redoubt unoccupied on the 
other bank had planted himself in it. This redoubt was a 


— 265 — 



Civil War in America 


link in the chain of works of which Fort Magruder was the 
centre. Finding no enemy before him, Hancock fearlessly 
advanced with his three or four thousand men; a second 
and a third redoubt, likewise deserted, are passed, when he 
arrives at last in sight of the left flank of Fort Magruder 
and the whole Confederate army. If he had been at the 
head of a division, he might have fallen suddenly upon the 
enemy, and probably obtained a decided success. But his 
force was not strong enough to attempt such a bold stroke, 
being so far from the reach of any reinforcements. The ut¬ 
most that he could do was to hold the position of which he 
had so unexpectedly taken possession, and to await for the 
arrival of a sufficient force to avail himself of the advan¬ 
tages which it offered. But the reinforcements he asked 
for were refused, as they had been to Hooker, the only 
replies to his urgent appeals being repeated orders to fall 
back. Feeling how important it was to hold a position 
which took all the enemy’s defences in the rear, and which 
would probably cost waves of blood to reconquer, he con¬ 
tented himself by merely evacuating the foremost redoubt, 
and determined to defend the others at all risk. Fortun¬ 
ately for the Federals, if their general staff was deficient, 
that of their adversaries was even more so, and the connec¬ 
tion which such a corps ought to preserve between all sec¬ 
tions of an army was entirely wanting in the Confederate 
ranks. In consequence of this defect of organization, Long- 
street was not apprised of Hancock’s movement, nor of the 
menacing position which the latter had taken upon his flank. 
It is certainly strange that the Confederates should have 
allowed those four Federal battalions to remain in peaceful 
possession during a whole day of a redoubt by which their 
entire line of defense could be turned; but is it not more 
singular that none of them thought of occupying the works 
they had constructed with their own hands in anticipation 
of such a struggle? 

It is already four o’clock; Hooker has been driven back 
into the woods, and the approaches to Fort Magruder are 
entirely free; it is at this juncture that Longstreet turns 
his attention, for the first time, toward his left, and per- 


— 266 — 


Williamsburg 

ceiving Hancock, thinks of dislodging him. He sends 
against Early’s brigade, the commander of which was 
destined, like his young adversary, to play an important 
part during the remainder of the war. Seeing the Federals 
fall back upon the farthest redoubt, Early’s soldiers imag¬ 
ine that they are already in flight and rush upon them; but 
being received at point-blank range by a well-directed fire, 
they are driven back in disorder. The Federals, urged on 
by the valiant Hancock, pursue them sword in hand. It is 
now five o’clock—the moment when Kearny comes into line 
at the other extremity of the battle-field. 

General McClellan at last arrived among the combat¬ 
ants. While a salvo of musketry and the hurrahs of Han¬ 
cock’s brigade announced to him this brilliant passage-at- 
arms from a distance, the Federal troops, massed in various 
places along the road, who had felt most keenly the absence 
of all direction during the battle, received their chief with 
acclamations. The Confederates, on their side, satisfied 
in having held their ground around Fort Magruder, did not 
attempt another attack against Hancock. Night came on 
while the various Federal corps recently arrived were tak¬ 
ing their position, and the left was forming a connection 
with the right; the continuation of the battle was therefore 
adjourned to the next day. 

Recognizing at first glance the importance of the 
position so fortunately maintained by Hancock, McClellan 
saw at once that all the Confederate defences were turned, 
and that the troops assembled around him would suffice 
to make them fall. Besides, the obstruction of the road 
over which he had just passed had convinced him that the 
two divisions whose embarkation he had suspended at the 
moment of his departure, to forward them to the scene of 
action, would not arrive in time if the battle was renewed. 
He therefore ordered them back to the transports which 
were to convey them to West Point. He was not, however, 
without some uneasiness regarding the issue of the next 
day’s fight; for with such young soldiers a panic was always 
to be feared; and having desired to take the offensive, he 
thought the enemy might try to forestall him by an early 


— 267 — 


Civil War in America 


morning attack. But Johnston, who had only halted for 
the purpose of covering his retreat, and who was aware 
of his great numerical inferiority to the Federals, saw that 
a longer stay in front of Williamsburg with Hancock on his 
flank might compromise the very existence of the troops 
who had been in action the day before. During the night 
he ordered Longstreet to evacuate all the positions he had 
so vigorously defended, and hastily resume his march in 
the direction of Richmond with all his troops. This was a 
wise decision; for at Williamsburg he could have made but 
a short resistance, the Federals having it always in their 
power to land troops higher up the York River and menace 
his line of retreat. Besides, it never had been his intention 
to prolong the struggle in the peninsula. It was only through 
necessity, and in order to resist the persistent attacks of 
Hooker, that he had been finally induced to impart the pro¬ 
portions of a pitched battle to a simple affair of the rear 
guard. This battle was a first ordeal to most of the troops 
engaged on both sides; it showed how much the spirit of 
the two armies had been improved since the beginning of 
the war. Early’s brigade, which, while charging Hancock’s 
troops, cried out to them ironically, “Bull Run,” learnt to 
its own cost that it had committed an anachronism. Differ¬ 
ing widely from the encounter of which the Manassas pla¬ 
teau had been the scene the preceding year, this bloody and 
undecided battle continued during an entire day on a narrow 
space of ground, marks, in fact, the real commencement 
of the long struggle between the two large armies of the 
Potomac and Northern Virginia, which after unheard-of 
sacrifices on both sides, terminated in the annihilation of 
the latter at the end of three years. 

The town of Williamsburg was full of Confederate 
wounded. The spacious halls of the college, which had 
been converted into a hospital, presented a painful sight 
to the uninitiated. But the most cruel sufferings were re¬ 
served for those soldiers of both parties who had fallen in 
the midst of the abatis. Hiddon under the branches of the 
felled trees, they escaped for a long time the most active 
search, and on the third day after the battle some were 


— 268 — 


Williamsburg 


taken out who had yet a spark of life. During the evening 
of that same day the dry wood was set on fire by accident; 
the conflagration spread rapidly, and stifling the agonizing 
cries of those who were perhaps still waiting for the succor 
of their friends, swept away the last traces of the victims 
of the struggle. 

The Confederates had three thousand men disabled, and 
left six hundred unhurt prisoners in the hands of the Fed- 
erals. The latter lost two thousand and seventy-three men 
in killed and wounded, and six hundred and twenty-three 
prisoners. Two-thirds of these losses fell to the share of 
Hooker’s division, at the evening roll-call of which one 
thousand five hundred and seventy-five combatants were 
missing, one thousand two hundred and forty of whom had 
fallen by the fire of the enemy. These telling figures show 
that it had borne the whole brunt of that day’s fight. 

The Federals had lost six guns, but they picked up six 
others, which the enemy abandoned in the suburbs of 
Williamsburg. Everything bore evidence that the retreat 
of the Confederates had at first been precipitate and dis¬ 
orderly. The road was strewn for miles with canon, 
wagons, and equipment. In these trophies the army of the 
Potomac beheld the most substantial proof of its success; 
and on entering the forest and the town of Williamsburg 
the day after the important battle, it had no need to inquire 
whether the enemy intended to dispute any further the 
possession of those places. Consequently although the bat¬ 
tle had, in reality, been undecided, its effect upon the morale 
of the two armies was entirely to the advantage of the 
Federals. Unfortunately for the army of the Potomac, it 
was unable to turn it immediately to account. The diffi¬ 
culty in obtaining supplies kept it for several days around 
Williamsburg. The only road from Yorktown, softened 
by the rain, obstructed by cavalry, by the reserve park, by 
a part of the artillery of the divisions which had been em¬ 
barked, and by baggage of every kind which follows an 
army, did not suffice for the passage of the wagons con¬ 
taining the necessary rations for sixty thousand men who 
were assembled in Williamsburg on the 6th and 7th. 


— 269 — 


Civil War in America 


It was found necessary to establish a temporary victu¬ 
alling base near that town. In one day the wooded banks 
of Queen’s Creek are cleared and rude wharves built, where 
transports come to deposit their cargoes of salt pork, bis¬ 
cuit, rice, and forage, which the army-wagons, lightened 
by several days’ consumption, proceed to distribute among 
the various regiments. In exchange the vessels receive 
a sad but precious cargo, consisting of all the wounded able 
to bear transportation, who, after a first dressing of their 
wounds, are forwarded to the large Northern cities, where 
they will meet with the care, comfort, and pure air which 
will solace their sufferings. 

We left four divisions at Yorktown the day after the 
evacuation of that place, ready to embark in order to reach 
the extremity of the long estuary of York River. If con¬ 
ducted with speed, this operation might be productive of 
brilliant results. It assures a new base of supplies in ad¬ 
vance of the army, thus enabling it to march by longer 
stages; by taking Williamsburg in the rear, it rendered all 
resistance on the part of the Confederates useless; for if 
they had lingered there, it would have placed them in a 
most perilous position. In fact, while Johnston, with a 
portion of his army, was checking the progress of the 
Federals in the lines of defence at Williamsburg, the re¬ 
mainder was disposed en echelon on the Richmond road; 
the four divisions thrown on the flank of this road could 
either occupy it before the Confederates, or surprise them 
on the march, throw their columns into confusion by harass¬ 
ing them, or at least deprive them of all the advantage of 
the start which had cost them so dear by fighting the battle 
of Williamsburg. 

Unfortunately, notwithstanding the presence of the 
general-in-chief, this opportunity was lost in consequence 
of delays not yet accounted for. Two days after the evacua¬ 
tion of Yorktown, on the evening of the battle of Williams¬ 
burg, these forces had not yet embarked, and Franklin’s 
division, which had never left the transports, was waiting 
in vain for the signal of departure. The orders and counter¬ 
orders of which we have just spoken caused fresh delays 


— 270 — 


Williamsburg 

on the evening of the 5th of May; and leaving the rest of 
the troops behind, this division started alone during the 
night. It reached the mouth of the Pamunky River on the 
6th, at a place called Eltham, not far from the little village 
of Barhamsville. Newton’s brigade, together with some 
artillery, was landed before sunset on the right bank of the 
river, and the process of disembarkation was suspended 
until the following day. 

On the morning of the 7th this operation had just been 
ended when Franklin’s division was fiercely attacked by 
the Confederates. The whole of Johnston’s army had 
started early on the 6th, just as Longstreet was leaving 
Williamsburg, and his heads of column had to bivouac that 
evening in the vicinity of Barhamsville. On learning that 
the Federals were landing troops in the neighborhood, the 
Confederate general sent Whiting’s division to surprise 
them in the midst of that delicate operation, to prevent 
them from menacing his flank, and to try and drive them 
into the water. Franklin had landed in a vast field sur¬ 
rounded by woods on three sides. The pickets occupying 
these woods were suddenly attacked by Whiting and driven 
back, the combat extending to the very verge of the forest. 
The Federals, shut up within a narrow space of ground, 
and exposed to the fire of an enemy not yet visible, had 
some cause to dread a renewal of the Ball’s Bluff disaster. 
But a battery that had been landed on the day previous, and 
the artillery of the gunboats which accompanied Franklin’s 
expedition, opened their fire upon the skirts of the woods, 
where the enemy was beginning to show himself, and soon 
threw his ranks into confusion. In the meantime, a bri¬ 
gade of Sedgwick’s division having been landed, the Fed¬ 
erals resumed the offensive, and easily repulsed their ad¬ 
versary. They did not venture, however, to follow in pur¬ 
suit. They had one hundred and ninety-four men disabled. 

Hastily falling back upon Richmond after this action, 
the Confederates completely escaped all further attacks 
of the army of the Potomac. The Federal cavalry, despite 
its utmost endeavors, was hardly able to keep within sight 
* of their rear-guard, so greatly is the character of that 


— 271 — 


Civil War in America 


country opposed to offensive warfare when large masses of 
men have to be moved. Three days after the battle of 
Williamsburg the first columns of the Federal infantry left 
that town, and on the 10th of May the whole army was 
receiving its supplies from the depot established near 
Eltham. A new phase of the campaign was about to be¬ 
gin. Notwithstanding many miscalculations and/ delays, 
General McClellan had succeeded in removing the seat of 
war from the vicinity of Washington to that of Richmond. 
He had left the peninsula for a richer and more open 
country, where he could have plenty of elbow-room, and 
nothing but a battle delivered in open field could prevent him 
from appearing before the works which had been erected 
during the winter around the Confederate capital. 

Being free in his movements, how was he going to 
maneuver to attack it? For a few days his route lay entirely 
along the Pamunky, which for him was a prolongation of 
the York River line, through which he had up to that time 
received his supplies. The ships which the enemy had sunk 
on the bar were soon raised, and the whole fleet of trans¬ 
ports entered that river, the slow and muddy waters of 
which pursue their winding course between banks of prodi¬ 
gious fertility. On their passage the silence of a still virgin 
nature was temporarily succeeded by a show of life, or, more 
properly speaking, of buoyant activity; at night all these 
vessels, like so many fantastic apparitions, threw a glare 
of light across the foliage of the tall trees whose feet were 
bathed by the waters. In this way the army reached the 
neighborhood of Cumberland, then that of the White House, 
where the Pamunky becomes difficult of navigation, and a 
small railway line leading from West Point to Richmond 
crosses from the left to the right side of the river. In order 
to continue the campaign, McClellan had only to follow this 
road by repairing it, so as to make it useful in victualling 
the army; he could thus march upon the enemy’s capital 
while still preserving his base of operations on the Pamunky. 
But just as he was preparing to make this movement an 
unlooked-for opportunity offered for adopting another plan, 


— 272 — 


Williamsburg 

which, although apparently more hazardous, promised, 
nevertheless, to be surer and more decisive. 

As we have said before, the Confederates had only 
deferred the evacuation of Yorktown in order to secure that 
of Norfolk. General Huger, who occupied that place with 
his division, had succeeded, like Magruder, in deceiving his 
adversaries in regard to his numerical weakness, and the 
Federal authorities had not dared to send Burnside’s corps, 
then stationed at Roanoke Island, in North Carolina, against 
him. There is no doubt but that these troops would only 
have had to make a simple demonstration, without even 
going entirely through so difficult a country, to precipitate 
the evacuation of Norfolk, and thus deprive the Confed¬ 
erates of all the material which they had not yet been able 
to transfer to Richmond. As soon as Huger was informed 
of Johnston’s retreat, he sent away all his troops, remaining 
almost alone in Norfolk, ready to destroy the docks, the 
work-shops, the hulks and all that was left of the navy- 
yard, as soon as the evacuations should be completed. This 
operation could have been speedily accomplished by water, 
thanks to the protection of the Virginia, which kept a 
watch at the entrance of the port. Her presence alone 
defended the Confederate transports ascending the James 
against the whole Union fleet. 

By the 8th of May, Huger had completed his final 
preparations for the work of destruction. Some fugitives 
immediately carried the news to Fortress Monroe. As we 
have already stated, old General Wool, who was in command 
of that place, was no longer under the orders of General 
McClellan, and the first use he had made of his independence 
had been to retain upon the glacis of the fortress the whole 
division which had occupied the extremity of the peninsula 
during the winter. When he saw the two hostile armies 
penetrate into Virginia after the battle of Williamsburg, 
he was desirous to give employment to these troops, but was 
afraid at the same time, lest they should again be placed 
under the orders of McClellan, so that instead of leading 
them into action by the side of their comrades in arms, he 
conceived the idea of making them gather cheap laurels 


— 273 — 


Civil War in America 


among the ruins of the Norfolk navy yard. The occasion 
was the more favorable as the President, accompanied by 
the Secretary of War, had arrived at Fort Monroe on that 
very day; they had set out on hearing of the capture of 
Yorktown, and were coming to congratulate the army of 
the Potomac upon that success. Being apprised by the col¬ 
umns of smoke which rose in the horizon that the propitious 
moment had arrived, Wool proposed to the President to 
undertake an expedition against Norfolk. Max Weber’s 
brigade was speedily embarked, and, to protect his descent, 
Commodore Goldsborough’s fleet was ordered to escort it. 
But the Confederate batteries, not having yet been aban¬ 
doned, fired a few shots in reply, while the Virginia, which, 
since the wounding of the brave Buchanan, had been com¬ 
manded by Commodore Tatnall, showed her formidable shell 
(carapace), and the expedition was countermanded. Two 
days more were consumed in waiting. Finally, on the 
morning of the 10th, Weber disembarked east of Sewall’s 
Point. This time the enemy’s artillery was silent. There 
was found an entrenched camp mounting a few guns, but 
absolutely deserted; General Wool reached the city of Nor¬ 
folk, which had been given up to its peaceful inhabitants 
the day previous, and hastened to place a military governor 
there. The President, who had made his entrance into the 
newly conquered city with Wool, announced this cheaply- 
bought success to the American people in a special bulletin, 
while he forgot the words of encouragement so justly due 
to the soldiers who had just fought important battles. 

Meantime, the evacuation of Norfolk was followed by 
an event destined to influence military operations to a con¬ 
siderable extent, of which the President was yet ignorant, 
and the merits of which General Wool could not appropriate 
to himself. The Virginia was no longer in existence. That 
formidable vessel had been abandoned and destroyed by her 
crew. On the 9th of May she was the last to come out of 
that port of Norfolk, whence, during two months, she had 
held the whole Federal fleet in check. Was she to make a 
desperate attempt to steam into Hampton Roads, and thence 
either to gain the open sea or run the risk of being sur- 


— 274 — 


Williamsburg 

rounded by the debris of that fleet and perish? Or was it 
not better to reascend the James River, so as to keep the 
Federal navy away from Richmond? Tatnall adopted the 
latter course. In order to get over the sand-banks of the 
river more easily, he lightened the ship, in pursuance of 
his pilot’s advice, by landing the guns, ammunition, and all 
the war material he had on board. But when on the 11th, 
this operation completed he wished to go up the James, the 
same pilots declared that, in consequence of a westerly wind, 
the tide was not sufficiently high to enable the Virginia to 
get over the banks. The vessel was disarmed; her hull, 
rising higher than the water-line and the iron covering, was 
no longer proof against Goldsborough’s cannon-balls. The 
latter might arrive at any moment. Tatnall was perplexed; 
and without attempting to remedy the error of the previous 
day, he set fire to his ship. The James River was open. 
The Federal gunboats hastened to steam into it, and ascend¬ 
ing the stream with speed appeared on the 15th within 
less than twelve kilometres of Richmond. 

There was great excitement in the Confederate capital. 
The excessive confidence inspired by the success of the 
Virginia two months before caused her loss to be severely 
felt. There were cries of treason. People expected every 
moment to see the broadside of the little Monitor bear upon 
the edifice where the delegates of all the Southern States 
were in session. The rich were preparing for flight and 
the poor for plunder. Courage and determination were 
displayed side by side with the most abject fears. The 
cannon spoke out at last, and the whole day was spent in 
listening to its solemn voice from a distance. It ceased to 
speak; evening came, and the gunboats did not make their 
appearance. Richmond was saved. The Federal flotilla 
had encountered a large battery known as Fort Darling, 
perched upon the summit of a steep acclivity called Drury’s 
Bluff. A stockade rendered it impossible to pass this bat¬ 
tery rapidly, which was manned with cannon of heavy 
calibre, while the angle in the river prevented the vessels 
from perceiving it afar off. On the 15th of May the Moni¬ 
tor, accompanied by the Galena, a lightly-sheathed gunboat 


— 275 — 


Civil War in America 


of which we have already spoken, and two wooden vessels, 
made an unsuccessful attack upon Fort Darling. The Moni¬ 
tor could not give sufficient elevation to her guns to reach 
the heights occupied by the enemy, and the two wooden 
vessels had not the requisite strength to sustain the con¬ 
flict. The Galena commanded by the intrepid Rogers, per¬ 
sisted in her efforts for a considerable length of time; but 
she finally withdrew, after having experienced severe losses 
and without having done any damage to her adversaries. 
The advantage of elevated positions in defending a river, 
which had already been demonstrated at Fort Donelson, in 
this instance received a new and striking confirmation. 

Thus the James River, which had been closed until then 
by the presence of the Virginia, as York River had been by 
the cannon of Yorktown, was opened by the destruction of 
that ship, just as York River had been by the evacuation 
of the Confederate fortress. But it was only open as far 
as Drury’s Bluff; in order to overcome this last obstacle 
interposed between Richmond and the Federal gunboats, 
the support of the land-forces was necessary. 

On the 19th of May, Commodore Goldsborough had a 
conference with General McClellan regarding the means to 
be employed for removing that obstacle. The headquarters 
were at Tunstall’s station, on the railway from West Point 
and Richmond. The whole army was placed en echelon 
within reach of this road, between the Pamunky and the 
Chickahominy. The latter river had been struck at Bot¬ 
tom’s Bridge, over which the old mail route from Williams¬ 
burg to Richmond passes. The enemy had not disputed 
its passage. Only a few cavalry pickets had been seen. He 
was evidently reserving his entire force for the defence of 
the immediate approaches to his capital. General McClel¬ 
lan, as we have stated above, might have continued to follow 
the railway line, and preserved his depots at White House 
on the Pamunky, which would have led him to force the 
passage of the Chickahominy above Bottom’s Bridge and 
attempt an attack upon Richmond on the north side; but 
he could also now go to reestablish his base of operations 
on James River, which the Virginia had hitherto prevented 


— 276 — 


Williamsburg 

him from doing. By crossing the Chickahominy at Bottom’s 
Bridge, and at some of the fords situated lower down, be¬ 
tween that bridge and the extreme point reached by the 
tide, he was sure of encountering no resistance. The army, 
by carrying in their wagons a sufficient quantity of provi¬ 
sions, could have reached the borders of the James in two 
or three days, where its transports would have preceded it. 
This flank march, effected at a sufficient distance from the 
enemy and covered by a few demonstrations along the upper 
Chickahominy, offered him great advantages without involv¬ 
ing any risk. It enabled him to advance afterward as far 
as Richmond, by following the course of a navigable river, 
open at all times, instead of obtaining his supplies by rail¬ 
way, exposed to the attacks of the enemy; it avoided the 
formidable obstacles which the Chickahominy interposed 
on the north side, and by assaulting the city on the south 
side it threatened to separate it from the rest of the Confed¬ 
eracy. 

But to adopt this plan McClellan should have been able 
to count upon the enlightened concurrence on the part of 
the government at Washington. Indeed, he could only 
have executed it by withdrawing the imaginary protection 
which his army was supposed to afford the capital of the 
United States from a distance. Instead of recognizing the 
fact that best way of defending the capital was to keep all 
the enemy’s forces occupied elsewhere, the Federal authori¬ 
ties fancied that the safety of Washington depended on the 
position of the army of the Potomac before Richmond. Im¬ 
pressed with this idea, they offered McClellan important 
reinforcements, provided he would place himself to the 
north of the enemy’s capital. The day before Goldsborough 
proposed to him to invest Richmond on the south, he had 
received a dispatch from Mr. Lincoln informing him that 
McDowell’s corps, reinforced and numbering nearly forty- 
thousand men, was at last about to leave the banks of the 
Rappahannock to co-operate with him against Richmond. 
This corps, with a view to avoid enormous expenses, as well 
as for the purpose of covering Washington, instead of em¬ 
barking, was to march directly southward, so as to form 


— 277 — 


Civil War in America 


the right of the army of the Potomac. It was placed under 
the orders of McClellan,, although an absurd restriction 
revealed the old mistrusts and fears, as we know, and did 
not permit the general-in-chief to separate it from the direct 
road from Richmond to Washington. In thus imposing 
upon McClellan the necessity of operating by way of the 
north, the President did not appreciate the advantages of 
a march along the line of the James, which Grant’s last 
campaign so clearly demonstrated four years later. If Mc¬ 
Clellan could have foreseen how deceptive were the promises 
of reinforcement made to him at the time, he would un¬ 
doubtedly have declined the uncertain support of McDowell, 
to carry out the plan of campaign which offered the best 
chances of success with the troops which were absolutely 
at his disposal. But the formal assurances he was receiv¬ 
ing did not permit him to pursue such a course, and he 
subordinated his movements to those which the President 
directed in person. The project of marching upon the 
James was abandoned, and the army, penetrating into a 
country bristling with obstacles, commenced a series of oper¬ 
ations which only brought doubtful and dearly bought suc¬ 
cesses. Resting its left on Bottom’s Bridge, which it al¬ 
ready occupied, and deploying its right, it took a position 
higher up along the north side of the Chickahominy, to join 
hands with McDowell, whose arrival was long waited for 
in vain, but who never made his appearance. 

This army had passed through the first ordeals of the 
war. It had worked in the presence of the enemy; it had 
fought; it had marched; it had shown itself laborious, pa¬ 
tient, intelligent. In battle the soldiers had displayed great 
personal bravery and tenacity. It was owing to these quali¬ 
ties that the mismanagement of those in command at 
Williamsburg had not been productive of the fatal results 
that might have been apprehended. The regiments which 
had suffered most in battle, if temporarily disorganized, 
had promptly recovered their equanimity. On the march 
they had been less successful. It is true that the roads 
were few, narrow and in a bad condition, but this difficulty 
did not quite justify the extreme slowness of their move- 


— 278 — 


Williamsburg 


ments and the confusion into which their columns were more 
than once thrown. The American soldier had yet much 
to learn in this respect; the history of the war will show 
that he became in the course of time, if not the equal of 
the best foot-soldiers in Europe, at least a sufficiently good 
marcher to undergo, when necessary, one of those long 
marches upon which the success of a battle frequently de¬ 
pends. 

But before following the army of the Potomac any 
further, we must relate the events that are taking place 
in other parts of Virginia at the same time, and which were 
destined to exercise so great and so fatal an influence on 
its subsequent operations. 


— 279 — 


CHAPTER II 


Fair Oaks 

The departure of General McClellan had left a clear field 
for the strategic experiments of Mr. Lincoln and his mili¬ 
tary advisers. They had at once proceeded to alter all the 
arrangements that had been made by the commander of the 
army of the Potomac for the safety of Washington. In¬ 
stead of confining themselves to such points as were of im¬ 
portance for the defence of the capital, and considering the 
rest as the enemy’s country, given up to the guerrillas of 
both parties, they sought to extend the Federal rule over the 
whole region comprised between the Rappahannock and the 
Potomac, and to make a political conquest of them before 
having achieved the victories which alone could secure it. 
With this object in view, the numerous troops they had kept 
back under the pretext of protecting Washington were scat¬ 
tered over so extended a line they possessed no power of 
resistance. McDowell’s corps had been sent as far as the 
Rappahannock. Shield’s division, detached from Banks’ 
corps, had come to replace under McDowell’s command that 
of Franklin, which had been sent to Yorktown. It had left 
the valley of Virginia in the second week of May to join its 
new corps commander, who already occupied Fredericks¬ 
burg with the three divisions of Ord, McCall and King, and 
who was watching an enemy reduced in reality to a thin line 
of mounted scouts. Gerry, with a few regiments, equivalent 
to a small division, occupied Manassas. Banks, instead of 
remaining on the defensive, after having successfully re¬ 
pulsed Jackson at Winchester, had followed his adversary 
step by step into the great valley watered by the Shenan¬ 
doah; and the President, encouraged by this easy success, 
had urged him to push on to Harrisonburg, one hundred and 
ten kilometres from Winchester, without troubling himself 
about the dangers which such an advanced position involved. 
Once there, he had suddenly withdrawn from him, as we 
have just stated, Shield’s division, thereby reducing the 


— 280 — 


Fair Oaks 


number of his forces to six or seven thousand men. More 
to the west, Fremont with the army of the Mountain, so 
called, occupied West Virginia, which the Confederates had 
entirely abandoned since the end of January. One of his 
brigades, commanded by Crook, was posted on the banks of 
Greenbrier River, while the remainder of his troops were 
encamped at Moorefield, and Franklin in some of the numer¬ 
ous valleys which stretch between the ridges of the Alle- 
ghanies. The President, after taking away Blenker’s divi¬ 
sion from the army of the Potomac, in order to place it at 
Manassas, had sent it to Fremont, thus increasing the num¬ 
ber of his forces to six brigades, amounting to thirteen or 
fourteen thousand men. These armies, being so scattered 
as to be unable to give each other mutual support, were all 
independent of one another; McDowell, Geary, Banks, and 
Fremont received their orders direct from Washington. The 
Secretary who directed the movements of these armies in 
the name of the President from the recesses of his office, 
was thus preparing an inevitable defeat for them. Jackson 
was not the man to neglect such an opportunity. 

Yorktown had just been evacuated. All the Confeder¬ 
ate forces which were in Virginia were assembling around 
Richmond to swell Johnston’s army. It would have been 
easy for the several Federal armies to make a correspond¬ 
ing movement. McDowell could by a few days’ march have 
joined McClellan on the borders of the Chickahominy. Fre¬ 
mont occupied the two slopes of the Alleghanies; the Con¬ 
federates, who had contested their possession with so much 
fury the preceding autumn, had abandoned to him the 
sources of the Potomac and the Greenbrier; he could by 
pushing his outposts into the valley of the Shenandoah have 
connected with Banks, and combined,, they would have 
menaced Staunton near the important passes which open 
into the valley of James River. 

The Richmond authorities felt that it was necessary to 
prevent this concentration of troops at any price, and that 
the surest way was to rouse the fears of the government at 
Washington by a bold stroke. Nothing further would have 
been required but to wait with confidence for the errors 


— 281 — 


Civil War in America 


which those alarms would be sure to make the Federals 
commit. Jackson, who had never ceased to urge an invasion 
of the North, and had obeyed the order directing him to 
evacuate the valley of Virginia with great reluctance, was 
entrusted with this task. The Richmond government, 
shrewder than its adversary in the distribution of its forces, 
gave him at once the means he needed. General Edward 
Johnson, who had defended Camp Alleghany during the 
winter, joined him with one brigade, while Ewell brought 
him a fine division from Gordonsville. Jackson had thus 
twenty thousand men under his orders; he started at once. 
Leaving Staunton, where he had organized his army, he 
sent Ewell to watch and detain Banks, while, with the re¬ 
mainder of his forces, he went to attack Fremont in person, 
in order to prevent the junction of his two adversaries. 

The commander of the Mountain army was at Frank¬ 
lin, and had detached Milroy’s brigade to occupy the last 
ridges bordering on the Virginia valley on the west, known 
by the name of Shenandoah Mountains and Bull Pasture 
Mountains. Milroy had taken his position in the village of 
McDowell, situated at the foot of the western slope of the 
last line of heights. On the 7th of May, Jackson drove in 
his outposts, which had penetrated into valley of Virginia, 
and was crossing the Shenandoah Mountains with nearly 
ten thousand men. By a forced march he reached the sec¬ 
ond chain, Bull Pasture Mountains, on the 8th, and his heads 
of column, rapidly ascending those acclivities, took posses¬ 
sion of them before the Federals were strong enough to de¬ 
fend them. Once master of these heights, he had the village 
of McDowell at his feet, where Milroy had allowed himself 
to be taken completely by surprise. The latter, discovering 
too late the error he had committed, made a vigorous effort 
to recapture a point called Sutlington’s Hill, which was the 
key to this position. He failed in the attempt. He was 
soon joined by General Schenck’s brigade, which had been 
sent to his assistance by Fremont as soon as he was informed 
of Jackson’s appearance, and which had arrived after a 
march of fifty-five kilometres in twenty-three hours. 
Schenck, who assumed the command, had only three thou- 


- 282 — 


Fair Oaks 


sand five hundred men to defend, against eight or nine 
thousand assailants, a place commanded on every side, and 
from which he could only extricate himself by passing 
through a narrow defile. To remain in such a place was to 
be captured. To leave it in the daytime was to run the risk 
of being routed. He determined to hold out until evening, 
and by means of well-directed attacks concealed his weak¬ 
ness from Jackson, who does not appear to have shown on 
this occasion his habitual coup d’oeil; or it might be that 
his soldiers were too much fatigued to attempt a serious 
attack. At nightfall Schenck fell back in good order with 
his small force upon Franklin. The engagement at Mc¬ 
Dowell had cost him two hundred and forty-six men, while 
Jackson lost four hundred and sixty-one; among the 
wounded were General Johnston and three colonels. 

Jackson, after taking possession of Franklin, which 
Fremont had evacuated to wait for him in the rear of the 
town, did not go in search of his adversaries on this new 
position. He contented himself with the important result 
he had just obtained; for in fact, if the army of the Moun¬ 
tain had suffered but little, it had received such a repulse 
that it was no longer able to join hands with Banks. It was 
against the latter that Jackson was now about to turn; and 
for this purpose he resumed his march rapidly through the 
valley of Virginia in the direction of Staunton. There he 
found Ewell, but no longer Banks, who, on being informed 
of the fight at McDowell, had fallen back from Harrison¬ 
burg as far as Strasburg, eighty kilometres lower down the 
valley. 

Before following the two adversaries thither, we must 
describe the configuration of this singular valley, which has 
been so often ravaged by the fluctuating fortunes of the 
war. It extends two hundred kilometres in a straight line 
from the sources of the Shenandoah, a little below Staunton, 
to the confluence of this river and the Potomac at Harper’s 
Ferry. Its breadth, between the two chains of hills which 
enclose it, is everywhere from forty to fifty kilometres. Ter¬ 
minated at the north by the Potomac, which intersects it 
perpendicularly, it may be said that it is similarly terminated 


— 283 — 


Civil War in America 


at the south by the James, as this river flows a few kilo¬ 
metres from the sources of the Shenandoah, from which it 
is separated by only a slight undulation in the ground. A 
series of small parallel ridges follows the line of this valley 
in the direction of its length. The highest form a group 
called the Massanuten Mountains, extending from Harrison¬ 
burg to Strasburg. East of these mountains flows the South 
Fork, the principal branch of the Shenandoah, which runs 
past Staunton, descends into a narrow valley not far from 
Luray, where it drains the waters of the other branch, called 
North Fork, at Front Royal. This last stream waters the 
western slope of the same mountains, and, after flowing 
through a larger valley than that of South Fork as far as 
Strasburg, turns abruptly to the right. A little below 
Staunton it assumes already the proportions of a deep un- 
fordable river, which is crossed by three bridges. The 
first, up stream, is that of Port Republic, over which passes 
the road leading from Harrisonburg to Richmond through 
Brown's Gap, the second is at Conrad's Store, on the road 
from Harrisonburg to Gordonsville through Swift Run Gap. 
The third is the White House bridge, constructed for a cross 
road, which, branching off from the main valley road at 
New Market, ascends the Massanuten Mountains, and runs 
in the direction of the important defile in the Blue Ridge 
called Thornton's Gap, by way of Luray. The principal 
road follows the larger valley of North Fork from Harri¬ 
sonburg to Strasburg, through'Woodstock, and thence down 
to Winchester direct. Below Strasburg and Front Royal 
the undulations in the ground disappear almost entirely, 
and the Shenandoah, hugging the base of the Blue Ridge, 
leaves to its left the magnificent plain watered by the small 
stream of the Opequan, in which lie the towns of Winchester, 
Martinsburg and Charlestown. There are but two small 
lines of railroad to be found in the valley. Oe connects 
Harper’s Ferry with Winchester; the other is the one used 
by Johnston on the 21st of July, 1861, to take his troops to 
the battle-field of Bull Run. By following this unfinished 
track from east to west, starting from Manassas Junction, 


— 284 — 


Fair Oaks 


we find that it crosses the Blue Ridge at Manassas Gap, 
above Front Royal, descends into the valley, crosses the 
Shenandoah road, and, ascending the North Fork through 
Strasburg as far as Woodstock, terminates abruptly at 
Mount Jackson. It was to have been continued as far 
as Staunton. 

This description will enable the reader to understand 
the importance of the villages of Strasburg and Front Royal, 
which close up the two outlets of the vajley, communicating 
with Winchester on one side and with Washington on the 
other, by way of Manassas Gap and the railway. But these 
were not positions the defense of which could be entrusted 
to a small force; for Strasburg was approachable on every 
side, and Front Royal was too great a distance from the en¬ 
campments of Manassas Junction to be within reach of help, 
being at the same time commanded by heights which were 
easy of access. Without taking into consideration the pe¬ 
culiarities of this position, a single regiment, the First Mary¬ 
land, had been stationed at Front Royal for some time for 
the purpose of holding the partisans of the enemy in check, 
and Banks occupied Strasburg with the five thousand men 
composing his small army corps. 

On the 20th of May, Jackson left New Market at the 
head of an army of twenty thousand men. Instead of bear¬ 
ing down directly upon Strasburg by the main road and the 
broad valley of North Fork, which Banks was carefully 
watching, he crossed the Massanuten Mountains and re-en¬ 
tered the narrow valley of South Fork, where he was pro¬ 
tected both by that river and the mountains. He thus left 
Luray behind, while his advance-guard encamped unnoticed, 
on the 22d, only sixteen kilometres from Front Royal. On 
the 23d the small Federal garrison, consisting of about nine 
hundred men, with two pieces of artillery, was taken com¬ 
pletely by surprise. By a strange coincidence the regiment 
placed at the head of Jackson’s column bore the same name 
as the one he was about to attack, the First Maryland. This 
unfortunate State of Maryland, convulsed by conflicting pas¬ 
sions, inflamed by its neighbors of the North on one side and 
by those of the South on the other, supplied combatants to 


— 285 — 


Civil War in America 


both armies. The encounter of these two namesake regi¬ 
ments—sad consequences of the civil war!—was fearful and 
sanguinary in the extreme, for mutual recognition took 
place at first sight. The people of the South regarded Nor¬ 
thern soldiers as legitimate enemies; but Marylanders, be¬ 
longing to a slave State, when found fighting under the 
Federal flag, were nothing but traitors in their eyes. The 
Federals of Maryland, on the contrary, regarded their fellow- 
citizens who had enlisted in the Southern army as two-fold 
rebels: first, against the Union, next, against their own 
State, which had never officially separated from the govern¬ 
ment at Washington. 

The situation of the small band of Union troops had 
been desperate from the beginning of the fight. Over¬ 
whelmed by numbers, it tried to escape from the enemy by 
placing the two branches of the Shenandoah between them; 
but it had not time to destroy the bridges. Pursued through 
the open country, the Federals dispersed in groups, which 
were successively surrounded, with the exception of fifteen 
fugitives only. The remainder were either killed, wounded 
or captured; but the defence of this handful of men had 
been highly creditable, and their chief, Colonel Kenly, fully 
atoned by his courage for his want of vigilance in allowing 
himself to be surprised. He was only captured after being 
seriously wounded. 

The fickle fortune of war decreed that on the same day 
a body of troops detached from Jackson's army should ex¬ 
perience nearly as bloody a check in the mountains of West 
Virginia. On leaving these mountains, Edward Johnson 
had entrusted to General Heth the task of watching with 
three regiments the brigade of Colonel Crook, which occu¬ 
pied the beautiful valley of the Greenbrier, with its station 
at Lewisburg. Carried away by his zeal, Heth crossed the 
river to attack his adversary in that position. He was re¬ 
pulsed after a bloody struggle, in which he had more than 
one hundred men disabled, and left four hundred prisoners 
in the hands of the Federals. The remainder of his brigade, 
reduced by nearly one-half, was indebted for its safety solely 
to the Greenbrier River, the bridges of which it succeeded 


— 286 — 


Fair Oaks 


in destroying in its rear. But this advantage was of no 
benefit whatever to the Federals; for Crook was not suffi¬ 
ciently strong to venture among the difficult mountain passes 
which separated him from Jackson’s base of operations, and 
which it would have been necessary to traverse in order to 
menace the latter. 

Meanwhile, Jackson had not lost a moment’s time, after 
the combat of Front Royal, in following up his success; the 
very evening after the battle found him already on the left 
bank of the Shenandoah, above the point of confluence of the 
two branches. He thus menaced the line of retreat of 
Banks, who was at Strasburg in a state of dangerous se¬ 
curity. In fact, less distant from Winchester than Banks, 
he could occupy that place before him, cut him off from the 
northern route, and thus compel him to take to the moun¬ 
tain after abandoning his supply train, his artillery and 
probably a portion of his troops. The news of the disaster 
at Front Royal reached Strasburg during the night of the 
24th. Banks saw the danger, and as early as two o’clock in 
the morning his army was on the march in order to outstrip 
the enemy on the road to Winchester. The train of wagons 
was placed in front, for it was upon the rear of the column 
that the attack of Jackson was expected. The cavalry, 
which was to form the rear-guard, remained at Strasburg 
until the following day. 

Jackson also resumed his march on the morning of the 
24th, but the repose he was compelled to allow his worn-out 
soldiers that night was to make him lose the valuable prize 
he was so near seizing. The two roads converging upon 
Winchester from Strasburg and Front Royal form two sides 
of an equilateral triangle. Banks took the first, Ewell the 
second; Jackson, with his cavalry and the remainder of his 
infantry, separated from the latter, and followed cross¬ 
roads which enabled him to strike the flank of the enemy’s 
column. Only a few mounted Confederates arrived in time 
to meet the head of the long train of wagons which led the 
march of the Federal army. Their appearance threw the 
train into inexpressible confusion, but they were easily dis¬ 
persed, and order once more restored, the wagons continued 


— 287 — 


Civil War in America 


their march, accompanied by the main body of the army, 
which had been compelled by this panic to pass from the 
rear to the head of the column. When the whole Confeder¬ 
ate cavalry, led by the fiery Ashby and closely followed by 
Jackson, finally struck the road, it was only able to seize 
a few of the wagons in the rear of Banks’ train. Ashby’s 
soldiers, inured to plunder as much as to fighting by their 
partisan life, allowed themselves to be detained by this 
meagre booty, instead of following their chief, who was 
urging them to the pursuit of the enemy. The instant when 
a panic, easily engendered, would have been fatal to Banks 
slipped rapidly by, and Jackson tried in vain to seize once 
more the lost opportunity by intercepting the Federal cav¬ 
alry, which formed the rear-guard; the Jatter fell back 
toward Strasburg and precipitated itself among the moun¬ 
tain roads; it was thus enabled to overtake Banks’ army on 
the banks of the Potomac. 

Evening came on before Jackson had been able 
to come into serious contact with his adversary, 
and the latter, favored by the darkness, reached Win¬ 
chester in the middle of the night. The Confederates 
had not yet made their appearance; from this mo¬ 
ment his retreat was assured. But the rest which the 
Federals had found at last, after so painful a march, was 
not destined to be of long duration. At daybreak the firing 
of musketry made them aware that Jackson had arrived and 
was attacking the surrounding heights, which command 
Winchester from south-east to south-west. While he was 
driving off without trouble the Federal sharpshooters, Gen¬ 
eral Ewell, following the road to the right from Front Royal, 
had reached the eastern approaches of Winchester, and was 
only waiting for the signal of his commander’s cannon to 
engage the battle on that side. Banks’ position had again 
become most critical. In danger of being surrounded with 
his five thousand men by eighteen or twenty thousand of 
the enemy, he could not follow the shortest line of retreat, 
that of Harper’s Ferry, which would have exposed his flank 
to Ewell’s attacks. Besides, it was not an easy matter to 
evacuate a town situated in an entirely open plain in the 


— 288 — 


Fair Oaks 


presence of so numerous an enemy. Without intending to 
maintain himself there for any length of time, the most im¬ 
portant thing for him to do was to retard as long as possible 
the threatening progress of his foe. The Federal soldiers 
went into the fight with a great deal of spirit for men who 
should have been exhausted or discouraged by such a retreat. 
Banks’ small army, deploying outside of Winchester, rushed 
to the assault of the principal height, situated to the south¬ 
west, while his left made head against Ewell’s division on 
the east side. For a moment the hill was swept by the fire 
of Colonel Gordon’s sharpshooters, afid the Confederate 
guns were silenced. But when the Federals attempted to 
occupy the ground, they were taken in flank and driven back. 
The same success attended them at first on the left, where 
they put one of Ewell’s regiments to flight. But there also, 
overwhelmed by numbers, their whole line gave way, and 
they rushed pell-mell into the streets of Winchester. To 
increase the confusion, the inhabitants fired upon them from 
all the windows, and it seemed as if nothing could save them 
from complete disaster. Fortunately for them, Jackson, 
despite all his ardor, did not push his soldiers forward with 
sufficient alacrity to take advantage of this disorder; he be¬ 
lieved the Federals to be much more numerous than they 
really were. His infantry was completely exhausted, while 
his cavalry had again failed him at the moment when it 
might have rendered him essential service. He had alien¬ 
ated the two generals who were in command of that arm. 
One of these, General Stuart, refused to obey him; the other, 
Ashby, hurt by the reproaches he had received from him the 
previous day concerning the plunder of the Federal wagons 
by his soldiers, held back at this moment. The Confeder¬ 
ates came to a halt eight kilometres from Winchester, and 
the Federals, being no longer pursued except by small squads 
of cavalry, retired without difficulty to the banks of the 
Potomac, which they reached at Williamsport on the evening 
of the 25th of May. They had marched eighty-five kilo¬ 
metres in less than forty-eight hours, leaving only fifty-five 
wagons behind them out of five hundred, and saving all their 
cannon. The loss in supplies was considerable; that in men 


— 289 — 


Civil War in America 


on the 24th and 25th amounted to thirty-eight killed, one 
hundred and fifty-five wounded, and seven hundred and 
eleven prisoners. But if the losses were trifling, the moral 
effect of this reverse was great. In forcing Banks to re¬ 
cross the Potomac, Jackson had forced him back into the po¬ 
sitions toward which he should have retired on the day on 
which his army was reduced by the departure of Shields. 
But if his whole corps had been annihilated, the excitement 
at Washington could not have been greater. *The Confeder¬ 
ate general, therefore, had dealt a telling blow; and if he 
made fewer prisoners than he had a right to expect from his 
successful maneuvers, he had nevertheless attained the 
principal object of his diversion. Confusion was at its 
height in Mr. Lincoln's cabinet, and the army of the Poto¬ 
mac was deprived of all the reinforcements it had been 
promised. 

Meantime, Jackson, in spite of his desire to invade the 
Northern States, and the ardor which seized him as soon as 
he drew near to Maryland, was preparing to slip away from 
his adversaries by a speedy retreat before the latter had 
time to concentrate a superior force and crush him in the 
hazardous position he had just taken. In fact, Mr. Lincoln, 
while fervently addressing an eloquent appeal to the North¬ 
ern States for the protection of the capital, which he thought 
in danger, had at the same time conceived the idea of “catch¬ 
ing Jackson in a trap," to use his own words, by shutting 
him up in the valley of Virginia. He personally directed by 
telegraph the movements of every division which was to co¬ 
operate in carrying out this chimerical project. His plan 
was to make three independent corps converge upon a point 
situated in the enemy’s country, from which they were all 
three far more remote than the adversary whom it was in¬ 
tended to forestall. 

Fremont was ordered to march from west to east, from 
Moorefield, where his quarters now were, to Strasburg; 
Banks to follow close upon the tracks of Jackson; Shields, 
who had only joined McDowell at Fredericksburg two days 
before, to retrace his steps from east to west, to join hands 
with Fremont at Front Royal, and thus cut off Jackson’s 


— 290 — 


Fair Oaks 


retreat. In vain did McDowell protest against this order, 
the fatal consequences of which he foresaw; in vain did he 
allege that his soldiers would reach the valley too late to 
overtake Jackson, and that the surest way to protect Wash¬ 
ington against the dangers which seemed to menace the 
latter city was to press the enemy in front of Richmond. 
The fatal order was adhered to, and all the campaign plans 
agreed upon a few days before were upset. 

Mr. Lincoln had visited McDowell at Fredericksburg on 
the 24th of May, when it was decided that this general should 
march upon Richmond. He was to start with his army 
corps, more than forty thousand strong, with one hundred 
pieces of artillery; and it may be asserted without exagger¬ 
ation that his junction with McClellan would have proved 
the decisive blow of the campaign. The fate of Richmond 
trembled in the balance; Jackson’s column, thrown at a 
lucky moment into the plateau, saved the Confederate capi¬ 
tal. On the 25th, Shield’s division, instead of moving for¬ 
ward, turned its back upon the real objective of the cam¬ 
paign, and regaining the valley road started on one of those 
fruitless expeditions which American soldiers call in trapper 
language a “wild-goose chase.” The next day McDowell 
was ordered to send a second division, and finally to march 
himself with a third, upon Front Royal. He obeyed with 
great reluctance; for notwithstanding his unpleasant rela¬ 
tions with McClellan, he had too much good sense and pa¬ 
triotism not to see and to deplore the irreparable mistake 
he was being forced to commit. 

Jackson, concealing his preparations for a retreat, ap¬ 
peared determined to follow up his successes in the north 
without troubling himself about what might take place in 
his rear. His cavalry had followed Banks as far as Williams¬ 
port, where the latter had hastened to cross the Potomac. 
He at once turned against Harper’s Ferry, and on the 28th 
appeared in front of that position. He could have had no 
serious intention of occupying it; for in order to do so, it 
would have been necessary for him to have control of the 
other bank of the Potomac; he simply wished to dislodge 
the Federals from it, and on the morning of the 29th he 

• — 291 — 


Civil War in America 


took possession of the heights commanding that position 
south of the Shenandoah. By this bold movement he con¬ 
firmed all the alarms and anxieties into which his opponents 
had been thrown by his late successes in menacing Mary¬ 
land and Washington; he magnified the number of his 
forces in their imagination, thus relieving Richmond, and se¬ 
curing for his soldiers the repose they needed before under¬ 
taking a retrograde movement, which was becoming un¬ 
avoidable; for on the 29th, while he was preparing to at¬ 
tack Harper’s Ferry, he learned that the Federal armies 
were at last moving from every direction to cut off his re¬ 
treat, and he set about at once the duty of excelling them in 
speed. 

It was high time. His army had been reduced by 
marching and battles to fifteen thousand men.* The 
Washington authorities, being totally ignorant of the diffi¬ 
culties of the campaign, had fixed upon the 30th as the day 
when the trap which they had set for catching the impru¬ 
dent Jackson was to be sprung. As we stated before, the 
Confederate general was to be intercepted by the simultane¬ 
ous arrival of Fremont at Strasburg and of Shields at Front 
Royal. If their calculations had been correct, Jackson’s 
small army was lost indeed. It only evacuated Winchester 
on the 31st, carrying off, in the midst of the inhabitants 
who were filled with consternation at this sudden depar¬ 
ture, the valuable spoils of the Federal storehouses, which 
formed a train of nearly twenty kilometres in length. De¬ 
spite the presumptuous incapacity of those who directed 
the operations against Jackson from Washington, this gen¬ 
eral might yet have found himself in great jeopardy. Shields, 
punctual to the rendezvous, had reached Front Royal on 
the 30th, with a brigade, before which the small Confeder¬ 
ate garrison had retired. But the plan of the Federals was 
too complicated to succeed. It was Fremont who caused 
its failure by allowing Jackson to reach Strasburg before 
him by a forced march; finding himself thus placed between 

*He had only lost four hundred men by the fire of the enemy. 
The five thousand that were missing must therefore have been strag¬ 
glers, men on the sick-list, and probably a few deserters. 


— 292 — 



Fair Oaks 


his two opponents, he prevented them from acting in con¬ 
cert and paralyzed all their movements. While McDowell 
was uniting two of his reduced divisions at Front Royal, 
Fremont, encamped on the neighboring heights of Stras- 
burg, waited, without stirring, for Jackson to attack him, 
instead of coming down to bar his passage, or at least to 
dispute it. The Confederate chief found it easy to occupy 
his attention by means of a few demonstrations, and thus 
gave his long column time to escape. At last, on the 1st of 
June, he was rejoined by the whole of his rear-guard, and 
quietly resumed his march toward Harrisonburg by the turn¬ 
pike. His adversaries had been so entirely separated that 
neither of them felt strong enough to attack him singly; 
and while each party was waiting for the support of the 
other, they suffered their prey to escape them. As soon as 
they became aware of the fact they tried to redeem their 
error by a vigorous pursuit. They might yet possibly inter¬ 
cept Jackson farther on, and, at all events turn his retreat 
into a positive rout. Fremont, who was ascending the val¬ 
ley of the North Fork, was sufficiently near him to retard 
his march, while Shields’ vanguard, by following the paral¬ 
lel valley, had some chance of reaching the right bank of 
the South Fork in advance of him, and of burning the bridges 
of that deep river before they could be occupied by the 
Confederates. If the whole of Shields’ division should ar¬ 
rive in time, it could even cross the river in its turn, so as 
to attack the Confederates in flank, and finally form a junc¬ 
tion with Fremont. But Jackson was too active to be thus 
caught by an enemy whose designs he had already so many 
times frustrated. He took possession of the bridge at White 
House, and did not hesitate to destroy it in order to render 
the junction of Shields and Fremont impossible. Whilst 
one of his detachments was performing this operation, the 
remainder of his army continued its march up the valley of 
the South Fork; and although his progress was delayed by 
the heavy wagon-train he carried as a substantial token of 
his victory, he reached Harrisonburg on the 5th of June. 
He had not, however, yet entirely escaped from the Federals, 
who were pressing him on both flanks, and who, without 


— 293 — 


Civil War in America 


having been able to effect a junction, still menaced his line 
of retreat. Fremont’s vanguard, consisting of Bayard’s 
cavalry brigade and some infantry under Colonel Cluseret, 
had harassed him with great boldness since leaving Stras- 
burg. These two officers made up by their activity for the 
want of alacrity on the part of their chief. The next day 
Jackson learned that they had succeeded in outflanking him 
with their right, and that, preceding him in the direction of 
Staunton, they had cut down the bridges along the road 
leading to this town. With a view of retarding their pur¬ 
suit, he was obliged to engage all his cavalry in front of 
Harrisonburg. These brave troops dismounted and covered 
Jackson’s retreat by an energetic resistance; but they lost 
in the action their commander, Turner Ashby, one of the 
best officers in the Confederate army. The Federals, on 
their side, left in the hands of the enemy Colonel Percy 
Wyndham, an Englishman, who had entered the volunteer 
service at the beginning of the war. Jackson, in the mean¬ 
time, struck into a cross-road on the left for the purpose 
of gaining Port Republic, crossed the Shenandoah at that 
point to reach Brown’s Gap, in the Blue Ridge, where he well 
knew his adversaries could no longer follow him. But at 
Port Republic his flank was exposed to the attacks of 
Shields, whose heads of column had already reached Con¬ 
rad’s Store, while Fremont, having resumed his march, was 
pressing him in the rear. 

Jackson’s situation was again full of peril. Leaving 
Ewell to keep Fremont in check, he reached the neighbor¬ 
hood of Port Republic with the remainder of his forces on 
the 7th of June. But before he had time to cross the river 
and occupy the town, Shields’ first brigade, commanded by 
Colonel Carroll, comprising about one thousand men and a 
battery, appeared on the opposite side, repulsed his skir¬ 
mishers, entered the town and took possession of the bridge. 
This bridge had played an important part in the campaign 
plans forwarded direct from Washington to the Union gen¬ 
erals. They had been alternately directed to destroy and 
to save it. Colonel Carroll, having been ordered to preserve 
it, held it for nearly twenty minutes; adhering strictly to 


— 294 — 


Fair Oaks 


the letter of his instructions, he suffered the opportunity 
to escape which presented itself for preventing the Con¬ 
federates from crossing the Shenandoah; and when the ene¬ 
my’s cannon, whose fire had been quickly concentrated upon 
him, compelled him to abandon the bridge, he did not even 
attempt to destroy it. The result of his blind obedience 
was to leave Jackson in possession of a sure means of retreat 
at the moment when he was on the point of being thrown 
upon an impassable river. Once master of Port Republic, 
the Confederate general had nothing more to fear, and his 
only object in holding his adversaries in check was to in¬ 
timate to them that all pursuit was at an end. He deter¬ 
mined, however, to take advantage of their separation to 
deal them successively a last blow. 

On the 8th, Ewell, with five thousand men, was waiting 
for Fremont at Cross Keys, a point of junction of several 
roads in the neighborhood. The six Federal brigades were 
prompt in attacking him. But Fremont, being under the 
impression that he had the whole of Jackson’s army before 
him, allowed himself to be held back a long time by the 
resistance which the Confederates offered in a difficult 
country, where clearings alternate with woods. At last, 
after a brisk musketry engagement, which cost him many 
men without securing him any marked advantage, he had 
just ordered a general attack, when, seeing a German bri¬ 
gade borne back by the enemy, he suddenly abandoned his 
project and gave the signal for retreat. The battle of Cross 
Keys cost the Federals from six to seven hundred men, 
while the Confederates lost three hundred. The latter, by 
holding the enemy in check during an entire day, had ac¬ 
complished the object they had in view. 

In the meantime, Jackson, crossing the bridge which 
had been so wonderfully preserved, was'emerging from Port 
Republic with the remainder of his army, and taking ad¬ 
vantage of his vast numerical superiority was driving Car- 
roll’s brigade before him, which was the only one left of 
McDowell’s army at that important point. But during the 
afternoon Tyler’s brigade effected a junction with Carroll’s; 
and although they had only three thousand men under their 


— 295 — 


Civil War in America 


orders, they prepared to make a stand against Jackson, if 
he should attack them. They had not long to wait for him; 
Jackson, encouraged by his success and the hesitation of his 
opponents, had conceived a bold plan. He proposed to crush 
the inferior forces he had found before him at Port Re¬ 
public, recross the Shenandoah immediately after, and 
march with his whole army to meet Fremont, in order to 
give him battle in his turn, and finally to resume the Brown’s 
Gap route, leaving nothing but vanquished foes behind him. 
To this effect he had brought back Ewell to Port Republic, 
leaving only Patton’s small brigade, numbering scarcely 
eight hundred men, in front of Fremont. He had ordered 
Patton to deploy all his men as skirmishers in case of need, 
to retard the advance of the enemy as long as possible, 
promising to join him with his army at ten o’clock in the 
morning. Then he marched directly against Tyler. 

The latter, posted three or four kilometers from Port 
Republic, rested his right upon the Shenandoah and his left 
upon a hill with uncovered slopes. The summit of this hill, 
crowned by a wood, was the key to the entire position. Jack- 
son, leading his old brigade in person, made a vigorous at¬ 
tack upon the Federal right; but his soldiers were repulsed, 
and fled in disorder, abandoning a battery, one of whose guns 
fell into the hand of the Federals. He had more than twelve 
thousand men under his command, while only three thousand 
were arrayed against him; it was easy, therefore, for him 
to repair this check. But deceived by the valor of his oppo¬ 
nents, and believing them to be stronger than himself, he 
abandoned the project he had conceived of marching against 
Fremont. He recalled Patton’s brigade in great haste; and 
setting fire to the Shenandoah bridge immediately after he 
placed the river between himself and Fremont. Meanwhile, 
the combat, which was raging along the right wing of the 
Federals, had obliged the latter to weaken their positions on 
the left. Jackson pushed one of his brigades to the assault 
of these positions, and after a desperate struggle the Con¬ 
federates took possession of them, together with three pieces 
of artillery which were found in them. Being turned on this 
side, Tyler was obliged to fight in retreat, and fell back in 


— 296 — 


Fair Oaks 


good order toward the hamlet of Conrad’s Store, occupied 
by the remainder of Shield’s division. His soldiers, who had 
been recruited among the pioneers of the West, and espe¬ 
cially in the State of Ohio, had fought with great deter¬ 
mination ; they had inflicted a loss of six hundred men upon 
an enemy three or four times their number. 

The battle of Port Republic ended the pursuit of Jack- 
son. Fremont had witnessed its termination from the other 
side of the Shenandoah without being able to cross the river 
in time to participate in it. He withdrew, and Jackson, be¬ 
ing master of the battle-field, gave some rest to his troops 
before entering on a new campaign. This time his course 
lay in the direction of Richmond; turning his back upon 
the theatre of his easy successes, his opportune arrival 
enabled Lee to take advantage of the mistakes which his 
bold maneuvers in the valley of Virginia had caused the 
military authorities at Washington to commit. 

In the meantime, his adversaries were dispersing. Fre¬ 
mont returned to his Mountain department and Banks to 
Strasburg, while McDowell with difficulty united his divi¬ 
sions at Fredericksburg, exhausted and discouraged by so 
many fruitless marches and countermarches; although they 
had seen the enemy but once, they sustained more losses 
than if they had fought a pitched battle. 

Returning to the peninsula of Virginia, we find the 
army of the Potomac still without the reinforcements it 
had so long been expecting, and left to its own resources. 
We left General McClellan on the 19th of May master of 
the Chickahominy pass at Bottom’s Bridge. Free to seek 
a new base of operations on James River, or to continue rest¬ 
ing on York River, he had just chosen the latter alternative, 
notwithstanding its dangers, in the vain hope of being able 
to keep in communication with McDowell’s corps. Before 
resuming his march he had introduced some changes in the 
composition of his army corps; for the experience acquired 
at the battle of Williamsburg had shaken whatever confi¬ 
dence he might have reposed in the capacity of the three 
commanders who had been forced upon him by the Presi¬ 
dent at the opening of the campaign. The army corps had 


— 297 — 


Civil War in America 


been reduced to five in number, each with two divisions, and 
an effective force of from fifteen to nineteen thousand men. 
This subdivision rendered them more manageable, while the 
command of the new corps fell, by right of seniority, upon 
Generals Franklin and Fitz-John Porter, two officers for 
whom he entertained a particular regard. 

The ground on which he was about to operate may be 
described in few words. It presents but a single obstacle, 
the Chickahominy—a serious one, it is true. This river, 
after passing within seven or eight kilometres of Richmond, 
turns off, continuing to flow in a south-easterly direction, so 
that Bottom’s Bridge lies about eighteen or twenty kilo¬ 
metres from that city. Taking its rise to the north-east of 
the capital of Virginia, it winds through a valley regularly 
enclosed on both sides averaging eight or nine hundred 
metres in breadth. Following its downward course, we find 
Meadow Bridge first, over which passes a wagon-road and 
the Gordonsville railway; lower down, the bridge of Mechan- 
icsville, commanded on the left bank by the hamlet of that 
name, is situated at the point where this river runs nearest 
to Richmond. Here the surrounding hills on each side are 
destitute of trees, and presently, on the road between Rich¬ 
mond and Cold Harbor, we come to New Bridge which con¬ 
nects the hamlet of Old Tavern with the Gaines’ Mill 
heights. One kilometre below this bridge the forest again 
enfolds the banks of the Chickahominy, and does not leave 
it for ten kilometres lower down, at the bridge of the West 
Point railway, which is situated one kilometre above Bot¬ 
tom’s Bridge. The only tributaries of the Chickahominy 
are, on the left bank, a small stream called Beaver-dam 
Creek, between Mechanicsville and Gaines’ Mill, and on the 
right bank a vast wooded swamp, known as White Oak 
Swamp, the waters of which empty into the river a few 
kilometres below Bottom’s Bridge. This swamp, which has 
its origin in the immediate vicinity of Richmond, is abso¬ 
lutely impassable, except at two or three points, where it 
becomes narrow, affording passage to a few crossroads. 

The Confederate army was encamped around Rich¬ 
mond, where it was receiving reinforcements forwarded in 


— 298 — 


Fair Oaks 


haste from every section of the country. Huger arrived 
with twelve thousand men from Norfolk; Branch, whose 
defeat at Newberne by Burnside we have noticed, brought 
nine thousand from North Carolina, and others were yet to 
follow. The reconnaissances of the Federal army had re¬ 
vealed the fact that the abandonment of Bottom’s Bridge 
was the last step in Johnston’s retreat. The latter was pre¬ 
paring for the defence of Meadow Bridge and New Bridge. 
The nature of the ground was perfectly adapted for this 
purpose, and the Federal general was the less likely to think 
of carrying this pass by main force because he could turn 
it by the lower course of the river, of which he had control. 
Everything, therefore, urged him to push his attacks by 
following the right bank between Bottom’s Bridge to the 
clearing of Seven Pines, eleven kilometres from Richmond. 
The rest of the army remained on the left bank of the river. 
The centre, consisting of Sumner’s corps, was encamped in 
the neighborhood of the railroad-bridge; the two corps com¬ 
manded by Porter and Franklin, forming the right wing, 
were posted in the vicinity of Gaines’ Mill and Mechanics- 
ville. The army had occupied these positions without any 
difficulty, having only met some weak detachments of the 
enemy at Seven Pines and Mechanicsville, which were easily 
repulsed. But it found itself divided into two parts by the 
Chickahominy, without any other communication between 
its right and left wings than the railway-bridge at Despatch 
and Bottom’s Bridge; these two passages were far remote 
from the extreme points of Seven Pines and Mechanicsville, 
which were the most exposed to an attack from the enemy. 
It would undoubtedly have been infinitely better, under every 
aspect of the case, to have transferred the entire army to 
the right bank of the Chickahominy; but McClellan had 
been obliged to occupy both sides of the river and to push 
his right wing to the vicinity of its source, as much for the 
purpose of keeping up communication with McDowell’s van¬ 
guard, whose arrival he was still constantly promised, as 
to cover his depots at the White House, and the railroad 
through which he obtained his supplies. The faulty dis¬ 
position of his army was therefore forced upon him by cir- 


— 299 — 


Civil War in America 


cumstances from the moment he had abandoned the idea of 
seeking a new base of operations on the James. We shall 
see presently how, in consequence of unforeseen accidents 
and too long delays, he remained in this dangerous position 
for more than a month. 

It was on the 24th of May that McDowell had received 
an order from the President’s own mouth to march upon 
Richmond. The next day being Sunday, his departure was 
fixed for the 26th. He had a march of seventy-two kilo¬ 
metres before him between Fredericksburg and Richmond, 
through a difficult country, as Grant was to find out two 
years later, but in which, owing to the position occupied by 
McClellan before Richmond, the Confederates could not have 
offered any serious resistance to the Federals. This region 
has two railroads. One, running north and south, leads 
from Aquia Creek to Richmond, through Fredericksburg 
and Bowling Green, and crosses to the south of the latter 
town the two branches of the Pamunky, called the North 
Anna and the South Anna, near Jericho Bridge and Ash¬ 
land. The other railroad, from Gordonsville, intersects the 
first between these two branches, and passing the second 
near Hanover Court-house crosses the Chickahominy at 
Meadow Bridge to enter Richmond more to the east than the 
Aquia Creek road. 

The Confederates had placed Anderson at Bowling 
Green with twelve or fifteen thousand men for the purpose 
of holding McDowell in check, and Branch’s division between 
the Chickahominy and Hanover Court-house, that it might 
be within reach of Richmond or Bowling Green, as circum¬ 
stances should require. On announcing McDowell’s depar¬ 
ture, Mr. Lincoln requested General McClellan to make a 
movement on his right to cut the communications between 
Bowling Green and Richmond, and to seize the two railroad 
bridges on the South Anna, in order that he might the more 
easily assist the troops who were on their way from Freder¬ 
icksburg. This order was promptly executed, and on the 
25th, Stoneman’s cavalry was at work destroying the Gor¬ 
donsville railroad between Hanover Court House and the 
Chickahominy. But on this very day the mirage which had 


— 300 — 


Fair Oaks 


attracted McClellan to the north side of Richmond was van¬ 
ishing entirely away. McDowell had received fresh instruc¬ 
tions ; Shields was on his way to Front Royal; great excite¬ 
ment prevailed in Washington, and Mr. Lincoln telegraphed 
to the commander of the army of the Potomac that if he 
could not attack Richmond with the forces at his disposal, 
he had better give up the job and come to defend the capi¬ 
tal.* The next day the President urged him to send out 
the proposed expedition on his right, but with a very dif¬ 
ferent object from that which had at first been contem¬ 
plated, and to destroy the bridges on the South Anna, which 
two days before he was desirous to preserve at any price. 
Jackson had thus succeeded beyond his expectations; for 
it was for the purpose of cutting off the pretended rein¬ 
forcements which, according to the Washington authori¬ 
ties, were to be forwarded to him from Richmond, that the 
Federals sought to destroy with their own hands the road 
which would have enabled them to concentrate their forces 
in front of the enemy’s capital. 

Tired out by such constant vacillations, McClellan pre¬ 
pared to execute this fatal order without offering any com¬ 
ments; but he determined to take advantage of the oppor¬ 
tunity thus offered to exercise his right wing by striking 
an unexpected blow at Branch’s division, which might 
threaten his depot while he was engaged in a great battle 
before Richmond. On the morning of the 27th, Porter, 
with Morell’s division, Warren’s brigade and three regi¬ 
ments of cavalry, two of which were regulars, little less 
than ten thousand men in all, left Mechanicsville and Cold 
Harbor and proceeded toward Hanover Court-house. After 
a fatiguing march of twenty-two kilometres, his vanguard, 
consisting of the cavalry and two regiments of infantry, 
encountered Branch, who, on being apprised of this threat¬ 
ening movement, had taken position at the intersection of 
the Hanover and Ashland roads. The Confederates thus 
covered the two railroad-bridges on the South Anna; but 
they were vigorously attacked, and Butterfield’s brigade, 

♦“Either attack Richmond, or give up the job and come to the de¬ 
fence of Washington.” 


— 301 — 



Civil War in America 


arriving in time, put them completely to flight. Branch 
lost in this first engagement one cannon and a large number 
of prisoners. Continuing his route, Porter', after having 
joined Warren's brigade, sent the latter to destroy the 
bridge of the Gordonsville railroad, while that of Martin- 
dale proceeded to cut the other railroad line at Ashland. 
Warren had picked up whole companies of the enemy, which, 
deprived of all direction, surrendered without a struggle. 
After a slight skirmish, Martindale had also accomplished 
his task, and was on his way back to rejoin his chief at 
Hanover, when he suddenly fell in with the remainder of 
Branch's troops debouching by the same road which the 
Federals had followed in the morning. The Confederate 
chief, having, in fact, been surprised and forced into the 
preceding combat before he had time to collect all his 
forces, had been turned by the Federal detachment, which 
had passed on his right, and had thus been driven upon the 
banks of the Pamunky, near Hanover. In order to extri¬ 
cate himself from this difficult position, he described a 
large arc around the Federals, which would have brought 
him back to the Richmond and Ashland turnpike, when, just 
as he was about reaching the road, not far from the scene 
of the first fight, his heads of column fell in with Martin- 
dale's small brigade. The latter fought the superior forces 
of the enemy with great spirit, until Porter, informed by 
the noise of cannon, came back from Hanover with the re¬ 
mainder of his division, and attacking the Confederates 
both in front on the road, and by the flank through the 
woods, drove them in disorder toward the south. 

The double combat of Hanover Court-house had cost 
the Federals fifty-three men killed and three hundred and 
forty-four wounded or taken prisoners. It was a brilliant 
and complete success. The enemy had left more than seven 
hundred prisoners and one gun in Porter’s hands. Branch’s 
division, dispersed among the woods, was entirely disor¬ 
ganized. The morale of the Federals was restored by so 
fortunate a result. But in Washington the tidings of this 
success afforded no compensation for the alarms caused by 
Jackson, which filled the minds of all men. Mr. Lincoln 


— 302 — 


Fair Oaks 


replied to McClellan’s despatches with complaints that the 
order for the destruction of all the bridges on the South 
Anna had not yet been executed. On the following day the 
general-in-chief was able to inform him that his instruc¬ 
tions had been scrupulously carried out, and on the 29th 
Porter’s troops, quitting the scene of their glorious but 
fruitless victory, returned to take position at Gaines’ Mill. 
Everything indicated that the banks of the Chickahominy 
were soon to be ensanguined by a desperate struggle. 

The Confederates were in fact collecting all their dis¬ 
posable forces for the protection of Richmond. The civil 
government as well as the personnel of the administration, 
who in that capital, as at Washington, fancied that all the 
interest of the war was centered in the defence of their 
bureaus, had passed from the utter discouragement caused 
by the loss of the Virginia to the most absolute confidence. 
On the 28th and 29th of May, considerable reinforcements 
came to join Johnston’s army, Anderson’s division among 
the rest; this officer, on seeing McDowell rushing in pur¬ 
suit of Jackson, instead of following in his tracks, had quick¬ 
ly brought back his troops from Bowling Green to Rich¬ 
mond. 

The position of the army of the Potomac seemed, on 
the other hand, to invite an attack. Its left, thrown over 
the unfriendly bank of the Chickahominy, and inactive for 
the last seven days, occupied a position which was at once 
menacing to the Confederates and dangerous to itself. Its 
front extended between the Chickahominy and White Oak 
Swamp. This latter water-course is composed of a succes¬ 
sion of swamps running in a parallel direction with the for¬ 
mer for a considerable distance, but the unequal width of 
which at certain points reduces the space comprised be¬ 
tween them to four or five kilometres; at the elevation of 
Bottom’s Bridge, the swamp gives place to a stream which 
inclining to the left carries their muddy waters into the 
Chickahominy a few kilometres below. The Williamsburg 
road and the West Point railway, after crossing the Chicka¬ 
hominy at Bottom’s Bridge and at Dispatch, follow a parallel 
course in a direct line to Richmond. The bridge at Dispatch 


- 303 — 


Civil War in America 


could not be thoroughly repaired before the 30th of May; all 
the troops posted on the right bank of the Chickahominy ob¬ 
tained their supplies, therefore, by the turnpike; and to 
facilitate the distribution of rations most of these troops 
were encamped in the successive clearings through which 
this road passes. On the left, dense woods, traversed only 
by narrow paths, stretch out as far as the impenetrable 
thickets which cover the stagnant waters of White Oak 
Swamp with eternal verdure. The road forks within ten 
kilometres of Richmond, at a place called Seven Pines. One 
branch continues in the original direction, and approaches 
the capital by following the course of the James. The other, 
turning to the right, intersects the railroad at Fair Oaks 
station, emerging afterward into a large clearing, in the 
midst of which, at Old Tavern, it again connects with the 
Richmond road to New Bridge and Cold Harbor. This is 
the Nine Mile road. The railway, forming an almost 
straight line, runs along the summit of a slight undulation 
which separates the waters of White Oak Swamp from 
those of the Chickahominy. After rising upon the right 
bank of this water-course by passing through a deep cut, 
it crosses the woods without meeting with any work of 
importance to mark its course. There are three stations 
along the section of the line then occupied by the Federals— 
Dispatch, in the vicinity of the bridge; Fair Oaks, the near¬ 
est to Richmond; and between the two, Savage Station, 
situated in a large clearing at the intersection of several 
roads. These forest roads are very numerous; they form 
so many connecting links between isolated plantations, 
farms or country houses, each standing in the centre of a 
cleared space surrounded by woods on every side; most of 
them are perpendicular to the Williamsburg turnpike, and 
run as far as the Chickahominy; but among these dense 
copses they constitute an inextricable labyrinth for those 
who are not familiar with the locality in all its details. 

In order to approach Richmond, General McClellan was 
desirous of gaining ground gradually on the right bank of 
the Chickahominy, and after each step taken on that side 
to connect his two wings by throwing new bridges over this 


— 304 — 


Fair Oaks 


dangerous river. Sumner’s corps, which occupied the left 
bank as far as the neighborhood of Gaines’ Mill, had al¬ 
ready constructed two bridges in conformity with this plan, 
one at three thousand five hundred metres, the other at 
six kilometres, above the railroad bridge. In executing this 
work he had been able to cross to the opposite bank without 
meeting the enemy, and had completed it in a few days, 
thanks to the skill and ingenuity of his soldiers. The river, 
by a multitude of sinuous turnings, formed a swamp three 
or four hundred metres wide, lying in the shadow of gigan¬ 
tic trees, whose trunks rose to a height of fifty metres 
above the waters, while the roots were buried in a muddy 
bottom impracticable for men and horses. It was found 
necessary to open a passage across this forest, and to lay 
the flooring of the bridge, formed of unhewn pieces of tim¬ 
ber bound together by cords or bind-weed, sometimes on 
piles sunk into the bed of the river, sometimes on the 
stumps of the trees, which were cut down to a proper 
height. No* survey had been made of the country beyond 
the shores of the river. Higher up still, in the neighbor¬ 
hood of New Bridge, two trestle-bridges had been construc¬ 
ted and almost entirely placed in position. It only re¬ 
mained to lay the flooring. But the open space in which 
they stood exposed them to the fire of the enemy, which had 
soon interrupted the work, and it could only be completed 
by the aid of an aggressive movement on the right bank. 

The Federal left wing was composed of four divisions, 
each from six to eight thousand men strong. Casey, who 
commanded the newest regiments in the whole army, had 
very imprudently been placed at the most exposed point of 
the whole line, and occupied a clearing about one kilometre in 
advance of Seven Pines, where he had erected two small 
redoubts amounting a few field pieces. His pickets had 
been pushed only one thousand metres beyond that point. 
Couch, with his division, was at Seven Pines, near Fair Oaks 
Station, situated sixteen hundred metres to the north, and 
along that portion of the Nine Mile road which connects the 
two points. At a distance of two kilometres from Seven 
Pines, where the Williamsburg road emerges from a large 


— 305 — 


Civil War in America 


clearing to enter a wood, there was a line of breastworks 
and small redoubts occupied by Kearny's division. The 
fourth, Hooker's, had been sent a considerable distance 
south to watch the passes of White Oak Swamp. 

The army of the Potomac was thus unfortunately 
scattered; the divisions, posted in front of Seven Pines, at 
White Oak Swamp and Mechanicsville, could not afford 
each other mutual support, and they formed a vast semi¬ 
circle of nearly forty kilometres in extent. General McClel¬ 
lan estimated that it would have taken two days' march for 
Franklin’s division to reach Casey's encampments. The 
Confederates, on the contrary, occupying the chord of the 
arc, could as easily move to the front of one as of the other; 
and after having menaced the extreme right of the Federals 
at Meadow Bridge, they had only eleven or twelve kilo¬ 
metres to march to reach Fair Oaks and fall upon their 
extreme left. Johnston was not the man to leave his ad¬ 
versary in so perilous a situation without turning it to ac¬ 
count. His army, assembled around Richmond, consisted 
of four large divisions, each comprising five or six brigades, 
under Generals Longstreet, G. Smith, D. H. Hill and Huger; 
it numbered about sixty thousand effective soldiers. 

On the 30th he gave the necessary instructions for 
battle on the morrow. Huger, following a road called the 
Charles City road, was to pass to the right of White Oak 
Swamp, and then cross this marsh, so as to attack Keyes' 
positions in flank, on the Williamsburg road, whilst Hill, 
debouching by this road, was to charge them in front. 
Longstreet, following in Hill's rear, was to sustain his at¬ 
tack. Smith's orders were to proceed to Old Tavern, in 
order to cover the left wing of the army in case the Federals 
should attempt to cross the Chickahominy near New Bridge; 
otherwise, to come and take part in the battle by entering 
into line to the left of Fair Oaks station. 

During the evening a tropical storm burst upon the two 
armies, and in the midst of profound darkness poured 
torrents of rain upon the ground on which they were to 
measure their strength. On the morning of the 31st this 
clayey soil was half submerged; the passage of a single 


— 306 — 


Fair Oaks 


vehicle was sufficient to turn the roads into inextricable 
mud-holes; the smallest streams were swelling as one looked 
at them, while the Chickahominy, assuming a reddish tint, 
was beginning to overflow its banks and to spread over the 
plains adjoining, which were already very muddy. Far 
from allowing the obstacles which the condition of the 
ground was about to interpose to turn him from his purpose, 
Johnston only saw in it an additional motive for giving 
battle, being convinced that the mu^d an|d the overflow 
would be more fatal to the Federals, scattered along a line 
too extended, than to the army which was compactly 
gathered around him. 

At break of day that army took up its line of march 
in the presence of the whole population of Richmond, which 
had come out of the city to encourage those to whom its 
defence was entrusted. It would have been difficult to find 
a single inhabitant of the Confederate capital who had not 
a relative or a friend in the ranks of the army. Curious 
persons and newspaper correspondents followed it as far 
as the battle-field. The three divisions of Hill, Longstreet 
and Smith, after some strenuous efforts, arrived in position 
toward eight o’clock; they had been obliged, however, to 
leave their artillery behind—a bold resolve, which the Fed¬ 
erals were not wise enough to imitate. But Huger’s troops, 
which had started at the same time as the former, did not 
make their appearance in the positions which had been as¬ 
signed to them. It is probable that the latter general may 
have found the fords at White Oak Swamp utterly impass¬ 
able. Be that as it may, he did not reach the field of battle 
during the whole of that day, nor did he even notify his 
chief of the cause of his delay; his absence, so fatal to the 
success of the Confederates, was made the subject of bitter 
reproaches on the part of those whose plans had thus been 
frustrated. Finally, about noon, Longstreet, who had been 
waiting for him up to that moment, gave Hill the order to 
attack. Without sending any skirmishers ahead, that they 
might take the enemy more completely by surprise, the 
Confederates advanced, some in line across the woods, others 
in deep columns along the road, sweeping before them 


— 307 — 


Civil War in America 


Casey’s pickets, together with a regiment which had been 
sent to reinforce them. The foremost works of the Fed¬ 
erate, which were as yet unfinished, being simply abatis or 
breastworks, whose profiles could afford no protection to 
soldiers, were occupied by Naglee’s brigade. The latter 
made a vigorous resistance, while the division artillery, un¬ 
der Colonel Bailey, and old regular officer, caused great 
havoc in the ranks of the assailants. Meanwhile, the com¬ 
bat extended along the line. Hill had deployed all his 
troops and brought them into action; his left had reached 
Fair Oaks, where Couch was making a stand with a portion 
of his division. Casey’s two other brigades had hastened 
to the assistance of Naglee, and, despite heavy losses, they 
held out against the Confederates, whose numbers were 
constantly increasing. Longstreet’s division now entered 
into line and was supporting Hill’s soldiers, who were be¬ 
coming exhausted. Attacking the Federal position by the 
right, some of his regiments penetrated into the woods 
which separate White Oak Swamp from the clearing de¬ 
fended by Casey. The Federal works were attacked in the 
rear, and their defenders decimated by enfilading fire. 
These young soldiers, who had hitherto been sustained by 
the excitement which springs from danger and the very 
exhaustion of a fierce struggle, no longer possessed the re¬ 
quisite coolness to resist this unexpected attack. They 
were driven back in disorder upon Seven Pines. Besides, 
the number alone of their adversaries would have been 
sufficient to crush them. Some few, however, persisted in 
defending the redoubts, but soon disappeared among the 
ranks of Hill’s troops, who, having returned to the charge, 
hemmed them in on every side. Bailey was killed by the 
side of the guns he had just spiked, and seven pieces fell 
into the hands of the assailants. It was three o’clock. 
Precisely at this moment Peck’s brigade of Couch’s division 
was arriving from Seven Pines, led by Keyes, who had been 
informed somewhat late of the serious character of the 
fight. The Lafayette Guards, which formed part of this 
brigade, having deployed into line among the debris of 
Casey’s division, allowed the fugitives to pass without mov- 


— 308 — 


Fair Oaks 


ing, then rallying around them this floating mass, among 
whom the bonds of discipline had disappeared, but not per¬ 
sonal courage, they made a vigorous aggressive movement. 
Despite their efforts, they could recapture neither the re¬ 
doubts nor the lost cannon; but the enemy was checked, 
the remainder of Casey’s artillery saved, and the Federals 
had time to rally. Regiments after regiments from Couch’s 
division were sent to sustain the fight; for if the Federals 
were losing ground, they now contested it foot to foot. On 
the right Couch commanded at Fair Oaks in person, where, 
with the rest of his division, he held in check the left wing 
of Longstreet, whose main efforts were still concentrated 
upon the position of Seven Pines. 

The struggle lasted four hours, and yet, strange to say, 
only two divisions had taken part in it on either side. Keyes’ 
corps alone, numbering about twelve thousand effective men, 
had been engaged on the Federal side, and while Longstreet 
and Hill’s columns were being decimated by the enemy’s 
artillery, Huger, on their right, was still lost in the White 
Oak Swamp; Smith, on their left, continued inactive around 
Old Tavern. In short, the two generals-in-chief were both 
unconscious of the battle in which their respective soldiers 
were engaged. McClellan, who was sick at his headquar¬ 
ters near Gaines’ Mill, had heard nothing from Heintzel- 
man, to whom the command of the entire left was entrusted. 
The telegraph which connected the various sections of the 
army was silent. Heintzelman himself, although posted at 
Savage Station, only a few kilometres from Seven Pines, 
had only heard of the enemy’s attack several hours after 
the first musket-shot was fired. Johnston’s ignorance was 
still more unaccountable, in as much as he was the assail¬ 
ant. Leisurely posted at Old Tavern, he was still waiting 
for the booming of cannon on the Williamsburg road to put 
Smith in motion. But the storm of rain and wind which 
followed the gale of the previous day carried the sound in a 
different direction, and the general-in-chief, who had or¬ 
dered the attack to be made in the morning, remained until 
four o’clock listening in expectation of this signal, without 
sending a solitary aide-de-camp to ascertain what was pass- 


— 309 — 


Civil War in America 


ing on his right. He was, however, separated by less than 
four kilometres in a direct line from the Williamsburg road, 
and a man on horseback, leaving Old Tavern, would have 
had no more than ten kilometres to ride, without leaving 
the main road, to reach Longstreet in the midst of the sol¬ 
diers whom he was bringing without delay into the thickest 
of the fight. Although taken by surprise, the Federals had 
not lost quite so much time. The booming of cannon, which 
Johnston did not hear, had reached McClellan’s tent. The 
high wind made it impossible for the balloon, which had 
been brought there at great expense, to make an ascension 
to reconnoitre the movements of the enemy; it had met the 
fate of all complicated machines, which, although useful 
at times, should never be relied on in war. An order, how¬ 
ever, was immediately sent to Sumner to hold himself in 
readiness to march. The latter, also hearing the cannon, 
was not satisfied with simply obeying the letter of his in¬ 
structions ; but putting his two divisions in motion without 
delay, he placed each of them near one of the bridges he 
had constructed, ready to cross the river at the first signal. 
On his side Heintzelman, on learning the state of affairs 
about two o’clock, at once recalled Hooker from White Oak 
Swamp, despatched Kearny to the support of Keyes, and 
notified McClellan, who immediately ordered Sumner to 
cross the Chickahominy and take part in the battle. 

At half-past three o’clock Kearny, who, from the mo¬ 
ment that he heard the sound of cannon, knew no obstacles, 
arrived at Seven Pines with two of his brigades, Berry’s 
and Jamison’s, and his timely presence retrieved for a 
moment the fortunes of the day. But at the same time 
Johnston was also roused from his inactivity. He sent at 
last an aide-de-camp to ascertain the movements of Long- 
street ; and learning from him that a fierce battle was rag¬ 
ing on his right, he determined to bring Smith’s corps into 
line. A portion of this corps, under Hood, marched directly 
upon Fair Oaks by way of Nine Mile road to support Long- 
street’s attack. The remainder, under the personal lead 
of the general-in-chief, bore to the left, and reached the 
large clearings extending from Fair Oaks to the Chicka- 


— 310 — 


Fair Oaks 


hominy; by this movement Johnston hoped to strike the 
right flank and rear of the Federals who were defending 
Seven Pines. It was four 'clock. Hood arrived at Fair 
Oaks with his fresh troops, and swept everything before 
him. He cut the Federal line in two. Couch, with a few 
regiments, was driven back north of the railroad, while 
the remainder of his division, already scattered and mixed 
up with the debris of Casey’s, was no longer able to defend 
Seven Pines, and was forced back on the Williamsburg 
road, while Kearny’s brigades, which had resolutely de¬ 
fended their positions on the extreme left, finding them¬ 
selves separated from the rest of the army, were obliged 
to make a large detour across the woods to rejoin their 
comrades. 

It was a critical moment. The Federals, who had 
struggled vigorously against the ever-increasing numbers 
of their adversaries—for they were only eighteen or nine¬ 
teen thousand against more than thirty thousand—were 
in a condition in which the least mischance might lead to 
an irreparable disaster. Brigades, regiments, and even 
companies, were mixed up. The relative commands no 
longer existed. In their efforts to restore order among the 
troops the officers gathered around them, by their words 
and their example, men from the regiments, and marshalled 
them in haste and almost at random behind the breastworks 
erected a few days before near the camp occupied by Kear¬ 
ny, two kilometres in the rear of Seven Pines. One moment 
more, and Smith, falling upon the extreme right of this 
weak line, would give the signal for a new attack, which 
would probably consummate the destruction of all the Fed* 
erals south of the Chickahominy. 

It was six o’clock in the evening, and the Confederates 
had more than two hours of daylight before them to com¬ 
plete their victory; but all of a sudden a brisk fire of mus¬ 
ketry broke out in the wood to the right of the railroad. 
The hollow sound of howitzers loaded with grape was soon 
mingled with it. Smith had encountered a foe entirely un¬ 
expected. It was Sumner, who arrived in time to check 
his progress and resume on this side the game which had 


— 311 — 


Civil War in America 


been lost on the Williamsburg road. The warriors in¬ 
stinct, which prompted him to push his divisions forward 
and mass them in the vicinity of the bridges when ordered 
to keep under arms, had enabled him to gain an hour, and 
that hour secured the safety of the army. The new order 
directing him to cross the Chickahominy to participate in 
the battle reached him about two o’clock. At that moment 
the river was already rising as far as the eye could see, 
seeming to conspire with the enemy to prevent him from 
going to the assistance of his comrades. The lower bridge 
had been carried away; the other was entirely submerged, 
while the unhewn timbers which constituted its flooring, 
being only held together by ropes, floated about amid the 
waters, whose impetuous current tossed them in their foam. 
Sumner himself, despite his inflexible will, was beginning 
to think that not a single company would ever be able to 
reach the other side of the river. Nevertheless, he pushed 
the head of column of Sedgwick’s division over this bridge. 
The first soldiers who crossed found it difficult to keep 
steady on the moving platform, which was shaking under 
their feet. But the weight of those who followed soon re¬ 
stored its stability; it soon settled on the piles from which 
it had been wrenched. The whole of Sedgwick’s division 
crossed it, the officers on horseback; the artillery followed, 
but most of the guns sunk in the mud in the marshy plains 
which extend beyond the bridge. Kirby’s regular battery 
alone succeeded in getting safely over. Richardson, who, 
after having tried in vain to restore the lower bridge, had 
been compelled to cross at this same point, followed in rear 
of Sedgwick, but his troops only reached the opposite shore 
at nightfall. Sumner had not waited for his arrival to move 
forward with his first division. He had just overtaken 
Couch, who had been driven back on the right of Fair Oaks 
with a portion of his troops, and had barely time to deploy 
to receive the shock of Smith’s corps, which was about to 
debouch in the large clearing. Kirby’s battery enfiladed an 
open space leading to Nine Mile road; Sumner placed one 
brigade and a half on the right, fronting Old Tavern; on the 
left the remainder of Sedgwick’s division was disposed en 


— 312 — 


Fair Oaks 


potence parallel to the railroad, which the enemy had just 
occupied. Even before these dispositions were fully car¬ 
ried out, the battle was furiously engaged. Smith was in 
haste to make up for lost time, and believed himself sure 
of success; Whiting, who commanded three brigades of this 
corps, debouched on the salient angle formed by the Federal 
line; but being received by a terrible fire from Kirby’s guns, 
he halted on the skirt of the wood. After a brisk fire of 
musketry, the Confederates made a new attempt to carry 
this battery, which occupied the key of the position, and 
had interrupted their turning movement. Johnston, rush¬ 
ing in person into the thickest of the fight, hurled Petti¬ 
grew’s brigade against it. It advanced fearlessly up to the 
cannon’s mouth; but the Federal gunners, anxious to avenge 
the memory of Bull Run, where this same Johnston had 
captured their pieces, coolly waited for the assault of the 
Confederate brigade, which they decimated at short range. 
It was driven back in disorder, leaving in the Federal hands 
its wounded commander, Pettigrew, and the ground strewed 
with dead bodies. Availing himself of this chance, Sum¬ 
ner assumed the offensive with his left, and drove the ene¬ 
my back in the direction of Fair Oaks. Smith brought his 
reserve brigades into action in vain; he could barely hold 
the ground he occupied, and his forward movement was de¬ 
finitely checked. The Confederate army was, moreover, 
paralyzed at this moment by the loss of its commander-in¬ 
chief; Johnston had just been severely wounded and car¬ 
ried into Richmond. It was seven o’clock in the evening. 
Along the whole line the battle had degenerated into a mus¬ 
ketry fire, which was continued pretty well into the night, 
but each party remained on the defensive. The check of 
Smith had, in fact, crippled the success of Longstreet on the 
Williamsburg road. The latter, arriving in front of the 
small works where the Federal forces were massed, was 
afraid of attempting to carry them by assault with worn- 
out troops whose ranks were fearfully thinned. His oppo¬ 
nent, reinforced by a few fresh regiments, made a bold 
stand while the fugitives were rapidly coming back into line. 
Longstreet was waiting for assistance, either from Huger 


— 313 — 


Civil War in America 


on his right or from Smith on his left, before making the 
attack, and thus allowed the last hours of daylight to pass 
away. 

A dark and rainy night came on at last to put an end 
to the slaughter, but not to the sufferings, the fatigue and 
the anxieties, of the two armies. The losses had been 
equally heavy on both sides. During the whole of that 
night long wagon-trains of wounded men, carrying into 
Richmond the unfortunate victims of a fratricidal war, told 
the inhabitants of the capital how dearly bought was the 
success which had been prematurely announced to them. 
All the vehicles in the city, omnibuses and carts, were 
despatched to the field of battle to find the wounded and the 
dying, whom they brought back in the midst of a dense 
and silent crowd. As for the dead, there was no time as 
yet to think of them. On the side of the Federals the am¬ 
bulances, camps and railway-stations were not less encum¬ 
bered. 

On both sides the generals were filled with anxiety. 
Smith had assumed the command, but in succeeding Johns¬ 
ton he could not replace that experienced chieftain. The 
Federals had undoubtedly sustained a severe check; but if 
their left wing had been defeated, it was not destroyed, as 
was hoped in Richmond. The attack had been wanting in 
unison; the absence of Huger together with the prolonged 
inaction of Smith, had thrown all the burden of the battle 
upon one-half of the army. Finally the encounter with 
Sumner had not only roughly interrupted the success of the 
operation, but had revealed the existence of communica¬ 
tions which the Confederates had not suspected. It gave 
them to understand that, notwithstanding the rise in the 
Chickahominy, they might on the following day have to 
measure themselves with the whole Federal army. Conse¬ 
quently, they determined upon a retreat. 

On the side of the Federals the anxiety was not less. 
They had always wished during this aggressive campaign 
for an opportunity to fight a defensive battle, thinking that 
this kind of fighting was better adapted to the character of 
their soldiers; they had been attacked, and, so far from 


— 314 — 


Fair Oaks 


coming off victorious, their left wing had been so crushed 
that Sumner’s success afforded no compensation for the 
reverse. The Chickahominy was constantly rising, and it 
way easy to foresee that on the following morning all the 
new communications established by Sumner between the 
two wings of the army would be interrupted by the freshet. 
It was known that the enemy had not brought all his forces 
into action. There were more than sixty thousand men 
around Richmond and within reach of Fair Oaks. General 
McClellan thought there were eighty thousand. The Fed¬ 
eral troops who were about to find themselves almost iso¬ 
lated on the right bank of the Chickahominy did not amount 
to forty-five thousand men, while one-third of them at 
least, disorganized by the great struggle of the 31st of May, 
would have found it difficult to come into line the day follow¬ 
ing. 

This numerical inferiority should not have existed; 
and if the Confederates had cause to complain that some of 
their generals had compromised the success of their opera¬ 
tions by not appearing on the field of battle or by arriving 
too late, the Federals had an equal right to say that the 
inaction of half their army had prevented them from turn¬ 
ing the battle of Fair Oaks into a great victory. Sum¬ 
ner’s success was sufficient proof of this. At the time when 
the latter was ordered to cross the Chickahominy, General 
McClellan, from his headquarters at Gaines’ Mill, could see 
the smoke, which rose above the tree-tops, tracing the un¬ 
dulations of the line of battle and marking the steady pro¬ 
gress of the enemy. He had in hand two army corps of 
his right wing; before him the Chickahominy, which, al¬ 
though swollen, was still passable; two bridges already in an 
advanced state of construction could be completed in a few 
hours; on the opposite hill, commanding the approaches to 
the river, no work had been erected by the enemy; only one 
or two regiments were seen moving about with suspicious 
ostentation along the most conspicuous points of the pla¬ 
teau. By leaving one division to guard the large park of 
artillery, and the depots, McClellan could have crossed the 
river with three others in the vicinity of New Bridge, and 


— 315 — 


Civil War in America 


fallen upon the flank of the Confederates; such an attack 
would have made them pay dear for their first success. 
Several brigades had been stationed in front of two bridges 
—the construction of which had been commenced several 
days previous—so as to be ready to cross them the moment 
they should be finished. But General McClellan, seeing 
that it would be impossible, before evening, for the artillery 
to cross those bridges, and not wishing to risk a detachment 
of his army in an unknown region, with a numerous and ap¬ 
parently victorious enemy in its front and a swollen river 
in its rear, merely gave directions for the completion of 
the bridges during the night, hoping, no doubt, that he 
would be able to accomplish the passage the following morn¬ 
ing. But even while abandoning the idea of forcing the 
passage of the Chickahominy at New Bridge, he might 
perhaps have been able to bring back his right wing to the 
rear, in order to cross the river over the same bridge as 
Sumner. This bridge was situated only about four miles 
and a half from the encampments of the right wing; and if 
the troops had been put in motion at the time Sumner re¬ 
ceived the order to cross, they would have arrived in time 
to follow him over the bridge, which withstood the flood 
until noon the next day. In this case, five fresh divisions, 
instead of two, could have resumed the offensive in the 
morning. But General McClellan, knowing that a single 
defeat might involve the loss of his whole army, isolated as 
it was in the enemy’s country, and ruin the Federal cause 
for ever, was not willing to weaken his right wing. Fear¬ 
ing lest the enemy might debouch by way of Meadow Bridge 
and cross the Chickahominy, he did not dare to entrust 
to a thin line of troops the guard of his communications 
and the immense park of artillery, which the condition of 
the roads prevented from being removed; and he left nearly 
fifty thousand men inactive on the plateau of Cold Harbor. 
We cannot blame his prudence, but it may be asserted that 
if he had known what was passing among the Confederate 
bivouacs, and at the camp-fires around which the generals 
in command of the enemy’s troops were trying to find shel¬ 
ter from the penetrating dampness of that night, he would 


— 316 — 


Fair Oaks 


have acted very differently. Indeed, their new commander- 
in-chief had no idea of throwing himself on both banks of 
the Chickahominy, in the position which had so nearly 
proved fatal to the Federals. He did not believe it possible 
to complete the maneuver which had been interrupted by 
Sumner against their left wing. It must be acknowledged, 
however, that the chances were greatly in his favor. Huger 
had made his appearance after the battle, and Generals 
Holmes and Ripley had just arrived in Richmond from 
North Carolina with eight thousand men. This timely re¬ 
inforcement would perhaps permit them to resume the 
attack with greater hope of success, as the rise in the river 
rendered the position of the Federals more difficult. But in 
the absence of Johnston, who had alone conceived the plan 
of battle, prudence prevailed, and Smith would have given 
the signal for retreat that very night, if he had not been 
obliged to give his soldiers a few hours’ rest, and his offi¬ 
cers time to rally and reorganize their troops. Conse¬ 
quently, when day dawned upon the two armies no sound 
disturbed at first the silence which reigned over the battle¬ 
field; and it was the Federals who renewed the conflict on 
the morning of the 1st of June. During the evening Hooker 
had again struck into the Williamsburg road, while Richard¬ 
son had joined Sedgwick near Fair Oaks. These two divi¬ 
sions, advancing to the front line, attacked the Confeder¬ 
ates, who were already in full retreat. Notwithstanding 
this reinforcement, the troops composing the left wing of 
the Federals were not in a condition to push into a woody 
and unknown region, in pursuit of an enemy whose prowess 
they had just experienced. A movement of this kind could 
not have been seriously undertaken unless Franklin and 
Porter had been able to join them on the field of battle. 
General McClellan as we have said, had ordered the comple¬ 
tion of the bridges that were in course of construction in 
front of their camps. The corps of engineers, by extraor¬ 
dinary exertions, had succeeded for a while in controlling the 
swollen waters of the Chickahominy, and on the 1st of June, 
at 8 o’clock in the morning, the bridge of boats at New 
Bridge was passable for the artillery; the trestle-bridge, 


— 317 — 


Civil War in America 


situated higher up, might, in spite of the condition of the 
surrounding country, which was overflowed, allow the in¬ 
fantry to cross. The rise in the river, it is true, seemed to 
preclude all hope of long preserving these bridges; for, as 
early as noon that day, they were under water. Still, even 
here was to be found an opportunity for transforming the 
battle into a decisive victory and the general-in-chief would 
doubtless have seized this opportunity if, at that moment, 
he had been with his right wing, and if he had known how 
little able the Confederates were, at that time to oppose 
the crossing of the river at New Bridge, if that crossing 
had been supported by Sumner on the other bank, and by a 
demonstration on the extreme right, near Mechanicsville. 
But McClellan was called, by the grave aspect of the fight, 
to the left wing; he could not take advantage of this cri¬ 
tical moment, while it was out of his power, at that dis¬ 
tance, to order his lieutenants to undertake a movement so 
hazardous, and which he himself, but a few hours before, 
had deemed impossible; and thus his right wing remained 
inactive, and the Confederate army was saved from immi¬ 
nent disaster. Indeed, it has been asserted by eye-witnesses 
that its retreat was not made without disorder, and that 
if the Federals had pressed with a sufficient force, even 
without artillery, the three brigades of Huger’s corps, 
which, under Pickett, Pryor and Mahone, were defending 
every inch of ground, they might probably have been able 
to enter Richmond with them. 

The combat of the 1st of June, in which but a few thou¬ 
sand men were engaged on either side, had notwithstanding 
the proportions of a great battle. On the left it was marked 
by a brilliant charge of Sickles’ brigade along the railway 
track; on the right by a sharp encounter between an Irish 
brigade in the Federal service, commanded by General 
Meagher, and Pickett’s troops. Before noon the Federal 
outposts took possession without a blow of the works whose 
capture had cost so dear to the Confederate army, and suf¬ 
fered it to disappear among the dense woods without moles¬ 
tation. This brilliant army, which had gone out the day 
before almost in triumph for the purpose of delivering 


— 318 — 


Fair Oaks 


Richmond from the grasp of the invader, returned to its 
cantonments on that same evening, with only four flags, ten 
cannon and twelve hundred prisoners, more as an evidence 
of its valor than as a token of success. 

The undecided battle, which had drenched the vicinity 
of Fair Oaks with blood during two entire days, was at¬ 
tended with a loss of nearly four thousand five hundred men 
to the Confederates, and five thousand seven hundred and 
twenty-seven on the part of the Federate. The heaviest 
losses on both sides were sustained around Seven Pines; 
those of Longstreet and Hill amounted to more than three 
thousand, and those of Keyes to three thousand one hun¬ 
dred and twenty men.* After such a struggle the two ar¬ 
mies of war, were equally in need of rest.f 

A very remarkable work just published by General 
Johnston explains how McClellan is mistaken in attributing 
a loss of two thousand five hundred men more than they 
really sustained, to his opponents. In this work Johnston 
severely blames the generals who succeeded him in com¬ 
mand for not having followed up on the 1st of June their 
success of May 31st. He complains, moreover, of not hav¬ 
ing been informed beforehand of the approach of Holmes 
and Ripley, whose arrival he would have waited for before 
giving battle, if he had known of their being so near. As 
General Johnston’s official report, addressed to the Confeder¬ 
ate government, contains none of these reproaches, now em¬ 
bodied in a book which has appeared since the close of the 
war, we may infer that President Davis is chiefly respon¬ 
sible in the estimation of General Johnston, for the mis¬ 
takes he refers to in his later publication. 

*The official reports give the following figures for the army of 
the Potomac: Sumner, one hundred and eighty-three killed, eight hun¬ 
dred and ninety-four wounded, one hundred and forty-six prisoners; 
Heintzelman, two hundred and fifty-nine killed, nine hundred and 
eighty wounded, one hundred and fifty-five "prisoners; Keyes, four 
hundred and forty-eight killed, one thousand seven hundred and fifty- 
three wounded, nine hundred and twenty-one prisoners; total eight 
hundred and ninety killed, three thousand" six hundred and twenty- 
seven wounded, and one thousand two hundred and twenty-two pris¬ 
oners. For the army of Northern Virginia: Longstreet and Hill, a 
little over three thousand; Smith, one thousand two hundred and 
thirty-three men disabled. 

fSee Note A in the Appendix to this volume. 


— 319 — 



CHAPTER III 


Gaines' Mill 

The alarms occasioned by Jackson’s success did not 
prevent the battle of Fair Oaks from producing a great 
sensation in the North. The army of the Potomac was es¬ 
sentially national in its character, and there was not a vil¬ 
lage in the free States that had not furnished to it some 
young men; consequently, a greater interest was every¬ 
where manifested in its labors than in the pretended dan¬ 
gers of the Federal capital. The government, still cherish¬ 
ing a secret jealousy against General McClellan, seldom com¬ 
municated to the public the tidings it received from him, 
but after such a battle it was no longer possible to keep 
silent; accordingly, a despatch from the commander-in- 
chief was for the first time published. The latter, unfor¬ 
tunately deceived by Heintzelman’s report, threw undue 
blame upon Casey’s division. This despatch was corrected 
in Washington, but in such a manner as to aggravate the 
painful effect of the error it contained. The unmerited 
censure was allowed to stand, while the eulogies which 
McClellan bestowed upon Sumner were suppressed. The 
general-in-chief soon set forth the truth, and it became 
known that the army had been saved by the stubborn resist¬ 
ance of Naglee and Bailey, the ardor which Kearny had 
infused into Jamison’s and Berry’s brigades, and, finally, 
by the indomitable energy of old Sumner. 

Mr. Lincoln learned at last that he could no longer 
delay sending the reinforcements which the army of the 
Potomac needed in order to continue the task, which threat¬ 
ened to be difficult. The garrison of Fort Monroe and a 
few other regiments, eight or nine thousand men in all, 
were assigned to General McClellan, who distributed them 
among the different brigades of the army. He was again 
promised the co-operation of McDowell as soon as the lat¬ 
ter could gather together the detachments he had sent for¬ 
ward in pursuit of Jackson. This promise, no less vain 
than of the preceding year, was to exercise on the opera- 


— 320 — 


Gaines' Mill 


tions of the Federals against Richmond even a more bane¬ 
ful influence than the first breach of promise. Still afraid 
of exposing the capital, the President refused to send more 
than one division of McDowell’s corps by water. In notify¬ 
ing McClellan that the other three divisions would proceed 
from Fredericksburg to rejoin him by land, he again re¬ 
quested him to be ready to communicate with them on the 
South Anna, and thus caused him to miss the opportunity 
to repair his delays and the mistakes he had been led to 
commit. He could, in fact, have taken advantage of the 
confusion into which the Confederates had been thrown by 
the battle of Fair Oaks, to seek the new base of operations 
on the James River, the advantage of which we have pointed 
out elsewhere. This movement, to which, three weeks later, 
it was necessary to resort for the purpose of saving the 
army, would have given very different results if it had been 
executed then with an offensive aim. 

The enforced rest which followed the battle of Fair 
Oaks was prolonged by the bad weather for two distressing 
weeks. The Chickahominy, the overflow of which exceeded 
anything ever witnessed by the oldest inhabitants, carried 
away all the bridges, and for several days the six divisions, 
encamped on the right side of the river, only obtained their 
supplies by the railroad and the viaduct, whose frail scaffold¬ 
ing trembled above the flood. The ground, which consists 
of alternate layers of reddish clay and quicksand, was 
nothing more than a vast swamp, and the guns which had 
been ranged in battery near the camps gradually sunk into 
the earth, from which they could not be extricated. Every 
morning a scorching sun, shining upon this damp soil, and 
decomposing the dead bodies of men and horses, which the 
rain had again brought to the surface, filled the hot air 
with poisonous exhalations. Every evening thick clouds 
gathered, the lightning flashed, the heat became suffocating, 
and all night long rain fell in abundance, which still fur¬ 
ther increased the inundation. 

The inactivity to which the two armies were thus con¬ 
demned, however, did not partake of the qualities of refresh¬ 
ing rest. The Federals, as we have stated, would probably 


— 321 — 


Civil War in America 


have achieved an important success on the 1st of June, if 
they had put in motion the troops encamped at Gaines’ Mill, 
on the evening of the 31st, or during the night, so as to 
find themselves on the right banks of the Chickahominy at 
daybreak, with all the disposable portion of their army. 
This opportunity had been allowed to pass; but they were 
yet in time to change their base of operations, and mass all 
their forces between the Chickahominy and the James. 
General McClellan having given up this project in order to 
remain within reach of Fredericksburg, nothing was left 
for him to do but to carry out the plan which has been 
temporarily interrupted by the battle of Fair Oaks. This 
plan consisted in gaining ground gradually by capturing, 
one day a wood, another day a clearing, and thus advancing 
step by step until, by a succession of battles more or less 
fierce, Richmond should be so closely hemmed in that the 
enemy’s army would either abandon it, or renew, under 
less favorable circumstances, the dangerous experiment 
of Fair Oaks. But even a slow operation of this kind 
required fine weather. It was necessary before joining 
battle to have facilities—in fact, to be able to move and 
victual the troops with ease; it was necessary before join¬ 
ing battle to conquer the treacherous waters of the Chicka¬ 
hominy, and to connect both banks by bridges numerous and 
always passable; it was necessary, finally, to be able to 
take to the battle-field that powerful artillery, without which 
the generals of the army of the Potomac were unwilling to 
lead their soldiers to the attack. These two weeks, there¬ 
fore, were employed on the part of the Federals in repair¬ 
ing the roads which connected their several camps, in 
constructing new ones, in extricating from the mud the 
large supply-trains, which scarcely sufficed for the distribu¬ 
tion of daily rations, in strengthening the bridges and in¬ 
creasing their number, and finally in covering the whole 
battle-field and increasing their number, and finally in 
covering the whole battle-field of the 31st of May with 
vast works. 

About the middle of June the ground was once more 
practicable, and the Chickahominy, having again become 


— 322 — 


Gaines' Mill 


a modest stream, did not appear inclined to renew its fatal 
freaks of violence. The army of the Potomac was at length 
firmly established, provided with excellent communications, 
and surrounded by strong entrenchments, which enabled 
it to concentrate without danger a large portion of its forces 
at any given point along its front. But these results had 
been dearly bought. The soldiers, obliged to work in the 
mud and in an unhealthy climate, had suffered severely. 
The camps, too long seated on a marshy soil, had become the 
foci of swamp fevers and typhoid fevers. To the painful 
monotony of throwing up earthworks were added continual 
watches and picket duty, which deprived the men of that 
rest which is necessary to health, without offering them in 
exchange the stimulants of an active campaign. In short, 
fatigue and disgust multiplied the number of deserters into 
the interior, whose crime was encouraged by a vicious sys¬ 
tem of recruiting, and especially by the bait of bounties, 
which they hoped to receive by re-enlisting in new regiments. 
Consequently, notwithstanding the reinforcements which 
had come from Fortress Monroe, and the arrival of McCall’s 
division, detached from McDowell’s corps and landed on the 
11th and 12th at White House, the effective force of the 
army was reduced to a little more than one hundred thou¬ 
sand men for duty. Its official morning reports acknowl¬ 
edged thirty thousand absentees, nine-tenths of whom were 
on the sick list, or quartered in the hospitals, or sent to 
their respective homes on leave as convalescents.* The 
Confederates, on their side, had also made good use of the 
respite which circumstances had granted them. They had 
naturally opposed a line of entrenchments to those of the 


*The following was the morning report of the army of the Po¬ 
tomac on the 20th of June: Present, one hundred and fifteen thou¬ 
sand one hundred and two; sick, detached, under arrest, twelve 
thousand two hundred and twenty-five; absent, twenty-nine thou¬ 
sand five hundred and eleven; total, one hundred and fifty-six thou¬ 
sand eight hundred and thirty-eight. The garrisons of Fort Monroe 
and Yorktown should be deducted from the first figure. Sumner’s 
and Franklin’s corps had the least number of men unfit for service. 
On the 10th of July, out of thirty-eight thousand two hundred and 
fifty absentees, thirty-four thousand four hundred and seventy-two 
were on regular leave of absence, three thousand seven hundred and 
seventy-eight had deserted to the interior. 


— 323 — 



Civil War in America 


Federals. As McClellan’s task was to capture Richmond, 
and not to defend the swamps of the Chickahominy, these 
delays all accrued to the benefit of his adversaries; and the 
more he fortified his position, the more the difficulties of 
the task he had to accomplish increased. The Confederate 
army was also receiving reinforcements; and thanks to 
the plans which the Southern generals had caused the Rich¬ 
mond government to adopt, the moment was approaching 
when it would be in a condition to venture upon a decisive 
struggle, with better chances than at Fair Oaks. General 
Lee had assumed the command made vacant by Johnston’s 
wound. His first efforts in the war had not been more 
brilliant than those of Grant, his future opponent, and he 
was personally but little known to the troops he was about 
to lead into battle. But his companions in the Mexican 
expedition had not forgotten the eminent services he had 
then rendered notwithstanding his inferior rank. Since 
the outbreak of the civil war, the Confederate authorities 
had had occasion to appreciate his wisdom and clearness 
of judgment in matters connected with military affairs. 
His fellow-citizens of Virginia respected him as the repre¬ 
sentative of one of the first families of the most aristo¬ 
cratic of the American colonies. He was looked upon by 
all as a true type of soldier and man of honor. The regrets 
even he had experienced in forsaking the Federal flag no 
longer injured him in the eyes of the public, for the moment 
of the first ebullitions had passed. Once upon the scenes, 
he will no more leave it, and he will always play, if not the 
first, at least one of the first, parts. We shall always find 
him a patient, persevering and prudent calculator, yet 
ready to risk much at the opportune moment; handling a 
large army with great dexterity in the midst of the thickest 
forests; understanding men, selecting them carefully, and 
securing their attachment by his equity, worshipped by 
his soldiers, obtaining from them what no other chief could 
have thought of asking them; respected and obeyed by all 
his lieutenants, humane, of a conciliatory disposition, one 
whose only fault as a general was an excess of deference 
to the opinion of his subordinates, which at times caused 


— 324 — 


Gaines' Mill 


him to lose a little of that firmness which is so indispensable 
in the midst of a battle. Such was the new adversary of 
General McClellan. 

Since he had assumed command he had reorganized 
his army and gathered new combatants from every part 
of the Confederacy. The conscription law, which was in 
force, had filled up his cadres, mixing young soldiers with 
those whom the war had already trained. The scattering 
system, which had prevailed at first, was abandoned; the 
garrisons along the coast were reduced to their minimum 
or entirely suppressed, and most of the troops composing 
them were sent on to Richmond. A few regiments had been 
brought from the West, where the operations had lost some¬ 
thing of their importance since Beauregard had retired 
into the interior, leaving Corinth in the hands of Halleck. 

But it was the co-operation of Jackson that Lee was 
expecting, in order to change the course of the campaign, 
and execute the offensive movement for which he was pre¬ 
paring. He counted upon his arrival, just as McClellan 
relied upon that of McDowell. He was not, however, des¬ 
tined to be the victim of the same deceptions which the 
commander of the army of the Potomac had to experience. 
Jackson’s return to Richmond was the brilliant conclusion 
of the operations which the latter had so successfully con¬ 
ducted in the valley of Virginia. After having carried 
trouble into the councils of the enemy, after having thrown 
the latter on the wrong scent, and drawn a portion of the 
forces destined for the reduction of Richmond into the 
mountains, he had to effect his escape and double in his 
tracks, in order to go to the rescue of those who were mak¬ 
ing a stand against the large Federal army. No precaution 
was neglected to secure the success of this plan. Jackson, 
who had at first thought of invading Pennsylvania, eagerly 
accepted the new part assigned to him by Lee, the import¬ 
ance of which he understood. 

The battle of Port Republic had terminated the cam¬ 
paign in the valley of Virginia on the 9th of June, and 
arrested the pursuit of the Federals. Jackson gave some 
rest to his troops at Weyer’s Cave, not far from the field 


— 325 — 


Civil War in America 


of battle, and made ostensible preparations to undertake a 
new offensive movement on the same ground. On the 11th, 
Whiting’s division, nearly ten thousand strong, was de¬ 
tached from Smith’s old corps, which had fought at Fair 
Oaks, and being placed on board a train of cars, which had 
been made ready with affected secrecy, proceeded from 
Richmond by the right bank of the James to the Lynchburg 
and Burkesville junction, so celebrated since. At a short 
distance from Richmond some apparently unaccountable 
reason caused the cars to be detained for several hours in 
front of Belle Isle prison, where were shut up a large num¬ 
ber of Federal soldiers about to be exchanged in a few days. 
The passers-by expressed much indignation at the careless¬ 
ness of the railroad employees in allowing the Federals to 
take note of the powerful reinforcements which were being 
sent to Jackson, thus revealing to the enemy such impor¬ 
tant movements of troops. This was precisely what Gen¬ 
eral Lee desired. On the 15th, Whiting left Lynchburg 
for Charlottesville, reaching Staunton on the 18th, where 
he landed his material, and seemed to be preparing to pro¬ 
ceed down the valley to fall upon Fremont conjointly with 
Jackson; but on the 20th he speedily got on board the same 
cars which had brought him over, and returned to Char¬ 
lottesville, where Jackson was awaiting him with the army 
that had fought at Cross Keys and Port Republic. By the 
movements of his cavalry, by his own words, and by means 
of letters written with the intention that they should fall 
into the hands of the Federals, he had confirmed all the 
fears which the movements of Whiting’s division had ex¬ 
cited in Washington. General McClellan had, in fact, noti¬ 
fied the President on the 18th of the departure of these 
troops and the intelligence received from Fredericksburg 
fully corroborated this information. On receipt of this 
news, General Fremont hastily fell back upon Strasburg, 
while McDowell, who had at last witnessed the return of 
Shield’s division to his encampments, and who had already 
sent that of McCall to join McClellan by water, was waiting 
in vain for the order to set off on the three or four days’ 
march which separated him from the army of the Potomac. 


— 326 — 


Gaines' Mill 


The desire to form a new army which was to achieve easy 
successes under the personal direction of the Secretary of 
War, had decided the government to detain this general 
on the Rappahannock. The safety of Washington, which 
Jackson could not seriously menace, had only been, it must 
be acknowledged, a false pretext for conferring the command 
of an army, which absorbed all the reinforcements promised 
to McClellan, upon General Pope, an officer as brave as he 
was inexperienced, who had become the favorite of the hour. 
McDowell's corps was designed to swell its numbers use¬ 
lessly, at the moment when every interest called it to the 
borders of the Chickahominy. 

Meanwhile, a bold reconnaissance had revealed to Gen¬ 
eral Lee the weak points of his adversary. On the morn¬ 
ing of the 13th a brigade of cavalry, about one thousand 
two hundred strong, and accompanied by a few pieces of 
artillery left Richmond under command of General Stuart. 
Its destination was a profound secret. Following the road 
to Louisa Court-house, as if on his way to reinforce Jack- 
son, Stuart encamped in the evening at the railway-bridge 
of Quai Creek, on the South Anna. Before daylight on the 
14th, he turned suddenly to the right in the direction of 
Hanover Court-house, where two squadrons of the Fifth 
regular cavalry were performing picket duty. The first 
squadron, surprised by the appearance of the Confederates, 
was quickly dispersed. The second, taking advantage of 
the narrowness of the road, which compelled the enemy's 
troopers to march by fours, charged them vigorously with¬ 
out concern as to their numerical superiority. Being closely 
packed within this narrow defile, the two detachments were 
mingled, and fought with sabres. The Federal commander, 
Captain Royall, killed the commander of the first squadron 
of the enemy with his own hand, and was himself seriously 
wounded a moment after.* The weight of the Confederate 
column soon swept before it the handful of regulars who 
had attempted to check its progress. The Fifth regiment 
of cavalry, which before the war was numbered the Second, 

♦Captain Royall was severely wounded in several places, but 
recovered, and is still in the United States Army.— Editor. 

— 327 — 



Civil War in America 


had long been commanded by General Lee and his nephew 
Colonel Lee, who led one of the Virginia regiments under 
Stuart, had also served in it. He thus found himself called 
upon, as a sad result of the civil war, to draw his sword 
against officers who had been his comrades the preceding 
year—perhaps even against some of the soldiers whom he 
had commanded in the garrisons of the far West. Far from 
feeling any secret remorse in their presence, and carried 
away by the passion which inspired him for the cause of 
the South, he solicited of his chief the privilege of measur¬ 
ing swords with his late companions in arms. But there 
were no longer any enemies to fight; the two squadrons 
which alone had guarded the flank of the Federal army on 
that side were dispersed; and proceeding down the Pam- 
unky, Stuart led his brigade as far as Old Church, at an 
unbroken trot. The task assigned to him by his chief was 
accomplished; he had turned the right wing of the Federals, 
he made a survey, before reaching Old Church, of the 
course of a swampy stream called the Tolopotamoi, a tribu¬ 
tary of the Pamunky, which could easily have been covered 
with defensive works, and thus marked out the route which 
Jackson was to follow a few days after with his army. 

The Confederate column was about sixteen miles from 
Hanover Court-house. It seemed natural that it should 
retrace its steps and go back to Richmond; but Stuart, who 
possessed all the instincts of a light cavalry general, de¬ 
termined to carry out a plan much more hazardous in 
appearance, but less dangerous in reality—to make the 
complete circuit of the Federal army, so as to enter Rich¬ 
mond on the south, which he had left by the north. By 
this movement he expected to throw the rear of his enemy 
into great confusion, so that amid the contradictory rumors 
which such a bold march would spread he would have a 
good chance to baffle the pursuit of his adversaries. None 
of the officers to whom he communicated his plan dared to 
approve of it; but he knew that all would obey him with 
courage and intelligence. After giving his brigade a mo¬ 
ment of rest, and making careful inquiries regarding the 
Hanover Court-house road, which he pretended to wish to 


— 328 — 


Gaines' Mill 


follow, Stuart ordered the bugles tb sound “boots and 
saddles,” silently placed himself at the head of his column, 
and directed his horse toward New Kent Court-house. The 
soldiers followed with astonishment, but without hesitation, 
a chief who inspired them with a blind confidence. Yet 
every step they took seemed to interpose an additional 
barrier against all chances of return. On the right lay 
the whole army of the Potomac; on the left the immense 
depot of White House; in front of them the railway and 
the turnpike, along which the enemy’s troops were inces¬ 
santly passing to and fro. The small band drew closer 
together, for there was danger on every side; this danger, 
however, was considerably lessened through the connivance 
of all the inhabitants. At each house Stuart received the 
minutest information regarding the Federal corps to be 
avoided, and the magazines which might be destroyed. Two 
boats on the Pamunky were burned, but Stuart dared not 
go as far as the White House, notwithstanding the tempta¬ 
tion which so rich a prize offered him. He struck the 
railroad at Tunstall’s station; and after putting a small 
Federal outpost to flight, he went into ambuscade in order 
to capture the first train which might happen to pass by. 
An instant after, a train of cars loaded with sick and 
wounded, bound for the White House, arrived at full speed, 
but instead of stopping to water as usual, continued right 
on, while the pieces of timber placed across the track for 
the purpose of throwing off the cars were scattered right 
and left by the locomotive. The surprised Confederates 
merely fired a volley into the train, which wounded many 
of the sick and frightened the passengers some of whom 
jumped out of the cars; the danger, however, was of short 
duration, and the train, disappearing among the woods, 
spread the alarm along the whole line. Stuart, thus disap¬ 
pointed ; had not even time to destroy the railway track, for 
he learned that McCall’s division, on its way to join Mc¬ 
Clellan, was encamped in the neighborhood, that it was under 
arms and would soon make its appearance. He drew off, 
still pursuing his onward course, after having burned a 
few cars loaded with provisions and several camps, and 


— 329 — 


Civil War in America 


after feeding his soldiers at the expense of the frightened 
sutlers whom he had stopped on the road. But night had 
come, and the fires kindled by his hand, flashing above the 
forest, were so many signals which drew the Federals upon 
his tracks. Fortunately for Stuart, his soldiers were well 
acquainted with the faintest path in the country through 
which they were passing; they were at home. Consequently, 
they reached the hamlet of Talleysville without difficulty, 
where the column was allowed a few hours’ rest and time 
to rally. Then, turning to the right, it proceeded rapidly 
toward the Chickahominy. 

At daybreak the Confederate cavalry reached the bor¬ 
ders of this river, considerably below Bottom’s Bridge, at 
a place called Forge; or Jones’ Bridge. But the ford on 
which they had depended was not passable; the bridge had 
been destroyed, and the Federal cavalry, which, under 
Averill, had been sent by McClellan to intercept these passes, 
was only a few miles distant from the place. Two hours 
more of delay, and Stuart would have lost his only chance 
of retreat; it was a critical moment. Efforts were made 
to repair the old bridge, every man set to work to cut 
down treqs for that purpose. A foot-bridge was soon 
constructed, which the men crossed on foot, swimming their 
horses alongside. Once on the other side of the river, the 
Confederates proceeded to enlarge the dimensions of the 
flying bridge, and, by dint of labor, succeeded in getting 
their artillery over this fragile structure. Stuart had thus 
baffled all pursuit, and resumed his march on the Richmond 
road, having lost but one man killed and one caisson stuck 
in the mud, during this adventurous expedition. 

The whole Federal cavalry had been started in pur¬ 
suit of Stuart. As soon as he was known to be at Tun- 
stall, McClellan had divined his purpose, and, as we have 
said before, despatched Averill with one brigade to inter¬ 
cept him at Jones’ Bridge. But his orders, tardily trans¬ 
mitted, only reached the rest of his cavalry two hours after 
the passage of the Confederates. The latter arrived in 
Richmond that very evening. They had, in point of fact, 
committed but few depredations, but had caused a great 


— 330 — 


Gaines' Mill 


commotion, shaken the confidence of the North in McClellan, 
and made the first experiment in those great cavalry ex¬ 
peditions which subsequently played so novel and so import¬ 
ant a part during the war. 

During the ten days which followed this alarm the 
Federals always fancied themselves on the eve of making 
a general attack upon the enemy; but each day, after hav¬ 
ing determined upon it, and made preparations for it, they 
would meet with some new and unforeseen difficulty, which 
caused them to defer its execution. Lee, knowing how im¬ 
portant it was to gain time, so as to allow Jackson to join 
him, neglected nothing which could make him appear much 
stronger in the eyes of his adversary than he really was. 
By multiplying his pickets, by disputing every inch of 
ground and constantly provoking skirmishes, sometimes at 
one point, sometimes at another, he finally succeeded in his 
design. The Federal spies, the fugitive negroes and de¬ 
serters, all aided him, through their exaggeration, in de¬ 
ceiving. McClellan. On the 26th of June the latter believed 
that the arrival of Jackson would swell Lee’s forces to 
one hundred and sixty thousand men, and that the fortifi¬ 
cations around Richmond were bristling with two hundred 
guns of heavy calibre. The army he was about to face, 
the strength of which Lee had been constantly increasing 
during the last three weeks, did not, however, number more 
than one hundred thousand men, while the fortifications 
surrounding the Confederate capital were in reality slight 
breastworks, mounting only a few guns. The Confederates 
were undoubtedly working to increase their strength; but 
this work was chiefly carried on in those localities where 
they knew the Federals to be watching them with their 
spyglasses, and anxiously following their slightest move¬ 
ments. The opportunity for attacking Lee, while he was 
weakened by the absence of Whiting, thus passed by, and 
by degrees people became familiarized with the idea that 
siege operations might be advantageously substituted for 
a pitched battle. Many officers in the army of the Potomac 
imagined that by turning up large quantities of earth, and 
burning a great deal of powder, they would be able to escape 


- 331 — 


Civil War in America 


that ordeal of terrible suspense when skill and prudence 
are equally powerless to decide the fate of the battle, and 
when torrents of blood must be shed to wrest victory from 
the hands of the enemy. This kind of tactics had just been 
applied in the West, where it had resulted in the evacuation 
of Corinth by the Confederates, and the general question 
now was whether, when the final charge was made, they 
should step upon the top of a parapet defended with the 
energy of despair or upon the ruins of a deserted city. 
Consequently, while wishing for a more decided success, the 
latter alternative was but too readily acquiesced in; and 
the desire to spare the army a fearful sacrifice of life having 
made such an alternative appear probable, everybody felt 
disposed to wait patiently for this issue. 

A movement, however, took place on the 25th of June 
which, although of no great importance, interrupted at 
last this long inaction. In order to make himself master 
of the approaches to the plateau of Old Tavern, McClellan, 
still maneuvering as if conducting the operation of a siege, 
became desirous of extending his left wing. To this effect, 
he dispatched Hooker’s division on the road from Williams¬ 
burg to Richmond, beyond the positions occupied by Casey 
on the morning of the 31st of May. Hooker had just dis¬ 
lodged the Confederates from a small wood called Oak Grove, 
lying across the road, after a desperate engagement, when 
an order, wrongly construed, rendered it necessary for him 
to fall back. This error, however, was soon detected and 
rectified. McClellan, hastening to the scene of action, per¬ 
sonally assumed the direction of the battle, pushing forward 
the divisions of Kearny and Couch, with a portion of those 
of Casey and Richardson. Hooker, being thus sustained, 
re-entered Oak Grove and planted himself firmly in it; he 
extended his lines as far as the extreme edge of this wood, 
whence he commanded an immense open space, in which 
were seen some small works, with a few abandoned tents. 
This battle, known by the name of Oak Grove cost the 
Federals fifty-one killed, four hundred and one wounded and 
sixty-four prisoners. 


— 332 — 


Gaines' Mill 


They were not more than about four miles from Rich¬ 
mond, and yet the enemy, hitherto so stubborn, had ex¬ 
hibited too great a want of persistency in the defense of the 
wood not to have been the result of calculation. The fact 
is that the movement of the army of the Potomac lost all 
its importance in view of the great operations which were 
in preparation, and which it could no longer prevent. When 
McClellan decided at last to feel the enemy with his left, 
a terrible storm was gathering on his right. 

On that very day, the 25th of June, a single horseman, 
without companions and without followers, had ridden 
through the deserted streets of Richmond at an early hour 
in the morning, had dismounted at Lee’s headquarters, and 
had shortly after quickly resumed his journey in the direc¬ 
tion of the north. Some passers-by asserted that they had 
recognized the famous Jackson in this mysterious personage, 
but no credence was given to their statement, for every¬ 
body knew that he was fighting on the borders of the Shen¬ 
andoah, and that he was not the man to abandon his soldiers 
before the enemy. It was he, nevertheless, but he had left 
his army, whose every movement was wrapt in profound 
secrecy, at a few leagues only from that place, and, after 
having received his chief’s instructions, was returning to 
meet his heads of column, then within a short distance of 
Ashland. A short conference had sufficed the two generals 
to determine all their plans, and they were going to join 
in striking a heavy blow against the right wing of the 
Federals. This wing was in fact the most exposed, since 
McClellan had massed the best part of his troops between 
Richmond and the Chickahominy. To cover the long line 
of railway which supplied his army as far as White House, 
he had been obliged to leave the three divisions of Morell, 
Sykes and McCall, which formed his right wing under 
Porter, north of the Chickahominy. They faced south, 
ranged parallel with the river. McCall occupied the ex¬ 
treme right at Mechanicsville and Beaverdam Creek; Sykes 
and Morell were posted on the neighboring heights of 
Gaines’ Mill, resting their left on the swamps of the Chicka¬ 
hominy just where it begins to become wooded. With the 


— 333 — 


Civil War in America 


exception of some small breastworks and a few abatis on 
the left bank of the Beaver-dam, no works had been erected 
to protect these positions. General McClellan had always 
intended to abandon them as soon as the time had arrived 
for transferring his base of operations to the James River. 
He had never given up the idea of this change of base, so 
often projected and always postponed; he had even begun 
making preparations for it within the last few days, by 
sending a certain number of vessels loaded with provisions 
into the waters of the James. Such, therefore, being his 
intention, he had deemed it useless to cover his right wing 
with defensive works like those extending along the rest of 
his front; he soon had cause bitterly to regret this. 

Two principal passages, each composed of two bridges 
thrown alongside of each other across the Chickahominy, 
connected the right wing with the rest of the army. The 
lower passage was formed by the bridge on which Sumner 
had crossed on the day of the battle of Fair Oaks, and by 
another constructed under the direction of Colonel Alex¬ 
ander, whose name it bore. They gave access to the ex¬ 
tremity of the vast clearing, named after Doctor Trent, on 
the right side of the river, where the headquarters were. 
The other passage, situated two thousand five hundred 
metres higher up, and composed of the Duane and Wood¬ 
bury bridges, named after two engineer officers, connected 
the positions occupied by Porter’s left with Golding’s clear¬ 
ing, which stretches beyond the former on the same side 
of the Chickahominy. 

The Federal line extended from Golding to the border 
of White Oak Swamp forming the arc of a circle, of which 
Bottom’s bridge was the centre. It was covered through¬ 
out by considerable works; redoubts placed at intervals 
were connected by breastworks built of wood and earth, 
and by vast abatis; and numerous clearings, which afforded 
a considerable field of fire to the artillery along the whole 
front, prevented the enemy from approaching under cover. 
Franklin’s corps occupied the position adjoining the Golding 
clearing. Sumner, on his left, in front of the Courtenay 
farm, rested on Fair Oaks. Heintzelman’s line, thrown 


— 334 — 


Gaines' Mill 


across the Williamsburg turnpike, extended from the rail¬ 
way to White Oak swamp. Keyes, who had been held in 
reserve since the battle of Fair Oaks, occupied the vicinity 
of Bottom’s Bridge and the road which crosses the swamp 
near its entrance. 

The Confederate army had opposed to these works a 
line of entrenchments which, although of no great import¬ 
ance, would enable it on the day of battle to reduce the 
defenders of Richmond to a simple cordon of sharpshooters. 
Being reinforced by a large number of soldiers drawn from 
the South, and, it is said, even from the armies of the West, 
it had been arranged into five divisions. Longstreet and 
A. P. Hill commanded two of them. Huger, despite his 
conduct of the 31st of May, as he possessed great influence 
at Richmond, had preserved his own. Magruder, who had 
distinguished himself by his energy at Yorktown, had com¬ 
mand of another, and the fifth had been given to D. H. Hill. 
This army numbered nearly sixty thousand men; Jackson 
had brought it about thirty thousand. Huger and Mag¬ 
ruder were opposed, the first to Heintzelman, the second to 
Sumner. To the left of Magruder, A. P. Hill, whose right 
was in front of Golding, extended along the river opposite 
Porter’s position, and one of his brigades, under Branch, 
detached on the upper Chickahominy, held a bridge situated 
above Meadow Bridge. Longstreet and D. H. Hill, placed 
in reserve, were encamped near Richmond, on the Williams¬ 
burg and New Bridge roads. 

On the evening of the 25th, Jackson’s heads of column 
arrived at Ashland. But notwithstanding the secrecy which 
attended his march, General McClellan was already in¬ 
formed of it. On the morning of the 24th he had learnt, 
through a deserter, that Jackson had left Gordonsville, and 
would, probably attack him on the 28th. He could not be¬ 
lieve, however, that the latter would thus be able to escape 
the three Federal armies which were exclusively engaged 
in pursuing him. But the next day, even while the battle 
of Oak Grove was being fought, he received positive infor¬ 
mation of Jackson’s approach, the advanced cavalry of the 
latter having appeared at Hanover Court-house. There 


— 335 — 


Civil War in America 


was no further room for doubt. The sixty or seventy 
thousand men assembled at Washington and in the valley 
of Virginia had neither been able to detain Jackson’s army 
nor to follow it. They had not even perceived its departure; 
and while McDowell, Banks and Fremont remained motion¬ 
less, all the Confederate forces were massing in order to 
crush the army of the Potomac. In a few more hours the 
cannon would announce the commencement of the great 
struggle. As Mr. Lincoln candidly wrote to McClellan a 
few days after, even if they had had a million of men to 
send him they would have arrived too late. The commander 
of the army of the Potomac had no alternative but to fight 
with the resources at his command. He set himself im¬ 
mediately to work. Those only who have felt the weight 
of a heavy responsibility, who have long predicted the 
dangers incurred through the mistakes of others, and who, 
after having pointed them out in vain, find themselves 
suddenly obliged to face them, can form a conception of 
what was then passing in the mind of the Federal comman¬ 
der. But far from faltering, this ordeal suggested to him 
the finest inspiration of his entire career—to abandon his 
communications with York River, in order to establish a new 
base of operations on the James immediately after the 
battle which was now pending. Such was the bold and 
masterly plan conceived by McClellan, in response to the 
movement of his opponent, which he had divined even be¬ 
fore it had commenced. Jackson’s presence at Hanover 
Court-house had convinced him that Lee designed to fall 
upon his right wing, and oblige him to hastily evacuate 
the works which menaced Richmond, in order to save his 
communications with York River. This movement of re¬ 
treat on his right was such as would most naturally 
suggest itself to the mind of the commander-in-chief of the 
army of the Potomac in the position he occupied; but it was 
also precisely the movement which his adversary expected 
him to make, and it thus afforded excellent chances of suc¬ 
cess to the Confederates, who must have made every prep¬ 
aration for turning, during this flank march, his retreat 
into an irreparable rout. In relinquishing the idea of cover* 


—336 


Gaines’ Mill 


ing the York River road, he deceived all the calculations 
of the enemy. The more the latter extended his lines on 
the right, the easier it became for McClellan to establish, 
by his left, new communications with the James. This 
done, he could concentrate the whole of his army on the 
right bank of the Chickahominy, and, if forced by circum¬ 
stances, proceed in the direction of the James by crossing 
White Oak Swamp, or, if a favorable opportunity offered, 
even take advantage of Lee’s eccentric movement to march 
direct upon Richmond, and enter that city before him. Once 
established on the James, he was free to reascend this river 
in order to attack the Confederate capital, or to cross it 
to undertake a new campaign on the south side with greater 
chances of success. He could thus thrust after parring; 
and if overwhelmed by numbers, he would at least have 
frustrated the combinations upon which his opponent 
seemed to rely for crushing him. It was necessary above 
all to secure to the army the means for subsisting and 
fighting, during the time it would be deprived of communi¬ 
cations with its stores. The wagons of the several corps 
were loaded with eight days’ rations and a large quantity 
of ammunition. A drove of two thousand five hundred 
head of cattle was collected together and parked under the 
shade of the beautiful foliage which gives the borders of 
the Chickahominy the appearance of an English garden. 
At the same time, the wounded, the sick, the lame and all 
the non-combatants (bouches inutiles) were sent to White 
House. The vast stores which had accumulated there were 
hastily reshipped, and several vessels loaded with provi¬ 
sions were already proceeding down York River, with di¬ 
rections to await further instructions at the entrance of 
the James. The execution of these measures, which had 
begun amid the silence of the night of the 25th-26th, was 
continued during the succeeding days, despite the noise and 
turmoil of conflicts. From that moment the army of the 
Potomac, able to depend upon its own resources for a 
whole week, resembled a ship which, with its cargo and 
ballast on board, is only fastened to her mooring by a 
slender rope. It was destined to encounter many storms 


-— 337 — 


Civil War in America 


before casting anchor on the banks of the James River. 
To venture thus with an army of more than one hundred 
thousand volunteers into a series of operations, in the midst 
of which, whether victorious or vanquished, it was des¬ 
tined for some time to see its communications cut by the 
enemy, was certainly one of the boldest resolutions which 
can be adopted by a general in war. It was in singular 
contrast with the circumspection which had hitherto char¬ 
acterized all the movements of the Federals; but despite 
appearances, it was the less dangerous course to pursue, 
and this contrast was in perfect harmony with the Ameri¬ 
can character, which can at times combine a temporizing 
prudence with the strangest rashness. 

On the morning of the 26th the Confederate army was 
in motion. Jackson left Ashland with his three divisions, 
marching toward the west. He was to take in rear all 
the positions which the Federals might attempt to defend 
along the Chickahominy. Branch’s brigade, which was 
encamped higher up the river, came down by the left bank, 
while A. P. Hill crossed it at Meadowville Bridge, in order 
to appear before the strong positions of Mechanicsville, 
and attack them in front, as soon as Jackson’s cannon should 
announce that they were turned on the left. D. H. Hill 
and Longstreet were waiting for the bridge at Mechanics¬ 
ville to be freed by this movement, in order to cross it 
immediately in succession. The first, bearing to the left, 
was to join hands with Jackson, and thus unite for the 
battle all the Confederate forces into a single army. The 
second was to take position on the right of A. P. Hill, and 
follow the course of the Chickahominy, while the left wing, 
formed now by Jackson, and the centre by the two Hills, 
would continue to advance in order to attack the right wing 
of the Federals, which was expected to deploy beyond the 
White House railway. Magruder, with his own division 
and that of Huger, numbering altogether about twenty- 
five thousand men, was left to cover Richmond and watch 
McClellan’s left wing. 

The movements of the Confederate army were not 
punctually executed. Jackson and his principal lieutenants 


— 338 — 


Gaines' Mill 


were not so well acquainted as the defenders of Richmond 
with the country in which they were about to operate; 
they found it difficult to move their troops through that 
region, covered with woods and traversed by sinuous roads, 
so unlike the wide open spaces in the valley of Virginia. 
These unavoidable delays which Jackson had to encounter, 
however, did not prevent him from following Lee’s instruc¬ 
tions. After having communicated, through his scouts 
in the vicinity of Meadow Bridge, with the army which 
was coming out of Richmond, and having assured himself 
that he was supported in the bold movement he had under¬ 
taken, he took the White House railway for his objective 
point, and following as straight a line as possible, preceded 
by the whole of Stuart’s cavalry, he started on his march; 
he expected to meet the enemy on the borders of the Tolo- 
potamoi. 

While Jackson was approachng this water-course, the 
banks of which he was to find deserted, Lee had also put 
his army in motion. General A. P. Hill had massed his 
division in front of Meadow Bridge for the purpose of 
forcing the passage of that bridge as soon as Jackson had 
turned it by extending his left beyond Mechanicsville. Hav¬ 
ing advanced at the appointed time, he had met with no 
resistance around the bridge itself, of which he took pos¬ 
session without striking a blow; but a serious engagement 
took place shortly after between his troops and those of 
McCall, forming the extremity of the Federal line on that 
side. 

McCall had only left one regiment and a battery at 
Mechanicsville and this detachment had fallen back upon 
the rest of the division, after having checked for a moment 
by its fire the columns which were climbing the bare slopes 
of the hill on the summit of which the village stands. It 
was on Beaver-dam Creek, in fact that the Federal general 
was awaiting the enemy. This marshy stream, which runs 
into the Chickahominy through a ravine with precipitous 
sides, is only accessible by two roads, one, to the north, 
leading to Bethesda church and the Pamunky; the other, 
to the south, communicates with Cold Harbor junction by 


- 339 - 


Civil War in America 


way of Ellyson’s Mills. McCall had entrusted Reynold’s 
brigade with the defence of the first pass, while Seymour 
was directed to guard the second. His third brigade, com¬ 
manded by Meade, was held in reserve. A. P. Hill, having 
reached the Mechanicsville heights, deployed his division, 
nearly fourteen thousand men strong, in front of the for¬ 
midable positions occupied by the Federals. His name¬ 
sake, D. H. Hill, followed in his rear for the purpose of 
extending to the left, with Ripley’s brigade in advance. 
Lee directed in person all the movements which were to 
place his army in line. President Davis had come out of 
Richmond to witness the first act of this great conflict. The 
Confederates knew that it was easy to turn the position of 
the Federals by attacking it from the north. If McCall 
was supported on that side—that is to say, on his right— 
by considerable forces, Jackson could not fail to meet it 
on his route, and the noise of cannon would soon apprise 
his chief of such an encounter. It was natural to infer, 
therefore, from the prolonged.silence, that McCall was iso¬ 
lated, and that the army of the Shenandoah was about to 
take his position in rear without striking a blow; conse¬ 
quently, there was nothing to be done but to wait for the 
issue of this movement. But Lee, rendered impatient at 
the slowness with which his orders were executed, and 
stimulated, it may be, by the presence of the President, 
could not resist the temptation to hurl against the Federal 
positions the fine troops he was leading into battle for the 
first time. It is true that time was precious, and that no 
one among the Confederates who saw those magnificent 
regiments and witnessed the fervent zeal which animated 
them was doubtful of success. Pender’s brigade, of A. P. 
Hill’s division, reinforced by that of Ripley, attempted to 
cross the Beaver-dam at Ellyson’s Mills, while a strong 
demonstration was made on the left upon the Bethesda 
road. But the Federals, being completely sheltered, re¬ 
ceived with a terrific fire of musketry and artillery the 
assailants, who were utterly unprotected against their shot. 
On the left a Georgia regiment advanced alone close to the 
Union lines; but a final volley drove it back in disorder 


— 340 — 


Gaines’ Mill 


upon the rest of the column engaged in this demonstration. 
At Ellyson’s Mills, Pender and Ripley, after witnessing the 
destruction of one-half of their brigades, without being even 
able to reach the enemy, were obliged to recross the stream 
with the remnant of their troops. Meanwhile, the Confeder¬ 
ate chief, exasperated by this check, still persisted in attack¬ 
ing the Federal positions in front. Their whole line advanced, 
and was exposed to the fire of the enemy’s cannon, while 
a new attack was attempted against the batteries which 
commanded Ellyson’s Mills. Vain was the bloody effort. 
The assaulting columns were checked and driven back, the 
Federal shells striking the long lines of the Confederates 
fairly in the centre, and after four hours of fighting night 
put an end to the conflict, without a solitary inch of ground 
having been gained by the assailants. This imprudent 
attack had cost them nearly three thousand men, while the 
Federals had only two hundred and fifty wounded and 
eighty killed. 

The battle of Beaver-dam Creek, where so many men 
had been sacrificed fruitlessly, was an unfortunate begin¬ 
ning for the great operation of Lee. The number of vic¬ 
tims was concealed from the army, and the Confederate 
generals waited to hear from Jackson, whose cannon had 
not once been heard during the whole of that day. 

The latter, however, had executed the movement which 
had been prescribed to him. Crossing the Tolopotamoi, 
he had continually pushed forward, leaving the Chicka- 
hominy gradually behind him, but without meeting any of 
the enemy’s forces, except Stoneman’s cavalry, and night 
where he had bivouacked. Impressed with the purpose of 
his chief, in haste to outflank the right wing of the Federals 
and to seize the White House railway, the noise of cannon 
along the Beaver-dam, on which he had turned his back, 
had only the effect of hastening his march. McClellan, on 
his side, had been informed of Jackson’s movement, both 
through Stoneman, who had been watching the march of 
the Confederate general since morning with several regi¬ 
ments of cavalry, and by the few words which had fallen 
from prisoners captured by McCall. As the latter all be- 


— 341 — 


Civil War in America 


longed to Lee’s army, it was evident that Jackson was 
maneuvering on the extreme Federal right, and that his 
approaching arrival would be sufficient to cause the de¬ 
fences of Beaver-dam Creek to fall. McClellan was ex¬ 
pecting this, and had instructed General Barnard, chief of 
engineers of his army, to select a new position, which 
covered the bridges of the Chickahominy, upon which the 
whole right wing was ordered to fall back on the 27th at 
daybreak. 

This position was not very strong; the hills adjoining 
the Chickahominy, although quite steep on the river side 
upon which the Federals were resting, sloped down in 
slight undulations on the side where the enemy was expected, 
and presented no natural line of defence. Between Mechan- 
icsville and the Alexander bridge, where the forest sweeps 
down to the edge of the Chickahominy swamps, the hills 
commanding the left bank of this water-course are for the 
most part under cultivation, and their crest alone is crowned 
with isolated clusters of trees. This open space stretches 
thus a distance of from five to six miles in length, while 
its width gradually increases from one and a half to three 
miles on a line with the Alexander bridge. At the point 
where this breadth is greatest stands the building which 
gives its name to the important cross-roads of Cold Harbor. 
Among the roads crossing at this point, one connects at 
Bethesda with that from Mechanicsville by way of the 
houses of New Cold Harbor and Doctor Gaines’; a third, 
passing by McGee’s farm, at a distance of three or four 
hundred feet from Cold Harbor, descends toward the Chicka¬ 
hominy, to continue its course through the woods as far as 
Dispatch station. The causeway constructed by Colonel 
Alexander, leading to the bridge which bears his name, 
struck this road a little above the point where it penetrated 
into the marshy forest bordering the large clearing; and 
finally, a cross-road branched off from this same point, con¬ 
necting it directly with New Cold Harbor, and running 
beside a long narrow wood belonging to this plantation. 

The line of defence selected by General Barnard rested 
its left on the Chickahominy below the Gaines house. This 


— 342 — 


Gaines' Mill 


portion of the line could have been effectively protected by 
the small stream called Powhite Creek, which runs at right 
angles to the course of the river, and on which Gaines’ Mill 
is situated; but it had been laid two or three hundred feet 
in rear, through a long strip of wood rather narrow and 
easy of access, which descended nearly to the river. It 
fronted westward. The centre of the line, placed at right 
angles and facing north, followed the New Cold Harbor 
road, resting upon the woods; thence it stretched over a 
considerable space of decidedly undulating ground, and 
crossed an open field, terminating on the other side of the 
same wood, the extremity of which it intersected. The 
right of the line, still more drawn back, was traced across 
McGee’s farm on the road from Cold Harbor to Dispatch, 
resting upon the impassable swamps which border the large 
clearing on this side. 

A little before daylight McCall left the position of 
Beaver-dam, which he had so well defended the day before. 
The brigades of Martindale and Griffin of Morell’s division, 
which had come the previous evening to take position along¬ 
side of him, but had not been in action, remained to cover 
his retreat. The Confederates soon attacked them with as 
much fierceness, but with as little success, as on the preced¬ 
ing day. Taking advantage of a moment’s pause, while 
his adversaries were resting, Morell quickly abandoned the 
works he occupied, and hastened to join the rest of Porter’s 
corps at Gaines’ Mill without being pursued. 

At noon on the 27th the twenty-five thousand men com¬ 
posing this corps awaited the enemy in the position we have 
described. All their baggage, all their material, their park 
of siege guns and their reserve artillery, had been trans¬ 
ferred, during the night or early in the morning to the 
other side of the Chickahominy; the difficult task entrusted 
to the right wing of the army of the Potomac was not to 
throw any obstacle in the way of the enemy to prevent him 
froim extending his lines and cutting the railroad, but 
simply to bar his approach to the river. General McClellan, 
as we have before remarked, had no other object in view 
but to prevent his opponent from crossing this stream dur- 


— 343 — 


Civil War in America 


ing the movement he was obliged to make in order to reach 
the James. But he was of opinion that to defend the right 
bank it was necessary to wait with firm attitude for the 
Confederates on the left bank; otherwise, they could have 
rapidly descended as far as Bottom’s Bridge, or even Long’s 
Bridge, and there finding crossings which the Federals 
could not guard, they could fall upon the seemingly less 
exposed flank of the long columns which were about to march 
in toward the James. 

Porter placed Morell in the narrow wood which ex¬ 
tends back of Powhite Creek. The three brigades belong¬ 
ing to this division were thus disposed: Butterfield on the 
left, in the flat banks adjoining the river; Martindale in 
the centre, occupying the edge of the Powhite wood; Griffin 
on the right, deployed across the forest of which this wood 
is only the extremity, and resting upon New Cold Harbor. 
The position of the last was a difficult one, for his line was 
not fortified by any depression in the ground, while the 
thickness of the surrounding foliage exposed it to all sur¬ 
prises of the enemy. Sykes’ division formed the centre and 
the right of Porter’s corps. The brigades were deployed 
in two lines each consisting of two regiments. McCall’s 
division was placed in reserve; one of his brigades under 
Meade on the left, in rear of Morell’s troops; the rest under 
Reynolds and Seymour, on the extreme right, observing the 
road to Dispatch station. Twelve batteries, half of which 
were regular artillery, supported the Federal infantry, but 
the undulations of the ground and the proximity of the 
woods destroyed much of their efficiency. A few squadrons 
of the Fifth regular cavalry, and two regiments of mounted 
volunteers, completed this force. 

Master of the Beaver-dam passes, Lee had followed the 
Federals step by step, pressing them close, but being careful 
not to bring on an engagement. Indeed, he was far from 
having fathomed the designs of his adversary. Believing 
him still bent upon preserving his communications with 
the White House, he expected every moment to hear that 
Jackson had met the right wing of the Federals, and wanted 
to give his lieutenant time to feel the enemy before going 


-- 344 — 


Gaines’ Mill 


into battle. Meanwhile, the whole of his army had been 
deployed as soon as he had obtained control of the Beaver- 
dam passes. Longstreet had come by Ellyson’s Mills to 
take position on the right and rear of A. P. Hill; D. H. Hill, 
resting upon the left, had struck into the road leading from 
Mechanicsville to the Pamunky, upon which he was to join 
Jackson. 

About one o’clock the heads of column of A. P. Hill, 
who was following the Cold Harbor road, encountered the 
first line of Griffin’s brigade at the entrance of the wood 
occupied by the Federals, whose fire, supported by numerous 
cannon, brought them to a full stop. Hill’s artillery planted 
itself in vain within short range to support the attack; the 
Federal shells which swept the plateau soon reduced it to 
silence. In vain did Hill bring back his division to the 
charge several times. Fatigued and probably discouraged 
by the combat of the previous day, and the fruitless losses 
they had sustained, his soldiers were unable to break the 
Federal line. Three regiments, which for an instant struck 
it, were immediately repulsed, and the rest fell back in dis¬ 
order. Hill’s main attack had been directed upon the wood 
of New Cold Harbor, between that place on the left and a 
point on the right where this wood becomes narrower as 
it stretches down into the valley. This attack had been 
repulsed by the right of Morell’s division and Sykes’ left 
brigade, commanded by the young and valiant Warren; be¬ 
fore the end of the first engagement these troops had been 
reinforced by Meade’s and Seymour’s brigades. 

Lee had arrived on the field of battle; the unexpected 
resistance that Hill had met with showed that he had a 
considerable portion of the enemy’s army before him, and 
that, instead of extending his lines to defend his communi¬ 
cations with the White House, the Federal commander had 
concentrated his entire force in the neighborhood of the 
Chickahominy. It was necessary, therefore, that Jackson, 
who was proceeding toward the left of Tunstall station, 
should return to the right and attack the flank of the Fed¬ 
erals in the positions they had selected, and cut them off 
entirely from York River, which was the object of all the 


— 345 — 


Civil War in America 


maneuvers executed during these three days. Cold Harbor 
was indicated to Jackson as the point of direction. 

While waiting for the arrival of this powerful rein¬ 
forcement, Lee made a new attempt between three and four 
o’clock to carry the Federal position. In pursuance of his 
instructions, Hill returned to the charge near New Cold 
Harbor, and Longstreet, who had deployed on his right, 
made a strong diversion against Morrell’s and McCall’s 
troops, posted in the narrow section of the woods, while 
this movement was supported by all the available artillery. 
But Hill was not more successful this time than before, and 
Longstreet soon perceived that he would have to bear the 
whole brunt of the battle. Instead of making a simple 
demonstration, he determined to charge the Federal troops 
opposed to him, with his whole division. 

Those troops received at the same instant an important 
reinforcement. Porter’s three divisions, numbering about 
twenty-five thousand men, which until then had held out 
against the equal forces of Hill and Longstreet, had been 
engaged to the last man; at the solicitation of their chief, 
who felt himself pressed on every side, General McClellan 
had just sent Slocum’s division of Franklin’s corps to their 
assistance. It arrived just the moment when Longstreet 
was charging the left wing of the Federal army with the 
greatest vigor. The latter resisted with difficulty. Porter 
always showed himself where the danger was greatest, en¬ 
couraged his soldiers and reformed their ranks in the midst 
of a shower of balls. The battle raged with equal violence 
along the whole line from New Cold Harbor to the Chicka- 
hominy. The brigades and regiments successively brought 
forward from the reserve, to fill the gaps caused by the 
enemy’s fire, or to replace the troops who had exhausted 
their ammunition, had become divided and scattered; Mc¬ 
Call’s soldiers had become mixed with those of Morell in 
the woods, so that the generals, having no longer their troops 
in hand, could not direct them, and were reduced to giving 
the combatants examples of personal bravery wherever the 
chances of the conflict led them. Besides, it was impossible, 
amid the dust and smoke and the intervening clusters of 


- 346 — 


Gaines’ Mill 


trees which intercepted the view, to form a clear idea of the 
whole field. At this juncture Slocum made his appearance. 
His division was immediately parcelled out like the others; 
Bartlett went to the right to support Sykes; Newton got 
into line on the left to oppose Longstreet, by the side of 
Morell’s and McCall’s soldiers. If, in thus sharing his di¬ 
vision, Slocum had deprived himself of the means of unit¬ 
ing it again for a new effort, he had at least supplied with 
fresh troops all the points menaced by the enemy; he ar¬ 
rested the assailants, and inflicted upon them, for the 
moment, a bloody check. It was nearly five o’clock in the 
evening; Lee had not been able to effect a breach in a single 
one of the positions which since four o’clock he had attacked 
with so much vigor. The soldiers of Hill and Longstreet 
were exhausted. 

Meanwhile, Porter, seeing that the enemy would not 
grant him a moment’s rest except for the purpose of re¬ 
turning to the charge, called for immediate reinforcements. 
General McClellan, informed by the occurrences of the pre¬ 
ceding day, of the presence of Jackson, and of the crossing 
to the left bank of the Chickahominy by a portion of the 
Confederate army, knew that the enemy must have more 
than sixty thousand men on that side of the river. He had 
opposed to this force up to that time only thirty-three 
thousand or thirty-five thousand, under Porter at Gaines’ 
Mill; he had yet a few hours of daylight before him to finish 
the battle, and could have availed himself of them to bring 
the largest portion of his army to the succor of his lieuten¬ 
ant, and face the Confederates with a force at least equal 
to their own. But convinced that Lee commanded an army 
of one hundred and sixty thousand men, he believed that 
nearly one hundred thousand of them had been left in front 
of his lines, from White Oak Swamp to Golding; he was 
unwilling to weaken his left wing in their presence, to 
strengthen his right. His corps commanders, being con¬ 
sulted by him fully endorsed his views, saying that they 
needed all their troops to defend their positions. Old Sum¬ 
ner alone had offered two brigades, which were forwarded 
to the battle-field at the close of the evening. 


— 347 — 


Civil War in America 


While a decisive struggle was taking place on the left 
bank, and all the available forces of the enemy were being 
brought together, to attack the thirty-five thousand men 
forming the right wing of the army of the Potomac, seventy 
or eighty thousand Federals were thus kept back on the 
right bank by twenty-five thousand Confederates. Ma- 
gruder, who was in command of the latter, succeeded, as he 
had done at Warwick Creek, in deceiving his adversary as 
to his real strength. He kept him constantly on the alert 
during the entire day; and just when the fire slackened on 
the other bank, he even made a vigorous attack upon Smith’s 
division at Golding. He was repulsed with loss, leaving 
the greatest portion of a Georgia regiment, with its com¬ 
mander, Colonel Lamar, formerly a member of Congress, 
in the hands of the Federals. But he had thereby accom¬ 
plished his object and prevented new reinforcements from 
being sent to the aid of the Federal right wing. 

In the meantime, Lee was impatiently waiting for the 
arrival of Jackson, who had been delayed on his march, 
and who alone could henceforth secure him the victory. The 
commander of the army of the Shenandoah had joined D. 
H. Hill’s division at Bethesda, and was approaching the 
field of battle with an army of forty thousand men, fresh 
and full of ardor. The firing of musketry, the repeated 
volleys of which burst forth on the side of Cold Harbor, on 
the extreme left of the Confederate line, soon proclaimed 
that he had at last met the enemy, and that the battle was 
about to assume a new aspect. Lee rushed to the sound, 
and meeting Jackson concerted with him a general attack. 
Whiting and a brigade of Jackson’s old division proceeded 
to the right to support Longstreet and take position between 
him and the debris of A. P. Hill’s division. The attack on 
the wood of New Cold Harbor on the left was entrusted to 
the remainder of Jackson’s division; in the vicinity of Cold 
Harbor were deployed Ewell’s forces first, then those of 
D. H. Hill, while Stuart’s cavalry was drawn up still fur¬ 
ther to the left, as far as the forest. 

Toward six o’clock this new army renewed the attack 
upon Porter’s troops, already exhausted by five hours’ fight- 


— 348 — 


Gaines’ Mill 


ing. D. H. Hill gave the signal of attack to the extreme 
left, and in less than a quarter of an hour the battle raged 
along the whole line from the borders of the Chickahominy 
to the front of Cold Harbor. The Federal artillery was 
reinforced, and concentrated its fire upon every point where 
the enemy’s battalions could be seen. Nor was it made to 
falter by the advance of the enemy on its right, near Mc¬ 
Gee’s farm, but poured grape-shot into the ranks of D. H. 
Hill, almost at the cannon’s mouth. The latter captured 
a few pieces of cannon, only to lose them again an instant 
after. They had, however, gained some ground on this 
side, but in the meanwhile Ewell, who was posted between 
McGee’s farm and New Cold Harbor, had seen all his efforts 
fail before the well-sustained fire of his adversaries. He 
nevertheless led to the attack soldiers proved by all the 
marches and victories in the valley of Virginia, but he 
found before him the brigade of regulars, who make it a 
point of honor never to yield before volunteers, whatever 
may be their number. To support Ewell, Jackson ordered 
three brigades of his old division to advance successively 
against the wood of New Cold Harbor. This was the weak¬ 
est point of the Federal line; for lying across the densest 
part of the forest, it was exposed to constant surprises, and 
could not be supported by artillery, as elsewhere. The 
brigades of Meade and Taylor of Slocum’s division made 
a stubborn defence in this difficult position, but they were 
slowly driven back by the superior forces which attacked 
them. This advantage which the Confederates had gained 
in the centre exposed the angle of the wood at the point 
where it becomes narrow as it stretches down toward the 
Chickahominy. The Federal left had hitherto made an 
obstinate stand in this narrow section of the wood, against 
the assaults of Longstreet at first, and of Whiting after him. 
The latter finally availed himself of the confusion into which 
his adversaries had been thrown by the loss of the wood at 
New Cold Harbor, to take possession of it; but every time 
that his soldiers ventured beyond the curtain of trees the 
enemy’s cannon compelled them to run back for shelter 
behind this protecting screen. Meanwhile, the Federal in- 


349 — 


Civil War in America 


fantry, which had again formed into line near its guns, was 
becoming exhausted by so unequal a struggle; the ammuni¬ 
tion was giving out, no reinforcements arrived, and the mo¬ 
ment approached when excessive fatigue would overcome 
the energy of the steadiest men. The regiments, of which 
more than one were reduced to a handful of men, drew to¬ 
gether in isolated groups; the combat continued, but was 
carried on individually by soldiers among whom all sys¬ 
tematic connection had ceased to exist. Precisely at this 
moment Jackson came forward with his last reserves and 
ordered a general attack. The attenuated lines of the Fed- 
erals were everywhere shattered. Whiting sent forward 
one of his brigades, composed of Texan soldiers, into the 
re-entering angle formed by the thick wood of Cold Harbor 
and the clusters of trees which extend its line toward the 
river. General Hood, who was then one of the most bril¬ 
liant officers in the Confederate army, although he 
subsequently became a most indifferent commander-in-chief, 
was in command of this brigade, to which he imparted 
his own martial ardor. In vain did the Federal artillery 
concentrate its fire to check him like the others as he 
emerged from the wood. The four Texan regiments 
advanced without faltering, under a shower of shells. 
As they closed up their ranks, which the Federal mis¬ 
siles were thinning more and more, their long line 
scarcely wavered. They paused for a moment to fire, but 
Hood instantly pushed them forward; they rushed on¬ 
ward with loud yells to the very mouth of the guns which 
had so mercilessly poured grape into them. The ar¬ 
tillery horses hitched to the limbers either ran away 
with their drivers, or were driven off by them. The Fed¬ 
eral soldiers, who up to this time had stood by those guns 
to support them, grew weak at last; not daring yet to take 
to flight openly, they began to desert the post of danger 
under pretence of carrying to ambulances the wounded, 
whose number was constantly increasing. The most de¬ 
termined among them were soon hurried along in the re¬ 
treat, which was accelerated more and more, and the few 
gunners who had persisted in remaining at their post to 


— 350 — 


Gaines' Mill 


the last, also disappeared in the tide of Texans, which over¬ 
whelmed them in an instant, leaving nothing behind but 
corpses lying on the ground. 

Longstreet had imitated this movement on the extreme 
left of the Federal line, and the greater part of Butter¬ 
field’s brigade, being cut off from the rest of the army, barely 
escaped through the Upper Duane Bridge. And there, too, 
a few batteries left to their fate by the infantry, still keep 
up the fight, alone and unaided. General Cooke, posted 
at the bottom of the valley, throws out the 5th regiment, 
consisting only of three squadrons, against the enemy’s 
lines, that are already crowning a part of the heights on his 
right. The Federal cavalry obliquely scale the steep and 
loamy acclivities, and on reaching the summit on their 
panting horses they find that the enemy, on issuing from 
the wood, have formed ranks, and, with a firm foot, are 
waiting for them to come on. Finding it impossible to 
break their line, the cavalry disperse in the manner of 
foragers, and keep up the fight with their revolvers, accord¬ 
ing to the custom they have contracted in the Far West. 
A fight of this kind cannot last more than a few minutes. 
One-half their number either lie stretched on the ground 
or have fallen into the enemy’s hands; the others fall back 
in disorder upon the Union battalions, now in full retreat. 
But they have succeeded in saving most of the guns, which 
the enemy was preparing to capture on the left; and the 
remainder of Cooke’s cavalry, formed in good order, arrest, 
by their steady bearing, Longstreet’s movement in the direc¬ 
tion of Alexander bridge. Meanwhile, the Confederates 
are carrying everything before them along the whole line. 
Two Federal regiments, which have bravely kept up the 
fight in the wood of New Cold Harbor when all was giving 
way around them, find themselves surrounded, decimated 
and compelled to surrender. Ewell and D. H. Hill also 
take advantage in their turn of the successes achieved by 
the right wing of the army. Their artillery succeeds at 
last in planting itself on the summit of the hill so long 
occupied by Sykes’ division, and crushes that division with 
its fire. Being thus attacked in front and menaced in flank 


—351 


Civil War in America 


by the enemy, who has taken possession of the wood of 
New Cold Harbor, Sykes falls back, defending the ground 
foot by foot. But a portion of his artillery, the teams of 
which have been killed, remains on the field of battle. The 
regulars do not allow Hill to push his success along the 
road leading from Cold Harbor to Dispatch, by which he 
could have cut off the retreat of the enemy. Fearfully 
reduced as they are, they care less for the losses they have 
sustained than for the mortification of yielding to volun¬ 
teers. 

Meanwhile, the retreat of the Federals on the left and 
centre threatens to become a rout. The crowd of fugitives, 
with which are mingled artillery teams, followed at a dis¬ 
tance by groups of brave soldiers who have rallied around 
their chiefs, has rapidly descended into a small ravine, be¬ 
yond which rises another hill. On the summit of this hill 
the two Cold Harbor roads form a junction to gain the 
Alexander bridge beyond, at the bottom of the valley, the 
only passage by which the Federals may yet be able to 
cross the Chickahominy. If the enemy succeeds in seizing 
this position, his two wings will unite for the purpose of 
driving the debris of the right wing of the army of the Po¬ 
tomac into the swamp, and crush them before they have 
been able to cross the narrow defile of the bridge. But at 
this critical moment fortune does not employ her final rig¬ 
ors against the Federals. The Confederates, fatigued by 
the effort they have just made, halt to re-form their lines. 
Hood’s brigade alone has lost over one thousand men in 
the last charge. Stuart, near Cold Harbor, does not know 
how to make his excellent troops play the part which apper¬ 
tain to cavalry on the eve of a victory; he allows himself 
to be held back by the resolute stand of the regulars, and 
some few hundred men bearing the flags of Warren’s bri¬ 
gade. ' 

The retreat of the Federals, which was hastened by the 
declivity which they were descending into the ravine, is, on 
the contrary, slackened when they climb the other side. The 
battle has suddenly ceased; an effort is made to ascertain the 
condition of things; they halt. Twenty-two pieces of can- 


— 352 — 


Gaines' Mill 


non have fallen into the hands of the enemy, but there yet 
remain forty or fifty. Most of these are again placed in 
battery,, and open from a distance upon the lines of the 
assailants a fire which restores courage to the Union sol¬ 
diers. The latter listen once more to the voices of their 
chiefs. Porter, Morell, Slocum, Meade and Butterfield see 
increasing the groups gathering around them from every 
regiment. On the right the Federals have lost less ground 
and preserved better order in their retreat. At this instant 
French and Meagher arrive on the ground with two bri¬ 
gades sent by Sumner. The second is composed exclusively 
of Irishmen, the green flag, ornamented with a golden harp, 
floating in their midst. They arrive, shouting vociferously 
and displaying all that vivacity and dash for which the 
children of this ancient warlike race are noted when march¬ 
ing to battle. Their comrades, on finding themselves thus 
supported, respond with loud hurrahs, by which they seek 
to gain fresh courage. In the meantime, the enemy has 
re-formed his ranks, and is again in motion; but instead of 
a routed crowd he beholds a body of resolute troops, who 
seem to be calmly waiting for him on the slopes situated on 
the other side of the ravine. At this sight he hesitates, and 
approaching night puts an end to the sanguinary struggle. 

The losses were heavy on both sides. Out of thirty- 
five thousand men engaged, the Federals had nearly seven 
thousand killed or wounded. The assailants suffered even 
more, but they had achieved a signal victory. Twenty-two 
guns, a large number of prisoners, and most of the wounded, 
abandoned by the enemy on the field of battle afforded sub¬ 
stantial-proof of their success. Their opponents had fought 
with great vigor, and it was no disgrace to Porter’s soldiers 
that they had to succumb in such an unequal struggle. Be¬ 
sides, the success of the Confederates was not so decisive 
as they at first imagined. The resistance made by the 
Federals at Gaines’ Mill, and their inaction on the other 
side of the Chickahominy, had led Lee and his generals to 
believe that they had just beaten the largest portion of the 
army of the Potomac, and that by driving it back to the 
river they had completely turned it by their maneuvers. Con- 


— 353 — 


Civil War in America 


vinced that they had cut off the Federals from their only 
line of retreat, they already fancied that McClellan, hemmed 
in among the marshes of the Chickahominy and White Oak 
Swamp, was about to capitulate with all his forces, or that 
the great army of invasion, harassed on every side, ex¬ 
hausted by fatigue and hunger, would dissolve before them 
like a storm-cloud after thunder. 

While they were preparing to gather the fruits of their 
victory, the Federals were collecting together and counting 
their numbers. Generals and colonels were trying to rally 
the scattered fragments of their brigades and regiments. 
Then, when order was completely restored, battalion after 
battalion passed over the Alexander bridge, occupied by a 
squadron of cavalry, which, during the evening, had pre¬ 
vented the fugitives from approaching it. In the midst of 
the obscurity, the Union general Reynolds had been separ¬ 
ated from his men by the enemy’s pickets. But despite a 
few incidents of this nature, the retreat was ably conducted, 
and at daybreak not a single straggler, wounded man or 
cannon remained on the ground which had been occupied 
during the night by Porter’s troops. The regulars were 
the last to cross, after which they entirely destroyed the 
magnificent bridge which had cost so much trouble to con¬ 
struct. 

The Federals had not succeeded in preventing the Con¬ 
federates from occupying the left bank of the Chickahominy, 
but they had made them pay so dear for its possession that 
the latter did not feel disposed to make an immediate at¬ 
tempt to force a passage, for the purpose of disputing with 
them the opposite side of the river. 

While the darkness of a short summer night was cover¬ 
ing the mournful and silent march of the Federal soldiers 
who had just fought the battle of Gaines’ Mill, a blazing 
pine-wood fire was crackling under the tall acacias which 
commanded the south entrance of the Alexander bridge. It 
was on this spot that the headquarters of the army had been 
situated during the preceding days. This camp had been 
broken up like all the rest, for the entire army was ready 
to march; but the tall flitting shadows, projected here and 


— 354 — 


Gaines’ Mill 


there by the flame upon the dark background of the sur¬ 
rounding trees, showed that its occupants had not yet de¬ 
serted it. 

In fact, General McClellan had assembled several of his 
generals around this fire, and was consulting with them 
regarding the dispositions to be made for the following day, 
upon which the very existence of the army of the Potomac 
seemed to depend. The idea was for a moment entertained 
of playing double or quits on the right bank of the Chicka- 
hominy the game which had just been lost on the other 
side. It was McClellan himself who, forgetting his habi¬ 
tual circumspection, and emboldened by the imminence of 
the danger, thought of taking advantage of the enemy’s 
movement against his right wing to throw himself upon 
unprotected Richmond with all the forces that were left 
him. The Confederates, being separated from their capital 
by the Chickahominy, would not be able to arrive in time 
to succor it, so that the defeat of the previous day might 
turn out to be only the prelude to a brilliant success. His 
lieutenants, however, Heintzelman especially, opposed this 
project, and found no difficulty in diverting his attention 
from it. It must be acknowledged that it would have been 
a desperate undertaking; for the condition of the army was 
such that, so far from justifying any rash movement, it 
imposed upon its chief the duty of sacrificing the most 
tempting combinations to the dictates of prudence. The 
day before, while Porter was keeping the largest portion 
of Lee’s army engaged at Gaines’ Mill, it might have been 
possible to concentrate the rest of the Federal army, and thus 
penetrate into Richmond. But the propitious hour had 
passed. That portion of the army which had just fought 
at Gaines’ Mill had suffered too severely to be able to resume 
hostilities on the following day. All that Lee would have 
had to do in order to oppose this bold movement would 
have been to recross the Chickahominy near the field of 
battle, and fall upon the flank of the Federals, if they had 
come out of their entrenchments. Moreover, as usual, 
the Confederate forces were exaggerated in the councils of 
McClellan. But let us ask, Did this plan, the failure of 


— 355 — 


Civil War in America 


which would have involved the destruction of the whole 
army, offer any tangible and lasting advantages in the event 
of success? Once master of Richmond, McClellan would 
soon have been besieged in turn by the conquerors of Gaines’ 
Mill; he would thereby have sacrificed his communications 
by way of the White House, without having been able to 
secure a new base of operations on the James, the naviga¬ 
tion of which above City Point could easily have been closed 
by the enemy’s batteries placed on the right bank. 

In these circumstances, even the capture of the enemy’s 
capital would only have aggravated, by retarding for a few 
days, the dangers which threatened the army of the Poto¬ 
mac. 

The retreat was decided on; the first siege of Richmond 
was raised. 


— 356 — 


CHAPTER IV 
Glendale and Malvern 

We have stated that the army of the Potomac, by 
changing its base of operations a few weeks sooner, might 
have accomplished important results. But even if it had 
been entirely free to execute this movement, the configura¬ 
tion of the James would have compelled it to move away 
from Richmond, to rest upon that part of the river which 
the navy could reach without danger. This maneuver, 
which had been in preparation by McClellan for several 
days, would not have assumed the character of a retreat if 
it had not been undertaken the day after a bloody defeat. 

But on the evening of the 27th of June it had become a 
necessity. It alone, in fact, afforded the Federals the 
means of escaping a serious disaster. A few words, regard¬ 
ing the situation of the two armies, will enable the reader 
to appreciate the difficult position in which they found 
themselves, the resources they still possessed for getting 
out of it, and the rare ability with which General Mc¬ 
Clellan knew how to use them. 

The Chickahominy, after running parallel to the James 
River and the Pamunky, at nearly an equal distance from 
these two streams, empties into the former about fifty kilo¬ 
metres below Richmond. The James in its numerous wind¬ 
ings alternately approaches and recedes from this water¬ 
course. In the elbow called Turkey Bend, which lies 
twenty-three kilometres in a direct line from Richmond, 
the river, which is both wide and deep, waters the base 
of a large hillock, that rises on the left bank in a succes¬ 
sion of bare slopes above the forest. From this eminence, 
named Malvern Hill by the early English settlers, to the 
confluence of White Oak Swamp and the Chickahominy be¬ 
low Bottom’s Bridge, there is only a distance of twelve kilo¬ 
metres, but the tract which separates them is singularly 
difficult. The White Oak Swamp, which we have described 
as covering the Federal left, and forming by its course an 


- 357 — 


Civil War in America 


acute angle with the Chickahominy, was the first obstacle 
which the Federals had to encounter if they proceeded to¬ 
ward the James. There was but one road crossing it, 
which, connecting with the Williamsburg turnpike near 
Bottom’s Bridge, ran due south for a distance of five kilo¬ 
metres, crossing the waters of the swamp, which, being 
shut in between two unwooded hills, presented only the ap¬ 
pearance of a small stream, and reascended on the other 
side the cultivated slopes called Frazier’s Farm. One or 
two kilometres beyond, this road joins that coming from 
New Kent Court-house—that is to say, from the east— 
which crossed the Chickahominy at Long Bridge. Thence 
it inclined to south-west, and at the end of a mile and a half, 
it entered a group of connected clearings known by the 
name of Glendale, the centre of which was occupied by 
the large farm of Mr. Nelson. Farther yet, the road took 
a southerly direction, under the name of Quaker road, and 
struck the northern slopes of Malvern Hill, five kilometres 
farther on, ascending them directly, and finally descending 
in an oblique line on the other side, to join the elbow of 
Turkey Bend at Haxall’s Landing. A great number of 
smaller roads coming from Richmond debouched perpendi¬ 
cularly into the Quaker road, like so many radii connecting 
the arc of a circle with its centre. To the north of White 
Oak Swamp there was only one of these roads, the Wil¬ 
liamsburg turnpike, the old line of attack of the Federals, 
while south of it there were three principal ones—the 
Charles City road, following the right bank of White Oak 
Swamp, the New Market road, near the left bank of the 
James, and the Central road, between the two. Before ap¬ 
proaching Malvern Hill, however, the New Market road 
turned abruptly to the left, intersecting the Central road 
and emerging into the Charles City road, to connect with 
the Quaker road in the Glendale clearings. Several smaller 
roads, less practicable for an army, wound about these three 
principal roads, connecting the New Market and Central 
road directly with Haxall’s Landing and the Quaker road. 
Their numerous zigzags turned them into perfect laby¬ 
rinths, calculated to lead a solitary traveller astray, or to 


— 358 — 


Glendale and Malvern 


misdirect the heads of column of an army on the march. 
With the exception of the clearings of Frazier’s Farm and 
Glendale, and the cultivated slopes of Malvern Hill, the 
whole of this region was only a dense forest of oaks and 
magnolias, but the soil was generally sandy and solid. There 
was but one small water-course to be met with, the West¬ 
ern Run, which, skirting Malvern Hill, slopes north and 
eafet, and empties into the James below this hill. 

All these topographical details were unknown at Mc¬ 
Clellan’s headquarters, and, what is yet more extraordinary, 
they were no better known to the Confederate Staff, who had 
never expected to make a campaign on that side. The in¬ 
formation possessed by the Federals, regarding the country 
into which their army was about to be launched with its 
accompanying heavy trains, was extremely vague, and it 
may be truly said, that in making Turkey Bend the objec¬ 
tive point of his march, General McClellan was combining 
a journey of discovery with the retreat of his army. He 
was therefore obliged, throughout the whole of this danger¬ 
ous expedition, to assure himself personally of the direc¬ 
tion indicated to each of his corps, and was thereby pre¬ 
vented from commanding in person at all the battles that 
were fought on the route, which subsequently drew upon 
him the most violent and undeserved reproaches. 

During the night of the 27th-28th, Porter’s corps, 
after crossing the Chickahominy, occupied the line of 
heights which command the course of this river on the right 
bank. Turned toward the north, these troops faced the hills 
where their adversaries of the day previous were posted. 
Slocum’s division had taken post on their left, adjoining that 
of Smith, which with it formed Franklin’s corps, and which 
was posted among the earthworks of Golding. The rest of 
the line of entrenchments facing Richmond was occupied by 
four divisions, disposed as follows from right to left: Rich¬ 
ardson, who had just been joined by the two brigades sent 
to Game’s Mill; then Sedgwick, both under the orders of 
Sumner; farther on, Hooker and Kearny, composing Heint- 
zelman’s corps; at the extreme left, Keyes, with the divi- 


— 359 — 


Civil War in America 


sions of Couch and Peck, guarding the passes of White Oak 
Swamp. 

On the other side, the conquerors of Gaines , Mill had 
slept on the field of battle, while Magruder kept a watch 
around Richmond, very uneasy when he thought of the 
small number of troops he had at his command. 

The retreat upon the James afforded McClellan the 
important advantage of releasing him from the defence of 
his line of communications with the White House, against 
which it was evident the Confederates at first intended to 
direct all their efforts. In the condition in which his army 
found itself after the battle, a retreat begun across a diffi¬ 
cult country for the purpose of covering the White House 
would probably have only terminated under the walls of 
Yorktown. By abandoning his depots on York River he 
avoided this danger; but it then became necessary for him 
to carry along all that was needed to subsist his troops, 
until he could find new supplies on the James—that is to 
say, for five, or perhaps six, days. The foresight of the 
general-in-chief had fortunately provided beforehand all 
the resources which such an enterprise required. But 
while these indispensable resources rendered the march of 
the army practicable, they could not fail to impede and re¬ 
tard its movements. The soldiers received two or three 
days’ cooked rations, additional provisions for three more 
days being placed in the wagons. A drove of two thou¬ 
sand five hundred head of cattle had been also on its way 
to White Oak Swamp since the evening of the 27th. This 
long line of bellowing cattle was in singular contrast with 
the warlike scenes through which it had to pass. At times 
these thousands of animals, utterly indifferent to their 
surroundings, would stop, despite the cries of the drivers, 
who escorted them on horseback, and persistently browse on 
the grass silvered by the full moon; again, they would pre¬ 
cipitate themselves with blind fury across the bivouacs, 
where everything contributed to increase their fright. 

Three days’ rations for one hundred thousand soldiers 
and twenty thousand non-combatants, five days’ forage for 
forty thousand horses, three hundred and fifty pieces of 


— 360 — 


Glendale and Malvern 


artillery—in short, the munitions of such an army—con¬ 
stituted a formidable train. It was the task of the army of 
the Potomac to protect this train as far as the borders of 
the James. Consequently, however urgent may have been 
the march of the army itself, it was compelled to remain 
motionless, until this interminable ribbon should be un¬ 
wound along the only and narrow road which was open to 
it. Keyes’ corps alone received orders to march on the 
evening of the 27th. Being placed at White Oak Swamp, 
it was directed to take the advance, with injunctions to 
cover continually the right flank of the train. The other 
corps, unable to move out of their positions in consequence 
of the crowded condition of the roads, were not even able 
to put their division-trains in motion before the evening of 
the 28th, so long was the line of wagons belonging to the 
general administration. 

Meanwhile, the work of destruction, the inevitable con¬ 
sequence of every threat, was rapidly progressing. No por¬ 
tion of the enemy’s cavalry having reached the railroad dur¬ 
ing the night, that line remained open, and advantage was 
taken of it to send back upon York River the greatest pos¬ 
sible number of sick, wounded, non-combatants of every 
description, as well as a large quantity of materiel. The 
last train of cars was then loaded with powder and shell, 
and the locomotive was despatched, under a full head of 
steam, in the direction of the Chickahominy bridge, which 
had been burning for some few minutes. A terrible ex¬ 
plosion announced the arrival of this dangerous cargo amid 
the flames, and the simultaneous destruction of the bridge, 
cars and ammunition. The telegraph, however, had not 
ceased to perform its functions, but still continued to be 
the connecting link between the soldiers of the army of the 
Potomac and all that was dear to them now left behind. 
General McClellan was thus enabled to send a last despatch 
to the government at Washington, giving an account of the 
dangerous situation of his army. As he said himself, in 
words full of sadness and dignity, if so many brave soldiers 
were to perish in vain, the fault rested with those who had 
so imprudently haggled about reinforcements at the critical 


— 361 — 


Civil War in America 


moment. This was a responsibility which the Federal 
authorities were unwilling to accept at any price. In order 
to get rid of it they resorted to a culpable strategem. Far 
from letting the public know the truth regarding what was 
taking place around Richmond, the Secretary of War, for¬ 
getting that he had to deal with a few people who would not 
tolerate deception, gave out that the army of the Potomac 
had undertaken a strategic movement which would result 
in the capture of Richmond. Consequently, when, after 
waiting four days, it became known that this army had 
reached Turkey Bend with considerable difficulty, the ex¬ 
citement was all the greater, because the people had been 
kept in ignorance of its dangers, and had anticipated a very 
different issue. McClellan’s enemies, instead of rendering 
justice to the manner in which he had conceived and exe¬ 
cuted this strategic movement, censured him for it as being 
nothing but a rout, and sought to turn it into ridicule. It 
would be perhaps going too far to interpret this announce¬ 
ment of an impending victory, made by the Federal govern¬ 
ment at the very time when McClellan was informing them 
of the difficulties of his position, as a perfidious scheme, de¬ 
signed to excite public opinion against the commander of 
the army of the Potomac; it is certain, however, that the 
government sought to conceal the facts which made the 
chief responsibility for the defeat fall upon itself. It per¬ 
sistently refused to give the text of McClellan’s despatches 
to the newspapers; and, what is worse, when the whole 
series of official documents was laid before the committee on 
the conduct of the war, the government permitted itself to 
mutilate the text of its correspondence with the general, 
without making any mention whatever of the omissions.* 
On the other bank of the Chickahominy, as soon as the 
sun of the 28th began to shine over the battle-field so pain- 


*Thus the despatch of which we have spoken above, addressed to 
Mr. Stanton on the 28th of June, twenty minutes after midnight, 
closed with these words: “If I save this army now, I tell you plainly 
that I owe no thanks to you or to any other person in Washington. 
You have done your best to sacrifice this army.” This phrase was 
suppressed at the War Department, as any one may ascertain by 
comparing two official documents, McClellan’s Report, p. 132, and 
that of the committee, first part, first volume, p. 340. 


— 362 — 



Glendale and Malvern 


fully conquered the day before, Lee and his lieutenants be¬ 
thought themselves of gathering the fruits of their recent 
victory. Their army had suffered cruelly. It required 
time to reorganize the corps, to collect together their ele¬ 
ments, which had been scattered during the conflict, to at¬ 
tend for the first time to the ten thousand or eleven thou¬ 
sand wounded who were lying on the heights of Gaines’ Mill, 
and finally to see to the distribution of rations and ammuni¬ 
tion. Nevertheless, the Confederate army, still full of ar¬ 
dor, despite the heavy losses it had sustained, was able to 
put part of its battalions in motion by midday. Moments 
were precious, for it was important to forestall McClellan 
on his line of retreat, and turn into a rout the retrograde 
march which his check of the preceding day would no doubt 
compel him to undertake. Jackson’s soldiers were not in 
the habit of resting the day after a battle; therefore they 
were soon in motion. Lee, however, had not understood the 
maneuver of his opponent. From the moment he crossed 
the Chickahominy to join Jackson, we have seen him ac¬ 
tuated by the desire of flanking McClellan’s right wing, so 
as to separate him from York River. In order to ’accom¬ 
plish this object, he had already caused the army of the 
Shenandoah to follow the eccentric direction which came 
near preventing it from reaching the battlefield of Gaines’ 
Mill in time. In delivering this battle, he had proposed 
to cut off McClellan entirely from the road leading to White 
House. Consequently, after having won this battle, all the 
movements of his army during the 28th were intended to 
prevent the army of the Potomac from putting itself again 
in communication with York River. If McClellan had the 
design naturally attributed to him by his adversary, he 
had but two ways of carrying it into effect; he could have 
crossed the Chickahominy with his whole army between 
Gaines’ Mill and Bottom’s Bridge, and tried to force a pas¬ 
sage through the position occupied by the Confederates; 
otherwise, he should have endeavored to outstrip them in 
speed by pushing his way. back of the river, to cross it 
at some point lower down, so as to fall back upon Williams¬ 
burg. But, as we have seen, these two alternatives had 


— 363 — 


Civil War in America 


been both discarded by McClellan, and his sagacity had in¬ 
spired him with a determination, the merit of which con¬ 
sisted in its not having been fathomed by his adversaries. 
Consequently, the Confederate generals, after having vig¬ 
orously executed a well-conceived plan, were deceived by 
their own wishes; they too readily imagined that the Fed¬ 
eral general would fall into the trap which they had been 
preparing for him. 

A division of cavalry, cleverly directed by Stoneman, 
contributed to confirm them in their error. The latter, in 
fact, by slowly retiring toward New Kent Court-house, 
seemed as if intending to cover the lower passes of the 
Chickahominy, as well as the Williamsburg turnpike, and he 
thus drew a portion of the enemy’s forces on his side. 
Whilst Longstreet and Hill, who had suffered most the day 
before, continued to occupy the heights of Gaines’ Mill, three 
of Jackson’s divisions deployed along the Chickahominy, 
as if to defend the left bank against the Federals, who were 
massed on the other side; the fourth, Ewell’s, was despatched 
to Bottom’s Bridge, when it became evident that McClellan 
had no intention of forcing a passage near the battle-field 
for the preceding day. Magruder, on his side, retaining 
his position in front of the Federal lines, could easily per¬ 
ceive that the number of troops occupying them had not 
diminished. For an instant.only toward noon he thought 
these positions were about to be abandoned. Smith’s divi¬ 
sion evacuated a few breastworks which had been erected in 
front of the fortifications at Golding. Magruder at once 
launched the Seventh and Eighth Georgia regiments of 
Toombs’ brigade against these works; but being received 
by the fire of Hancock’s brigade, they were repulsed, leav¬ 
ing two hundred wounded and prisoners on the ground, one 
of whom was a colonel. This brisk discharge of musketry 
was the only thing that occurred to disturb the silence of 
that long day, the 28th. 

Every hour that elapsed amid this silence afforded an 
additional chance to the Federals for reaching the James 
without serious interruption. Consequently, in the midst 
of the apparent quiet among the troops, the work of push- 


— 364 — 


Glendale and Malvern 


ing forward the train, and opening a way for its passage, 
was carried on with the utmost activity, while at the head¬ 
quarters astonishment was manifested at the inaction of 
an adversary hitherto so vigilant and enterprising. 

The dust raised above the forest by Ewell’s march 
toward Bottom’s Bridge soon explained the error commit¬ 
ted by the enemy. Although a yet thicker cloud of dust 
betrayed the movement of the Federal train on the opposite 
bank, its appearance failed to undeceive the Confederates. 
They persisted in believing that McClellan was proceeding 
in the direction of Williamsburg. It was only when Stuart, 
who had followed Stoneman step by step with his cavalry, 
had reached the last fords of the Chickahominy, without 
finding even a Federal vidette to guard them, that Lee un¬ 
derstood at last the bold maneuver by which McClellan was 
about to rob him of a success which he had considered 
certain. 

It was too late to remedy his mistake; the whole pre¬ 
cious day had been wasted. Stuart’s cavalry, which might 
so effectually have harassed the Federal vanguard, and pre¬ 
ceded it to the borders of the James, either through White 
Oak Swamp or the lower Chickahominy, had advanced so 
far into the peninsula that it did not again make its ap¬ 
pearance during the whole of the campaign. Ewell’s sol¬ 
diers, who were brought back during the night and posted 
near the remainder of Jackson’s troops, had been exhausted 
by a fruitless march, and it was necessary to grant them at 
least a few hours’ rest. 

During the whole of this same night, the trains of 
the army of the Potomac were on their way toward White 
Oak Swamp. The bridge situated in front of Frazier’s 
Farm had been reopened toward noon, and Keyes with his 
two divisions had encamped at Glendale, in the neighbor¬ 
hood of Nelson’s Farm. The topographical officers had, 
moreover, discovered another passage through the swamp 
above this bridge, leading directly from Savage station to 
Glendale—a precious discovery, although this road was too 
much exposed in flank to the enemy, to venture over it with 
the train. The moment had arrived for evacuating the 


— 365 — 


Civil War in America 


works which had hitherto concealed the preparations for 
the movement. This was a most delicate operation. It 
would have been desirable to effect it during the night, but 
the length of the train had not permitted this. Fortunately, 
when day broke, instead of shedding a glaring light over 
the two armies as on the preceding mornings, it was dark¬ 
ened by a thick fog, which for several hours completely 
concealed the movements of the Federals from the enemy. 
Their retreat had commenced. Henceforth, until the 
friendly gun-boats floating on the waters of the James 
should greet their sight, they would have to fight by day, 
and march during the night, almost without rest. Nor was 
the train, which resembled an immense reptile, allowed to 
make any stop. When wagons were drawn aside to give 
the horses time to feed, other wagons took their places. 
This column, formed of four or five teams abreast, moved 
along quite regularly in the midst of whirlwinds of dust 
and a stifling heat. The troops marched on the sides of the 
road. Between the heavy vehicles of the commissary de¬ 
partment there were light ambulances overloaded with 
wounded men; around the train crept along a large number 
of other wounded and sick men, who had left the hospital 
to follow the army, falling at every step and presenting a 
lamentable spectacle. It had been found impossible to take 
along all those who had been wounded in the recent battles, 
and nearly two thousand five hundred of them had been left 
at Savage station, with some surgeons, and recommended 
to the humanity, already experienced, of the Confederates. 
Near them a small mountain of coffee, rice, biscuit and hams 
was burning as a sort of holocaust offered to the god of 
war. 

The troops who had suffered so severely at Gaines’ 
Mill were immediately to follow Keyes’ corps toward the 
James. The task of covering the retreat was entrusted to 
the yet untouched corps of Sumner and Heintzelman, and 
to Smith’s division. As between White Oak Swamp and 
Turkey Bend the army was to be exposed to flank attacks 
of the enemy, who could not fail to come down from Rich¬ 
mond by the three roads we have mentioned, the troops 


— 366 — 


Glendale and Malvern 


covering this march were ordered to remain stationary 
during the day, and to move on again at night; in this way 
they were to relieve each other successively, each gaining 
one stage in the journey before the sun allowed the enemy 
to renew the fighting. On the morning of the 29th, Por¬ 
ter's corps and the divisions of McCall and Slocum took 
position beyond White Oak Swamp, so as to support Keyes 
at Glendale, and occupy the difficult pass of the swamp in 
force. 

During this time the works in which the army had 
passed three long weeks were quietly evacuated. General 
McClellan had indicated to Sumner the positions which the 
troops forming the rear were to occupy, and had gone to 
superintend in person the march of the remainder of the 
army; for it was by the right border of the swamp that 
the enemy could strike the most dangerous blows. The 
rear-guard, on the contrary, had its two flanks protected 
against all attack from Richmond, before reaching the 
bridge—on the left by the swamp, on the right by the 
Chickahominy; and these two obstacles, drawing gradually 
nearer to each other, narrowed the space of ground it had 
to defend, in proportion as it fell back. 

The main portion of the Confederate army was there¬ 
fore separated from the enemy by a river difficult to cross, 
and had an immense circuit to make to overtake him on the 
new line of retreat he had chosen. Huger, with a single 
division, numbering from eight to ten thousand men, had 
been ordered several days before to occupy the right bank 
of the White Oak Swamp. It would certainly have been 
impossible for him to impede McClellan's march with such 
a small force, but he could easily watch his movements, and 
ought to have noticed the direction in which Keyes had been 
marching since the 28th. He did not, however, display 
more activity on this occasion than at the battle of Fair 
Oaks. Allowing some of his squadrons to be borne down 
by Averill’s Federal cavalry, without affording them any as¬ 
sistance, he remained inactive on the Charles City road, 
while the Federals continued their march unmolested dur¬ 
ing the whole of the 29th, without having to fire a musket- 


— 367 — 


Civil War in America 


shot south of White Oak Swamp. Longstreet and Hill 
returned on the 29th, crossing by New Bridge to take posi¬ 
tion in his rear in the vicinity of Richmond, ready to oper¬ 
ate, as circumstances might require, on either side of the 
swamp. Jackson, with his four divisions, remained north 
of the Chickahominy. 

Finally, toward eight o’clock in the evening, Magruder, 
perceiving the abandonment of the Federal works, pushed 
forward McLaws’ division, which had been placed under 
his orders, together with Griffith’s brigade of his own divi¬ 
sion. The Federals steadily awaited their approach. 

Heintzelman’s corps, posted across the Williamsburg 
turnpike, occupied the works before which the Confederates 
had stopped on the day of Fair Oaks, his lines extending 
as far as the railroad. On his right was deployed Sum¬ 
ner’s corps, skirting the edge of a wood situated about two 
kilometres in advance of Savage station. Of the two divi¬ 
sions composing this corps, that of Sedgwick was placed 
between Heintzelman and the railroad, and that of Richard¬ 
son on the other side of this line. Still more to the 
right and in the rear, Smith’s division occupied the heights 
which overlook the Chickahominy, where Porter had en¬ 
camped the day before. 

Toward nine o’clock the Confederates began the attack 
on a point called Allen’s Farm, where Sedgwick’s right 
formed a junction with Richardson’s left. The latter first, 
and then Sedgwick, had to sustain the whole brunt of the 
fight. But the enemy was repulsed along the whole line; 
and seeing the fruitlessness of their assaults, the Confeder¬ 
ates soon retired. The darkness, in the midst of which this 
engagement ended, which had commenced too late to lead to 
any serious results, was against the aggressors, who, not 
being able to combine their movements, unnecessarily lost 
many men, and among others General Griffith. 

Meanwhile, Jackson had been ordered to cross the 
Chickahominy on the morning of the 29th, and to throw 
himself with all his^forces upon the troops posted on the 
other side of the river, which he had thus far believed to 
be held in check by his mere presence. He at once set 


— 368 — 


Glendale and Malvern 


himself to work to reconstruct the Alexander bridge, de¬ 
signated in his reports by the name of Grape-vine bridge. 
This bridge opened at the foot of the hill where Doctor 
Trent’s house stands. The Federals no longer occupied this 
position, Franklin having placed Smith’s division lower 
down, so as to cover the approaches to Savage station, on 
the side of the Chickahominy. 

As to Sumner, he was ordered to fall back until he 
should join Smith’s left. He nevertheless remained for 
some time before Allen’s Farm, thus leaving his right en¬ 
tirely unprotected (en l’air), and opening a vast space in 
the Federal line in front of the Trent house, precisely at 
the point upon which Jackson’s heads of column could not 
fail to emerge. The Union generals, however, had quickly 
perceived this danger. Franklin had brought Smith back 
near to Savage station, in order to close up the Federal 
line. On being informed of this movement, Sumner finally 
determined to fall back likewise upon the position, of which 
Savage is the centre; and assuming command of the five 
divisions which were about to assemble at this point, he re¬ 
solved to defend it to the utmost, agreeably to McClellan’s 
orders. 

Heintzelman, who with his army corps formed the Fed¬ 
eral left, had received formal orders to halt at a short dis¬ 
tance from the station and not to continue the retreat until 
dark; but instead of complying with these instructions, he 
proceeded with his two divisions in the direction of White 
Oak Swamp. McClellan had designated to him a road 
which, after following the line of this swamp for some dis¬ 
tance, crossed it at Brackett’s Ford, above the bridge, over 
which the remainder of the army was passing. He en¬ 
tered this road at noon, thus uncovering the entire flank 
of Sumner, who had not been apprised of his sudden de¬ 
parture. 

The Confederates were not slow in taking advantage 
of such a blunder. They advanced by the Williamsburg 
road and along the railroad track, preceded by an engine, 
to which was attached an iron-plated car carrying a heavy 
gun. This strange machine, which was called the Land 


— 369 — 


Civil War in America 


Merrimac, stopped from time to time to fire a random shot; 
but it does not appear that anybody was hurt by it. As 
we have before stated, Sumner’s two divisions were de¬ 
ployed in the vicinity of Savage station; that of Sedgwick 
occupied the clearing between the railroad and the Williams¬ 
burg road; that of Richardson had fallen back so as to form 
a right angle with the line of the first, along the railway 
tracks, facing north. Sumner, believing his left to be cov¬ 
ered by Heintzelman, had not occupied in force the wood bor¬ 
dering the Williamsburg road, and Franklin, finding no 
enemy in sight, had sent Smith’s division to the rear. That 
of McCall was posted at Bottom’s Bridge, guarding the pas¬ 
sage of the Chickahominy. 

Toward four o’clock in the afternoon the officers of the 
signal corps announced the approach of the enemy. Smith, 
being hastily recalled by his chief, has barely time to throw 
Hancock’s brigade on Richardson’s right, to extend his line 
by resting it upon a thicket, which the enemy will presently 
take from him, and at the same time to send Brooks’ brigade 
to the extreme left. The latter general arrives just in 
time to occupy the wood stretching along the road, and to 
reinforce Burns’ troops, of Sedgwick’s division, who are 
keeping up an unequal fight from their position across this 
road. Magruder, in fact, taking advantage of the gap made 
by Heintzelman’s unhoped-for departure, has with his 
wonted vigor hurled his own and McLaws’ division against 
the weakest point of the Federal line. He almost breaks it, 
when the opportune arrival of the reserve of Sumner, who 
had soon recovered from his surprise, checks him. Brooks 
re-establishes the battle on that side; but the struggle con¬ 
tinues with fierceness along the whole line until after sun¬ 
set. The Confederates, encouraged by their victory of 
Gaines’ Mill, and finding that their adversary is about to 
escape them, are determined at all hazards to inflict another 
reverse upon him before night comes on to protect his re¬ 
treat. The Federal lines give way more than once under 
their repeated efforts, but each time they are speedily re¬ 
formed ; and despite all his fire and the ardor of his soldiers, 
Magruder cannot effect a serious breach. Jackson, whose 


— 370 — 


Glendale and Malvern 

arrival on the field of battle might have proved fatal to the 
Federals, as it had done two days before, did not make his 
appearance. The construction of the bridge detained him 
the whole day, and it was only after sunset that his troops 
were at last able to cross the Chickahominy. Thus, al¬ 
though only two regiments had been engaged during the 
whole of the 28th, Lee was only able to bring two divisions 
at most into line on the 29th. Disconcerted by McClellan's 
unlooked-for maneuver, the Confederate generals seemed to 
have lost that capacity for the initiative which had suc¬ 
ceeded so well on former occasions. On the evening of the 
29th, the brave Sumner was unwilling to abandon the ground 
he had so gallantly defended. Nevertheless, the safety of 
the army required that its lines should be extended as little 
as possible, and that in proportion as the heads of column 
drew near to the James the rear-guard should follow their 
movements. It required a positive order from General 
McClellan to determine Sumner to cross the White Oak 
Swamp; finally, on the 30th, at five o’clock in the morning, 
French’s brigade, being the last to pass, destroyed the 
bridge which had been thrown over the stream near Fra¬ 
zier’s Farm. 

This day’s operations were a great success for McClel¬ 
lan. The first and most difficult step in his retreat move¬ 
ment was taken, and with fortunate results. He had suc¬ 
ceeded in placing White Oak Swamp between his army and 
the main body of his adversaries, and in surmounting this 
serious obstacle without losing either a cannon or a vehicle. 
All the efforts of the enemy to effect a rout in his rear-guard 
had been repulsed with loss. The following movement of 
troops took place on the right bank of the swamp during 
the afternoon of the 29th; Slocum, having crossed in the 
morning, had taken the position previously occupied by 
Keyes’ corps at Glendale. The latter had started for Tur¬ 
key Bend, on the banks of the James, with instructions not 
to stop until he had reached that place. Porter had passed 
Slocum, who was facing north, for the purpose of covering 
the road from Frazier’s Farm to Nelson’s Farm; and taking 
post at the other extremity of the Glendale clearings, he 


—37i — 


Civil War in America 


guarded their approaches to the west on the side of the New 
Market road. He was ordered to remain there until even¬ 
ing, and to resume his march in the track of Keyes imme¬ 
diately after nightfall. 

At daybreak on the 30th the approaches to White Oak 
Bridge and Frazier’s Farm were occupied by Franklin, with 
the division of Smith and Richardson and Naglee’s brigade. 
On the left was deployed Slocum’s division, his right resting 
on the Charles City road. Heintzelman, who had crossed 
the swamp at Brackett’s Ford the previous evening without 
being molested, had come during the night to take the posi¬ 
tion occupied by Porter a few hours before, beyond Glen¬ 
dale. McCall had left Frazier’s Farm, and his troops were 
making coffee in the neighborhood of Nelson’s Farm. Sum¬ 
ner soon joined him there with Sedgwick’s division. Keyes, 
followed close by Porter, continued to lead the advance of 
the army, reaching Haxall’s Landing, on the James, in the 
course of the morning. But both had been delayed on their 
march, and they had not informed the general-in-chief of 
their movements. The latter was utterly ignorant of their 
fate, merely presuming that, as he had not heard the sound 
of cannon, his two lieutenants had not had any serious en¬ 
gagement. The impossibility of exactly tracing in advance 
the movements of his troops, of knowing the country 
through which they had to pass, and of obtaining timely 
information regarding the positions they had occupied, 
rendered McClellan’s task singularly difficult. The topo¬ 
graphical officers who had been detached on the 28th to 
make a reconnaissance of the roads leading to the James 
had not yet returned, nor even sent a solitary guide to 
headquarters. Fortunately, in the midst of these uncer¬ 
tainties it became known that Keyes had accidentally dis¬ 
covered a road running parallel to the Quaker road, which 
had been abandoned for a number of years, half buried un¬ 
der the grass, wild vines and the trunks of fallen trees, but 
nevertheless easily reopened. It was a valuable discovery; 
for this road, lying to the left of the Quaker road for troops 
marching toward the James, offered a safe way for the 
train, the right flank of which would thus be covered by 


— 372 — 


Glendale and Malvern 


the whole army. The long file of vehicles, ambulances and 
baggage-wagons at once entered it. 

In the course of the morning, when Keyes, followed by 
Porter, reached the James, the line of the army of the Poto¬ 
mac extended from White Oak Bridge to HaxalFs Landing, 
a distance of thirteen kilometres. This line was too long 
to be everywhere defended by the Federals against a vigor¬ 
ous attack, nor could they shorten it; for in order to protect 
the train and prevent the enemy from placing himself on 
the left flank of the troops in the march, it was necessary 
to bar the passage of White Oak Swamp against him. The 
three principal points of this line had, therefore, to be oc¬ 
cupied in force. The first was that portion of the bank of 
the James toward which the army was directing its course. 
At Haxall’s Landing the river borders an immense clearing 
occupied by a few huts situated to the south, and conse¬ 
quently beyond Malvern Hill, for those approaching that 
position either by way of the Quaker road or New Market 
road. All the roads leading to this landing pass either along 
the side or at the foot of the hill which thus commands 
the approaches. It overlooks the whole surrounding coun¬ 
try ; wooded at the east, it is entirely bare on all the other 
sides. A cluster of acacias surrounds the old house of Mr. 
Crewe, situated on the highest point above the rather 
abrupt acclivities which stretch down to the James. These 
slopes are less precipitous to the west on the side facing 
Richmond, and become still gentler to the north toward the 
Quaker road. A point equally important to defend was 
that of Frazier’s Farm, at the other extremity of the line, 
for it commands the passage of White Oak Swamp. The 
intermediate position was that of Glendale. At this point 
all the roads through which the enemy, coming from Rich¬ 
mond, might try to throw himself upon the flank of the 
Federal column, emerge into the Quaker road. Omitting 
a few irregularities and one or two cross-roads of no im¬ 
portance, the intersection of these different roads at Glen¬ 
dale may be represented by a square, the four angles of 
which, each facing a cardinal point, would mark the en¬ 
trance of the four principal roads into the clearing. The 


— 373 — 


Civil War in America 


Confederates, who had crossed the White Oak Swamp by 
following the tracks of Heintzelman, or those who had fol¬ 
lowed the right bank, were to debouch by the Charles City 
road into the northern angle; those who had come down by 
the Central or New Market road were to unite in order to 
penetrate together into the clearing by the western angle. 
The Federals, coming from White Oak Bridge, entered the 
road by the eastern angle, in order to strike at the south¬ 
ern angle the Quaker road, which led to the margin of the 
James. 

These were the only three points in which the line 
formed by the Federals to cover their movement was vul¬ 
nerable. In fact, the line occupied by the Federals between 
Glendale and Frazier’s Farm was covered by the White Oak 
Swamp on the Richmond side. Between Glendale and Mal¬ 
vern Hill small swamps, forming the source of the Western 
Run, and rendered impassable by a dense forest, extended 
to the right of the Quaker road, so that the roads coming 
from the Central or New Market road, being compelled to 
avoid them, all converged upon the slopes themselves or in 
full view of Malvern Hill. This was the line that all the 
forces of Lee intended to attack on the 30th of June, and 
that McClellan had to defend for a sufficient length of time 
to enable his train to reach Haxall’s Landing without im¬ 
pediment. On this occasion he could no longer count upon 
the inaction of the enemy for Lee had had ample time to 
concentrate his army. Visiting all the points which were 
menaced, General McClellan speedily made his dispositions 
for battle. Keyes left Haxall’s and proceeded to occupy 
the space comprised between the James at Turkey Bend 
on one side and Malvern Hill on the other. Porter, who 
had arrived by the Quaker road, took a strong position on 
this hill. At Frazier’s Farm, Franklin was ordered to de¬ 
fend to the last the pass of White Oak Swamp, as the 
troops against whom Sumner had fought the day previous 
at Savage station were sure to come and dispute it. Final¬ 
ly, McClellan’s attention having been called to the Glen¬ 
dale junction by the Prince de Joinville, whose suggestions 
he always willingly listened to, he saw at once all the im- 


— 374 — 


Glendale and Malvern 


portance of this point. It was evidently here that Lee was 
preparing to strike the decisive blow. In order to cover 
the march of the army it was necessary to hold and pre¬ 
serve at all hazards the western and southern angles. Ac¬ 
cordingly, all the disposable forces yet remaining were sent 
to defend this position. The moments were precious, the 
forest thick, the roads intricate, and it was essential to 
spare the worn-out troops all unnecessary counter-marches; 
they were consequently drawn up somewhat at random, but 
finally succeeded in forming a large arc of a circle, covering 
the greater part of the Glendale junction, the convexity of 
which was turned toward Richmond. Slocum was deployed 
on the right of the Charles City road, his left resting upon 
this road and facing north; Kearny, who remained where 
he had bivouacked during the night, joined him, his lines 
being deployed on the left of this road a little above the 
New Market road and looking toward the north-west. McCall 
had come about noon to take position on his left en potence; 
he rested his right on the New Market road, across the 
cross-road which connected the former with the Quaker 
road, and awaiting the enemy from the west. In rear, on 
McCall’s left, Hooker had deployed his division, his right 
extending as far as the cross-road which forms an angle 
toward the south; he thus found himself facing south-west 
and resting upon the edge of a wood before a large clearing 
intersected by the New Market road. A space of several 
hundred metres separated Hooker’s right from McCall’s 
left, but at a short distance in rear of this gap was posted 
Sumner with a portion of the Sedgwick’s division, which 
was half concealed by the other two. The remainder of 
this division had not yet left Frazier’s Farm. There was 
hardly any connection between the different parts of the 
line which had thus been formed at Glendale; the generals 
of division were all ignorant of the positions of their neigh¬ 
bors, and found it difficult to maintain communications be¬ 
tween them in the midst of the forest. Nor does it appear 
that any person had assumed the superior command of the 
troops assembled in the vicinity of this clearing; but they 
were in sufficient proximity to each other for mutual sup- 


- 375 — 


Civil War in America 


port, should the din of battle reveal the presence of the 
enemy at any given point. 

On the part of the Confederates, their whole army was 
preparing to make a desperate effort before McClellan could 
have time to reach the James. Jackson with his four divi¬ 
sions had only halted for a moment at Savage, and had en¬ 
tered the road which Sumner had taken during the night 
for the purpose of forcing the passage of White Oak Swamp, 
in front of Frazier’s Farm. Hill and Longstreet, who had 
left Richmond, were proceeding along the New Market and 
the Central roads, having sent a few detachments forward 
on the Charles City road. They were therefore to debouch 
directly upon Glendale. Magrudej, having returned to the 
rear after his reverse at Savage station, had joined Huger, 
and following them closely with his united forces was to 
form the Confederate right in the general attack. Wise’s 
legion, with other troops hitherto posted on the right bank 
of the James, crossed the river at Drury’s Bluff; they were 
ordered to take position on the extreme right, so as to fore¬ 
stall the Federals if possible in the occupation of Malvern 
Hill. 

Jackson had reached the pass of White Oak Swamp at 
eleven o’clock in the morning, where he found Franklin 
firmly posted. The latter, having eight or nine batteries at 
his command, covered the passage with the fire of his guns. 
His infantry, just reinforced by a portion of Sedgwick’s 
division, thus consisting of nine brigades, was drawn up a 
little in the rear. Jackson’s forces were far superior in 
number to those of the Federals; he brought with him his 
four large divisions, and the eighteen or twenty batteries 
which he had commanded since the 26th. But the ap¬ 
proaches to White Oak Bridge, encompassed on both sides 
by wooded swamps, rendered it impossible for him to avail 
himself of this superiority and to bring all his troops into 
line at once, so that, in spite of his great daring, in spite 
of the interest he had in acting promptly, he was afraid 
of venturing with his soldiers into this formidable defile. 
Seven Confederate batteries were placed in position above 
the pass with a view of silencing the fire of the Federals 


— 376 — 


Glendale and Malvern 


seemed at first to have the worst of it; the two batteries of 
Hazzard and Mott, which were in the first line, were silenced, 
nearly all their guns being shattered by the enemy’s pro¬ 
jectiles. The combat, however, was, soon renewed with 
rifled ten-pounders, which, being able to keep farther back, 
and almost beyond range of the Confederate artillery in con¬ 
sequence of their light calibre, inflicted upon the latter con¬ 
siderable losses in their turn. Meanwhile, the battalions of 
infantry of both parties continued under arms, one side 
ready to commence the attack, the other to repulse it, and 
both alike exposed to the enemy’s projectiles, which were 
causing cruel ravages in their ranks. Notwithstanding all 
their efforts, the Confederates were unable to silence the 
fire of Franklin’s artillery; the cannonading was thus con¬ 
tinued during the whole day; and when night came, Jackson 
had not even made an attempt to force the passage. The 
losses had been severe on both sides. 

The battle of Frazier’s Farm was an important success 
for the Federals; Franklin had succeeded in holding nearly 
one-half of the Confederate army in check the entire day. 
In contenting himself with extending hi$ line in a manner 
which might appear excessive, rather than abandon the 
passage of White Oak Swamp, McClellan had prevented Lee 
from uniting his two wings, which were separated by this 
marsh. He had thus paralyzed Jackson’s four divisions at 
a moment when their presence on another battlefield might 
have been decisive. In fact, a fierce and sanguinary con¬ 
flict was taking place on that very day around the Glendale 
junction, a few kilometres from that spot. 

Toward two o’clock in the afternoon a few Confederate 
detachments, coming by way of the Charles City road, had 
attacked Slocum, but were easily repulsed. They preceded 
the troops of Longstreet and A. P. Hill, amounting in all to 
about eighteen or twenty thousand men, then under com¬ 
mand of the latter. A little before three o’clock these two 
corps debouched upon the Glendale clearings by way of the 
New Market road, the first on the right, the second on the 
left of that road, and fell directly upon McCall’s division, 
which, placed in the centre, occupied the most salient point 


— 377 — 


Civil War in America 


of the Federal front. McCall had ranged his troops in two 
lines, Meade on the right, Seymour on the left, with Rey¬ 
nolds’ brigade in reserve, while five batteries covered his 
front. After having prefaced the attack with a shower of 
shell, the Confederate columns charged their adversaries 
with great vigor. McCall’s small division was reduced to 
six thousand men by his losses of the preceding days, and 
for the last four days it had fought more and marched more 
than any other division in the army of the Potomac; never¬ 
theless, it succeeded in thoroughly repulsing the first onset; 
Seymour and Meade being each attacked in succession by 
the enemy, who was endeavoring to find the weak point in 
the line, defended themselves most energetically, and even 
took several hundred prisoners. 

But at each new attack, the Confederates bring for¬ 
ward fresh troops, and McCall’s Pennsylvanians become ex¬ 
hausted. Hill has at length found the open breach be¬ 
tween this division and that of Hooker, and availing him¬ 
self of this discovery endeavors to turn both of them in 
succession. On the left of the Federal line, Hooker, fiercely 
attacked, is obliged to bring all his reserves, and a regiment 
detached from Sumner’s corps, to the assistance of Grover, 
who commands his first brigade. More to the right an¬ 
other charge is made by the Confederates against Seymour’s 
brigade, forming McCall’s left wing, and against two Ger¬ 
man batteries borrowed from the reserve artillery, which 
cover it. The gunners are put to flight; a great portion of 
this brigade is thus placed between two fires; it at once be¬ 
comes disintegrated, and the fugitives are driven back upon 
Hooker. The latter allows them to pass through his ranks, 
and receives the pursuing Confederates with a murderous 
fire. Longstreet’s soldiers have not been able to preserve 
their ranks during the charge, and thus they arrive in dis¬ 
order. They are stopped short, and two of Hooker’s regi¬ 
ments, the First Massachusetts and Sixty-ninth Pennsyl¬ 
vania, resuming the offensive, drive them at the point of 
the bayonet upon McCall’s two other brigades, which, hav¬ 
ing firmly kept their ground, receive them with a well-sus¬ 
tained fire. Sedgwick, in the meantime, has received rein- 


— 378 — 


Glendale and Malvern 


forcements; the two brigades which had been detached in 
the morning to support Franklin at Frazier’s Farm have 
been sent back to that general, as soon as he has found him¬ 
self strong enough to defend the pass without them. These 
troops, still fresh, arrive at Glendale, and proceed to occupy 
the space left open in the Federal line by Seymour’s brigade, 
which is entirely disorganized. The battle is re-established, 
although some little ground has been lost. The enemy, 
however, constantly renews his attacks, and he turns from 
the line occupied by Hooker and Sedgwick, to direct his 
main efforts against McCall’s right and Kearny’s left, at 
the other extremity of the. Federal positions. Kearney is 
supported by Taylor’s brigade of Slocum’s division, which 
had long been under his own command. The sight of their 
old chief infuses additional ardor into the four New Jersey 
regiments comprising it, and this timely reinforcement en¬ 
ables him to hold his position. But McCall’s right, con¬ 
sisting of Meade’s brigade, is again engaged in an unequal 
and murderous struggle. Many are the attacks it has al¬ 
ready repulsed, when, toward six o’clock, the Fifty-fifth 
and Sixtieth Virginia make a desperate charge upon Ran¬ 
doms regular battery, posted alongside of Meade, which, up 
to this time, has resisted every assault. The Virginians, 
carrying the musket in one hand, and drawn up in the form 
of a wedge, rush forward at a run across the open space of 
six hundred metres which separates them from the Federal 
guns. Nothing can withstand them; although decimated 
by grape and musketry, they are not staggered. They reach 
the goal at last; the gunners are killed, the cannon cap¬ 
tured, and Meade’s brigade is obliged to fall back. It how¬ 
ever continues to fight with uncommon obstinacy; at seven 
o’clock a new charge results in the capture of Cooper’s bat¬ 
tery, in the centre of McCall’s line. But the Ninth Penn¬ 
sylvania charges back in return, and, after a fierce engage¬ 
ment, recaptures the guns. The enemy at the same time 
abandons those taken from Randol, which he has not been 
able to carry off. 

It is near sunset, and the contest becomes less animated. 
The two magnificent divisions of Hill and Longstreet have 


— 379 — 


Civil War in America 


been lavish of their efforts; there is not a man left in re¬ 
serve. Magruder, who should long since have been on the 
field of battle, has not yet made his appearance. Jackson’s 
cannon is still thundering in the direction of White Oak 
Swamp, but he has made no progress since morning—a bad 
sign for the Confederates. No intelligence can be obtained 
of him, because in order to reach him it would be necessary 
to go round the whole swamp and through the suburbs 
of Richmond, a distance of from forty to fifty kilometres. 
The Confederate army, divided into two parts by this ob¬ 
stacle, is rendered powerless. The Federals have had but 
fifteen or eighteen thousand men engaged at Glendale against 
the twenty thousand who have attacked them; but the re¬ 
mainder of the divisions of Hooker, Sedgwick and Slocum 
are within reach, ready to sustain them, and the Confeder¬ 
ates have not failed to perceive, toward the close of the 
battle, that they have been dealing with troops who felt 
sure of support. They relinquished the attack; and believ¬ 
ing these troops to be even more numerous than they really 
are, they abandon the greater portion of the ground they 
have just conquered, in order to disengage themselves. Gen¬ 
eral Lee was on the field of battle, and had brought with 
him President Davis; for it was hoped in Richmond that 
this day, the 30th, would complete the destruction of the 
army of the Potomac. How grieved Lee must have felt 
at having lost so much time on the 28th, when he saw two 
of these divisions struggling alone in fruitless efforts 
against the vital point of the enemy’s line; how bitterly he 
must have regretted having caused Jackson to waste the 
whole of the 29th, by uselessly detaining him in front of the 
ruined bridges of the Chickahominy, and by having finally 
placed him with four divisions, on the 30th, between two 
swamps, before a defile which a few guns had prevented 
him from crossing! His mistake as to McClellan’s real de¬ 
sign had compromised the most brilliant results of his 
victory at Gaines’ Mill. Far from rectifying this error, he 
had made matters worse when, on being informed of the 
march of the Federals toward the James, he had directed 
one-half of his army into the blind alley of Frazier’s Farm. 


— 380 — 


Glendale and Malvern 


It is difficult to account for this blunder on the part of so 
skillfull a general, except by attributing it to his ignorance 
of the country occupied by his adversary. If he had brought 
back Jackson to Richmond on the 29th, leaving Magruder 
to follow Sumner alone, he would have been able on the 30th 
to place three-fourths of his army in line between White 
Oak Swamp and the James. 

An engagement of secondary importance had taken 
place on the banks of this river, while the battles of Fra¬ 
zier’s Farm and Glendale were being fought. Wise’s legion 
had come down the James for the purpose of forestalling if 
possible the Federals at Turkey Bend. In order to do this 
it had to go completely round the foot of Malvern Hill. Be¬ 
fore reaching this point it ran against Porter’s corps, which, 
as we have said, was posted upon the slopes of the hill ex¬ 
tending to the flat wooded lands which separate it from the 
James. The Confederates attacked it from that side, but 
with the lack of spirit felt by troops who do not anticipate 
meeting the enemy; and despite the protection afforded 
them by the thick underwood, they were easily repulsed 
by Warren’s brigade. At the same time they engaged in 
an artillery fight with Porter’s batteries posted on the sum¬ 
mit of the hill, and for a moment threw the march of the 
Federal train into confusion. A few gun-boats, under Com¬ 
modore Rodgers, were waiting for the army at Haxall’s 
Landing; one of them, the Galena, had just taken General 
McClellan on board, who desired to make a reconnaissance 
up the river, when Wise’s attack commenced. Rodgers 
immediately threw a few of Parrott’s hundred-pound shells 
in the direction in which the enemy’s reserves were sup¬ 
posed to be. These missiles, fired at random, could not 
do much harm to troops scattered about the forest; but 
the strange noise which announced their passage, and final¬ 
ly the violence of their explosion produced a deep impres¬ 
sion upon the Confederates. The Federals, on the con¬ 
trary, who heard from a distance the heavy and powerful 
voice of the naval guns, hailed it as that of an auxiliary im¬ 
patiently expected. 

It was time for them to reach the banks of the James. 


— 381 — 


Civil War in America 


During the whole of the 30th, notwithstanding the oppor 
tune discovery of a new road, as above mentioned, the 
train had proceeded very slowly and with much difficulty. 
The booming of cannon, resounding along so many points of 
the line, had more than once spread senseless alarms among 
the drivers of this long column. The larger part of reserve 
and siege artillery, and the batteries detached from the 
several corps which McClellan had ordered to Malvern Hill 
to fortify that position, found great difficulty in advancing. 
All the farmhouses, all the huts, were converted into hos¬ 
pitals, where the victims of the battles of Savage station, 
Frazier’s Farm and Glendale were huddled. There was 
scarcely a sufficient number of surgeons to attend to their 
most pressing wants; and most of the wounded felt the 
painful certainty of being left at night in the hands of the 
enemy. The stifling heat of a Virginia summer, the want 
of sleep, the long marches, the combats incessantly renewed, 
the excitements and the anxieties of every description, tri¬ 
umphed over the most robust constitutions, and prostrated 
those whom the terrible swamp-fever had yet spared. Night 
marches had also singularly contributed to diminish the 
effective force of the several corps, and to increase the 
number of stragglers. Many soldiers became lost in the 
obscurity, and, being unable to find their regiments, at day¬ 
light rejoined the invalid column, which extended the whole 
length of the train. Frequently without haversacks, but 
always armed and well provided with ammunition, they 
moved along in groups of from three to twenty; and finding 
themselves freed from all official authority, they soon re¬ 
sumed the independence natural to their character. The 
sick, the lame and the crippled increased in a frightful pro¬ 
portion. Finally, what was a still greater cause of the 
privations of the soldier in the midst of these incessant en¬ 
gagements, the distribution of rations could not be made 
with any regularity. In proportion as this crowd, com¬ 
posed of so many different elements, perceived from afar 
across the verdure the waters of the James, the smooth sur¬ 
face of which sparkled under a burning sun, but one idea 
pervaded it, one common ardor gave strength to these worn- 


—382 — 


Glendale and Malvern 


out men. They rushed toward the river to refresh them¬ 
selves, to make sure that they were not the sport of some 
delusive mirage, to take a nearer view, and to touch, if they 
could have done so, those gunboats whose assistance was 
to put an end to their dangers and sufferings; and finally, 
to hail the national flag, which, floating gently in the breeze, 
reflected its constellated azure in the waters. To witness 
their eagerness one would have said that the James was to 
them the river of oblivion, to which, the poet tells us, the 
shades repair in crowds in search of sovereign remedy 
against all their sufferings. 

The sight of their comrades under arms, however, mili¬ 
tary honor, the exhortations of the officers who had been 
detailed to reorganize them, soon restored strength to the 
most disheartened, and in a short time improvised com¬ 
panies and battalions, inspired with fresh ardor; might be 
seen falling into line behind the well-trained soldiers of 
Porter. 

To sum up the account, the operations of the 30th had 
secured to the Federals all the advantages which those of 
the 29th had led them to expect. Placed as it were back to 
back and able to support each other mutual, their rear-guard 
on one side, and their centre on the other, had repulsed all 
the attacks of the enemy. Franklin, resting his left upon 
impracticable swamps, had held in check with eighteen 
thousand men an army of more than thirty-six thousand, 
commanded by the redoubtable Jackson, whilst Slocum, ex¬ 
tending his right as far as these same swamps, occupied the 
extremity of the other line, which at Glendale covered the 
roads followed by the entire army. These two lines formed 
thus an acute angle, the vertex of which, posted on the 
southern bank of White Oak Swamp, was protected by this 
insurmountable obstacle, and entirely separated the two 
wings of the assailants. If Jackson had succeeded in push¬ 
ing his way beyond Frazier’s Farm, he would have taken 
the Federal combatants at Glendale in rear and crushed 
them between two fires. If, on the other hand, Hill had 
been able to penetrate as far as the Quaker road, he would 


— 383 — 


Civil War in America 


have cut the Federal army in two and secured the destruc¬ 
tion of one-half that army. 

The battle of Glendale, therefore, was remarkable for 
its fierceness among all those that have drenched the Ameri¬ 
can forests in blood. Nothing could have been more seri¬ 
ous than the game which was played in the clearing only 
the day before, unknown to the staffs of both armies. If 
the number of trophies had constituted the only evidence 
of success, although the Confederates left a few in the 
hands of their opponents, all the advantage would have been 
on their side. They had made many more prisoners than 
they had lost, and in the course of the evening their out¬ 
posts had picked up General McCall, who had lost his way 
in the woods. They had captured eight or ten guns from 
the Federals, while the latter only carried off four flags, 
to which must be added two pieces of artillery which Wise 
had left at Malvern in Porter’s hands. But the Federals 
had reason to consider themselves fortunate in not having 
paid dearer for the results they had obtained by their 
tenacity in that battle; their retreat was thereby assured, 
and the delicate operation of a change of base might be 
considered an accomplished fact. Indeed, by four o’clock 
in the afternoon on the 30th, the last wagons had reached 
Malvern Hill. Before sunset the entire train was encamped 
in the vast clearing at Haxall’s doubled upon itself, and 
protected against all attacks by the position of Malvern Hill, 
while the numerous field and siege guns which had ac¬ 
companied the train were painfully climbing the height 
which they were about to render impregnable. 

All the ambulances were in safety; only about one hun¬ 
dred wagons failed to appear at the muster, to which trifling 
number must be added one cannon abandoned in a quagmire, 
four or five guns lost by McCall at Glendale, and as many 
dismounted pieces which Franklin was obliged to leave at 
Frazier’s Farm. Four thousand wagons, four or five hun¬ 
dred ambulances, three hundred and fifty field-pieces, fifty 
siege guns and two thousand five hundred head of cattle 
had thus followed a single road, a mere woodland path, con¬ 
stantly occupied by troops on the march, or obstructed 


— 384 — 


Glendale and Malvern 


either by infantry or cavalry, amid the din of battle, which 
was heard simultaneously in front, in the rear and on the 
flank, and had travelled a distance of more than thirty kilo¬ 
metres in forty-eight hours. General McClellan had good 
cause to consider such a march as an almost unlooked-for 
success, and the manner in which it was conducted was 
highly creditable to the administrative departments of the 
Federal army. 

Nevertheless, although this army had fortunately es¬ 
caped from a perilous situation, it could not remain in the 
positions which it occupied from Frazier’s Farm to Haxall’s 
Landing. Not only was it necessary that it should be con¬ 
centrated for purposes of defence, provisions and rest, but 
it was also compelled by the configuration of the course of 
the James to leave Haxall’s Landing, and look for a more 
favorable point for revictualling lower down. In fact, the 
James River becomes so narrow above its confluence with 
the Appomattox at City Point, that vessels going up to Hax- 
all’s would have been constantly exposed to the fire of 
batteries erected by the enemy on the right bank of the river; 
consequently, Commodore Rodgers, at his first interview 
with McClellan, had recommended Harrison’s Landing as 
the most favorable point to establish depots for the army. 
It was here, therefore, that its march was to terminate, for 
it could not think of remaining on White Oak Swamp, or even 
at Malvern, receiving its supplies by land from Harrison’s 
Landing; it would have been starved in a very few days. 

Malvern Hill first, then Harrison’s Landing, were there¬ 
fore the two stages in the journey naturally appointed for 
the army of the Potomac. General McClellan had no in¬ 
tention of defending Frazier’s Farm and Glendale, and was 
waiting for the reports of the generals who had just fought 
in those positions, to send them the order to fall back. An 
immediate retreat, however, had become so necessary that 
they took upon themselves to carry it into effect. Frank¬ 
lin, the most distant, began his movement about ten o’clock 
in the evening, having previously notified the headquarters 
of his intention. His neighbors were only apprised of this 
movement by General Seymour, who, while wandering about 


— 385 — 


Civil War in America 


in search of his brigade, from which he had become separ¬ 
ated at the time of his rout at Glendale, accidentlly fell in 
with Franklin's heads of column. There was no longer 
time to ask for instructions from headquarters at Malvern 
Hill. Franklin’s retreat opened the way for Jackson. 
Heintzelman and Sumner prepared at once to carry their 
troops to the borders of the James. In this they only an¬ 
ticipated the orders which McClellan was about to send 
them. The general-in-chief had no reason to blame his 
lieutenants for this great eagerness to fall back, for the 
ignorance in which he remained till evening in regard to 
their situation, and which occasioned the delay in forward¬ 
ing the orders for retreat, could only be attributed to the 
very imperfect organization of the Federal staffs. The 
necessity of providing for the ulterior movements of his 
troops justified his remaining on the gun-boats of Rodgers; 
but his momentary absence had been noticed by soldiers 
who needed encouragement in the midst of a bloody strife, 
and also by lieutenants who were already too much inclined 
to criticism. By not waiting for his tardy instruction, his 
corps commanders rendered the retreat which had become 
inevitable more easy of accomplishment. The night march 
was performed in the best order, and before daybreak the 
Federal army was concentrated around the approaches of 
Malvern Hill. 

This hill afforded an admirable position. Its summit, 
two thousand five hundred metres in length by one thousand 
two hundred in width, formed a level and open plateau. 
Rising gradually from north to south to the ridge of the 
acclivity overlooking the James, it presented great facilities 
for the maneuvering of troops. From north-east to south, 
at the foot of the barren slopes which terminated the de¬ 
scent, its base was enveloped by the Western Run and thick 
underwood. To the west wound one of the tributaries of 
this stream, also surrounded by swampy forests, and quite 
difficult for artillery to cross. The approaches to Malvern 
Hill were only easy between these two water-courses. On 
this side, below the principal hillock, the slopes extended 
gradually across an open country. The Quaker road, after 


— 386 — 


Glendale and Malvern 


joining a crossroad coming from the New Market road, took 
advantage of these slopes to ascend Malvern Hill, leaving 
a small wood and the West house on the left, then forked 
before reaching the summit. The west branch followed the 
western ridge, passing by the Crewe house, thence descend¬ 
ing upon the steep acclivities which look to the south to 
cross the Western Run at Turkey Bridge. Finally, not far 
from this bridge it again connected with the direct road 
from Richmond to Haxall’s, which is a continuation of the 
New Market road, running close to the banks of the James. 
The east branch skirted the eastern side of Malvern Hill, 
and after passing the Binford house descended into the 
woods which overshadow the Western Run, to merge at last 
into the other branch at Haxall’s. 

The last Federal troops reached Malvern on the 1st of 
July at ten o’clock in the morning. Before going on board 
the Galena to make a reconnaissance, McClellan himself 
posted these troops upon the ground, which he had examined 
the day before, giving to their line the form of a vast semi¬ 
circle, which extended from the Crewe house to the Binford 
house, through the wood adjoining the West house. Re¬ 
fusing his extreme right, he had deployed it to the east 
along the Western Run as far as in front of Haxall’s while 
the extreme left was effectively protected by the impassable 
mouth of this stream and by the gun-boats presenting their 
broadside in the James. The army thus guarded all the ap¬ 
proaches to Malvern, bringing its two wings close to the 
banks of the river. It was disposed in the following order, 
reckoning from left to right: At the extreme left, Sykes 
guarded the approaches of the direct road from Richmond 
to Haxall’s, having one brigade posted at the foot of Mal¬ 
vern, near Turkey Bridge, and the other two on the slopes of 
the hill; Morell was on his right, beyond the Crewe house; 
together they formed Porter’s corps. Couch’s division, 
which had been detached from this corps, was placed by 
McClellan immediately after it. It was deployed midway 
between the summit of Malvern Hill and the woods border¬ 
ing its base, its right resting upon a deep and wooded ravine. 
This ravine, which extended almost as far as the West 


— 387 — 


Civil War in America 


house, marked the boundary of what was properly called 
Malvern Hill, separating the Federal left from the centre. 
This centre was formed by Heintzelman’s corps, extending 
from the ravine to the wood of West, the skirt of which he 
occupied; his forces lay across the Quaker road, Kearny on 
the left and Hooker on the right. Between Hooker and the 
Binford house the line was prolonged by Sumner’s corps— 
first Sedgwick, then Richardson, on his right. Farther on, 
the course of Western Run was guarded by the divisions of 
Smith and Slocum, composing Franklin’s corps. Finally, 
the bridge of Carter’s Mill spanning this stream and the ap¬ 
proaches to Haxall’s, where a large number of roads con¬ 
verged, were entrusted to Keyes, with Peck’s division, who 
thus found himself facing eastward, with his back turned 
toward that of Sykes. There was every indication that the 
efforts of the Confederates would be directed against the 
Federal left. In fact, they could only approach the army of 
the Potomac by two roads—that from Richmond to Haxall’s 
and the Quaker road, which, fortunately for the Federals, 
led to that part of their positions easiest to defend. It was 
this side, therefore, that McClellan took particular care to 
fortify. The division of Pennsylvania Reserves, which Mc¬ 
Call had commanded till the battle of Glendale, where he 
was taken prisoner, was placed in rear of Porter. Although 
this small band had been terribly decimated, it was yet 
ready to make a gallant fight. The general-in-chief gave, 
moreover, a powerful reinforcement of artillery to his left 
wing. For the first time since the beginning of the cam¬ 
paign, the ground was admirably adapted to the employ¬ 
ment of this army; and the foresight with which McClel¬ 
lan had organized a reserve of more than one hundred can¬ 
non, the constant care he had shown in attending to its re¬ 
quirements, and the energy he had displayed in preserving 
it intact during the retreat, in spite of its weight and the 
many dangers to which it had been exposed, were at last to 
be abundantly rewarded on this evening of July 1st. The 
reserve batteries were massed on the left and centre of the 
Federal lines under the direction of Colonel Hunt, an officer 
of the highest merit. They were placed wherever a favor- 


— 388 — 


Glendale and Malvern 


able position could be found, and more than sixty pieces were 
so disposed as to cover with their converging tire every 
point of Porter’s line. Finally the heavy siege guns having 
reached Haxall’s, thanks to the unremitting zeal of Colonel 
Tyler, who had left but one behind during the retreat, ten 
of them were hauled up to near the Crewe house, whence 
they could, by firing over the friendly lines, reach the as¬ 
sailants if they should venture upon the slopes of Malvern 
Hill. 

It was evident that the Confederates intended to try 
a last attack upon the army of the Potomac. On the even¬ 
ing of the 30th their situation was much less favorable 
than it had been three days before. The army which they 
thought, after the battle of Gaines’ Mill, they held shut up 
within a network of iron, had escaped them with all its ma¬ 
teriel, leaving in their hands only some wounded men, a few 
thousand prisoners and broken cannon. All their efforts 
to crush it had failed, and it had finally found a position on 
the James whence it could, at the first opportunity, under¬ 
take operations much more dangerous to Richmond than 
those which had been prevented at so great a sacrifice. On 
the other hand, the Confederate army was at the end of its 
resources. Forced marches and counter-marches, only 
interrupted by frequent and bloody combats, had greatly 
attenuated its ranks, and the number of men it was able to 
bring into line before Malvern Hill on the 1st of July was 
much inferior to the force with .which it had commenced its 
movement six days before. The woods were filled with its 
wounded, sick and stragglers. The two corps of Longstreet 
and A. P. Hill had suffered so severely at Glendale, that a 
day’s rest was absolutely indispensable to them, and they 
had to be relieved during the night by those of Huger and 
Magruder. 

The retreat of the Federals, however, had at last en¬ 
abled Lee to bring the two wings of his army together. 
Although this concentration was effected somewhat tardily, 
he could not fail to take advantage of it to attack his ad¬ 
versary, who was equally exhausted, before the latter should 
have time to establish himself in an entrenched position. 


— 389 — 


Civil War in America 


At break of day Jackson crossed the White Oak Swamp, and 
soon reached the battle-field of Glendale. He received an 
order to continue to follow the enemy by the Quaker road, 
while Magruder and Huger were to file to his right by forest 
paths, to gain the road to Haxall’s and come up to attack 
McClellan's left wing. Longstreet and Hill, being held in 
reserve, followed in the rear of Jackson, and came to take 
position on his left, at a considerable distance from the field 
of battle, which they did not leave during the whole day. 
Before crossing the Western Run at the Quaker road fork, 
and appearing in front of the first slopes of Malvern, Jack- 
son left his old division, with two of Ewell's brigades, in the 
woods near Willis' Church, and moved forward with the re¬ 
mainder, Ewell’s third brigade in the centre, Whiting's divi¬ 
sion on the left, and D. H. Hill on the right. The latter, de¬ 
ploying between the road and the' tributary of the Western 
Run, followed the course of this stream by partly extending 
his line into the adjoining woods. Having reached the point 
where this stream connects with the ravine which separated 
McClellan's centre from his left, the Confederate general 
sent, beyond the ravine, Anderson’s brigade, which thus de¬ 
bouched upon the right of Couch’s division, formed by 
Howe’s brigade. It was three o'clock. Whilst the artillery 
of Whiting and Ewell was cannonading the Federal centre, 
Anderson, supported by the fire of two batteries, vigorously 
attacked the Federals, but in vain. Howe had been waiting 
for the Confederates at a short distance. The latter, being 
received by a terrific fire, halted, when a charge of the One 
Hundred and Second Pennsylvania completed their repulse 
on one side, while on the other the Thirty-sixth New York 
carried off the flags of the Fourteenth North Carolina. The 
Lafayette Guards, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Thou- 
ret, fully sustained the reputation they had already acquired 
at Williamsburg and Fair Oaks, and Couch took advantage 
of this success to rectify his line by advancing about eight 
hundred metres. The attack of the Confederates was not 
renewed. Lee had sent an order to his generals to wait un¬ 
til the whole army had got into line before resuming the 
offensive. Armistead’s brigade of Huger’s division was, 


— 390 — 


Glendale and Malvern 


by rushing forward with loud yells, to give the signal for 
a general assault upon the enemy’s positions. 

Meantime, the march of Magruder and Hooker was im¬ 
peded by the woods and swamps they had to cross before 
reaching the position which had been assigned them. Their 
artillery especially could scarcely be dragged along. Through 
some unaccountable neglect on the part of the Confederate 
staff, no map of this region existed in the army; as we have 
already stated, no one had foreseen the possibility that the 
tide of war would flow in that direction. The column there¬ 
fore proceeded somewhat at random. At last two of Huger’s 
brigades emerged from the woods on Anderson’s right. The 
third, Armistead’s, which was to have commenced the at¬ 
tack, followed Magruder. The latter, pushing his heads of 
column forward as fast as the thick underwood which he 
had to clear right and left from his path permitted, arrived 
about four o’clock in front of Porter’s positions, and imme¬ 
diately placed Purcell’s guns in battery, the only field-pieces 
that had been able to follow him. But the Confederate 
artillerists have scarcely shown themselves when they are 
crushed by the fire from Porter’s powerful guns. Despite 
their stubbornness, their pieces are speedily dismounted or 
reduced to silence. Another battery, called the Letcher Ar¬ 
tillery, which has come up to their assistance, has also most 
of its cannoneers killed or wounded in a short space of time. 
Magruder, whom no obstacle can dismay, thinks he can res¬ 
cue this battery by making his soldiers charge some of the 
Federal guns posted nearest to his point of attack. This 
task is entrusted to one regiment, which rushes up bravely 
to the assault within one hundred and fifty metres of the 
enemy’s guns; but the latter reply by such a shower of 
grape that the Confederates recoil in disorder, leaving the 
ground strewn with dead and wounded. A second and a third 
charge, also made by a single regiment at a time, are fol¬ 
lowed by the same result. The fire of the artillery is sup¬ 
ported by the volleys of musketry from Porter’s troops. No 
direct orders, no general command, control the movements 
of the Confederate army. Stuart, carried away first toward 
the White House by the greed for plunder, then into the 


— 391 — 


Civil War in America 


peninsula in the vain hope of overtaking Stoneman, has not 
yet rejoined Lee, and it may be said that with him the 
eyes of the Confederate army are absent. Whiting on the 
left, D. H. Hill in the centre, Magruder and Huger on the 
right, afford each other no mutual support, there being no 
communication between them, nor any instructions from 
Lee to enable them to act in concert. After having given to 
the different corps, as a signal of attack, an indication en¬ 
tirely insufficient, the commander-in-chief of the Confeder¬ 
ate army seems to have ceased to preside over the move¬ 
ments of these corps, which are, as it were, lost in the midst 
of the forest. The Federals, on the contrary, from the 
heights of Malvern Hill, can perceive all these movements at 
a glance, and their central position enables them at all times 
rapidly to mass men and cannon upon the point most men¬ 
aced. Their view extends even so far that McClellan can 
see the columns of Longstreet and A. P. Hill as they pro¬ 
ceed to take position in the rear of the left of Jackson; and 
being anxious about his right flank, which is not so well 
protected by nature, he retains a considerable force there 
for a considerable time. We have seen that Magruder, not 
having all his troops in line, was unwilling to push the bat¬ 
tle to the extreme; but he had sustained useless losses by 
risking a few batteries first, then three regiments one after 
the other. This valiant soldier had been exasperated by 
reproaches which had been cast upon him the day before 
for not having reached Glendale in time, so that he had 
sworn, it is said, to lead his soldiers directly up to the enemy 
the first time he should encounter him, and it is to this 
motive that his bloody attacks, so imprudently renewed, 
must be attributed. 

Meanwhile, the sound of the battle, which was being 
fought on the extreme right of the Confederates, did not 
reach the rest of their line, being intercepted by the density 
of the forest, and undoubtedly also by the wind, which had 
suddenly changed—an unreliable messenger, upon which 
Lee had reposed too much confidence. As we have said, 
Armistead’s brigade, which was to have given the signal 
for the attack, having followed Magruder instead of pro- 


— 392 — 


Glendale and Malvern 


ceeding with the remainder of Huger’s division, found itself 
placed in a portion of the line where it could not longer play 
the important part which had been assigned to it. But 
toward six o’clock D. H. Hill, who had been patiently waiting 
for the signal agreed upon, thought that he had heard it at 
last. He distinctly recognized the sound of sharp musketry 
mingled with hurrahs, and did not wait for anything more 
to put his division in motion. He was probably deceived by 
the distant echo of one of the last partial charges attempted 
by Magruder, the first having been made an hour before. 
Such was the utter want of communications between the 
different generals that Hill remained in ignorance of the 
fact, not only during the whole battle, but even for some 
days after, then he wrote his report, that Magruder had 
really attacked the enemy before himself, and sustained a 
combat much longer than his own. When he put his divi¬ 
sion in motion, believing the whole army to be engaged, his 
neighbors on the right and left, having heard .nothing, re¬ 
mained motionless in their turn; and even after the battle 
had commenced they do not appear to have received any 
order to support him. If we make this assertion with some 
reservation, it is because the Confederate reports, from 
that of the general-in-chief to those of simple colonels, are 
so vague, so confused and contradictory in all that concerns 
the hour, that it is almost impossible to arrive at any posi¬ 
tive conclusion as to the share of responsibility for the check 
resting upon each. However that may be, Hill advanced 
alone against the Federal positions. After Anderson’s first 
attack he had borne toward his right, Lee having indicated 
the enemy’s left as the point upon which all the efforts of 
his army were to be concentrated. He had therefore before 
him Morell’s right, Couch’s division, reinforced by Cald¬ 
well’s brigade, which had been temporarily detached from 
Richardson, and finally the left of Kearny. The woods 
skirting the foot of Malvern Hill had hitherto protected the 
Confederates; but as soon as they passed beyond the edge 
of the forest they were received by a fire from all the bat¬ 
teries at once, some posted on the summit of the hill, others 
ranged midway, close to the Federal infantry. The latter 


— 393 — 


Civil War in America 


joined its musketry fire to the cannonade when Hill’s first 
line had come within range, and threw it back in disorder on 
the reserves. While it was re-forming new battalions 
marched up to the assault in their turn. The remembrance 
of Cold Harbor doubles the energy of Hill’s soldiers. 

They try to pierce the line sometimes at one point, 
sometimes at another, charging Kearny’s left first, and 
Couch’s right, formed by Caldwell’s and Howe’s brigades, 
and afterward throwing themselves upon the left of Couch’s 
division. But here also, after having nearly reached the 
Federal positions, they are repulsed. The conflict is car¬ 
ried on with great fierceness on both sides, and for a mo¬ 
ment it seems as if the Confederates are at last about to 
penetrate the very centre of their adversaries, and of the 
formidable artillery which but now was dealing destruc¬ 
tion in their ranks. But Sumner, who commands on the 
right, seeing no likelihood of any attack on that side, de¬ 
taches Sickles’ and Meagher’s brigades successively to 
Couch’s assistance. During this time Whiting on the left, 
and Huger on the right, suffer Hill’s soldiers to become 
exhausted, without supporting them. Neither Lee nor Jack- 
son has sent the slightest order, and the din of the battle 
which is going on in their immediate vicinity has not sufficed 
to make them march against the enemy. Jackson, however, 
feels at last the necessity of reinforcing Hill and aiding 
him in the desperate attack he has undertaken. Taking 
upon himself the management of the battle on this side, 
and directing in person those bloody but fruitless assaults, 
he calls up in great haste from Willis’ church his reserve, 
consisting of his old division and that of Ewell. But these 
troops are far off; and notwithstanding their alacrity, they 
cannot arrive until after sunset. At seven o’clock Hill re¬ 
organized the debris of his troops in the woods. He had 
no longer the means for essaying a new attack; his tenacity 
and the courage of his soldiers have only had the effect 
of causing him to sustain heavy losses. 

He complained bitterly of having been sacrificed and 
abandoned by his colleagues; yet he had not been so en¬ 
tirely isolated as he imagined, for more to the right Ma- 


— 394 — 


Glendale and Malvern 


gruder had been engaged at the same time as himself, and 
under circumstances equally unfavorable, in a struggle 
which was to have an issue not less fatal. Recognizing the 
uselessness of his former attacks, he has ceased fighting in 
order to wait for the arrival of his artillery, which he left 
behind during his march a few hours before, and to which 
he sends orders to sacrifice everything in order to join him 
in time. He depends upon the fire of his rifled guns, about 
thirty in number, to silence the batteries which protect 
Porter’s line, and to enable him to charge at the point of 
the bayonet. But it is near six o’clock. Day declines, and 
the artillery does not arrive. Perhaps the fiery Magruder 
has also heard the distant sound of the battle in which Hill 
was then engaged. Without waiting for his cannon any 
longer, he orders his fine division to attack the formidable 
positions occupied by the Federals. He points out to them 
as the aim of their efforts the Crewe house, around which 
a large portion of McClellan’s reserve artillery is con¬ 
centrated. This is, in fact, the key to the whole position. 
Before they can reach the Federal lines which cover it, the 
assailants have to cross six hundred metres of a rather 
steep slope, which does not afford the least shelter. Ma- 
gruder’s first brigade has scarcely appeared in sight when 
it is exposed to a terrible artillery fire. Still the Confed¬ 
erates continue to advance; but the Federal infantry, which 
has been waiting for them within a short distance without 
firing, receives them with a murderous discharge, and taking 
advantage of the confusion thrown into their ranks to as¬ 
sume the offensive, drives them back upon the slopes which 
they have ascended with so much difficulty. Magruder, 
not considering himself beaten, brings all his brigades 
successively into action, and Huger rouses himself at last 
from his long inaction to participate in the battle. But 
the Confederate generals, by dividing their efforts, have 
lost all chances of success. A charge en masse of one or two 
entire divisions could alone have compensated for their in¬ 
ferior artillery, and while it would have involved the sacri¬ 
fice of fewer men than they had lost in detail, they might 
perhaps have thus succeeded in reaching and surrounding 


— 395 — 


Civil War in America 


the Federal batteries. As soon as Porter understands the 
tactics of his opponent he husbands his resources. His in¬ 
fantry and artillery consume an enormous quantity of am¬ 
munition, but their losses are insignificant, for the enemy 
has never been able to make a stand sufficiently near them 
to engage in a regular musketry fight. Each time that an 
attacking column stops to fire it is immediately driven 
back. Whenever one of his regiments or one of his bat¬ 
teries has exhausted its ammunition, Porter replaces them 
with others, sending the former to the second line to fill 
their cartridge-boxes or their caissons. In this manner 
he keeps up the fight, exposing only a portion of his troops, 
and keeping the remainder massed in case the enemy should 
attempt a general assault with all his forces. 

It is already near seven o’clock. Magruder, Huger, 
and D. H. Hill—that is to say, the whole Confederate right 
—have successively taken part in the struggle. But Whit¬ 
ing remains inactive, and limits himself to the exchange 
of a few cannon-shots with the enemy from a distance; 
Ewell and Jackson’s old division cannot arrive on time; 
Magruder’s artillery has not made its appearance, nor have 
Longstreet and A. P. Hill been brought forward. Even 
where the battle is raging with the greatest violence, Lee, 
as we have seen, has not succeeded in preserving concert 
of action. The attacks are made by each general indi¬ 
vidually, without any understanding with his neighbors; 
consequently, they have all the same issue. More than 
once the Federal lines seemed on the point of being charged 
and broken, so great is the impetuosity of the assailants; 
but at the last moment, the latter are always checked and 
compelled to redescend those fatal slopes, already covered 
with the dead bodies of their comrades. The last rays of 
the setting sun, gilding the tree-tops and the smoky heights 
of Malvern light up this bloody scene. In the centre D. H. 
Hill has given up the contest, but Magruder, loth to resign 
himself to this cruel reverse, persists in continuing the 
fight. It is only toward nine o’clock that the booming of 
cannon gradually dies away along the entire line, and the 


— 396 — 


Glendale and Malvern 

silence of the night succeeds at last, unbroken, to the noise 
of battle. 

This time the Confederates had experienced a defeat un¬ 
mitigated by any compensation. The great effort they have 
made to repair the errors committed on the preceding days 
had signally failed. Their divisions, exhausted and dimin¬ 
ished by six days’ marching and fighting, had been led to 
the assault of formidable positions without order or unity 
of action, and had paid dearly for the confidence of their 
generals—a confidence which, since the victory of Gaines’ 
Mill, had become positive presumption. Their losses were 
enormous and out of all proportion to those they had in¬ 
flicted upon their adversaries. So useless a sacrifice of life 
troubled and discouraged them. Magi^uder’s corps was 
partially destroyed; those of D. H. Hill and Huger had 
suffered cruelly; those of Longstreet and A. P. Hill had 
not yet recovered from the effects of the battle of Glendale. 
The troops of Whiting, Ewell and Jackson would no doubt 
have been in a condition to renew the contest on the follow¬ 
ing day, but the struggle was virtually at an end. It was 
one of those facts which impress themselves upon the 
strongest minds. Up to this time the Confederate army 
had labored under the conviction that the capitulation of 
McClellan and all his troops would be the inevitable result 
of the campaign. The soldier, unable to judge of the com¬ 
bined movements of the Federals, had seen nothing but 
success in all his encounters with them, and believed that 
as great advantages had been obtained at Frazier’s Farm 
and Glendale as at Gaines’ Mill; consequently, when on the 
evening of the 1st of July he found himself repulsed at all 
points by those very men whom he had supposed to be in 
full flight, discouragement took the place of the assurance 
which until then had imparted so much strength. The men 
still fit for service set themselves to numbering those present 
and those that were absent—the killed, the wounded, the 
sick and the stragglers; the latter were in frightful num¬ 
bers. If Lee had desired at this moment to lead his army 
once more to the charge, he would not have been followed. 
He had to remain contented with the results obtained—re- 


397 — 


Civil War in America 


suits, indeed, of sufficient importance to satisfy any rational 
mind that had not been lulled into illusions. Lee could 
show, as substantial evidences of his success, fifty pieces of 
cannon—most of them damaged, it is true—which his sol¬ 
diers had captured at the point of the bayonet or picked up 
on the field of battle, a considerable number of wagons, a 
large number of muskets, accoutrements of every descrip¬ 
tion, provisions, tents, ammunition, together with six thou¬ 
sand prisoners, one-half of them wounded, and among them 
several generals. In a strategic point of view, the results 
were still more considerable. McClellan, who may be said 
to have been laying siege to Richmond, had been violently 
interrupted in that siege, conquered in open field, and com¬ 
pelled to undertake a perilous retreat in order to find a new 
base of operations at a much greater distance from the 
aim of all his efforts. He had sustained considerable losses, 
for the material which the enemy had taken from him was 
nothing compared with what he himself had been obliged 
to destroy. The wounded who had followed the army were 
far more numerous than those who had remained behind. 
No one as yet counted the dead, who might be reckoned at 
many thousands. Finally, the thought that a campaign, 
undertaken with so much perseverance had ended in a dis¬ 
aster, depressed the courage of every one, from the general- 
in-chief to the simple soldier. 

The Federals, however, had achieved on the borders 
of the James the victory which had been denied them on 
the Chickahominy. If the first part of this short but san¬ 
guinary campaign was illustrated by the battle of Gaines' 
Mill, the second was by that of Malvern Hill. The enemy, 
therefore, could not compel them to fall back farther. But 
the motives which had decided McClellan to select a posi¬ 
tion below City Point for his army still existed; the vicinity 
of the right bank would always have rendered it difficult to 
provision Malvern Hill. The general-in-chief, therefore, 
adhered to the order issued before the battle, directing the 
evacuation of this position during the night of the 1st and 
2d of July. The place he had designated as the quarters 
for the army near his new base was Harrison's Landing, 


— 398 — 


Glendale and Malvern 

formerly the property of President Harrison, situated twelve 
kilometres lower down in a direct line. Whilst the convoy, 
which had resumed its march since the evening of the 30th, 
was approaching the Harrison plantation by roads which, 
at times, had to be cleared with the axe, and was fast cover¬ 
ing all the spaces surrounding the improvised wharves along 
the river, the greater part of the army was slowly falling 
back by way of Haxall’s. Porter, who was the last to leave, 
covering its march with a regiment of cavalry and the bri¬ 
gade of regulars, only reached this point on the morning 
of the 2d. At Haxall’s he passed Peck’s division, which, 
after having prepared the road to Harrison, formed the 
rear-guard of the whole army, under the chief command of 
General Keyes, who had several regiments of cavalry to 
protect this march. The heat of the preceding days had 
been followed by torrents of rain; and if it proved an ob¬ 
stacle to the pursuit which the Confederates might have 
wished to attempt, it also impeded the movement of the 
wagons. Nevertheless, they continued their course over 
two roads without any difficulty, before the enemy was able 
to disturb them; and when he finally made his appearance, 
he no longer found anything to pick up on the track of the 
Federals. He did not venture to attack them, while Stuart, 
who had followed Keyes with several batteries of horse 
artillery, contented himself with sending after him a few 
harmless cannon-shots. 

The army of the Potomac was to find at Harrison’s 
Landing the repose it absolutely needed. The retreat from 
Malvern Hill was effected without any trouble; but precise¬ 
ly, perhaps, because they were no longer stimulated by the 
presence of the enemy, the soldiers gave way more rapidly 
to physical exhaustion than before. This last night march, 
following so many other fatigues, transcended the powers 
of endurance of most of them; when the columns, more and 
more stretched out and reduced, reached the encampments 
which had been assigned to them, Nature asserted her rights, 
and the need of rest overcame every other consideration. 
Fortunately, but few troops were required to cover the 
position which was naturally very strong. The army was 


— 399 — 


Civil War in America 


massed between the James and a deep marshy water-course 
called Herring Creek. The approaches to the peninsula, 
thus formed by the river and the stream, were speedily 
protected by a considerable abatis and field-works. A fleet 
of transports soon came to cast anchor in front of the army, 
and a few hours later the wagons were carrying rations 
to all the divisions of the army. The functions of the 
quartermaster’s department, under the superintendence of 
Colonel Ingalls, were admirably performed. The army was 
soon rested and organized; the sight of a few reinforcements 
sent from Fortress Monroe had produced the best effect 
upon the spirits of the soldiers, whose imagination magni¬ 
fied their number. The stragglers had all rejoined their 
regiments, so that an estimate could be formed of the num¬ 
ber present. The army of the Potomac, reunited before 
Richmond June 20th, had an effective force of one hundred 
and four thousand seven hundred and twenty-four men fit 
for service, and eleven thousand two hundred and eighty- 
nine sick or unable to perform any kind of service. On 
reaching Harrison’s Landing there were scarcely fifty thou¬ 
sand men in the ranks, but on the 4th of July, when the 
corps commanders made their reports, it was found that 
the net losses of the army since the 20th of June amounted 
to fifteen thousand two hundred and forty-nine men, of 
whom one thousand five hundred and eighty-two had been 
killed, seven thousand seven hundred wounded, and five 
thousand nine hundred and fifty-eight missing. This last 
figure comprised, besides prisoners, all the soldiers who 
had been left behind on the field of battle, whose fate, 
whether killed or wounded, could not be ascertained; to this 
number may be added, without exaggeration, six thousand 
sick or lame who had gone to the hospital in consequence 
of the excessive fatigues of the preceding days. McClellan 
therefore found himself with about eighty-four thousand 
men under arms, not counting those who had just joined him. 

The losses of Lee’s army during the seven days 
amounted to twenty thousand men, to which number must 
be added at least five thousand rendered unfit for active 
service by the same causes ‘which had operated with his 


- 400 — 


Glendale and Malvern 


adversaries; this army, therefore, had undergone a diminu¬ 
tion of twenty-five thousand men.* This was more than 
one-fourth of its effective force on the 26th of June. 

An interlude was to follow this great struggle. While 
McClellan was fortifying himself at Harrison’s Landing, 
Lee, hampered like himself by the difficulty of subsisting 
his army, was obliged to fall back as far as the environs 
of Richmond. Both sides were gathering their troops to¬ 
gether while waiting for a favorable opportunity to renew 
the contest. In the estimation of those who did not allow 
themselves to be troubled by foolish alarms and were not 
blinded by party prejudices, McClellan’s situation was far 
from bad. The material losses he had sustained could be 
easily repaired. The great danger the army had incurred 
had excited an extraordinary sensation in the North, which 
resulted in numerous enlistments; the government felt at 
last that it could no longer haggle about reinforcements; 
the soldiers had been trained by their trials, and their chief 
had displayed qualities which justified the confidence re¬ 
posed in him. Planted on the James, McClellan could, either 
by ascending this river or by seizing upon Petersburg, 
strike much deadlier blows at Richmond than when his 
army lay across the Chickahominy, far from any water 
communication. 

Such was the position of the two armies about the 7th 
of July. On this day the steamer coming from Fortress 
Monroe landed a passenger at Harrison’s Landing, whose 
dress, as simple as his manners, did not at first attract any 
attention, but in whom people soon recognized President 
Lincoln. He had come to consult with the commander of 
the army of the Potomac about the measures to be adopted 
under those grave circumstances. 

But before we begin the narrative of the new cam¬ 
paign which was preparing in Virginia, we must retrace 
our steps to relate the events of which the valley of the 
Mississippi had been the theatre during the spring of 1862. 

*See the tabular figures of effective strength in Note B, Appen¬ 
dix to this volume. [Omitted— Ed.] 

******* 


— 401 — 





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EXTRACTS 


FROM 

BATTLES AND LEADERS 
OF THE 
CIVIL WAR 


VOLUME II 


NEW YORK 
The Century Company 


Copyright , 1887 
By the Century Company 















































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I 


The Peninsular Campaign 

By George B. McClellan, 

Major-General , U.S.A. 

In the following pages I purpose to give a brief sketch of 
the Peninsular Campaign of 1862. As it is impossible, with¬ 
in the limits available, to describe even the most important 
battles, I shall confine myself to strategical considerations. 
But even this requires a rapid review of the circumstances 
under which, from a small assemblage of unorganized citi¬ 
zens, utterly ignorant of war and almost of the use of arms, 
was evolved that mightly Army of the Potomac, which, un¬ 
shaken alike in victory and defeat, during a long series 
of arduous campaigns against an army most ably commanded 
and the equal in heroism of any that ever met the shock of 
battle, proved itself worthy to bear on its bayonets the 
honor and fate of the nation. 

******* 

On my arrival at Fort Monroe on the 2d of April, I 
found five divisions of infantry, Sykes’ brigade of regulars, 
two regiments of cavalry, and a portion of the reserve ar¬ 
tillery disembarked. Another cavalry regiment and a part 
of a fourth had arrived, but were still on shipboard; com¬ 
paratively few wagons had come. On the same day came a 
telegram stating that the Department of Virginia was with¬ 
drawn from my control, and forbidding me to form the divi¬ 
sion of ten thousand men without General Wool’s sanction. 
I was thus deprived of the command of the base operations, 
and the ultimate strength of the army was reduced to 135,- 
000—another serious departure from the plan of campaign. 
Of the troops disembarked, only four divisions, the regulars, 
the majority of the reserve artillery, and a part of the cav¬ 
alry, could be moved, in consequence of the lack of transpor¬ 
tation. Casey’s division was unable to leave Newport News 
until the 16th, from the impossibility of supplying it with 
wagons. 


- 405 - 


Battles and Leaders of the Civil War 


The best information obtainable represented the Con¬ 
federate troops around Yorktown as numbering at least 
fifteen thousand, with about an equal force at Norfolk; and 
it was clear that the army lately at Manassas, now mostly 
near Gordonsville, was in position to be thrown promptly to 
the Peninsula. It was represented that Yorktown was sur¬ 
rounded by strong earth-works, and that the Warwick River, 
instead of stretching across the Peninsula to Yorktown,—as 
proved to be the case,—came down to Lee's Mills from the 
North, running parallel with and not crossing the road from 
Newport to Williamsburg. It was also known that there 
were intrenched positions of more or less strength at 
Young’s Mills, on the Newport News road, and at Big Bethel, 
Howard’s Bridge, and Ship’s Point, on or near the Hampton 
and Yorktown road, and at Williamsburg (see map, p. 188). 

On my arrival at Fort Monroe, I learned, in an interview 
with Flag-Officer Goldsborough, that he could not protect the 
James as a line of supply and that he could furnish no ves¬ 
sels to take an active part in the reduction of the batteries 
at York and Gloucester or to run by and gain their rear. 
He could only aid in the final attack after our land batteries 
had essentially silenced their fire. 

I thus found myself with 53,000 men in condition to 
move, faced by the conditions of the problem just stated. 
Information was received that Yorktown was already 
being reenforced from Norfolk and it was apprehended 
that the main Confederate army would promptly follow the 
same course. I therefore determined to move at once with 
the force in hand, and endeavor to seize a point—near the 
Halfway House—between Yorktown and Williamsburg, 
where the Peninsula is reduced to a narrow neck, and thus 
cut off the retreat of the Yorktown garrison and prevent the 
arrival of reenforcements. The advance commenced on the 
morning of the 4th of April, and was arranged to turn suc¬ 
cessively the intrenchments on the two roads; the result 
being that, on the afternoon of the 5th, the Third Corps was 
engaged with the enemy’s outposts in front of Yorktown 
and under the artillery fire of the place. The Fourth Corps 
came upon Lee’s Mills and found it covered by the unfordable 


— 406 — 


The Peninsula Campaign 

line of the Warwick, and reported the position so strong as 
to render it impossible to execute its orders to assault. Thus 
all things were brought to a stand-still, and the intended 
movement on the Halfway House could not be carried out. 
Just at this moment came a telegram, dated the 4th, inform¬ 
ing me that the First Corps was withdrawn from my com¬ 
mand. Thus, when too deeply committed to recede, I found 
that another reduction of about 43,000, including several 
cavalry regiments withheld from me, diminished my paper 
force to 92,000, instead of the 155,000 on which the plans of 
of the campaign had been founded, and with which it was 
intended to operate. The number of men left behind, sick 
and from other causes incident to such a movement, re¬ 
duced the total for duty to some 85,000, from which must be 
deducted all camp, depot, and train guards, escorts, and non- 
combatants, such as cooks, servants, orderlies, and extra¬ 
duty men in the various staff-departments, which reduced 
the numbers actually available for battle to some 67,000 or 
68 , 000 . 

The order withdrawing the First Corps also broke up 
the Department of the Potomac, forming out of it the De¬ 
partment of the Shenandoah, under General Banks, and the 
Department of the Rappahannock, under General McDowell, 
the latter including Washington. I thus lost all control of 
the depots at Washington, as I had already been deprived of 
the control of the base at Fort Monroe and of the ground 
subsequently occupied by the depot at White House. The 
only territory remaining under my command was the paltry 
triangle between the departments of the Rappahannock and 
Virginia; even that was yet to be won from the enemy. I 
was thus relieved from the duty of providing for the safety 
of Washington, and deprived of all control over the troops 
in that vicinity. Instead of one directing head controlling 
operations which should have been inseparable, the region 
from the Alleghanies to the sea was parceled out among 
four independent commanders. 

On the 3d of April, at the very moment of all others 
when it was most necessary to push recruiting most vigor¬ 
ously, to make good the inevitable losses in battle and by 


— 407 — 


Battles and Leaders of the Civil War 


disease, an order was issued from the War Department dis¬ 
continuing all recruiting for the volunteers and breaking 
up all their recruiting stations. Instead of a regular and 
permanent system of recruiting, whether by voluntary en¬ 
listment or by draft, a spasmodic system of large drafts 
was thereafter resorted to, and, to a great extent, the sys¬ 
tem of forming new regiments. The results were wasteful 
and pernicious. There were enough, or nearly enough, or¬ 
ganizations in the field, and these should have been con¬ 
stantly maintained at the full strength by a regular and 
constant influx of recruits, who, by association with their 
veteran comrades, would soon have become efficient. The 
new regiments required much time to become useful, and 
endured very heavy and unnecessary losses from disease and 
in battle owing to the inexperience of the officers and men. 
A course more in accordance with the best-established mili¬ 
tary principles and the uniform experience of war would 
have saved the country millions' of treasure and thousands 
of valuable lives. 

Then, on the 5th of April, I found myself with 53,000 
men in hand, giving less than 42,000 for battle, after de¬ 
ducting extra-duty men and other non-combatants. In our 
front was an intrenched line, apparently too strong for as¬ 
sault, and which I had now no means of turning, either by 
land or water. I now learned that 85,000 would be the max¬ 
imum force at my disposal giving only some 67,000 for bat¬ 
tle. Of the three divisions yet to join, Casey’s reached the 
front only on the 17th, Richardson’s on the 16th, and Hook¬ 
er’s commenced arriving at Ship Point on the 10th. What¬ 
ever may have been said afterward, no one at the time—so 
far as my knowledge extended—thought an assault prac¬ 
ticable without certain preliminary siege operations. At 
all events, my personal experience in this kind of work was 
greater than that of any officer under my command; and 
after personal reconnaissances more appropriate to a lieu¬ 
tenant of engineers than to the commanding general, I could 
neither discover nor hear of any point where an assault 
promised any chance of success. We were thus obliged to 
resort to siege operations in order to silence the enemy’s ar- 


— 408 — 


The Peninsula Campaign 

tillery fire, and open the way to an assault. All the batter¬ 
ies would have been ready to open fire on the 5th, or, at 
latest, on the morning of the 6th of May, and it was deter¬ 
mined to assault at various points the moment the heavy 
batteries had performed their allotted task; the navy was 
prepared to participate in the attack as soon as the main 
batteries were silenced; the Galena, under that most gal¬ 
lant and able officer, John Rodgers, was to take part in the 
attack, and would undoubtedly have run the batteries at 
the earliest possible moment; but during the night of the 
3d and 4th of May the enemy evacuated his positions, re¬ 
garding them as untenable under the impending storm of 
heavy projectiles. 

Meanwhile, on the 22d of April, Franklin’s division of 
McDowell’s corps had joined me by water, in consequence 
of my urgent calls for reenforcements. 

The moment the evacuation of Yorktown was known, 
the order was given for the advance of all the disposable 
cavalry and horse batteries, supported by infantry divisions, 
and every possible effort was made to expedite the movement 
of a column by water upon West Point, to force the evacua¬ 
tion of the lines at Williamsburg, and, if possible, cut off a 
portion of the enemy’s force and trains. 

The heavy storms which had prevailed recommenced on 
the afternoon of the 4th, and not only impeded the advance 
of troops by land, but delayed the movement by water so 
much that it was not until the morning of the 7th that the 
leading division—Franklin’s—disembarked near West Point 
and took up a suitable position to hold its own and cover 
the landing of reenforcements. This division was attacked 
not long after it landed, but easily repulsed the enemy. 

Meanwhile the enemy’s rear-guard held the Williams¬ 
burg lines against our advance, except where Hancock broke 
through, until the night of the 5th, when they retired. 

The army was now divided: a part at the mouth of the 
Pamunkey, a part at Williamsburg, and a part at Yorktown 
prepared to ascend the York River. The problem was to 
reunite them without giving the enemy the opportunity of 
striking either fraction with his whole force. This was ac- 


— 409 — 


Battles and Leaders of the Civil War 


complished on the 10th, when all the divisions were in com¬ 
munication, and the movement of concentration continued 
as rapidly as circumstances permitted, so that on the 15th 
the headquarters and the divisions of Franklin, Porter, 
Sykes, and Smith reached Cumberland Landing; Couch and 
Casey being near New Kent Court House, Hooker and 
Kearny near Roper's Church, and Richardson and Sedgwick 
near Eltham. On the 15th and 16th, in the face of dreadful 
weather and terrible roads, the divisions of Franklin, Porter, 
and Smith were advanced to White House, and a depot estab¬ 
lished. On the 18th the Fifth and Sixth Corps were formed, 
so that the organization of the Army of the Potomac was 
now as follows: Second Corps, Sumner—Divisions, Sedg¬ 
wick and Richardson; Third Corps, Heintzelman—Divi¬ 
sions, Kearny and Hooker; Fourth Corps, Keyes—Divisions, 
Couch and Casey; Fifth Corps, F. J. Porter—Divisions, 
Morell and Sykes and the Reserve Artillery; Sixth Corps, 
Franklin—Divisions, Smith and Slocum. 

The cavalry organization remained unchanged, and we 
were sadly deficient in that important arm, as many of the 
regiments belonging to the Army of the Potomac were 
among those which had been retained near Washington. 

The question now arose as to the line of operations to 
be followed: that of the James on the one hand, and, on the 
other, the line from White House as a base, crossing the 
upper Chickahominy. 

The army was admirably placed for adopting either, and 
my decision was to take that of the James, operating on 
either bank as might prove advisable, but always preferring 
the southern. I had urgently asked for reenforcements to 
come by water, as they would thus be equally available for 
either line of operations. The destruction of the Merrimac 
on the 11th of May had opened the James River to us, and it 
was only after that date that it became available. My plan, 
however, was changed by orders from Washington. A tele¬ 
gram of the 18th from the Secretary of War informed me 
that McDowell would advance from Fredericksburg, and di¬ 
rected me to extend the right of the Army of the Potomac to 
the north of Richmond, in order to establish communications 


— 410 — 


The Peninsula Campaign 

with him. The same order required me to supply his troops 
from our depots at White House. Herein lay the failure 
of the campaign, as it necessitated the division of the 
army by the Chickahominy, and caused great delay in con¬ 
structing practicable bridges across that stream; while if 
I had been able to cross to the James, reenforcements would 
have reached me by water rapidly and safely, the army 
would have been united and in no danger of having its flank 
turned, or its line of supply interrupted, and the attack could 
have been much more rapidly pushed. 

I now proceeded to do all in my power to insure success 
on the new line of operations thus imposed upon me. On 
the 20th of May our light troops reached Chickahominy at 
Bottom’s Bridge, which they found destroyed. I at once 
ordered Casey’s division to ford the stream and occupy the 
heights beyond, thus securing a lodgment on the right bank. 
Heintzelman was moved up in support of Keyes. By the 
24th, Mechanicsville was carried, so that the enemy was now 
all together on the other side of the river. Sumner was 
near the railroad, on the left bank of the stream; Porter 
and Franklin were on the same bank near Mechanicsville. 

It is now time to give a brief description of the Chicka¬ 
hominy. This river rises some fifteen miles north-westward 
of Richmond, and unites with the James about forty miles 
below that city. Our operations were on the part between 
Meadow and Bottom’s bridges, covering the approaches to 
Richmond from the east. Here the river at its ordinary 
stage is some forty feet wide, fringed with a dense growth 
of heavy forest-trees, and bordered by low marshy lands, 
varying from half a mile^to a mile in width. Within the 
limits above mentioned the firm ground, above high-water 
mark, seldom approached the river on either bank, and in no 
place did the high ground come near the stream on both 
banks. It was subject to frequent, sudden, and great varia¬ 
tions in the volume of water, and a single violent storm of 
brief duration sufficed to cause an overflow of the bottom¬ 
lands for many days rendering the river absolutely impass¬ 
able without long and strong bridges. When we reached the 
river it was found that all the bridges, except that at 


— 411 — 


Battles and Leaders of the Civil War 


Mechanicsville, and Meadow bridges, was bordered by high 
bluffs, affording the enemy commanding positions for his 
batteries, enfilading the approaches, and preventing the re¬ 
building of important bridges. We were thus obliged to 
select other less exposed points for our crossings. Should 
Dowell effect the promised junction, we could turn the head¬ 
waters of the Chickahominy, and attack Richmond 
from the north and north-west, still preserving our line of 
supply from White House. But with the force actually avail¬ 
able such an attempt would expose the army to the loss of its 
communications and to destruction in detail; for we had an 
able and savage antagonist, prompt to take advantage of any 
error on our part. The country furnished no supplies, so 
that we could not afford a separation from our depots. All 
the information obtained showed that Richmond was in¬ 
trenched, that the enemy occupied in force all the approaches 
from the east, that he intended to dispute every step of our 
advance, and that his army was numerically superior. Early 
on the 24th of May I received a telegram from the President, 
informing me that McDowell would certainly march on the 
26th, suggesting that I should detach a force to the right 
to cut off the retreat of the Confederate force in front of 
Fredericksburg, and desiring me to march cautiously and 
safely. On the same day another dispatch came, inform¬ 
ing me that, in consequence of Stonewall Jackson’s advance 
down the Shenandoah, the movement of McDowell was sus¬ 
pended. Next day the President again telegraphed that 
the movement against General Banks seemed so general 
and connected as to show that the enemy could not intend 
a very desperate defense of Richmond; that he thought the 
time was near when I “must either attack Richmond or give 
up the job, and come back to the defense of Washington.” 
I replied that all my information agreed that the mass of 
the enemy was still in the immediate vicinity of Richmond, 
ready to defend it, and that the object of Jackson’s move¬ 
ment was probably to prevent reenforcements being sent 
to me. On the 26th General Stoneman, with my advanced 
guard, cut the Virginia Central Railroad in three places. 
On the same day I learned that a very considerable force 


— 412 — 


The Peninsula Campaign 

of the enemy was in the vicinity of Hanover Court House, 
to our right and rear, threatening our communications, 
and in position to reenforce Jackson or oppose McDowell, 
whose advance was then eight miles south of Fredericks¬ 
burg. I ordered General F. J. Porter to move next morning 
to dislodge them. He took with him his own old division, 
Warren’s provisional brigade and Emory’s cavalry brigade. 
His operations in the vicinity of Hanover Court House were 
entirely successful, and resulted in completely clearing our 
flank, cutting the railroads in several places, destroying 
bridges, inflicting a severe loss upon the enemy, and fully 
opening the way for the advance of McDowell’s corps. As 
there was no indication of its immediate approach, and the 
position at Hanover Court House was too much exposed to 
be permanently held, General Porter’s command was with¬ 
drawn on the evening of the 29th, and returned to its old 
position with the main army. The campaign had taken its 
present position in consequence of the assurance that I 
should be joined by McDowell’s corps. As it was now clear 
that I could not count with certainty upon that force, I had 
to do the best I could with the means at hand. 

The first necessity was to establish secure communica¬ 
tions between the two parts of the army, necessarily separ¬ 
ated by the Chickahominy. Richmond could be attacked 
only by troops on the right bank. As the expectation of 
the advance of McDowell was still held out, and that only 
by the land route, I could not yet transfer the base to the 
James, but was obliged to retain it on the Pamunkey, and 
therefore to keep on the left bank a force sufficient to protect 
our communications and cover the junction of McDowell. 
It was still permissible to believe that sufficient attention 
would be paid to the simplest principle of war to push Mc¬ 
Dowell rapidly on Jackson’s heels, when he made his in¬ 
evitable return march to join the main Confederate army 
and attack our right flank. The failure of McDowell to 
reach me at or before the critical moment was due to the 
orders he received from Washington. The bridges over the 
Chickahominy first built were swept away by the floods, and 
it became necessary to construct others more solid and with 


— 413 — 


Battles and Leaders of the Civil War 


long log approaches, a slow and difficult task, generally 
carried on by men working in the water and under fire. The 
work was pushed as rapidly as possible, and on the 30th 
of May the corps of Heintzelman and Keyes were on the 
right bank of the Chickahominy, the most advanced positions 
being somewhat strengthened by intrenchments; Sumner's 
corps was on the left bank, some six miles above Bottom’s 
Bridge; Porter’s and Franklin’s corps were on the left bank 
opposite the enemy’s left. During the day and night of the 
30th torrents of rain fell, inundating the whole country and 
threatening the destruction of our bridges. 

Well aware of our difficulties, our active enemy, on the 
31st of May, made a violent attack upon Casey’s division, 
followed by an equally formidable one on Couch, thus com¬ 
mencing the battle of Fair Oaks or Seven Pines. Heintzel¬ 
man came up in support, and during the afternoon Sumner 
crossed the river with great difficulty, and rendered such 
efficient service that the enemy was checked. In the morn¬ 
ing his renewed attacks were easily repulsed, and the ground 
occupied at the beginning of the battle was more than re¬ 
covered ; he had failed in the purpose of the attack. The 
ground was now so thoroughly soaked by the rain, and the 
bridges were so much injured, that it was impracticable to 
pursue the enemy or to move either Porter or Franklin to 
the support of the other corps on the south bank. Our 
efforts were at once concentrated upon the restoration of the 
old and the building of new bridges. 

On the 1st of June the Department of Virginia, includ¬ 
ing Fort Monroe, was placed under my command. On the 
2d the Secretary telegraphed that as soon as Jackson was 
disposed of in the Shenandoah, another large body of troops 
would be at my service; on the 5th, that he intended send¬ 
ing a part of General McDowell’s force as soon as it could 
return from Front Royal (in the Shenandoah Valley, near 
Manassas Gap, and about one hundred and fifteen miles 
north-west of Richmond), probably as many as I wanted; 
on the 11th, that McCall’s force had embarked to join me 
on the day preceding, and that it was intended to send the 
residue of General McDowell’s force to join me as speedily 


— 414 — 


The Peninsula Campaign 

as possible, and that it was clear that a strong force was 
operating with Jackson for the purpose of preventing the 
forces there from joining me. 

On the 26th the Secretary telegraphed that the forces 
of McDowell, Banks, and Fremont would be consolidated 
as the Army of Virginia, and would operate promptly in 
my aid by land. 

Fortunately for the Army of the Potomac, however, 
I entertained serious doubts of the aid promised by the land 
route, so that, on the 18th, I ordered a number of transports 
with supplies of all kinds, to be sent up the James, under 
convoy of the gun-boats, so that I might be free to cut loose 
from the Pamunkey and move over to the James, should 
circumstances enable me or render it desirable to do so. 

The battle of Fair Oaks was followed by storms of 
great severity, continuing until the 20th of June, and adding 
vastly to the difficulties of our position, greatly retarding 
the construction of the bridges and of the defensive works 
regarded as necessary to cover us in the event of a repulse, 
and making the ground too difficult for the free movements 
of troops. 

On the 19th Franklin’s corps was transferred to the 
south side of the Chickahominy, Porter’s corps, reenforced 
by McCall’s division (which with a few additional regiments, 
had arrived on the 12th and 13th), being left alone on the 
north side. 

This dangerous distribution was necessary in order to 
concentrate sufficient force on the south side to attack Rich¬ 
mond with any hope of success; and, as I was still told that 
McDowell would arrive by the overland route, I could not 
yet change the base to the James. 

It was not until the 25th that the condition of the 
ground and the completion of the bridges and intrenchments 
left me free to attack. On that day the first step was taken, 
in throwing forward the left of our picket-line in face of a 
strong opposition, to gain ground enough to enable Sumner 
and Heintzelman to support the attack to be made next 
day by Franklin on the rear of Old Tavern. The successful 
issue of this attack would, it was supposed, drive the enemy 


— 415 — 


Battles and Leaders of the Civil War 


from his positions on the heights overlooking Meehanics- 
ville, and probably enable us to force him back into his 
main line of works. We would then be in position to recon- 
noiter the lines carefully, determine the points of attack, 
and take up a new base and line of supply if expedient. 

During the night of the 24th, information arrived con¬ 
firming the anticipation that Jackson was moving to attack 
our right and rear, but I persisted in the operation intended 
for the 25th, partly to develop the strength of the enemy 
opposite our left and center, and with the design of attack¬ 
ing Old Tavern on the 26th, if Jackson’s advance was so 
much delayed that Porter’s corps would not be endangered. 

Late in the afternoon of the 25th, Jackson’s advance 
was confirmed, and it was rendered probable that he would 
attack next day. All hope of the advance of McDowell’s 
corps in season to be of any service had disappeared; the 
dangerous position of the army had been faithfully held to 
the last moment. After deducting the garrisons in rear, 
the railroad guards, non-combatants, and extra-duty men, 
there were not more than 75,000 men for battle. The enemy, 
with a force larger than this, the strong defenses of Rich¬ 
mond close at hand in his rear, was free, to strike on either 
flank. I decided then to carry into effect the long-considered 
plan of abandoning the Pamunkey and taking up the line 
of the James. 

The necessary orders were given for the defense of the 
depots at the White House to the last moment and its final 
destruction and abandonment; it was also ordered that all 
possible stores should be pushed to the front while com¬ 
munications were open. 

The ground to the James had already been reconnoitered 
with reference to this movement. 

During the night of the 26th Porter’s siege-guns and 
wagon-trains were brought over to the south side of the 
Chickahominy. During the afternoon of that day his corps 
had been attacked in its position on Beaver Dam Creek, near 
Mechanicsville, and the enemy repulsed with heavy losses 
on their part. It was now clear that Jackson’s corps had 
taken little or no part in this attack, and that his blow would 


— 416 — 


The Peninsula Campaign 

fall farther to the rear. I therefore ordered the Fifth Corps 
to fall back and take position nearer the bridges, where 
the flanks would be more secure. This was skillfully effected 
early on the 27th, and it was decided that this corps should 
hold its position until night. All the corps commanders on 
the south side were on the 26th directed to be prepared to 
send as many troops as they could spare in support of Porter 
on the next day. All of them thought the enemy so strong 
in their respective, fronts as to require all their force to 
hold their positions.* 

Shortly after noon on the 27th the attack commenced 
upon Porter's corps, in his new position near Gaines's Mill, 
and the contest continued all day with great vigor. 

The movements of the enemy were so threatening at 
many points on our center and left as to indicate the pres¬ 
ence of large numbers of troops, and for a long time created 
great uncertainty as to the real point of his main attack. 
General Porter's first call for reenforcement and a supply 
of axes failed to reach me; but, upon receiving a second call, 
I ordered Slocum's division to cross to his support. The 
head of the division reached the field at 3:30 and immedi¬ 
ately went into action. At about 5 P.M. General Porter 
reported his position as critical, and the brigades of French 


*Soon after the appearance of General McClellan’s article the 
following letter was received from the daughter of General Heintzel- 
man: 

“In ‘The Century’ for May, 1885, General McClellan has an article, 
‘The Peninsular Campaign,’ in which there are one or two misstate¬ 
ments in regards to the Third Corps, commanded by General Heintzel- 
man. Fortunately my father’s papers, which are in my possession, 
contain replies to both allegations,—one in the handwriting of 
General Heintzelman’s adjutant-general, and the other the rough 
draft of a letter addressed to General Lorenzo Thomas, then Adjutant- 
General of the Army. General McClellan says (see above) : 

“ ‘All the corps commanders on the south side were on the 26th 
directed to be prepared to send as many troops as they could spare 
in support of Porter on the next day. All of them thought the enemy 
so strong in their respective fronts as to require all their force to 
hold their positions.’ 

“Upon the demand for troops General Heintzelman replied as 
follows: 

“ ‘Headquarters Third Corps, 

“‘4 p.m., June 26, 1862. 

“ ‘General Marcy, Chief of Staff: I think I can hold the intrench- 
ments with four brigades for twenty-four hours; that would leave 


— 417 — 



Battles and Leaders of the Civil War 


and Meagher—of Richardson’s division—were ordered to 
reenforce him, although the fearless commander of the 
Second Corps, General Sumner, thought it hazardous to 
remove them from his own threatened front. I then 
ordered the reserve of Heintzelman to move in support of 
Sumner, and a brigade of Keyes’ corps to headquarters for 
such as might be required. Smith’s division, left alone 
when Slocum crossed to the aid of Porter, was so seriously 
threatened that I called on Sumner’s corps to send a brigade 
to its support. 

French and Meagher reached the field before dusk, just 
after Porter’s corps had been forced by superior numbers 
to fall back to an interior position nearer the bridges, and, 
by their steady attitude, checked all further progress of 
the enemy and completed the attainment of the purpose in 
view, which was to hold the left bank of the river until dark, 
so that the movement to the James might be safely com¬ 
menced. The siege-guns, material, and trains on the left 
bank were all safe, and the right wing was in close con¬ 
nection with the rest of the army. The losses were heavy, 
but the object justified them, or rather made them neces¬ 
sary. At about 6 o’clock next morning the rear-guard of 


two (2) brigades available for service on the other side of the river, 
but the men are so tired and worn out that I fear they would not 
be in a condition to fight after making a march of any distance . . . 

“ ‘S. P. Heintzelman, 

“ ‘ Brigadier-General .’ 

“This is far from being a statement that all his forces were 
required to hold his own lines. 

“General McClellan says (see p. 183) : 

“ ‘Meanwhile, through a misunderstanding of his orders, and 
being convinced that the troops of Sumner and Franklin at Savage’s 
Station were ample for the purpose in view, Heintzelman withdrew 
his troops during the afternoon, crossed the swamp at Brackett’s 
ford, and reached the Charles City road with the rear of his column 
at 10 P.M.’ 

“When the same statement was first made in 1863, General 
Heintzelman wrote the following letter: 

“ ‘Headquarters, Defenses of Washington, 

“‘April 11th, 1863. 

“ ‘General L. Thomas , Adjutant-General , U.S.A., Washington. 

“‘General: I find in the “New York Tribune ” of the 8th of 
April a “Preliminary Report of the Operations of the Army of the 


— 418 ’— 



The Peninsula Campaign 

regulars crossed to the south side and the bridges were 
destroyed. 

I now bent all my energies to the transfer of the army 
to the James, fully realizing the very delicate nature of a 
flank march, with heavy trains, by a single road, in face of 
an active enemy, but confident that I had the army well 
in hand and that it would not fail me in the emergency. 
I thought that the enemy would not anticipate that move¬ 
ment, but would assume that all my efforts would be directed 
to cover and regain the old depots; and the event proved 
the correctness of this supposition. It seemed certain that 
I could gain one or two days for the movement of the trains, 
while he remained uncertain as to my intentions, and that 
was all I required with such troops as those of the Army 
of the Potomac. 

During the night of the 27th, I assembled the corps 
commanders at headquarters, informed them of my inten¬ 
tions, and gave them their orders. Keyes’ corps was ordered 
to move at once, with its trains, across White Oak Swamp, 
and occupy positions on the farther side, to cover the pas¬ 
sage of the remainder of the army. By noon of the 28th 
this first step was accomplished. During the 28th Sumner, 


Potomac, since June 25th, 1862,” made by General G. B. McClellan . . . 

“ ‘In a paragraph commencing “On the 28th Porter’s corps was 
also moved across the White Oak Swamp,” etc., is the following: 

“ ‘They were ordered to hold this position until dark, then to 
fall back across the swamp and rejoin the rest of the army. This 
order was not fully carried out, nor was the exact position I 
designated occupied by the different divisions concerned.’ 

“ ‘I was furnished with a map marked in red with the positions 
we should occupy. 

“ ‘As I had the fortified lines thrown up some time before by 
the troops in my command, I had no difficulty in knowing where to 
go, and I did occupy these lines. General Sumner’s were moi^e indefi¬ 
nite, and he occupied a position in advance of the one designated. 
This left a space of half a mile unoccupied between his right and 
Franklin’s left. In the morning I was informed that some rebels 
were already at or near Dr. Trent’s house, where General McClellan’s 
headquarters had been; I sent and found this to be the case. General 
Franklin had also called at my headquarters and told me that the 
enemy were repairing the bridges of the Chickahominy, and would 
soon cross in force. About 1 p.m. I saw some of our troops filing 
into the fields between Dr. Trent’s house and Savage’s Station, and 
a few moments later Generals Franklin and W. F. Smith came to 
me and reported the enemy approaching, and urged me to ride to 


— 419 — 



Battles and Leaders of the Civil War 


Heintzelman, and Franklin held essentially their old posi¬ 
tions ; the trains converged steadily to the White Oak Swamp 
and crossed as rapidly as possible, and during this day and 
the succeeding night Porter followed the movement of Keyes’ 
corps and took position to support it. 

Early on the 28th, when Franklin’s corps was drawing 
in its right to take a more concentrated position, the enemy 
opened a sharp artillery fire and made at one point a spirited 
attack with two Georgia regiments, which were repulsed 
by the two regiments on picket. 

Sumner’s and Heintzelman’s corps and Smith’s division 
of Franklin’s were now ordered to abandon their intrench- 
ments, so as to occupy, on the morning of the 29th, a new 
position in rear, shorter than the old and covering the 
crossing of the swamp. This new line could easily be held 
during the day, and these troops were ordered to remain 
there until dark, to cover the withdrawal of the rest of the 
trains, and then cross the swamp and occupy the positions 
about to be abandoned by Keyes’ and Porter’s corps. Mean¬ 
while Slocum’s division had been ordered to Savage’s Sta¬ 
tion in reserve, and, during the morning, was ordered across 
the swamp to relieve Keyes’ corps. This was a critical 


General Sumner and get him to fall back and close this gap. I rode 
briskly to the front, and on the Williamsburg road, where it passed 
between my two divisions, met General Sumner’s troops falling back. 
He wished me to turn back with him to arrange for ulterior operations, 
but as my right flank was entirely uncovered by these movements, 
I declined until after I had seen my division commanders and given 
them orders how to fall back. On my return there was some difficulty 
in finding General Sumner, and when found he informed me he had 
made his arrangements. I returned to my command, and on the way 
found the ground filled with troops, more than could be used to 
any advantage, and if the enemy planted a few batteries of artillery 
on the opposite side of the railroad, they would have been cut in 
pieces. 

“ ‘An aide to General McClellan having reported to me the day 
before to point out to me a road across the White Oak Swamp, open¬ 
ing from the left flank of my position of the fortified lines, I did not 
hesitate to retreat by that road, and left at 3 P.M. General Smith, 
of Franklin’s corps, having spnt to the rear all his batteries earlier 
in the day, I, at his request, let him have two of mine (Osborn’s and 
Bramhall’s), and they did good service that afternoon in checking and 
defeating the rebel attack. 

“ ‘My remaining would have been no aid to General Sumner, 
as he already had more troops than he could defile through the narrow 
road in his rear, and the road I took covered his left flank. 


— 420 — 



The Peninsula Campaign 

day; for the crossing of the swamp by the trains must be 
accomplished before its close, and their protection against 
attack from Richmond must be assured, as well as communi¬ 
cation with the gun-boats. 

A sharp cavalry skirmish on the Quaker road indicated 
that the enemy was alive to our movement, and might at 
any moment strike in force to intercept the march to the 
James. The difficulty was not at all with the movement 
of the troops, but with the immense trains that were to be 
moved virtually by a single road, and required the whole 
army for their protection. With the exception of the cavalry 
affair on the Quaker road, we were not troubled during 
this day south of the swamp, but there was severe fighting 
north of it. Sumner’s corps evacuated their works at day¬ 
light and fell back to Allen’s farm, nearly two miles west 
of Savage’s Station, Heintzelman being on their left. Here 
Sumner was furiously attacked three times, but each time 
drove the enemy back with much loss. 

Soon afterward Franklin, having only one division with 
him, ascertained that the enemy had repaired some of the 
Chickahominy bridges and was advancing on Savage’s Sta¬ 
tion, whereupon he posted his division at that point and in¬ 
formed Sumner, who moved his corps to the same place, ar¬ 
riving a little after noon. About 4 P.M. Sumner and Frank- 


“ ‘Before dark the advance of my corps was across the swamp, 
and by 10 P.M. the rear was over, with but little molestation from the 
enemy. I immediately sought General McClellan, and reported to 
him what I had done, and this is the first intimation I have had that 
my conduct was not entirely satisfactory. 

“ ‘To hold my position till dark, by which time I was to receive 
orders, would have been impossible. After Generals Franklin and 
Sumner had fallen back, my right flank and rear were uncovered 
and by a road which passed entirely in my rear; and beyond my right 
flank my only line of retreat would have been cut off, and I would 
have lost my entire corps. I did not know where General McClellan 
was, and it was, therefore, impossible to report to him for orders. 

“ ‘When General Birney reached Fisher’s Ford, the enemy were 
there, but not in force; they soon arrived in force, and he had to take 
another road more to our left. Had we been a little later they would 
have been in possession, and our retreat by this road cut off. 

“ ‘S. P. Heintzelman.’ 

“I trust that you will be able to find space for these letters.— 
Mary L. Heintzelman.” 

— Editors . 


—421 — 



Battles and Leaders of the Civil War 

lin—three divisions in all—were sharply attacked, mainly by 
the Williamsburg road; the fighting continued until between 
8 and 9 P.M., the enemy being at all times thoroughly re¬ 
pulsed, and finally driven from the field. 

Meanwhile, through a misunderstanding of his orders, 
and being convinced that the troops of Sumner and Frank¬ 
lin at Savage’s Station were ample for the purpose in view, 
Heintzelman withdrew his troops during the afternoon, 
crossed the swamp at Brackett’s ford, and reached the 
Charles City road with the rear of his column at 10 P. M. 

Slocum reached the position of Keyes’ corps early in 
the afternoon, and, as soon as the latter was thus relieved, 
it was ordered forward to the James, near Malvern Hill, 
which it reached with all its artillery and trains early on 
the 30th. Porter was ordered to follow this movement and 
prolong the line of Keyes’ corps to our right. The trains 
were pushed on in rear of these corps and massed under 
cover of the gun-boats as fast as they reached the James, 
at Haxall’s plantation. As soon as the fighting ceased with 
the final repulse of the enemy, Sumner and Franklin were 
ordered to cross the swamp; this was effected during the 
night, the rear-guard crossing and destroying the bridge 
at 5 A.M. on the 30th. All the troops and trains were now 
between the swamp and the James, and the first critical 
episode of the movement was successfully accomplished. 

The various corps were next pushed forward to estab¬ 
lish connection with Keyes and Porter, and hold the different 
roads by which the enemy could advance from Richmond 
and strike our line of march. I determined to hold the 
positions now taken until the trains had all reached a place 
of safety, and then concentrate the army near the James, 
where it could enjoy a brief rest after the fatiguing battles 
and marches through which it was passing, and then renew 
the advance on Richmond. 

General Franklin, with Smith’s division of his own 
corps, Richardson’s of the Second, and Naglee’s brigade 
were charged with the defense of the White Oak Swamp 
crossing. Slocum held the ground thence to the Gharles 
City road; Kearny from that road to the Long Bridge 


— 422 — 


The Peninsula Campaign 

road; McCall on his left; Hooker thence to the Quaker road; 
Sedgwick at Nelson’s farm, in rear of McCall and Kearny. 
The Fifth Corps was at Malvern Hill, the Fourth at Turkey 
Bridge. The trains moved on during this day, and at 4 P.M. 
the last reached Malvern Hill and kept on to HaxalFs, so 
that the most difficult part of the task was accomplished, 
and it only remained for the troops to hold their ground 
until nightfall, and then continue the march to the positions 
selected near Malvern Hill. 

The fighting on this day (June 30th) was very severe, 
and extended along the whole line. It first broke out between 
12 and 1, on General Franklin’s command, in the shape of 
a fierce artillery fire, which was kept up through the day 
and inflicted serious losses. The enemy’s infantry made 
several attempts to cross near the old bridge and below, 
but was in every case thrown back. Franklin held his posi¬ 
tion until after dark, and during the night fell back to 
Malvern. At half-past 2 Slocum’s left was attacked in 
vain on the Charles City road. At about 3 McCall was 
attacked, and, after 5 o’clock, under the pressure of heavy 
masses, he was forced back; but Hooker came up from the 
left, and Sedgwick from the rear, and the two together not 
only stopped the enemy, but drove him off the field. 

At about 4 p.m. heavy attacks commenced on Kearny’s 
left, and three ineffectual assaults were made. The firing 
continued until after dark. About midnight Sumner’s and 
Heintzelman’s corps and McCall’s division withdrew from 
the positions they had so gallantly held, and commenced their 
march to Malvern, which they reached unmolested soon 
after daybreak. Just after the rear of the trains reached 
Malvern, about 4 p. M., the enemy attacked Porter’s troops, 
but were promptly shaken off. 

Thus, on the morning of July 1st, the army was concen¬ 
trated at Malvern, with the trains at Haxall’s, in rear. The 
supplies which had been sent from White House on the 18th 
were at hand in the James. 

After consultation with Commodore Rodgers, I decided 
that Harrison’s Landing was a better position for the rest¬ 
ing-place of the army, because the channel passed so close 


— 423 — 


Battles and Leaders of the Civil War 


to City Point as to enable the enemy to prevent the passage 
of transports if we remained at Malvern. It was, however, 
necessary to accept battle where we were, in order to give 
ample time for the trains to reach Harrison’s, as well as 
to give the enemy a blow that would check his further pur¬ 
suit. 

Accordingly, the army was carefully posted on the 
admirable position of Malvern Hill, with the right thrown 
back below Haxall’s. The left was the natural point of 
attack, and there the troops were massed and the reserve 
artillery placed, while full preparations were made to frus¬ 
trate any attempt to turn our right. Early in the forenoon 
the army was concentrated and ready for battle, in a posi¬ 
tion of unusual strength—one which, with such troops as 
held it, could justly be regarded as impregnable. It was, 
then, with perfect confidence that I awaited the impending 
battle. 

The enemy began feeling the position between 9 and 
10 A.M., and at 3 p.m. made a sharp attack upon Couch’s 
division, which remained lying on the ground until the 
enemy were within close range, when they rose and delivered 
a volley which shattered and drove back their assailants 
in disorder. At 4 p.m. the firing ceased for a while, and 
the lull was availed of to rectify the position and make 
every preparation for the approaching renewal of the attack. 
It came at 6 p.m., opened by the fire of all their artillery 
and followed by desperate charges of infantry advancing 
at a run. They were always repulsed with the infliction of 
fearful loss, and in several instances our infantry awaited 
their approach within a few yards, poured in a single vol¬ 
ley, and then dashed forward with the bayonet. At 7 P.M. 
the enemy was accumulating fresh troops, and the brigades 
of Meagher and Sickles were sent from Sumner’s and Heint- 
zelman’s corps to reenforce Porter and Couch; fresh bat¬ 
teries were moved forward from the reserve artillery and 
the ammunition was replenished. 

The enemy then repeated his attacks in the most des¬ 
perate style until dark, but the battle ended with his com¬ 
plete repulse, with very heavy losses, and without his even 


— 424 — 


The Peninsula Campaign 

for one moment gaining a foothold in our position. His 
frightful losses were in vain. I doubt whether, in the an¬ 
nals of war, there was ever a more persistent and gallant 
attack, or a more cool and effective resistance. 

Although the result of this bloody battle was a com¬ 
plete victory on our part, it was necessary, for the reasons 
already given, to continue the movement to Harrison’s, 
whither the trains had been pushed during the night of the 
30th of June and the day of the 1st of July. Immediately 
after the final repulse the orders were given for the with¬ 
drawal of the army. The movement was covered by Keyes’ 
corps. So complete was the enemy’s discomfiture, and so 
excellent the conduct of the rear-guard, that the last of the 
trains reached Harrison’s after dark on the 3d, without loss 
and unmolested by the enemy. 

This movement was now successfully accomplished, and 
the Army of the Potomac was at last in a position on its true 
line of operations, with its trains intact, no guns lost save 
those taken in battle, when the artillerists had proved their 
heroism and devotion by standing to their guns until the 
enemy’s infantry were in the midst of them. 

During the “Seven Days” the Army of the Potomac 
consisted of 143 regiments of infantry, 55 batteries, and less 
than 8 regiments of cavalry, all told. The opposing Con¬ 
federate army consisted of 187 regiments of infantry, 79 
batteries, and 14 regiments of cavalry. The losses of the 
two armies from June 25th to July 2d were:* 


*Tables (to follow) of the “Opposing Forces” of the “Seven 
Days,” made from the fullest revised data of the War Records office, 
will show that the Army of the Potomac consisted of 150 regiments 
of infantry; 2 regiments and 1 battalion of engineers; 1 regiment of 
heavy or siege artillery; 58 batteries; and 10 regiments of cavalry. 
The Confederate forces consisted of 173 regiments and 12 battalions 
of infantry; 71 batteries; and 12 regiments of cavalry. General 
McClellan correctly estimates the Union loss, but the Confederate loss, 
according to the revised returns, was: killed, 3286; wounded, 
15,909; missing, 940, Total, 20,135.— Editors. 


Killed 

Wounded 

Missing 

Total 

2,823 

13,703 

3,223 

19,749 

1,734 

8,062 

6,053 

15,849 

—425— 





Confederate Army __ 
Army of the Potomac 





Battles and Leaders of the Civil War 


The Confederate losses in killed and wounded alone 
were greater than the total losses of the Army of the Poto¬ 
mac in killed, wounded, and missing. 

No praise can be too great for the officers and men who 
passed through these seven days of battle, enduring fatigue 
without a murmur, successfully meeting and repelling every 
attack made upon them, always in the right place at the 
right time, and emerging from the fiery ordeal a compact 
army of veterans, equal to any task that brave and disci¬ 
plined men can be called upon to undertake. They needed 
now only a few days of well-earned repose, a renewal of 
ammunition and supplies, and reenforcements to fill the 
gaps made in their ranks by so many desperate encounters, 
to be prepared to advance again, with entire confidence, to 
meet their worthy antagonists in other battles. It was, 
however, decided by the authorities at Washington against 
my earnest remonstrances, to abandon the position on the 
James, and the campaign. The Army of the Potomac was 
accordingly withdrawn, and it was not until two years later 
that it again found itself under its last commander at sub¬ 
stantially the same point on the banks of the James. It was 
as evident in 1862 as in 1865 that there was the true defense 
of Washington, and that it was on the banks of the James 
that the fate of the Union was to be decided. 


ARTILLERY DATA—WAR OF THE REBELLION 

Prepared by 

Colonel Conrad H. Lanza, 

Field Artillery 


Artillery Data 


•epjBA 

aSuejt 

mnunxej\[ 

5000 

4400 

6700 

5000 

4500 

8453 

4272 

1950 

2000 

? 

•sqj aSajaAB 
airpafoax i 
jo 

10 

19 

29 

29 

40 

80 

150 

250 

300 

1080 

saqoui 

aaqiiBD 

2.90 

3.67 

4.20 

4.20 

4.62 

6.40 

8.00 

10.00 

13.00 

•xoadde -sqj 
saaaqo japMUj 

1 

2 

3.25 

3.25 

10 

16 

25 

15 

•xoaddB ’sqi 
aamjjBo puB un2 
jo jqSPM 

890 

1750 

4200 

3550 

4000 

9700 

16500 

26000 

22500 

•saqoui 
•un3 
jo q^Suoq 

70 

70 

120 

97 

130 

136 

? 

30( ?) 

ojog qjoouxs 

SuipuodsoaaoQ 

3 pounder 
(bronze) 

6 pounder 
(bronze) 

9 pounder 
(bronze) 

9 pounder 
(bronze) 

12 pounder 
Napoleon 
(bronze) 

32 pounder 
(cast iron) 

8 inch 
(cast iron) 

10 inch 

(cast iron) 

13 inch 
(cast iron) 

20 inch 

(cast iron) 

•(uoat ^qgnojM) 
(noaaBd) poyiH 
ooaij jo 3dAx 

10 pounder 

20 pounder 

30 pounder (Army) 

30 pounder (Navy) 

32 pounder 

O 

c. 100 pounder 

0>’> > ’ 

200 pounder 

300 pounder 

a j , *. (, 

i. .— c- -:- L 


— 427 ^ 


(cast iron) 





















II 


Yorktown and Williamsburg 

Recollections of a Private —III 

By Warren Lee Goss 


It was with open-eyed wonder that, as part of McClel¬ 
lan’s army, we arrived at Old Point Comfort and gazed upon 
Fort Monroe, huge and frowning. Negroes were every¬ 
where, and went about their work with an air of impor¬ 
tance born of their new-found freedom. These were the 
“contrabands” for whom General Butler had recently in¬ 
vented that sobriquet. We pitched our tents amid the 
charred and blackened ruins of what had been the beautiful 
and aristocratic village of Hampton. The first thing I 
noticed about the ruins, unaccustomed as I was to Southern 
architecture was the absence of cellars. The only building 
left standing of all the village was the massive old Episco¬ 
pal church. Here Washington had worshipped, and its 
broad aisles had echoed to the footsteps of armed men dur¬ 
ing the Revolution. In the church-yard the tombs had been 
broken open. Many tombstones showed that some one with 
a greater desire for possessing curiosities than reverence 
for ancient landmarks had been digging for the corner¬ 
stone and its buried mementos. 

Along the shore which looks toward Fort Monroe were 
landed artillery, baggage-wagons, pontoon trains and boats, 
and the level land back of this was crowded with the tents 
of the soldiers. Here and there were groups of men frying 
hard-tack and bacon. Near at hand was the irrepressible 
army mule, hitched to and eating out of pontoon boats; 
those who had eaten their ration of grain and hay were 
trying with their teeth, with promise of success, in eating 
the boats. An army mule was hungrier than a soldier, and 
would eat anything, especially a pontoon boat or a rubber 
blanket. The scene was a busy one. The red cap, white 


— 428 — 



Yorktown and Williamsburg 

leggins, and baggy trousers of the Zouaves mingled with 
the blue uniforms and dark trimmings of the regular in¬ 
fantry-men, the short jackets and yellow trimmings of the 
cavalry, the red stripes of the artillery, and the dark blue 
with orange trimmings of the engineers; together with the 
ragged, many-colored costumes of the black laborers and 
teamsters, all busy at something. 

One morning we broke camp and went marching up 
the peninsula. The roads were very poor and muddy with 
recent rains, and were crowded with the indescribable ma¬ 
terial of the vast army which was slowly creeping through 
the mud over the flat, wooded country. It was a bright day in 
April—a perfect Virginia day; the grass was green beneath 
our feet, the buds of the trees were just unrolling into 
leaves under the warming sun of spring, and in the woods 
the birds were singing. The march was at first orderly, 
but under the unaccustomed burden of heavy equipments 
and knapsacks, and the warmth of the weather, the men 
straggled along the roads mingling with the baggage-wag¬ 
ons, ambulances, and pontoon trains, in seeming confusion. 

During our second day’s march, it rained, and the 
muddy roads, cut up and kneaded, as it were, by the teams 
preceding us, left them in a state of semi-liquid filth hardly 
possible to describe or imagine. When we arrived at Big 
Bethel the rain was coming down in sheets. A dozen houses 
of very ordinary character, scattered over an area of a third 
of a mile, constituted what was called the village. Just 
outside and west of the town was an insignificant building 
from which the place takes its name. It did not seem 
large enough or of sufficient consequence to give name to 
a hamlet, as small as Big Bethel. Before our arrival it 
had evidently been occupied as officers’ barracks for the 
enemy, and looked very little like a church. 

After leaving Big Bethel we began to feel the weight 
of our knapsacks. Castaway overcoats, blankets, parade- 
coats, and shoes were scattered along the route in reckless 
profusion, being dropped by the overloaded soldiers, as if 
after plowing the roads with heavy teams they were sowing 
them for a harvest. I lightened my knapsack without much 


— 429 — 


Battles and Leaders of the Civil War 


regret, for I could not see the wisdom of carrying a blanket 
or overcoat when I could pick one up almost anywhere along 
the march. Very likely, the same philosophy actuated those 
who preceded me or came after. The colored people 
along our route occupied themselves in picking up this 
scattered property. They had on their faces a distrustful 
look, as if uncertain of the tenure of their harvest. The 
march up the peninsula seemed very slow yet it was impos¬ 
sible to increase our speed, owing to the bad condition of 
the roads. I learned in time that marching on paper and 
the actual march made two very different impressions. I 
can easily understand and excuse our fireside heroes, who 
fought their or our battles at home over comfortable break¬ 
fast-tables, without impediments of any kind to circum¬ 
scribe their fancied operations; it is so much easier to man¬ 
euver and fight large armies around the corner grocery, 
than to fight, march, and maneuver, in mud and rain, in 
the face of a brave and vigilant enemy. 

The baggage-trains were a notable spectacle. To each 
baggage wagon were attached four or six mules, driven 
usually by a colored man, with only one rein, or line, and 
that line attached to the bit of the near leading mule, while 
the driver rode in a saddle upon the near wheel mule. Each 
train was accompanied by a guard, and while the guard 
urged the drivers the drivers urged the mules. The drivers 
were usually expert, and understood well the wayward, 
sportive natures of the creatures over whose destinies they 
presided. On our way to Yorktown our pontoon and bag¬ 
gage trains were sometimes blocked for miles, and the 
heaviest trains were often unloaded by the guard to facili¬ 
tate their removal from the mud. It did seem at times as 
if there were needless delays with the trains, partly due, 
no doubt, to fear of danger ahead. 

On the afternoon of April 5th, 1862, the advance of 
our column was brought to a standstill, with the right in 
front of Yorktown, and the left by the enemy’s works at 
Lee’s mille (see page 188). We pitched our camp on Worm- 
ley Creek, near the Moore house, on the York River, in 
sight of the enemy’s water-battery and their defensive 


- 430 — 


Yorktown and Williamsburg 

works at Gloucester Point. One of the impediments in an 
immediate attack on Yorktown was the difficulty of using 
light artillery in the muddy fields in our front, and at that 
time the topography of the country ahead was but little 
understood, and had to be learned by reconnaissance in 
force. We had settled down to the siege of Yorktown; 
began bridging the streams between us and the enemy, 
constructing and improving the roads for the rapid transit 
of supplies, and for the advance. The first parallel was 
opened about a mile from the enemy’s fortifications, extend¬ 
ing along the entire front of their works, which reached 
from the York River on the left to Warwick Creek on the 
right, along a line about four miles in length. Fourteen 
batteries and three redoubts were planted, heavily armed 
with ordnance. 

We were near Battery No. 1, not far from the York 
River. On it were mounted several 200-pounder guns, 
which commanded the enemy’s water-batteries. One day 
I was in a redoubt on the left, and saw General McClellan 
with the Prince de Joinville, examining the enemy’s works 
through their field-glasses. They very soon drew the fire 
of the observant enemy, who opened with one of their heavy 
guns on the group, sending the first shot howling and hiss¬ 
ing over and very close to their heads; another, quickly 
following, it, struck in the parapet of the redoubt. The 
French prince, seemingly quite startled, jumped and glanced 
nervously around, while McClellan quietly knocked the ashes 
from his cigar. 

Several of our war-vessels made their appearance in 
the York River, and occasionly threw a shot at the enemy’s 
works; but most of them were kept busy at Hampton Roads, 
watching for the iron-clad Merrimac, which was still afloat. 
The firing from the enemy’s lines was of little consequence, 
not amounting to over ten or twelve shots each day, a num¬ 
ber of these being directed at the huge balloon which went 
up daily on a tour of inspection, from near General Fitz 
John Porter’s headquarters. One day the balloon broke from 
its mooring of ropes and sailed majestically over the enemy’s 
works; but fortunately for its occupants it soon met a 


— 431 — 


Battles and Leaders of the Civil War 


counter-current of air which returned it safe to our lines. 
The month of April was a dreary one, much of the time 
rainy and uncomfortable. It was a common expectation 
among us that we were about to end the rebellion. One of 
my comrades wrote home to his father that we should 
probably finish up the war in season for him to be at home 
to teach the village school the following winter; in fact, 
I believe he partly engaged to teach it. Another wrote to 
his mother: “We have got them hemmed in on every side, 
and the only reason they don’t run is because they can’t.” 
We had at last corduroyed every road and bridged every 
creek; our guns and mortars were in position; Battery No. 
1 had actually opened on the enemy’s works, Saturday, May 
3d, 1862, and it was expected that our whole line would 
open on them in the morning. About 2 o’clock of Saturday 
night, or rather of Sunday morning, while on guard duty, 
I observed a bright illumination, as if a fire had broken out 
within the enemy’s lines. Several guns were fired from 
their works during the early morning hours, but soon after 
daylight of May 6th, it was reported that they had aban¬ 
doned their works in our front, and we very quickly found 
the report to be true. As soon as I was relieved from guard 
duty, I went over on “French leave” to view our enemy’s 
fortifications. They were prodigiously strong. A few tumble- 
down tents and houses and seventy pieces of heavy ord¬ 
nance had been abandoned as the price of the enemy’s safe 
retreat. 

As soon as it was known that the Confederates had 
abandoned the works at Yorktown, the commanding general 
sent the cavalry and horse artillery under Stoneman in pur¬ 
suit to harass the retreating column. The infantry divi¬ 
sions of Smith (Fourth Corps) and Hooker (Third Corps) 
were sent forward by two roads to support the right column. 
General Sumner (the officer second in rank in the Army of 
the Potomac) was directed to proceed to the front and as¬ 
sume command until McClellan’s arrival. Stoneman over¬ 
took Johnston’s rear-guard about noon, six miles from 
Williamsburg, and skirmished with the cavalry of Stuart, 
following sharply until 4 o’clock, when he was confronted 


— 432 — 


Yorktown and Williamsburg 

by a line of redoubts before Williamsburg. The works 
consisted of a large fort (Magruder) at the junction of two 
roads running from Yorktown to Williamsburg, and small 
redoubts on each side of this, making an irregular chain 
of fortifications extending, with the creeks upon which they 
rested on either flank, across the peninsula. The Confed¬ 
erate brigades of Kershaw and Semmes, of Magruder’s com¬ 
mand, occupied the works when Stoneman came in front 
of them, and, on finding his advance stubbornly opposed, 
Stoneman sent his cavalry upon reconnaissances over the 
field, and waited for the infantry under Hooker and Smith 
to come to his support. These divisions marched from 
Yorktown on parallel roads until Smith’s column was 
halted by a burning bridge, and compelled to turn into the 
road by which Hooker was advancing. Sumner accom¬ 
panied Smith’s column, and, immediately on the arrival 
before Williamsburg, formed the brigades of Hancock and 
Brooks for an advance through a piece of woods which 
screened the Confederate rifle-pits. The result is given in 
Sumner’s official report as follows: 

“After entering the woods I found the underbrush much 
thicker than I expected, and the lines became entangled, and 
shortly afterward it became so dark it was impossible to 
advance, and I ordered the troops to halt and lie on their 
arms.” 

General Hooker was delayed on, the road so long that 
he did not reach the field until early on the morning of May 
5th, when he found himself on the left of Smith’s division, 
and in front of Fort Magruder. The position of the Union 
troops then was: Smith on the right, Hooker on the left, 
confronting the enemy’s works, the latter having the heavi¬ 
est obstacle before him, and the divisions of Kearney, Casey 
and Couch struggling on toward the front, over crowded, 
muddy roads. General Sumner says in his report: 

“I had a careful reconnaissance made on the left of 
the enemy’s works on the morning of the 5th, and found 
two of their forts unoccupied. I immediately ordered Gen¬ 
eral Hancock to advance with a brigade and ten pieces of 


— 433 — 


Battles and Leaders of the Civil War 

artillery, and hold those works, it being my intention to 
force their left.” 

This was about 11 a.m. Meantime, at 7:30 A.M., Gen¬ 
eral Hooker, on his own responsibility, had advanced his 
lines. In his official report he says: 

“Being in pursuit of a retreating army, I deemed it 
my duty to lose no time in making the disposition to attack, 
regardless of their number and position, except to accom¬ 
plish the result with the least possible sacrifice of life.” 

Hooker sent forward Grover’s brigade, and Bramhall’s 
and Webber’s batteries, and very soon all opposition on his 
front was silenced for a time, Longstreet, however, ordered 
up reinforcements, and soon had a section of Pelham’s bat¬ 
tery, and the three fresh brigades of Wilcox, Pickett, and 
A. P. Hill on the ground, driving Hooker back* with the loss 
of all his cannon, and heavy casualties. During his des¬ 
perate engagement, Hooker reported his situation to Sum¬ 
ner, and Kearney was promptly ordered up with his divi¬ 
sion, while Heintzelman, the proper commander of the Third 
Corps, was sent to the spot to take charge. (See “Oppos¬ 
ing Forces,” page 200.) 

A comrade in Hooker’s division gave me an account of 
his experiences about as follows: “Marching over the muddy 
road later in the afternoon, we found our farther advance 
prevented by a force which had preceded us, and we 
halted in the mud by the roadside just as it began 
to rain. About 5 o’clock we resumed our march by cross¬ 
ing over to the Hampton road, and did not halt till 11 in 
the evening, when we lay down in our blankets, bedraggled, 
wet, and tired, chewing hard-tack and the end of reflection 
the tenor of which was, ‘Why did we come for a soldier?’ 
Before daylight we were on the march, plodding in the rain 
through the mire. By daybreak we came out on the edge 
of the dense woods in front of Fort Magruder. The main 
fort was a strong earth-works .with a bastioned front and 
a wide ditch. In front of this muddy-looking heap of dirt 
was a level plain, sprinkled plentifully with smaller earth¬ 
works ; while between us and the level plain the dense forest, 
for a distance of a quarter of a mile, had been felled, thus 


— 434 — 


Yorktown and Williamsburg 

forming a labyrinth of tangled abatis difficult to penetrate. 
A mile away lay the village of Williamsburg. 

“We were soon sent out as skirmishers, with orders 
to advance as near the enemy’s rifle-pits as possible. They 
immediately opened fire upon us with heavy guns from the 
fort, while from their rifle pits came a hum of bullets and 
crackle of musketry. Their heavy shot came crashing 
among the tangled abatis of fallen timber, and plowed up 
the dirt in our front, rebounding and tearing through the 
branches of the woods in our rear. The constant hissing 
of the bullets, with their sharp ping or bizz whispering 
around and sometimes into us, gave me a sickening feeling 
and a cold perspiration. I felt weak around my knees—a 
sort of faintness and lack of strength in my legs, as 
if they would sink from under me. These symptons did not 
decrease when several of my comrades were hit. The little 
rifle-pits in our front fairly blazed with musketry, and the 
continuous snap, snap, crack, crack was murderous. Seeing 
I was not killed at once, in spite of all the noise my knees 
recovered from their unpleasant limpness, and my mind 
gradually regained its balance and composure. I never after¬ 
ward felt these disturbing influences to the same degree. 

“We slowly retired from stump to stump and from log 
to log, finally regaining the edge of the wood, and took our 
position near Webber’s and Bramhall’s batteries, which had 
just got into position on the right of the road, not over seven 
hundred yards from the hostile fort. While getting into 
position several of the battery men were killed, as they 
immediately drew the artillery fire of the enemy, which 
opened with a noise and violence that astonished me. Our 
two batteries were admirably handled, throwing a number 
of shot and shell into the enemy’s works, speedily silencing 
them, and by 9 o’clock the field in our front, including the 
rifle pits, was completely ‘cleaned out’ of artillery and in¬ 
fantry. Shortly afterwards we advanced along the edge 
of the wood to the left of Fort Magruder, and about 11 
o’clock we saw emerging from the little ravine to the left 
of the fort a swarm of Confederates, who opened on us with 
a terrible and deadly fire. Then they charged upon us with 


- 435 - 


Battles and Leaders of the Civil War 


their peculiar yell. We took all the advantage possible of 
the stumps and trees as we were pushed back, until we 
reached the edge of the wood again, where we halted and 
fired upon the enemy from behind all the cover the situa¬ 
tion afforded. We were none of us too proud, not even 
those who had the dignity of shoulder-straps to support, to 
dodge behind a tree or stump. I called out to a comrade, 
‘Why don’t you get behind a tree?’ ‘Confound it,’ said 
he, ‘There ain’t enough for the officers.’ I don’t mean to 
accuse officers of cowardice, but we had suddenly found out 
that they showed the same general inclination not to get 
shot as privates did, and were anxious to avail themselves 
of the privilege of their rank by getting in our rear. I 
have always thought that pride was a good substitute for 
courage, if well backed by a conscientious sense of duty; and 
most of our men, officers as well as privates, were too proud 
to show the fear which I have no doubt they felt in common 
with myself. Occasionally, a soldier would show symptoms 
which pride could not overcome. One of our men, Spinney, 
ran into the woods and was not seen until after the engage¬ 
ment. Some time afterward, when he had proved a good 
soldier, I asked him why he ran, and he replied that every 
bullet which went by his head said “Spinney,” and he 
thought they were calling for him. In all the pictures of 
battles I had seen before I ever saw a battle, the officers 
were at the front on prancing steeds, or with uplifted swords 
were leading their followers to the charge. Of course, I was 
surprised to find that in a real battle the officer gets in 
the rear of his men, as is his right and duty—that is, if 
his ideas of duty do not carry him so far to the rear as to 
make his sword useless. 

“The ‘rebs’ forced us back by their charge, and our 
central lines were almost broken. The forces withdrawn 
from our right had taken the infantry support from our 
batteries, one of which, consisting of four guns, was cap¬ 
tured. We were tired, wet, and exhausted when supports 
came up, and we were allowed to fall back from under the 
enemy’s fire, but still in easy reach of the battle. I asked 
one of my comrades how he felt, and his reply was charac- 


— 436 — 


Yorktown and Williamsburg 

teristic of the prevailing sentiment: ‘I should feel like a 
hero if I wasn’t so blank wet.’ The bullets had cut queer 
antics among our men. A private, who had a canteen of 
whiskey when he went into the engagement on endeavor¬ 
ing to take a drink found the canteen quite empty, a bullet 
having tapped it for him. Another had a part of his thumb¬ 
nail taken off. Another had a bullet pass into the toe of 
his shoe, down between two toes, and out along side of his 
feet without much injury. Another had a scalp-wound from 
a bullet which took off a strip of hair about three inches 
in length from the top of his head. Two of my regiment 
were killed outright and fourteen badly wounded, besides 
quite a number slightly injured. Thus I have chronicled 
my first day’s fight, and I don’t believe any of my regiment 
were ambitious to ‘chase’ the enemy any farther just at 
present. Refreshed with hot coffee and hardtack, we rested 
from the fight, well satisfied that we had done our duty.” 

On the Confederate side, according to Longstreet’s ac¬ 
count, the march of the rear column northward in retreat 
from the town was being delayed all day on the 5th day by 
impassable roads, and he ordered fresh troops from time 
to time to countermarch to the field at Williamsburg, re¬ 
lieving those whose ammunition was exhausted in this un¬ 
expected engagement. After Hooker had been forced back 
from Fort Magruder, the threatening position of Hancock 
on the Confederate left was noted by the enemy, and D. H. 
Hill went forward with Early’s brigade, Early and Hill in 
person leading, toward the crest where Hancock’s infantry 
was posted. 

The Confederates were met by a severe musketry fire, 
and at length by a counter charge, led by Hancock in which 
the bayonet was used in open field. Generals Sumner, 
Keyes, and Smith all mentioned Hancock’s victory, which 
was brilliant and decisive. General Smith said in his report, 
“The brilliancy of the plan of battle, the coolness of its ex¬ 
ecution, the seizing of the proper instant for changing from 
the defensive to the offensive, the steadiness of the troops 
engaged, and the completeness of the victory, are subjects 
to which I earnestly call the attention of the General-in- 


— 437 — 


Battles and Leaders of the Civil War 


Chief fox just praise.” General Keyes wrote, “If Hancock 
had failed, the enemy would not have retreated.”* * 

The division of Kearny, that was coming to Hooker’s 
aid, was delayed by crowded roads, and reached the field 
by brigades between 2:30 and 4 o’clock, and, taking position 
on Hooker’s field, became engaged in a somewhat irregular 
fight to the extent of five regiments of the brigades of Berry 
and Birney. Berry’s brigade made a desperate charge, re¬ 
covering some of the ground yielded by Hooker earlier in the 
day. The heavy losses at Williamsburg fell upon Hooker 
and Kearny, the division of the former sustaining nearly 
three-fourths of the total Union loss. 

After the engagement I went over the field in front of 
the enemy’s fort. Advancing through the tangled mass of 
logs and stumps, I saw one of our men aiming over the 
branch of a fallen tree which lay among the tangled abatis. 
I called to him, but he did not turn or move. Advancing 
nearer I put my hand on his shoulder, looked in his face and 
started back. He was dead. Shot through the brain; and 
so suddenly had the end come that his rigid hand grasped 
his musket, and he still preserved the attitude of watchful¬ 
ness, literally occupying his post after death. At another 
place we came upon one of our men who had evidently 
died from wounds. Near one of his hands was a Testa¬ 
ment, and on his breast lay an ambrotype picture of a group 
of children and another of a young woman. 

The 6th of May was a beautiful morning, with birds 
singing among the thickets in which lay the dead. The next 
morning we marched through quaint, old-fashioned Wil¬ 
liamsburg. The most substantial buildings of the town 
were those of William and Mary College, which were of 
brick. We kindled fires from that almost inexhausible 
source of supply, the Virginia fences, cooked our coffee* 
sang, and smoked, thoughtless of the morrow. 


*It was of this action that McClellan telegraphed to his wife: 
‘'Hancock was superb.”— Editors. 

* . * * * * * 


— 438 — 



Ill 


Manassas to Seven Pines 

By Joseph E. Johnston 
General, C. S. A. 


Already in this work (Vol. I, page 240) I have dis¬ 
cussed Mr. Davis’s statements in his “Rise and Fall of the 
Confederate Government,” so far as they bore upon the 
responsibilities of the First Bull Run. I will now consider 
his remarks upon the operations following the withdrawal 
from Manassas and including the battle of Seven Pines. 

As to the question of the forces on the Peninsula, Mr. 
Davis says: “Early in April General McClellan had landed 
about 100,000 men at or near Fortress Monroe” (“Rise and 
Fall,” II, 84). According to John Tucker, Assistant Sec¬ 
retary of War, 121,000 Federal troops landed before the 
5th of April. Mr. Davis further says: “At this time Gen¬ 
eral Magruder occupied the lower Peninsula with his force 
of seven or eight thousand men” (II, 84). General Ma¬ 
gruder reported that he had eleven thousand men. Mr. 
Davis also says: 

“After the first advance of the enemy, General Magruder was 
reenforced by some troops from the south side of James River, and 
General Wilcox’s brigade, which had been previously detached from 
the army under General Johnston.” 

These reenforcements, together, made about five thou¬ 
sand men (II., p. 85). He says on the same page: 

“On the 9th of April, General Magruder’s command, thus re¬ 
enforced amounted to about 12,000. On that day General Early 
joined with his division from the Army of Northern Virginia. . . . 
This division had about 8,000 officers and men for duty. General 
Magruder’s force was thus increased to about 20,000. 

The same order detached Early’s, D. R. Jones’s, and 
D. H. Hill’s divisions from the Army of northern Virginia, 
and they were transported as fast as the railroad trains 
could carry them. The two latter divisions had together 


— 439 — 



Battles and Leaders of the Civil War 


about 10,000 men, so that Magruder’s army was raised to 
about 33,000 men, instead of 20,000, as Mr. Davis said. 

Coming to the plan of withdrawal, Mr. Davis says: 

“As soon as it was definitely ascertained that General McClellan, 
with his main army, was on the Peninsula, General J. E. Johnston 
was assigned* to the command of the Department of the Peninsula 
and Norfolk, and directed to proceed thither to examine the condi¬ 
tion of affairs there. 

“After spending a day on General Magruder’s defensive lines he 
returned to Richmond and recommended the abandonment of the 
Peninsula, and that we should take up a defensive position nearer to 
Richmond.” 

The President has forgotten my recommendation, or 
misunderstood it at the time. I represented to him that 
General McClellan’s design was, almost certainly, to demol¬ 
ish our batteries with his greatly superior artillery, and 
turn us by the river, either landing in our rear or moving 
directly to Richmond; so that our attempting to hold York- 
town could only delay the enemy two or three weeks. In¬ 
stead of that, I proposed that all our available forces should 
be united near Richmond; Magruder’s troops to be among 
the last to arrive; the great army thus formed about Rich¬ 
mond not to be in a defensive position, as Mr. Davis sup¬ 
poses, but to fall with its whole force upon McClellan when 
the Federal army was expecting to besiege only the troops 
it had followed from Yorktown. If the Federal army should 
be defeated a hundred miles away from its place of refuge, 
Fort Monroe, it could not escape destruction. This was 
undoubtedly our best hope (see maps, pp. 167 and 188). 

In the conference that followed the President took no 
part, but the Secretary of War, G. W. Randolph, once a 
naval officer, opposed the abandonment of the valuable 
property in the Norfolk Navy Yard; and General Lee op¬ 
posed the plan proposed, because it would expose Charleston 
and Savannah to capture. I maintained that if those places 
should be captured, the defeat of the principal Federal army 
would enable us to recover them; and that, unless that army 
should be defeated, we should lose those sea-ports in spite 
of their garrisons. Mr. Davis says: 


*That assignment was made after the conference at Richmond 
mentioned on page 203.— Editors. 


— 440 — 



Manassas to Seven Pines 


“After hearing fully the views of the several officers named, I 
decided to resist the enemy on the Peninsula. . . . Though General 
J. E. Johnston did not agree with this decision, he did not ask to 
be relieved.” 

Not being in command, I could not be relieved. My 
assignment was included in the order to oppose McClellan 
at Yorktown; that order added to my then command the 
departments of Norfolk and the Peninsula. It is not easy 
to reconcile this increase of my command by the President, 
with his very numerous disparaging notices of me. 

General Keyes, before the Committee on the Conduct 
of the War, confirmed my opinion in saying that “Glou¬ 
cester must have fallen upon our (McClellan’s) getting 
possession of Yorktown, and the York River would then 
have been open.” 

Mr. Davis expresses the opinion that “General Mc¬ 
Clellan certainly might have sent a detachment from his 
army, which, after crossing York River, could have turned 
the position at Gloucester Point” (II, 90). That would 
have been needless; the driving us from Yorktown would 
have compelled us to abandon Gloucester Point. Then (Vol. 
II., p. 91) he says: 

“Whether General McClellan . . . would have made an early 
assault ... or have waited to batter our earth-works in breach . . . 
is questionable.” (II., 91.) 

We did not apprehend “battering in breach,” but be¬ 
lieved that the heavy sea-coast rifles to be mounted in the 
batteries, about completed, would demolish our water-bat¬ 
teries, drive us from the intrenchments at Yorktown, and 
enable the enemy to turn us by the river. Mr. Davis quotes 
from one of his dispatches to me: 

“Your announcement today (May 1st) that you would withdraw 
tomorrow night takes us by surprise and must involve enormous 
losses, including unfinished gun-boats. Will the safety of your army 
allow more time?” (II, 92.) 

My own announcement was made April 27th, not May 
1st, and reached Richmond in ten hours; so the President 
had abundant time to prevent the withdrawal. The ap¬ 
pearance of the enemy’s works indicated that fire from them 
might open upon us the next morning. The withdrawal 


— 441 — 


Battles and Leaders of the Civil War 


just then was to avoid waste of life. With regard to the 
property abandoned, he says: 

“The loss of public property, as was anticipated, was great, the 
steamboats expected for its transportation not having arrived before 
the evacuation was made. From a narrative by General Early I 
make the following extract: ‘A very valuable part of the property 
so lost . . . consisted of a very large number of picks and spades . . . 
All of our heavy guns, including some recently arrived and not 
mounted, together with a good deal of ammunition piled upon the 
wharf, had to be left behind.’ ” (II, 94.) 

The steamboats he mentions were controlled in Rich¬ 
mond. As to the loss of very valuable picks and spades, 
Colonel Henry T. Douglas, chief-engineer at Yorktown, 
wrote to me, May 12th, 1883: 

“I was at Yorktown the evening before the evacuation com¬ 
menced. I did not see any quantity of picks and shovels there, and 
cannot understand how they could have accumulated there when they 
were needed so much from Redoubt Number Five to Lee’s Mills— 
that is, on the extreme right of our line.” 

General D. H. Hill, who commanded in and near York¬ 
town, said, in his official report: “We lost very little by 
the retreat, save some medical stores which Surgeon Coffin 
deserted in his flight, May 1st. The heavy guns were all 
of the old navy pattern.” We had very little ammunition 
on hand at the time. The heavy guns could have been 
saved only by holding the place, which was impossible. 

Mr. Davis says that General Magruder’s “absence at 
this moment was the more to be regretted, as it appears 
that the positions of the redoubts he had constructed (be¬ 
fore Williamsburg) were not all known to the commanding 
general.” (II, 94.) The positions of the redoubts were 
“all known.” But to a body of troops serving merely as a 
rear-guard, it was necessary to occupy only those nearest 
the road. A rear-guard distributed in all the redoubts in¬ 
tended for an army could have held none of them. The 
events showed that the proper redoubts were occupied. It is 
singular that Mr. Davis’s only notice of the conflict at 
Williamsburg, in which our troops behaved admirably, re¬ 
lates to a detached affair, unimportant, because it had, and 
could have, no influence upon the rear event. Mr. Davis 
says of General Early’s account of his attack upon Han¬ 
cock at Williamsburg: 


— 442 — 


Manassas to Seven Pines 


‘He (Early) confidently expresses the opinion that had his 
attack been supported promptly and vigorously, the enemy’s forces 
there engaged must have been captured.” (II, 96.) 

General Early sent an officer to report that there was 
a battery in front of him which he could take, and asked 
authority to do so. The message was delivered to General 
Longstreet, who referred the messenger to me, we being 
together. I authorized the attempt, but desired the general 
to look carefully first. Under the circumstances he could 
not have expected support, for he moved out of reach of it. 

Mr. Davis speaks of the employment of sub-terra shells 
to check a marching column, and quotes from General 
Rains as follows: 

“Fortunately we found in a mud-hole a broken ammunition wagon 
containing five loaded shells. Four of these, armed with a sensi¬ 
tive fuse-primer, were planted in our rear, near some trees cut down 
as obstructions to the road. A body of the enemy’s cavalry came 
upon these sub-terra shells, and they exploded with terrific effect.” 
(II., 97.) 

This event was not mentioned in General D. H. Hill’s 
report, although General Rains belonged to his division, nor 
was it mentioned by our cavalry which followed Hill’s divi¬ 
sion. Such an occurrence would have been known to the 
whole army, but it was not; so it must have been a dream 
of the writer. (But see p. 201.— Editors.) 

Mr. Davis says: “The next morning after the battle 
of the 5th, at Williamsburg, Longstreet’s and D. H. Hill’s 
divisions being those there engaged” (II, 98). But one 
regiment of Hill’s division was engaged. 

In the Federal reports of this action, it is treated as a 
battle in which the whole Confederate army was engaged. 
It was an affair with our rear-guard, the object of which 
was to secure our baggage trains. For that it was neces¬ 
sary to detain the Federal army a day, which was accom¬ 
plished by the rear-guard. In those Federal reports a 
victory is claimed.* The proofs are: (1) that what de- 

*General McClellan’s statement was as follows: 

“Notwithstanding the report I received from General Heintzelman 
during the night (of the 5th), that General Hooker’s division had 
suffered so much that it could not be relied upon next day, and that 
Kearny’s could not do more than hold its own without reenforce- 


- 443 - 



Battles and Leaders of the Civil War 


serves to be called fighting ceased at least two hours before 
dark, yet the Confederates held the ground until the next 
morning, having slept on the field, and then resumed their 
march; (2) that they fought only to protect their trains, 
and accomplished the object; (3) that although they 
marched but twelve miles the day after the affair, they saw 
no indications of pursuit, unless the seeing a scout party 
once can be so called; (4) that they inflicted a loss much 
greater than they had suffered; (5) and that in the ten 
days following the fight they marched but thirty-seven miles. 
They left four hundred wounded in Williamsburg, because 
they had no means of transporting them. But they cap¬ 
tured five cannon and destroyed the carriages of five more, 
and took four hundred prisoners and several colors. 

Mr. Davis says: 

“In the meantime, Franklin’s division had gone up the York 
River and landed a short distance below West Point, on the south 
side of York River, and moved into a thick wood in the direction of 
the New Kent road, thus threatening the flank of our line of march. 
(McClellan wrote that the divisions of Franklin, Sedgwick, Porter, 
and Richardson were sent from Yorktown by water to the right 
bank of the Pamunkey, near West Point.— J. E. F .) Two brigades 
by water of General G. W. Smith’s division, Hampton’s and Hood’s, 
were detached under the command of General Whiting to dislodge 
the enemy, which they did after a short conflict, driving him through 
the wood to the protection of his gun-boats in York river.” (II, 98.) 

The Federal force engaged was very much less than a 
division. 


ments, being satisfied that the result of Hancock’s engagement was 
to give us possession of the decisive point of the battlefield. During 
the night I countermanded the order for the advance of the divisions 
of Sedgwick and Richardson and directed them to return to York¬ 
town. ... On the next morning we found the enemy’s position aban¬ 
doned, and occupied Fort Magruder and the town of Williamsburg, 
which was filled with the enemy’s wounded. . . Colonel Averell was 
sent forward at once with a strong cavalry force to endeavor to over¬ 
take the enemy’s rear-guard. He found several guns abandoned and 
picked up a large number of stragglers, but the condition of the 
roads and the state of his supplies forced him to return after ad¬ 
vancing a few miles. The supply trains, had been forced out of the 
roads on the 4th and 5th to allow troops and artillery to pass to 
the front, and the roads were now in such a state, after thirty-six 
hours’ continuous rain, that it was almost impossible to pass even 
empty wagons over them. General Hooker’s division had suffered 
so severely that it was in no condition to follow the enemy, even if 
the roads had been good. Under these circumstances an immediate 
pursuit was impossible.— Editors. 


— 444 — 



Manassas to Seven Pines 


Mr. Davis says, lower down: “The loss of the enemy 
(in the battle of Williamsburg) greatly exceeded our own, 
which was about 1,200.” He means exclusive of General 
Early’s loss. According to General McClellan’s report his 
loss was 2,228. General Hooker stated under oath that his 
was 1,700.* But Kearny’s, Couch’s, and two-thirds of 
Smith’s division, and Peck’s brigade were engaged also; a 
loss of 528 is very small among so many men.f 

Mr. Davis says: 

“Soon after General Johnston took position on the north of the 
Chickahominy, accompanied by General Lee, I rode out to his head¬ 
quarters. A long conversation followed, which was so inconclusive 
that it lasted until late in the night, so late that we remained until 
the next morning. As we rode back to Richmond, . . . General Lee 
confessed himself, as I was unable to draw from it any more definite 
purpose that the policy was to . . . improve his (Johnston’s) posi¬ 
tion as far as practicable, and wait for the enemy to leave his gun¬ 
boats, so that an opportunity might be offered to meet him on land.” 
(II., 101.) 

I explained that I had fallen back that far to clear my 
left flank of the navigable water, and so avoid having 
it turned; that as we were too weak to assume the offensive, 
and as the position I then held was an excellent one, I 
intended to await the Federal attack there. These explana¬ 
tions covered the whole ground, so that the President had 
no cause to complain, especially as he suggested nothing 
better. And he was satisfied then; for, three days later, 
he wrote to me by Colonel G. W. C. Lee: “ ... If the 
enemy proceed as heretofore indicated, your position and 
policy, as you stated it in our last interview, seems to me 
to require no modification.” This is the interview called 
“inconclusive.” Mr. Davis says: 

“After the repulse of the enemy’s gunboats at Drewry’s bluffs 
(May 15th, 1862) I wrote to General Johnston a letter to be handed 
to him by my aide, Colonel G. W. C. Lee ... I soon thereafter rode 

*The total Union loss was 2,283 and Hooker’s loss 1,575. See 
tables 200.— Editors. 

fPeck’s brigade (5 regiments) belonged to Couch’s division and 
was the only brigade of that division which took part in the battle. 
Six regiments of Kearney’s division (2 of Birney’s brigade and 3 of 
Berry’s) and 6 of Smith’s division (4 of Hancock’s and 2 of David¬ 
son’s) were engaged so the loss (exclusive of Hooker’s) of 528 
belonged, in fact, to only 16 regiments. 


- 445 - 



Battles and Leaders of the Civil War 


out to visit General Johnston at his headquarters, and was surprised, 
in the suburbs of Richmond, ... to meet a portion of the light 
artillery, and to learn that the whole army had crossed the Chicka- 
hominy.” (II, 103.) 

The army crossed the Chickahominy immediately after 
the affair of Drewery's Bluff. So that if Colonel Lee de¬ 
livered a letter to me then, he of course reported to the 
President that I had crossed the River. And as the army's 
nearest approach to Richmond was on the 17th, his meeting 
with the light artillery must have occurred that day. So 
one cannot understand his surprise. 

He says on the same page: 

“General Johnston’s explanation of this (to me) unexpected 
movement was, that he thought the water of the Chickahominy un¬ 
healthy . . . He also alluded to the advantage of having the river 
in front rather than in the rear of him.” 

The army crossed the Chickahominy because the pos¬ 
session of James River by the enemy suggested the proba¬ 
bility of a change of base to that river. And it was neces¬ 
sary that we should be so placed as to be able to meet the 
United States army approaching either from York River or 
along the James. Water was not considered, for we did 
not use that of the Chickahominy; nor the position of the 
little stream behind us,. for we had four bridges over it. 
The position of Seven Pines was chosen for the center, the 
right somewhat thrown back. But the scarcity of water in¬ 
duced me to draw nearer to Richmond, which was done on 
the 17th. 

Mr. Davis makes statements (II., 106), regarding the 
strength of the Army of Northern Virginia, on the 21st and 
31st of May; but as he treats the subject more minutely 
further on, we will examine what he says (p. 153) : 

“In the Archives Offices of the War Department in Washington, 
there are on file some of the field and monthly returns of the Army 
of Northern Virginia . . . The following statements have been taken 
from those papers by Major Walter H. Taylor, of the staff of 
General Lee. . . . 

“A statement of the strength of the troops under General John¬ 
ston shows that on May 21st, 1862, he had present for duty, as follows: 
Smith’s division, . . 10,592; Longstreet’s division. . . . 13,816; Mag- 
ruder’s division, . . . 16,680 (240 too little) D. H. Hill’s 


— 446 — 


Manassas to Seven Pines 


division, . . . 11,151; cavalry brigade, 1289; reserve artillery, 1160; 
*total effective men, 53,688.” 

The above is from Major Taylor’s memorandum given 
the President, made from estimates of brigades, not from 
returns. Without being accurate, it is not far from the 
truth; corrected as above, Magruder should be given 15,920 
men. Mr. Davis continues: 

“Major Taylor in his work (‘Four Years with General Lee’) states, 
‘In addition to the troops above enumerated, . . . there were two 
brigades subject to his orders, then stationed in the vicinity of Han¬ 
over Junction, one under the command of General J. R. Anderson, 
and the other under the command of General Branch. They were 
subsequently incorporated into the division of General A. P. Hill.’ 
(Mr. Davis continues) : He estimates the strength of the two at 
4000 effective. 

“. . . Previous to the battle of Seven Pines, General Johnston 
was reenforced by General Huger’s division of three brigades. The 
total strength of these three brigades, according to the ‘Reports of 
the Operations of the Army of Northern Virginia/ was 5008 effec¬ 
tives. Taylor says: ‘If the strength of these five be added to the 
return of May 21st, we shall have 62,696 as the effective strength 
of the army under General Johnston on May 31st, 1862.’ ” 

But according to General Huger’s report to me, there 
were 7000 men (instead of 5008) in his three brigades, 
which does not exceed the ordinary strength of brigades 
(that is to say, three average brigades would have had not 
less than 7000 men) ; and what Mr. Davis calls two bri¬ 
gades of “4000 effective,” were, in fact, Anderson’s divi¬ 
sion sent to observe McDowell’s corps at Fredericksburg, 
and so large that General Lee called it the army of the 
North, and estimated it as 10,000 men;f and the second, 
Branch’s brigade, greatly strengthened to protect the rail¬ 
road at Gordonsville, and estimated by General Lee as 5000 
men.J When these troops were united on the Chicka- 


*According to General Johnston’s memorandum of May 21st, 
1862, “Official Records,” Vol. XI., Part III, p. 531, the reserve artil¬ 
lery numbered 920.— Editors. 

f“I advised you, April 23d, of certain troops ordered to report 
to General Field, via: two regiments from Richmond, two light bat¬ 
teries, a brigade from South Carolina, and one from North Carolina 
(Anderson’s), in all 8000, in addition to those (2500.— J. E. J.) pre¬ 
viously there.”—General Lee’s letter, May 8th—“Official Records,” 
Vol. XI, Part III, pp. 500-1.— J. E. J. 

$“Two brigades, one from North Carolina (Branch’s) and one 
from Norfolk, have been ordered to Gordonsville, to reenforce that 
line.” General Lee’s letter, as above.— J. E. J. 


— 447 — 



Battles and Leaders of the Civil War 


hominy, General Anderson’s estimate of their numbers was, 
of the first, 9000, and of the other, 4000; 20,000 then, and 
not 9008, is the number to be added’to the return of May 
21st, 1862, to show the effective strength of that army May 
31st, viz., 73,928, including the correction of the number 
in Magruder’s division. 

Referring to our withdrawal from the north side of 
the Chickahominy to the vicinity of Richmond, Mr. Davis 
says: 

“Remembering a remark of General Johnston’s that the Spaniards 
were the only people who now undertook to hold fortified towns, I had 
written to him that he knew the defense of Richmond must be made 
at a distance from it.” (II, 120.) 

Mr. Davis is mistaken. No such letter was sent to 
me then. We communicated with each other only orally, 
excepting a note he sent me to point out that I had been 
absent from a skirmish the day before. He knew that the 
fact that the enemy was then able to approach Richmond 
either from York River or by the James compelled me to 
prepare for either event, by placing the army near the city. 
A short time before, he wrote: “To you it is needless to say 
that the defense must be made outside of the city.” His 
next sentence, approving the course I was pursuing has 
been quoted in connection with what the President said of 
an “inconclusive” conversation with me. 

Mr. Davis continues, a little farther down (II., 120) : 

“It had not occurred to me that he (Johnston) meditated a re¬ 
treat which would uncover the capital, nor was it ever suspected, 
until in reading General Hood’s book, published in 1880, the evidence 
was found that General Johnston, when retreating from Yorktown, 
told his volunteer aide, Mr. McFarland, that ‘he (Johnston) expected 
or intended to give up Richmond.’ ” 

This story of Mr. McFarland is incredible. He, a very 
rich, fat old man, could not have been an aide-de-camp. As 
I did not know him at all until four years later, and then 
barely, he could not have been my aide-de-camp. And lastly, 

I had no volunteer aide. Besides, the Confederate Presi¬ 
dent had abundant evidence that I had no such expectation, 
in the fact, that so far from giving up Richmond, I stood 
between it and the Federal army for three weeks, until I 


— 448 — 


Manassas to Seven Pines 


was disabled by desperate wounds received in its defense. 
Under such circumstances his accusation is, to say the least, 
very discreditable. E. F. Harvie, late Colonel and Assistant 
Inspector-General, C. S. A., now in the “War Records” Office, 
Washington, in answer to my question, “Had I ever a vol¬ 
unteer aide-de-camp named McFarland, or any volunteer 
aide-de-camp after leaving Manassas, while serving in Vir¬ 
ginia?” wrote me, under date of January 28th, 1885, as fol¬ 
lows : “To my knowledge, you certainly had not. My posi¬ 
tion as your staff officer justifies me in saying that Mr. Mc¬ 
Farland was not with you in any capacity.” 

Surgeon A. M. Fauntleroy, in answer to my question, 
“Had I a volunteer aide-de-camp in May, 1862, especially 
when the army was moving from Yorktown toward Rich¬ 
mond ; or did you ever in that time see an old gentleman of 
Richmond, named McFarland, about my headquarters?” 
writes: 

“I never did, I cannot well see how such a person could have 
escaped my observation, if he was there at any time.” 

And J. B. Washington, president of the Baltimore and 
Philadelphia Railway, writes me as follows: 

“You had not on your staff after leaving Manassas a volunteer 
aide-de-camp, especially during May, 1862, when the army was be¬ 
tween Yorktown and Richmond. I was personally acquainted with 
Mr. McFarland of Richmond, but never saw him at our headquarters, 
nor heard of his ever having been there. Having served as aide-de- 
camp on your staff from May, 1861, to February, 1864, I was in 
the position to' know of the circumstances of which I have written.” 

Mr. Davis says: 

“Seeing no preparation to keep the enemy at a distance ... I 
sent for General Lee . . . and told him why and how I was dis¬ 
satisfied with the condition of affairs. He asked me what I thought 
it was proper to do ... I answered that McClellan should be at¬ 
tacked on the other side of the Chickahominy, before he matured 
his preparations for a siege of Richmond. To this he promptly 
assented ... He then said: ‘General Johnston should, of course, 
advise you of what he expects or proposes to do. Let me go and 
see him’ . . . When General Lee came back, he told me that General 
Johnston proposed, on the next Thursday, to move against the enemy, 
as follows: General A. P. Hill was to move down on the right 
flank and rear of the enemy. General G. W. Smith, as soon as 
Hill’s guns opened, was to cross the Chickahominy at the Meadow 
Bridge, attack the enemy in flank, and, by the conjuction of the two, 


— 449 — 


Battles and Leaders of the Civil War 


it was expected to double him up. Then Longstreet was to cross on 
the Mechanicsville bridge and attack him in front. From this plan 
the best results were hoped by both of us.” (II, 120.) 

It is certain that General Lee could have had no such 
hopes from this plan, nor have been a party to it; for it 
would not only have sent our army where there was no 
enemy, but left open the way to Richmond. For the Meadow 
Bridge is 24 miles from Mechanicsville and that place about 
6 miles above the Federal right. So after two-thirds of our 
troops had crossed the Chickahominy, the Federal army 
could have marched straight to Richmond opposed by not 
more than one-fifth of its-number in Magruder’s and D. H. 
Hill’s divisions. This plan is probably the wildest on record. 

As to what is described (II, 121) G. W. Smith’s divi¬ 
sion was never in the place indicated, and General Long- 
street’s was never on the Mechanicsville road near the 
bridge, before General Lee crossed the Chickahominy to 
fight at Gaines’s Mills. 

A glance at the map will show how singularly in¬ 
correct is Mr. Davis’s description (II, 122-3) of the vicinity 
of Seven Pines and of the disposition of the Federal troops. 

On the 23d of May, Keyes’s Federal corps crossed to 
the south side of the Chickahominy, and a detachment 
attacked Hatton’s Confederate brigade, which was in ob¬ 
servation near Savage’s Station. The detachment was driven 
back, and Hatton’s object having been accomplished (to 
learn whether the enemy had crossed the stream), he was 
recalled. I was advised to hold that position with the army, 
but preferred to let the enemy advance, which would in¬ 
crease the interval between his left and the right, which 
was beyond the Chickahominy. McDowell’s corps of 40,000 
men* was then at Fredericksburg, observed by a division 
under Brigadier-General J. R. Anderson; and a large Con¬ 
federate brigade, under Brigadier-General Branch, was at 
Gordonsville. 


*McDowell says, May 22d, 1862, “Official Records,” Vol. XII, 
Part III., p. 214, that he would require subsistence for 38,000 men. 
This included both effectives and non-effectives. A fair deduction 
would leave McDowell about 35,000 combatants, to compute by the 
basis on which the Confederate generals always estimated their 
strength.— Editors. 


— 450 — 



Manassas to Seven Pines 


On the 24th our cavalry was driven across the Chicka¬ 
hominy, principally at Mechanicsville. This extension of 
the right wing of the enemy to the west made me apprehend 
that the two detachments (Anderson and Branch) above 
mentioned might be cut off. They were therefore ordered 
to fall back to the Chickahominy. Near Hanover Court 
House the brigade was attacked by Porter’s corps and 
driven off, escaping with a loss of 66 killed and 177 wounded, 
as General Branch reported.* 

A division was formed of Anderson’s and Branch’s 
troops to the command of which Major-General A. P. Hill 
was assigned. 

That evening General Anderson sent word that his 
scouts left near Fredericksburg reported that McDowell’s 
troops were marching southward. As the object of this 
march was evidently the junction of this corps with the 
main army, I determined to attack McClellan before Mc¬ 
Dowell could join him; and the major-generals were de¬ 
sired to hold their troops ready to move. But at night, 
when those officers were with me, to receive instructions 
for the expected battle, General J. E. B. Stuart, who also had 
a detachment of cavalry observing McDowell’s corps, re¬ 
ported that it had returned to Fredericksburg. As my 
object was to bring on the inevitable battle before McClellan 
should receive an addition of 40,000 men to his forces, this 
intelligence made me return to my first design—that of 
attacking McClellan’s left wing on the Williamsburg road 
as soon as, by advancing, it had sufficiently increased its 
distance from his right, north of the Chickahominy. 

The morning of the 30th, armed reconnaissances were 
made under General D. H. Hill’s direction on the Charles 
City road by Brigadier-General Rodes, and on the Williams¬ 
burg road by Brigadier-General Garland. The latter found 
Federal outposts five miles from Richmond, or two miles 
west of Seven Pines, in such strength as indicated that 
a corps was near. On receiving this information from 

^Exclusive of the loss of the 28th North Carolina, of Lane’s 
command, which as far as reported was 7 killed and 15 wounded.— 
Editors. 


- 451 — 



Battles and Leaders of the Civil War 


General Hill, I informed him that he would lead an attack 
on the enemy next morning. Orders were given for the 
concentration of twenty-two of our twenty-eight brigades 
against McClellan’s left wing, about two-fifths of his army. 
Our six other brigades were guarding the river from New 
Bridge to Meadow Bridge, on our extreme left. Long- 
street and Huger were directed to conduct their divisions 
to D. H. Hill’s position on the Williamsburg road, and G. 
W. Smith to march with his to the junction of the Nine- 
mile road with the New Bridge road, where Magruder was 
with four brigades. 

Longstreet, as ranking officer of the troops on the 
Williamsburg road, was instructed verbally to form D. H. 
Hill’s division, as first line, and his own as second, across 
the road at right angles, and to advance in that order to 
attack the enemy; while Huger’s division should march by 
the right flank along the Charles City road, to fall upon the 
enemy’s flank when our troops were engaged with him in 
front. Federal earth-works and abatis that might be found 
were to be turned. G. W. Smith was to protect the troops 
under Longstreet from attack by those of the Federal right 
wing across the Chickahominy; and, if such transfer should 
not be threatened, he was to fall upon the enemy on the 
Williamsburg road. Those troops were formed in four 
lines, each being a division. Casey’s was a mile west of 
Seven Pines, with a line of skirmishers a half mile in ad¬ 
vance ; Couch’s was at Seven Pines and Fair Oaks—the two 
forming Keyes’s corps. Kearny’s division was near Sav¬ 
age’s Station and Hooker’s two miles west of Bottom’s 
Bridge—the two forming Heintzelman’s corps. 

Longstreet’s command of the right was to end when 
the troops approached Seven Pines and I should be present 
to direct the movements, after which each major-general 
would command his own division. The rain began to fall 
violently in the afternoon of the 30th, and continued all 
night. In the morning the little streams near our camps 
were so much swollen as to make it probable that the 
Chickahominy was overflowing its banks and cutting the 
communication between the wings of the Federal army. 


— 452 — 


Manassas to Seven Pines 


Being confident that Longstreet and D. H. Hill, with their 
forces united, would be successful in the earlier part of the 
action against adversaries formed in several lines, with 
wide intervals between them, I left the immediate control 
on the Williamsburg road to them, under general instruc¬ 
tions, and placed myself on the left, where I could soonest 
learn of the approach of Federal reenforcements from their 
right. For this scouts were sent forward to discover all 
movements that might be made by the enemy.* 

The condition of the ground and little streams delayed 
the troops in marching; yet those of Smith, Longstreet, and 
Hill were in position quite early enough. But the soldiers 
from Norfolk, who had seen garrison service only, was 
unnecessarily stopped in their march by a swollen rivulet. 
This unexpected delay led to interchange of messages for 
several hours between General Longstreet and myself, I 
urging Longstreet to begin the fight, he replying. But, 
near 2 o’clock that officer was requested to go forward to 
the attack; the hands of my watch marked 3 o’clock at the 
report of the first field piece.f The Federal advanced 
line—a long line of skirmishers, supported by several 
regiments, was encountered at 3 o’clock. The greatly su¬ 
perior numbers of the Confederates soon drove them back 
to the main position of Casey’s division. It occupied a line 
of rifle pits, strengthened by a redoubt and abatis. Here 
the resistance was very obstinate; for the Federals, com¬ 
manded by an officer of skill and tried courage, fought as 
soldiers generally do under good leaders; and time and 
vigorous efforts of superior numbers were required to drive 
them from their ground. But the resolution of Garland’s 
and G. B. Anderson’s brigades, that pressed forward on 
our left through an open field, under a destructive fire, the 

*The map of Seven Pines, printed with this paper in “The Cen¬ 
tury Magazine ” fpr May, 1885, was prepared by the editors, and has 
been canceled because of incorrectness as to the positions of the op¬ 
posing forces on the night of May 31st, as well as on the morning of 
June 1st.— Editors. 

fGeneral D. H. Hill, who directed the onset, says in his report: 
“At 1 o’clock the signal guns were fired, and my division moved off 
in fine style.” In their reports, the Union commanders name 12:30 
and 1 o’clock as the time of the Confederate attack.— Editors. 


— 453 — 



Battles and Leaders of the Civil War 


admirable service of Carter’s and Bondurant’s batteries, 
and a skillfully combined attack upon the Federal left, 
under General Hill’s direction, by Rodes’s brigade in front 
and that by Raines in flank, were at last successful, and the 
enemy abandoned their entrenchments. Just then reen¬ 
forcements from Couch’s division same up, and an effort 
was made to recover the position. But it was to no purpose; 
for two regiments of R. H. Anderson’s brigade, reenforced 
Hill’s troops, and the Federals were driven back to Seven 
Pines. 

Keyes’s Corps (Casey’s and Couch’s divisions) was 
united at Seven Pines and reenforced by Kearny’s division, 
coming from Savage’s Station. But the three divisions 
were so vigorously attacked by Hill that they were broken 
and driven from their intrenchments, the greater part along 
the Williamsburg road to the intrenched line west of Sav¬ 
age’s Station. Two brigades of their left, however, fled to 
White Oak Swamp. 

General Hill pursued the enemy a mile; then, night 
being near, he reformed his troops, facing toward the 
Federals. Longstreet’s and Huger’s divisions coming up, 
were formed between Hill’s line and Fair Oaks. 

For some cause the disposition on the Charles City 
road was modified. Two of General Huger’s brigades were 
ordered to advance along that road, with three of Long- 
street’s under Brigadier-General Wilcox. After following 
that road some miles, General Wilcox received orders to 
conduct his troops to the Williamsburg road. On entering 
it, he was ordered to the front, and two of his regiments 
joined Hill’s troops near and approaching Seven Pines. 

When the action just described began, the musketry was 
not heard at my position on the Nine-mile road, from the 
unfavorable condition of the air; and I supposed for some 
time that we were hearing only an artillery duel. But a 
staff officer was sent to ascertain the facts. He returned 
at 4 o’clock with intelligence that our infantry as well as 
artillery had been engaged an hour, and all were pressing 
vigorously. As no approach of troops from beyond the 
Chickahominy had been discovered, I hoped that the enemy’s 


— 454 — 


Manassas to Seven Pines 


bridges were impassable, and therefore desired General 
Smith to move toward Seven Pines, to be ready to co-operate 
with our right. He moved promptly along the Nine mile 
road, and his leading regiment soon became engaged with 
the Federal skirmishers and their reserves, and in a few 
minutes drove them off. 

On my way to Longstreet’s left, to combine the action 
of the two bodies of troops, I passed the head of General 
Smith’s column near Fair Oaks, and saw the camps of 
about a brigade in the angle between the Nine mile road 
and the York River Railroad, and the rear of a column of 
infantry moving in quick time from that point toward the 
Chickahominy by the road to the Grapevine ford. A few 
minutes after this, a battery near the point where this 
infantry had disappeared commenced firing upon the head 
of the Confederates’ column. A regiment sent against it 
was received with a volley of musketry, as well as canister, 
and recoiled. The leading brigade, commanded by Colonel 
Law, then advanced, and so much strength was developed 
by the enemy that General Smith brought his other bri¬ 
gades into action on the left of Law’s. An obstinate con¬ 
test began, and was maintained on equal terms, although 
we engaged superior numbers on ground of their own choos¬ 
ing. 

I passed the railroad a few hundred yards with Hood’s 
brigade when the firing commenced, and stopped to see it 
terminated. But being confident that the enemy opposing 
us were those whose camp I had just seen, and therefore 
only a brigade, I did not doubt that General Smith was 
more than strong enough to cope with them. Therefore, 
General Hood was directed to go in such a direction as to 
connect with his right with Longstreet’s left and take his 
antagonists in flank. The direction of that firing was then 
nearly southwest from Fair Oaks. It was then about 5 o’clock. 

In that position my intercourse with Longstreet was 
maintained through staff officers, who were assisted by 
General Stuart of the cavalry, which was then unemployed; 
their reports were all of steady progress. 


— 455 — 


Battles and Leaders of the Civil War 


At Fair Oaks, however, no advantage was gained on 
either side, and the contest was continued with unflagging 
courage. It was near half-past 6 o’clock before I admitted 
to myself that Smith was engaged, not with a brigade, as 
I had obstinately thought, but with more than a division; 
but I thought that it would be injudicious to engage Ma- 
gruder’s division, our only reserve, so late in the day. 

The firing was then violent at Seven Pines, and within 
a half hour the three Federal divisions were broken and 
driven from their position in confusion. It was then evi¬ 
dent, however, from the obstinacy of our adversaries at 
Fair Oaks, that the battle would not be decided that day. 
I said so to the staff officers near me, and told them that 
each regiment must sleep where it might be standing when 
the firing ceased for the night, to be ready to renew it at 
dawn next morning. 

About half past 7 o’clock, I received a musket shot in 
the shoulder, and was unhorsed soon after by a heavy frag¬ 
ment of shell which struck my breast. I was borne from 
the field, first to a house on the roadside, thence to Rich¬ 
mond. The firing ceased before I had been carried a mile 
from it. The conflict at Fair Oaks was terminated by dark¬ 
ness only. 

Mr. Davis’s account of what he saw and did at Fair 
Oaks (II, 123) indicates singular ignorance of the topog¬ 
raphy of the vicinity, as well as of what was occurring. 
He says that the enemy’s line was on the bank of the river. 
It was at right angles to and some three miles from it. He 
says that soon after his arrival I was brought from the 
right wounded. This proves that his “arrival” was near 
sunset. He also describes the moving of reenforcements 
from the left to the right. This was not being done. The 
right was abundantly strong. He says that he made a 
reconnaissance, then sent three couriers, one after the other, 
with an order to Magruder “to send a force” by the wooded 
path under the bluff, to attack the enemy in flank and re¬ 
verse. If the first courier had been dispatched before the 
reconnaissance, and delivered the order to Magruder 
promptly his “force” marching little more than a mile by 


— 456 — 


Manassas to Seven Pines 


the straight Nine mile road, could scarcely have come up 
before dark. The routes described would have been (if 
found) five or six miles long. 

The only thing he ought to have done, or had time to 
do, was to have postponed almost twenty hours—the putting 
General Lee, who was near, in command of the army. 

The operations of the Confederate troops in this battle 
were very much retarded by the broad ponds of rain-water, 
in many places more than knee-deep, by the deep mud, and 
by the dense woods and thickets that covered the ground. 

Brigadier-General Hatton was among the killed, and 
Brigadier-General Pettigrew and Hampton were severely 
wounded. The latter kept his saddle and served to the end 
of the action. Among the killed on the Williamsburg road 
were Colonels Moore, of Alabama, Jones and Lomax. In 
the two days' battle, the Confederate loss, so far as the 
reports indicate, was 6134 (including the loss in G. W. 
Smith’s division, w T hich was 1283) ; and the Federal loss, 
according to the revised returns, was 5031. 

Prisoners to the number of 350, 10 pieces of artillery, 
6700 muskets and rifles in excellent condition, a garrison 
flag and 4 regimental colors, medical, commissary, quar¬ 
termaster and ordnance stores, tents and sutler’s property, 
were captured and secured. 

The troops on the ground at nightfall were: on the 
Confederate side, 22 brigades, more than half of which had 
not been in action, and on the Federal side 6 divisions in 
3 corps, two-thirds of which had fought, and half of which 
had been totally defeated. Two Federal divisions at Fair 
Oaks, and three and a half at Savage’s, three miles off, and 
half a one two miles nearer Bottom’s Bridge. The Southern 
troops were united, and in a position to overwhelm either 
fraction of the Northern army, while holding the other in 
check. 

Officers of the Federal army have claimed a victory at 
Seven Pines. The Confederates had such evidences of vic¬ 
tory as cannon, captured intrenchments, and not only sleep¬ 
ing on the field, but passing the following day there, so 
little disturbed by the Federal troops as to gather, in woods, 


- 457 — 


Battles and Leaders of the Civil War 


thickets, mud, and water, 6700 muskets and rifles.* Besides 
the Federal army had been advancing steadily until the day 
of this battle; after it they made not another step forward, 
but employed themselves industriously in intrenching. 

In a publication of mine (“Johnston’s Narrative”) 
made in 1874, I attempted to show that General Lee did 
not attack the enemy until June 26th, because he was en¬ 
gaged from June 1st until then in forming a great army, 
bringing to that which I had commanded 15,000 men from 
North Carolina under General Holmes, 22,000 from South 
Carolina and Georgia, and above 16,000 in the divisions of 
Jackson and Ewell. My authority for the 15,000 was Gen¬ 
eral Holmes’s statement May 31st, that he had that number 
waiting the President’s order to join me. When their 
arrival was announced, I supposed the number was as stated. 

General Ripley, their best-informed and senior officer, 
was my authority for the 22,000 from South Carolina and 
Georgia. I thought, as a matter of course, that all of these 
troops had been brought up for the crisis. Mr. Davis 
is eager to prove that but 2 of the 4 bodies of them came 
to Richmond in time. One who, like me, had opportunity 
to observe that Mr. Davis was almost invariably too late 
in reenforcing threatened from unthreatened points, has no 
apology for the assumtion that this was an exception. Gen¬ 
eral Ripley reported officially that he brought 5000 from 
Charleston, and explained in writing that, arriving before 
them, he was assigned to the command of the brigade of 
2366, his 5000 being distributed as they arrived in detach¬ 
ments. General Lawton stated in writing that he brought 


*The Union position at Fair Oaks was, in general, maintained 
on both days of the battle. Part of the field at Seven Pines was 
regained on the second day (June 1st) by the troops of General 
Heintzelman, who reported that “our troops pushed as far forward 
as the battlefield of the previous day, where they found many of our 
wounded and those of the enemy.” General Daniel E. Sickles, who 
led the advance on Seven Pines on the 1st, states in his report that 
“the fields were strewn with Enfield rifles, marked ‘Tower, 1862/ 
and muskets marked ‘Virginia/ thrown away by the enemy in his 
hurried retreat. In the camp occupied by General Casey and Gen¬ 
eral Couch Saturday, before the battle of Seven Pines, we found 
rebel caissons filled with ammunition, a large number of small arms 
and several baggage wagons.”— Editors. 


— 458 — 



Manassas to Seven Pines 


about 6000 men from Georgia to the Valley; but as they 
had never marched before, they were incapable of moving 
at Jackson’s rate, and he estimated that 2500 had been un¬ 
able to keep their places when they arived at Gaines’s Mill, 
where, as he states, he had 3500. But the laggards re¬ 
joined him in two or three days. 

I estimated Jackson’s and Ewell’s forces at 16,000 be¬ 
cause Ewell told me that his was 8000 and Jackson’s had 
been usually about twenty-five per cent larger. Mr. Davis 
puts the joint force at 8000. His authority has stated it 
also at 12,000 (see “Personal Reminiscences of General 
Lee,” p. 6), and this is far below the fact. My object in 
this is to show that I consulted respectable authorities. Mr. 
Davis proves that his forces were not well employed. 

* * * * * H= * 


— 459 — 


IV 

Two Days’ Battle of Seven Pines* (Fair Oaks) 

By Gustavus W. Smith, 

Major General , C.S.A. 


Where the Williamsburg “old stage” road is intersected 
by the Nine-mile road, at a point seven miles east of Rich¬ 
mond was fought the first great contest between the Con¬ 
federate Army of Northern Virginia and the Federal Army 
of the Potomac. The junction of these two roads is called 
Seven Pines. About one mile from Seven Pines, where the 
Nine-mile road crosses the Richmond and the York River 
Railroad, there is a station called Fair Oaks. Before the 
action ended there was a good deal of fighting near the 
latter place. The Federals called the action of May 31st 
and June 1st the battle of Fair Oaks. 

Before describing this contest, a sketch will be given 
of the movements of the two armies from the time the 
Confederates withdrew from Williamsburg. It is well, how¬ 
ever, to say here that, in preparing an account of the battle, 
I have felt constrained to refer to some important matters 
in more detail than would have been considered essential, 
if there was not such direct conflict of “high authorities” 
in regard to them. For instance, nearly all the descriptions 
of this action heretofore published give as the intention 
of the Confederate commander that Longstreet’s division 
was to move to the Williamsburg road and support D. H. 
Hill’s division on that road. In “asserting” that this is 
an error, I have felt that, under the circumstances, it is 
incumbent on me to prove what I say on that subject. 

It is broadly stated by many authorities, that General 
Johnston intended Huger’s division should attack the Fed- 


*In the Confederate attack, in the irregular and desperate fight¬ 
ing, and in the duration and changing success of this first great battle 
in the East, there are striking resemblances to (as well as wide diver¬ 
gences from) the two days’ battle at Shiloh, the first great clash of 
arms in the West.— Editors. 


— 460 — 




Two Days’ Battle of Seven Pines 


eral left flank and rear, Huger’s attack to be followed by 
D. H. Hill’s division falling on the Federal front; and it is 
claimed by many that the slowness of Huger’s division 
caused the failure of complete Confederate success the first 
day. In refutation of these statements and claims, I have 
felt constrained to give proofs, and not leave the questions 
to be decided by mere “assertion.” 

The position of the Confederate troops at dark, May 
31st, has been erroneously stated by General Johnston, and 
in such particularity of detail as at the time to satisfy me 
that, in the main, he was correct. But the “Official Rec¬ 
ords,” recently published, show beyond question that Gen¬ 
eral Johnston is in error on this point. It had, therefore, 
been considered necessary in this article to give definite 
proof in regard to the position of the Confederate forces 
when the command of the army devolved upon me, by 
reason of General Johnston’s being wounded. His state¬ 
ment of the reasons for my not having ordered the attack 
to be renewed the next morning (June 1st) calls for specific 
proof that I did order the attack to be renewed, and for 
a detailed exhibit of General Longstreet’s battlefield notes 
to me on that day. 

Without specifying further, at this time, in regard to 
the “misunderstanding,” misapprehension, and other causes 
that have led to erroneous published accounts of important 
events in this battle—to some extent on the Federal but 
more on the Confederate side,—it may be added that the 
recent publication of the “Official Records,” when carefully 
studied, throws a great deal of light upon these events, the 
accounts of which have heretofore been nearly as dark 
and confusing as were the dense, tangled wood and swamps 
in which most of the close and desperate fighting took 
place. The Federal accounts, as now officially published, 
are full; they embrace the reports of nearly every regi¬ 
mental, brigade, division, and corps commander engaged; 
but many of the Confederate reports are missing, those 
in D. H. Hill’s division being the only ones that are com¬ 
plete in regard even to brigade commanders. There are, 
however, enough others, when taken in connection with 


— 461 — 


Battles and Leaders of the Civil War 


the full Federal reports, to give quite a clear understanding 
of the main facts on both sides. 

The affair at Williamsburg, May 5th, was an incident in 
the withdrawal of the Confederate army from its fortified 
lines near Yorktown, to the open country between the Pa- 
munkey and the Chickahominy Rivers, where General Johns¬ 
ton intended to halt, near the Richmond and York River 
Railroad, and contest the farther advance of General Mc¬ 
Clellan’s army. From Williamsburg, Longstreet’s and 
Hill’s divisions, both under General Longstreet, moved on 
the Charles City road, which crosses the Chickahominy at 
Long Bridge; the division of G. W. Smith and Magruder’s 
forces—commanded by him before Johnston’s army arrived 
at the Yorktown lines,—moved on the road that passes 
through Barhamsville and New Kent Court House and 
crosses the Chickahominy at Bottom’s Bridge. All the 
Confederate troops on the latter road were under my com¬ 
mand, and they were followed by the Federal army. Ex¬ 
cepting occasional collisions between our rearguard and the 
Federal advance-guard, nothing of special interest occurred 
after we left Barhamsville, near which place, below West 
Point, the Federals landed quite a large force, and seemed 
disposed to move out against us, General Johnston ordered 
nearly the whole of his army to Barhamsville, and came 
there in person. The next day, May 7th, the Federal skir¬ 
mishers advanced but cut them off from their gun boats. 
At this point there was a good deal of sharp fighting for 
several hours.* From this time the Confederates were 


*Reference is had here to the York River expedition, under Gen¬ 
eral W. B. Franklin, which McClellan dispatched from Yorktown on 
the 5th with instructions to seize and hold a landing near West Point, 
situated at the confluence of the York and Pamunkey rivers, and the 
terminus of the Richmond and York River railroad. This movement 
on West Point, if successful, would secure the so-called Urbana route 
of communications, the advantages of which are explained in McClel¬ 
lan’s letter to the War Department of March 19th, 1862. 

Franklin moved up the York River on the 6th, his troops in 
transports and under convoy of a number of gunboats, and made a 
landing the same day. General Franklin in a letter on this subject, 
dated Nov. 25th, 1881, says: 

“My instructions were to await orders after landing, and not to 
advance. We were attacked on the 7th, the object of the enemy being 


— 462 — 



Two Days' Battle of Seven Pines 

more worried by the deep mud through which they were 
patiently trudging than they were by any movements of 
the Federals. In a letter to me from Palo Alto, on the 
Charles City road, dated Headquarters, Second Corps, May 
8th, General Longstreet says: 

“If your road can beat this for mud, I don’t want to see it.” “If 
you see the General (Johnston) say to him that we are as happy as 
larks over here, till we get 126 wagons (the total number) up to the 
hub at one time.” “I don’t fear McClellan or any one in Yankeedom.” 

When my command had passed the Baltimore Cross¬ 
roads, four and a half miles west of New Kent Court House, 
and had reached the position about halfway between the 
Pamunkey and Chickahominy rivers, on good ground, they 
were halted. Longstreet’s corps was again within easy 
supporting distance of mine, and General Johnston intended 
in that vicinity to contest the further advance of McClel¬ 
lan’s army. We remained there about five days. The 
troops, having rested from the tiresome service in the 
trenches near Yorktown, and the fatiguing march, were 
now furnished with abundant supplies from Richmond, and 
were elated at the prospect of meeting the enemy on an 
open field of battle. 

General Johnston then supposed that something effec¬ 
tive had been done by the Government for the local de¬ 
fense of Richmond, during the month that had elapsed 
since his army moved from there to the peninsula. On the 


to drive us into the river. We had not made any attempt to advance, 
as such an attempt would have been in conflict with my orders.” 

General John Newton, commander of the Federal Brigade most 
heavily engaged, states: 

“The enemy was not only repelled in his attempt upon our posi¬ 
tion but at the end of the day we occupied with our troops a position 
in advance of that held at the commencement of the action.” 

General Gustavus W. Smith, who commanded the Confederate 
troops engaged, says: 

“On the morning of the 7th, after becoming satisfied that the 
enemy did not intend to advance in force from under the protection of 
their guns boats, I directed General Whiting to drive their skirmishers 
from the dense woods, and endeavor to get position in the open ground 
between the woods and the river, from which he could reach their 
place of landing and their transports with his artillery fire.” 

In this action the Union losses were 48 killed, 110 wounded, 28 
missing; total, 186. The Confederate losses were 8 killed and 40 
wounded; total 48.— Editors. 


— 463 — 



Battles and Leaders of the Civil War 


14th of May he learned, through his chief engineer, that 
little or nothing—either in the way of fortifications or of 
troops—had been provided; and that the enemy, on the 
James River, were above City Point, and threatening Drew- 
ry’s Bluff, as well as the obstruction in the Appomattox, 
four and a half miles below Petersburg. This report 
closed with the remark: “The danger is on the south side 
of James River.” 

On the same day General Johnston received intelligence 
of the destruction of the Confederate iron-clad Virginia 
—called by the Federals the Merrimac. The next day news 
was received of the attack on Drewry’s Bluff (see p. 271), 
and of the confusion and fright in Richmond. In this state 
of affairs, General Johnston decided that it was expedient 
to cross the Chickahominy and take position nearer the 
city, rather than continue to wait, north of that stream, 
for the advance of McClellan from the Pamunkey. Ac¬ 
cordingly, orders were issued that night for Longstreet’s 
“corps” to cross the Chickahominy at Long Bridge, and for 
my command to cross at Bottom’s Bridge. A regiment of 
riflemen was sent direct to aid in the defense of Drewry’s 
Bluff. On the 17th, the James River defenses, D. H. Hill’s 
division, on Longstreet’s left, guarded the Charles City 
road, and was about three miles from Richmond; G. W. 
Smith’s division was on the Williamsburg road, and north 
of it, two or three miles from the city, with one brigade in 
observation at Bottom’s Bridge; whilst Magruder’s troops 
extended from Old Tavern, on the Nine-mile road, to New 
Bridge, thence along the crest of the Chickahominy Bluffs 
to the Mechanicsville road. 

McClellan’s army approached the Chickahominy slowly. 
On the 23d Keyes’s corps crossed at Bottom’s Bridge; on 
the 25th he reached the position known later as the “third 
line of defense,” at which point, as well as at Bottom’s 
Bridge, strong earth-works were constructed; on the 27th 
the leading division of Keyes’s corps occupied and com¬ 
menced to fortify a position across the Williamsburg road 
at Seven Pines. In the meantime Heintzelman’s corps had 
crossed at Bottom’s Bridge; one division remained near that 


- 464 — 


Two Days’ Battle of Seven Pines 

place, and the other division was posted at White Oak 
Bridge. Three corps of McClellan’s army were still on the 
north side of the Chickahominy, their left near the railroad, 
their right, thrown back in a naturally strong position, on 
the left bank of Beaver Dam Creek, with an intrenched out¬ 
post at Mechanicsville. All the bridges and fords along 
the Chickahominy in their front were in possession of the 
Federals; and they were rapidly constructing new bridges. 

In the meantime there had been no material change in 
the position of the Confederate forces. General Johnston 
was closely watching the movements of the Federals ap¬ 
proaching on the Williamsburg road; but in his opinion, the 
proper time to strike McClellan’s left wing had not come. 
On the morning of the 27th our pickets were closely pressed 
just east of Old Tavern. This was some indication that the 
enemy were probably coming nearer in large force, and 
would soon be within our effective reach, on the Williams¬ 
burg or Nine-mile road, or on both. Our attention was, 
however, almost immediately diverted to McClellan’s right 
flank, on the opposite side of the Chickahominy. 

At 1 P.M. that day I received a note from General Johns¬ 
ton, stating he had just been informed that McDowell was 
advancing from Fredericksburg in force. This put a new 
phase on Confederate affairs around Richmond. It was well 
understood by us that McDowell was advancing and had an 
army of about 40,000 men ;* McClellan’s forces were known 
to be about 100,000 and we could not afford to wait until 
McDowell reached him. 

General Johnston determined to attack the Federal 
right before McDowell could come up. I was ordered to 
move my division to the vicinity of Meadow Bridge, bring 
up A. P. Hill’s division from the vicinity of Ashland, and 
make preparations as soon as possible to attack at Mechan¬ 
icsville and Beaver Dam Creek. Longstreet’s division was 
ordered to take position north and east of Richmond, and 
D. H. Hill’s division was ordered to the ground vacated by 

*About 35,000, effectives. McDowell asked for subsistence for 
38,000 men, including, of course, the non-effectives.— Editors . 


— 465 - 



Battles and Leaders of the Civil War 

mine on the Williamsburg road. Magruder’s troops were 
not moved; but, at my request, I was relieved from longer 
commanding General Magruder, and he was ordered to re¬ 
port, in future, direct to General Johnston. At the same 
time D. R. Jones’s division, two brigades, of Magruder’s 
proper command, posted on our extreme left, remained tem¬ 
porarily under my control, for service in the proposed at¬ 
tack. Brigadier General Whiting was regularly assigned, 
temporarily, to the command of my division. 

About sunset, May 28th, I reported to General Johns¬ 
ton that A. P. Hill’s division would be close in front of 
Mechanicsville, on the north side of the Chickahominy, be¬ 
fore midnight, with orders to attack that place at dawn on 
the 29th. As soon as A. P. Hill’s attack commenced my • 
division and D. R. Jones’s division would cross the Meadow' 
and Mechanicsville bridges, and the three divisions, consti¬ 
tuting the new left wing of Johnston’s army under my com¬ 
mand would make a prompt and combined attack on the 
right of the Federals, strongly posted at Beaver Dam Creek. 

I was satisfied that the three divisions could carry the works 
at that place by open assault, but it would be a bloody busi¬ 
ness—called for, however, by the necessity for prompt ac¬ 
tion before McDowell could join McClellan. I did not know, 
in any detail, what General Johnston intended to do with the 
rest of his forces during the contest I was ordered to ini¬ 
tiate, but I was perfectly satisfied that he would use the 
whole strength of his army against McClellan and, if pos¬ 
sible, defeat him before McDowell could arrive. 

On receiving my report General Johnston stated that 
his latest information showed McDowell’s army had returned 
to Feredericksburg; and it was believed he was moving 
north from that place. In this state of affairs, there was 
no longer any necessity for crossing the Chickahominy, at¬ 
tacking the three Federal corps on the north side of that 
stream, and moving against the very strong position at 
Beaver Dam Creek; while there were but two Federal corps 
on our side, gradually coming within striking distance where 
the natural features of the ground were not against us. 
General Johnston ordered the contemplated attack on the 


— 466 — 


Two Days' Battle of Seven Pines 

Federal right to be suspended, and directed me to with¬ 
draw A. P. Hill’s division, bring it to the south side of the 
Chickahominy, and place it on our extreme left. 

General Longstreet, who was present, then proposed 
that an attack be made early next morning, the 29th, in the 
direction of Seven Pines. General Johnston said that it was 
not quite certain that McDowell had moved north; the dis¬ 
position made of our troops whilst it was supposed McDowell 
was coming was too strong on the left to admit of immediate 
and advantageous attack being made in the direction of 
Seven Pines; that Huger’s division from Norfolk was ex¬ 
pected to join us very soon; and that the enemy, east of 
us, had not yet approached near enough, in force worth 
crushing, to justify the engagement of the mass of our 
army in the swamps around Seven Pines, whilst the Federals 
were threatening the city on the north side. No orders 
were given to attack on the 29th, but it was distinctly un¬ 
derstood that, in case McDowell did not promptly come on, 
General Johnston would revert to his former intention, and 
endeavor to strike a sudden, and, if possible, crushing blow, 
in full force, against the Federals in the vicinity of Seven 
Pines, and destroy them before they could be reenforced 
either from the troops in their rear, now on our side of the 
Chickahominy or by forces sent across from the opposite 
side. When I was assigned to the command of the left 
wing of the army, General Longstreet became the ranking 
officer on the right and was anxious to attack in that direc¬ 
tion on the 29th. These matters are mentioned in General 
Johnston’s letter of that date to General Whiting. 

On the 30th my division, under Whiting, was drawn 
back to ground about midway between Meadow Bridge and 
Richmond; and A. P. Hill’s division was brought nearer the 
bridges. The other commands were still in the positions 
to which they were assigned when it was first heard that 
McDowell was moving to join McClellan. In the meantime 
Huger’s division had arrived and was encamped east of the 
city, north of the Williamsburg road, on Gillis’s Creek. 

About noon on the 30th General D. H. Hill reported 
to General Johnston that reconnaissances satisfied him that 


— 467 — 


Battles and Leaders of the Civil War 


the enemy was not in force on the Charles City road, but 
was on the Williamsburg road and fortified about Seven 
Pines. General Johnston promptly determined to attack. 
His intention was that General Longstreet’s division should 
move by the Nine-mile road, that of General D. H. Hill by 
the Williamsburg stage road, and General Huger’s by the 
Charles City road. In his order for my division to move, 
a copy of which was sent by him direct to Whiting, General 
Johnston says: 

“Please be ready to move by the Nine-mile road, coming as 
early as possible to the point at which the road to New Bridge 
turns off (at Old Tavern). Should there be cause of haste, 
General McLaws on your approach, will be ordered to leave his 
ground for you, that he may reenforce General Longstreet.” 

In written instructions, May 30th, to Huger, General 
Johnston says: 

“I wish to concentrate the troops of your division on the Charles 
City road ... Be ready if an action should be begun on your 
left, to fall upon the enemy’s left flank.” 

On May 31st General Johnston wrote to General Huger; 

“I fear that in my note of last evening of which there is no 
copy, I was too positive on the subject of your attacking the enemy’s 
left flank ... It will be necessary for your progress to the 
front to conform at first to that of General Hill. If you find no 
strong body in your front, it will be well to aid General Hill; but 
then a strong reserve should be retained to cover our right.” 

There seem to have been no written instructions 
given either to General Longstreet or to General D. H. 
Hill; but, in his official report, General Johnston says the 
divisions of G. W. Smith, Longstreet, D. H. Hill, and 
Huger were ordered to move at daybreak. At sunrise, 
General Johnston confidentialy expected that Keyes’s corps 
would be crushed or routed before 8 a.m. At that season 
daybreak was at about 4 a.m. Magruder’s command and 
A. P. Hill’s division were not moved. 

In order to form a proper conception of Johnston’s 
plan it will be well to glance at the position of the Federal 
forces on the morning of May 31st. One division of 
Keyes’s corps was across the Williamsburg road, a little 
more than a half mile west of Seven Pines; the other divi- 


— 468 — 


Two Days' Battle of Seven Pines 


sion was across the road at Seven Pines. Both lines were 
strengthened by rifle-pits extending a short distance on 
each side of the road, with abatis or felled timber in front. 
In the first line there was a small unfinished pentangular 
redoubt; and the abatis of the second line extended in a 
curve to the rear, across the Nine-mile road. The left of 
the position was protected by the almost impracticable 
White Oak Swamp. But the ground on the right offered 
no strong features for defense and was not fortified. About 
one thousand yards in front of the first line of rifle-pits, 
and nearly at right angles to the Williamsburg road, a 
skirmish line, extended from the White Oak Swamp to 
the Chickahominy River. Two regiments were detached 
to support the skirmish line—one near the railroad, the 
other to the right on the Nine-mile road; whilst two regi¬ 
ments and a battery were detached and posted near Fair 
Oaks Station, to guard the depot of supplies at that place, 
where there were no artificial defenses. Keyes’s lines were 
provided with ample artillery. On the morning of the 31st 
the two divisions were in camp just in rear of the earth¬ 
works; whilst strong working parties were engaged upon 
the unfinished trenches and other artificial defenses. 

The “third line of defense,” across the Williamsburg 
road, two miles in rear of the first line, was unoccupied, 
Heintzelman’s corps was five miles in rear of Seven Pines; 
and Sumner’s corps was three or four miles from Keyes, 
with the Chickahominy between them. The two other 
Federal corps on the north side of that stream were still 
farther off. In this part of its course the Chickahominy, 
at ordinary stages of water, is a sluggish stream, from 
thirty to sixty feet in width, from three to four feet deep, 
with low, muddy banks. It is bordered by flat bottom-lands 
for some distance, to the foot of rather abrupt bluffs about 
one hundred feet high. In times of freshet it raises 
rapidly, extends over the bottom-lands in depth of two or 
three feet to the bluffs; and at this stage the stream becomes 
a very serious military obstacle. 


— 469 — 


Battles and Leaders of the Civil War 


The ground upon which Keyes’s corps fought that 
day is level, or very slightly undulating, and most of it, 
except the small open spaces at the earth-works, was densely 
wooded and swampy. The soil in all that region, when wet, 
is very soft and spongy, making passage over it difficult 
even for infantry. In the dense woods the thick under¬ 
growth is matter with tangled vines, and the luxuriant 
foliage, in the full bloom of spring, rendered it in many 
places impossible to distinguish objects ten paces distant. 
A violent rain-storm set in about 5 P.M. on the 30th, a 
few hours after General Johnston had determined to attack 
next morning. The heavy rain continued all night and 
the face of the country was literally flooded. At daylight 
on the 31st the .Chickahominy was booming, passable only 
at the bridges, and continued to rise during the day, al¬ 
though it had ceased to rain. 

General Keyes gives a still closer view of his condition 
at that time. On the morning of the 31st he reported to 
General McClellan’s chief-of-staff: 

“Everything on the part of the Confederates indicates an 
attack on my position, which is only tolerably strong, and my forces 
are too weak to defend it properly. Brigadier-General Sumner 
told me yesterday he should probably cross the Chickahominy last 
night. If he did so, and takes post nigh Old Tavern and this side, 
I should feel more secure than I do now.” 

Sumner did not cross at that time referred to, and there 
is no other indication that he had orders or authority to 
do so. But General Keyes’s report, made that morning, 
develops the fact that there was a dangerous gap between 
these two corps, and shows that there was a strong prob¬ 
ability that it would soon be filled by Sumner’s corps. In 
his “Fifty-Years’ Observations,” General Keyes says: 

“The left of my lines was all protected by the White Oak Swamp, 
but the right was on ground so favorable to the approach of the enemy, 
and so far from the Chickahominy, that if Johnston had attacked 
there an hour or two earlier than he did, I could have made but a 
feeble defense comparatively, and every man of us would have 
been killed, captured, or driven into the swamp or river before 
assistance could have reached us.” 

Isolated as Keyes’s corps was, every effort should 
have been made to strongly fortify the ground it occupied. 


— 470 — 


Two Days’ Battle of Seven Pines 


The defenses in front were weak and incomplete. The 
vulnerable and easy accessible right flank, the point at 
which attack ought to have been expected, because Confed¬ 
erate success at that place would have cut the Federal army 
in two, and would have exposed its left wing to destruc¬ 
tion—ought to have been strongly fortified instead of being 
left entirely open. All this would have been practically 
illustrated if General Johnston’s intentions had been carried 
into effect—that is, if Longstreet’s division in full force 
had struck Keyes’s right flank near Fair Oaks, when D. H. 
Hill’s division moved against Keyes’s front. But, through 
a “misunderstanding,” General Longstreet transferred his 


MAP SHOWING POSITIONS PRELIMINARY TO THE BATTLE OF SEVEN PINES 



— 471 — 













Battles and Leaders of the Civil War 


own division to the Williamsburg road, instead of moving 
to the attack by the Nine-mile road, and he caused that di¬ 
vision to take precedence of Huger’s division at the cross¬ 
ing of Gilliss Creek, which at daylight was a raging torrent. 
General Huger, in a report, says: “Longstreet’s division 
got to the road at the crossing firstand adds that his own 
troops “had to wait until they (Longstreet’s division) had 
passed. The delay after that was the time necessary to 
cross.”* 

Captain B. Sloan, of Huger’s staff, says in a letter 
dated August 17th, 1885: 

“Longstreet’s brigades as they successively reached the plain 
above the creek halted and remained for an hour or two resting ou 
their arms. This plain (in front of General Huger’s headquarters) 
was perhaps between three and four miles in rear of the battle-field. 
Here at a farm-house, Huger met Longstreet and Hill, and a dis¬ 
cussion was had as to the movements of the divisions, and as to the 
relative rank of the division commanders. Longstreet claimed (by 
instructions from General Johnston) to be in command of that 
portion of the army. After protest Huger acquiesced.” 


*On the 20th of September, 1862, General Huger wrote to Gen¬ 
eral Johnston: 

“I beg to refer you to my letter of the 20th ultimo. I have waited 
one month, and no reply has been received from General Longstreet. 
As you have indorsed his erroneous statements, to my injury, I must 
hold you responsible, and desire to know from you if you have any 
reason to believe an answer will be made by General Longstreet. 
You must perceive that by postponing an answer your published 
report is allowed to go down in history as true. I cannot conceive 
that you desire to perpetrate such an injustice, for, though it may 
ruin me, I cannot redound to your credit ... I send you here¬ 
with an abstract of such parts of your reports as refer to my divi¬ 
sion, with my remarks annexed, to which I invite your attention.” 

In Huger’s abstract of Johnston’s report we find: 

“Major-General Longstreet, unwilling to make a partial attack 
. . . . waited from hour to hour for General Huger’s division. 

Had Major-General Huger’s division been in position and ready 
for action when those of Smith, Longstreet, and Hill moved, I am 
satisfied that Keyes’s corps would have been destroyed instead of 
merely defeated . . . Had it gone into action at 4 o’clock, the 

victory would have been much more complete.” 

In his remarks on these abstracts, Huger says: 

“When General Longstreet’s troops moved to support General 
Hill’s attack, General Huger’s division moved down the Charles City 
road at the same time with three brigades of Longstreet’s division. . 
to the last paragraph I have only to say that if (Huger’s division) 
did not go into action by 4 o’clock, it was because General Longstreet 
did not require it, as it was in position and awaiting his orders.”— 
G. W. S. 


— 472 — 



Two Days' Battle of Seven Pines 


It was “then possibly 10 a.m. or 11 a.m.” After 
that time “Huger’s movements were directed by Long- 
street.” 

Governor William E. Cameron, who was then adjutant 
of the 12th Virginia, of Mahone’s brigade, Huger’s division, 
says: 

“Longstreet (three brigades) moved that morning from Fair- 
field race-course, and arrived at the crossing of the (Gilliss) creek 
in front of the command. We waited till Longstreet cleared the way— 
crossed the creek about 10:30 a.m.— moved as far as the Tudor 
House—rested there until 1 P.M.” (Mahone’s brigade then moved 
out on the Charles City road) ; “the men were fresh, eager, and in 
light marching-trim. The roads were bad, but there was no physi¬ 
cal obstruction of any moment, and we met no enemy.” 

The following is from a letter by General R. E. Coleton, 
commander of one of the three brigades of Longstreet’s 
division that moved at 6:30 A.M., from a point three miles 
out on the Nine-mile road: 

“A little brook (Gilliss Creek) near Richmond was greatly 
swollen, and a long time was wasted crossing it on an improvised 
bridge made of planks, a wagon mid-stream serving as a trestle. 
Over this the division passed in single file, you may imagine with what 
delay. If the division commander had given orders for the men to 
sling their cartridge-boxes, haversacks, etc., on their muskets and 
wade without breaking formation, they could have crossed by fours 
at least, with water up to their waists .... and hours would 
have been saved . . . When we got across we received orders to 

halt on the roadside until Huger’s division passed us. There we 
waited for five or six hours.” 

These movements of Longstreet’s division are in very 
marked contrast with General Johnston’s intention that 
this division should start at daylight, move on the Nine-mile 
road and attack the enemy on D. H. Hill’s left, as early 
as possible that morning. 

At 6:30 a.m. General D. H. Hill wrote to General 
Rodes: 

“I am ordered to attack the enemy this morning . . . Have 

your men ready to start at a moment’s notice.” 

Rodes’s brigade was in observation, three and a half 
miles out, on the Charles City Road, and had to cross an 
almost impracticable swamp in order to reach the position 
on the Williamsburg road from which Hill’s division was 


- 473 - 


Battles and Leaders of the Civil War 


to advance to the attack. General Rodes says that the 
order to move reached him between 10 and 11 a.m. and 
adds: 

“The progress of the brigade was considerably delayed by the 
washing away of a bridge near the head of White Oak Swamp . . 
At this point the character of the crossing was such that it was 
absolutely necessary to proceed with great caution, to prevent the 
loss of both ammunition and life.” 

When the signal for attack was given, only two regi¬ 
ments of Rodes’s brigade had reached Hill’s position on the 
Williamsburg road, about one thousand yards in front of 
the Federal picket-line. But the other regiments of this 
brigade came up soon after. At 1 o’clock the signal guns 
were fired, and Hill’s division at once moved forward. 

The foregoing details in reference to the movements 
of these three divisions could not well be omitted, because 
General Johnston “asserts” that the divisions of Hill and 
Longstreet were in position early enough “to be ready to 
commence operations by 8 A.M.,” and that General Long- 
street “waited from hour to hour for General Huger’s di¬ 
vision.” Having thus seen D. H. Hill’s division start out 
alone at 1 p.m. to attack the Federals, it will be well to 
glance at the preparations made to receive him. 

Whilst his troops were coming into position, their 
movements had been reported to General Silas Casey, who 
commanded the Federal first line of defense. He at once 
ordered one regiment to go forward about eight hundred 
yards on the Williamsburg road, and support the picket 
line; the working parties were called in, batteries har¬ 
nessed up and the troops formed, ready to take their assigned 
places. In a short time the Confederate signal guns 
were heard, and the division was ordered into position 
to resist attack. The camps of these troops were immedi¬ 
ately in rear of the earth-works. Palmer’s brigade on 
the left, Wessells’s in the center, and Naglee’s on the right. 
Two regiments of Naglee’s brigade were detached, support¬ 
ing the picket-line, as already stated. About one-half of 
this division was placed in the rifle-pits on the right and 
left of the redoubt; the others were put in front, with 


— 474 — 


Two Days' Battle of Seven Pines 


orders to contest the advance of the Confederates against 
the first abatis, and Spratt’s battery was placed four hun¬ 
dred yards in advance of the earthworks, on the north side 
of the road, closely supported by three regiments of 
Naglee’s brigade and one of Palmer’s. 

In moving to attack, Rodes’s brigade was on the south 
side of the road, supported by Raines; Garland’s brigade, 
on the north side of the road, was supported by G. B. Ander¬ 
son. All were in the dense and marshy woods, wading 
through water occasionally from two to three feet deep, 
the whole way obstructed by undergrowth, which often pre¬ 
vented commanders from seeing more than one company of 
their men at a time. General Hill had taken the precaution 
to order every man to wear in action a white strip of cloth 
around his hat as a battle-badge. Garland moved a few 
minutes before Rodes was ready. His skirmishers soon 
struck the Federal picket-line, and the shock of Garland’s 
brigade fell upon the small regiment of raw troops that 
had been ordered into the woods to support the Federal 
pickets. That regiment fell back to the abatis just in time 
to prevent being enveloped and destroyed. And it was 
soon driven through the abatis in great disorder. It had 
lost about one-fourth its numbers in a few minutes, and was 
broken to pieces in crossing the abatis under close and 
deadly fire. This regiment could not again be rallied. Gen¬ 
eral Keyes says that it “retreated, joined by a great many 
sick. The numbers, as they passed down the road as 
stragglers, conveyed an exaggerated idea of surprise and 
defeat.” 

The field hospitals of the division were in the camps 
at the front; there was a large number of sick; some men 
of the working parties did not resume their arms and join 
their regiments; these, with the teamsters and army fol¬ 
lowers, suddenly finding themselves under the fire of a large 
Confederate force rapidly emerging from the dark woods, 
fled in wild disorder. 

But Garland, who encountered Spratt’s battery and 
its support at the first abatis, says: 


— 475 — 


Battles and Leaders of the Civil War 

“We had now reached the edge of the wood where the abatis 
impeded our farther advance, and the troops were under heavy fire. 
. . . The regimental commanders, who had received my orders to 

move by the left flank, were unable to effect the movement in good 
order under the galling fire. The alternative was adopted—to push 
the regiments forward through the abatis.” 

General Garland soon found that his brigade unaided 
could not accomplish the work in hand. His losses were 
very heavy. But he adds: “G. B. Anderson’s brigade ar¬ 
rived upon the field just at the proper time.” 

The latter officer, having put in three regiments to 
aid Garland, moved to the left with the 27th Georgia and 
endeavored to turn the right of the Federals. He encount¬ 
ered one of Naglee’s detached regiments and drove it back; 
but the other detached regiment of Naglee’s brigade came 
on the ground, and one regiment sent by General Keyes 
came up. G. B. Anderson then withdrew from the ad¬ 
vanced position he had gained, but continued the fighting 
on the ground where it had been commenced on this part 
of the field. 

In the meantime the contest around the battery at the 
abatis was close and desperate. Rodes’s brigade was 
hotly engaged on the south side of the road, and General 
Hill had ordered Carter’s battery to the front. The Fed¬ 
erals stubbornly held their ground, and Hill now detached 
General Rains to make a wide flank movement through 
the woods to the right in order to turn the left of Casey’s 
earth-works. From the edge of the wood, south of the 
Williamsburg road, Rain’s brigade commenced firing on 
the flank and rear of the troops posted in Casey’s rifle-pits. 
General Hill says: 

“I now noticed commotion in the camps and redoubt and in¬ 
dications of evacuating the position. Rodes took skillful advantage 
of this commotion, and moved up his brigade in beautiful order and 
took possession of the redoubt and rifle-pits.” 

Pending this contest for Casey’s earth-works, General 
Keyes had sent two regiments from the second line direct 
to Casey’s assistance, and a short time before those works 
were caried he sent General Couch, with two regiments, to 
attack the Confederate left, and thus relieve the pressure 


— 476 — 


Two Days’ Battle of Seven Pines 


on Casey's front. Before Couch could get into position 
Casey’s line was carried, and General Keyes made immedi¬ 
ate preparations for the defense of the line at Seven Pines, 
held by Couch’s division. Peck’s brigade was on the left, 
Deven’s in the center, and the regiments of Abercrombie’s 
brigade that had not been detached were on the right. 
Casey’s troops, in falling back from their earth-works, 
endeavored to make a stand at the abatis in front of 
Couch’s line and General Keyes sent forward one regiment 
of Devens’s brigade to assist in checking the advance of 
the Confederates. Casey’s men were driven through the 
abatis, and the regiment of Devens’s brigade was hurled 
back in disorder, and could not be rallied until they had 
retreated beyond the earth-works from which they had 
advanced. A large proportion of the men of Palmer’s and 
Wessells’s brigades having been thrown into great disorder 
whilst retiring through the second abatis, and finding the 
earth-works of the second line already crowded, continued 
to retreat; but some of them, with nearly the whole of 
Naglee’s brigade, remained upon the field. The Confed¬ 
erates in the immediate front of Seven Pines were now 
pressing into the second abatis, and there seemed to be 
strong probability that they would soon break through it 
and carry the earth-works of Keyes’s second line. Thus, 
after more than two hours’ close and bloody fighting, 
Hill’s division unaided had captured the Federal first line 
of defense, and was closely pressing upon their second line. 
Hill then sent to Longstreet for another brigade. In a few 
minutes “the magnificent brigade of R. H. Anderson” came 
to Hill’s support. The latter says: 

“A portion of this force, under Colonel Jenkins, consisting of 
the Palmetto Sharp-shooters and the 6th South Carolina, was sent 
on the extreme left to scour along the railroad and Nine-mile road, 
and thus get in rear of the enemy.” 

These two regiments were conducted by General (then 
Colonel) G. B. Anderson to the position in which he had 
left the 27th Georgia. The three regiments soon became 
engaged with the two regiments under General Couch, 
previously referred to. The latter says: 


— 477 — 


Battles and Leaders of the Civil War 


“I advanced with Neill’s and Ripper’s regiments through a 
close wood, moving by the flank. . . . We at once came upon 

a large column of the enemy in reserve, but apparently moving to¬ 
ward Fair Oaks. . . Immediately engaged. . . . Here Colonel 

Rippey and all his field officers fell, and in twenty minutes the enemy 
had passed over the (Nine-mile) road leading to my center, cutting 
off the advance at Fair Oaks.” 

In reference to this affair General Keyes says: 

“Both regiments were badly cut up . . . Casualties in 

Rippey’s amount to 263, and are heavier than in any other regiment 
in Couch’s division.” 

He adds that, after Couch was thrown back, Neill’s 
regiment “took part in the hard fighting which closed the 
day near the Seven Pines,” but Rippey’s regiment “with¬ 
drew in detachments, some of which came again into action 
near my headquarters.” 

So far, the fighting done by the Federal troops for 
the safety of their second line of defense was not so effec¬ 
tive as the resistance made by Casey’s division at the first 
line. After the three Confederate regiments had fought 
their way across the Nine-mile road, not far south of 
Fair Oaks Station, they changed direction and moved to¬ 
ward Seven Pines. Leaving them for the present, at¬ 
tention will be called to the state of affairs in the vicinity 
of the redoubt in Casey’s captured line. 

When General Hill ordered the two South Carolina 
regiments to join the 27th Georgia and “scour along the 
railroad and Nine-mile road, and thus get in rear of the 
enemy,” he directed General R. H. Anderson, with the 
other portion of his brigade, to attack the Federals in a 
wood north, and within cannon-range of the redoubt. This 
wood was then occupied by two regiments and some com¬ 
panies of Naglee’s brigade that had been, previous to the 
commencement of the action, supporting the picket line. 
In reference to the fighting at this point, General Naglee 
says in his official report: 

“The Confederates opened a most destructive cross fire upon 
them from the pieces near the redoubt that had not been spiked, 
and this, with the (musketry) fire from their immediate front, 
was no longer to be endured, and they (his men), were withdrawn 
and marched down to Nine-mile road and placed in position in rear 
of this road, about three hundred yards from the Seven Pines.” 


— 478 — 


Two Days’ Battle of Seven Pines 

Whilst these operations were in progress on Hill’s left, 
the state of affairs at the second abatis, just in front of 
Seven Pines, and in the woods south and east of the re¬ 
doubt had materially changed against the Confederates, who 
were first checked at the second abatis, and on the right 
were forced back to the redoubt. Previous to this the 
brigades of Rodes, Garland, and G. B. Anderson were en¬ 
gaged at the second abatis, and General Hill, having “re¬ 
solved to drive” the Federals out of the woods, on the 
south of the road, where they now appeared in strong 
force, ordered General Rains, who was near them, “to 
move farther to the right,” and adds: 

“I regret that that gallant and meritorius officer did not ad¬ 
vance farther in that direction. He would have taken the 
Yankee in flank, and the direct attack of Rodes in front would have 
been less bloody. The magnificent brigade of Rodes moved over 
the open ground to assault the Yankees, strongly posted in the 
woods. He met a most galling fire, and his advance was checked. 
A portion of his command met with a disastrous repulse. Kemper’s 
brigade was now sent me by General Longstreet, and directed by 
me to move directly to the support of Rodes. This brigade how¬ 
ever, did not engage the Yankees, and Rodes’s men were badly cut 
up.” 


General Rodes was severely wounded, but did not turn 
over the command of his brigade to the senior colonel, 
John B. Gordon, until the firing had ceased. The latter 
says: 

“Notified that I was placed in command, I reported to Major 
General Hill for orders. Under his direction I moved the brigade 
about half a mile to the rear, and ordered them to encamp on either 
side of the Williamsburg road.” 

General G. B. Anderson says: “After night we were 
ordered by the major-general commanding the division to 
take position in the woods in rear of the clearing.” That 
is, in the edge of the wood on the Richmond side of Casey’s 
line. General Garland says that his brigade bivouacked 
that night with G. B. Anderson’s. General Rains says that 
his brigade “ultimately passed the night in line of battle, 
without fire or light, in another part of the woods ready 
to receive and check the enemy, should he advance.” He 
makes no mention of any fighting done by his brigade 
after Casey’s camp was captured. 


— 479 — 


Battles and Leaders of the Civil War 


Attention will now be called to the Federal movements 
that caused the right of D. H. Hill's division to fall back 
from the second abatis. 

At 12 M. Berry’s brigade of Kearny’s division, from 
Bottom’s Bridge, arrived at the third line of defense; and 
about the same time Birney’s brigade, of the same divi¬ 
sion, reached the same line, but was near the railroad. 
At 3 p.m. the latter brigade was ordered to move along 
the railroad and support Keyes’s right; but owing to sub¬ 
sequent conflicting orders, it did not go into action that 
day. About 3:30 p.m. Berry’s brigade, now at the third 
line of defense, was ordered to Seven Pines to support 
Keyes; and at the same time, General Kearny “sent written 
orders for Jameson’s brigade, camped at tote-de-pont, near 
Bottom’s Bridge (three miles in rear), to come up without 
delay.” It was about 4 p.m. when the advance of Berry’s 
brigade reached Seven Pines. At that time one regiment 
of Devene’s brigade had just been routed in the second 
abatis. General Kearny says: “On arriving at the field 
of battle, we found certain zigzag rifle-pits sheltering 
crowds of men, and the enemy firing from abatis and tim¬ 
ber in their front.” Berry’s brigade was moved forward 
in the woods on the south side of the Williamsburg road. 
That officer says: “We steadily drove the enemy so far 
that I had serious fears of being flanked by the enemy, as 
they were driving our troops down the (Nine-mile) road.” 
He evidently refers to the effect being produced by the ad¬ 
vance of the three regiments under Colonel Jenkins. Gen¬ 
eral Berry adds: 

“We were at this time in the woods extending from the edge 
of the slashings up the woods and on the left (south) of the camp¬ 
ing-ground of General Casey’s division, completely commanding his 
old camp and the earth-works with our rifles.” 

In the meantime the head of Jameson’s brigade had 
reached the field. Two regiments were sent in advance 
of Seven Pines, in the abatis and woods on the south side 
of the road, supporting Berry’s brigade; one regiment was 
posted in the earth-works of the second line, and the other 
regiment of Jameson’s brigade had not yet come up. 


— 480 — 


Two Days’ Battle of Seven Pines 

General Kearny says: 

“It was perhaps near 6 o’clock, when our center and right (the 
forces in the earth-works at Seven Pines, and those that had been 
sent to resist the Confederates advancing in rear of the Nine-mile 
road) defended by troops of the other divisions, with all their will¬ 
ingness, could no longer resist the enemy’s right central flank 
attacks, pushed on with determined discipline and with the impul¬ 
sion of numerous concentrated masses. Once broken, our troops 
fled incontinently, and a dense body of the enemy pursuing rapidly, 
yet in order, occupied the Williamsburg road, . . . and, pen¬ 

etrating deep into the woods on either side, soon interposed between 
my division and my line of retreat. He says that he checked 
the enemy in his intent of cutting us off against the White Oak 
Swamp. This enabled the advance regiments to retire by a remain¬ 
ing wood path, known to our scouts (the Saw-mill road), until they 
once more arrived at and remained in the impregnable position (the 
third line of defense).” 

Besides Kearny's troops on the south side of the 
Williamsburg road, a large portion of those in the earth¬ 
works at Seven Pines retreated by the Saw-mill road; but 
some of the regiments from the earth-works, and others, 
that had been contesting Colonel Jenkins's advance along 
the Nine-mile road, fell back on the Williamsburg road. 
The latter were re-formed, and again contested Colonel 
Jenkins's advance. It does not appear that any of D. H. 
Hill’s division, except the regiment that was with Colonel 
Jenkins, succeeded in getting beyond the second abatis; but 
it is very certain that the effective fire, across that abatis, 
from Hill’s musketry and artillery, materially aided Colo¬ 
nel Jenkins in “bursting across the Williamsburg road.” 

Having given the Federal account of the manner in 
which the two South Carolina regiments and the 27tih 
Georgia forced their way to and crossed the Nine-mile road 
a little south of Fair Oaks, it is now proposed to give ex¬ 
tracts from Colonel Jenkins’s report, showing the advance 
of these three regiments to and across the Williamsburg 
road, and then along the latter road to a point within 
about one mile of the Federal third line of defense. Colo¬ 
nel Jenkins says: 

“I advanced my regiment through the abatis under a very heavy 
fire. ... I instructed Colonel Bratton (6th South Carolina) 
to keep his left touching my right; and the enemy’s line, after a 
stubborn resistance, having given way to our attack, ... I 
executed, under fire from the right front, a change of front obliquely 


— 481 — 


Battles and Leaders of the Civil War 


forward. . . We drove the enemy to the front and right, passing 

over their second camp . . . The ene^m^, heiavily reinforced, 
made a desperate stand, and our fighting was within seventy-five 
yards . . . Our advance continued . . . the enemy steadily 

giving back ... I halted the lines, dressed them, and then 
changed front obliquely forward . . . Our steady advance was 

not to be resisted . . . The enemy gave back to our left and 

right across the Williamsburg road, about a mile or more from Gen¬ 
eral Casey’s headquarters. Following the latter and heavier body, 
they were again reenforced and took position in a wood parallel 
(to) and about three hundred yards on the right (-south) of the 
Williamsburg road.” 

In describing his progress thus far, Colonel Jenkins 
speaks repeatedly of the obstinate resistance he met with, 
the terrible slaughter of the enemy, and his own severe 
losses. Bearing in mind the movement of Kearny’s troops 
in the meanwhile against D. H. Hill’s right, and the effect 
of Kearny’s fire on Rodes’s brigade, the Federals have 
good cause to regret the conflicting orders that prevented 
Birney’s brigade, on the railroad, from closely supporting 
Keyes’s right. It should be also borne in mind that, whilst 
Colonel Jenkins was fighting his way to the Williamsburg 
road, that there were four Federal regiments and a battery 
at Fair Oaks that had not been in action that day. Two 
of these regiments were the regular guards of the depot of 
supplies, and the other two had been ordered from Seven 
Pines to support Couch, but, missing their way, reached 
Fair Oaks just before the two regiments under Couch were 
cut up. It was very fortunate for the Confederates that 
Birney’s brigade and the force at Fair Oaks Station 
were not thrown against the rear of Colonel Jenkins’s 
three regiments, that were so gallantly fighting, and were 
also determinedly resisted in their brilliant movement to 
the Williamsburg road, in rear of the Federal second line 
of defense, and far in rear of Kearny’s successful advance. 

Resuming Colonel Jenkins’s account, it appears that 
five companies of his regiment pushed after that portion 
of the Federals which fell back along the Williamsburg road. 
With the rest of his force Colonel Jenkins was preparing 
to move against the enemy in the woods south of that road, 
when it was reported to him that a heavy column of Fed¬ 
erals was advancing upon the five companies. Learning 

— 482 — 


Two Days’ Battle of Seven Pines 


just then that the 5th South Carolina was not far to the 
rear, Colonel Jenkins sent for it to come up as soon as 
possible; ordered the commander of the five companies to 
advance upon the approaching Federal column, and deter¬ 
mined to break the enemy south of the road before the 
column advancing on the road could reach him. He says: 

“Having to pass across an open field on this advance, I lost 
heavily, but succeeded in routing and dispersing the enemy in my 
front, driving them at least a quarter of a mile; then, gathering my 
men promptly ... I moved by the flank . . . and took up 
line of battle oblique to the (Williamsburg) road and to the left, 
so as to present front at once to the enemy’s advance by the road 
and to any rallied party that might recover from my last attack. . . 
We had evidence of the near approach of the enemy by hearing 
their words of command and their cheers. ... I advanced 
my line toward them. . . . The enemy poured in a heavy fire 

. . . The supporting regiment (27th Georgia), under a terrible 

fire, gave back . . . The enemy, encouraged, redoubled his fire 

. . and advanced, and I determined to meet him. In prompt 

obedience, the two regiments . . . resumed their old, steady 

advance, firing full in the face of the foe. 

The two lines neared each other to 30 or 40 yards . . . 

Losing heavily I pressed on, and the enemy suddenly and slowly 
gave way. . . . We had advanced some 200 or 300 yards. . . . 
By this time . . . the 5th South Carolina . . . came up at a 
double-quick . . . The 27th Georgia . . . rallied and came 
forward . . . Jackson (5th South Carolina) came up on their 
right, sweeping before him the rallied fragments, who had collected 
and resumed fire from the woods to the right, and thus, at 7:40 p.m. 
we closed our busy day.” 

Out of thirteen brigades composing the right wing 
of the Confederate army, but five were put in close action 
that day. General Pickett says: 

“On the afternoon of May 31st, and just as the battle of Seven 
Pines was being opened by General Longstreet, I was directed by that 
officer to move with my brigade to the York River Railroad, cover the 
same, (and) repel any advance of the enemy up that road.” 

General Longstreet held Pickett's brigade back in that 
position until daybreak, June 1st. From this it would 
seem that Longstreet was not in need of help on that side 
from troops not under his command. Attention will now 
be called to the five brigades under Longstreet’s control 
on the Charles City road. 

General Wilcox, in his official report, says that the 
three brigades under his command were in camp near the 
“Mechanicsville” road. He tells me, however, that he had 

— 483 — 


Battles and Leaders of the Civil War 


no map of the country, knew very little about the names of 
of the roads, but distinctly remembers that the road his 
troops were on passed close to General Johnston's head¬ 
quarters near the northeast suburb of Richmond and led 
to New Bridge—that is, the Nine-mile road. Whatever 
may have been the name of the road on which the troops 
were in camp, he says that they were three and a half miles 
from the city, and moved, at 6:30 A.M., “by paths across 
to the junction of the Charles City and Williamsburg roads, 
and remained at this point till 3:30 P.M., I was then or¬ 
dered to move with three brigades—my own, Colston’s and 
Pryor’s—on the Charles City Road, in rear of a part of 
Huger’s division (Blanchard’s and Armistead’s brigades) 
as a support to these troops.” 

The Charles City road is south of the White Oak 
Swamp; it bears rapidly away from the point where the 
battle had been raging for more than two hours; and there 
was no enemy on that road. General Wilcox adds: 

“This order was soon modified, and my three brigades ordered 
to precede Huger’s two. Having passed Huger’s brigades, the 
march was continued but for a short time, when orders were again 
received, and this time to countermarch to the Williamsburg road 
and follow on in rear of the troops then advancing. The brigades 
had retraced their steps near one mile, and orders were given to face 
about and march down the Charles City road . . . Again orders 

were received in writing to move across to the Williamsburg road, 
following country roads and paths through woods and fields . . . 

in many places covered with water, and at one point waist deep. . . 

It was about 5 p.m. when the head of the column reached the 
Williamsburg road.” 

The plain words of General Wilcox, written at the 
time and addressed to his immediate commander, are more 
significant of the real truth than any skillfully formed 
sentences, framed now, could possibly be. With Wilcox’s 
report before him, General Longstreet says: 

“I was obliged to send three of my small brigades on the Charles 
City road to support the one of Major-General Huger’s which had 
been ordered to protect my right flank.” 

Three brigades of Huger’s division were then on that 
road. 

In order to form a proper conception of the folly ex¬ 
hibited by the marching and counter-marching of five Con- 


— 484 — 


Two Days’ Battle of Seven Pines 


federate brigades up and down the Charles City road 
between 3 and 5 P.M., it is necessary to glance at the move¬ 
ments then being made by the Federals from the north 
side of the Chickahominy. At 1 P.M., when the firing 
of Hill’s attack was first heard, General McClellan ordered 
General Sumner to form the two divisions of his corps, 
and be ready to move across the Chickahominy, at a 
moment’s notice, to aid Keyes. Sumner at once put his 
two divisions under arms, marched them to their respec¬ 
tive bridges, and, with the heads of the columns on the 
bridges, awaited further orders. General Sumner says: 
“At 2:30 o’clock p. m. I received the order to cross the river.” 
And he adds: “The columns immediately moved over the 
river and marched rapidly to the field of battle by two 
roads.” It is now proposed, just now, to describe the 
earnest haste with which Sumner’s troops pressed forward, 
through the deep mud, to the assistance of their friends. 
The head of Sumner’s leading column reached the immediate 
vicinity of Fair Oaks before the head of the column of 
five brigades of Longstreet’s command, from the Charles 
City road, reached the Williamsburg road, far in rear of 
the fighting. 

The leading brigade of Wilcox’s command arrived at 
Casey’s captured redoubt a little before the firing of 
Kearny’s rear guard, iin the woods south of the Williams¬ 
burg road, ceased. Three companies of the leading regi¬ 
ment of Wilcox’s troops were sent to dislodge a party 
of the enemy—Kearny’s detached rear guard—whose fire 
was still annoying the Confederates in the open between 
Casey’s earth-works and the second abatis. In this con¬ 
test these three companies lost 66 men in a few minutes. 
The five brigades with Wilcox went into bivouac between 
the first and the second abatis. Hill’s division* was after- 


*On the Confederate side the losses May 31st, in D. H. Hill’s 
division were 2915, being more than one-third of his effective strength. 
The losses in R. H. Anderson’s brigade (of Longstreet’s division) are 
not reported; but it is known that the 6th South Carolina Regiment 
lost 269 out of 521 in action. The losses in this brigade may fairly 
be estimated to have been more than 600, and the total losses in Long¬ 
street’s division that day may be placed at 700. These figures 


— 485 — 



Battles and Leaders of the Civil War 


ward withdrawn and bivouacked in the woods west of 
Casey’s redoubt and rifle-pits. 

In his “Narrative,” p. 132, General Johnston says: 

“An hour or two later (than noon, May 30th) orders were 
given for the concentration of 23 of our 27 brigades against 
McClellan’s left wing.” 

The result of that alleged “concentration” has been 
described. McClellan’s left wing was attacked by five 
brigades; and General Johnston, who was wounded on 
another part of the field about sunset that day, says, in 
his official report: 

“The skill, vigor, and decision with which these operations 
were conducted by General Longstreet are worthy of the highest 
praise.” 

Without discussion here General Johnston’s opinion in 
regard to the manner in which General Longstreet con¬ 
ducted the operations of the three divisions on the right, 
reference will now be made to the movements of tne divi¬ 
sion on the Nine-mile road, directed by General Johnston 
in person. 

In addition to the action already described, there was 
a sharp contest north of Fair Oaks Station late in the 
afternoon, May 31st, between reenforcements, under Gen- 


whilst showing that the losses in the six brigades of Longstreet’s 
division were not one-fourth as great as the losses in the four brigades 
of D. H. Hill’s division, indicate clearly enough that Hill’s division 
did the greater part of the fighting; but all honor is due to the 
brilliant, successful, and bloody work done that day by the two 
South Carolina regiments of Longstreet’s division under Colonel 
Jenkins. 

On the Federal side the losses in the operations described were: 
Kearny’s division, less 1 brigade, 873; Couch’s division, less 4 
regiments, 1049; Casey’s division, 1426. It is not amiss to give here 
the following from General Casey’s official report. After stating 
that of the 13 regiments that composed his division were raw troops, 
and had suffered from the inclemency of the weather, at times 
without tents or blankets, and poorly supplied with rations and 
medical stores, he adds: 

“Notwithstanding all these drawbacks, and the fact that there 
were not five thousand men in line of battle, they withstood for three 
hours the attack of an overwhelming force of the enemy ... It 
is true that the division, after being nearly surrounded by the 
enemy and lossing one-third of the number actually engaged, re¬ 
treated to the second line. They would all have been prisoners of war 
had they delayed their retreat a few minutes longer.”—G.W.S. 


— 486 — 































Battles and Leaders of the Civil War 


eral Sumner, sent from the north side of the Chickahominy 
to aid Keyes at Seven Pines, and my division under General 
Whiting. It will be borne in mind that when three Con¬ 
federate regiments, under Colonel Jenkins, crossed the Nine- 
mile road just south of Fair Oaks, a little after 4 P.M., four 
regiments and a battery of Couch’s division were cut off 
from the Federals opposed to D. H. Hill. Immediately 
after being thus cut off, General Couch communicated with 
Birney’s brigade on the railroad, a mile or more east of 
Fair Oaks and endeavored to make arrangements by which 
the cut-off forces could rejoin Keyes. 

Just then it was reported to General Couch that a 
large Confederate force on the Nine-mile road was rapidly 
advancing on Fair Oaks and the four regiments and 
battery retreated in the direction of Sumner’s bridges. 
On reaching a point about one thousand yards north of 
Fair Oaks, General Couch was informed that the leading 
troops of Sumner’s corps were closely approaching. Couch 
halted his forces, formed a line of battle, facing nearly 
south, placed two guns on each side of the road, and pre¬ 
pared to defend the position until Sumner’s troops could 
come up. 

It is now proposed to give in some detail an account of 
the movements that day of my division under Whiting which 
prevented Sumner’s forces from reaching Keyes at Seven 
Pines and incidentally deprived Keyes and Heintzelman 
of the services of two brigades and a battery of their own 
troops. 

In my official report (as originally submitted to General 
Johnston), it is stated that: 

‘‘On ariving at the headquarters of General Johnston about 
sunrise (May 31st), I learned from him that his intention was 
that General Longstreet’s division should move by the Nine-mile 
road, that of General D. H. Hill by the Williamsburg road, and Gen¬ 
eral Huger’s by the Charles City road. The enemy, it was under¬ 
stood, had already upon this side of the Chickahominy a force 
variously estimated at from 20,000 to 40,000 men. The recent 
rains had materially increased the difficulty of crossing that stream, 
and, notwithstanding the very bad condition of the roads over which 
we had to pass, and the boggy, swampy condition of the fields and 
woods through which our troops would have to operate, it was 
believed that an energetic attack early in the morning, properly 


— 488 — 


Two Days' Battle of Seven Pines 


supported and followed up, would result in defeat to that portion 
of the enemy already upon this side before the other portion of their 
army could cross the swollen stream either to reenforce their troops 
or to attack the city in our rear . . . General Johnston’s inten¬ 

tions, as then explained to me, were, that whilst General D. H. Hill’s 
division was attacking the enemy’s advance position, on the Williams¬ 
burg stage road, General Longstreet’s division would engage the ene¬ 
my on Hill’s left.” 

About 6 A.M. the head of the division under Whiting 
reached the vicinity of General Johnston’s headquarters. 
There its way, to a point on the Nine-mile road near the 
suburb, was blocked by troops of Longstreet’s division. 
General Whiting wrote to General Johnston asking that the 
route should be cleared. In reply, a staff officer wrote: 
“General Johnston directs me to say, in answer to yours of 
this date, that Longstreet will precede you.” This quieted 
Whiting for a time, but, as the delay continued, he became 
impatient, and having heard that I was at General Johnston’s 
headquarters he came there to see if I could not have his 
line of march cleared of Longstreet’s troops. About 8 
A.M., I sent my aide-de-camp, Captain Beckham, to see 
General Longstreet in regard to this matter. Captain 
Beckham asked me where General Longstreet was to be 
found. I referred him to General Johnston who, with 
several others, was present. General Johnston said Gen¬ 
eral Longstreet’s division was on the Nine-mile road and 
he was probably with it; if not, he might be found on the 
Williamsburg road with that part of his command. 

I now quote again from the suppressed portion of my 
official report: 

“In about an hour I learned by note from Captain Beckham 
that neither General Longstreet nor any portion of his command was 
on the Nine-mile road. This note was immediately shown to General 
Johnston, who dispatched his aide-de-camp, Lieutenant Washington, 
to General Longstreet with directions to turn his division into the 
Nine-mile road, provided it could be done without material loss of 
time. This message did not reach General Longstreet.” 

It was about 9 A.M. when I handed Captain Beckham’s 
note to General Johnston, who was amazed at the informa¬ 
tion and for a time strongly inclined to discredit it, thinking, 
that my aide had not gone far enough on the Nine-mile 
road to come up with Longstreet’s troops. Johnston then 


— 489 — 


Battles and Leaders of the Civil War 


sent one of his aides, Lieutenant J. B. Washington, to 
Longstreet with orders for the latter “to send three bri¬ 
gades by the Nine-mile road.” Washington rode at full 
speed along the Nine-mile road and soon found himself 
within the Federal picket-line—captured.* As I first wrote 
in my report: 

“An hour later Captain Beckham reported that he had found 
Longstreet’s division on the Williamsburg road, halted, for the 
purpose of allowing General D. H. Hill's troops to file by.” 

In a letter to me dated February 7th, 1863, Captain 
Beckham says it was about 10 a.m. when he reached 
General Longstreet. He adds: 

“Kemper’s brigade, which formed a part of General Longstreet’s 
division, was at a halt when I got to General Longstreet’s head¬ 
quarters, and, what surprised me most, was accompanied by wagons 
loaded with baggage and camp-equipage.” 

During these delays the firing of cannon across the 
Chickahominy and reports from our troops guarding the 
river between New Bridge and Mechanicsville, indicated 
threatening movements of the Federals on that side. About 
11 A.M. General Johnston directed me to take Hampton’s 
and Hatton’s brigades, proceed to the Chickahominy bluffs, 
and assume command of all the forces on that side, in case 
the Federals made any attempt to cross the river. At the 
same time, the other three brigades, after about five hours’ 
delay near the suburbs of the city, accompanied by General 
Johnston, proceeded on the Nine-mile road, and halted 
near the point at which the road to New Bridge turns off. 
Finding nothing that required my presence on the banks 
of the river, I placed Hampton’s and Hatton’s brigades 
in position from which they could promptly resist the pas¬ 
sage of the river at New Bridge or above, and could support 
the other three brigades when needed, and then joined 
Generals Johnston and Whiting near Old Tavern. About 
2:30 p.m., nothing having been heard from General Long¬ 
street since my aide returned from the Williamsburg road, 
the chief of my staff, Major Whiting, requested to be allowed 

*General Casey says this incident helped to put him on his 
guard.— Editors. 


— 490 — 



Two Days’ Battle of Seven Pines 


to go over to that road and find out the state of affairs 
there. I tendered his services in this matter to General 
Johnston. 

In my official report it is stated: 

“Between 4 and 5 o’clock a note was received (by General 
Johnston) from General Longstreet, stating that he had attacked 
and beaten the enemy after several hours’ severe fighting; that he 
had been disappointed in not receiving assistance upon his left; and, 
although it was now nearly too late, that an attack, by the Nine-mile 
road, upon the right flank and rear of the enemy would probably 
enable him to drive them into the Chickahominy before night.” 

All the foregoing quotations from my report were 
omitted from the copy that was put on file, in compliance 
with General Johnston’s request, contained in his letter to 
me, June 28th, 1862, in which he said: 

“I herewith inclose the three first sheets of your report, to ask 
a modification or omission rather. They contain two subjects which 
I never intended to make generally known, and which I have men¬ 
tioned to no one but yourself, and mentioned to you as I have been in 
the habit of doing everything of interest in the military way. I 
refer to the mention of the misunderstanding between Longstreet 
and myself in regard to the direction of his division, and that of his 
note to me, received about 4 o’clock, complaining of my slowness, which 
note I showed you. As it seems to me that both of these matters 
concern Longstreet and myself alone, I have no hesitation in asking 
you to strike them out of your report, as they in no manner concern 
your operations. I received information of L.’s misunderstandings 
(which may be my fault, as I told you at the time) while his troops 
were moving to the Williamsburg road, and sent to L. to send three 
brigades by the Nine-mile road, if they had not marched so far as to 
make the change involve a serious loss of time; this, after telling 
you of the misunderstanding. Your march from General Semmes’s 
headquarters (he means the advance made by the division, under 
Whiting, from the point where it was halted, near Old Tavern. 
G.W.S.) was not in consequence of the letter from L. Whiting 
(Major) had gone at my request, with our permission, to ascertain the 
state of things with Longstreet. Just before 4 o’clock we heard 
musketry for the first time, and Whiting (General) was ordered to 
advance. Just then Major W. rode up and reported from L., and 
a moment after the note was brought me which, after reading it, I 
showed it to you.” 

In his official report General Johnston says that Gen¬ 
eral Longstreet received verbal instructions, and that the 
division of General Longstreet was to support the attack 
made by D. H. Hill’s division. General Longstreet, in his 
official report, makes no mention of the preliminary move¬ 
ments of his own division, except that he was obliged to 
send three of his small brigades on the Charles City road 


— 491 — 


Battles and Leaders of the Civil War 


to support the brigade of Huger’s division, which had been 
ordered to protect his (Longstreet’s) right flank. Indefi¬ 
nite as these reports are in reference to the direction in 
which Longstreet’s division was to move, it may, on the 
preceding evidence, be now considered established that 
General Johnston intended Longstreet’s division should 
move into action on the Nine-mile road, and support Hill by 
attacking Keyes’s right flank. It is noticeable that Gen¬ 
eral Johnston, in his official report, makes no mention of the 
information he received in regard to the transfer of Long- 
street’s division to the Williamsburg road, or of the attempt 
made to have at least three brigades sent back to the Nine- 
mile road. No allusion is made, in either of their official 
reports, to the note from Longstreet, received by Johnston 
about 4 p.m. 

The anxiety felt by those near Old Tavern was extreme 
in the hours of suspense previous to 4 P.M. during which 
all were expecting to hear that the fighting on the Williams¬ 
burg road had commenced. In my official report it is stated 
that “as the day wore on and nothing decisive was heard 
from General Longstreet’s attack, except occasional firing 
of cannon, and, for some two or three hours, but little 
musketry it seemed that no real attack was likely to be made 
that day.” Previous to 4 p.m., it was believed by all on 
the Nine-mile road that no attack had yet been made; the 
division on that road could not be advanced beyond McLaw’s 
picket-line without bringing on the battle which General 
Johnston intended should be initiated by the divisions of 
Hill and Longstreet. The division under Whiting was 
there for the purpose of holding in check reenforcements 
from the north side of the river that would surely be sent 
to Keyes as soon as he was attacked in force; and Whiting 
was only to reenforce Longstreet “should there be cause of 
haste.” The information finally received not only warned 
General Johnston that the battle had been raging for several 
hours, but the character of Longstreet’s note conveyed the 
distinct expression that the delay from 8 A.M. to the after¬ 
noon had enabled the Federals to reenforce Keyes to such 


— 492 — 


Two Days' Battle of Seven Pines 


an extent that Longstreet had met with more opposition 
than the whole of his command could well overcome. In 
this state of affairs General Johnston ordered the division 
under Whiting to move forward as rapidly as possible, and 
himself urged and led the division against “the right flank 
of Longstreet’s adversaries” without further regard to 
reenforcements from the north side of the Chickahominy. 
This advance was so rapid that no artillery was carried 
forward, on account of the almost impracticable condition 
of the ground. Very soon after this movement commenced, 
General Johnston directed Hood’s brigade to bear strongly 
to the right, and go direct to the assistance of Longstreet’s, 
who Was supposed to be in front of the enemy, near Seven 
Pines. But it has already been seen that Colonel Jenkins’s 
command had then burst across the Nine-mile road a little 
south of Fair Oaks, and was “scouring” the rear of that 
road, and that 8 of the 13 brigades under Longstreet’s 
control had not been put in action. Nothing of this, how¬ 
ever, was then known to General Johnston. When the 
head of the column on the Nine-mile road, in the hurried 
movement to aid Longstreet, reached the vicinity of Fair 
Oaks Station, General Johnston censured General Whiting 
for hesitating to cross the railroad before disposing of a 
Federal force, north of that station in position to threaten 
the left flank and rear of Whiting’s«command in case he 
moved farther. I was not present, but the following ex¬ 
tracts from a letter to me, written in 1868 by Colonel B. W. 
Frobel, of the Confederate States Engineer Corps, gives 
an account of what occurred on that occasion: Colonel Frobel 
was then a major on General Whiting’s staff. He says: 

“Generals Johnston and Whiting were following immediately 
after Whiting’s brigade. As Whiting’s brigade reached the rogij 
near the railroad crossing, I was sent to halt it. On returning 
after doing this, I joined Generals Whiting and Johnston, who werb 
riding toward the crossing. General Whiting was expostulating 
with General Johnston about taking the division across the railroad 
insisting that the enemy were in force on our left flank and rear. 
General Johnston replied: ‘Oh! General Whiting, you are too 
cautious.’ At this time we reached the crossing and nearly at the 
same moment the enemy opened an artillery fire from the direction 
pointed out by General Whiting. We moved back up the road near 
the small white house. Whiting’s brigade (a portion of it) was 


— 493 — 


Battles and Leaders of the Civil War 


gone; it had been ordered forward to charge the batteries (twc 
separate sections of one battery) which were firing on us. The 
brigade was repulsed, and in a few minutes came streaming back 
through the little skirt of woods to the left of the Nine-mile road 
near the crossing. There was only a part of the brigade in this 
charge. Pender (commanding regiment) soon rallied and re-formed 
those on the edge of the woods. General Whiting sent an order to 
him to reconnoiter the batteries, and if he thought they could be 
taken, to try it again. Before he could do so some one galloped up, 
shouting, ‘Charge that battery.’ The men moved forward at a 
double-quick, but were repulsed as before, and driven back to the 
woods.” 

Of the Federal resistance to this attack, General E. V. 
Sumner, in his official report, says: 

“On arriving on the field, I found General Couch with four 
regiments and two companies of infantry and Brady’s battery. 
These troops were drawn up in line near Adam’s house, and there 
was a pause in the battle.” 

General; Sedgwick, commander of Sumner’s leading 
division, says: “Upon debouching into the open field near 
Adams’s house, we found Abercrombie’s brigade of Couch’s 
division sustaining a severe attack and hard pushed by the 
enemy.” 

Kirby’s six Napoleon guns were promptly placed in 
position facing south. The infantry of Sedgwick’s divi¬ 
sion was put on the right and left in Couch’s defensive 
line. The Federal accounts show that repeated attempts 
were made by the Confederates to carry the position, but 
without success; that the contest continued until dark, at 
which time Kirby’s battery faced west, without having 
otherwise changed position, and the infantry on the left 
of the battery was also facing west, with its left very near 
the railroad, a little east of Fair Oaks Station. On the 
immediate right of Kirby’s battery the line of infantry 
still faced nearly south. There was no change in this part 
of the Federal lines; but on the extreme right the line was 
facing almost west, and had not been closely engaged. 

In the meantime, before the action north of Fair Oaks 
commenced, when the head of Pettigrew’s brigade reached 
the point in the large wood about three-fourths of a mile 
from the railroad crossing, I halted for the purpose of giving- 
instructions to General Wade Hampton, whose brigade had 


— 494 — 


Two Days’ Battle of Seven Pines 

reached the rear of Pettigrew’s. Generals Johnston and 
Whiting had gone on with the two leading brigades, and 
I did not again see either of them until after dark. I 
directed General Hampton to lead his brigade to the left, 
on the wood road, a little more than a brigade length, and 
then resume his march in a direction parallel to the Nine- 
mile road, which would bring Hampton into line of battle 
on Pettigrew’s left, in the attack General Johnston pro¬ 
posed to make. I remained at that point until Hampton’s 
brigade had filed out of the Nine-mile road; then gave di¬ 
rections to Hatton’s brigade to continue moving on the 
Nine-mile road, which would bring it into position as a 
reserve, to the line of battle formed by the brigades of Whit¬ 
ing, Pettigrew, and Hampton. In the meantime the action 
had commenced near Fair Oaks. On reaching the eastern 
edge of the wood I saw the leading troops moving north 
from Fair Oaks in direction almost exactly opposite to 
that in which I had given Colonel Hampton to understand 
that General Johnston’s movement would be made. In 
a short time I saw our leading troops retiring. This was 
the second repulse spoken of by Colonel Frobel. I notified 
General Whiting of Hampton’s position, and soon learned 
from him that the previous attacks had been conducted 
without proper knowledge of the enemy’s position, but 
that a reconnaissance had been made, and a combined 
attack by the three brigades would capture the battery in a 
few minutes. Before this attack was arranged, Kirby’s bat¬ 
tery of six pieces and the first brigade of Sedgwick’s division 
reached Couch’s line and the attack was repulsed. By 
this time Hatton’s brigade had come up and was in the open 
field, close to the north side of the Nine-mile road. One 
regiment of Pettigrew’s brigade, in reserve, was in the 
same field about two hundred yards north of the road. 
Soon after the repulse of the three brigades, the firing of 
the Federal side greatly increased. General Johnston, 
who was at the small grove north of Fair Oaks, sent word 
to me to have all the available troops brought up quickly. 
The only troops within reach, not already up, were a brigade 


495 — 


Battles and Leaders of the Civil War 


and a half of Magruder’s command stationed along the 
New Bridge road. I sent General Johnston’s order direct 
to these brigade commanders; and seeing that Whiting’s 
brigade was pressed back on the right, and learning that 
Hampton and Pettigrew were suffering great losses in 
the small wood, 600 to 800 yards north of Fair Oaks, it 
seemed to me that the Federal reenforcements from the 
north side of the river were likely to break through the di¬ 
vision and reach Longstreet’s left flank and rear. I 
therefore ordered Hatton’s brigade and Pettigrew’s reserve 
regiment to move into the woods and aid the troops closely 
engaged there. Believing that Whiting had on the right 
as much as he could well attend to, I went with Hatton’s 
brigade to the extreme front line of Hampton and Petti¬ 
grew in the woods, and soon learned that General Pettigrew 
had been wounded, it was supposed mortally, and was a 
prisoner. General Hatton was killed at my side just as 
his brigade reached the front line of battle; and in a very 
few minutes General Hampton was severely wounded. In 
this state of affairs, I sent word to General Whiting that 
I would take executive control in that wood, which would 
relieve him, for the time, of care for the left of the division, 
and enable him to give his undivided attention to the right. 

In the wood the opposing lines were close to each other, 
in some places not more than twenty-five or thirty yards 
apart. The contest continued until dark without material 
variation in the position of either line on that part of the 
field after I reached the extreme front, until the firing had 
ceased at dark, when I ordered the line to fall back to the 
edge of the field and reform. In the meantime Whiting’s 
brigade and the right of Pettigrew’s had been forced back 
to the clump of trees just north of Fair Oaks Station, where 
the contest was kept up until night.* 

On reaching the open field in rear of the line where 
Hampton’s and Hatton’s brigades had been engaged, I heard 
for the first time that General Johnston had been very ser- 

*In the action north of Fair Oaks the four Confederate brigades 
lost 1061 killed and wounded.—-G.TF.&. 


— 496 — 



Two Days’ Battle of Seven Pines 


iously wounded and taken from the field an hour or more 
before. I was second in rank in his army, therefore the 
command, for the time being, devolved upon me. 

In further illustration of views held at that time on 
the Confederate side in regard to the events of the first day 
at Seven Pines, the following extracts from a letter dated 
June 7th, 1862, from Longstreet to Johnston, are not ir- 
relevent, however erroneous the opinions he expresses may 
be. He says: 

‘‘The failure of complete success on Saturday (May 31st) I 
attribute to the slow movements of General Huger’s command. 
This threw perhaps the hardest part of the battle upon my own poor 
division . . . Our ammunition was nearly exhausted when Whit¬ 

ing moved, and I could not, therefore, move on with the rush that 
we could have had his movements been earlier ... I can’t but help 
think that a display of his forces on the left flank of the enemy by 
General Huger would have completed the affair and given Whiting 
as easy and pretty a game as was ever had upon a battle-field.” 

It is not deemed necessary to make any comments on 
this letter. The facts already stated and proved are 
sufficient. 

General Johnston says (see p. 214) : 

“It was near half-past 6 o’clock before I admitted to myself 
that Smith was engaged, not with a brigade, as I had obstinately 
thought, but with more than a division.” 

It may not be amiss to mention here that Colonel 
Frobel, in the letter to me above referred to, says: 

“General W. H. C. Whiting was at that time commanding your 
division, you being in command of the left wing of the army . . . 

Whiting was directly under General Johnston, who was with the 
division the whole day until he was wounded, late in the afternoon.” 

Without dwelling now upon the persistency with which 
General Johnston insists that I was then in command of 
the division which bore my name, it may be stated here that 
General Whiting was clearly of the opinion then and ever 
after, that but for General Johnston’s determination to 
press on across the railroad to Longstreet’s assistance, Couch 
would have been beaten and his battery captured before 
Sumner’s leading troops reached the field. 

Before describing what occurred on the second day, 
allusion will be made to some of the erroneous views which 


— 497 — 


Battles and Leaders of the Civil War 


have been widely promulgated in regard to these operations. 
General Johnston, in his official report says: “Major-Gen¬ 
eral G. W. Smith succeeded to the command. He was 
prevented from renewing his attack on the enemy’s position 
next morning by the discovery of strong intrenchments not 
seen on the previous evening.” On page 141 of this 
published “Narrative,” he says: “Sumner’s corps at Fair 
Oaks (June 1st) was six miles from those of Heintzelman 
and Keyes, which were near Bottom’s Bridge.” In refer¬ 
ence to the position of the Confederates at that time, he 
places D. H. Hill’s division in line of battle across the 
Williamsburg road, at right angles to it, more than a mile 
east of Seven Pines, the left of Hill’s line, near the railroad, 
facing north; Longstreet’s and Huger’s divisions on Hill’s 
left, parallel to the railroad and extending a short distance 
west of Fair Oaks Station, uniting there with the division 
under Whiting; and says, “Magruder’s division in reserve” 
“was under arms near.”* On the map in his book he re¬ 
presents Sumner’s corps in one line facing west, its left on 
his railroad a little west of Fair Oaks, with Longstreet’s 
and Huger’s divisions close on Sumner’s left flank and rear. 
Having thus placed the contending forces, he adds: “Such 
advantage of position and superiority of numbers would have 
enabled the Confederates to defeat Sumner’s corps, had 
the engagement been renewed Sunday morning (June 
1st) before any aid could have come from Heintzelman, 
after which his troops could not have made effectual 
resistance.” He claims that the battle was “unfinished 
in consequence of the disabling of their commander (John¬ 
ston),” and states that after he was disabled, the only thing 
President Davis “ought to have done, or had time to do, 
was postponed almost twenty hours—the putting General 
Lee, who was near, in command of the army.” 

General Johnston also states that three Federal corps 
on the Richmond side “were completely separated from 
the two corps of their right beyond the Chickahominy by 

♦“Narrative of Military Operations/’ by Joseph E. Johnston, 
pp. 137, 119.— G.W.S. 


— 498 — 



Two Days' Battle of Seven Pines 


the swollen stream, which had swept away their bridges/' 
This, if true, was not known or believed on our side. 
Anxiety on account of Federal reenforcements from the 
north side of the Chickahominy was felt, on the 1st of June 
as well as on the 31st of May, by the Confederate commander. 
But General Longstreet seems to have ignored all consider¬ 
ation of that subject on both days. 

In the official report of the chief engineer of McClel¬ 
lan’s army it is stated: 

“At 8:15 a.m. (June 1st) the pontoon-bridge at the site of 
New Bridge was complete and passable to infantry, cavalry and 
artillery. About noon the upper trestle-bridge was practicable for 
infantry. It was not till night that a practicable bridge for infantry 
was obtained at the lower trestle-bridge.” 

The railroad bridge had been made practicable for all 
arms, and was not affected by the freshet. 

The specific details given by General Johnston in regard 
to the positions occupied by the divisions of D. H. Hill, 
Longstreet and Huger on the morning of June 1st, accorded 
in the main, with General Longstreet’s report to me at the 
time; and I never questioned the accuracy of General 
Johnston’s statement in regard to the general positions 
occupied by these three divisions until I saw the recently 
published “Official Records.” But I knew there was a 
gap between Whiting’s right and Longstreet’s left, and I 
knew, too, that Magruder’s troops were Hot concentrated 
at Old Tavern. 

Only one of the many remarkable statements made by 
General Longstreet in regard to the operations of the second 
day will be mentioned here. In a letter written in 1874 
to General George W. Mindil, Federal, for the avowed 
purpose of throwing light upon the Confederate side, Gen¬ 
eral Longstreet says: 

“I do not remember to have heard of any fighting on the second 
day, except a sharp skirmish reported by General Pickett as he 
was retiring, under the orders of General Lee, to resume our former 
position.” 

Without dwelling upon what might have happened if 
General Johnston had not been disabled, or discussing what 


- 499 - 


Battles and Leaders of the Civil War 


President Davis “ought to have done, or had time to do,” 
it is proposed to show that General Johnston is greatly in 
error in reference to the positions of the contending forces 
on the morning of June 1st, and to present evidence that 
will refresh General Longstreet’s memory in regard to the 
fighting he “heard of” that day. 

In reference to the positions occupied by the three 
divisions under General Longstreet, it has already been 
stated and proved that D. H. Hill’s division was in bivouac 
in the woods west of Casey’s earth-works; and that large 
portions of the divisions of Longstreet and Huger were 
around Casey’s redoubt, in the open field west of the second 
abatis. Before midnight, May 31st, Colonel Jenkins’s 
command was withdrawn to Seven Pines, and the brigades 
of Wilcox and Pryor moved forward from the redoubt and 
bivouacked on the sides of the Williamsburg road, in 
advance of Seven Pines, the head of their column being on 
the ground where Colonel Jenkins ceased fighting. Pick¬ 
ett’s brigade was still far back on the railroad, where it 
was posted by Longstreet’s order when the attack was 
commenced, May 31st, and Mahone’s brigade was three and 
a half miles out on the Charles City road. 

Two brigades of the division under Whiting were in 
line of battle, facing nearly east of the right wing on the 
railroad about five hundred yards west of Fair Oaks, the 
left in the woods on the north of the Nine-mile road, and 
the other three brigades within close-supporting distance. 
There were six brigades in Magruder’s command. Two 
of them were guarding the Mechanicsville and Meadow 
Bridge roads. The positions of the other four brigades 
are given in a note, dated 11 p.m. May 31st, addressed to 
me by their immediate commander, General McLaws. He 
says: 

“General Cobb, five regiments (posted) from the Mechanicsville 
road to General Harvey’s place; General Kershaw from General 
Harvey’s to Baker’s; Generals Griffith and Semmes from General 
Kershaw’s right to New Bridge, and on the line down New Bridge 
road.” 


— 500 — 


Two Days* Battle of Seven Pines 

Magruder’s six brigades were the only forces guarding 
the crossings of the Chickahominy from New Bridge to 
Meadow Bridge. 

On the Federal side Keyes’s corps, with abundant ar¬ 
tillery, occupied that part of the Federal third line of defense 
which was on the south side of the Williamsburg road, one 
and three-eighths miles east of Seven Pines. One brigade 
and two regiments of Hooker’s division were close in rear 
of Keyes’ and two brigades of Kearny’s division were in 
the trenches of the third line of defense on the north side of 
the Williamsburg road; whilst Birney’s brigade of that 
division was about half a mile in advance, with three regi¬ 
ments in line of battle, facing nearly south-west, their 
right resting on the railroad, and in close connection with 
Sumner’s corps. In fact, the lines of Sumner’s and Heint- 
zelman overlapped here at the time the Confederate attack 
was made. Sumner’s corps (instead of being drawn up 
in one line, facing nearly west, as represented by General 
Johnston) was in two lines, nearly at right angles, to each 
other. Sedgwick’s division, with Couch’s cut off forces and 
five batteries, were in line, facing nearly west, the left 
wing a little north of the railroad, a short distance east of 
Fair Oaks. Richardson’s division was on Sedgwick’s left, 
in three lines, nearly parallel to the railroad, with four 
batteries. In front of Richardson’s position was a dense 
and tangled wood; on his right, and in front of Sedgwick, 
the ground was open for several hundred yards. 

I find no reasonable cause to doubt the substantial 
accuracy of the Federal official reports in regard to the 
position of their forces, or in reference to their accounts 
of the actual fighting, a synopsis of which will presently 
be given. I am far from agreeing with General Johnston 
in the rose-colored view he takes of the situation, at the 
time he was wounded, when there were, practically, three 
Federal corps upon the field. But I gave orders for the 
renewal of the attack, with no expectation, however, of the 
easy, complete, and certain success he pictures for that day. 


— 501 — 


Battles and Leaders of the Civil War 


When I assumed command of the army, I could learn 
nothing from those around me in reference to what oc¬ 
curred on the Williamsburg road later than the information 
contained in the note received from General Longstreet, at 
4 p.m. Hood’s brigade had been recalled before it reached 
D. H. Hill’s staff-officers with several different parties to 
communicate with General Longstreet and request him to 
meet me as soon as possible at the headquarters on the 
Nine-mile road, near Old Tavern. A few minutes later 
General J. E. B. Stuart reported to me that the enemy had 
made no advance during the day on the Charles City road, 
and that our troops had captured the Federal works at 
Seven Pines some time before sunset and had advanced 
beyond that point—he -did know how far. He had good 
guides with him, and offered to go in person to General 
Longstreet and have him piloted to headquarters. A little 
after 11 p.m. I received a note from General Stuart, stating 
that at 10:30 he had failed to find General Longstreet. 

In the meantime General McLaws, who was at New 
Bridge, reported large forces opposite that point, and that 
they were building a pontoon-bridge. He added: “If this 
position is forced, your command will be in great danger, as 
you are aware.” 

Guided by one of my staff, who had succeeded in finding 
him about midnight, General Longstreet reached headquar¬ 
ters after 1 a.m. He reported that D. H. Hill’s division 
and a portion of his own, after prolonged fighting and 
heavy losses, had succeeded in driving the enemy back to 
Seven Pines late in the afternoon, and had pursued them 
more than a mile until dark. On learning from him that 
a portion of his own division had not been in action, and that 
Huger’s division, recalled from the Charles City road, 
though now at the front, had not been engaged at all, I 
directed General Longstreet to send a brigade of Huger’s 
division to the Nine-mile road. Thai} brigade was to 
support McLaws at New Bridge, or Whiting at Fair Oaks, 
as might be required. General Longstreet w T as ordered 
to renew the attack with the rest of his command as soon 


— 502 — 


Two Days’ Battle of Seven Pines 

after daybreak as practicable, and to fight north rather than 
attempt to force his way any farther toward Bottom’s 
Bridge. He left me a little after 2 A.M., and returned to 
the Williamsburg road. I wrote to General Lee, who was 
stationed in Richmond, in general charge of military opera¬ 
tions, informing him of the orders I had given. In reply, 
dated 5 A.M., June 1st, General Lee says: “Your movements 
are judicious, and determination to strike the enemy right.” 
In my official report it is stated: 

“General Longstreet was directed to push the successes of the 
previous day as far as practicable, pivoting his movement upon the 
position of General Whiting, on his left. The latter was directed 
to make a diversion in favor of General Longstreet’s real attack.” 

Soon after daylight there was sharp firing for a few 
minutes between Hood’s skirmishers, near the railroad, and 
the extreme right of Richardson’s position. These skir¬ 
mishers were promptly recalled, and Whiting was ordered 
to make no advance until the attack by the right wing was 
well developed, in full force. In this affair Hood lost 
thirteen wounded. No part of the division under Whiting 
was engaged during the day; because, although there was 
a good deal of heavy firing in the right wing that morning, 
nothing was observed from the Nine-mile road that indi¬ 
cated to me a real and determined attack, in full force by 
the right wing, such as I intended Whiting should support. 

At 6:30 A.M. firing in the wood commenced, a little 
south of the railroad, about half a mile or more east of 
Fair Oaks, and was sufficiently heavy to indicate that the 
movement Longstreet had been ordered to make had begun. 
This heavy firing continued for an hour or more, nearly 
at the same place, but did not develop into an attack in full 
force. It lulled for a while, and was presently renewed, 
but now at a point several hundred yards south of the rail¬ 
road. Longstreet’s troops were evidently losing ground 
without his having made an attack with more than a very 
small portion of the right wing. 

In the meantime my chief of staff, who was on the 
Chickahominy bluffs, had, from time to time, reported 


— 503 — 


Battles and Leaders of the Civil War 


movements of troops, pontoons, etc., on the north side of 
the river, showing preparations for sending over additional 
Federal reenforcements. The first information received 
from General Longstreet was contained in a note from him, 
dated 8 a.m. saying: “I have ordered a brigade of General 
Huger’s, as agreed upon. Please send a guide for it.” 
About 10:30 a.m. the following was received from Gen¬ 
eral Longstreet: “The brigade cannot be spared. Every 
man except a brigade is in action.” In a few minutes 
this came from him: “The entire army seems to be opposed 
to me. I trust that some diversion may be made in my 
favor during these successive attacks, else my troops can¬ 
not stand it. The ammunition gives out too readily.” And 
directly after, a note dated 10 a.m. was received, saying: 
“Can you reenforce me? The entire army seems to be 
opposed to me . . . If I can't get help, I fear I must 

fall back.” 

His leading troops had fallen back some time before; 
this was evident from observations made on the Nine-mile 
road. In Longstreet's dire extremity, as shown in the 
three notes received almost at one time, there were two 
ways in which I could then, possibly, help him, one way by 
ordering Whiting forward over the open ground, and in 
deep mud, against the strong lines and numerous batteries 
of Sedgwick and Richardson; the other was to strip the 
Chickahominy of its defenders above New Bridge, and send 
reenforcements direct to Longstreet on the Williamsburg 
road. I adopted the latter course, and requested General 
McLaws to go to General Longstreet,, inform him that 
about five thousand men had been ordered to reenforce 
him, assure him that the whole Federal army was not in 
his front, tell him that he must not fall back any farther 
but drive the enemy, and, if possible, regain the ground 
he had lost. 

About 1 P.M. I received a note from General McLaws, 
stating: “Longstreet says he can hold his position with 
five thousand more men. He has now the same ground the 
enemy held yesterday.” A little after 2 p.m. I received 


- 504 — 


Two Days’ Battle of Seven Pines 

a letter from General Longstreet, dated 1:30 p.m. in which 
he says: 

“The next attack will be from Sumner’s division. I think that 
if we can whip it we shall be comparatively safe ... I sin¬ 
cerely hope that we may succeed against them in their next effort. 
Oh, that I had ten thousand men more!” 

When I received that note from Longstreet there had 
been little or no firing for several hours, and there was 
none of any consequence after that time. On reading in 
the “Official Records” the detailed reports of subordinate 
fighting commanders on both sides, I asked General D. H. 
Hill what orders he received from General Longstreet that 
day. His reply, dated June 26th 1885, authorizes me to 
state: “General Hill says that he got no orders from Gen¬ 
eral Longstreet on Sunday, June 1st, whatever.” This 
information was to me like lightning from a clear sky, and 
it cleared the murky atmosphere which had surrounded 
some of the recently published official reports on the Con¬ 
federate side, and enabled me to comprehend things that 
appeared to be inexplicable before I knew that Longstreet 
had made no attempt to obey my order. 

The Federal reports of regimental, brigades and divi¬ 
sion commanders of troops closely engaged the second day 
are given in such detail in the “Official Records,” that, by 
comparing them with the limited number of Confederate 
reports found there, a clear idea may be‘formed of what 
actually occurred. This comparison eliminates nearly all 
of those exaggerated elements in the accounts which relate 
to the wondrous results claimed to have been achieved by 
so-called “bayonet-charges” on the one side and the bloody 
repulse of “ten-times” their own numbers on the other. 

It has already been shown that on May 31st, the Con¬ 
federates struck Keyes's corps, isolated at Seven Pines, with 
four brigades, and increased the attacking force to five 
brigades after Keyes had been reenforced by Heintzelman. 
June 1st, the Confederate attack was made against the left 
wing of French’s brigade, which, with one regiment of 
Howard’s brigade on its left, formed the front line of 


— 505 - 


Battles and Leaders of the Civil War 


Richardson's division. On the left of that division was 
Birney’s brigade of Kearny’s division. In his official report, 
Richardson says: 

“Near our left two roads crossed the railroad and up these the 
enemy moved his columns of attack. At 6:30 a.m. . . . the 

enemy opened a heavy rolling fire of musketry within fifty yards. 
It soon became the heaviest musketry firing that I had ever exper¬ 
ienced during an hour and a half ... I now ordered in General 
Howard to reenforce the first line with his brigade . . . Soon 

after this the whole line of the enemy fell back for the first time, 
unable to stand our fire, and for half an hour the firing ceased on 
both sides.” 

In this attack the regiment of Howard’s brigade on the 
extreme left of Richardson’s front line was broken, fell 
back behind the second line, and was not again in action. 
The regiment next to it on the right was forced back a short 
distance. The left of Richardson’s front line was so 
rudely shaken that all available means were used to strength¬ 
en it: a battery and Meagher’s brigade were put in to 
cover the gap, and Burns’s brigade, previously detached to 
cover the communications with the bridges, was recalled 
and hurriedly sent by General Sumner to Richardson’s 
assistance. 

It will be seen later that this staggering blow against 
the left of Richardson’s line was from three regiments of 
Armistead’s brigade and three regiments of Mahone’s 
brigade, both of Huger’s division. It will be seen, too, 
that these six regiments were the only Confederate forces 
that attacked the Federals during the second day. 

It was about 8 A.M. when General Howard, with two 
regiments of his brigade, relieved the left wing of French’s 
brigade and took up the fighting. Just at that time the 
three regiments of Birney’s brigade south of the railroad, 
whose strong advance guards had been slowly driven back, 
were rapidly thrown forward. The regiment next the 
railroad struck the flank of the Confederates just at the 
time Howard was advancing against their front; and under 
these two attacks the Confederates gave way in great dis¬ 
order. The center regiment, of Birney’s three, met with 
little resistance until it struck a Confederate force in strong 


— 506 — 


Two Days’ Battle of Seven Pines 


position on a wood road parallel to and three hundred to 
four hundred yards south of the railroad, in front of the 
left wing of French’s brigade. The two regiments of 
Howard’s brigade, in their forward movement, soon struck 
the same Confederates in the densely tangled wood. These 
three Federal regiments after repeated efforts to dislodge 
the Confederates—Pickett’s brigade, were repulsed with 
severe losses, and resumed position in the lines from which 
they had advanced. 

General Howard was wounded just as his two regi¬ 
ments were coming to close quarters with Pickett’s brigade. 
The command of Howard’s brigade then devolved upon 
Colonel Cross, of the 5th New Hampshire, who says: 

“Finding that the three other regiments of the brigade had been 
some time in action and severely handled, I directed that they should 
move out of the woods and reform in the rear of Meagher’s brigade, 
while I advanced my regiment to occupy the ground. We moved 
forward in line of battle through the wood, and about three hundred 
yards from the railroad track encountered the rebel line of battle. 
The fire was now very close and deadly, the opposing lines being 
several times not over thirty yards apart. When about ordering 
another the (third) charge I was struck by a rifle-ball. Lieutenant 
Colonel Langley then took command of the regiment, and, the rebels 
endeavoring to flank us, he brought off the regiment in excellent 
order, carrying most of our wounded.” 

It was now about 11 A.M., perhaps earlier. The 
fighting was practically ended when the 5th New Hampshire 
withdrew from in front of the position defended by Picketts’ 
brigade. In the meantime however, there had been some 
sharp firing, and for a short time a little close fighting, on 
the Williamsburg road, between the two Confederate bri¬ 
gades, General Wilcox and seven regiments of Hooker’s 
division and the left regiment of Birney’s three. The two 
regiments of the right wing of French’s brigade also 
advanced into the wood a short time before the action was 
ended. (For losses, see p. 218.) 

On the Confederate side, General D. H. Hill, in his 
official report, says that at daylight, June 1st, he “learned 
that heavy reenforcements had come up to the support of 
Keyes,” and “that General G. W. Smith had been checked 
upon the Nine-mile road, and that no help could be expected 


— 507 — 


Battles and Leaders of the Civil War 


in that direction.” He also adds: “I therefore resolved 
tc concentrate my troops around the captured works.” 
This resolution was formed in the absence of any instruc¬ 
tions “whatever” from his chief, General Longstreet, and 
he certainly received none from me. It now appears that 
after Longstreet, about 10:00 A.M., May 31st, assumed 
control of Huger and Huger’s division, all the brigades, 
when sent to the front, were ordered to report to General 
D. H. Hill. I did not know that General Longstreet had, 
for the time being, virtually given up to General Hill the 
command of the three divisions on the Williamsburg road; 
much less did I know, or even suspect, that General Long¬ 
street made no attempt, June 1st, to carry into effect the 
order I gave him to renew the attack. The official reports 
show that D. H. Hill commanded the thirteen brigades in 
the right wing that day. It is now proposed to tell what 
he did with them. It will be seen that he ordered the bri¬ 
gades of Pickett and Mahone to attack, and, by inference 
that Armistead’s brigade was ordered to attack; that the 
brigades of Wilcox and Pryor were ordered to retire, and 
that the brigades of Mahone and Colston, just as the fight¬ 
ing ended, were ordered to assist Pickett in the defensive 
position he had taken up after Armistead’s three regiments 
were repulsed. 

General Pickett, in his official report, says that his 
brigade marched at daylight from its position back on the 
railroad and, in compliance with General Longstreet’s or¬ 
ders given the evening before, reported to General D. H. 
Hill at Casey's redoubt. He adds: 

“My brigade had marched on some four hundred yards in advance 
of this point when it was there halted. General Hill directed me 
to ride over to the railroad and communicate with Brigadier-General 
Hood, whose right was resting on that road. I asked General Hill 
of the whereabouts of the enemy. He said they were some distance 
in advance—in fact, I had no definite idea where.” 

It is very clear that to the Confederates on the Williams¬ 
burg road the expression “in advance” meant toward the 
east. But Pickett’s instructions from Hill required him 
in person to go north in search of Hood. On his route, 


— 508 — 


Two Days* Battle of Seven Pines 

Pickett soon met a small “plundering party” of Confed¬ 
erates rushing past him. He says: 

“One fellow riding a mule with a halter I seized on and detained 
for explanation. He said the enemy was within a few yards of us, 
and entreated me to let him save himself. I immediately rode back 
with him at a gallop, and as briefly as possible informed General 
Hill of the circumstances. He ordered me to attack, and I supposed 
(the) same order was given to other brigade commanders.” 

It is well to call attention here to the fact that the 
three regiments of Birney’s brigade (Federal) had strong 
outposts well to their front, stationed in the woods several 
hundred yards south of the railroad, for the purpose of 
holding any advance of the Confederates in check long 
enough to enable Kearny, with the rest of his division, to 
reach and support Birney if closely pressed. The Federal 
accounts show that these outposts did seriously delay the 
Confederates advancing east on the south side of the rail¬ 
road. 

General Pickett says that his brigade was “in line of 
battle nearly perpendicular to the railroad,” and that Ar- 
mistead’s was on his left. It will be noticed that, advanc¬ 
ing in the line he describes, Pickett’s brigade moved nearly 
parallel to the railroad. Pickett encountered the strong 
outposts of Birney’s brigade. Continuing his account, he 
says his brigade: 

“ . . . struck the enemy within a short distance (who opened 
heavily upon us), drove him through an abatis over a cross-road lead¬ 
ing to (the) railroad, and was advancing over a second abatis, when 
I discovered Armistead’s brigade had broken and were leaving the 
field pell-mell. At this moment I was on foot and halfway across the 
abatis, the men moving on beautifully and carrying everything be¬ 
fore them.” 

He had certainly not yet struck Richardson’s line, and 
never did reach it. He called on General Hill for reen¬ 
forcements and he says that he threw back the left of his 
brigade so as to oppose a front to the Federals on the side 
where Armistead’s men had given way, and adds: 

“As a matter of course, from having been the attacking party, 
I now had to act on the defensive. Fortunately the enemy seemed 
determined on attacking and carrying my front, and driving me out 
of the abatis, which our men succeeded in preventing, though with 
considerable loss.” 


— 509 — 


Battles and Leaders of the Civil War 


The “Official Records” contain no report from any com¬ 
mander in that portion of Amistead’s, or of Mahone’s bri¬ 
gade engaged in the attack on Richardson’s line. But Gen¬ 
eral Mahone, in a letter to Captain Benj. Huger, October 
13th, 1862, says that his brigade moved early on the morn¬ 
ing of June 1st from its position on the Charles City road, 
and reported to General Hill, at the redoubt, “at the same 
time that General Pickett’s brigade reported upon the field,” 
and that his own “brigade was in a few minutes thereafter 
thrown into action, a report of which General Huger has.” 
That report cannot be found; but General Mahone now says, 
in letters to me, December, 1885, and January, 1886: 

“At the moment I was reporting to General Hill, some person 
rode up and excitedly stated to him that the enemy were in the wood 
on the north side of the (Williamsburg) road . . . General Hill said: 
‘General Mahone, take your brigade in there/ referring to the wood 
in which the enemy were supposed to be. I am quite certain that 
Armistead’s brigade was on my immediate right, and I suppose it 
went into the fight about the time my brigade went in. There was 
no fighting which would indicate an attack by either side before my 
leading regiments went in . . . and none on my left during the 
engagement that followed. Arm,istead’s brigade and mine must 
have struck the enemy about the same time. The impetus of the 
charge of the 3d Alabama, a splendid regiment, I am satisfied must 
have severely shocked and disordered Richardson’s line, and if there 
had been any intelligent understanding of the position of the enemy, 
and instructions as to what we were to do, it can be seen now how 
easy a destructive blow might have been given.” 


From different but authentic sources, I learn that the 
losses in Mahone’s brigade were 339, of which 175 were in 
the 3d Alabama, 112 in the 41st Virginia, and 52 in the 12th 
Virginia. The other two regiments were detached. 

I have not succeeded in getting specific information 
from any one engaged in either of the regiments of Armi- 
stead’s brigade that attacked the extreme left of Richard¬ 
son’s line. The effect produced by that attack shows it 
was of a very determined character, and from the nature 
of the Federal counter-attack on Armistead, the losses of 
the latter must have been very heavy. That Armistead’s 
three regiments did not then retire from the wood is shown 
by the published official report of Colonel H. B. Tomlin, of 
the 53d Virginia, which had been kept back during the 
night, May 31st at General Longstreet’s headquarters, and 


— 510 — 


Two Days’ Battle of Seven Pines 

did not get to the front before the other three regiments 
had been repulsed. On reaching the redoubt, this regi¬ 
ment was ordered to join the other three in the woods. In 
the tangled undergrowth it became engaged by mistake with 
one of Mahone’s regiments; and, whilst they were firing 
into each other, one of the regiments of French’s Federal 
brigade came up, and Armistead’s regiment, in confusion, 
fell back to the redoubt, “apprehending more danger from 
friends than the enemy.” In this fiasco that regiment lost 
one killed and eighteen wounded, and the regiment of 
French’s brigade lost one killed and five wounded. These 
incidents have been referred to because of the exaggerated 
importance attached by the Federals to the “bayonet- 
charge” made by the right of French’s brigade. 

General Wilcox, commanding his own brigade and 
Pryor’s, says that on the morning of June 1st, having no 
orders, he formed his brigade in line of battle across and 
at right angles to the Williamsburg road about half a mile 
east of Seven Pines, and Pryor’s brigade on the left, but 
facing nearly north. The Federals moved against Wilcox 
about 8 A.M. In his official report he says that after the 
firing had continued for some time, the engagement became 
serious on his entire front, and the contest “was going on 
as well as could be desired,” when “an order was sent to 
me to withdraw my command, which was instantly done.” 
General Wilcox adds: 

“The order given me to retire my command on the second morn¬ 
ing was given in writing by D. H. Hill, and for the reason, as he 
stated in his note, that Mahone’s men had acted badly.” 

After the withdrawal of these two brigades they were 
placed in position near the redoubt. In this affair the 
losses in Wilcox’s brigade were 44; those in Pryor’s brigade 
are not stated. The Federal accounts of operations on this 
part of the field show great misapprehension of the real 
state of affairs on the Confederate side. General Hooker 
says: 

“Our advance on the rebels . . . was slow, ... the fire brisk 
and unerring. After an interchange of musketry of this character 
for more than an hour, directions were given to advance with the 


— 511 — 


Battles and Leaders of the Civil War 


bayonet, when the enemy were thrown into wild confusion, throwing 
away their arms, hats, and coats, and broke through the forest in 
the direction of Richmond.” 

A good deal of this “magnificence” vanishes before the 
plain statements made by General Wilcox; but, in fairness, 
it should be stated that “extravagances” are also found in 
the Confederate reports. General Hill says: “Pickett held 
his ground against the odds of ten to one for several hours.” 

Pickett’s frantic appeals to Hill for help gave color of 
probability to General Hill’s opinion; but the Federal re¬ 
ports, now published, show that Pickett’s strong defensive 
position was attacked by four regiments only. Hill finally 
sent two brigades to Pickett’s assistance, and on their ap¬ 
pearance the 5th New Hampshire withdrew from Pickett’s 
front; or, as he expresses it: “the enemy retreated to their 
bushy cover, and their fire immediately slackened.” He 
adds: “No other attempt was made by them to advance, 
and about 1 P.M., I judge, by General Hill’s order, I with¬ 
drew the whole of our front line.” He evidently means 
his own brigade and the two brigades that had been sent to 
aid him. The losses in the 4 regiments of Pickett’s brigade 
were 350. 

General Hill had now succeeded in concentrating the 
right wing of the army “around the captured works.” He 
says: 

“The (remainder of the) day was spent in removing 6700 mus¬ 
kets and rifles in fine condition, ordnance, commissary and medical 
stores. Ten captured guns had been removed the night before. . . . 
General Longstreet sent me an order after dark to withdraw my 
whole command. The thirteen brigades were not together until near 
midnight.” 

General Pickett says: 

“General Hill sent for me about 1 o’clock at night, or rather, 
morning of June 2d, and I went to the redoubt in search of him . . . 
General Hill gave me orders to cover (the) withdrawal of the troops 
with my brigade . . . The whole of our force filed past by half an 
hour after sunrise. I then leisurely moved off, not a Yankee in 
sight or even a puff of smoke.” 

The Federals resumed the positions they held that 
morning, with the exception of Sickles’s brigade of Hooker’s 
division, which occupied the ground where Colonel Jenkins’s 


— 512 — 


Two Days’ Battle of Seven Pines 


command ceased fighting the previous day. Some time 
after sunrise, June 2d, the Federal pickets discovered that 
the Confederates had retired from Casey’s captured works. 
At 5 p.m. that day General Hooker reported the result of 
an armed reconnaissance from which he had just returned. 
He says that a short distance in front of Casey’s camp “the 
enemy appeared to have a regiment of cavalry and three 
of infantry, but as the latter were most concealed in the 
forest, it was not prudent to determine their number.” At 
3 a.m. that day the chief of staff of McClellan’s army wrote 
to General Sumner: “the general commanding says, in 
reply to your despatch, that you must do the best you can do 
hold your own if attacked. General Heintzelman will sup¬ 
port you.” At 11:50 p.m., June 3d, General Sumner wrote 
to General Kearny: 

“From information I have received, I have reason to expect a 
formidable attack tomorrow morning. Please advance with your 
division at 2 a.m. in order to attack the flank of the enemy if he 
assails me in large force. Everything may depend upon this move¬ 
ment of yours.” 

The theory that the “Confederates attacked in full 
force,” were repulsed, retreated in “disorganization and 
dismay,” which sent them to Richmond in a panic on the 
night of June 1st,” is not in accordance with tfre facts 
already established, nor with any that are likely to be 
brought to light hereafter. 

The divisions of Longstreet and Hill leisurely returned 
to the positions they occupied when the order to attack was 
given; but Huger’s division remained well out on the 
Williamsburg road in advance of D. H. Hill’s position. The 
latter fact is made clear by the following written state¬ 
ment of General Longstreet, dated June 3d, 1862. He 
says: 

“The entire division of General Huger was left in advance upon 
retiring with the forces from the later battle-field. He was absent 
yesterday, but not coming to report after being sent for, I ordered 
General Stuart to take command of the division.” 

This in itself shows, beyond doubt, that General Long¬ 
street was exercising control over Huger and Huger’s divi¬ 
sion during these operations. 


—513 


Battles and Leaders of the Civil War 


On the Nine-mile road the division under Whiting 
remained, for some days after the battle was ended, closely 
confronting Sumner’s corps near Fair Oaks. In the letter 
already referred to, Colonel Frobel says: 

“We remained in the position indicated until the afternoon 
when the brigades were withdrawn a short distance to the shelter 
of heavy woods in our rear. I do not think after this that we changed 
our position for several days/’ 

In his official report of what occurred the day after 
he was disabled and left the field, General Johnston says: 
“In the evening (June 1st) our troops quietly returned to 
their own camps.” 

The camps of the division under Whiting were on the 
Meadow Bridge road; this division remained on the Nine- 
mile road, a mile or more in advance of Magruder’s line at 
Old Tavern. The camps of Huger’s division were on the 
banks of Gilliss Creek, close to the suburbs of Richmond; 
this division remained on the Williamsburg road, more than 
a mile in advance of Hill’s camps. The two divisions that 
did return to their camps left the field on the morning of 
June 2d—not “in the evening” of June 1st. 

To complete this sketch of the battle'of Seven Pines, 
it is essential to mention that, when I received General 
Longstreet’s note, dated 1:30 P.M., June 1st, which ended 
with the exclamation, “Oh, that I had ten thousand men 
more,” General Lee had just taken command of the army. 
He seemed very much impressed by the state of affairs on 
the Williamsburg road as depicted in General Longstreet’s 
note. I assured him, however, that Longstreet was mis¬ 
taken in supposing that the whole Federal army was op¬ 
posed to him; that I had several hours before nearly stripped 
the Chickahominy, between New Bridge and Mechanics- 
ville, in order to send him reenforcements; and that the 
danger to Richmond, if any, was not then on the Williams¬ 
burg road, if it ever had been. 

General Lee gave me no orders that day. The fact 
that Longstreet’s and D. H. Hill’s divisions were sent back 
to their former camps induces me to believe that this was 
in compliance with orders given by General Lee to General 


— 514 — 


Two Days’ Battle of Seven Pines 

Longstreet—perhaps for the reason that on May 31st we 
had not fully succeeded in crushing one Federal corps iso¬ 
lated at Seven Pines, and on June 1st had lost all the ground 
beyond Seven Pines that we had gained the day previous. 

I was completely prostrated on the 2d of June by an 
attack of paralysis, no symptom of which was manifested 
within eighteen hours after Lee relieved me of the com¬ 
mand of the army. But, for that misfortune, I would 
certainly have required all subordinates to report to me 
events that took place on the field in their respective com¬ 
mands whilst I was in control of the army. 

The detailed reports of regimental and brigade com¬ 
manders on both sides in this battle show many instances 
of close, persistent, and bloody fighting, such as have been 
seldom equaled by any troops on any field. Cases of tem¬ 
porary confusion and disorder occurred, but fair examina¬ 
tion shows there was good reason for this. In reference 
to the general management, however, it may well be said 
that General McClellan committed a grave error in allowing 
Keyes’s corps to remain isolated for several days within 
easy striking distance of General Johnston’s army. The 
intention of the latter to throw Longstreet’s division against 
Keyes’s exposed and weak right flank was the best plan that 
could have been adopted. The first great blunder consisted 
in Longstreet’s taking his division from the Nine-mile road 
to the Williamsburg road, and the next in placing six bri¬ 
gades on the Charles City road, where there was no enemy. 
Five of these brigades were marching and counter-march¬ 
ing on the latter road, and struggling through the White 
Oak Swamp, in mud and water waist-deep, to reach the 
Williamsburg road miles in rear of the fighting, where 
General Longstreet then was, whilst Colonel Jenkins’s three 
regiments were scouring the rear of the Nine-mile road 
from Fair Oaks to Seven Pines; thus not only saving the 
right of Hill’s division from being driven out of Casey’s 
captured works by Federal reenforcements under Kearny, 
but forcing Keyes and Heintzelman to their third line of 
defense. No one can fairly doubt what would have been 
the result, if at 3 p.m. when Hill’s division alone had carried 


— 515 — 


Battles and Leaders of the Civil War 


Casey's works, the five brigades that had been sent to the 
Charles City road had been within supporting distance of 
Hill, and had been promptly put in close action, and Pickett’s 
brigade had been thrown forward instead of being held far 
back on the railroad by Longstreet’s order “to repel any 
advance of the enemy up that road.” Instead of putting 
his own troops into the fight, even late in the afternoon, 
Longstreet called on General Johnston for help, and com¬ 
plained of the latter’s “slowness.” 

It is not proposed to speculate here upon what might 
have happened on the second day, if General Longstreet had 
made any attempt to carry out the orders he received to 
renew the attack. But it may be well to emphasize the 
fact that if Longstreet’s division had promptly moved, on 
the Nine-mile road, at daybreak, May 31st, and been put 
in close action on that side, whilst D. H. Hill’s division 
attacked in front, as Johnston certainly intended, there 
would have been no occasion to make excuses for the failure 
of complete Confederate success in wiping out Keyes’s corps, 
early in the morning of May 31st, before it could have been 
reenforced by either Heintzelman or Sumner.* 

*On the 15th of May, the Union gunboats opened fire on the 
forts at Drewry’s Bluff, twelve miles below Richmond, and soon after 
Johnston’s army retired, opening the way for McClellan’s advance 
to within seven miles of Richmond, whose citizens believed at this 
time that the Confederate authorities would be compelled to evacuate 
the city. The archives were shipped to Columbia, S. C., the public 
treasure was kept on cars ready for transportation to a place of 
safety. Confidence was restored before the battle of Seven Pines. 
On May 25th and 26th, Lieutenant F. C. Davis of the 3d Pennsyl¬ 
vania Cavalry, with eleven men rode from Bottom’s Bridge, by way 
of White Oak Bridge and Charles City Court House, to the James 
River and communicated with the gunboat fleet. After the battle 
of Seven Pines, General Lee determined to defend Richmond on the 
line then held by his army. This fact, in connection with the suc¬ 
cess of General Jackson in freeing the Shenandoah Valley of Union 
forces, restored the confidence of the people at Richmond. A large 
draft of soldiers from the ranks furnished a laboring force to build 
intrenchments, and slaves in the counties around Richmond were 
impressed for the work. 

On the 18th of June, Brigadier-General Cuvier Grover’s brigade, 
of Hooker’s division, made a reconnaissance between the Williams¬ 
burg road and the railroad, and found the Confederates in force 
behind the earthworks. The divisions of Hooker’s and Kearny’s ad¬ 
vanced on the 25th to a point called Oak Grove, about four miles 
from Richmond, in front of Seven Pines. This was the nearest ap¬ 
proach to Richmond during the investment by McClellan.— Editors. 


— 516 — 



V 


The Opposing Forces in the Seven Days’ Battles 

June 25th-July 1st , 1862 


The composition, losses, and strength of each army as 
here stated give the gist of all the data obtainable in the 
Official Records. K stands for killed; w for wounded; m w 
for mortally wounded; m for captured or missing; c for 
captured. 


THE UNION FORCES 
Army of the Potomac, 

Major-General George B. McClellan. 

General Headquarters: Provost Marshal’s and Hdqr’s Guard, 
Brig-Gen Andrew Porter; 2d U.S. Cavalry (7 co’s), and McClellan 
(Ill.) Dragons (2 cos), Maj Alfred Pleasonton; 93d N.Y. (4 co’s), 
and Sturges (Ill.) Rifles, Maj. Granville 0. Haller; 8th U.S. Inf. 
(2 co’s), Capt. Royal T. Frank and Lieut. Eugene Carter. Escort: 
4th U.S. Cavalry (2 co’s) and Onedia (N.Y.) Cavalry, Capt. James 

B. McIntyre. Volunteer Engineer Brigade, Brig-Gen Daniel P. Wood¬ 
bury; 15th N.Y., Col. J. McLeod Murphy; 50th N.Y., Col Charles B. 
Stuart, Brigade loss: m. 12. Battalion U.S. Engineers, Capt. James 

C. Duane, Loss: w. 2: m. 9 m. 11. Casey’s Command (at White 
House), Brig-Gen. Silas Casey: 4th Pa. Cav. (Squadron, Capt William 
Shorts: 11th Pa. Cav. (5 co’s), Col Josiah Harlan; F. 1st N.Y. Arty., 
Capt. Wm R. Wilson; 93d N.Y. (6 co’s), Col. Thos. F. Morris. 

Second Corps, Brig-Gen. E. V. Sumner, Staff Loss: w.l. 
Cavalry: D. F. and K, 6th N.Y., Lieut-Col. Duncan McVicar. 
First Division, Brig-Gen Israel B. Richardson. 

First Brigade, Brig-Gen. John C. Caldwell; 5th N.H., Lieut- 
Col. Samuel G. Langley, Capt. Edward E. Sturtevant; 7th N.Y., Col. 
George von Schack; 61st N. Y. Col. Francis C. Barlow; 81st Pa., Col. 
Charles F. Johnson (w), Lieut-Col. Eli. T. Conner (k). Maj. H. 
Boyd McKeen. Brigade loss k. 61; w. 356; m, 137 = 554. Second 
Brigade, Brig-Gen. Thomas F. Meagher, Col. Robert Nugent, Brig- 
Gen. Thomas F. Meagher; 29th Mass., Col. Ebenezer W. Peirce (w), 
Lieut-Col. Joseph H. Barnes; 63d N.Y. Col. John Burke (w), Lieut. 
Col. Henry Fowler, Capt. Joseph O’Neil; 69th N.Y., Col. Robert 
Nugent; 88th N.Y., Col. Henry M. Baker, Maj. James Quinlan. 
Brigade loss: k, 34; w. 227, m, 232=493. Third Brigade, Brig. Gen. 
William H. French; 2d Det., Lieut Col. William P. Baily, Capt. D. 
L. Strieker; 52d N.Y. Col. Paul Frank; 57th N.Y., Col. Samuel K. 
Zook;. 64th N.Y., Col. Thomas J. Parker; 66th N.Y., Col. Joseph C. 
Pinckney; 53d Pa., Col. John R. Brooke. Brigade loss: k, 3; w. 
44; m, 162 = 208. Artillery, Capt. George W. Hazzard (mw); B, 1st 


— 517 — 




Battles and Leaders of the Civil War 


N.Y. Capt. Rufus D. Pettit; A and C, 4th U.S., Capt. George W. 
Hazzard, Lieut. Rufus King, Jr. Artillery loss: w, 19; m, 10=29. 
Second Division, Brig. Gen. John Sedgwick. 

First Brigade, Col. Alfred Sully: 15th Mass. Lieut-Col. John 
W. Kimball; 1st Minn., Lieut-Col. Stephen Miller; 1st Co. Mass., 
Sharp-shooters, Capt. John Saunders; 34th N.Y., Col. James A. 
Suiter; 82d N.Y., Col. Henry W. Hudson; 2d Co. Minn. Sharp¬ 
shooters, Capt William F. Russell. Brigade loss: k, 12=82; m, 
152=246. Second Brigade, Brig-Gen. William W. Burns (w); 69th 
Pa., Col. Joshua T. Owen; 71st Pa. Lieut-Col. William G. Jones; 
72d Pa., Col De Witt C Baxter; 106th Pa., Col. Turner G. Morehead. 
Brigade loss: k, 40; w, 193; m, 172=405. Third Brigade, Brig-Gen 
N. J. T. Dana: 19th Mass., Col. Edward W Hinks (w), Capt Edmund 
Rice, Lieut. Col., Arthur F Devereux; 20th Mass., Col William R. 
Lee; 7th Mich., Col. Ira R. Grosvenor; 42d N.Y., Col. Edmund C. 
Charles (w and c), Lieut-Col. 

James J Mooney, Brigade loss: k, 51; w. 262; m, 153=466. 
Artillery, Col. Charles H. Tompkins: A, 1st R.I., Capt. John A. 
Tompkins: I-, 1st U.S., Lieut Edmund Kirby, Artillery loss: W, 12; 
m, 4 = 16. 

Reserve Artillery, G, 1st N. Y., Capt. John D. Frank; B, 1st 
R.I. Capt Walter O. Bartlett; G, 1st R.I., Capt. Charles D. Owens. 
Reserve Artillery loss: w, 6; m, 2=8. 

Third Corps: Brig. Gen. S. P. Heintzelman, Cavalry: 3d Pa., 
Col. William W. Averell. Loss: k, 6; w, 2; m, 3; =11. 

Second Division: Brig Gen. Joseph Hooker. 

First Brigade: Brig-Gen. Cuvier; 1st Mass., Col. Robert Cowdin; 
11th Mass., Col. William Blaisdell; 16th Mass. Col. Powell T. Wyman 
(k), Lieut-Col. George A. Meacham (w), Maj. Daniel S. Lamson; 
2d N.H., Col. Gilman Marston; 26th Pa., Lieut-Col. George D. Wells. 
Brigade loss: k, 25; w, 214; m, 116 = 355. Second Brigade Brig-Gen. 
Daniel E. Sickles: 70th N.Y., Maj. Thomas Holt; 71st N.Y. Col. 
George B. Hall; 72d N.Y. Col. Nelson Taylor; 73d N.Y. Capt. Alfred 
A. Donalds; 74th N.Y., Col. Charles K. Graham. Brigade loss: k, 26; 
w, 173; m, 109 = 308. Third Brigade, Col. Joseph B. Carr: 5th N.J. 
Maj. John Ramsey; 6th N.J., Col. Gershom Mott; 7th N.J., Col 
Joseph w. Revere, Capt. Henry C. Bartlett; 8th N.J., Maj. William 
A. Henry; 2d N.Y. Lieut-Col. William A. Olmstead. Brigade loss: 
k, 4; w, 24; 31 = 59. Artillery: D, 1st N.Y., Capt. Thomas W. Osborn; 
4th N.Y., Lieut. Joseph E. Nairn; H. 1st U.S., Capt. Charles Webber. 
Artillery loss: w, 1; m, 7 = 8. 

Third Division, Brig-Gen. Philip Kearny. 

First Brigade: Brig-Gen. John C. Robinson: 20th Ind., Col. 
William L. Brown; 87th N.Y., Lieut-Col. Richard A. Bachia; 57th 
Pa., Lieut-Col. Elhanon W. Woods; 63d Pa. v Col. Alexander Hays; 
105th Pa., Col. Amor A. McKnight. Lieut. Col. William K. Corbet, Capt. 
Calvin A. Craig. Brigade loss: k, 56; W, 310; m, 161 = 527. Second 
Brigade, Brig-Gen. David B. Birney: 3d Me., Lieut-Col. C.A.L. 
Sampson, Maj. Edwin Burt; 4th Me., Col. Elijah Walker; 38th N.Y., 
Col. J. H. H. Ward; 40th N.Y., Col. Thomas W. Egan; 101st N.Y. 
Col. Enrico Fardella. Brigade loss: k, 10; w, 53; m, 185=248. 
Third Brigade, Brig-Gen. Hiram G. Berry: 2d Mich., Maj. Louis 
Dillman, Capt. William Humphrey; 3d Mich. Lieut. Col. Ambros 
A. Stevens; Maj. Byron R. Pierce; 5th Mich., Maj. John D. Fairbanks 
(mw), Capt. Judson S. Farrer; 1st N.Y., Col. Garrett Dyckman; 
37th N.Y., Col. Samuel B. Hayman. Brigade Loss; k, 28; w, 225; 
m, 176 = 429. Artillery: E, 1st R.I., Capt. George E. Randolph; G, 
2d U.S., Capt. James Thompson. Artillery loss: k, 2; w, 16; m, 5=23. 


— 518 — 


Opposing Forces in Seven Days’ Battles 


Reserve Artillery, Capt. Gustavus A. D. Russy: 6th N.Y., 
Capt. Walter M. Bramhall; 2d N.J., Capt. John E. Beam (k), 
Lieut. John B. Monroe; K, 4th U.S., Lieut. Francis W. Seeley. Loss: 
k, 1; w, 3; m, 1=5. 

Fourth Corps, Brig-Gen Erasmus D. Keyes. 

Cavalry: 8th Pa., Col. David McM. Bregg. 

First Division, Brig-Gen. Darius N. Couch. 

First Brigade, Brig-Gen. Albion P. Howe: 55th N.Y., Lieut-CoL 
Louis Thonrot; 62d N.Y. Col. David J. Nevin; 92d Pa., Capt John 
S. Long 88th Pa., Col John *F. Ballier; 102d Pa., Col. Thomas A. 
Rowley. Brigade loss: k, 27; w, 148; m, 33=208. Second Brigade, 
Brig-Gen. John K. Abercrombie: 65th N.Y. (1st U.S. Chasseurs), 
Lieut-Col. Alexander Shaler; 67th N.Y. (1st Long Island), Lieut- 
Col. Nelson Cross; 23d Pa., Col Thomas H. Neill; 31st Pa. Col 
David H. Williams; 61st Pa., Lieut-Col. Frank Vallee. Brigade 
loss: k, 19; w, 168; m, 16 = 203. Third Brigade, Brig-Gen. Innis N. 
Palmer: 7th Mass. Col. David A. Russell; 10th Mass., Maj. Ozro 
Miller (mw), Capt Frederick Barton; 36th N.Y., Maj. James A. 
Raney; 2d R.I. Col. Frank Wheaton. Brigade loss: k, 23; w, 194; 
m, 48 = 265. Artillery: C, 1st Pa., Capt. Jeremiah McCarthy; D, 
1st Pa., Capt. Edward H. Flood. 

Second Division, Brig-Gen John J. Peck. 

First Brigade, Brig-Gen. Henry M. Naglee; 11th Me., Col. 
Harris M. Plaisted; 56th N.Y., Col. Charles Van Wyck; 100th N.Y., 
Lieut-Col Phineas Staunton; 52d Pa., Lieut-Col. Henry M. Hoyt; 
104th Pa., Lieut-Col. John W. Nields; Second Brigade, Brig-Gen. 
Henry W. Wessells; 81st N.Y. Col. Edwin Rose; 85th N.Y., Col. 
Jonathan S. Belknap; 92d N.Y. Lieut-Col. Hiram Anderson, Jr.; 96th 
N.Y., Col. James Fairman; 98th N.Y., Lieut-Col. Charles Durkee; 
85th Pa., Col. Joshua B. Howell;. 101st Pa., Capt. Charles W. May; 
103d Pa., Col. Theodore F. Lehmann. Brigade loss: k, 1; w, 2; m, 
121 = 124. Artillery: H. 1st N.Y., Lieut. Charles E. Mink; 7th N.Y., 
Capt. Peter C. Regan. 

Reserve Artillery, Maj. Robert M. West; 8th N.Y., Capt. 
Butler Fitch; E, 1st Pa., Capt. Theodore Miller; H, 1st Pa., Capt. 
James Brady; M, 5th U.S., Capt. James McKnight. 

Fifth Corps, Brig-Gen. Fitz John Porter, Staff loss: m, 1. 
Cavalry: 8th Ill., Col. John F. Farnsworth, Loss: k, 3; w, 9, 
m, 3=15. 

First Division, Brig-Gen. George W. Morell. 

First Brigade, Brig-Gen. John H. Martindale: 2d Me., Col. Charles 
W. Roberts: 18th Mass., (detached with Stoneman’s command) Col. 
James Barnes; 22d Mass., Col. Jesse A. Grove (k), Maj. William S. 
Tilton (w and k) Capt. Walter S. Sampson, Capt. D. K. Wardwell; 
1st Mich.; Col Horace S. Roberts; 13th N.Y. Col. Elisha G. Marshall, 
Maj. Francis Schoeggel; 25th N.Y., Maj. Edwin S. Gilbert (c) 
Captain Shepard Gleason; 2d Co. Mass., Sharp-shooters, Lieut. Charles 
D. Stiles. Brigade loss: k, 114; w, 443; m, 329 = 886. Second 
Brigade, Brig-Gen. Charles Wilson: 9th Mass., Col. Thomas Cass 
(mw), Lieut-Col Patrick R. Guiney; 4th Mich., Col. Dwight A. 
Woodbury (k), Lieut-Col. Jonathan W. Childs (w), Capt. John M. 
Randolph; 14th N.Y., Col. James McQuade; 62d Pa., Col. Samuel 
W. Black (k), Lieut. Col. Jacob B. Sweitzer (w and c), Capt. James 
C. Hull, Brigade loss; k, 182; w, 772; m, 199 = 1153. Third Brigade, 
Brig. Gen Daniel Butterfield: 12th N.Y., Lieut Col. Robert M. 
Richardson; 17th N.Y. (detached with Stoneman’s command), Col. 
Henry S. Lansing; 44th N.Y. Lieut-Col. James C. Rive; 16th Mich., 
Col. T. B. W. Stockton (c), Lieut-Col. John V. Ruehle; 83d Pa., Col. 


519 


Battles and Leaders of the Civil War 


John W. McLane (k) Capt. Hugh S. Cambell (w) Brady’s Co. Mich. 
Sharp-shooters, Capt Kin S. Dygert. Brigade loss: k, 166; w, 546; 
m, 269 = 981. Artillery: Capt. William B. Weeden; 3d Mass., Capt. 
Augustus P. Martin; 5th Mass., Lieut. John B. Hyde; C. 1st R.I., 
Lieut. Richard Waterman; D, 5th U.S., Lieut. Henry W. Kingsburg. 
Artillery loss: k, 9; w, 38; m, 9=56. Sharp-shooters: 1st U.S., Col. 
Hiram Berdan. Loss: k, 8; w, 35; m, 13=56. 

Second Division, Brig-Gen. George Sykes. 

First Brigade, Col. Robert C. Buchanan: 3d U.S., Maj. Nathan 
B. Rossell (k), Capt. Thomas W. Walker, Capt. John D. Wilkins; 
4th U.S. Maj. Delozier Davidson (c), Capt. Joseph B. Collins; 12th 
U.S., Maj Henry B. Clitz (w and c), Capt. John G. Read, Capt. 
Matthew M. Blunt, 14th U.S., Captain John D. O’Connell, Brigade 
loss: k, 89; w, 297; m, 181=567. Second Brigade, Lieut-Col. William 
Chapman, Maj. Charles S. Lovell; 2d U.S., Capt. Adolphus F. Bond, 
Lieut. John S. Poland; 6th U.S. Capt. Thomas Hendrickson; 10th 
U.S., Maj. Charles S. Lovell, Maj. George L. Andrews; 11th U.S., 
Maj. DeLancey Floyd-Jones; 17th U.S. Maj. George L. Andrews. 
Brigade loss: k, 38; w, 228; m, 93=359. Third Brigade, Col. 
Gouvernour K. Warren: 5th N.Y., Lieut-Col. Hiram Duryea; 10th 
N.Y., Col. John E. Bendix. Brigade loss: k, 47; w, 154 m, 85=286. 
Artillery: Captain Stephen H. Weed; L and M, 3d U.S., Capt. 
John Edwards; I. 5th U.S., Capt S. H. Weed. Artillery loss: k, 4; 
w, 24; m, 4=32. 

Third Division, Brig-Gen. George A. McCall (c), Brig-Gen. 
Truman Seymour. Staff loss: k, 1; w, 1, m, 1=3. 

First Brigade, Brig-Gen. John F. Reynolds (c), Col. Seneca G. 
Simmons (k), Col. R. Biddle Roberts; 1st Pa., Res., Col. R. Biddle 
Roberts, Maj. Lemuel Todd; 2d Pa., Res., Lieut.-Col. William Mc- 
Candless; 5th Pa., Res., Col. Seneca G. Simmons, Lieut-Col. Joseph 
W. Fisher 8th Pa., Rs., Col. George S. Hays; 13th Pa. Res. (1st 
Rifles 6 Co’s), Maj Roy Stone. Brigade loss: k, 109; w, 497, m, 
403 = 1009. Second Brigade, Brig-Gen. George G. Meade (w), Col. 
Albert L. Magilton; 3d Pa., Res. Col. Horatio G. Sickel; 4th Pa., 
Res. Col. Albert L. Magilton; 7th Pa. Res. Col. Elisha B. Harvey; 
11th Pa, Res., Col. Thomas F. Gallagher (c), Capt. Daniel S. Porter. 
Brigade loss: k, 107; w, 284, m, 1009 = 1400. (The wounded of the 
11th Reserves at Gaine’s Mill are counted among the captured or 
missing.) Third Brigade, Brig-Gen. Truman Seymour, Col. C. Feger 
Jackson: 6th Pa. Res. (Detached with Casey’s command), Col. William 
Sinclair; 9th Pa., Res., Col. C. Feger Jackson: 6th Pa. Res. Capt. 
John C. Uthbertson (w); 10th Pa. Res., Col. James T. Kirk; 12th Pa. 
Res. Col. John H. Taggart. Brigade loss: k, 78; w, 339; m, 142=559. 
Artillery: A, 1st Pa., Capt. Hezekiah Easton (k), Lieut. Jacob L. 
Deitrich, Lieut. John G. Simpson; B. Kerns (w), Lieut. Frank P. 
Amsden; C. 5th U.S., Capt. Henry V. DeHart (mw), Lieut. Eben 
G. Scott. Artillery loss: k, 21 w, 42; m, 11 = 72. Cavalry: 4th 
Pa., Col. James H. Childs, Cavalry loss: k, 2; w, 13, m, 7 = 22. 

Artillery Reserve: Col. Henry J. Hunt. First Brigade (Horse 
Artillery), Lieut-Col William Hays: A, 2d U.S., Capt. John C. Tidball; 
B and L, 2d U.S., Capt James M. Robertson; M, 2d U.S., Capt Henry 
Benson, C and G 3d U.S. (detached with Casey’s command). Capt. 
Horatio G. Gibson. Brigade loss: w, 6; m, 2 = 8. Second Brigade. 
Lieut-Col George W. Getty: E and G, 1st U.S., Lieut. Alanson M. 
Randol; K, 1st U.S., Lieut Samuel S. Elder; G, 4th U.S., Lieut. 
Charles H. Morgan; A, 5th U.S., Lieut. Adelbert Ames; K, 5th 
U.S., Capt. John R. Smead. Brigade loss: k, 7; w, 29, m, 6=22. 
Third Brigade, Maj. Albert Arndt; A, 1st Battalion N.Y., Capt. 


— 520 — 


Opposing Forces in Seven Days’ Battles 

Otto Diodveics B, 1st Battalion N.Y., Capt. Adolph Voegelee; C, 
1st Battalion N. Y., Capt. John Knieriem; D, 1st Battalion N.Y., 
Capt Edward Grimm. Brigade loss: k, 4; w, 11; m, 4 = 19. Fourth 
Brigade, Major Edward R. Petherridge: A, Md., Capt. John W. 
Wolcott; B, Md., Capt., Alonzo Snow. Brigade loss: k, 2 
w, 22; m, 1 = 25. Fifth Brigade, Capt. J. Howard Carlisle: 5th N.Y. 
(dismounted and officers and men attached elsewhere) Capt. Elijah 
D. Taft; E, 2d U.S., Capt. J. Howard Carlisle; F and K 3d U.S. 
Capt. La Ehett L. Livingston. Brigade loss: k, 2; w, 5 = 7. 

Siege Train, 1st Conn. Heavy Artillery, Col. Robert 0. Tyler. 
Loss: k, 2; w, 4; m, 29 = 35. 

Sixth Corps, Brig Gen William B. Franklin. Cavalry: 1st N.Y. 
Col. Andrew T. McReynolds. 

First Division,) Brig-Gen. Henry W. Slocum. 

First Brigade, Brig-Gen. George W. Taylor; 1st N.J., Lieut-Col. 
Robert McAllister, Col. A. T. A. Torbert; 2d N.J., Col. Isaac M. 
Tucker (k), Maj. Henry 0. Ryerson (w), Lieut-Col. Samuel L. Buck; 
3d N.J., Col. Henry W. Brown; 4th N.J., Col. James H. Simpson (c) 
Brigade loss: k, 116; w,380; m, 582 = 1078. Second Brigade, Col. 
Joseph J. Bartlett; 5th Me., Col. Nathaniel J. Jackson (w), Lieut-Col. 
William S. Heath (k), Capt. Clark S. Edwards; 16th N.Y. Col. 
Joseph Howland (w), Maj. Joel J. Seaver; 27th N.Y. Lt. Col. 
Alexander D. Adams; 96th Pa., Col. Henry L. Cake. Brigade loss: 
k, 69; w, 409; m, 68 = 546. Third Brigade, Brig-Gen. John Newton: 
18th N.Y. Lieut Col. George Myers, Major John C. Meginnis; 31st 
N.Y., Col. Calvin E. Pratt (w), Maj. Alexander Raszewski; 32d 
N.Y., Col Doderick Matheson, 95th Pa., Col John M. Gosline (mw), 
Lieut-Col. Gustavus W. Town. Brigade loss: k, 40; w, 279; m, 114 = 
433. Artillery, Capt. Edward R. Platt: 1st Mass. £apt. Josiah 
Porter; 1st N.J., Capt. William Hexamer; D, 2d U.S. Lieut. Emory 
Upton. Artillery loss: k, 1; w, 13; m, 4 = 18. 

Second Division, Brig-Gen William F. Smith. 

First Brigade, Brig-Gen. Winfield S. Hancock; 6th Me., Col. 
Hiram Burnham; 43d N.Y., Col. Francis L. Minton; 49th Pa., Col 
William H. Irwin; 5th Wis., Col. Amasa Cobb. Brigade loss: k, 
9; w, 93; m, 98=200. Second Brigade, Brig-Gen. W. T. H. Brooks 
(w), 2d Vt., Col. Henry Whiting; 3d Vt., Lieut. Col. Wheelock G. 
Veazey 4th Vt., Col. Edwin H. Stoughton; 5th Vt., Lieut-Col. Lewis 

A. Grant; 5th Vt., Col. Nathan Lord, Jr. Brigade loss: k, 45; w, 
271, m, 139 = 455. Third Brigade, Brig-Gen. John W. Davidson; 
7th Me., Col. Daniel D. Bidwell; 77th N.Y., Col. James B. McKean. 
Brigade loss: k, 12; w, 23; m, 87 = 122. Artillery: Capt. Romeyn 

B. Ayres: E. 1st N.Y., Capt Charles C. Wheeler; 1st N.Y., Capt. 
Andrew Cowan; 3d N.Y., Capt. Thadeous P. Mottl, F, 5th U.S., 
Capt. Romeyn B. Ayers. Artillery loss: k, 3,j w, 4; m, 15=22. 
Cavalry: I and K, 5th Pa., Capt. John O’Farrell. Loss: k, 1. 

Cavalry Reserve, Brig-Gen. P. St. George Cooke. First Brigade: 
6th Pa., Col. Richard H. Rush; 5th U.S. (5 co’s), Capt. Charles 
J. Whiting (e), Capt. Joseph H. McArthur. Second Brigade, Col. 
George A. H. Blake: 1st U.S. (4 co’s), Lieut-Col. William N. 
Grier; 6th U.S. (with Stoneman’s Command), Capt. August V. Kautz. 
Cavalry Reserve loss: k, 14; w, 55; m, 85 = 154. 

(Brig-Gen. George Stoneman and Brig-Gen. William H. Emory 
operated on the right flank of the army with a mixed command of 
infantry, cavalry and artillery.) 

Total loss of the Army of the Potomac: 1734 killed, 8062 woun¬ 
ded, and 6053 captured or missing=15,849. 


— 521 — 


Battles and Leaders of the Civil War 


The “present for duty equipped," or effective force of this army 
(exclusive of Dix’s command at and about Fort Monroe) on June 
20th, 1862, was 1511 engineers, 6513 cavalry, 6446 artillery, and 
90,975 infantry, in all 105,445. See “Official Records” XI., Pt. II., 
p. 238. 


THE CONFEDERATE FORCES 
Army of Northern Virginia, 

General Robert E. Lee. 

Jackson’s Command, Maj-Gen. T. J. Jackson. 

Cavalry: b d Va., Col. Thomas T. Munford. 

Whiting’s Division, Brig-Gen. William H. C. Whiting. 

Staff loss: k, 1; w, 1=2. 

First Brigade, Brig-Gen. John B. Hood; 18th Ga., Lieut. Col. 
S. Z. Ruff; 1st Tex., Col A. T. Rainey (w) ; 4th Tex., Col John 
Marshal (k). Capt. W. P. Townsend; 5th Tex., Col. J. B. Robertson; 
Hampton (S.C.) Legion, Lieut-Col. M. W. Gary. Brigade Loss: 
k, 92; w, 526; m, 5 = 623. Third Brigade, Col. E. McIntyre. Col. 
E. Mclver Law; 4th Ala., Lieut-Col. O.K. McLemore (w), Capt. 
L. H. Scruggs; 2d Miss., Col. J. M. Stone; 11th Miss., Col J. P. 
Liddell; 6th N.C., Lieut-Col. I. E. Avery (w), Maj. R. F. Webb. 
Brigade loss: k, 66; w, 428; m, 5 = 553. Artillery: Va. Battery 
(Staunton Arty.) Capt. W. L. Balthis (w), N.C. Battery (Rowan 
Arty). Capt James Reilly. Artillery loss: w, 16. 

Jackson’s Division. 

First Brigade, Brig-Gen. Charles S. Winder: 2d Va., Col. J. W. 
Allen (k), Lieut-Col. Lawson Botts; 4th Va., Col. Charles A. Ronald; 
5th Va., Col. A. J. Grigsby (w), Capt. G. C. Smith; 33d Va., Col. 
John F. Neff; Va. Battery (Alleghany Arty), Lieut John C. Carp¬ 
enter. Va. Battery (Rockbridge Artillery), Capt. William De 
Poague. Brigade loss: k, 30; w, 149 = 179. Second Brigade, Lieut- 
Col. R. H. Cunningham, Jr., Brig-Gen. J. R. Jones (w), Lieut-Col. 
R. H. Cunningham, Jr., 21st Va. Maj. John B. Mosely, 42 Va., Lieut- 
Col. William Martin; 48th Va., Capt John M. Vermillion; 1st Va., 
(Irish) Battalion. Capt. B. W. Leigh; Va. Batty. (Hampton Arty), 
Capt. William H. Caskie. Brigade loss: k, 1; w, 15 = 16. Third 
Brigade, Col. S. V. Fulkerson (mw), Col. E. T. H. Warren; Brig- 
Gen Wade Hampton; 10th Va., Col. E. T. H. Warren; 23d Va. Capt. 
A. V. Scott; 37th Va., Maj. T. V. Williams; Va. Battery (Danville 
Arty). Capt. George W. Wooding. Brigade loss: k, 2; w, 15, 
m, 1 = 18. Fourth Brigade, Brig-Gen. Alexander R. Lawton; 13th 
Ga., Col. Marcellus Douglass; 26th Ga., Col. E. N. Atkinson; 31st 
Ga., Col. C. A. Evans (w), 38th Ga., Lieut-Col. L. J. Parr (w), 
Capt. William H. Batter; 60th Ga., Lieut-Col. W. H. Stiles; 61st 
Ga., Col. John H. Lamar. Brigade loss: k, 115; w, 452 = 567. 
Ewell’s Division, Maj-Gen. Richard S. Ewell. 

Fourth Brigade, Brig. Gen. Arnold Elzey (w), Col. James A. 
Walker, Brig. Gen. Jubal A. Early: 12th Ga., Capt. James G. Rodgers; 
13th Va., Col. James A. Walker; 25th Va., Lieut-Col. John C. 
Higginbotham; 31st Va., Col. John S. Hoffman; 44th Va., Lieut-Col. 
Norvell Cobb; 52d Va., Lieut-Col. J. H. Skinner; 58th Va., Col. F. H. 
Board. Brigade loss: k, 52; w, 229; m, 3=284. Seventh Brigade, 
Brig-Gen. Isaac R. Trimble: 15th Ala., Col. James Cantey; 21st 
Ga., Maj. T. W. Hooper (w); 16th Miss., Col. Carnot Posey; 21st 
N.C. Lieut-Col. W. W. Kirkland; 1st N.C. Battalion sharpshooters 
Maj. Rufus W. Wharton; Va. 


—522 


Opposing Forces in Seven Days’ Battles 


Battery, Capt. A. R. Courtney. Brigade loss: k, 71; w, 280; m, 
49=400. Eighth Brigade, Brig-Gen. Richard Taylor, Col. I.G. Seymour 
(k), Col. LeRoy A. Stafford; 6th La., Col I. G. Seymour; 7th La., 
Lieut-Col. David B. Penn.; 8th La., Col. Henry B. Kelly; 9th La., 
Col. Leroy A. Stafford; 1st La. Special Battalion, Maj. C. R. Wheat 
(k) ; Va. Battery (Charlottesville Arty), Capt J. McD. Carrington. 
Brigade loss: k, 56; w, 236=298. Maryland Line: 1st Inf. Col. 
Bradley T. Johnson; A, Cav., Capt. Ridgely Brown; Balto. Battery, 
Capt. J. B. Brockenbrough. Maryland line loss: k, 3; w, 8 = 11. 
Hill’s Division, Maj-Gen. Daniel H. Hill. 

First Brigade, Brig-Gen. Robert E. Rodes, Col. John B. Gordon: 
3d Ala., Lieut-Col. Charles Forsyth, Maj. Robert M. Sands; 5th 
Ala., Col. C. C. Pegus (mw), Maj. E. L. Honson; 6th Ala., Col. John 

B. Gordon, Maj. B. G. Baldwin; 12th Ala., Col. B. B. Gayle; 26th Ala., 
Col. E. A. O’Neal; Va. Battery (King William Arty.) Capt. Thomas 
H. Carter. Brigade loss: k, 112; w, 458=570. Second Brigade, 
Brig-Gen George B. Anderson (w), Col. C. C. Tew: 2d N.C., Col. 

C. C. Tew: 4th N.C., Col. E. A. Osborne; 14th N.C., Lieut-Colonel 
William A. Johnston; 30th N.C. Col. Francis M. Parker; Ala. 
Battery, Capt. R. A. Hardaway. Brigade Loss: k, 159; w, 704=863. 
Third Brigade, Brig-Gen. Samuel Garland, Jr.; 5th N.C., Col. 

D. K. McRae; 12th N.C., Col. Benjamin O. Wade; 13th N.C., Col. 

Alfred M. Scales; 20th N.C., Col. Alfred Iverson (w), Lieut-Col. 
Franklin J. Faison (k), Maj. William H. Toon; 23d N.C., Col. 

Daniel H. Christie (w), Lieut. I. J. Young (w); Ala. Battery 
(Jeff Davis Arty.), Capt. J. W. Bondurant, Brigade loss; k, 192; 
w, 637; m, 15 = 844. Fourth Brigade, Col. Alfred H. Colquitt; 

13th Ala., Col. Birkett D. Fry: 6th Ga., Lieut Col. J. JVL Newton; 
23d Ga., Col Emory F. Best; 27th Ga., Col. Levi B. Smith; 28th Ga., 
Col. T. J. Warthen. Brigade loss: k, 75; w, 474; m, 5 = 554. Fifth 
Brigade, Brig-Gen. Roswell. S. Ripley: 44th Ga., Col. Robert A. 

Smith (mw), Capt. John W. Beck; 48th Ga., William Gibson; 1st 
N.C., Col M. S. Stokes (k), Capt. H. A. Brown, Lieut-Col. William 
P. Bynum; 3d N.C., Col. Gaston Meares (k), Lieut Col. William L. De 
Rosset. Brigade loss: k, 171; w, 707; m, 30 = 908. Artillery: Va. 
Battery (Hanover Artillery), Capt G. W. Nelson. (See, also, 

Jones’s Battalion in Reserve Artillery temporarily attached to this 
division.) 

Magruder’s Command, Maj-Gen. J. B. Magruder. 

Jones’s Division, Brig-Gen. David R. Jones. Staff loss w, 1. 
First Brigade, Brig-Gen. Robert Toombs: 2d Ga., Col. Edgar 
M. Butt (w), Lieut-Col. William R. Holmes; 15th Ga. Col. William 
M. McIntosh (mw), Lieut-Col. William T Millican, Maj T. J. Smith, 
Capt. S. Z. Hearnsberger; 17th Ga. Col. Henry L. Benning; 20th 
Ga., Col. J. B. Cumming. Brigade loss: k, 44; w, 380; m, 6 = 430. Third 
Brigade, Col. George T. Anderson; 1st Ga., (regulars), Col. William 
J. Magill; 7th Ga., Lieut-Col. W. W. White (w), Maj. E. W. Hoyle 
(w), Capt George H. Carmical; 8th Ga., Col. L. M. Lamar (w and 
c), Capt. George O. Dawson; 9th Ga., Col. R. A. Turnipseed; 11th 
Ga. Lieut-Col. William Luffman. Brigade loss: k, 64; w, 327; m, 
46 = 437. Artillery, Maj. John J. Garnett: Va. Battery (Wise Arty), 
Capt. James S. Brown; S.C. Battery (Washington Arty), Capt. 
James F. Hart; La. Battery (Madison Arty.), Capt. George V. 
Moody; Va. Battery, Capt. W. J. Dabney. Artillery loss: k, 3; 
w, 11 = 14. 

McLaws’ Division, Maj-Gen. Lafayette McLaws. 

First Brigade, Brig-Gen Paul J. Semmes: 10th Ga., Col Alfred 
Cumming (w), Capt. W. C. Holt; 53d Ga., Col T. L. Duyal; 5th La., 


— 523 — 


Battles and Leaders of the Civil War 


Col. T. G. Hunt; 10th La., Lieut-Col. Eugene Waggaman (w and c) 
15th Va., Col T. P. August (w), 32d Va., Lieut-Col. William R. 
Willis; N.C. Battery, Capt. Basil C. Manly. Brigade loss: k, 31; 
w, 121; m, 63 = 215. Fourth Brigade, Brig-Gen. Joseph B. Kershaw; 
2d S. C., Col John D. Kennedy, Maj. F. Gaillard; 3d S.C. Colonel 
James D. Nance; 7th S.C., Col. D. Wyatt Aiken; 8th S.C., Col John 
W. Henagan; Va. Battery (Alexandria Arty.) Capt. Del Kemper. 
Brigade loss: k, 70; w, 349, m, 38=457. 

Magruder’s Division. 

Second Brigade, Brig-Gen. Howell Cobb: 16th Ga., Col. Goode 
Bryan; 24th Ga., Col. Robert McMillan; Ga. Legion (Cobb’s) —: 
2d La., Col. J. T. Norwood (mw) ; 15th N.C., Col. Henry A. Down (w) ; 
Ga., Battery (Troup Arty.), Capt. Henry H. Carlton. Brigade loss: 

k, 66; w, 347; m, 2 = 415. Third Brigade, Brig-Gen. Richard Griffith 
(mw), Col. William Barksdale; 13th Miss., Maj. Kennon McElroy; 
Col. William Barksdale., Lieut-Col. J. W. Carter (w) 17th Miss., 
Col. W. D. Holder (w), Lieut-Col. John C. Fiser; 18th Miss., Col. 
Thomas M. Griffin (w), Lieut-Col. William H. Luse; 21st Miss., 
Col. Benjamin G. Humphreys, Lieut-Col. W. L. Brandson (w), Capt. 
William C. F. Brooks; Va. Battery (1st Richmond Howitzers), 
Capt. E. S. McCarthy. Brigade Loss: k, 91; w, 434 = 525. 

Artillery, Lieut Col. Stephen D. Lee: Ga. Battery (Pulaski 
Arty.) Capt. J. P. W. Read; Va. Battery (James City Arty.), Capt. 

l, W. Richardson; Va. Battery (Magruder Arty.), Capt. T. Jeff 
Page, Jr. 

Longstreet’s Division, Maj. Gen. James Longstreet (also in com¬ 
mand of A. P. Hill’s division), Brig Gen Richard H. Anderson. 

First Brigade, Brig-Gen. James L. Kemper: 1st Va., Capt. G. F. 
Norton; 7th Va., Col. W. T. Patton; 11th Va., Capt. K. Otey; 17th 
Va., Col. M. D. Corse; 24th Va., Lieut-Col. Peter Hairston; Va. 
Battery (Loudoun Arty.), Capt. Arthur L. Rodgers. Brigade loss: 
k, 44; w, 205; m, 165 = 414. Second Brigade, Brig-Gen. Richard H. 
Anderson, Col. Micah Jenkins: 2d S.C. (Rifles), Col. J. V. Moore; 
4th S.C. (Battalion) Maj. S. C. Mattison; 5th S.C., Lieut-Col. A. 
Jackson; 6th S.C., Col. John Bratton; Palmetto (S.C.) Sharp-shooters, 
Col. Micah Jenkins, Lieut-Col. Joseph Walker. Brigade loss: k, 
136; w, 638; m, 13 = 787. Third Brigade, Brig-Gen. George E. 
Pickett (w), Col. John B. Stranger 8th Va., Col Eppa Hunton; 
18th Va., Col. R. E. Withers (w); 19th Va., Col. John B. Strange; 
28th Va., Col. Robert C. Allen; 56th Va., Col. W. D. Stuart. Brigade 
loss: k, 72; w, 563; m, 19 = 654. Fourth Brigade, Brig-Gen. Cadmus 
M. Wilcox: 8th Ala., Lieut-Col. L. Royston (w), 9th Ala., Maj. 
J. H. J. Williams; Capt. J. H. King (w) ; 10th Ala., Col. J. J. 

Woodward (k), Maj. J. H. Caldwell (w) ; 11th Ala., Lieut-Col. 

S. F. Hale, (w), Capt George Field (w) ; Va. Battery (Thomas 
Arty.), Capt. Edwin J. Anderson. Brigade loss: k, 229; w, 806; 

m, 20 = 1055. Fifth Brigade, Brig-Gen. Rodger A. Fryor: 14th Ala., 

Lieut-Col. D. W. Baine (k) ; 2d Fla., Col. E. A. Perry; 14th La., 

Col. Z. York; 1st La. Battalion, Lieut-Col. G. Coppens, 3d Va., 
Lieut-Col. J. V. Scott (w), La. Battery (Donaldsonville Arty), Capt. 
Victor Maurin. Brigade loss: k, 170; w, 681; m, 11 = 862. Sixth 
Brigade, Brig-Gen. Winfield S. Featherston (w) ; 12th Miss., Maj. 
W. H. Willy (w), Capt. S. B. Thomas; 19th Miss., Maj. John Mullins 
(w) ; 2d Miss. Battalion, Lieut-Col. John G. Taylor (k); Va. 
Battery (3d Richmond Howitzers), Capt. Benjamin H. Smith, Jr. 
Brigade loss: k, 115; w, 543; m, 9 = 667. 


—524 


Battles and Leaders of the Civil War 


Artillery: La. Battalion (Washington Arty.), Col. J. B. Walton; 
Va. Battery (Lynchburg Arty.), Capt. James Dearing; Va. Bat’y 
(Dixie Arty.), Capt. W. H. Chapman. 

Huger’s Division, Maj-Gen. Benjamin Huger. 

Second Brigade, Brig-Gen. William Mahone: 6th Va., Col. G. T. 
Rodgers; 12th Va., Col. D. A. Weisiger; 16th Va., Lieut. Col. Joseph 
H. Ham; 41st Va., Lieut-Col. William A. Patham (w) 49th Va., 
Col William Smith; Va. Battery (Portsmouth Artillery), Capt. 
Carey F. Frimes; Va. Battery, Capt. M. N. Moorman. Brigade 
loss: k, 66; w, 274; m, 124 = 464. Third Brigade, Brig-Gen. Ambrose 
R. Wright; 44th Ala., Col. James Kent; 3d Ga., Maj. J. R. Sturges 
(k), Capt. R. B. Nisbet; 4th Ga., Col. George Doles; 22d Ga., Col. 
R. H. Jones, Maj. Joseph Wasden; 1st La., Lieut-Col. W. R. Shivers 
(w), Capt. M. Nolan; Va. Battery, Capt. Frank Huger. Brigade 
loss: k, 93; w, 483; m, 90 = 666. Fourth Brigade, Brig-Gen. Lewis 
A. Armistead: 9th Va., Lieut-Col. James S. Gilliam; 14th Va., Col. 
James G. Hodges; 38th Va., Col. E. C. Edmonds; 53d Va., Capt. 
William R. Aylett, Maj. George M. Waddill, Capt. R. W. Martin, 
Col. H. B. Tomlin; 57th Va., Lieut-Col. Waddy T. James; 5th Va. 
Battalion, Capt. William E. Alley; Va. Battery (Fauquier Arty.), 
Capt. Robert M. Stribling; Va. Battery, Capt. William H. Turner. 
Brigade loss: k, 51; w, 281; 69 = 401. 

Hill’s (Light) Division (attached to Longstreet’s command June 
29th-July 1st), Maj. Gen. Ambrose P. Hill. 

First Brigade, Brig. Gen. Charles W. Field; 40th Va., Col. J. M. 
Brockenbrough; 47th Va., Col. Robert M. Mayo; 55th Va., Col. Fran¬ 
cis Mallory; 60th Va., Col. William E. Starke (w), Lieut-Col. B. H. 
Jones, Col. William E. Starke, Maj. J. C. Sumners. Brigade loss: 
k, 78; w, 500; m, 2=580. Second Brigade, Brig-Gen. Maxcy Gregg; 
1st S. C. Col. D. H. Hamilton; 1st S. C. (Rifles) Col. J. Foster Mar¬ 
shall; 12th S. C. Col. Dixon Barnes (w) ; 13th S. C., Col. O. E. Ed¬ 
wards; 14th S. C. Col. Samuel McGowan. Brigade loss: k, 152; w, 
773; m, 4 = 929. Third Brigade, Brig-Gen. Joseph R. Anderson (w), 
Col. Edward L. Thomas; 14th Ga., Lieut-Col. Robert W. Folson (w) ; 
35th Ga., Col. Edward L. Thomas: (w) ; 45th Ga., Col. Thomas Harde¬ 
man (w) ; 49th Ga., Col. A. J. Lane (w) ; 3d La. Battalion, Lieut-Col. 
Edmund Pendleton. Brigade loss: k, 62; w, 300; m, 2 = 364 (esti- 
timated). Fourth Brigade, Brig-Gen. L. O’b. Branch: 7th N.C., Col. 
Royle P. Campbell (k), Lieut-Col. E. Graham Haywood (w); Maj. 
J. L. Hill; 18th N. C., Col. Robert H. Cowan; 28th N. C., Col. James 
H. Lane; 33d N. C. Lieut-Col. Robert F. Hoke; 37th N. C., Col. 
Charles C. Lee (w), Lieut-Col. William M. Barbour. Brigade loss: 
k, 105; w, 706; m, 28=839. Fifth Brigade, Brig-Gen. James J. 
Archer: 5th Ala. Battalion, Capt. A. S. Van De Graaf (w) ; 19th Ga., 
Lieut-Col. Thomas C. Johnson (k) ; 1st Tenn., Lieut. Col. T. C. Shack¬ 
elford (k) ; 7th Tenn., Col. John F. Goodner (w) ; 14th Tenn., Col. 
W. A. Forbes. Brigade loss: k, 92; w, 443=535. Sixth Brigade, 
Brig-Gen William D. Pender; 2d Ark. Battalion, Maj. W. N. Bron- 
augh (k) ; 16th N. C., Lieut-Col. John S. McElroy; 34th N. C., Col. 
Richard H. Riddick (w) ; 38th N. C. Col. William J. Hoke (w) ; 22d 
Va. Battalion, Capt. J. C. Johnson. Brigade loss: k, 130: k, 130 w, 692 = 
822 (approximately). Artillery, Lieut-Col. Lewis M. Coleman: Md. 
Battery, Capt. R. Snowden Andrews; S. C. Battery (German Arty.) 
Capt. William K. Bachman; Va. Battery (Fredericksburg Arty.), 
Capt. Carter M. Braxton; Va. Battery, Capt. William G. Cren¬ 
shaw; Va. Battery (Letcher Arty.), Capt. Greenlee Davidson; Va. 
Battery, Capt. Marmaduke Johnson; Master’s Battery, Capt. L. Mas- 
trsl S. C. Battery (Pee Dee Arty.), Capt. D. G. McIntosh; Va. Bat- 


— 525 — 


Opposing Forces in Seven Days’ Battles 

tery (Purcell Arty.), Capt. W. J. Pegram. Artillery loss k, 12; w, 
96 — 108. 

Holmes’s Division. —Maj-Gen. Theophilus H. Holmes. 

Second Brigade. — (Temporarily attached to Huger’s division) 
Brig. Gen. Robert Ransom, Jr; 24th N. C., Col. William J. Clarke; 
25th N. C., Col. Henry M. Rutledge; 26th N. C., Col. Z. B. Vance; 35th 
N. C., Col. M. W. Raason (w), Lieut-Col O. C. Petway (k) ; 48th N. C. 
Col. Robert C. Hill; 49th N. C., Col. S. D. Ramseur (w). Brigade 
loss: k, 95; w, 453; m, 76=624. Third Brigade, Brig-Gen. Junius 
Daniel: 43d N. C., Col. T. S. Kenan; 45th N. C. Lieut. Col. J. H. More- 
head; 50th N. C., Col. M. D. Craton; Va. Cavalry Battalion, Maj. 
Edgar Burroughs. Brigade loss: k, 2; w, 22 = 24. Fourth Brigade, 
Brig-Gen. John G. Walker, Col. Van H. Manning: 3d Ark., Col. Van 
H. Manning; 2d Ga., Battalion, Maj. George W. Ross; 27th N. C., 
Col. John R. Cooke; 46th N. C., Col. E. D. Hall; 30th Va., Col. A. T. 
Harrison; Va. Cavalry Company, Capt. Edward A. Goodwyn, Bri¬ 
gade loss: w, 12. Artillery, Col. James Deshler: Va. Battery, Capt. 
James R. Branch; N. C. Battery, Capt. T. H. Brem; Va. Battery, 
Capt. David A. French; V. C. Battery, Capt. Edward Graham, Ar¬ 
tillery loss: w, 17. 

Wise’s Command —(temporarily attached to Holmes’s Division) 
Brig-Gen Henry A. Wise: 26th Va., Col. P. R. Page; 46th Va., Col. 
R. T. W. Duke; Va. Battery, Capt. W. G. Andrews; Va. Battery, Capt. 
J. H. Rives. 

Reserve Artillery. —Brig. Gen. William S. Pendleton. * First Va. 
Artillery, Col. J. Thompson Brown; Williamsburg Artillery, Capt. 
John A. Coke; Richmond Fayette Arty., Lieut. William I. Clopton; 
Watson’s Battery, Capt. David Watson, Loss; w, 1. 

Jones’s Battalion. — (Temporarily attached to D. H. Hill’s Divi¬ 
sion) Maj. Henry P. Jones: Va. Battery, Capt. P. H. Clark; Va. Bat¬ 
tery, (Orange Arty.), Lieut. C. W. Fry; S.C. Bat’y Capt. A. Burnet 
Rhett. Loss: k, 5; w, 24=29. 

First Battalion. — (Sumpter), Artillery, Lieut-Col. A. S. Cutts; 
Ga. Battery, Capt. James Ap. Blackshear; Ga. Battery, Capt. John 
Lane; Ga. Battery, Capt. John V. Price; Ga. Battery Capt. H. M. Ross; 
Ga. Battery (Regulars), Capt. S. B. Hamilton. Loss: k, 3; w, 6 = 9. 
Second Battalion, Maj. Charles Richardson: Va. Battery (Fluvanna 
Arty.) Capt. John J. Ancell; Ga. Battery, Capt. John Milledge Jr.; 
Va. Battery (Ashland Arty.), Lieut. James Woolfolk. Loss; k, 1; 
w, 4=5. Third Battalion, Maj. William Nelson: Va. Battery (Fluv¬ 
anna Arty.)., Capt. Charles T. Huckstep; Va. Battery (Amherst 
Arty), c Capt. Thomas J. Kirkpatrick; Va. Battery (Morris Arty.), 
Capt. R. C. M. Page. Loss: k, 1; w, 1 = 2. 

Cavalry, Brig-Gen. James E. B. Stuart: 1st N. C., Lieut-Col. 
James B. Gordon, Col. Lawrence S. Baker; 1st Va., Col. Fitshugh 
Lee; 3d Va., Col. Thomas F. Goode; 4th Va., Capt. F. W. Chamber- 
layne; 5th Va., Col. Thomas L. Rosser; 9th Va., Col. W. F. H. Lee, 
10th Va., Col. J. Lucius Davis; Ga. Legion, Col. Thomas R. R. Cobb; 
15th Va. Battalion, Maj. J. Critcher; Hampton (S. C.) Legion (Squad¬ 
ron), Capt. Thomas E. Screven; Jeff Davis (Miss.) Legion, Lieut-Col. 
W. T. Martin, Stuart Horse Artillery, Capt. John Pelham. Cavalry 
loss (incomplete) : k, 5; w, 26; m, 40 = 71. 

Total Confederate loss (approximate) : 3286 killed, 15,909 wounded 
and 940 captured or missing = 20,135. 

The strength of the Confederates is not officially stated, but is 
probably ranged from 80,000 to 90,000 effectives. 

******* 


■ 526 — 


VI 


Hanover Court House and Gaines’s Mill 

By Fitz John Porter, 

Major-General, U. S. V. 


Under the direction of General McClellan certain mea¬ 
sures for the protection of the right flank of the army in 
its advance upon Richmond were put in my hands, begin¬ 
ning simultaneously with the march of the army from the 
Pamunkey.* Among these were the clearing of the enemy 
from the upper Peninsula as far as Hanover Court House 
or beyond, and, in case General McDowell's large forces, 
then at Fredericksburg were not to join us, the destruction 
of railroad and other bridges over the South and Pamun¬ 
key rivers, in order to prevent the enemy in large force 
from getting into our rear from that direction, and in order, 
further, to cut the Virginia Central Railroad, the one great 
line of the enemy's communications between Richmond and 
Northern Virginia. 

A portion of this duty had been accomplished along the 
Pamunkey as far as was deemed prudent by Colonel G. K. 
Warren's forces, posted at Old Church, when on the 26th of 
May, preparatory to an immediate advance upon Richmond, 
General McClellan directed me to complete the duty above 
specified, so that the enemy in Northern Virginia, then oc¬ 
cupying the attention of McDowell, Banks, and Fremont, 
could not be suddenly thrown upon our flank and rear nor 
otherwise strengthen the enemy in Richmond. I was al¬ 
lowed to adopt my own plans, and to select such additional 
forces as I deemed necessary. 

At 4 a.m. on the 27th General G. W. Morell, com¬ 
manding the division consisting of J. H. Martindale's, Dan- 

*The army left its camp at White House Landing, on the Pa¬ 
munkey, May 17th to 20th. The 6th Corps, under Franklin, advanced 
along the north bank of the Chickahominy, and on the 23d and 24th 
Davidson’s brigade of Smith’s division occupied Mechanicsville after 
a brief encounter with a Confederate column of Magruder’s command, 
under General Paul J. Semmes.— Editors. 


— 527 — 




Battles and Leaders of the Civil War 

iel Butterfield’s, and James McQuade’s brigades, marched 
from New Bridge preceded by an advance-guard of two regi¬ 
ments of cavalry and a battery of artillery under com¬ 
mand of General W. H. Emory. At the same hour Colonel 
Warren with his brigade moved from Old Church. Cavalry 
under General George Stoneman and regular infantry under 
General George Sykes followed at a later hour, to protect 
our left flank and rear. The first two commands were to 
fall upon the enemy, who I had reason to believe were 
camped in strong force near Hanover Court House. The 
first command, under my immediate direction, was to take 
the enemy in front, while Colonel Warren, taking the road 
along the Pamunkey, was to fall upon him in flank and rear. 
In a pelting storm of rain, through deep mud and water, 
for about 14 miles, the command struggled and pushed its 
way to Peake’s Station on the Virginia Central Railroad, 
2 miles from Hanover Court House, where we came in 
presence of the enemy. 

At once a force of infantry (Colonel C. A. Johnson’s 
25th New York Volunteers and Berdan’s Sharpshooters), 
protected by artillery, was sent forward to hold the enemy 
in check, pending the arrival of Morell, who was slowly 
pushing along the swampy roads. Cavalry and artillery 
were sent to the left along the Ashland road, to guard our 
flank and destroy the railroad and telegraph at the cross¬ 
ing. On Martindale’s arrival he was sent in support of this 
force, and with it soon became engaged with very persistent 
opponents. Butterfield was sent to the front, where, de¬ 
ploying in line, he moved rapidly upon the enemy, put them 
to flight, and captured many prisoners and one cannon and 
caisson. 

As the enemy gave way, the troops were pushed on 
toward Hanover Court House in pursuit of the fleeing foe 
and to strike their camp, which I had been informed was 
nearby, but which was found abandoned. Suddenly the 
signal officers notified me of a large force attacking our 
flank and rear, and especially the troops under Martindale. 
they hastened to the aid of their imperiled comrades. Mc- 
At once the infantry were faced about, and at double-quick 


— 528 — 


Hanover Court House and Gaines’s Mill 


Quade’s brigade, on arriving opposite the contending forces, 
moved in line to the attack. Butterfield, now in rear as 
faced about, pushed this brigade through the woods and 
fell with vigor, upon the enemy’s flank. The united at¬ 
tack quickly routed the enemy, inflicting heavy losses in 
killed and wounded and prisoners.* 

Warren, greatly delayed by muddy roads, swollen 
streams, and the work of building bridges, arrived about 
3 P.M., at the close of the first battle, and was sent north¬ 
ward in pursuit of the enemy, and to destroy bridges 
and boats on the Pamunkey. He, with Rush of the 6th 
Pennsylvania Cavalry, captured a company of North Caro¬ 
lina infantry just before reaching the wagon road bridge, 
which they destroyed. Night put an end to the contest. 

The succeeding day was occupied in gathering in the 
results of our victory and in pushing the troops to Ashland, 
destroying two of the enemy’s railroad trains, abandoned 
camps, and railroad and other bridges over the Pamunkey 
and South Anna, and injuring the railroad tracks—it hav¬ 
ing been decided at Washington that McDowell was not to 
join us, and that a large portion of his command had been 
ordered to Northern Virginia in pursuit of Jackson, then on 
a raid into the Shenandoah Valley. Our movement had 
caused the rapid retreat to Richmond of General Joseph R. 
Anderson’s command, thereby releasing McDowell’s com¬ 
mand for active operations in Northern Virginia, as well as 
opening the way for him to join us. The destruction of 
the railroad bridges was accomplished by Major Lawrence 
Williams, 6th U. S. Cavalry, who, while on the South Anna, 
fell in with some of McDowell’s scouts, who were hourly 
looking for the advance of their corps. 

McClellan joined me on the battle-field, and was well 
pleased with the results of the labors. Besides the destruc¬ 
tion of the bridges, trains, etc., we were in possession of a 
large number of arms and one cannon, of some 730 pris- 

*The affair at Hanover Court House was with the brigade of 
General L. O’B. Branch, who says in his report that he contended 
against odds in the hope that Confederate troops would come to his 
assistance. His loss was 73 killed and 192 wounded.— Editors. 


— 529 — 



Battles and Leaders of the Civil War 


oners, and had buried some 200 killed. By General McClel¬ 
lan's. directions we returned to our camp on the 29th of 
May. 

This was the first occasion that the corps had had to 
show its good qualities, all being in action at once. The 
behavior of the officers and men showed the benefit of the 
good training before Washington, during the fall and winter 
of 1861, given by their brigade and regimental commanders. 
The regiments, without exception behaved most gallantly. 

On our return to camp all rejoiced at the success of our 
mission in securing for a reasonable time our flank from 
injury and preparing the whole army for a rapid advance on 
Richmond, and also by rendering McDowell’s presence un¬ 
necessary for the defense of Washington, giving the War 
Department the opportunity of sending his corps by water 
to join us. If that had been done, none of the enemy could 
have been detached from Richmond to threaten Washing¬ 
ton, and his forces in Northern Virginia would have been 
called to defend Richmond. But a mightier power inter¬ 
fered, and through years of trial and sufferings delayed the 
happy victory we then hoped was in our hands.* 

After the Battle of Fair Oaks, during the greater part 
of the month of June, 1862, the Army of the Potomac, un¬ 
der General McClellan, and the Army of Northern Virginia, 
under General Lee, confronted each other, east of Rich¬ 
mond. The two armies were of nearly equal strength. (See 
foot-note p. 187.) McClellan’s forces, divided by the Chick- 
ahominy, were extended south of that stream, from New 
Bridge to White Oak Swamp, leaving north of the river 
only the Fifth Army Corps. The Confederate troops faced 
the Federal army throughout its length, from White Oak 
Swamp to New Bridge, and thence up the right bank of the 
Chickahominy, covering the important crossings at Mechan- 
icsville and Meadow Bridge, north of the city. 

South of the Chickahominy each army was secured 
against surprise in flank or successful attack in front by 

*The Union loss at Hanover Court House was 62 killed; 223 
wounded; 70 missing = 355.— Editors. 


— 530 — 



Hanover Court House and Gaines's Mill 


that swollen stream; by marshy lands and muddy roads; 
by redoubts studded with artillery and rifle pits well 
manned, all flanked or covered by swamps, tangled thickets, 
and slashed timber. Notwithstanding the apparent quiet, 
both armies were actively engaged in the erection of those 
defensive works which permit large forces to be detached, 
at opportune moments, for aggressive action, or for the de¬ 
fense of menaced positions. These preparations for offen¬ 
sive and defensive action, known to both commanders, plain¬ 
ly impressed on each the necessity of guarding against any 
errors in position, and the importance of preparing prompt¬ 
ly to take advantage of any opening in his opponent’s line 
which promised results commensurate with the risks in¬ 
volved. 

It was apparent to both generals that Richmond could 
only be taken in one of two ways: by regular approaches, 
or by assault. An assault would require superior forces, 
supported by ample reserves. It was equally apparent that 
an attack could readily be made from Richmond, because 
that city’s well armed and manned intrenchments would 
permit its defense by a small number of men, while large 
forces could be concentrated and detached for offensive 
operations. 

The faulty location of the Union army, divided as it was 
by the Chickahominy, was from the first realized by Gen¬ 
eral McClellan, and became daily an increasing cause of 
care and anxiety to him; not the least disturbing element 
of which was the possibility of quickly reinforcing his right 
wing or promptly drawing it to the south bank. That this 
dilemma was known to so intelligent and vigilant a com¬ 
mander as General Lee could not be doubted; and that it 
was certainly demonstrated to him by General J. E. B. 
Stuart’s dashing cavalry raid around the Union army, on 
June 14th, was shown in many ways. One evidence of it 
was his immediate erection of field works on his left, and 
his increasing resistance to the efforts of Union scouts to 
penetrate into the roads leading to Richmond from the 
north. This indicated that Lee was preparing to guard 
against the reenforcement of McClellan’s right, and also 


— 531 — 


Battles and Leaders of the Civil War 


against information reaching us of Confederate reenforce¬ 
ments from the north. 

McClellan had been forced into this faulty position on 
the Chickahominy and held there by the oft-repeated as¬ 
surances that McDowell’s corps of 40,000 men, then at Fred¬ 
ericksburg, would be advanced to Richmond and formed on 
his immediate right, which would make that wing safe.* 
On the 27th of May, under promise that McDowell would 
join him at once, McClellan cleared his front of all opposi¬ 
tion to his rapid march, by operations at Hanover Court 
House. If McDowell had joined McClellan then, it would 
have resulted in the capture of Richmond. That junction 
could also easily have been brought about immediately after 
the battle of Fair Oaks, and even then Richmond could have 
been taken. But the Confederate authorities so skillfully 
used Jackson, in the Valley of Virginia, as to draw off Mc¬ 
Dowell ; while the fears of the Administration, then aroused 
for the safety of Washington, together with a changed 
policy, caused him to be held back from the Army of the 
Potomac; and, although orders were several times issued 
requiring McDowell to unite with McClellan, and assurances 
were given as late as June 26th that he would so unite, 
yet he never arrived, and the right wing of McClellan’s 
army, then left exposed, became the object of attack. Mc¬ 
Clellan saw the coming storm, and guarded against it as 
best he could. Realizing the faultiness of his position, re¬ 
sulting from McDowell’s withdrawal to the north, he de¬ 
sired to correct the error by changing his base from York 
River to the James, where he could be easily reenforced, and 
from which point his communications would be safe. This 
change could not be made so long as McDowell’s advance 
was to be expected nor in any event could it be affected 
without great risk to the safety of his own army in the face 
of a vigilant and active foe, and without seriously jeopardiz¬ 
ing the success of the cause to which he was devoting all 
his energies. He, however, secured by careful examination 

*See Stanton's letter of May 18th: “You are instructed to co¬ 
operate so as to establish this communication as soon as possible, 
by extending your right wing to the north of Richmond.”— F. J. P. 


— 532 — 



Hanover Court House and Gaines’s Mill 


full information of the roads, and the character of the coun¬ 
try over which he would be obliged to move, if circumstances 
or policy should require a change of base, and as early as 
June 18th sent vessels loaded with supplies to the James 
River. 

In the middle of June General McClellan intrusted to 
me the management of affairs on the north bank of the 
Chickahominy, and confided to me his plans as well as his 
hopes and apprehensions. His plans embraced defensive 
arrangements against an attack from Richmond upon our 
weak right flank. We did not fear the results of such an 
attack if made by the forces from Richmond alone; but 
if, in addition, we were to be attacked by Jackson’s forces, 
suspicions of whose approach were already aroused, we 
felt that we should be in peril. But as Jackson had thus 
far prevented McDowell from joining us, we trusted that 
McDowell, Banks, and Fremont, who had been directed to 
watch Jackson, would be able to prevent him from joining 
Lee, or, at least, would give timely warning of his escape 
from their front and follow close upon his heels. 

With McClellan’s approval, my command was distri¬ 
buted as follows: 

General Geo. G. Meade’s brigade of General Geo. A. 
McCall’s division of Pennsylvania Reserves was posted at 
Gaines’s house, protecting a siege-battery controlling New 
Bridge; Generals John F. Reynold’s and Truman Seymour’s 
brigades held the rifle pits skirting the east bank of Beaver 
Dam Creek, and the field-works covering the only crossings 
near Mechanicsville and Ellerson’s Mill. These field-works, 
well armed with artillery, and the rifle-pits, well-manned, 
controlled the roads and open fields on the west bank of that 
creek, and were concealed by timber and brush from an ap¬ 
proaching foe. The infantry outposts from the same divi¬ 
sion, and their supports west of Mechanicsville to Meadow 
Bridge, were instructed, if attacked or threatened by su¬ 
perior forces, to fall back by side approaches to the rear of 
Reynolds, at the upper crossing, thus leaving the main 
approaches open to the fire of their artillery and infantry 
defenders. 


— 533 — 


Battles and Leaders of the Civil War 


North from Meadow Bridge to the Pamunkey Federal 
cavalry pickets kept vigilant watch, and protected detach¬ 
ments who were felling timber in order to obstruct the 
roads against the rapid march of any force upon the flank 
or rear of the right wing. 

Cooke’s cavalry, near Cold Harbor, guarded the right 
rear and scouted toward Hanover Court House, while Mo- 
rell’s and Sykes’s divisions were conveniently camped so 
as to cover the bridgecrossings and to move quickly to any 
threatened point. 

Such was the situation on the 24th of June, when, at 
midnight, General McClellan telegraphed me that a pre¬ 
tended deserter, whom I had that day sent him, had informed 
him that Jackson was in the immediate vicinity, ready 
to unite with Lee in an attack upon my command. Though 
we had reason to suspect Jackson’s approach, this was the 
first intimation we had of his arrival; and we could obtain 
from Washington at that time no further confirmation of 
our suspicions, nor any information of the fact that he had 
left the front of those directed to watch him in Northern 
Virginia. 

Reynolds, who had special charge of the defense of 
Beaver Dam Creek and of the forces at and above Mechan- 
icsville, was at once informed of the situation. He pre¬ 
pared to give our anticipated visitors a warm welcome. The 
infantry division and cavalry commanders were directed 
to break camp at the first sound of battle, pack their wag¬ 
ons and send them to the rear, and, with their brigades, to 
take specified positions in support of troops already posted, 
or to protect the right flank. 

On the 25th the pickets of the left of the main army 
south of the Chickahominy were pushed forward under 
strong opposition, and, after sharp fighting, gained con¬ 
siderable ground, so as to enable the Second and Third 
Corps (Sumner’s and Heintzelman’s) to support the attack 
on Old Tavern which it was intended to make next day with 
the Sixth Corps (Franklin’s). The result of the fighting 
was to convince the corps commanders engaged that there 


— 534 — 


Hanover Court House and Gaines's Mill 


had been no reduction of forces in their front to take part 
in any movement upon our right flank. 

Early on the 26th I was informed of a large increase 
of forces opposite Reynolds, and before noon the Confed¬ 
erates gave evidence of their intention to cross the river 
at Meadow Bridge and Mechanicsville, while from our cav¬ 
alry scouts along the Virginia Central Railroad came re¬ 
ports of the approach from the north of large masses of 
troops. 

Thus, the attitude of the two armies toward each other 
was changed. Yesterday, McClellan was rejoicing over the 
success of his advance toward Richmond, and he was con¬ 
fident of reenforcement by McDowell. Today, all the united 
available forces in Virginia were to be thrown against his 
right flank, which was not in a convenient position to be 
supported. The prizes now to be contended for were: on 
the part of McClellan, the safety of his right wing, pro¬ 
tection behind his intrenchments with the possibility of 
being able to remain there, and the gain of sufficient time 
to enable him to effect a change of base to the James; on 
the part of Lee, the destruction of McClellan’s right wing, 
and, by drawing him from his intrenchments and attacking 
him in front, the raising of the siege of Richmond. 

The morning of Thursday, June 26th, dawned clear 
and bright, giving promise that the day would be a brilliant 
one. The formation of the ground south of the Chicka- 
hominy opposite Mechanicsville, and west to Meadow Bridge, 
largely concealed from view the forces gathered to execute 
an evidently well-planned and well-prepared attack upon 
my command. For some hours, on our side of the river, 
all was quiet, except at Mechanicsville and at the two 
bridge crossings. At these points our small outposts were 
conspicuously desplayed for the purpose of creating an im¬ 
pression of numbers and of intention to maintain an obsti¬ 
nate resistance. We aimed to invite a heavy attack, and 
then, by rapid withdrawal, to incite such confidence in the 
enemy as to induce incautious pursuit. 

In the northern and western horizon vast clouds of 
dust arose, indicating the movements of Jackson’s advanc- 


— 535 — 


Battles and Leaders of the Civil War 


ing forces. They were far distant, and we had reason to 
believe that the obstacles to their rapid advance, placed in 
their way by detachments sent for that purpose, would 
prevent them from making an attack that day. As before 
stated, we did not fear Lee alone; we did fear his attack, 
combined with one by Jackson on our flank; but our fears 
were allayed for a day. 

General McClellan’s desire to make the earliest and 
quickest movements at that time possible, and his plans 
for the accomplishment of that desire, as expressed to me, 
were substantially conveyed in the following dispatch of 
June 23d from his chief-of-staff: 

“Your dispositions of your troops are approved by the command¬ 
ing general. If you are attacked, be careful to state as promptly 
as possible the number, composition, and position of the enemy. The 
troops on this side will be held ready either to support you directly 
or to attack the enemy in their front. If the force attacking you is 
large, the general would prefer the latter course, counting upon your 
skill and the admirable troops under your command to hold their 
own against superior numbers long enough for him to make the 
decisive movement which will determine the fate of Richmond.” 

The position selected on Beaver Dam Creek for our 
line of defense was naturally very strong. The banks of 
the valley were steep, and forces advancing on the adjacent 
plains presented their flanks, as well as their front to the 
fire of both infantry and artillery, safely posted behind in- 
trenchments. The stream was over waist-deep and bor¬ 
dered by swamps. Its passage was difficult for infantry at 
all points, and impracticable for artillery, except at the 
bridge-crossing at Ellerson’s Mill, and at the one above, 
near Mechanicsville. 

Quite early in the day I visited General Reynolds, near 
the head of the creek, and had the best reasons not only to 
be contented but thoroughly gratified, with the admirable 
arrangements of this accomplished officer, and to be en¬ 
couraged by the cheerful confidence of himself and his able 
and gallant assistants, Seymour on his left, at Ellerson’s 
Mill, and Colonel Seneca G. Simmons and Major Roy Stone 
in his front. Each of these officers commanded a portion 
of the Pennsylvania Reserves,—all under the command of 
the brave and able veteran, McCall. These troops were 


—536 


Hanover Court House and Gaines’s Mill 


about to engage in their first battle, and bore themselves 
then, as they did on trying occasions immediately following, 
with the cheerful spirit of the volunteer and the firmness 
of the veteran soldier—examples inspiring emulation in 
these trying “seven days' battles." 


Plan of the Battle of Beaver Dam Creek, June 26 



a.a.a. Approach of D. H. Hill and Longstreet from Richmond; 
b.b.b. Approach of A. P. Hill; c.c.c. Route of D. H. Hill to Old 
Cold Harbor, the day after the battle, to join Jackson’s attack on 
Union right; d.d.d. Route of A. P. Hill to New Cold Harbor, to 
attack Union center; e.e.e. Route of Longstreet to Dr. Gaines’, to 
attack Union left. Of the five Confederate brigades engaged in this 
battle, one (Ripley’s) was attached to the division of D. H. Hill and 
came up as a re-inforcement to Pender, who, with Field, Archer, and 
Anderson, were part of the division of A. P. Hill, his other two 
divisions, Gregg and Branch, being held in reserve. The losses in 
their hopeless attack fell chiefly upon Archer, who made the first 
advance about 5 P.M., and later upon Pender and Ripley. Pegram’s 
battery was badly cut up, losing forty-seven men and many horses. 
On the Union side, Martindale, Griffin, and Meade came up after 
the • battle had begun, re-enforcing Reynolds and Seymour. When 
firing ceased, about 9 p.m., Porter’s troops held their position; but 
Jackson’s approach on their right flank compelled its evacuation early 
in the morning.— Editors. 


—537 







Battles and Leaders of the Civil War 


Part of the general details previously adopted was 
then ordered to be followed, and subsequently was enforced 
as near as practicable in all the battles in which my corps 
engaged; that under no circumstances should the men ex¬ 
pose themselves by leaving their intrenchments, or other 
cover, merely to pursue a repulsed foe; nor, except in un¬ 
even ground which would permit the fire of artillery to pass 
well over their heads, was infantry or cavalry to be posted 
in front of a battery, or moved so as to interfere with its 
fire. Bullet, shot, and shell were to be relied upon for both 
repulse and pursuit. 

Sitting for hours near the telegraph operator at my 
quarters, prior to the attack, I listened to the constant and 
rapid “ticking” of his instrument, and was kept informed, 
by the various intercommunicating messages at the head¬ 
quarters of the army, of the condition of affairs in front 
of the three corps farthest to the left. Reports often came 
from them that the enemy’s camps seemed to be largely de¬ 
serted, confirming the information that the enemy had 
gathered in front of Franklin and myself. Yet, the follow¬ 
ing day, when I called for aid to resist the forces of Lee 
and Jackson at Gaines’s Mill, known to be immensely su¬ 
perior to mine, the commanders of these three corps ex¬ 
pressed the belief that they were about to be attacked by 
bodies larger than their own, and objected to detaching any 
part of their troops. (See foot-note, page 180.) 

From the cavalry scouts of Colonel John F. Farns¬ 
worth, Stoneman, and General P. St. George Cooke, whose 
forces stretched in the order named, from Meadow Bridge 
north to the Pamunkey, reports came that Jackson was 
advancing slowly upon my flank.* I was also informed that 

*The outposts at Meadow Bridge, the extreme western front of 
Porter’s line, were attacked by the Confederates advancing from 
Richmond under A. P. Hill, about noon on the 26th, and during the 
afternoon the columns under Jackson encountered the cavalry pickets 
on the Hanover Court House road, six miles north of Mechanicsville, 
and at Hundley’s Corner, at the crossing of Topopotomoy Creek. The 
cavalry under General Cooke and Colonel Farnsworth moved with 
the main army, and the force under Stoneman, consisting of cavalry 
and infantry, retired down the Pamunkey to White House landing, 
and joined the force there under General Casey.— Editors. 


— 538 — 



Hanover Court House and Gaines’s Mill 

the departure of Jackson from Northern Virginia was sus¬ 
pected, but not positively known, at Washington; but that 
at this critical moment no assistance whatever could be ex¬ 
pected from that vicinity. 

Perhaps at this time the Administration had been 
crippled by its own acts, and could not respond to General 
McClellan’s calls for aid. About April 1st, when our army 
began active operations in the field and recruiting should 
have been encouraged, the enrollment of troops was ordered 
to be stopped. The War Governor of Pennsylvania (An¬ 
drew G. Curtin) notably disregarded this order. His fore¬ 
sight was afterward recognized at Antietam, where he was 
able to render valuable assistance. In the month of June, 
however, the policy had begun to change, and the troops in 
Northern Virginia were being placed in charge of an officer 
(General John Pope) called to Washington “to take com¬ 
mand of Banks and Fremont, perhaps McDowell, take the 
field against Jackson, and eventually supersede McClellan.” 
At the day the order of assignment was issued, June 27th, 
however, there was no enemy confronting that officer— 
Jackson having disappeared from Northern Virginia, and 
being in my front at Gaines’s Mill. 

About 2 o’clock P.M., on the 26th, the boom of a 
single cannon in the direction of Mechanicsville resounded 
through our camps. This was the signal which had been 
agreed upon, to announce the fact that the enemy were 
crossing the Chickahominy. The curtain rose; the stage 
was prepared for the first scene of the tragedy. At once 
tents were struck, wagons packed and sent to the rear to 
cross to the right bank of the Chickahominy. The several 
divisions were promptly formed, and. took the positions to 
which they had previously been assigned. General McCall 
assumed command at Beaver Dam Creek; Meade joined him, 
taking position behind Seymour; Martindale and General 
Charles Griffin, of Morell’s division, went, respectively, to 
the right and rear of Reynolds; Butterfield was directed to 
support General Cooke’s, and subsequently Martindale’s 
right, while Sykes was held ready to move wherever needed. 


— 539 — 


Battles and Leaders of the Civil War 


Reynolds and Seymour prepared for action and concealed 
their .men. 

About 3 o’clock the enemy, under Longstreet, D. 
H. and A. P. Hill, in large bodies commenced rapidly ta 
cross the Chickahominy almost simultaneously at Meehan- 
icsville, Meadow Bridge, and above, and pushed down the 
left bank, along the roads leading to Beaver Dam Creek. 
In accordance with directions previously given, the out¬ 
posts watching the access to the crossings fell back after 
slight resistance to their already designated position on the 
east bank of Beaver Dam Creek, destroying the bridges as 
they retired. 

After passing Mechanicsville the attacking forces were 
divided, a portion taking the road to the right to Ellerson’s 
Mill, while the larger body directed their march to the left 
into the valley of Beaver Dam Creek, upon the road covered 
by Reynolds. Apparently unaware, or regardless, of the. 
great danger in their front, this force moved on with ani¬ 
mation and confidence, as if going to parade, or engaging 
in a sham battle. Suddenly, when half-way down the bank 
of the valley, our men opened upon it rapid volleys of ar¬ 
tillery and infantry, which strewed the road and hill-side 
with hundreds of dead and wounded, and drove the main 
body of the survivors back in rapid flight to and beyond 
Mechanicsville. So rapid was the fire upon the enemy’s 
huddled masses clambering back up the hill, that some of 
Reynold’s ammunition was exhausted, and two regiments 
were relieved by the 4th Michigan and the 14th New York of 
Griffin’s brigade. On the extreme right a small force of 
the enemy secured a foothold on the east bank, but it did 
no harm, and retired under cover of darkness. 

The forces which were directed against Seymour at 
Ellerson’s Mill made little progress. Seymour’s direct and 
Reynold’s flank fire soon arrested them and drove them to 
shelter, suffering even more disastrously than those who 
had attacked Reynolds. Late in the afternoon, greatly 
strengthened, they renewed the attack with spirit and en¬ 
ergy, some reaching the borders of the stream, but only to 
be repulsed with terrible slaughter, which warned them 


— 540 — 


Hanover Court House and Gaines's Mill 


not to attempt a renewal of the fight. Little depressions 
in the ground shielded many from our fire, until, when 
night came on, they all fell back beyond the range of our 
guns. Night put an end to the contest. 

The Confederates suffered severely. All night the moans 
of the dying and the shrieks of the wounded reached our 
ears. Our loss was only about 250 of the 5,000 engaged, 
while that of the Confederates was nearly 2,000 out of 
some 10,000 attacking.* 

General McClellan had joined me on the battle-field at 
an early hour in the afternoon. While we discussed plans 
for the immediate future, influenced in our deliberations 
by the gratifying results of the day, numerous and un¬ 
varying accounts from our outposts and scouts toward the 
Pamunkey warned us of the danger impending on the ar¬ 
rival of Jackson, and necessitated a decision as to which 
side of the Chickahominy would be held in force. He left 
me late at night, about 1 a.m. (June 27th), with the 
expectation of receiving information on his arrival at his 
own headquarters from the tenor of which he would be 
enabled to decide whether I should hold my present position 
or withdraw to a well-selected and more advantageous one 
east of Gaines’ Mill, where I could protect the bridges 
across the Chickahominy, over which I must retire if com¬ 
pelled to leave the left bank. He left General Barnard, of 
the Engineers, with me, to point out the new line of battle 
in case he should decide to withdraw me from Beaver Dam 
Creek. The orders to withdraw reached me about 3 o’clock 
a.m., and were executed as rapidly as possible. 

The position selected for the new stand was east of 
Powhite Creek, about six miles from Beaver Dam Creek. 
The line of battle was semicircular, the extremities being 

*Union forces engaged, 11 regiments, 6 batteries. Confederate 
forces engaged, 21 regiments, 8 batteries.— F. J. P. 

According to the official returns the total Union loss at Meehan- 
icsville was 361, but little more than that of the 44th Georgia alone 
(335). The Confederate loss, exclusive of Field’s and Anderson's 
brigades and of the batteries, is reported at 1589. General Long- 
street is quoted by William Swinton as authority for putting the 
aggregate at “between three and four thousand.” (“Campaigns of 
the Army of the Potomac,” p. 145.)— Editors. 


— 541 — 



Battles and Leaders of the Civil War 


in the valley of the Chickahominy, while the intermediate 
portion occupied the high grounds along the bank of a creek 
and curved around past McGehee’s to Elder Swamp. Part 
of the front was covered by the ravine of the creek. The 
east bank was lined with trees and underbrush, which af¬ 
forded concealment and protection to our troops and artil¬ 
lery. 

From the point where the line of the creek turns 
suddenly to the east, the front was a series of boggy swamps 
covered extensively with tangled brush. Near McGehee’s 
and beyond, the ground, elevated and drier, was filled with 
ravines swept by our artillery and infantry, who were 
covered by depressions in the ground. The high land em¬ 
braced within the semicircle was cleared ground, but un¬ 
dulating, and often, with the aid of fences and ditches, giv¬ 
ing concealment and cover, breast-high, to both infantry 
and artillery. 

Before sunrise of the 27th troops were withdrawn 
from Beaver Dam Creek and sent to their new position 
east of Powhite Creek, destroying the bridges across it 
after them. 

Some batteries and infantry skirmishers, left as a ruse 
at Beaver Dam Creek, by their fire so fully absorbed the 
attention of the foe that our purpose suddenly and rapidly 
to abandon the intrenchments seemed unsuspected. But 
when they discovered our withdrawal, their infantry pressed 
forward in small detachments, the main body and the ar¬ 
tillery being delayed to rebuild the bridges. Seymour’s 
brigade, the last to start, under its skillful commander, with 
Captain John C. Tidball’s and Captain James M. Robert¬ 
son’s well-managed horse-batteries on its flanks, kept the 
enemy at a respectful distance and enabled all, horse, foot, 
and artillery, wagons and wounded, to reach, with little 
loss, their designated posts in the new positions. My brave 
and efficient aide, Lieutenant S. M. Weld, however, was 
taken prisoner. 

The siege guns were safely removed by hand from the 
works overlooking New Bridge and taken to the south bank 
of the Chickahominy, where, protected by Franklin’s corps, 


— 542 — 


Hanover Court House and Gaines's Mill 


they were posted and used with damaging effect upon the 
enemy as they advanced that afternoon to attack the left 
of our line. 

Our new line of battle was selected and strong, though 
long and requiring either more troops to man it than I had, 
or too great a thinning of my line by the use of the reserves. 
The east bank of the creek, from the valley of the Chicka- 
hominy to its swampy sources, was elevated, sloping, and 
timbered. The bed of the stream was nearly dry, and its 
west bank gave excellent protection to the first line of in¬ 
fantry posted under it to receive the enemy descending the 
cleared field sloping to it. The swampy grounds along the 
sources of the creek were open to our view in front for 
hundreds t of yards, and were swept by the fire of infantry 
and artillery. The roads from Gaines’s Mill and Old Har¬ 
bor, along which the enemy were compelled to advance, were 
swept by artillery posted on commanding ground. 

Along the ground thus formed and close to its border 
were posted the divisions of Morell and Sykes,—the latter 
on the right; Captain A. P. Martin’s Massachusetts bat¬ 
tery between—each brigade having in reserve, immediately 
in its rear, two of its regiments. Sections or full batteries 
of the division artillery were posted to sweep the avenues 
opened. Wherever possible and useful, guns were placed 
between brigades and on higher ground, in front or rear, 
as judgment dictated. The unemployed guns were in re¬ 
serve with their divisions. Batteries of Hunt’s Artillery 
Reserve were in rear of the left, covered by timber from 
view of the enemy, but ready to move at a moment’s call, 
or from their stand to pour their irresistible fire into the 
enemy’s face in case they broke our line. 

McCall’s division formed a second line, near the artil¬ 
lery in reserve, in rear of Morell, and immediately behind 
the woods on the left, Reynolds, the first to leave Beaver 
Dam Creek, had gone to Barker’s Mill to cover the ap¬ 
proaches from Cold Harbor and Dispatch Station to Grape¬ 
vine Bridge; but, hearing the battle raging on our left, 
and having no enemy in his front, while Emory, of Cooke’s 


— 543 — 


Battles and Leaders of the Civil War 


cavalry, with artillery, was near at hand to do the duty 
assigned to him, he hastened to join McCall, arriving op¬ 
portunely in rear of Griffin’s left. 

General Cooke was instructed to take position, with 
cavalry, under the hills in the valley of the Chickahominy— 
there, with the aid of artillery, to guard our left flank. He 
was especially enjoined to intercept, gather, and hold all 
stragglers, and under no circumstances to leave the valley 
for the purpose of coming upon the hill held by our infantry, 
or pass in front of our line on the left. Stoneman’s detach¬ 
ment of cavalry and infantry, miles to the north, was no 
longer available. Fearing it might be cut off by Jackson, 
I sent Stoneman word to make his way as best he could to 
White House, and in proper time to rejoin the army—wher¬ 
ever it might be. 

Believing my forces too small to defend successfully 
this long line, I asked General Barnard, when he left me, 
to represent to General McClellan the necessity of reen¬ 
forcements to thicken and to fill vacant spaces in my front 
line. He himself promised me axes. This was my first 
request for aid, but none came in response. The axes did 
not arrive till near dark, and were useless; but with the 
few obtained early in the day from the artillery, and in the 
little time at command, trees were felled along a small por¬ 
tion of our front, and barriers were erected, which were 
filled in with rails and knapsacks. 


— 544 — 


Hanover Court House and Gaines’s Mill 

Map of the Battlefield of Gaines’ Mill, Showing Approx¬ 
imately the Positions of Infantry 
and Artillery Engaged 

(The Topography from the Official Map ) 



545 














Battles and Leaders of the Civil War 


Confederate brigades: A.A. Anderson (R.H.); B, Wilcox; C, 
Featherston; D, Pryor; E, Pickett; Z, Kemper; F, G, H, J, L, Y, line 
of A. P. Hill’s six brigades at the opening <of the battle, as follows: 
Archer, Field, Anderson (J.R.), Branch Gregg, Pender; I, K, Hood 
and Law (Whiting’s division of Jackson’s corps), replacing Archer, 
Field, Anderson; M, N, 0, P, Jackson’s old division, as follows: Ful¬ 
kerson (3d Va.), Cunningham (2d Va.), Lawton, and Winder; Q, R, 
S, Seymour, Trimble and Elzey; T, U, V, W, X, line at first; Ripley, 
Colquitt, Rodes, Anderson (G. B.), Garland. General directions of 
approach are indicated by dotted lines. 

Union batteries: 1, Allen; 2, 3, Weeden; 4, Martin; 5, 5, 5, 5, 
Edwards; 6, Weed; 7, Tidball; 8, Kingsbury; 9, Hesamer; 10, Upton; 
11, 12, 13, 14, Kerns, Easton, De-Hart, Cooper; 15, Diederichs, Knier- 
iem, and Tyler; also Voegelee, Smead, Porter, and Robertson. Total, 
124 guns. 

Confederate batteries: 16, 17, 18, Longstreet’s artillery; 19, 
Braxton; 20, Pegram; 21, Johnson; 22, Crenshaw; 23, Pelham; 24, 
Brockenbrough; 25, Carrington; 26, Courtney; 27, Bondurant; also 
other guns not here indicated. 

At 2 o’clock P. M., after a sharp engagement between Gaines’ 
Mill and New Cold Harbor, A. P. Hill made the first severe attack 
on the Union center and left, and after two hours’ fighting was 
repulsed in such disorder that Longstreet was ordered up to relieve 
the pressure by a feint on the right, which he converted into an at¬ 
tack in force. Thus, up to 4 o’clock, the Confederate assault was 
mainly on the Union left center and left. About this hour D. H. 
Hill’s division got fully into action, and Jackson’s corps (consisting 
of Ewell’s, Whiting’s and Jackson’s divisions) was thrown in where 
needed from the direction of Old Cold Harbor. Major Dabney, 
Jackson’s chief-of-staff, in a letter to General Hill, thus describes 
the movements of Jackson’s corps: “The column,” he says, “came on 
the eastern extension of Game’s Mill road at Old Cold Harbor, and 
passing the old tavern a little way, soon ran afoul of McClellan’s 
right wing, with infantry and artillery in position. Your division 
had taken the lead, and became, therefore, the left or our whole line 
of battle. Jackson put Ewell in position on your right. He seemed 
to think that A. P. Hill was to drive the enemy into his corps. But 
in a little while the state of the firing, convinced him that Porter 
‘didn’t drive worth a cent,’ and he bestirred himself to let out his 
full strength. Then it was that, after ordering Ewell’s advance, he 
wheeled on me and began to give instructions about putting in his 
six other brigades, which were then standing idle in the road by which 
we had come. I sent them in from left to right en echelon, each 
brigade to support its left-hand neighbor, and to move to the sound 
of the firing. The strangest divergencies, however, took place in 
consequence of the coppices and woods and lack of guides. Law and 
Hood kept in proper relation to Ewell’s right, and thus helped A. P. 
Hill’s beaten division, attacked the enemy’s center or left center, and 
about 6 p.m. drove it in. But Lawton, bearing too much by his 
own left, unwittingly crossed Hood’s line of march and re-enforced 
Ewell—a most timely providence, for Ewell’s line was about done for. 
The 2d Virginia brigade seems to have borne as much too far to the 
right, and at last, near sunset found themselves behind Longstreet’s 
extreme right—the brigade of R. H. Anderson, whom they assisted in 
driving the enemy. The 3d Virginia brigade brought up behind Long¬ 
street’s left, passing near Gaine’s Mill, and near sunset participated 
in the victory. The Stonewall brigade, under Winder, bore too much 
to the left and entered the fight on your right. Pickett’s brigade 


- 546 - 


Hanover Court House and Gaines’s Mill 


headed by the ‘Old Ironsides’ (18th Virginia), broke Porter’s line 
just west of the Watts house.” With regard to this break, General 
Law, in a letter to the Editors, says: “Whiting’s division covered the 
ground on which J. R. Anderson’s, Archer’s and Field’s brigades had 
previously attacked. We passed over some of these men as we ad¬ 
vanced to the assault. We carried the Federal line in our front, and 
Longstreet on our right, bringing up his reserves, again attacked and 
carried his front.” At the last and successful advance the line from 
left to right was: Longstreet (Anderson, Pickett), Whiting (Hood 
and Law), Jackson (Winder and Lawton), Ewell (one or two bri¬ 
gades), and D. H. Hill (Rodes, Anderson and Garland). General 
Porter thinks the first break in his line was made by Hood from the 
direction indicated on the map by an arrow. Of the Union reserves, 
McCall’s division was put in on the line of Morell,—except a part of 
Reynold’s brigade, which went to the assistance of Warren; Slocum’s 
division also went to the left,—except Bartlett’s brigade, which was 
sent to the right of Sykes around the McGehee house. 

Note.— The map is incorrect in one regard; Longstreet’s right 
did not extend so far south as Morell’s left.— Editors. 

While withdrawing from Beaver Dam, I had seen to 
my delight, General H. W. Slocum’s division of Franklin’s 
corps crossing the river to my assistance. McClellan had 
promised to send it, and I needed it; it was one of the best 
divisions of the army. Its able, experienced, and gallant 
commander and his brave and gifted subordinates had the 
confidence of their well-trained soldiers. They were all 
worthy comrades of my well-tried and fully trusted officers, 
and of many others on that field, subsequently honored by 
their country-men. But to our disappointment, through 
some misunderstanding, the division was almost immediately 
recalled to Franklin. In response, however to a later call, 
it returned at a time when it was greatly needed, and ren¬ 
dered invaluable services. 

I fixed my headquarters at first at the Adams house; 
but early in the battle that locality became a hospital, and 
I advanced to the Watt’s house, on more elevated ground, 
whence I could see the greater part of the field and com¬ 
municate readily with all parts of it. 

Thus far, it will be seen, all plans were defensive; I 
had reason to believe that the enemy largely outnumbered 
me—three to one. Evidently it was their plan and their 
policy to crush me, if possible. Their boldness and confi¬ 
dence, I might add incaution, if not imprudence and rash- 


— 547 — 


Battles and Leaders of the Civil War 


ness in exposure and attack, confirmed my belief that at 
first they deemed the task an easy one. 

I, however, determined to hold my position at least 
long enough to make the army secure. Though in a des¬ 
perate situation, I was not without strong hope of some 
timely assistance from the main body of the army, with 
which I might repulse the attack and so cripple our op¬ 
ponents as to make the capture of Richmond by the main 
body of the army, under McClellan, the result of any sac¬ 
rifice or suffering on the part of my troops or of myself. 
I felt that the life or death of the army depended upon our 
conduct in the contest of that day, and that on the issue 
of that contest depended an early peace or a prolonged, de¬ 
vastating war—for the Union cause could never be yielded. 
Our brave and intelligent men of all grades and ranks fully 
realized this, and thousands of them freely offered up their 
lives that day to maintain the sacred cause which they had 
voluntarily taken up arms to defend to the last extremity. 

The Confederates, under Longstreet and A. P. Hill, fol¬ 
lowing us from Mechanicsville, moved cautiously by the 
roads leading by Dr. Gaines’s house to New Cold Harbor, 
and by 2 p.m. had formed lines of battle behind the 
crest of the hills east of Powhite Creek. These lines were 
parallel to ours, and extended from the valley of the Chick- 
ahominy through New Cold Harbor around Morell’s front, 
so as nearly to reach Warren’s brigade—the left of Syke’s 
division. At Gaines’s Mill, Colonel Thomas Cass’s gallant 
8th Massachusetts Volunteers of Griffin’s brigade obsti¬ 
nately resisted A. P. Hill’s crossing, and were so successful 
in delaying his advance, after crossing, as to compel him 
to employ large bodies to force the regiment back to the 
main line. This brought on a contest which extended to 
Morell’s center and over Martin’s front—on his right—and 
lasted from 12:30 to near 2 o’clock—Cass and his im¬ 
mediate supports falling back south of the swamps. This 
persistent and prolonged resistance gave to this battle one 
of its well-known names.* 

*A11 the severe battles in this campaign began after noon; Seven 
Pines, 1 o’clock; Mechanicsville, 3 to 4; Gaines’s Mill at 12:30; Sav¬ 
age’s Station at 4; White Oak Swamp, 12 to 1, Glendale, 3 to 4, 
Malvern Hill after 1.— Editors. 


— 548 — 



Hanover Court House and Gaines's Mill 


Another column of the enemy, D. H. HilPs, from Beaver 
Dam Creek, and Jackson’s column, from Northern Virginia, 
with which it had united, came opposite my right front from 
the direction of Old Cold Harbor and deployed, connecting 
with A. P. HilPs on the left and extending to our right 
beyond McGehee’s. The advance column of these troops 
came a little earlier than those under Longstreet and A. P. 
Hill, but were more cautious and for some hours not so 
aggressive. Believing that they were passing on down 
the river to intercept our communications, and thinking 
that I might strike them to good advantage while in motion, 
I asked permission to follow, intending to attack with Syke’s 
division and Emory of Cooke’s cavalry, leaving Morell and 
McCall to hold the other lines in check. Information, how¬ 
ever, soon poured in, convincing me that this force was 
larger than any I could use against them, and that still larger 
forces were forming to attack our left and center. This 
compelled me to keep my troops united and under cover, 
and also again to ask aid from the south bank of the Chick- 
ahominy. My first message to General McClellan was not 
delivered, as already stated; my second one was responded 
to by the speedy arrival of Slocum.* 

Soon after 2 P. M. A. P. HilPs force, between us and 
New Cold Harbor, again began to show an aggressive dis¬ 
position, independent of its own troops on its flanks, by 
advancing from under cover of the woods, in lines well 
formed and extending, as the contest progressed, from in 
front of Martin’s battery to Morell’s left. Dashing across 
the intervening plains, floundering in the swamps, and strug¬ 
gling against the tangled brushwood, brigade after bri¬ 
gade seemed almost to melt away before the concentrated 
fire of our artillery and infantry; yet others pressed on, 
followed by supports as dashing and as brave as their 
predecessors, despite their heavy losses and the dishearten¬ 
ing effect of having to clamber over many of their disabled 
and dead, and to meet their surviving comrades rushing 

*The forces in this battle were: Union, 50 regiments, 20 batteries 
(several not engaged), in all about 30,000 fighting men; Confederate; 
129 regiments, 19 batteries, in all about 65,000 men. 


— 549 — 



Battles and Leaders of the Civil War 


back in great disorder from the deadly contest. For nearly 
two hours the battle raged, extending more or less along 
the whole line to our extreme right. The fierce firing of 
artillery and infantry, the crash of the shot, the bursting 
of shells, and the whizzing of bullets, heard above the roar 
of the artillery and the volleys of musketry, all combined 
was something fearful. 

Regiments quickly replenished their exhausted am¬ 
munition by borrowing from their more bountifully sup¬ 
plied and generous companions. Some withdrew, tempor¬ 
arily, for ammunition, and fresh regiments took their places 
ready to repulse, sometimes to pursue, their desperate en¬ 
emy, for the purpose of retaking ground from which we 
had been pressed and which it was necessary to occupy in 
order to hold our position. 

The enemy were repulsed in every direction. An om¬ 
inous silence reigned. It caused the inference that their 
troops were being gathered and massed for a desperate and 
overwhelming attack. To meet it, our front line was con¬ 
centrated, reenforced, and arranged to breast the aval¬ 
anche, should it come. I again asked for additional re¬ 
enforcements. French’s and Meagher’s brigades, of Sum¬ 
ner’s corps, were sent forward by the commanding general, 
but did not arrive till near dark. 

At 2 P. M., when I took my station beyond the Watts 
house, my anxieties and responsibilities had been substan¬ 
tially relieved, at least so far as related to the establishment 
of a line of battle in which all engaged felt their power to 
resist attack. At that time the practicability of our de¬ 
fensive position, in charge of troops having implicit confi¬ 
dence in each other, had been demonstrated by the success¬ 
ful resistance for nearly two hours against the strong and 
persistent attacks upon our center and right. The troops 
were well shielded, with their reserves within immediate 
call. Commanders of divisions, of brigades, and of bat¬ 
teries were in the midst of their men, all confident and de¬ 
termined to hold their posts to the utmost, to resist and 
drive back the enemy, prepared to call up their reserves, 
replenish ammunition, and communicate to me such needs 


— 550 — 


Hanover Court House and Gaines's Mill 


as they could not fill, and furnish all necessary information 
for my action. They had been left to their own judgment 
and energy, to determine in what manner they could accom¬ 
plish the best results with the means at their command 
and with the least exposure. 

From my post in advance of the Watts house, the field 
in front of Sykes was visible, and it was easily understood, 
by the sound of battle in the woods and by the fire of the 
enemy in his advance and repulse, that the center and left 
still remained solid and undisturbed. All available means 
were used by which I could be kept informed so that I 
could provide in the best possible manner, for the many and 
rapid changes and wants suddenly springing up. The 
Prince de Joinville and his two nephews—the Comte de 
Paris and Due de Chartres—and Colonels Fant, Radowitz, 
and Hammerstein, from the commanding general’s staff, 
joined me as volunteer aides. Each of these, with my own 
staff, Locke, Kirkland, Mason, Monteith, and McQuade, ex¬ 
posed themselves to danger, not only quickly and cheerfully 
carrying every message, but often voluntarily throwing 
themselves where needed, to direct, to lead, to encourage 
and to rally. 

During the greater part of the afternoon, D. H. Hill’s 
troops, in detachments, were more or less aggressive on the 
right. The silence which followed the repulse, already re¬ 
ferred to, lasted but a short time. The renewed attacks 
raged with great fierceness and fury, with slight inter¬ 
mission, along the most of our front, till after five o’clock. 
Large and numerous bodies of infantry from the direction 
of Old Cold Harbor, under cover of artillery, directed their 
attacks upon Syke’s division and Martin’s battery; others, 
from the west side of Powhite Creek, were hurled in rapid 
succession against Martindale and Butterfield. These fur¬ 
ious attacks were successfully repelled, but were immedi¬ 
ately renewed by fresh troops. McCall’s Pennsylvania Re¬ 
serves, as needed, were pushed as rapidly as possible into 
the woods, in support of Martindale and Griffin, whose 
brigades for a long time bore the brunt of the attack and 
whose regiments were relieved as soon as their ammuni- 


— 551 — 


Battles and Leaders of the Civil War 


tion was expended. All our positions were held against 
enormous odds, and the enemy was driven back by our fresh 
troops, successively thrown into action. At each repulse 
they advanced new troops upon our diminishing forces, and 
in such numbers and so rapidly that it appeared as though 
their reserves were inexhaustible. The action extended 
along our entire line. At 4 o’clock, when Slocum ar¬ 
rived, all our reserves were exhausted. His brigades were 
necessarily separated and sent where most needed. New¬ 
ton’s brigade, being in advance, was led to the right of 
Griffin, there to drive back the enemy and retake ground 
only held by the enemy for an instant. Taylor’s brigade 
filled vacant places in Morell’s division, and Bartlett’s was 
sent to Sykes, just in time to render invaluable service, 
both in resisting and attacking. 

On the right, near McGehee’s, the enemy captured one 
of our batteries, which had been doing them great damage 
by enfilading their lines and preventing their advance. They 
gained thereby a temporary foothold by advancing some 
infantry; but, prompt to act, Sykes directed its recapture, 
and the 16th New York,* with arms shifted to the right 
shoulder, and moving at a double-quick, was soon in pos¬ 
session of the prize, which again renewed its fire. 

At times, the enemy on the right would gain an ad¬ 
vantage, but in such a case our infantry, supported by the 
fire of artillery, would move immediately at a rapid gait 
and regain the lost ground. This occurred frequently in 
Sykes’s command and in the brigades serving near it, all of 
which were, more or less, in exposed ground. Not less de¬ 
serving of praise were the divisions of McCall, Morell, and 
Slocum in their stubborn resistance to the oft-repeated and 
determined onslaughts of their assailants, who vastly out¬ 
numbered them. 


*The men of this regiment wore on this field, for the first time 
in battle, the white straw hats which made them so conspicuous 
during the “Seven Days.” These hats were presented by Mrs. Jo¬ 
seph Howland, wife of the colonel. As the hats drew upon them, 
the particular attention of the enemy, they were discarded after the 
retreat to James River.— Editors. 


— 552 — 



Hanover Court House and Gaines's Mill 


About 6:30, preceded by a silence of half an hour, the 
attack was renewed all along the line with the same ap¬ 
parent determination to sweep us by the force of numbers 
from the field, if not from existence. The result was evi¬ 
dently a matter of life or death to our opponent’s cause. 
This attack, like it predecessors, was successfully repulsed 
throughout its length. The sun had sunk below the horizon, 
and the result seemed so favorable that I began to cherish 
the hope that the worst that could happen to us would be 
a withdrawal after dark, without further injury—a with¬ 
drawal which would be forced upon us by the exhausted 
condition of our troops, greatly reduced by casualties, with¬ 
out food and with little ammunition. 

As if for a final effort, as the shades of evening were 
coming upon us, and the woods were filled with smoke, 
limiting the view therein to a few yards, the enemy again 
massed his fresher and reformed regiments, and threw 
them in rapid succession against our thinned and wearied 
battalions, now almost without ammunition, and with guns 
so foul that they could not be loaded rapidly. In prepar¬ 
ation for defeat, should it come, I had posted artillery in 
large force just in rear of our center and left, ready for 
any emergency and especially to be used against a success¬ 
ful foe, even if his destruction involved firing upon some 
of our own retreating troops, as might have been necessary. 
The attacks, though coming like a series of apparently ir¬ 
resistible avalanches, had thus far made no inroads upon our 
firm and disciplined ranks. Even in this last attack we 
successfully resisted, driving back our assailants with im¬ 
mense loss, or holding them beyond our lines, except in one 
instance, near the center of Morell’s line, where by force 
of numbers and under cover of the smoke of battle, our 
line was penetrated and broken; this at a point where I 
least expected it. This was naturally the weakest point of 
our line owing to the closer proximity of the woods held by 
the enemy. Under this cover they could form, and with less 
exposure in time and ground than elsewhere, and launch 
their batalions in quick succession upon our men. I be¬ 
lieved that I had guarded against the danger by strongly 


— 553 — 


Battles and Leaders of the Civil War 


and often reenforcing the troops holding this part of the 
line. Here the greater part of McCall's and Slocum’s forces 
were used. Just preceding this break, to my great sur¬ 
prise, I saw cavalry, Rush’s Lancers, which I recognized as 
ours, rushing in numbers through our lines on the left, and 
carrying off with sudden fright the limbers of our artillery, 
then prepared to pour their irresistible fire into a pursu¬ 
ing foe. With no infantry to support, and with apparent 
disaster before them, such of the remainder of these guns 
as could be moved were carried from the field; some de¬ 
liberately, others in haste, but not in confusion. 

In no other place was our line penetrated or shaken. 
The right, seeing our disaster, fell back united and in order, 
but were compelled to leave behind two guns, the horses 
of which had been killed. The troops on the left and center 
retired, some hastily, but not in confusion, often turning 
back to repulse and pursue the advancing enemy.* All soon 
rallied in rear of the Adams house behind Sykes and the 
brigades of French and Meagher sent to our aid, and who 
now, with hearty cheers, greeted our battalions as they re¬ 
tired and reformed. We lost in all twenty-two cannon; 
some of these broke down while we were withdrawing, and 
some ran off the bridges at night while we were crossing 
to the south bank of the Chickahominy. The loss of the 
guns was due to the fact that some of Cooke’s cavalry which 
had been directed to be kept, under all circumstances, in the 
valley of the Chickahominy, had been sent to resist an at¬ 
tack of the enemy upon our left. The charge, executed 
in the face of a withering fire of infantry and in the midst 


*We are informed by Colonel Auchmuty, then assistant adju¬ 
tant-general of Morell’s division, that there was no running or panic 
when the line broke. The men fell back in small groups, turning 
and firing as they went, and carrying many of the wounded with 
them. On the crest of the hill in the rear of the line of battle a stand 
was made, and from that point regimental organizations were pre¬ 
served. Near the close of the war General Griffin said to Colonel 
Auchmuty, that he regarded Gaines’s Mill as the hardest-fought battle 
in his experience. 

The same officer informs us that after the line of battle had 
been formed in the morning, and while the attack was momentarily 
expected, the mail arrived from the North, and the newsboys went 
along the line crying the New York and Philadelphia papers.— Editors. 


— 554 — 



Hanover Court House and Gaines’s Mill 


of our heavy cannonading, as well as that of the enemy, 
resulted, as should have been expected, in confusion. The 
bewildered and uncontrollable horses wheeled about, and, 
dashing through the batteries, satisfied the gunners that 
they were charged by the enemy. To this alone I always 
attributed the failure on our part to hold the battle-field and 
to bring off all our guns, with few exceptions, in an orderly 
retreat. Most unaccountably this cavalry was not used 
to cover our retreat or gather the stragglers, but was per- 
emtorily ordered to cross to the south bank of the river.* 
I never again saw their commander. 

At night I was called to General McClellan’s head¬ 
quarters, where the chief of corps, or their representatives, 
were gathered. The commanding general, after hearing 
full reports, was of the opinion that the final result would 
be disastrous if we undertook longer to hold the north bank 
of the river with my command in the condition in which 
it was left by a hard fight and the loss of rest for two 
nights. In this opinion all concurred; and I was then in¬ 
structed to withdraw to the south bank and destroy the 
bridges after me. The plans to move to the James River were 
then explained, together with the necessity for the move¬ 
ment, and the orders were given for their execution.! 

My command was safely withdrawn to the south bank 
of the river, and the bridges were destroyed soon after 
sunrise on the 28th.J 


♦See “Official Records” Vol. XI., Part II., pp. 43, 223, 273, 282.— 
F. J. P. 

fAt Gaines’s Mill the Union loss was: Killed, 895; wounded, 
3107; missing, 2836—total, 6837. On the Confederate side the losses 
of Jackson, Ewell, Whiting, and D. H. Hill, were: Killed 589; 
wounded, 2671; missing, 24,—total, 3284. Of these, Whiting (i.e. 
Hood’s and Law’s brigades) lost 1017. The losses of A. P. Hill and 
Longstreet for this battle are not reported separately, but a safe 
estimate from their losses in the campaign would probably bring 
the total considerably beyond the Union loss, that of the killed and 
wounded certainly much higher. Almost the whole of two Union 
regiments, the 11th Pennsylvania Reserves and the 4th New Jersey, 
were captured. 

$The landing of White House and the railroad south from Tun- 
stall’s station were abandoned, the infantry and artillery embarking 
for Fort Monroe, and the cavalry marching to Yorktown.— Editors. 


— 555 — 



Battles and Leaders of the Civil War 


The Prince de Joinville and his two nephews, the Comte 
de Paris and Due de Chartres, were on the field as volunteer 
aides-de-camp, actively engaged in encouraging the men, 
carrying messages, and performing other duties of aides. 
Each of these officers was in the midst of flying musket- 
balls, and was liable to be struck at any moment (see p. 184). 
At one time the Comte de Paris, regardless of himself, 
begged me to send his uncle to General McClellan with a 
message which would at once and permanently remove him 
from the dangers of the battle, since the family interests 
at stake were too important to permit him to be so exposed. 
I had shortly before asked Colonel Thomas L. Gnatt, an¬ 
other of McClellan’s aides, to hasten to that general and 
hurry up reenforcements, as our lines would soon be broken. 
The danger was now imminent, and I asked the Prince to 
carry the same message, telling him that he was selected 
because of the speed of his horse. He turned as if to go, 
and I went to attend to the field. Soon the Count returned, 
with tears in his eyes, and with choking utterance, expres¬ 
sive of his care and affection, begged me again to send away 
his uncle. This also I did. Scarcely had the Prince left 
the second time when our cavalry fell back on us as I have 
related, our line was broken and our artillery rendered un¬ 
serviceable. The Prince and Colonel Gnatt afterward told 
me that they did not leave, as I had directed, because all 
seemed favorable to us, and they thought I could not be in 
earnest or that I had greatly misjudged the situation. This 
shows how suddenly the tide may turn in battle and on 
what little incidents success may depend. 

The forces arrayed against us, and especially those 
which had thus far been launched upon my command, were 
the chosen of Southern manhood from Maryland to Texas. 
No braver or more spirited body of men was to be found 
among the Confederates, or any who more strongly believed 
in their own invincibility.* Their general officers, from 
the chief down, had been selected for earnest devotion to 


*The known presence of President Davis and General Lee, to 
oversee, direct, encourage, and urge, was another influential power 
in favor of the Confederates in this movement.— F. J. P. 


— 556 — 



Hanover Court House and Gaines’s Mill 


their cause, and well-earned reputation for intelligent and 
energetic performance of duty in other fields. With few 
exceptions they had been my personal friends, and many 
of them my intimate associates. In the varied relations 
to them as subaltern, as instructor, as academical and regi¬ 
mental comrade, in social life, as competitor for honor in 
war and in garrison life, and engaged in watching those 
performing trying duty in Kansas, Utah, and elsewhere, I 
learned to know them well and to respect their decision 
under conviction of duty, when, to my regret, they left the 
cause of the Union. Notwithstanding, my friendship, my 
personal regard for these old friends and former comrades, 
which never varied, it was my duty to oppose them, when 
arrayed against the Union, to the utmost. At the earliest 
moment, when separation was attempted, and afterward, 
my efforts were continuously directed against the success 
of their cause. One of the results of those efforts was 
manifested on this battle-field. I was enabled, after great 
labor and care, to meet these friends and comrades in com¬ 
mand of men, than whom there could be none more intel¬ 
ligent, better disciplined, braver, more confiding in each 
other, and more determined on success. They embraced 
soldiers from Maine, Michigan, Illinois, Pennsylvania, New 
York, and all New England,—together with all the regular 
army, then at the East, from all parts of the country. Their 
commanders were not excelled by those in any other corps 
in ability or experience; they had the highest confidence in 
each other, in the army, and in their own men, and were 
fully competent to oppose their able adversaries. 

I have said we did not fear Lee alone at Beaver Dam 
Creek. Nor, though anxious, did we fear the combined 
attack of Lee and Jackson at Gaines’s Mill. Defeat to us 
was necessarily great damage to them. Our flanks were 
secure and could not be turned; though fewer in numbers, 
the advantage of our position combined with the firm dis¬ 
cipline of our own brave men, overcame the odds. Our ad¬ 
versaries were forced to meet us face to face. All day they 
struggled desperately for success, and near night, after fear¬ 
ful destruction, broke our line at one point, just at a time 


— 557 — 


Battles and Leaders of the Civil War 

when a most unforeseen mismanagement on our part aided 
to crown their labors with possession of the field. Still, 
our confidence was not broken; and, as we shall see in a 
succeeding paper, under like circumstances victory crowned 
our arms with success against the same opponents, strongly 
reenforced, at Malvern Hill. 


* 


— 558 — 


VII 


The Charge of Cooke’s Cavalry at Gaines’s Mill 

By Phillip St. George Cooke, 

Brevet Major-General, U. S. A. 


In “The Century ” for June, 1885, there is an article on 
the battle of Gaines’s Mill, signed by Fitz John Porter, in 
which appear singular errors of statement regarding the 
action of the “Cavalry Reserve,” affecting also the con¬ 
duct and reputation of its commander. He says (see p. 
340 of the present volume) : 

“We lost in all twenty-two cannon; some of these broke down 
while we were withdrawing, and some ran off the bridges at night 
while we were crossing to the south bank of the Chickahominy. The 
loss of guns was due to the fact that some of Cooke’s cavalry, 
which had been directed to be kept, under all circumstances, in the 
valley of the Chickahominy, had been sent to resist an attack of the 
enemy upon our left. The charge, executed in the face of a wither¬ 
ing fire of infantry and in the midst of our heavy cannonading as 
well as that of the enemy, resulted, as should have been expected, in 
confusion. The bewildered and uncontrollable horses wheeled about, 
and, dashing through the batteries satisfied the gunners that they 
were charged by the enemy. To this alone I always attributed the 
failure on our part longer to hold the battle-field, and to bring off 
all our guns (with few exceptions)* in an orderly retreat. Most un¬ 
accountably this cavalry was not used to cover our retreat or gather 
the stragglers, but was peremptorily ordered to cross to the south 
bank of the river.” (Footnote, “See ‘Official Records,’ Vol. XI., Part 
II., pp. 43, 223, 273.— F.J.P.”) 

To silence forever the injurious statements and insin¬ 
uation of the last sentence, I give here evidence of two wit¬ 
nesses who were present, and whose high character is known 
to all. Major-General Wesley Merritt, colonel Fifth Cavalry, 
superintendent United States Military Academy, writes me, 
April 8th, 1885: 

“The cavalry remained, with you in immediate command, on that 
portion of the field, until after midnight on the 27th of June, 1862. 
It provided litter-bearers and lantern-bearers for our surgeons who 
went over the field of battle, succoring and attending the wounded. 


* Insertion by General Porter in the revision of his article for the 
present work.— Editors. 


— 559 — 




Battles and Leaders of the Civil War 


“The cavalry was the last force to leave the field and to cross 
the Chickahominy,* and the bridge on which 'it crossed, between 12 
midnight on the 27th and 2 A. M. on the 28th of June, was, I 
think, rendered impassable by your order.” 

Brevet Lieutenant Colonel J. P. Martin, assistant-ad- 
jutant-General United States Army, wrote me from Fort 
Leavenworth, April 30th, 1885: 

“The artillery did not drive the enemy from his front; the enemy 
was not driven from his front, but the charge of your cavalry did 
not stop the advance of the enemy, and this enabled Porter’s troops 
to get off the field. I am by no means alone in the belief that the 
charge of the cavalry at Gaines’s Mill, on June 27th, 1862, saved 
Fitz John Porter’s corps from destruction. . . . You did not direct 
your command at once to cross the river. There were no frightened 
men in your vicinity. All the frightened men were far to your right; 
you could not have reached the retiring crowd; and if you could have 
stopped them, you could have done more than Porter, himself did do, 
and he was amidst them, for I saw him. Your command, at least 
a part of it, was the very last to cross the river.” 


*Major William H. Powell, of the 4th Regular Infantry, wrote 
to the editor on September 8th, 1885: “Probably not much credit 
attaches to the particular organized force which was the last to cross 
the Chickahominy River after the battle of Gaines’s Mill; but in 
order to settle the question I desire to state that the cavalry was not 
the last to cross the river—even if they did leave at the time General 
Merritt states. The 4th U. S. Infantry was the last organization 
which crossed, and that regiment passed over about two hours after 
daylight on the morning of the 28th, and a bridge had to be partly 
relaid to enable it to do so. This regiment was posted on the ex¬ 
treme right flank of the army at the battle of Gaines’s Mill, and was 
ordered to support Weed’s battery. Weed was afterward reenforced 
by Tidball’s battery, and the 4th Infantry held its position from the 
commencement of the engagement (about 11 A. M.) until twilight 
of the 27th, without receiving an order or stirring from its position 
until Weed reported that he had no more ammunition, and retired 
from the field by way of the Cold Harbor road, covered by the 4th 
Infantry. Night came upon the regiment as it was retiring on this 
road. It went into bivouac in line of battle, in the Chickahominy 
Valley, on the road by which it retired from the field. When day¬ 
light came we expected orders to renew the engagement and took up 
our march to return to the battle-field, about a mile and a half distant. 
It was then that some wounded were met, who informed us that all 
the army had crossed during the night. We then marched from 
Grapevine Bridge to Alexander’s Bridge in sight of the enemy’s 
pickets, and when we arrived on the south side we were astonished 
to find that it was thought we had been captured. We learned after¬ 
ward that orders had been sent to the infantry during the action, 
but the officer who started with them was killed; another who took 
them was wounded before they could be delivered, and an orderly who 
was subsequently dispatched with them did not arrive at his destina¬ 
tion and was never heard of afterward.” 


- 560 - 



Charge of Cooke’s Cavalry at Gaines’s Mill 

It should be observed that in the short extract from 
“The Century,” above, General Porter repeats the assertion 
that the cavalry caused the loss of the (22) guns—empha¬ 
sizes, makes plainer, the meaning of the opening sentence 
to the charge “alone I always attributed the failure on our 
part to longer hold the battle-field and to bring off all our 
guns in an orderly retreat.” 

Captain W. C. Weeden, commanding Battery C, 1st 
Rhode Island Artillery, reports, Vol. XI, Pt. II, p. 282, 
“Official Records,” the loss of a section by stress of the en¬ 
emy’s attacks; the two other sections “held in support in 
rear of Griffin’s brigade” opened fire. “The smoke had filled 
the whole field to the woods, and it was impossible to direct 
the fire. The batteries were limbering to the rear in good 
order” when, he says, the cavalry fugitives ran through 
them, but he only lost one more piece “mired in the woods.” 
But General Griffin reports that the artillery “opened fire 
upon the enemy advancing upon our left; but it was too late; 
our infantry had already begun to fall back, and nothing 
being left to give confidence to the artillerymen, it was im¬ 
possible to make them stand to their work.” And that was 
just when the cavalry did go in and give confidence to the 
three batteries on the left, and the saving work was done.* 

I have examined the “Official Records” and found re¬ 
ports of about twenty batteries engaged in the battle, and 
the above is the only mention of the cavalry fugitives to 
be found in them; their losses are attributed to other causes. 
Here I will give the account of the loss of whole batteries r 

General Truman Seymour reports, p. 402, of Captain 
Easton: 

“This gallant gentleman fell and his battery was lost with him.” 

Captain Mark Kerns was wounded, but “loaded and 
fired the last shots himself, and brought four of the guns 
off the fields.” Of another battery he reports: 

*We learned afterward that orders had been sent to the infantry 
during the action, but the officer who started with them was killed; 
another who took them was wounded before they could be delivered, 
and an orderly who was subsequently despatched with them did not 
arrive at his destination and was never heard of afterward.” 


— 561 — 



Battles and Leaders of the Civil War 


“No efforts could not repel the rush of a successful foe, under 
whose fire rider and horse went down, and guns lay immovable on 
the field.” 

Captain H. J. Cooper, Battery B, 1st Pennsylvania Ar¬ 
tillery, reports, p. 410: 

“The remaining infantry falling back, we were compelled to re¬ 
tire from our guns. The charge being too sudden and overpowering 
it was impossible to remove them, many of the horses being killed 
by the enemy’s fire.” 

Was General Porter prevented from bringing off all 
these guns by the cavalry charge ? 

General Porter says, p. 322: 

“Just preceding this break (in Morell’s line) I saw cavalry, 
which I recognized as ours, rushing in numbers through our lines 
on the left.” 

All the evidence goes to disprove this very deliberate 
statement and that all the infantry on the left had broken 
and was fast disappearing before the first advance of the 
cavalry. Again he says: 

“General Cooke was instructed to take position, with cavalry 
under the hills in the valley of the Chickahominy—there with the aid 
of artillery to guard our left flank; he was especially enjoined to inter¬ 
cept, gather, and hold all stragglers, and under no circumstances to 
leave the valley for the purpose of coming upon the hill held by our 
infantry, or pass in front of our line on the left.” 

What strange folly of self-contradiction is betrayed be¬ 
tween this order “to guard our left flank” and the violent 
condemnation in the first extract, which we have been con¬ 
sidering, of the march “to resist an attack of the enemy on 
our left, ...” in a “charge executed in the face of a with¬ 
ering fire of infantry, and in the midst of our heavy cannon¬ 
ading as well as that of the enemy.” Could a poet laureate 
say more? 

“Cannon to right of them, 

Cannon to left of them, 

Volley’d and thundered— 

Then they rode back—” 

Ay, there's the rub. 

When I reported to General Porter before the battle, 
I remember that he proposed that I should take post in the 


— 562 — 


Charge of Cooke’s Cavalry at Gaines’s Mill 

narrow open meadow on the extreme left. I urged that 
the flank of the army was virtually covered by the Chicka- 
hominy; that, moreover, it was covered by three reserve 
batteries and 3 29-pounder batteries on the opposite side 
of the river; while the position I had taken on the hill-slope 
was within view, and also within cavalry striking distance. 
If I had gone there, I should not have been able, when the 
time came, to face and, with artillery aid, to stop the enemy 
in the flush of his success. To some such objections which 
I made General Porter evidently yielded, instead of “enjoin¬ 
ing” me; for the cavalry remained quite near his first 
station, Adam’s house; and I was there with him re¬ 
peatedly. An order “under no circumstances to leave the 
valley for the purpose of coming on the hill” would have 
been to a general officer not only unprecedented, but in¬ 
sulting. 

How strange, to military ears, would sound an order 
“to intecept, gather and hold all stragglers” on the extreme 
front and flank!—and the warning not to “pass in front of 
our line on the left!” Such extravagance of action—march¬ 
ing, with no earthly object, between two lines of fire—is 
seldomed thus forestalled! Seriously, this passes the bounds 
of sanity. But it is emphasized by his map, which repre¬ 
sents my cavalry as actually making a flank march between 
the lines of battle,—Morell’s and Longstreet’s. 

It seems necessary to add the statements of eyewit 
nesses, from different points of view—men of well-known 
high character, to corroborate my assertions and my cor¬ 
rections of misrepresentations of the part played by the 
cavalry and myself in the battle, as found in “The Century” 
article. 

Next morning, at Savage’s Station, the Prince de Join- 
ville approached me with both hands extended, saying with 
empressement, “I saw you make your charge yesterday;” 
and next day he wrote to the Due d’Aumale (see “New 
York Times,” August 13th, 1862) : 

. . . “Those fresh troops rush in good order upon our left, which 
falters, flies, and passing through the artillery draws on in disorder 
the troops of our center. The enemy advances rapid'y. The fusillade 
and cannonade are so violent that the projectiles striking the ground 


— 563 — 


Battles and Leaders of the Civil War 


raise a permanent cloud of dust. At that moment General Cooke 
charged at the head of his cavalry; but that movement does not 
succeed, and his horsemen on their return only increase the disorder. 
He makes every effort, aided by all who felt a little courage, to stop 
the panic, but in vain.” 

The Comte de Paris wrote to me, February 2d, 1877: 

... “I was with de Hart’s battery on the crest of the hill when 
you advanced on our left. . . The sacrifice of some of the bravest of 
the cavalry certainly saved a part of our artillery; as did, on a 
larger scale, the Austrian cavalry on the evening of Sadowa. . . . The 
main fact is, that with the cavalry you did all that cavalry could do 
to stop the rout.” 

General W. Merritt wrote me, February 2d, 1877: 

“I thought at the time, and subsequent experience has convinced 
me, that your cavalry and the audacity of its conduct at that time, 
together with the rapid firing of canister at short range by the 
battery mentioned, did much, if not everything, toward preventing the 
entire destruction of the Union army at Gaines’s Mill. The circum¬ 
stances were these: 

“The enemy had emerged from a wood, where his ranks were 
more or less disorganized, into an open field. Instead of finding the 
way clear before him he was met by a determined charge of cavalry 
and a heavy artillery fire. In his mind a new line of fresh troops 
were before him. It was but natural, at that stage of our military 
experience, that he should hesitate and halt, to prepare for a new 
emergency. He did so; and that night the cavalry bivouacked as near 
the scene of these events as the enemy did.” 

Brevet Lieut.-Colonel J. P. Martin wrote to me March 
24, 1870: 

“It is my opinion that but for the charge of the 5th Cavalry on 
that day, the loss in the command of General Fitz John Porter would 
have been immensely greater than it was; indeed, I believe that the 
charge, more than any other thing, was instrumental in saving that 
part of the army on the north bank of the Chickahominy. 

“You were the last general officer of General Porter’s command 
on the field on the left, General Porter himself leaving before you 
had, therefore an excellent opportunity of seeing what was going on.” 

Colonel G. A. H. Blake, United States Army, wrote me, 
June 16th, 1879: 

“About sundown you advanced the brigade under a warm fire and 
I deployed the 5th and 1st Cavalry in two lines, and a little to the 
rear of (the interval of) reserve batteries of artillery, which had 
opened a rapid fire. The infantry of the left wing had then dis¬ 
appeared from the top of the hill. You then rode off to a battery 
further to the left, where Rush’s Lancers had been ordered. The 5th 
Cavalry soon charged, and I saw no more of them. You had ordered 
me to support them; but there was a warm fire, and the smoke and 


—564 


Charge of Cooke’s Cavalry at Gaines’s Mill 


•dust made everything obscure. I saw none of the 5th, after it was 
broken, pass through the battery, which was very near. It was soon 
forced to retire and was followed by the 1st in its rear.” 

Finally, General William N. Grier, United States Army, 
wrote me, July 19th, 1879: 

“The reserve was stationed on the hill ... in full view of the 
slopes of the hill, down to the timber through which the enemy de¬ 
bouched in large numbers. The United States batteries were on 
the slope of the hill, a little to our right front. You ordered the 5th 
to make a charge, directing me to make a second charge after the 5th 
would rally. I never saw that regiment again on that day, after it 
was enveloped in a cloud of dust, making the charge—but soon after 
saw a battery or two emerge from the dust . . . withdrawing from 
the contest. I then wheeled my squadrons into column of fours, at a 
trot along the top of the hill, until getting in rear of the batteries— 
receiving the enemy’s fire at a loss of an officer and many men and 
horses—and, as I then supposed, saving the batteries from further 
loss.” 


The orders actually given were to support the batteries 
to the last moment, and then charge, if necessary to save 
them. 

Detroit , June , 1885. 

* * * * * * * 


— 565 — 


VIII 


Recollections of a Participant in the Charge 

By the Rev. W. H. Hitchcock 


Remembering clearly the incidents connected with the 
cavalry charge, I wish to clear up a point in regard to that 
charge so far as the regiment (the 5th Regular Cavalry) 
with which I had the honor of being connected was con¬ 
cerned. 

The battle did not begin until noon. We were stationed 
on the left of our position. As the hours passed, the battle 
became more and more furious. About 5 p.m. we were 
moved up near to the crest of the hill on our left, and within 
some 20 rods of the 5 or 6 batteries planted on the crest 
of the hill. 

It was something marvelous to watch those brave men 
handle their guns; never a man flinched or was dismayed, 
though a most withering fire of musketry and artillery 
was poured upon them. 

Just before dark when we could tell, by the sound of 
musketry fire and by the constantly advancing yells of 
the charging foe, that he was getting near the guns in our 
front, General Philip St. George Cooke, commanding the 
cavalry, rode to our front. I was on the right of the front 
line of the first squadron, and I heard his order to Captain 
Whiting, commanding the five companies of our regiment 
that were present on the field. He said, “Captain, as soon 
as you see the advancing line of the enemy raising the crest 
of the hill, charge at once, without any further orders, to 
enable the artillery to bring off their guns.” General Cooke 
then rode back around the right of our squadron. 

Captain Whiting turned to us and said, “Cavalry! 
Attention! Draw saber!” then added something to the effect, 
“Boys, we must charge in five minutes.” Almost immediate¬ 
ly, the bayonets of the advancing foe were seen, just beyond 
our cannon, probably not fifty rods from us. Captain 


— 566 — 



Recollections of a Participant in the Charge 

Whiting at once gave the order, “Trot! March!” and as 
soon as we were fully under way he shouted, “Charge!” 

We dashed forward with a wild cheer, in solid column 
of squadron front; but our formation was almost instantly 
broken by the necessity of opening to the right and left to 
pass our guns. So furiously were our brave gunners fight¬ 
ing that I noticed this incident: The gun directly in my front 
had just been loaded; every man had fallen before it could 
be fired. As I bore to the right to pass this gun, I saw 
the man at the breech, who was evidently shot through the 
body, drawing himself up by the spokes of the wheel, and 
reaching for the lanyard, and I said, “He will fire that gun,” 
and so kept to the right, and almost immediately felt the 
shock of the explosion. Then I closed in to re-form the 
line, but could find no one at my left, so completely had our 
line been shattered by the musketry fire in front and the 
artillery fire in our rear. I rushed on and almost instantly 
my horse reared upright in front of a line of bayonets, held 
by a few men upon whom I had dashed. My horse came 
down in front of the line, and ran away partly to our rear, 
perfectly uncontrollable. I dropped my saber, which hung 
to my waist by the saber-knot, and so fiercely tugged at 
my horse’s bit as to cause the blood to flow from her mouth, 
yet could not check her. The gun I had passed, now 
limbered up, was being hauled off at a gallop. I could 
direct my horse a little to right or left and so directed her 
toward the gun. As she did not attempt to leap the gun, 
I gained control of her, and at once started back upon my 
charge. After riding a short distance I paused. The 
firing of artillery and infantry behind and of infantry in 
front was terrific. None but the dead and wounded were 
around me. It hardly seemed that I could drive Lee’s battle- 
scarred veterans alone, and so I rode slowly off the field. 
The regiment had only about 250 men in action. Our 
commissioned officer was the only one not wounded except 
some who were captured. Only about 100 returned from 
that bloody field for duty next day. Some were captured, 
but a large number fell in that terrible charge, and sleep 


— 567 — 


Battles and Leaders of the Civil War 


with the many heroes who on that day gave their lives 
for the Union. So far as those of the 5th Regular Cavalry 
present in this charge were concerned, we certainly did 
our whole duty, just as we were ordered. We saved some 
guns, and tried to save all. 

Fairview, 111., June 13th, 1885. 

* * * * * * * 


- 568 — 


IX 


Lee s Attacks North of the Chickahominy 

By Daniel H. Hill, 
Lieutenant-General, C.S.A. 


While encamped, about noon on Monday, the 23d of 
June, 1862, on the Williamsburg road, about a mile from 
the battlefield of Seven Pines, in command of a division 
of the Confederate army, I received an order from General 
Lee to report immediately at his quarters on the Mechanics- 
ville road. On approaching the house which the general 
occupied, I saw an officer leaning over the yard-paling, 
duty, travel-worn, and apparently very tired. He raised 
himself as I dismounted, and I recognized General Jackson, 
who till that moment I had supposed was confronting Banks 
and Fremont far down the Valley of Virginia. He said 
that he had ridden fifty-two miles since 1 o’clock that morn¬ 
ing, having taken relays of horses on the road. We went 
together into General Lee’s office. General Jackson de¬ 
clined refreshments, courteously tendered by General Lee, 
but drank a glass of milk. Soon after, Generals Long- 
street and A. P. Hill came in, and General Lee closing the 
door, told us that he had determined to attack the Federal 
right wing, and had selected our four commands to execute 
the movement. He told us that he had' sent Whiting’s 
division to reenforce Jackson, and that at his instance 
the Richmod papers had reported that large reenforcements 
had been sent to Jackson “with a view of clearing out the 
Valley of Virginia and exposing Washington.” He believed 
that General McClellan received the Richmond papers regu¬ 
larly, and he (Lee) knew of the nervous apprehension 
concerning Washington.* He then said that he would retire 

*1 do not know how far the Federals were deceived by the 
announcement of reeinforcements sent to Jackson, but during the 
Seven Days’ battles I read in a Northern paper a letter from Stras- 
burg, Va., of the 25th of June, stating that they were expecting 


— 569 — 




Battles and Leaders of the Civil War 


to another room to attend to some office work, and would 
leave us to arrange the details among ourselves. The 
main point in his mind seemed to be that the crossings of 
the Chickahominy should be uncovered by Jackson’s advance 
down the left bank, so that the other three divisions might 
not suffer in making a forced passage. 

During the absence of General Lee, Longstreet said to 
Jackson: “As you have the longest march to make, and are 
likely to meet opposition you had better fix the time for 
the attack to begin.” Jackson replied, “Daylight of the 
26th.” Longstreet then said, “You will encounter Federal 
cavalry and roads blocked by felled timber, if nothing more 
formidable; ought you not give yourself more time?” When 
General Lee returned, he ordered A. P. Hill to cross at 
Meadow Bridge, Longstreet at the Mechanicsville Bridge; 
and me to follow Longstreet. The conference broke up 
about nightfall. 

It may be of interest to the student of history to know 
how Jackson managed to slip off so often and so easily. 
His plan was to press his infantry as near as possible to 
the enemy, without bringing on a general engagement; then 
to occupy these advanced points with dismounted cavalry 
pickets, and to start his “foot cavalry” in the other direc¬ 
tion with all possible speed. His stealthy marches to the 
rear were made without consulting his highest officers, and 
even without their knowing his destination. 

It was characterisic of Jackson to select for his chief - 
of-staff, not a military man, but a Presbyterian minister, 
a professor in a theological seminary, and to clothe him 
with the power of carrying out his mysterious orders when 
he was temporarily absent. Jackson’s confidence was well 
bestowed, and he found in the Rev. R. L. Dabney, D.D., a 
faithful, zealous, and efficient staff-officer. To him, now 
a professor in the State University of Texas, I am indebted 


Stonewall Jackson there, and were so well fortified that they would 
give him a warm reception. Jackson’s corps was then at Ashland, 
within twelve miles of Richmond. He certainly had slopped off 
without observation.— D. H. H. 


— 570 — 



Lee’s Attacks North of the Chickahominy 

for the following account of the unexpected appearance of 
Jackson on the Federal right wing before Richmond: 

“General Jackson’s forced march from Mount Meridian, in the 
neighborhood of the Port Republic battlefield, began in earnest on 
Wednesday, June 18th, the general and a few of the troops having 
left the evening before. About midday on Thursday, the 19th, 
we were at Medium's River Station, about ten miles west of Char¬ 
lottesville, with the head of the column. The general called me 
into a room in the hotel, locked the door, and told me that he was about 
to go in advance of his corps by rail to Richmond to see the commander- 
in-chief; that the corps was going to Richmond to join in a general 
attack upon McClellan, but that he would return to his command 
before we got there; that I was to march the corps toward Richmond, 
following the line of railroad, as near as the country roads would 
permit, by Charlottesville and Gordonsville, General Ewell’s division 
to form the head of the column with which I was personally to 
proceed; that strict precautions of secrecy were to be observed—which 
he then dictated to me. He then got on an express train and left us. 
I dined that day with General Ewell, and I remember that he com¬ 
plained to me with some bitterness of General Jackson’s reserve, 
saying, ‘Here, now, the general has gone off on the railroad without 
intrusting to me, his senior major-general, any order, or any hint 
whither we are going; but (Major J. A.) Harman, his quartermaster, 
enjoys his full confidence, I suppose, for I hear that he is telling the 
troops that are going to Richmond to fight McClellan.’* 

“ ‘You may be certain, General Ewell,’ I replied, ‘that you stand 
higher in General Jackson’s confidence than any one else, as your 
rank and services entitle you. As for Major Harman, he has not 
heard a word more than others. If he thinks that we are going 
to Richmond, it is only his surmise, which I suppose every intelligent 
private is now making.’ 

“The column reached Gordonsville, Saturday, June 21st, about 
noon. To my surprise, on riding into town, I got an order to go to 
the general—at a private house, where he was lodging. On reaching 
Gordonsville, Thursday afternoon, he had been met by news which 
alarmed the outpost there: that a heavy Federal force was on the 
Rapidan, about sixteen miles away. He therefore had postponed 
going to Richmond until he could effectually clear up this rumor. 
The chief mode adopted was characteristic: it was to send out by 
night an intelligent private citizen, thoroughly acquainted with 
the Rapidan people and country, as his scout. This gentleman came 
back, after thorough inquiry, with news that the rumor was unfounded. 


*This was a source of annoyance to Loring in ’61, and later on 
to Elwell. When Jackson’s corps was so strangely left at Winchester 
after the battle of Sharpsburg, or Antietam, and General Lee had 
gone to the Rappahannock (we were making a feint every day of 
holding the gaps in the Blue Ridge, with strict orders not to bring 
on an engagement), I said to Jackson one day: “I am your next in 
rank, and should you be killed or captured in your many scouts around, 
I would not know what the corps was left for, or what it was expected 
to do.” He then told me that he had suggested to General Lee, 
who had to move back to protect Richmond, that he could remain and 
remove our wounded and stores, and that his presence on McClellan’s 
flank and rear would keep him from attacking Lee. In case of 
any casualty to himself, the removal was to on till completed.— D.H.H. 


— 571 — 



Battles and Leaders of the Civil War 


About half an hour before sunset on Saturday, the general got into- 
an express car with no one but me and the conductor, and came to 
Frederick’s Hall Station in the county of Louisa, arriving about 
dawn on Sunday, the 22d. We spent the Sabbath there at the house 
of Mr. N. Harris, attending camp-preaching in the afternoon. At 
this house were General W. H. C. Whiting and General Hood, then 
commanding a Texas brigade. At 1 o’clock that night General 
Jackson arose, took an orderly whom I had selected for him as 
trustworthy and well acquainted with the road, and started for 
Richmond with impressed horses. He had me wake up General 
Whiting and make him sign a pass and an impressment order (which 
no one under the rank of major-general had a right to do). He had 
about fifty-two miles to ride to Richmond; to the Nine-mile bridge, 
near which General Lee was in person, I suppose the distance was 
as great, so that the ride occupied him, with the time lost in impress¬ 
ing relays of horses, about ten hours. He must have reached his 
rendezvous with General Lee and his three major-generals about 
noon on the 23d. If he rode into the city first, the meeting would 
have been a few hours later. He rejoined his corps at Beaver Dam 
Station on Tuesday (24), and assembled the whole of it around 
Ashland Wednesday night, the 25th. About two hours by sun on 
the 26th we came into collision with McClellan’s outposts. We were 
much mystified at first to know why the general should put a battery 
in position and cannonade the bushes furiously for ten minutes only 
to drive away a picket. We found out afterward this was his 
signal to you (General D. H. Hill), and in a little while the distant 
sound of your guns at Ellerson’s mill told us that the ball had opened.” 

It will be seen from the narrative of Major Dabney that 
General Jackson, who fought some of his most desperate 
battles on Sunday, would not start to Richmond till Sunday 
had passed. He had the pass and impressment order from 
General Whiting that he might not be known on the road; 
he wore no insignia of rank, and as he would have been 
known in Richmond he did not go to that city It was 
3 P.M. on the 23d when I saw him at General Lee’s head¬ 
quarters. Major Dabney is mistaken in saying that the 
signal-guns were intended for me. A. P. Hill was farther 
up the Chickahominy, and he was to cross first, and, being 
nearer Jackson, could hear his guns better that those of 
us lower down the stream. On the 25th, there was a brisk 
fight about King’s school-house on the Williamsburg road, 
between Hooker’s division and parts of the divisions of 
Generals T. H. Holmes and Benjamin Huger. That night 
my division marched across to the neighborhood of 
Mechanicsville Bridge. To conceal the movement our 
camp-fires were freshly lighted up by a detachment after 
the troops had left, and a company was sent some miles 


— 572 — 


Lee’s Attacks North of the Chickahominy 


down the Charles City road to send up rockets, as though 
signalling an advance in that direction. General Lee’s 
order, issued on the 25th of June, says: 

“At 3 o’clock Thursday morning, the 26th instant, General 
Jackson will advance on the road leading to Pole Green Church, 
communicating his march to General Branch (seven miles above 
Meadow Bridge), who will immediately cross the Chickahominy and 
take the road leading to Mechanicsville. As soon as the movements 
of these colums are discovered, General A. P. Hill, with the rest 
of his division, will cross the Chickahominy near Meadow Bridge. 
. . . The enemy being driven from Mechanicsville, and the 

passage across the bridge opened, General Longstreet. with his divi¬ 
sion and that of General S. H. Hill, will cross the Chickahominy 
at or near that point—General D. H. Hill moving to the support of 
General Jackson, and General Longstreet supporting General A. P. 
Hill,—the four divisions keeping in communication with each other, 
and moving en echelon on separate roads, if practicable; the left 
division in advance, with skirmishers and sharp-shooters extending 
their front, will sweep down the Chickahominy, and endeavor to 
drive the enemy from his position above New Bridge, General Jackson 
bearing well to his left, turning Beaver Dam Creek, and taking the 
direction toward Cold Harbor, etc.” 

General Jackson was unable to reach the point expected 
on the morning of the 26th. General A. P. Hill says: 

“Three o’clock p. M. having arrived, and no intelligence from 
Jackson or Branch, I determined to cross at once, rather than hazard 
the failure of th§ whole plan by longer deferring it.” 

Heavy firing was heard at 3 P.M. at Meadow Bridge 
and the Federal outposts were seen fleeing toward Mechan¬ 
icsville, pursued by A. P. Hill. We could see a line of battle 
drawn up at that village to receive Hill. My division 
being nearest the bridge, Longstreet ordered me to cross 
first. Some delay was made in repairing the bridge, and 
A. P. Hill became hotly engaged before we could get to his 
relief. At this time President Davis and staff hurried 
past us, going “to the sound of the firing.” Ripley’s brigade 
was pushed forward to the support of three batteries of 
artillery of Major H. P. Holme’s battalion, and the two 
under Captains R. A. Hardaway and J. W. Bondurant. The 
five batteries soon silenced the Federal artillery, and the 
whole plateau about Mechanicsville was abandoned to the 
Confederates, the Federals retiring across Beaver Dam 
Creek, which was strongly fortified. Our engineers seem 
to have had little knowledge of the country, and none of the 


— 573 — 


Battles and Leaders of the Civil War 


fortifications on the creek. The maps furnished the divi¬ 
sion commanders were worthless. At a request from General 
W. D. Pender, who had been roughly handled in attacking 
works on the creek, Brigadier-General Ripley, of my divi¬ 
sion, was directed to cooperate with him, and the attack was 
made about dark. The enemy had intrenchments of great 
strength and development on the other side of the creek, and 
had lined the banks with his magnificent artillery. The 
approach was over an open plain exposed to a murderous 
fire of all arms, and across an almost impassable stream. 
The result was, as might have been foreseen, a bloody and 
disastrous repulse. Nearly every field officer in the brigade 
was killed or wounded. It was fortunate for the Confed¬ 
erates that the crossing was begun before Jackson got 
in rear of Mechanicsville. The loss of that position would 
have necessitated the abandonment of the line of Beaver Dam 
Creek, as in fact it did, the next day. We were lavish of 
blood in those days, and it was thought to be a great thing 
to charge a battery of artillery or an earthwork line with 
infantry. “It is magnificent, but it is not war,” was the 
sarcastic remark of the French general as he looked on at the 
British cavalry charge at Balaklava. The attacks on the 
Beaver Dam intrenchments, on the heights of Malvern Hill, 
at Gettysburg, etc., were all grand, but of exactly the kind 
of grandeur which the South could not afford. 

A brisk cannonade was kept up on the morning of the 
27th for an hour or more from the Federal artillery along 
the line of Beaver Dam Creek, which was held by a thin 
line of skirmishers, the main force having retreated to 
Gaines’s Mill and New Cold Harbor. A. P. Hill’s division 
was ordered to pursue on the mill, and my division to take 
the Bethesda Church road to join Jackson. The works on 
that road were turned by my division, and some sixty or 
seventy prisoners holding them were captured. Major 
Dabney says: 

“General Jackson continued his march on the morning of the 
27th. When I overtook him he was dismounted in the turnpike road 
with his cap off before a gentleman sitting on a cedar-stump, who 
was speaking to him in a suppressed voice. An old acquaintance 


— 574 — 


Lee’s Attacks North of the Chickahominy 

whom I met told me that this gentleman was General Lee. The com- 
ference soon ended, and the march was resumed—deflecting strongly 
to the east.” 

General Lee's object in pressing down the Chickahom¬ 
iny was to unmask New Bridge, and thus to establish 
close communication between the forces defending Rich¬ 
mond and the six divisions attacking the Federal right. A. 
P. Hill, who marched close to the Chickahominy, succeeded 
in driving off the Federal troops defending the creek at 
Gaines's Mill, and advanced until he developed their full 
line of battle at New Cold Harbor, half a mile beyond. 
After waiting till 2:30 P.M. to hear from Longstreet,* he 
advanced his division without support to the attack of the 
intrenched position of the Federals. He kept up a strug¬ 
gle for two hours, was repulsed and driven back, and in 
turn repulsed his pursuers. His report says: 

“From having been the attacking I now became the attacked; but 
stubbornly and gallantly was the ground held. My division was 
thus engaged full two hours before assistance was received. We 
failed to carry the enemy’s lines, but we paved the way for the suc¬ 
cessful attacks afterward, in which attack it was necessary to em¬ 
ploy the whole of our army on that side of the Chickahominy.” 

Longstreet came into action after 4 o’clock. He thus 
describes the difficulties before him: 

“In front of me the enemy occupied the wooded slope of Turkey 
Hill, the crest of which is fifty or sixty feet higher than the plain 
over which my troops must pass to make an attack. The plain is 
about a quarter of a mile wide; the farther side was occupied by 
sharp-shooters. Above these, and on the slope of the hill, was a line 
of infantry behind trees, felled so as to form a good breastwork. The 
crest of the hill, some forty feet above the last line, was strength¬ 
ened by rifle-trenches and occupied by infantry and artillery. In ad¬ 
dition to this the plain was enfiladed by batteries on the other side 
of the Chickahominy. I was, in fact, in the very position from which 
the enemy wished us to attack him.” 

All was done that mortals could do by the two gallant 
divisions struggling against such disadvantages, but noth¬ 
ing decisive could be effected until the full Confederate 

*General Lee in his official report says: “The arrival of Jackson 
on our left was momentarily expected, and it was supposed that his 
approach would cause the extension of the enemy’s line in that direc¬ 
tion. Under this impression, Longstreet was held back until this 
movement should commence.”— Editors. 


— 575 — 



Battles and Leaders of the Civil War 


forces could be brought into action. In the meanwhile, 
Jackson moved forward on what we afterward found to be 
the Grapevine Bridge road, my division in advance. A few 
squads of Federal stragglers were picked up, and some 
wagons and ambulances were captured. One sutler, in his 
desperate desire to save his fancy stock, tried to dash his 
wagon through J. R. Anderson's brigade. He paid no at¬ 
tention to the orders to halt, or to the presented bayonets. 
Fortunately for him, his horses did not have so much at 
stake as he had in canned fruits and vegetables, and were 
quite willing to surrender. Some poor ragged graybacks 
got toothsome delicacies then, from which they had been 
long debarred, and of which before nightfall they had no 
need forever. 

About 2 p.m. we reached the neighborhood of McGe- 
hee’s house, an elevated knoll, which was the Federal right, 
and from which a dense and tangled swamp extended west¬ 
ward in an irregular curve to Gaines's Mill. Bondurant’s 
battery was brought up to feel the position. Jackson re¬ 
mained with it for a time after the firing began. The bat¬ 
tery was badly crippled, and was withdrawn by my order 
when I perceived the superiority of the enemy’s artillery— 
always the most effective arm of his service. So little was 
known of the condition of the battle and of the roads, that 
Jackson posted my division in the woods to the left of the 
road, and facing toward the firing at Gaines's Mill, in 
order to intercept the forces that Longstreet and A. P. Hill 
might drive in that direction. Jackson's report says: 

“Hoping that Generals A. P. Hill and Longstreet would soon 
drive the Federals toward me, I directed General D. H. Hill to move 
his division to the left of the road, so as to leave between him and the 
wood on the right of the road an open space, across which I hoped 
that the enemy would be driven. . . . But it soon becoming appar¬ 
ent from the direction and sound of the firing that General A. P. Hill 
was hard pressed, I ordered a general advance of my entire corps, 
which began with General D. H. Hill on the left and extending to 
the right, through Ewell’s, Jackson’s, and Whiting’s divisions . . . 
in the order named.” 

The swamp was to be gotten through, filled with sharp¬ 
shooters and obstructed with felled timber and choked 
with brushwood. The report continued: 


— 576 — 


Lee's Attacks North of the Chickahominy 

“In advancing to the attack, General D. H. Hill had to cross this 
swamp, densely covered with tangled undergrowth and young timber. 
This caused some confusion and a separation of regiments. On the 
farther edge of the swamp he encountered the enemy. The conflict 
was fierce and bloody. The Federals fell back from the wood under 
the protection of a fence, ditch, and hill. Separated now from them 
by an open field, some four hundred yards wide, he promptly deter¬ 
mined to press forward. Before doing so, however, it was necessary 
to capture a battery on his left which could enfilade his line upon his 
advance. . . .* 

“Again pressing forward, the Federals again fell back, but only 
to select a position for a more obstinate defense, when at dark, under 
the pressure of our batteries,—of which had then begun to play with 
marked effect upon the left,—of the other concerning events of the 
field, and of the bold and dashing charge of General Hill’s infantry, in 
which the troops of Brigadier General C. S. Winder joined, the ene¬ 
my yielded and fled in disorder.” 

I have always believed that this was the first break 
in the Federal line; it disposed of Sykes’s division of regu¬ 
lars who had been so stubborn and so troublesome all 
day. The Comte de Paris says of their retreat: “Fearfully 
reduced as they are, they care less for the losses they have 
sustained than for the mortification of yielding to volun¬ 
teers.” The general advance of our whole line and their 
intrepid onset everywhere made the defeat of the regulars 
possible, but credit should be given to the troops that did 
it. We discovered that our line overlapped that of the 

*The words of Jackson’s report, omitted in the quotation are as 
follows: 

“The battery was captured with severe loss, and held for a short 
time—sufficiently long, however, to enable the division to move on 
free from its terrific fire, when it was again retaken by the enemy.” 

This refers to the battle around the McGehee house, the right of 
Porter’s line under command of General George Sykes. The latter 
gives an account of the contest with Hill, differing from that of the 
Confederate generals. He says: 

“It was now 5:30 p. M. The enemy still continued to pour in 
fresh troops against 4500 men who had baffled him at every point 
since 11 o’clock in the morning. The excess of strength compelled 
the 12th and 14th (Regulars) to occupy the crest of a secondary 
ridge somewhat in rear of the position they had previously won. 
Previous to this a brigade of volunteers, under Colonel J. J. Bart¬ 
lett, consisting of the 16th and 27th New York, 5th Maine, and 96th 
Pa. volunteers, and Kingsbury’s bty Reg. Arty., joined my command. 
Under my direction, Col. Bartlett posted the regiments of his bri¬ 
gade with great daring in front of and around the McGehee house, 
and firmly maintained himself until the center of Porter’s army was 
pierced, the troops in his front driven in, his left exposed, and his 
position no longer tenable.” General Bartlett states in his 
report that he maintained his ground at the McGehee farm until after 
dark. See also pp. 339, 340.— Editors. 


— 577 — 



Battles and Leaders of the Civil War 


Federal forces, and saw two brigades (afterward ascer¬ 
tained to be under Lawton and Winder) advancing to make 
a front attack upon the regulars. Brigadier-Generals 
Samuel Garland and B. G. Anderson, commanding North 
Carolina brigades in my division, asked permission to move 
forward and attack the right flank and rear of the division 
of regulars. The only difficulty in the way was a Federal 
battery with its infantry supports, which could enfilade 
them in their advance. Two regiments of Elzey’s brigade, 
which had got separated in going across the swamp, were 
sent by me, by way of my left flank, to the rear of the bat¬ 
tery to attack the infantry supports, while Colonel Alfred 
Iverson, of the 20th North Carolina, charged it in front. 
The battery was captured and held long enough for the 
two brigades to advance across the open plain. “The ef¬ 
fect of our appearance,” says Garland’s official report, “at 
this opportune juncture (upon the enemy’s flank), cheer¬ 
ing and charging, decided the fate of the day. The enemy 
broke and retreated, made a second brief stand, which in¬ 
duced my immediate command to halt under good cover of 
the bank on the roadside and return their fire, when, charg¬ 
ing forward again, they broke and scattered in every direc¬ 
tion.” Their retreat was to the woods between the field 
and the river. Swinton gives credit to Hood and Law for 
making the first break in the Federal line, and quotes from 
Jackson’s report: “Dashing on with unfaltering step in 
the face of those murderous discharges of canister and 
musketry, Gen. Hood and Colonel E. M. Law at the head of 
their respective brigades rushed to the charge with a yell. 
Moving down a precipitous ravine, leaping ditch and stream, 
clambering up a difficult ascent, and exposed to an incessant 
and deadly fire from the intrenchments, these brave and 
determined men pressed forward, driving the enemy from 
his well-selected and fortified position. In this charge, in 
which upward of a thousand men fell killed and wounded 
before the fire of the enemy, and in which fourteen pieces 
of artillery and nearly a regiment were captured, the 4th 
Texas, under the lead of General Hood, was the first to pierce 
these strongholds and seize the guns. It is evident that 


— 578 — 


Lee’s Attacks North of the Chickahominy 

Jackson means to compliment Hood for being the first to 
pierce the intrenchments on the Federal left. But the 
word “first” has been misleading as to the point where 
the break was first made in the Federal line. 

General Lawton in his official report stated that after 
the forces were broken in front of him on our left, a staff 
officer rode up and called for assistance to charge a battery 
on the left, and that after marching two or three hundred 
yards by the right flank, “the shouts of victory from our 
friends announced that the last battery had been taken and 
the rout complete.” In a letter to me just received, Gen¬ 
eral Lawton says: “I do believe that the first break was 
on the right of the Federal line, and I moved against that 
line in front. My knowledge of the position of the battery 
to be charged was derived solely from the lips of a staff 
officer, who rode up to me at full speed on the field, and 
returned immediately to his chief. My recollection is, that 
very promptly after I heard the shouts of victory from our 
friends, the same messenger came again to request me to 
halt. I cannot feel that my memory fails me when I say 
that you struck the enemy in flank, while Winder’s com¬ 
mand and mine moved directly on his front. The effect of 
these several attacks was promptly felt, and soon became 
conspicuous.” 

It was not quite dark, and I took the responsibility of 
halting all the troops on our left. General Winder thought 
that we ought to pursue into the woods, on the right of the 
Grapevine Bridge road; but, not knowing the position of our 
friends, nor what Federal reserves might be awaiting us in 
the woods, I thought it advisable not to move on. General 
Lawton concurred with me. I had no artillery to shell the 
woods in advance, as mine had not got through the swamp. 
No Confederate officer on the field knew that the Federals 
had but one bridge over which to retreat, else all the artil¬ 
lery that could have been collected would have opened fire 
upon the Federal masses crowded into a narrow space in 
the woods, and there would have been a general advance of 
our line under cover of this fire. Winder was right; even a 


— 579 — 


Battles and Leaders of the Civil War 


show of pressure must have been attended with great re¬ 
sults. I made my headquarters at McGehee’s house, and 
ordered my artillery and infantry to occupy the hill around 
it. The artillery, however, did not get into position until 
sunrise next morning. Before the infantry was in place, 
we heard huzzaing on the bridge road, and understood by 
that that reenforcements had come to cover up the Federal 
retreat. They took up their position across the road and 
showed a determined front, but might have been broken by 
an artillery fire from our elevated plateau; unfortunately, 
for us, there was no artillery to do this work. 

Between 9 and 10 o’clock General Lawton and myself 
walked out alone to examine the line of battle across the 
road, afterward discovered to be Meagher’s Irish brigade. 
We got within thirty yards of the Federals, and must have 
been seen, but we were not fired upon, probably because we 
were mistaken for a party of their own men sent up to get 
water at McGehee’s well. We met the party going back, 
and saw them go into their own lines. Not a word was 
spoken by them or by us. At such times “silence is golden.”* 

In his attack upon General McClellan’s right wing Gen¬ 
eral Lee had 50,000 men.f General Fitz John Porter, who 


*After this paper appeared in “The Century ” magazine, I re¬ 
ceived a letter from William H. Osborne, of East Bridgewater, Mass., 
of which the following is a part: 

“I read your article on the battle of Gaines’s Mill, Va., I was 
especially interested in the circumstances related by you concerning 
the water party sent out from the Irish brigade to McGehee’s well, 
and the adventure of yourself and General Lawton. I remember the 
incident with great vividness, as I was one of the party. I was a 
member of Company “C,” 29th Regiment, Massachusetts Volunteers, 
which was a part of the brigade referred to, but I have always sup¬ 
posed, till I read your article, that it was later in the night when we 
started. I have also always supposed that in going for water we 
went inside the Confederate lines. I remember that several times 
during the night we approached very near your lines, on one occasion 
actually seeing your men gathered about a smoldering camp-fire in 
the woods. I suppose you will not blame me for saying that we should 
all have estimated it a great honor if we had made your acquaintance 
that night.”— D. H. H. 

fDabney, in his ‘‘Life of Jackson” puts the Confederate force at 
40,000. Swinton estimates Porter’s forces at 30,000 and Lee’s at 
70,000—an under and an over estimate respectively, I think.— D. H. H. 

General Porter (see foot-note, p. 336) estimates his fighting 
strength at 30,000, and that of the Confederates at 65,000.— Editors. 


— 580 — 



Lee’s Attacks North of the Ghickahominy 

commanded the Federals at Cold Harbor, handled his 40,000 
men with an ability unsurpassed on any field during the 
war. He had greatly the advantage in position, and he had 
improved this superiority with intrenchments, log breast¬ 
works, rifle-pits, and abatis. He had an immense prepon¬ 
derance in artillery, and that of the most superb character. 
Many of our field-batteries did not get across the swamp at 
all, and those which did get over were inferior in range and 
power to General Porter’s. Artillery seems to have been 
a favorite arm with General McClellan, and he had brought 
it to the highest point of efficiency. 

I do not know how much of our infantry straggled in 
the swamp. Ripley got lost, and his fine brigade was not 
in action at all. Of Colquitt’s brigade, the 6th and 27th 
Georgia regiments were engaged; the other three regiments 
in coming out of the swamp found themselves behind Jack¬ 
son’s corps and were not engaged. Rodes, Garland, and 
Anderson kept their brigades well in hand and did brilliant 
service. (These three splendid officers were all killed, 
subsequently, in battle.) I do not know how many men 
the other five divisions lost by the difficulties of the swamp. 

Riding in advance of his skirmish line through the 
swamp attended by a few staff officers, General Jackson 
found himself in the presence of fifteen or twenty Federal 
soldiers on outpost duty. He judged it the part of pru¬ 
dence to assume the offensive and charge upon them before 
they fired upon him. I am indebted to Major T. 0. Chest- 
ney, then assistant adjutant-general of Elzey’s brigade, for 
the following account: 

‘‘As Elzey’s brigade was pressing forward to the line held by the 
Confederates at the bloody battle of Gaines’s Mill, a squad of 15 or 
20 soldiers were encountered on their way to the rear. A tall fellow 
at the head of the little party drew special attention to himself by 
singing out at the top of his voice with an oath, ‘Gentlemen, we had 
the honor of being captured by Stonewall Jackson himself,’ a state¬ 
ment which he repeated with evident pride all along the line, as our 
men tramped past. We subsequently learned that his story was true. 
General Jackson, having ridden some distance in advance had come 
suddenly upon the blue-coats and with his characteristic impetuosity 
had charged among them and ordered them to surrender, which they 
made haste to do.” 


— 581 — 


Battles and Leaders of the Civil War 


One of the saddest things connected with the miserable 
fratricidal war was the breaking up of ties of friendship 
and of blood. The troops opposing mine on the murderous 
field that day were the regulars of General George Sykes, 
a Southerner by birth, and my roommate at West Point,— 
a man admired by all for his honor, courage, and frankness, 
and peculiarly endeared to me by his social qualities. Dur¬ 
ing the negotiations of the cartel for the exchange of pris¬ 
oners, intrusted to General Dix and myself, I sent word to 
General Sykes, through General N. B. Sweitzer, of General 
McClellan’s staff, that “had I known that he was in front of 
me at Cold Harbor, I would have sent some of my North 
Carolina boys up to take him out of the cold.” He replied 
through the same source: “I appreciate the sarcasm, but 
our time will be next and the tables will be turned.” Alas! 
it was a true prophecy. About 9 P. M. on the 27th, Major 
B. H. Clitz was brought into my room at the McGehee 
house, headquarters for the night, wounded in the leg, and 
a prisoner. He was very young and boyish-looking when 
he entered West Point, and was a very great favorite with 
us of maturer years. It flashed upon my mind how, in 
the Mexican war, as his regiment filed past, I had almost 
a fatherly fear lest he should be struck; and now he was 
here, wounded by one of my own men! He was tenderly 
cared for by my medical director, Doctor Mott, and I was 
delighted to learn that he would not lose his leg. The next 
morning General John F. Reynolds was brought in as a 
prisoner. He had been my messmate in the old army for 
more than a year, and for half that time my tent-mate. 
Not an unkind word had ever passed between us. General 
Reynolds seemed confused and mortified at his position. 
He sat down and covered his face with his hands, and at 
length said: “Hill, we ought not to be enemies.” I told 
him that there was no bad feeling on my part, and that he 
ought not to fret at the fortunes of war, which were no¬ 
toriously fickle. He was placed in my ambulance and sent 
over to Richmond, declining a loan of Confederate money. 
General Reynolds had gone to sleep in the woods between 


— 582 — 


Lee’s Attacks North of the Chickahominy 

the battle-ground and the Chickahominy, and when he 
awoke, his troops were gone and the bridge was broken 
down. 

Winder, Anderson, and Garland, probably the most 
promising of all our young brigadiers, fell fighting for the 
cause they loved. Reynolds, one of the noblest of mankind, 
fell doing his duty on his side at Gettysburg. Sykes, as 
the friend of McClellan, never received the recognition 
which his knightly qualities demanded. Worst of all, Por¬ 
ter, who commanded on the field the most creditable to the 
Federal arms, received that condemnation so much worse 
than death from the country he had served ably and loyally. 

In these battles, the great want with the Confederates, 
strange as it may seem, was accurate knowledge of the 
country in their front. The map furnished me (and I 
suppose the six other major-generals had no better) was 
very full in regard to everything within our own lines; but 
a red line on the east side of the Chickahominy and nearly 
parallel to it, without any points marked on it, was our 
only guide to the route on which our march was to be 
made.* None of us knew of the formidable character of 
the works on Beaver Dam. The blood shed by the Southern 
troops there was wasted in vain, and worse than in vain, 
for the fight had a most dispiriting effect on our troops. 
They could have been halted at Mechanicsville until Jack- 
son had turned the works on the creek, and all that waste 
of blood could have been avoided. Ripley’s brigade was 
sent to the assistance of Pender, by the direct order, through 

*General E. M. Law, writing on this point in the “Southern Biv¬ 
ouac ,” says: 

“The real trouble was that the Confederate officers, even those 
in high command, knew little or nothing of the topography of the 
country in which they were operating. An accurate map in the hands 
of each division commander would have saved many valuable lives 
at Gaines’s Mill as well as at Ellerson’s and time enough would have 
been gained to have brought the whole Confederate force upon the 
field at the former place several hours before it actually reached there. 
If Porter’s lines had been broken at 4 o’clock, instead of at half past 
six, he would not have had the cover of night to withdraw his routed 
troops, and his whole command could have been captured or destroyed 
in attempting the passage of the Chickahominy. There was no rea¬ 
son why this was not done, except the one given. The Federals, on 


— 583 — 



Battles and Leaders of the Civil War 


me, of both Mr. Davis and General Lee. They both felt 
pressing upon them the vast importance of keeping near 
Richmond, and of opening up communications with it as 
soon as possible. The crossing of the river by General A. 
P. Hill before hearing from Jackson precipitated the fight 
on the first day; and it having begun, it was deemed neces¬ 
sary to keep it up, without waiting for Jackson. The same 
necessity compelled Lee on the second day to attack his 
antagonist on his own strong and well-chosen position. Lee 
knew that McClellan depended upon the York River Rail¬ 
road for his supplies, and by moving upon that road he 
could have compelled the battle upon his own selected 
ground, with all the advantages thereof. The lack of 
transportation, and the fear of the capture of Richmond 
while he was making this detour to the Federal rear, con¬ 
strained him to surrender the advantage of position wisely 
chosen by the Federals and skillfully arranged for defense. 

During Lee’s absence Richmond was at the mercy of 
McClellan; but Magruder was there to keep up a “clatter,” 
as Swinton expresses it. No. one ever lived who could play 
off the Grand Seignior with a more lordly air than could 
“Prince John,” as Magruder was called.f During the ab- 


the other hand, knew the country thoroughly; they had occupied it for 
several weeks, and during that time their engineer officers had in¬ 
spected it carefully. . . . There was no earthly reason why the 
Confederate authorities should not have been possessed of the same 
information. The Federal Government had been all the previous 
winter preparing for the advance upon Richmond. McClellan was a 
long time getting from Yorktown to his position on the Chickahominy, 
and all his movements indicated the probable position he would take 
up in front of Richmond. There was no lack of time, therefore, to 
map the locality accurately, and no lack of warning that it 
would be of the most vital importance. To undertake the defense of 
a city, without attempting to learn the topography of the country 
around it, was a new principle in modern warfare.”— Editors. 

fin ante-bellum days (so the old army story used to run) Magru¬ 
der was a lieutenant of artillery at Rouse’s Point. There his mess 
entertained some British officers, two of whom were scions of nobility. 
The visit having been expected, the mess had borrowed or rented gold 
plate, and silver plate, cut-glass ware, rich furniture, and stylish equip¬ 
ages for conveying the noble guests. Prince John assured them that 
these were but the debris of the former splendor of the regimental 
mess. “Only the debris, my lord; the schooner bringing most of the 
mess plate from Florida was wrecked.” On the 2d day of the festival 
one of the dazzled nobleman said to Prince John: “We do not wish 


— 584 — 



Lee’s Attacks North of the Chickahominy 

sence of Lee he kept up such a clatter that each of McClel¬ 
lan’s corps commanders was expecting a special visit from 
the much-plumed cap and the one-gaudy attire of the mas¬ 
ter of ruses and strategy. He put on naturally all those 
grand and imposing devices which deceive the military op¬ 
ponent. 

The fortifications around Richmond at that time were 
very slight. McClellan could have captured the city with 
very little loss of life. The want of supplies would have 
forced Lee to attack him as soon as possible, with all the 
disadvantages of a precipitated movement. But McClel¬ 
lan seems to have contemplated nothing of the kind; and as 
he placed the continuance of the siege upon the hazard of 
Cold Harbor, he was bound to put every available man into 
that fight. 

Just before we crossed the Chickahominy, I asked Gen¬ 
eral Garland if he remembered what Napoleon said at Aus- 
terlitz when one of his marshals had begged permission to 
attack a column of the Austro-Russian army which was 
making a flank movement. Garland replied: “I, too, was 
just thinking that McClellan was saying to his officers, as 
Napoleon did, ‘When your enemy is making a false move¬ 
ment, do not strike him till he has completed itand it may 
be that he will gobble up Richmond while we are away.” 

While we were lying all day idle on the 28th, unable 
to cross the Chickahominy, the clouds of smoke from the 
burning plunder in the Federal camps and the frequent ex¬ 
plosions of magazines indicated a retreat; but Whiting kept 
insisting upon it that all this was but a ruse de guerre of 
McClellan preparatory to a march upon Richmond. I made 
to him some such reply as that once made to General Long- 
street when a cadet at West Point, by Professor Kendrick. 


to be inquisitive, but we have been so much impressed with this mag¬ 
nificence that we are constrained to believe that American officers 
must be paid enormously. What is your monthly pay? Assuming 
an indifferent air, Prince John said: “Damned if I know;” then, turn¬ 
ing to his servant, “Jim, what is my monthly pay?” The servant was 
discreetly silent, it may be from a wink, or it may be that to remem¬ 
ber $65 was too heavy a tax upon his memory also.— D. H. H. 


— 585 - 



Battles and Leaders of the Civil War 


The professor asked Longstreet, who never looked at his 
chemistry, how the carbonic acid of commerce was made. 
Longstreet replied: “By burning diamonds in oxygen gas.” 
“Yes,” said Professor Kendrick, “that will do it; but don't 
you think it would be a little expensive?”* Don’t you 
think,” I said to Whiting, “that this ruse of McClellan’s 
is a little expensive?” The old West Point yarn had a 
very quieting effect upon his apprehensions. 

*The professor would never contradict any one. The following 
is a specimen of his style of questioning. X. Y. Z. (whose name is 
now a household word) was on examination. Professor K.: “What is 
its color?” X. Y. Z.: “White, sir.” Professor K.: “Yes, you mean a kind 
of grayish white. In fact you might call it coal-black, might you 
not?” X. Y. Z.: “Yes, sir, that’s it.”— D. H. H. 

******* 


— 586 — 



X 


On the Confederate Right at Gaines’s Mill* 

By E. M. Law, 

Ma-or-General f U.S.A. 


By 5 o'clock on the 27th of June the battle of 
Gaines’s Mill was in full progress all along the line. Long- 
street’s and A. P. Hill’s men were attacking in a most de¬ 
termined manner, but were met with a courage as obstinate 
as their own by the Federals who held the works. After 
each bloody repulse the Confederates only waited long 
enough to re-form their shattered lines or to bring up their 
supports, when they would again return to the assault. 
Besides the terrific fire in front, a battery of heavy guns on 
the south side of the Chickahominy was in full play upon 
their right flank. There was no opportunity for maneuver¬ 
ing or flank attacks, as was the case with D. H. Hill on our 
extreme left. The enemy was directly in front, and he could 
only be reached in that direction. If he could not be driven 
out before night, it would be equivalent to a Confederate 
disaster, and would involve the failure of General Lee’s 
whole plan for the relief of Richmond. It was a critical 
moment for the Confederates, as victory, which involved 
the relief or the loss of their capital, hung wavering in the 
balance. Night seemed about to close the account against 
them, as the sun was now setting upon their gallant, but 
so far fruitless efforts. 

While matters were in this condition, Whiting’s divi¬ 
sion, after crossing with much difficulty the wooded and 
marshy ground below Gaines’s Mill, arrived in rear of that 
portion of the line held by the remnants of A. P. Hill’s 
division. When Whiting advanced to the attack a thin and 
irregular line of General Hill’s troops were keeping up the 
fight, but, already badly cut up, could effect nothing, and 

*This description of the fighting in front of MorelPs line is from 
an extended paper on “The Fight for Richmond in 1862, n which 
appeared in “The Southern Bivouac ” for April, 1887.— Editors. 

— 587 — 




Battles and Leaders of the Civil War 


were gradually wasting away under the heavy fire from the 
Federal lines. From the center of the division to the Chick- 
ahominy swamp on the right the ground was open; on the 
left were thick woods. The right brigade (Law’s) advanced 
in the open ground, the left (Hood’s) through the woods. 

As we moved forward to the firing we could see the 
straggling Confederate line laying behind a gentle ridge 
that ran across the field parallel to the Federal position. 
We passed one Confederate battery in the edge of the field 
badly cut to pieces and silent. Indeed there was no Con¬ 
federate artillery then in action on that part of the field. 
The Federal batteries in front were in full play. The fringe 
of woods along the Federal line was shrouded in smoke, 
and seemed fairly to vomit forth a leaden and iron hail. 
General Whiting rode along his line and ordered that there 
should be no halt when we reached the slight crest occupied 
by the few Confederate troops in our front, but that the 
charge should begin at that point in double-quick time, with 
trailed arms and without firing. Had these orders not been 
strictly obeyed the assault would have been a failure. No 
troops could have stood long under the withering storm of 
lead and iron that beat into their faces as they became 
fully exposed to view from the Federal lines. As it was, 
in the very few moments it took them to pass over the slope 
and down the hill to the ravine, a thousand men were killed 
or wounded. 

Law’s brigade advanced to the attack in two lines, the 
11th Mississippi regiment (Colonel Liddell) and the 4th 
Alabama (Lieutenant-Colonel McLemore) forming the first 
line, and the 2d Mississippi (Colonel Stone) and the 6th 
North Carolina (Colonel Avery) the second. Hood had a 
similar formation on our left, but just as we came under 
fire, and before reaching the slope where the charge began, 
General Hood passed rapidly across my rear at the head of 
the 4th Texas regiment, closely followed by the 18th Georgia, 
both of his brigade. They came up on my right, extending 
our line in that direction. The 1st and 5th Texas regi¬ 
ments and the Hampton Legion of the same brigade re¬ 
mained on the left in the woods. Passing over the scatter- 


— 588 — 


Confederate Right at Gaines's Mill 

ing line of Confederates on the ridge in front, the whole 
division “broke into a trot” down the slope toward the Fed¬ 
eral works. Men fell like leaves in an autumn wind, the 
Federal artillery tore gaps in the ranks at every step, the 
ground in rear of the advancing column was strewn thickly 
with the dead and wounded; not a gun was fired in reply; 
there was no confusion, and not a step faltered as the two 
gray lines swept silently and swiftly on; the pace became 
more rapid every moment; when the men were within thirty 
yards of the ravine, and could see the desperate nature of 
the work in hand, a wild yell answered the roar of Federal 
musketry, and they rushed for the works. The Confed¬ 
erates were within ten paces of them when the Federals 
in the front line broke cover, and, leaving their log breast¬ 
works, swarmed up the hill in their rear, carrying away 
their second line with them in their rout. Then we had out* 
“innings.” As the blue mass surged up the hill in our front, 
the Confederate fire was poured into it with terrific effect. 
The target was a large one, the range short, and scarcely 
a shot fired into that living mass could fail of its errand. 
The debt of blood contracted but a few moments before was 
paid, and with interest. 

Firing as they advanced, the Confederates leaped into 
the ravine, climbed out on the other side, and over the lines 
of breastworks, reaching the crest of the hill beyond with 
such rapidity as to capture all of the Federal artillery 
(fourteen pieces) at that point. We had now reached the 
high plateau in rear of the center of General Porter’s posi¬ 
tion, his line having been completely cut in two, and thus 
rendered no longer tenable. From the flanks of the great 
gap where Whiting’s division had torn through, the Federal 
lines gave way in both directions. R. H. Anderson’s bri¬ 
gade, till then in reserve, passed through on the right, and 
led the way for Longstreet’s division, while on the left the 
roll of musketry receded toward the Chickahominy, and the 
cheering of the victorious Confederates announced that 
Jackson, Ewell, and D. H. Hill were sweeping that part of 
the field. 


— 589 — 


Battles and Leaders of the Civil War 


The battle was won; the Federal infantry was in full 
flight toward the swamps of the Chickahominy and the 
bridges in their rear, leaving a large portion of their ar¬ 
tillery in the hands of the Confederates. But the fighting 
was not all over. Several Federal batteries, posted in re¬ 
serve on the further side of the plateau which the Con¬ 
federates had gained, opened a rapid but rather ineffective 
fire, with the view of covering the retreat of their infantry. 
The 4th Texas and 18th Georgia regiments of Hood’s, and 
the 11th Mississippi and 4th Alabama of Law’s brigade, 
continued their advance across the plateau directly upon 
these batteries. And here occurred an incident of the battle 
which has been a subject of much acrimonious dispute 
among Federal officers, especially Generals Porter, and 
Philip St. George Cooke, the latter commanding the cavalry 
on Porter’s extreme left next to the Chickahominy. In 
order to protect the guns upon which Law and Hood were 
advancing, General Cooke withdrew a portion of his com¬ 
mand from the low grounds near the river and ordered a 
charge by a battalion of the 5th United States Cavalry upon 
the advancing Confederates. 

Our line was ragged and irregular, as every soldier 
knows will be the case after such fighting as it had passed 
through, and the oportunity seemed favorable to check its 
farther advance and save the batteries from capture. The 
charge was directed upon the center of the Confederate 
line, which was halted and partly re-formed to receive it. 
Though delivered in most gallant style, it was repulsed with 
heavy loss, including all but one of the officers who entered 
it. This episode consumed scarcely more time than it takes 
to write it. In the meantime, those of the cavalry who es¬ 
caped retreated through the artillery they were attempting 
to save, and in the confusion of the retreat most of the 
guns were captured. 

General Porter represents this charge as having been 
made on his extreme left (Longstreet’s right), and beyond 
the stream along which his infantry line was originally 
formed, and severely censures General Cooke, charging him 
with throwing the artillery into confusion by retreating 


— 590 — 


Confederate Right at Gaines's Mill 

through it and preventing it from checking the Confederate 
advance. His statement as to the locality of the cavalry 
attack and his charges against General Cooke cannot be 
reconciled; for, had Cooke’s cavalry attacked where Gen¬ 
eral Porter says it did, it would have been utterly impossible 
for its line of retreat to have passed anywhere near the 
position of the batteries, and its flight after the repulse 
could have had no effect whatever upon the loss of the guns. 
Hood’s and Law’s line of advance was directly across the 
plateau from the left center of Porter’s original line, where 
they had broken in, passing south of and near the Watts 
house on the plateau; and as the cavalry charge was made 
upon them, and they captured the guns, it follows that the 
charge could only have been made there, and not half a mile 
nearer the Chickahominy, where it would have been object¬ 
less, and indeed ridiculous. I speak positively on this point, 
as I was an eyewitness of the whole affair, commanded the 
troops who received the charge, and was engaged in the 
capture of the guns. Whatever may be said to the contrary, 
it is certain that the batteries, having no infantry supports, 
did not check our advance for a moment. The diversion 
by the cavalry, on the other hand, did delay their capture 
for the short period it took to repulse it, and gave time for 
the artillerists to save some of their guns. 

While these events were taking place, on the plateau 
immediately upon the left of the gap in the Federal line 
through which we had passed, now some distance in our 
rear. As the front was clear, my brigade was halted and 
re-formed. This had scarcely been done when a Confed¬ 
erate cheer rose from the woods in the direction of the 
firing, and a large body of Federals rushed out upon the 
plateau on our left and rear, retreating rapidly and in great 
confusion. Part of them passed to our left, while the 
greater portion were running across our rear in the attempt 
to escape to the Chickahominy swamp in that direction. My 
rear rank was faced about, and they were called on to 
surrender. No attention was paid to the first summons, and 
a few shots were fired into our ranks. A volley from our 
rear rank, which now faced them, induced them to listen 


— 591 — 


Battles and Leaders of the Civil War 


to reason, and they at once threw down their arms in token 
of surrender.* The 1st and 5th Texas regiments and the 
Hampton Legion (Hood’s brigade) which it will be remem¬ 
bered were on the left of Law’s brigade in the original line 
of attack, had not driven the Federal line in their front at 
the same time with the rest of the division; but they had 
now forced it, and were closely following the fugitives. 
The prisoners, about 800 in number, were turned over to 
the 5th Texas regiment, which was close on their heels. 


*These troops were the 11th Pennsylvania Reserves, of McCall’s- 
division, and the 4th New Jersey, Slocum’s division. The 11th lost 
50 killed, and 634, including wounded, were made prisoners. 

Colonel J. H. Simpson, of the 4th New Jersey, explains the 
circumstances of the capture in a letter written from the military 
prison, Richmond, Va., July 8th, 1862, in which he says: 

“To relieve my friends of all apprehension about my safety, 1 
write to say that I am now here a prisoner of war, with a large portion 
of my regiment, and in good health and spirits. My regiment was 
posted in the wood to sustain the center in the battle near Gaines’s 
Mill, on Friday, June 27th, and nobly did it hold its ground till about 
an hour after the right and left wings of the army had fallen back. 
Mine (4th New Jersey) and Colonel Gallagher’s 11th Pennsylvania 
Reserve were the last to leave the front, and only did so when we 
found that the rest of the army had given way, and we were literally 
surrounded by the infantry and batteries of the Confederate forces. 

“Being in the woods, and trusting to our superior officers to in¬ 
form us when to retreat, and not being able to see on account of 
the woods what was going on toward our right and left, we continued 
fighting probably an hour after every other regiment had left the 
ground. The consequence was inevitable. We were surrounded by 
ten times our number, and though we could have fought till every 
man of us was slain, yet humanity, and, as I think, wisdom, dic¬ 
tated that we should at last yield. . . . Our casualties, so far as 
known, were: killed, 38; wounded, 111; total, 149,—besides 75 missing, 
of whom a number probably was killed and wounded. Considering 
the great jeopardy in which we were, I look upon it as a great mercy 
we all were not shot down.”— Editors. 

* * * * Hi * He 


— 592 — 



XI 


The Cause of a Silent Battle* 

By Professor John B. DePauw, 
University, Ind. 


Reference has been made to the supposed effect of the 
wind in preventing, as in the case of the heavy cannon¬ 
ading between the Merrimac and Congress, the transfer¬ 
ence of sound waves a distance of not over three and one- 
half miles over water; and at another time during the bom¬ 
bardments of the Confederate works at Port Royal, a dis¬ 
tance of not more than two miles. “The day was pleasant,” 
says the writer, “and the wind did not appear unusually 
strong.” Yet “people living in St. Augustine, Florida, told 
me afterward that the Port Royal cannonade was heard at 
that place, 150 miles from the fight.”f 


*For references to the phenomena of irregular transmission of 
sound at the battles on the Chickahominy, see the articles of Gen¬ 
erals Joseph E. Johnston, Gustavus W. Smith, and Wm. B. Franklin, 
pp. 223, 244, and 368, respectively. In Vol. I., p. 713, General R. E. 
Colston, mentions the interesting fact about the engagement between 
the Congress and Merrimac, at the mouth of the James River, March 
8, 1862. 

fThe Port Royal incident was related in a communication to “The 
Century” magazine by Mr. S. H. Prescott, of Concord, N. H., in part 
as follows: “At the bombardment of the Confederate works at Port 
Royal, South Carolina, in November, 1861, the transport my regiment 
was on lay near enough inshore to give us a fine view of the whole 
battle; but only in some temporary lull of the wind could we hear 
the faintest sound of firing. The day was a pleasant one, and the 
wind did not appear to be unusually strong; but I noticed then and 
afterward that a breeze on the coast down that way was very differ¬ 
ent from the erratic gusts and flaws I had been used to in the New 
England States, the whole atmosphere seeming to move in a body, 
giving sound no chance to travel against it, but carrying it immense 
distances to the leeward. People living at St. Augustine, Florida, 
told me afterward that the Port Royal cannonade was heard at that 
place, 150 miles from where the fight took place. A portion of the 
siege batteries at Morris Island, South Carolina, were not more than 
two miles from our camp, but at times the firing from them and the 
enemy’s replies could only be heard very faintly even at that short 
distance, while at others, when the wind blew from the opposite 
direction, the sounds were as sharp and distinct as if the battle were 
taking place within a few yards of us.” 


— 593 — 




Battles and Leaders of the Civil War 


It occurs to me that the effect of the wind is greatly 
exaggerated in these instances. How an ordinary breeze 
could “carry sounds of the conflict away from people stand¬ 
ing within plain sight of it” and yet carry the same sound 
150 miles in the opposite direction, is rather too strongly 
opposed to scientific fact to remain on record undisputed. 

In all of these cases, is it not probable that the varying 
density of the air had much more to do with this strange 
acoustic opacity than the wind ? 

These statements call to mind the prevalent belief that 
fog, snow, hail, and rain, indeed, any condition of the at¬ 
mosphere that render it optically opaque, render it also 
acoustically opaque; which, up to the time of Mr. Tyndall's 
experiments in the English Channel, off Dover, had scarcely 
been questioned. His tests made in 1873-74 proved con¬ 
clusively, as is now well known, that on clear days the air 
may be composed of differently heated masses, saturated 
in different degrees with aqueous vapors, which produce ex¬ 
actly the deadening effects described above. 

I submit as a case in point a similar effect, and its ex¬ 
planation as furnished by Mr. R. G. H. Kean to Professor 
Tyndall, and considered by the latter of sufficient value to 
find a place in his published works: 

“On the afternoon of June 27th, 1862, I rode, in company with Gen¬ 
eral G. W. Randolph, then Secretary of War of the Confederate 
States, to Price’s house, about nine miles from Richmond. The even¬ 
ing before General Lee had begun his attack on McClellan’s army, 
by crossing the Chickahominy about four miles above Price’s and 
driving in McClellan’s right wing. 

“The battle of Gaines’s Mill was fought the afternoon to which 
I refer. The valley of the Chickahominy is about one and a half 
miles wide from hill-top to hill-top. Price’s is on one hill-top, that near¬ 
est to Richmond; Gaines’s farm, just opposite, is on the other, reach¬ 
ing back in a plateau to Cold Harbor. 

“Looking across the valley, I saw a good deal of the battle, Lee’s 
right resting in the valley,; the Federal left wing the same. My line 
of vision was nearly in the line of the lines of battle. I saw the 
advance of the Confederates, their repulse two or three times, and 
in the gray of the evening the final retreat of the Federal forces. 

I distinctly saw the musket-fire of both sides, the smoke, individual 
discharges, the flash of the guns. I saw batteries of artillery on 
both sides come into action and fire rapidly. Several field-batteries 
on each side were plainly in sight. Many more were hid by the 
timber which bounded the range of vision. 

“Yet looking for nearly two hours, from 5 to 7 P.M. on 
a midsummer afternoon, at a battle in which at least 50,000 men were 


— 594 — 


The Cause of a Silent Battle 


actually engaged, and doubtless at least 100 pieces of field-artillery,, 
through an atmosphere optically as limpid as possible, not a single 
sound of the battle was audible to General Randolph and myself* * * * 
I remarked it to him at the time as astonishing. 

“Between me and the battle was the deep, broad valley of the 
Chickahominy, partly a swamp shaded from the declining sun by the 
hills and forest in the west (my side). Part of the valley on each 
side of the swamp was cleared: some in cultivation, some not. Here 
were conditions capable of providing several belts of air, varying in 
the amount of watery vapor (and probably in temperature), arranged 
like laminae at right angles to the acoustic waves as they came from 
the battlefield to me.”* 


* General E. M. Law, of Lee’s army, in the “Southern Bivouac ” 
for May, 1887, speaks as follows of the “silent battle” of Gaines’s. 

Mill: “To the troops stationed near the river, on the Richmond side, 
the action at Gaines’s Mill was plainly visible, that part of it at least, 
which took place in the open ground. I have been told by an eye¬ 
witness that from Price’s house, on the opposite side, he could dis¬ 
tinctly see the Confederate lines advancing to the attack through the 
open ground beyond the Chickahominy swamp, and could distinguish 
the direction of the lines of battle by the volume of smoke arising 
from the woods farther to the Confederate center and left. But it 
was all like a pantomine; not a sound could be heard, neither the 
tremendous roar of the musketry nor even the reports of the artillery. 
As they saw our assaulting lines recoil from the onset, as they were 

several times compelled to do early in the fight, the anxiety of our 

friends ‘over the river’ to help was intense, but the enemy was in their 
front also, and their time for action would soon come.— Editors. 

v ***** * 


— 595 — 



XII 


Rear-Guard Fighting During the Change of Base 

By William B. Franklin, 

, Major-General , U.S.A. 


The positions of the troops holding the Union line on 
the south side of the Chickahominy on the 26th of June, 
1862 (the day before the battle of Gaines’s Mill), were the 
following: General W. F. Smith’s division of my corps, the 
Sixth, held the right of the line, its right resting on the 
hill overlooking the Chickahominy (two miles north of Fair 
Oaks Station), and my other division, General Slocum’s, 
was next on the left. Going toward the left, General Sum¬ 
ner’s corps came next, then General Heintzelman’s, and 
then, on the extreme left, reaching to White Oak Swamp, 
General Keyes’s corps.* On the 26th an epaulement was 
thrown up by the troops of the Sixth Corps in a wheat-field 
in front of our lines on Golding’s farm, which was ready 
for guns on the morning of the 27th. During the night of 
the 26th five batteries of the Artillery Reserve, under the 
command of Colonel (now General) G. W. Getty, were col¬ 
lected in rear of the epaulement, ready to take position in it 
and commence a heavy artillery fire on ’the enemy’s line 
opposite. (See map, p. 384.) Golding’s is near the Chicka¬ 
hominy on the extreme right of the Union intrenched line. 
Five days’ rations, cold tea in the canteens, etc., etc., had 
been issued, so that everything was ready to follow up the 
projected bombardment, which it was presumed would com¬ 
mence on the morning of the 27th. But on the evening of 


* General Heintzelman’s corps, the 3d, advanced to the positions 
held by its outposts on the 26th, after a sharp engagement along the 
whole line on the 25th, known as Oak Grove, or King’s School House. 
Oak Grove was the first of the Seven Days’ battles. The Union loss 
was 67 killed, 504 wounded, 55 missing. The Confederate reports 
show a total loss of 441. (For the strategy of this movement see 
General McClellan’s article, page 179.) The ground secured by this 
action varied in front of the different brigades, and was from a quar¬ 
ter of a mile to one mile in advance of the line that had been held by 
the Third Corps since the battle of Seven Pines.— Editors. 


— 596 — 




Rear-Guard Fighting During Change of Base 

the 26th the fight at Beaver Dam Creek occurred, and Gen¬ 
eral McClellan called at my headquarters on his way to 
confer with General Porter as to his operations of the next 
day. I was then absent at General Slocum’s headquarters, 
conferring with him in regard to the attack we were ex¬ 
pecting to make, and therefore missed General McClellan, 
so that I received no word from him until the next morning. 

About daylight on the 27th I received orders to send 
General Slocum’s division across the Chickahominy to re¬ 
port to General Porter. This order was countermanded a 
short time after the division had started by way of Wood¬ 
bury’s Bridge, and it returned to its station. About 10:30 
o’clock in the morning the enemy opened on our artillery 
with theirs, doubtless unaware of the five batteries of re¬ 
serve artillery mentioned above. The fire was kept up for 
an hour, and theirs slackened, so did ours, until both sides 
ceased firing. Two hours before the bombardment began 

1 received orders not to do anything to bring on a general 
engagement, and after the cessation of the artillery fire 
everything was quiet in our front for several hours. At 

2 o’clock I was ordered again to send General Slocum’s divi¬ 
sion to report to General Porter. The division went, be¬ 
came engaged at once in the battle of Gaines’s Mill, where 
it lost very heavily, and did not return to its station until 
after nightfall. 

During the afternoon several of the heavy guns with us 
were used with effect on columns of the enemy on the north 
side of the Chickahominy moving against General Porter, 
causing them to fall back and seek some other route of 
attack. The range was about two and one-half miles. About 
sundown General Hancock’s brigade, which held the ex¬ 
treme right of General Smith’s line, was attacked furiously 
by the enemy. It was nearly dark when the fight began, 
and the combatants were not fifty yards apart; but Gen¬ 
eral Hancock was, as usual, equal to the occasion, and the 
enemy was driven back. This fight was preceded by a se¬ 
vere artillery fire from the enemy, which, however, was 
soon silenced. This day’s operations of Smith’s division 


— 597 — 


Battles and Leaders of the Civil War 

were known as “The Action at Golding's (or Garnett's) 
Farm.” 

The position held by General Smith's division was about 
one and one-half miles from the Gaines’s Mill field; and, 
possibly because the interval was filled with dense timber, 
not a gun of the Gaines's Mill battle was heard by the 
troops in our vicinity. 

The next morning, the 28th of June, General Smith's 
division was moved to the rear and left of the clearing of 
Golding’s farm; General Slocum's division remaining to 
the rear and right of Smith, where it had taken position the 
night before. During this retrograde movement the ene¬ 
my kept up a lively cannonade from the left, front, and 
right, but did remarkably little harm. A sharp infantry 
attack, however, was made upon the 49th Pennsylvania regi¬ 
ment, Colonel Irwin, and the 33d New York regiment, Col¬ 
onel Taylor, who were the last to evacuate the position. 
The time of the attack was about the middle of the after¬ 
noon, and the attacking force was the 7th and 8th Georgia 
regiments. It was handsomely repulsed, and Colonels 
Lamar and Towers of the Georgia regiments with 50 officers 
and men were taken prisoners, and more than 100 were 
killed and wounded. (This action of the 28th, also 
that of the 27th, see p. 367,—is known as Golding’s and 
Garnett's Farms.)* That evening the corps commanders 
were assembled at General McClellan’s headquarters at the 
Trent House. The commanding general announced to us 
his purpose to begin a movement to the James River on the 
next day, and each corps commander was furnished with a 
map on which were laid down the positions that the respec¬ 
tive corps were to hold until the next evening, when all the 
troops remaining near their present positions were to move 
across the White Oak Swamp en route for the James. The 
assembly broke up about 2 o'clock in the morning, each 
corps commander having received all the information neces- 


*Also on the 28th a detachment of Cobb’s Georgia Legion (cav¬ 
alry) had a skirmish at Dispatch Station with the pickets of the 8th 
Illinois Cavalry.— Editors. 


— 598 - 



Rear-Guard Fighting During Change of Base 

sary to determine his action for the 28th should nothing 
unforeseen occur. 

The relative position of the Sixth Corps was not 
changed. Smith’s division was still to have its right on 
the Chickahominy, extending down the river, where it was 
to touch the left of McCall’s division (that crossed the 
Chickahominy during the night of the 27th), which, how¬ 
ever, played no part in holding the line on June 29th, as it 
crossed White Oak Swamp early in the day. 

General Slocum’s division was to be at Savage’s Sta¬ 
tion in reserve. Then came Sumner’s corps and Heintzel- 
man’s. Keyes’s corps was to cross the White Oak Swamp 
at once. Porter’s corps had already crossed the swamp, 
and was under orders to press forward to a position on the 
James River. 

This new line was about two miles nearer the White 
Oak Bridge than the intrenched line in front of Fair Oaks 
and Golding’s farm (described above), and was nearly paral¬ 
lel. It was much shorter than the old line, its left reach¬ 
ing nearly to the swamp, and its right to the brink of the 
Chickahominy hills. This second line was about three- 
quarters of a mile in front of Savage’s Station on the York 
River Railroad, which had been the depot for unloading and 
storing supplies for the troops that held the old line, and 
where had been gathered in tents 2500 sick and wounded, 
most of the latter from Gaines’s Mill. 

General Slocum’s and General Smith’s divisions both 
moved to their new positions before daylight of Sunday, 
the 29th of June—the day of the fighting at Savage’s Sta¬ 
tion. As General Slocum’s division had suffered so severely 
in the battle of Gaines’s Mill, and had not yet recovered 
from its exhaustion, General McClellan ordered it to cross 
White Oak Swamp at once, and it accordingly left its posi¬ 
tion. Through some inadvertence I was not informed of 
this change of plan; so when I joined General Smith early 
in the morning, I found him in his proper position, but with 
an interval of more than a mile between him and the troops 
on the left. It was soon learned, by sending out cavalry, 
that General Sumner had not moved from the position that 


— 599 — 


Battles and Leaders of the Civil War 


he held the day before, and was, at the very time we learned 
this fact, engaged with the enemy at Allen’s farm.* It was 
also apparent that straggling parties of the enemy were in 
front of the interval already mentioned. These circum¬ 
stances showed an alarming state of things, and General 
Smith and I rode over to Savage’s Station, the vicinity of 
which offered a good fighting position, and advising him to 
bring his corps to that place. He answered the note at 
once, telling me that he was then engaged with the enemy, 
and that as soon as things were quiet he would join me 
with his corps. Soon after I had sent to General Sumner 
General Heintzelman rode up, and I told him what I had 
done. He approved, and said that he would also join us at 
the station with his corps. He afterward changed his 
mind, however, and instead of halting in the wood in front of 
the station, as we naturally supposed he would, he marched 
off toward White Oak Bridge, hidden from us by the woods, 
and crossed the swamp, so that we saw him no more that 
day, supposing, nevertheless, until we were attacked by 
the enemy, that his troops were in position on a part of 
our front.f General Smith’s division arrived at the sta¬ 
tion about noon or shortly after, and took position on the 
left in a wood. General Sumner’s corps, consisting of Gen¬ 
eral John Sedgwick’s and General Israel B. Kichardson’s 
divisions, arrived about 2 P. M. 

There was a cleared field of several acres on the north 
side of the railroad, filled with hospital tents laid out in 
rows, each tent containing fifteen or twenty men on com- 

* Sumner’s corps, retiring, left the works at Fair Oaks at daylight 
and halted for bivouac on Allen’s farm, between the Williamsburg 
road and the railroad. The Confederates of Magruder’s command 
opened on the troops at 9 A. m. with musketry and artillery, and 
a spirited fight was kept until 11 o’clock. This engagement is known 
also as the Peach Orchard.— Editors. 

fGeneral Heintzelman in his report says: “The whole open space 
near Savage’s was crowded with troops—more than I supposed could 
be brought into action judiciously.” He then states that an aide of 
the commanding general was with him to point out the road for his 
crossing. 

“I ordered the whole of my corps to take this road, with the 
exception of Osborn’s and Bramhall’s batteries.” These were turned 
over to General Smith’s division.— W. B. F. 


- 600 — 



Rear-Guard Fighting During Change of Base 

fortable, clean beds, with the necessary surgeons and at¬ 
tendants. South of the railroad, and between it and the 
Williamsburg road, was another clearing east of which was 
a ravine running obliquely across the railroad, its edges 
skirted by trees, and the ravine itself filled with under¬ 
growth. This clearing was nearly square, and was about 
one-third or one-half mile in length and breadth. In front 
of the ravine were some small hills which made good shel¬ 
ter for the troops; and west of the clearing was timber, 
where we supposed General Heintzelman’s troops to be; 
on the left of the Williamsburg road was timber also, and 
General Smith’s division was in position therein. Sum¬ 
ner’s corps took position in the clearing between the Wil¬ 
liamsburg road and the railroad. Burns’s brigade of Sedg¬ 
wick’s division was in front, Sedgwick’s other two brigades 
being just behind. The three brigades of Richardson’s 
division, Meagher having joined them, were farther to the 
rear, but more to the right. Three batteries of field artil¬ 
lery, Hazzard’s, Pettit’s, and Osborn’s, were posted toward 
the left, near the front of the ravine. 

The day was hot and sultry and wore away slowly as 
we waited either to be attacked or at nightfall to start for 
White Oak Bridge. Large quantities of all kinds of quar¬ 
termasters’ and other stores, partly in cars, were burning 
at the station, and at intervals shells would burst as the 
fire reached them, jarring the nerves of the tired and ex¬ 
pectant men. 

Shortly before 4 o’clock General Sedgwick and I rode 
over to the hospital to visit some of our wounded friends, 
whose condition was found to be as comfortable as could be 
expected under the circumstances. From the hospital we 
started to make a call upon General Heintzelman, whose 
supposed position has already been described. As we rode 
over the open field we saw a group of men come out of a 
wood on the north of the railroad, but some distance from 
the place where we expected to find Heintzelman. I thought 
they were our men, but General Sedgwick looked at them 
more closely, stopped, and exclaimed: “Why, those men 
are rebels!” We turned back in as dignified a manner as 


— 601 — 


Battles and Leaders of the Civil War 


the circumstances would permit. But we had hardly 
started when they opened on us with a field-piece, keeping 
up a lively and uncomfortable fire. A second piece soon 
joined the first and they kept up the fire until they were 
silenced by our batteries. This ludicrous incident pre¬ 
vented what might have been a disastrous surprise for our 
whole force. A few minutes afterward, before we had 
reached our troops, the signal-officers reported the approach 
of a force of infantry and a railroad car upon which was a 
rifled cannon, from the direction of Richmond. This ar¬ 
tillery car halted in a cut of the railroad a little distance 
in front of the station, and so about 5 P.M. the fight was 
begun. I immediately sought General Sumner, to inform 
him of the situation and get instructions. He had been 
fighting at the head of his corps during the morning (at 
the peach orchard), and, being much exhausted, was asleep 
when I reached his headquarters. I awoke him, and in a 
short time he had ordered two regiments of General Burns's 
brigade to attack at a point in the timber in front near the 
Williamsburg road, where the enemy’s infantry had by this 
time appeared. These regiments entered the wood, and be¬ 
fore they became engaged were joined by the 1st Minnesota 
Regiment. General Burns extended his line to the vicin¬ 
ity of the railroad, so that its center was necessarily weak. 
During this movement the enemy’s artillery played with 
effect upon our troops but was answered and finally silenced 
by the three batteries on our side already mentioned. 

The enemy made the infantry attack with great fury, 
and pierced the center of General Burns’s line. General- 
Burns was wounded, but remained on the field. At this 
time General Sumner placed himself in front of two regi¬ 
ments and waved his hat. With a cheer they moved for¬ 
ward at double time to the endangered place in General 
Burns’s line, enabling him to rectify it and drive the enemy 
from his front. Several other regiments joined General 
Burns’s line at about the same time, but the fight was over 
not long after the charge, and the enemy was driven from 
the wood. A Confederate battery placed near the Williams- 


— 602 — 


Rear-Guard Fighting During Change of Base 

burg road was compelled to withdraw in haste. On the left 
General Brooke’s brigade of General Smith’s division, Sixth 
Corps, moved forward, with its right on the Williamsburg 
road, against a force of the enemy that was moving south 
of that road in the wood skirting the open field. It steadily 
drove back the enemy, meeting with heavy loss, particularly 
in the 5th Vermont Regiment. Darkness ended the fight. 
General Brooks was wounded in the leg, but did not leave 
the field. Hancock’s and Davidson’s brigades (Smith’s di¬ 
vision) were posted some distance to the rear to repel an 
anticipated attack from the right and rear, but were not 
engaged. When the fight was over, our troops held the 
contested ground. Their behavior throughout the fight 
had been admirable.* 

The Confederate force engaged in this fight was com¬ 
manded by General J. B. Magruder, and consisted of 
Semmes’s and Kershaw’s brigades, Kemper’s battery and 
two regiments of Barksdale’s brigade opposite our left. 
Cobb’s division and the guns of Hart’s battery were north 
of the railroad to the right of our line. Cobb’s infantry 
was not engaged. 

About a half hour after the fight was ended, I sug¬ 
gested to General Sumner that if he had no objection I 
would carry out the commanding general’s orders, so far as 
I was concerned, and cross the White Oak Swamp with 
General Smith’s division. We were then on the field. His 
answer was, “No, General, you shall not go, nor will I go— 
I never leave a victorious field. Why! if I had twenty 
thousand more men, I would crush this rebellion.” I then 
told him that I would show him a dispatch from General 
McClellan directing that all of the troops should cross dur¬ 
ing that night. With some difficulty a candle was found 
and lighted, and the general read the dispatch. After read- 

*General E. M. Law says in the “Southern Bivouac” for May, 
1887: “The battle of Savage’s Station, although a ‘drawn fight’ as 
far as the possession of the field was concerned, was practically a 
victory for the Federals. Though their loss was three times as great 
as that of the Confederates, they accomplished the main purpose of 
the battle, which was to gain time for the passage of trains, artillery, 
and troops across White Oak Swamp.” 


— 603 — 



Battles and Leaders of the Civil War 

ing it he exclaimed, with some excitement, “General McClel¬ 
lan did not know the circumstances when he wrote that 
note. He did not know that we would fight a battle and 
gain a victory.” I was at my wit’s end. I knew that Gen¬ 
eral McClellan’s arrangements did anticipate a fight ex¬ 
actly like that just over, and that unless the whole force 
was on the other side of the swamp by the next morning, 
his movement might be seriously delayed. Moreover, I be¬ 
lieved that if we stayed where we were, the enemy would 
be upon us in force enough to defeat us utterly on the next 
morning, endangering the remainder of the army. Yet 
by all military usage I was under General Sumner’s orders. 
At this juncture General Smith had asked me to introduce 
Lieutenant Mathew Berry, his aide-de-camp, to General 
Sumner. After the introduction, Lieutenant Berry told 
General Sumner that he had seen General McClellan only a 
short time before, that he knew there had been a fight, 
and fully expected that all of the troops would cross the 
swamp that night. General Sumner was convinced by this 
statement, and with great reluctance permitted me to con¬ 
tinue the movement toward the swamp, he following imme¬ 
diately after. 

General Smith’s division crossed the White Oak Bridge 
about 3 o’clock on the morning of June 30th, and went into 
position on the left of the road leading from the bridge 
toward the James River. The batteries of the division 
were already there in position. It faced about so that its 
left rested upon the road, the division bearing southward 
from the road. At the same time I reported to McClellan 
at his headquarters. 

The rear of Sumner’s corps, Richardson’s division, 
crossed the bridge at 10 o’clock, in the morning, destroyed 
it, and took position some distance on Smith’s left, nearly 
in line with him. Both divisions guarded the crossing. 

After the fight at Savage’s Station was over, Hazzard’s 
battery of Richardson’s division was unhitched, its captain 
not supposing there was to be any further movement that 
night, and the men and horses went to sleep, as usual when 


- 604 - 


Rear-Guard Fighting During Change of Base 

there was opportunity, which was not often in those days. 
The division, as has been told, moved off and by accident 
no notice of the movement was sent to Captain Hazzard. 
On the next morning he heard reveille sounded by drums 
and trumpets from positions that he knew our troops did 
not hold the evening before. Everything in his vicinity 
was quiet. He took in the situation at once. He had been 
left behind, and the enemy might be upon us at any moment. 
He had the battery quietly hitched up, sent the caissons off 
in advance, and, bringing up the rear with two guns ready 
to open on a pursuing force, started off at a walk. When he 
was clear of the field he ordered the battery to trot. He 
arrived without harm at the White Oak Bridge at that 
place just as Richardson was on the point of destroying it. 
He found on the road many stragglers who were coolly 
wandering along with no suspicion that they were behind 
everybody and by his warning was the means of saving 
many soldiers from a Richmond prison. The pluck and 
coolness shown in this exploit of Captain Hazzard were ad¬ 
mirable. He was killed the next day while doing excellent 
work with his battery. 



— 605 — 







Battles and Leaders of the Civil War 


The order in which the Union troops entered the fight is thus 
described by General William W. Burns, in a letter dated Governor’s 
Island, May 10, 1885: 

“The enemy appearing in the woods west of Savage’s Station, 
General Sumner sent me forward to occupy the space between the 
Williamsburg road and the railroad. Thinking that two regiments 
of my brigade would suffice, I led them forward to the fences, at the 
edge of the woods on the west side of the clearing, about five hundred 
yards distant from the ravine on the east side of the clearing. Gen¬ 
eral Sumner had his headquarters east of this wooded ravine and 
could not observe what was occurring on the west side of the open 
field. 

“When I reached the fences I sent skirmishers through the belt 
of trees, and found the enemy advancing on the Williamsburg road 
and on the railroad, where General Lee’s famous railroad monitor 
was slowly approaching. I had to throw back the right company of 
the right regiment, the 72d Pennsylvania, to rake the monitor. Then 
I found my two regiments not enough to extend across between the 
Williamsburg road and the railroad. I sent an aide in haste after 
my other two regiments, informing General Sumner of the situation. 
The 1st Minnesota, of Gorman’s brigade, being most handy, was first 
sent, my two reserve regiments following. While placing the 1st 
Minnesota on the left to extend across the Williamsburg road, the 
battle began. My right flank swept the railroad monitor, which had 
advanced to the edge of the woods, and it ran back. The battle 
moved to my left, and I discovered that our works east of Seven Pines 
had been evacuated by Heintzelman. I threw back the left flank of 
the 1st Minnesota across the Williamsburg road and sent the 69th 
Pennsylvania of my brigade to prolong the left, to prevent the turn¬ 
ing movement of the enemy; at the same time informing General 
Sumner of the conditions in front. He would not believe that Heint¬ 
zelman had withdrawn until I sent my last mounted man, urging and 
demanding re-enforcements. The 71fet Pennsylvania (also called the 
1st California), of my brigade, arriving, I placed it behind the center 
of my line where a gap had been made by extending the 1st Minnesota 
to the left. General Franklin sent General Brooks’ brigade to the 
left of my line to check the turning movement of the enemy, and 
Sumner, when he realized that Heintzelman had withdrawn, sent 
Gorman’s and Dana’s brigades to my support in front. 

“General Sumner formed the 88th New York, of Meagher’s 
brigade, and the 5th New Hampshire, of Caldwell’s brigade, for a 
charge. A mass of men came up in my rear in full yell. I halted 
the crowd and asked for their commander. ‘I am Captain McCartan 
of the 88th New York, sir,’ exclaimed an officer. I got them into line 
(about 250 men), facing up the Williamsburg road, which was raked 
by the grape and canister of the enemy’s batteries. I gave the com¬ 
mand, double quick charge! They went in with a hurrah, and the 
enemy’s battery fell back. General McClellan mistakingly gave the 
credit of that gallant charge to the 69th New York. It seems that 
the 5th New Hampshire halted before the charge which General 
Sumner had put in motion reached me. 

“I was shot in the face with a minie-ball at the time the enemy 
broke through the gap in the center. There we had a hand-to-hand 
encounter, which determined the day in our favor. At nightfall I 
relieved the first line, its ammunition being exhausted, with the 71st 
Pennsylvania, the 15th and 20th Massachusetts, and the 82d New 
York. My report of the Seven Days’ fighting was made at Harri¬ 
son’s Bar in hot July. I was prostrated with my wound, malaria, 


■ 606 — 


Rear-Guard Fighting During Change of Base 


and twenty-eight days of constant strain, and was unable to write 
or to collect my thoughts. The battle of Glendale on the 30th of 
June, the next day after that of Savage’s Station, was saved by my 
brigade, which kept the army from piercing the center of the Army 
of the Potomac; but, like the instance above, history has given the 
credit to ‘General Misunderstanding,’ who, in history, fights most 
battles.” 

Part of Hazzard’s, Pettit’s, and Osborn’s batteries were engaged 
on the Union side. 

The Confederate infantry north of the railroad (Cobb’s, Toomb’s, 
and Anderson’s brigades) did not take an active part in the battle. 
Anderson’s brigade is not shown, its position being outside the nor¬ 
thern bounds of the map. 

The Confederate artillery engaged comprised Kemper’s battery, 
two guns of Hart’s battery, and Lieutenant Barry’s “32-pounder 
rifled gun mounted on a rail-car, and protected from cannon-shot by 
a sloping roof, in front, covered with plates of iron, through which 
a port-hole had been pierced.”— Editors. 

As the result of the dispositions made by the comand- 
ing general of the troops (a part of whose operations has 
just been described) a whole day was gained in getting a 
large part of the army to the James River without serious 
opposition, and into a proper defensive position; the enor¬ 
mous trains and heavy artillery had been given a start of 
twenty-four hours, insuring their safe arrival at the river. 
The rear of the army also had crossed White Oak Swamp, 
leaving the way clear to the James River, while at the same 
time a strong force was ready to protect the movement 
during its completion. 

On the enemy’s side, the slowness of Jackson in getting 
his force to the south side of the Chickahominy (he only 
arrived at Savage’s Station at 3 o’clock on the morning of 
June 30th) had prevented us from being defeated in the 
fight of June 29th. The 28th and 29th had been occupied 
by Jackson in disposing of the dead and wounded at Gaines’s 
Mill and in repairing Grapevine Bridge. 

On the north (the enemy’s) side of White Oak Swamp, 
the road for more than a quarter of a mile approaches the 
White Oak Bridge through low ground, open to artillery fire 
from the south side (see map, p. 384). On the right of 
the enemy, looking to the rear, there were hills covered 
with thick woods approaching the road, forming good cover 
for artillery, and making it possible for a large force to 
gather in the wood unseen from our side. The same range 


— 607 — 


Battles and Leaders of the Civil War 


of hills continues up the stream, and approaches quite near 
it at Brackett’s Ford, about one mile above White Oak 
Bridge. Both of these crossings were passable for artillery, 
but the bridges had been destroyed by our troops in the 
morning, after everything had crossed and before the ap¬ 
pearance of the enemy. 

On our side of the swamp, the ground rises from the 
bridge, and the road passes along the right, or east, of a 
ravine and joins the Long Bridge road about one and a 
quarter miles from the swamp. On the left of the ravine 
was a cleared space about a half a mile long in the direction 
of the swamp and running back about the same distance. 
At the swamp the clearing was fringed with trees and under¬ 
brush, and about half-way up the clearing to the left of 
the ravine were a small farm house and some slight out 
buildings. On the right of the ravine was a similar clear¬ 
ing, extending from the swamp about a furlong back. All 
other ground in the vicinity was covered with timber and 
underbrush. (The troops were disposed as shown on the 
map, p. 470.) 

The cleared space at this time had in it many wagons of 
the train, and Colonel R. 0. Tyler’s 1st Connecticut Heavy 
Artillery, which I ordered to the rear at once. Glad enough 
would I have been to keep this accomplished officer, with 
his gallant regiment and heavy guns, but we both knew that 
he was needed at the James River. At about 10:30 in the 
morning, as near as I can now recollect, I accompanied 
General McClellan to the intersection of the Charles City 
and Quaker roads, about two miles from the White Oak 
Bridge. I found General Slocum’s division posted some¬ 
what in rear of the intersection of those roads, and in front 
of the road leading from Brackett’s Ford. A small portion 
of his infantry and one gun were posted near Brackett’s 
Ford. His division formed the right of the force which 
later in the day fought the battle of Glendale or Frayser’s 
Farm. The small force at Brackett’s Ford defeated an at¬ 
tack at that point, some time during the day. 

At the junction of the Charles City and Quaker roads 
General McClellan had a conference with the corps com- 


— 608 — 


Rear-Guard Fighting During Change of Base 

manders (Sumner, Heintzelman, and Franklin), and when 
it was ended he went toward the James River. A short 
time afterward I received an order directing me to take 
charge of the force guarding the White Oak Bridge, and I 
immediately started back. I had gone but a short distance 
when a bombardment commenced in the direction of the 
bridge, the severity of which I had never heard equaled in 
the field. The wood through which I was riding seemed 
torn to pieces with round shot and exploding shells. But 
the danger was really greater from falling branches than 
from the shot, which did small damage. 

It appears that Jackson, having left Savage’s Station 
early in the morning, arrived at the vicinity of White Oak 
Bridge about noon, without exciting suspicion of his pres¬ 
ence on our part, the whole movement being hidden by the 
woods. Here, masked by the trees, he massed about thirty 
guns, which opened simultaneously on the troops in the 
clearings and on the rear part of the wagon train, which 
had not yet started from the clearing where it had passed 
the night. The troops immediately got under cover of the 
woods, except Caldwell’s brigade (Richardson’s division) 
which was guarding the batteries. It remained in the open 
ground, and lost many men, but the effect of the firing was 
otherwise small, except on the wagon train, which was 
thrown into some confusion, many of the wagons not being 
hitched up. These were at first abandoned by the drivers, 
but nearly all got away during the day. One field piece 
was dismounted. The batteries were, however, soon in 
position to return the enemy’s fire, which they did with such 
effect that many of his guns were silenced. It was here 
that Captain Hazzard, already mentioned, was mortally 
wounded, ending a brilliant career with a glorious death. 
Captain (afterward General) Romeyn B. Ayres, who com¬ 
manded the artillery of Smith’s division, used his guns with 
excellent effect. One of the enemy’s batteries came into 
view near the bridge, but was forced to retire almost im¬ 
mediately. The bombardment lasted with great severity 
for about a half-hour, w T hen it slackened and gradually fell 
off, opening again at intervals during the day, but never 


— 609 — 


Battles and Leaders of the Civil War 


with its original vigor. A cavalry force which was sent 
over by the enemy just after the bombardment had reached 
its height was forced to retire much faster than it advanced. 

The development of our defense of the crossing con¬ 
vinced General Jackson that it would be impossible for him 
to force it. At any rate, he made no attempt during the 
day to cross his infantry, unless sending sharp-shooters 
across to pick off our pickets may be so considered. The 
fight at White Oak Bridge was entirely with artillery, there 
being little musketry firing. 

About 4 o’clock the enemy made a movement to our 
left, threatening Brackett’s Ford, where I knew we were 
very weak. This was met by Dana’s and Colonel Alfred 
Sully’s brigades of Sedgwick’s division, which was sent by 
General Sumner upon information of the danger. There 
was no further movement in that direction after these 
troops appeared; and they were returned to General Sum¬ 
ner about 5 o’clock, in time to do good service at Glendale. 
Toward sundown at the request of General Sumner, Cald¬ 
well’s and Meagher’s brigades of Richardson’s division were 
also sent to reenforce him. 

No other movement was made by General Jackson’s 
force during the day. Our artillery fired at whatever could 
be seen on the other side, and was answered by theirs in 
what seemed a reluctant manner. When the bombardment 
began, the mules belonging to an engineer ponton-train were 
being watered at the swamp. The noise stampeded them, 
and they rushed to the rear, going through one of the regi¬ 
ments of Meagher’s brigade, and disabling more men than 
were hurt in the brigade during the remainder of the day. 
The mules were seen no more, and the ponton-train was 
deserted. Captain (afterward General) M. T. McMahon, 
of my staff, volunteered to burn the train about 5 o’clock. 
It was a plucky thing to do, for the train was under the guns 
of the enemy, who knew its value as well as we did, and 
the presumption was that he would open his guns on it. 
But Captain McMahon got ten volunteers, and the train 
was soon in flames. He found four mules already harnessed, 

— 610 — 


Rear-Guard Fighting During Change of Base 

and brought off in triumph the most valuable wagon with 
this team. 

In the house which has been described in about the 
middle of the clearing lived an old man with a young wife 
and a child about two years old. He came to me about 10 
o’clock and asked if I thought there would be a fight there 
that day. I told him that there certainly would be. He 
then asked when I thought it would begin. I thought in 
about a half hour. “Then,” said he, “I will have to take 
my wife and child to my brother, who lives about half a 
mile down the swamp, and get back before it begins. 

“Yes,” said I, “but why come back at all?” 

“Why,” said he, “if I don’t your men will take all my 
chickens and ducks.” So he departed with his wife and 
child and in a little while returned. General Smith’s head¬ 
quarters were near this house, so it was a fair target for 
the enemy. Several shots went through it, and one of them 
took off the leg of the poor old man, who bled to death in 
a few minutes. He had sacrificed himself for his poultry. 

One of the brigadier-generals of the command during 
a lull in the firing came to my headquarters, leaving his 
brigade to take care of itself. Finding his stay too long, 
I had him sent back to his post, and a short time afterward 
I was informed that he had been carried off the field on 
a stretcher, wounded. I thought it my duty to go to the 
brigade and find how things were going with it, and asked 
General Smith to accompany me. We started out, and al¬ 
most at once the enemy opened on us with great vigor. I 
looked back, and found to my horror that all my own and 
General Smith’s staff were following us, and that a large 
cavalry escort belonging to headquarters was also in the 
procession. The enemy had evidently taken us for a cav¬ 
alry regiment. Getting rid of them all, we finally arrived 
at the right of the brigade, unharmed. Making inquiry 
of a staff-officer about the general, he replied, “Oh, no, sir, 
he is not wounded, he felt unwell and has gone to the wood 
to lie down and will soon be back.” I turned off in great 
disgust to return, when another officer looking as neat and 
clean as if he had just joined the army, stepped up with 


— 611 — 


Battles and Leaders of the Civil War 


the air of a private secretary of some grand official, and, 
touching his hat, said, “Who shall I say called, sir?” Gen¬ 
eral Smith and I did not hear the last of that expedition 
for a long time. 

During the day a staff-officer of General Smith had 
explored a road toward James River about two miles in 
rear of that which the troops at Glendale were to take, and 
found it impracticable. About 10 in the evening, assuming 
that my instructions to hold the crossing until nightfall 
had been obeyed, I sent word to General Heintzelman and 
General Sumner that I should move to the James River by 
that road. General Richardson, with French’s brigade was 
instructed to remain, to deceive the enemy as to our move¬ 
ments by firing field-pieces in the direction of the bridge, 
and then, after an hour, to march. General Henry M. 
Naglee was to follow Smith’s division. These instructions 
were carried out, and the command arrived at the James 
about daylight. The discovery of this road made the con¬ 
centration of the troops at Malvern Hill a completed man¬ 
euver by noon of the 1st of July, and was due to the fertile 
brain of General Smith, who ordered the exploration. 

The military results of the defense of White Oak Bridge 
and the battle of Glendale were: (1) The enemy was re¬ 
pulsed at all points except in the single case of McCall’s 
division at Glendale, which was overpowered by numbers, 
after it had captured three of the enemy’s colors; (2) The 
trains and heavy artillery arrived in safety at the James 
River (except those wagons which were destroyed by the 
bombardment at White Oak Bridge, not exceeding fifty out 
of more than four thousand), the road along which they 
passed not having been molested by the enemy; (3) The 
troops arrived in good time at the river, so that they were 
all in the positions desired by the commanding general, 
to await the attack at Malvern Hill, long before that attack 
was made. 

General Jackson in his report intimates that his whole 
command, consisting of three divisions and D. H. Hill’s 
division of five brigades, were all at White Oak Bridge on 
the 30th of June. He says: “It was soon seen that the 


— 612 — 


Rear-Guard Fighting During Change of Base 

enemy occupied such a position beyond a thick intervening 
wood on the right of the road as enabled him to command 
the crossing. Captain Wooding’s battery was consequently 
recalled.” General Lee says: “Jackson, having been un¬ 
able to force the passage of White Oak Swamp, Longstreet 
and A. P. Hill were without the expected support” at the 
battle of Glendale. It must be evident to any military 
reader that Jackson ought to have known of the existence 
of Brackett’s Ford, only one mile above White Oak Bridge, 
and ought to have discovered the weakness of our defense 
at that point. He had troops enough to have attacked the 
ford and the bridge with the forces at both points exceeding 
ours at the bridge, and the two attacks, to say the least, 
would have embarrassed us exceedingly. Had he made 
two attacks simultaneously the result of the day at Glen¬ 
dale and White Oak Bridge might have been different. There 
may be reasons for his inaction in this matter that I do 
not understand, but as the record now shows, he seems to 
have been ignorant of what General Lee expected of him, 
and badly informed about Brackett’s Ford. When he found 
how strenuous was our defense at the bridge, he should 
have turned his attention to Brackett’s Ford also. A force 
could have been as quietly gathered there as at the bridge; 
a strong infantry movement at the ford would have easily 
overrun our small force there, placing our right at Glendale, 
held by Slocum’s division, in great jeopardy, and turning 
our force at the bridge by getting between it and Glendale. 
In fact, it is likely that we should have been defeated on 
that day had General Jackson done what his great reputa¬ 
tion seems to make it imperative that he should have done. 

A short time after I separated from General McClellan 
(as mentioned above) at the junction of the Charles City 
and Quaker roads, I bade farewell to the Prince de Join- 
ville, who told me that he and his nephews were about to 
leave us and return to Europe. He had always been very 
friendly, and now expressed many good wishes for my fu¬ 
ture. Holding my hand in his, he said, with great earnest¬ 
ness, “General, advise General McClellan to concentrate his 
army at this point, and fight a battle today; if he does, he 


— 613 — 


Battles and Leaders of the Civil War 


will be in Richmond tomorrow.” I was much impressed 
by his manner and by what he said, and from the purely 
military point of view the advice may have been good; but 
it was impracticable for me to adopt the suggestion. General 
McClellan was then well on his way to the James River, and 
I had no right to leave my command. It was impossible 
to concentrate the army there that day early enough to give 
battle, and had it been possible to risk a general engagement 
there, it would have been contrary to General McClellan’s 
views as to his responsibility connected with the safety of 
the army, views which were actuating him in the very move¬ 
ment then taking place. It is likely from what we know 
now that had it been possible to follow the prince’s advice, 
his military forecast might have proved correct. But no 
one at that hour could have predicted the paralysis of 
Jackson’s large force in our rear for the whole of that day, 
nor General Lee’s ignorance of McClellan’s intentions. Had 
a general engagement taken place, and had we been de¬ 
feated, the army would have reached the James River, it 
is true, but instead, of getting there as it did, with its 
morale unharmed, and with slight damage to its men and 
material, it would have been a disorganized mob, and as an 
army would have perished miserably. General McClellan 
believed that the destruction of the army of the Potomac at 
that time would have been ruin to our cause, and his actions, 
for which he alone is responsible, were guided by that belief 
and by the conviction that at any sacrifice the preservation 
of that army, at that time, was paramount to every other 
consideration. 

I cannot finish without a word as to the conduct of 
the men. My experience during the period generally 
known as' “the Seven Days” was with the Sixth and 
Seventh Corps. During the whole time between June 26th 
and July 2d, there was not a night in which the men did 
not march almost continually, nor a day on which there was 
not a fight. I never saw a skulker during the whole time, 
nor heard one insubordinate word. Some men fell by the 
wayside, exhausted and were captured; but their misfor¬ 
tune was due to physical inability to go on. They had no 


— 614 — 


Rear-Guard Fighting During Change of Base 

food but that which was carried in their haversacks, and 
the hot weather soon rendered that uneatable. Sleep was 
out of the question, and the only rest obtained was while 
lying down awaiting an attack, or sheltering themselves 
from shot and shell. No murmur was heard; everything 
was accepted as the work for which they had enlisted. They 
had been soldiers less than a year, yet their conduct could 
not have been more soldierly had they seen ten years’ of 
service. No such material for soldiers was ever in the field 
before, and their behavior in this movement foreshadowed 
their success as veterans at Appomattox. 

* * * * Hs * * 


— 615 — 


XIII 


McClellan’s Change of Base and Malvern Hill 

By Daniel H. Hill, 

Lieutenant-General , C. S. A. 


Five of the six Confederate divisions north of the 
Chickahominy at the close of the battle of Gaines’s Mill 
remained in bivouac all the next day (June 28th), it being 
deemed too hazardous to force the passage of the river. 
Ewell was sent with his division to Dispatch Station on the 
York River Railroad. He found the station and the rail¬ 
road-bridge burnt. J. E. B. Stuart, who followed the re¬ 
treating Federal cavalry to White House on the Pamunkey, 
found ruins of stations and stores all along the line. These 
things proved that General McClellan did not intend to 
retreat by the short line of the York River Railroad; but 
it was possible he might take the Williamsburg road. Gen¬ 
eral Lee, therefore, kept his troops on the north side of 
the river, that he might be ready to move on the Federal 
flank, should that route be attempted. New Bridge was 
repaired on Saturday (the 28th), and our troops were then 
ready to move in either direction. The burnings and ex¬ 
plosions in the Federal camp Saturday afternoon and night 
showed that General McClellan had determined to abandon 
his strong fortifications around Richmond. Ewell, who was 
watching him at Bottom’s Bridge, and the cavalry, holding 
the crossings lower down, both reported that there was no 
attempt at the Williamsburg route. Longstreet and A. P. 
Hill were sent across the river at New Bridge early on 
Sunday morning to move down the Darbytown road to the 
Long Bridge road to intercept the retreat to the James 
River. This movement began before it was known that 
General McClellan had evacuated his stronghold. Lee gave 
here the first illustration of a quality for which he became 
noted—the remarkable discernment of his adversary’s plans 


- 616 — 



McClellan's Change of Base and Malvern Hill 

through the study of his character. McClellan could have 
retreated to Yorktown with as little loss as Johnston sus¬ 
tained on his retreat from it. The roads from Richmond 
to Yorktown lead through a wooded and swamp country 
on which strong rear-guards could have afforded perfect 
protection to a retreating column without bringing on a 
general engagement. General Johnston, on his retreat from 
Yorktown, did fight at Williamsburg, but it was a battle of 
his own choosing, and not forced upon him by the vigor 
of pursuit. Lee had but little idea that McClellan would 
return to Yorktown, judging rightly that the military pride 
of his distinguished opponent would not permit him to 
march back a defeated column to the point from which he 
had started, a few months before, for the capture of the 
Confederate capital, with his splendid army and magnificent 
outfit.* It is proof of Lee’s sagacity that he predicated his 
orders for an advance upon the belief that General McClellan 
was too proud a man to fall back by the same route by 
which the triumphal advance had been made. A great com¬ 
mander must study the mental and moral characteristics 
of the opposing leader, and Lee was especially endowed 
with an aptitude in that direction. At the battle of Salz- 
bach, Montecuculi, the Austrian commander, noticed the 
French troops making a movement so different from the 
cautious style of his famous rival that he exclaimed, “Either 
Turenne is dead or mortally wounded.” So it proved to be; 
the French marshal had been killed by a cannon-ball be¬ 
fore the movement began. 

In pursuance of General Lee’s plan, Huger was direc¬ 
ted (on the 29th) to take the Charles City road to strike 
the retreating column below White Oak Swamp. Holmes 
was to take possession of Malvern Hill and Magruder to 
follow the line of retreat, as soon as the works were aban¬ 
doned. The abandonment became known about sunrise on 


*The capture of Petersburg would have been almost as disastrous 
to the South as the capture of Richmond, and for many days Peters¬ 
burg was at the mercy of the Federal army. There were no troops 
and no fortifications there when McClellan reached the James. Some 
two weeks after the battle of Malvern Hill the first earth-works were 
begun at Petersburg, by my order.— D. H. H. 


— 617 — 



Battles and Leaders of the Civil War 


Sunday morning, but Grapevine Bridge was not completed 
till sunset. Jackson then crossed his corps at that point, 
my division leading. We bivouacked that night near 
Savage’s Station, where McLaw’s division had had a severe 
fight a few hours before. Just at dawn on Monday, the 
30th, we were in motion, when I discovered what appeared 
to be a line of battle drawn up at the station, but which 
proved to be a line of sick and of hospital attendants, 2500 
in number. About half a mile from the station we saw 
what seemed to be an entire regiment of Federals cold in 
death, and learned that a Vermont regiment (the 5th) 
had been in the desperate charge upon the division of 
McLaws’ and had suffered great loss (killed, 31; wounded, 
143). From the time of crossing the river, we had 
evidence everywhere of the precipitate nature of the Federal 
retreat.* Dabney, in his life of Jackson, says: 

“The whole country was full of deserted plunder,. army wagons, 
and pontoon-trains partially burned or crippled; mounds of grain 
and rice and hillocks of mess beef smouldering; tens of thousands 
of axes, picks, and shovels; camp kettles gashed with hatchets; medi¬ 
cine chests with their drugs stired into a foul medley, and all the 
apparatus of a vast and lavish host; while the mire under foot was 
mixed with blankets lately new and with overcoats torn from the 
waist up. For weeks afterward agents of our army were busy 
in gathering in the spoils. Great stores of fixed ammunition were 
saved, while more were destroyed.” 

In our march from Savage’s Station my division picked 
up a thousand prisoners, stragglers from the retreating 
army, and gathered a large number of abandoned rifles. 
I detached two regiments (the Fourth and Fifth North 
Carolina) to take the prisoners and arms to Richmond. 
We reached White Oak Swamp about noon, and there found 
another hospital camp, with about five hundred sick in it. 
Truly, the Chickahominy swamps were fatal to the Federal 

*The Union reports do not indicate precipitancy. The greater 
part of McClellan’s army was within three miles of the original 
lines at the close of the second day after the battle of Gaines’s Mill, 
that is, on the evening of June 29th. The third day after that 
battle, the Army of the Potomac fought on three separate fields 
(White Oak Bridge, Charles City Road, and Glendale) at distances 
of from 7 to 10 miles from the old positions in front of Richmond. 
General Wm. B. Franklin was with the rear column of the army during 
the movement to the James River. (See p. 366.)— Editors. 


— 618 — 



McClellan’s Change of Base and Malvern Hill 

forces. A high bluff was on our side of the little stream 
called White Oak, and a large uncultivated field on the 
other side. In this field could be seen a battery of artillery, 
supported by a brigade of infantry—artillerists and infantry 
lying down and apparently asleep. Under cover of Thomas 
T. Munford’s 2d Virginia cavalry, thirty-one field-pieces 
were placed upon the bluff, and were ordered to open fire 
as soon as the cavalry mask was removed. The battery 
fired its loaded guns in reply, and then galloped off, followed 
by its infantry supports and the long lines of infantry far¬ 
ther back in the field. Munford crossed his regiment over 
the ford, and Jackson and myself went with him to see 
what had become of the enemy. We soon found out. 
The battery had taken up a position behind a point of woods, 
where it was perfectly sheltered from our guns, but could 
play upon the broken bridge and ford, and upon every part 
of the uncultivated part of the uncultivated field. It 
opened with grape and canister upon us, and we retired 
rapidly. Fast riding in the wrong direction is not military, 
but it is sometimes healthy. We had taken one prisoner, 
a drunken Irishman, but he declined the honor of going 
back with us, and made fight with his naked fists. A 
soldier asked me naively whether he should shoot the 
Irishman or let him go. I am glad that I told him to let 
the man go, to be a comfort to his family. That Irishman 
must have had a charmed life. He was under the shelter of 
his gum-cloth coat hung on a stick, near the ford, when 
a citizen fired at him four times, from a distance of about 
fifty paces; and the only recognition that I could see the 
man make was to raise his hand as if to brush off a fly.* 
One of the shells set a farm-house on fire. We learned from 
the owner that Franklin's corps was in front of us. 

* After the appearance of this article in “The Century” magazine, 
E. McLaughlin, of East Saginaw, Michigan, wrote me that he was a 
member of Co. C of the 7th Maine Volunteers, General W. F. Smith’s 
division, and said: “The statement in regard to the drunken Irishman 
is true. That man belonged to my company and told us, when he came 
to the company at Malvern Hill that he had been inside your lines 
and had been repeatedly shot at. He further said that if he had 
had one more canteen of whiskey he could have held the position 
all day .”—D H.H. 


— 619 — 



Battles and Leaders of the Civil War 


Our cavalry returned by the lower ford, and pronounced 
it perfectly practicable for infantry. But Jackson did not 
advance. Why was this ? It was the critical day for both 
commanders, but especially for McClellan. With consum¬ 
mate skill he had crossed his vast train of five thousand 
wagons and his immense parks of artillery safely over 
White Oak Swamp, but he was more exposed now than at 
any time in his flank march. Three columns of attack were 
converging upon him, and a strong corps was pressing upon 
his rear. Escape seemed impossible for him, but he did 
escape, at the same time inflicting heavy damage upon his 
pursuers. General Lee, through no fault in his plans, was 
to see his splendid prize slip through his hands. Longstreet 
and A. P. Hill struck the enemy at Frayser’s farm (or 
Glendale) at 3 p.m. on the 30th, and, both being always 
ready for a fight, immediately attacked. Magruder, who 
followed them down the Darbytown road, was ordered to 
the assistance of General Holmes on the New Market road, 
who was not then engaged, and their two divisions took 
no part in the action. Huger, on the Charles City road, 
came upon Franklin’s left flank, but made no attack. I sent 
my engineer officer, Captain W. F. Lee, to him through the 
swamp, to ask him whether he could not engage Franklin. 
He replied that the road was obstructed by fallen timber. 
So there were five divisions within sound of the firing, and 
within supporting distance, but not one of them moved. 
Longstreet and A. P. Hill made a desperate fight, contend¬ 
ing against Sumner’s corps, and the divisions of McCall’s, 
Kearny, and Hooker; but they failed to gain possession of 
the Quaker road, upon which McClellan was retreating. 
That night Franklin glided silently by them. He had to 
pass within easy range of the artillery of Longstreet and 
Hill, but they did not know he was there. It had been a 
gallant fight on their part. General Lee reported: “Many 
prisoners, including a general of division, McCall, were 
captured, and several batteries with some thousands of 
small arms, were taken.” But as an obstruction to the 
Federal retreat, the fight amounted to nothing. 


— 620 — 


McClellan's Change of Base and Malvern Hill 

Major Dabney, in his life of Jackson, thus comments 
on the inaction of that officer: “On this occasion it would 
appear, if the vast interests dependent upon General Jack¬ 
son’s cooperation with the proposed attack upon the center 
were considered, that he came short of the efficiency in 
action for which he was everywhere else noted.” After 
showing how the crossing of White Oak might have been 
effected, Dabney adds: “The list of casualties would have 
been larger than that presented on the 30th, of one can¬ 
noneer wounded; but how much shorter would have been 
the bloody list filled up the next day at Malvern Hill? 
This temporary eclipse of Jackson’s genius was probably 
to be explained by physical causes. The labor of the pre¬ 
vious days, the sleeplessness, the wear of gigantic cares, 
with the drenching of the comfortless night, had sunk the 
elasticity of his will and the quickness of his invention for 
the nonce below their wonted tension. And which of the 
sons of man is so great as never to experience this? 

I think that an important factor in this inaction was 
Jackson’s pity for his own corps, worn out by long and 
exhausting marches, and reduced in numbers by its numer¬ 
ous sanguinary battles. He thought that the garrison of 
Richmond ought now to bear the brunt of the fighting. 
None of us knew that the veterans of Longstreet and A. P. 
Hill were unsupported; nor did we even know that the firing 
that we heard was theirs. Had all our troops been at 
Frayser’s farm there would have been no Malvern Hill. 

Jackson’s genius never shone when he was under the 
command of another. It seemed then to be shrouded or 
paralyzed. Compare his inertness on this occasion with 
the wonderful vigor shown a few weeks later at Slaughter’s 
(Cedar) Mountain in the stealthy march to Pope’s rear, 
and later still in the capture of Harper’s Ferry. Mac¬ 
Gregor on his native heath was not more different from 
MacGregor in prison than was Jackson his own master 
from Jackson in a subordinate position. He wrote once 
to Richmond requesting that he might have “fewer orders 


— 621 — 


Battles and Leaders of the Civil War 


and more men.” That was the keynote to his whole 
character. The hooded falcon cannot strike the quarry. 

The gentleman who tried his “splendid rifle” on the 
drunken Irishman was the Rev. L. W. Allen. Mr. Allen 
had been raised in that neighborhood, and knew Malvern 
Hill well. He spoke of its commanding height, the difficulties 
of approach to it, its amphitheatrical form and ample area, 
which would enable McClellan to arrange his 350 field guns 
tier above tier and sweep the plain in every direction. I 
became satisfied that an attack upon the concentrated Fed¬ 
eral army so splendidly posted, and with such vast superior¬ 
ity in artillery could only be fatal to us. The anxious thought 
then was, Have Holmes and Magruder been able to keep 
McClellan from Malvern Hill? General Holmes arrived 
at Malvern Hill at 10:30 a.m. on the 30th, with 5170 in¬ 
fantry, 4 batteries of artillery, and 130 improvised or 
irregular cavalry. He did not attempt to occupy the hill, 
although only 1500 Federals had yet reached it. Our 
cavalry had passed over it on the afternoon of the 29th, 
and had had a sharp skirmish with the Federal cavalry 
on the Quaker road. 

As General Holmes marched down the river, his troops 
became visible to the gun-boats, which opened fire upon 
them, throwing those awe-inspiring shells familiarly called 
by our men “lamp-posts,” on acount of their size and 
appearance. Their explosion was very much like that of 
a small volcano, and had a very demoralizing effect upon 
new troops, one of whom expressed the general sentiment 
by saying: “The Yankees throwed them lamp-posts about 
too careless like.” The roaring, howling gun-boat shells 
were usually harmless to flesh, blood, and bones, but they 
had a wonderful effect upon the nervous system. General 
Junius Daniel, a most gallant and accomplished officer, who 
had a brigade under General Holmes, gave me an incident 
connected with the affair on the 30th, known as the “Battle 
of Malvern Cliff.” General Holmes, who was very deaf, had 
gone into a little house concealed from the boats by some 
intervening woods, and was engaged in some business when 


— 622 — 


McClellan’s Change of Base and Malvern Hill 

the bellowing of the “lamp posts” began. The irregular 
cavalry stampeded and made a brilliant charge to the rear. 
The artillerists of two guns of Graham’s Petersburg battery 
were also panic-stricken, and cutting their horses loose 
mounted them, and, with dangling traces, tried to catch up 
with the fleet-footed cavaliers. The infantry troops were 
inexperienced in the wicked ways of war, having never been 
under fire before. The fright of the fleeing cavalry would 
have pervaded their ranks also with the same mischievous 
result but for the strenuous efforts of their officers, part of 
whom were veterans. Some of the raw levies crouched 
behind little saplings to get protection from the shrieking, 
blustering shells. At this juncture General Holmes, who 
from his deafness was totally unaware of the rumpus, came 
out of the hut, put his hand behind his right ear, and said: 
“I thought I heard firing.” Some of the pale-faced infantry 
thought that they also had heard firing. 

Part of Wise’s brigade joined Holmes on the 20th, with 
two batteries of artillery and two regiments of cavalry. 
His entire force then consisted of 5820 infantry, 6 batteries 
of artillery, and 2 regiments of cavalry. He remained in¬ 
active until 4 P.M., when he was told that the Federal 
army was passing over Malvern Hill in a demoralized con¬ 
dition. He then opened upon the supposed fugitives with 
six rifled guns, and was speedily undeceived in regard to 
the disorganization in the Army of the Potomac by a reply 
from thirty guns, which in a brief time silenced his own. 
The audacity of the Federals and the large number of their 
guns (which had gone in advance of the main body of 
Porter’s corps) made General Holmes believe that he was 
about to be attacked, and he called for assistance, and, by 
Longstreet’s order, Magruder was sent to him. After a 
weary march, Magruder was recalled to aid Longstreet; 
but the day was spent in fruitless marching and counter¬ 
marching, so that his fine body of troops took no part in 
what might have been a decisive battle at Frayser’s farm. 
General Holmes was a veteran soldier of well-known per¬ 
sonal courage, but he was deceived as to the strength and 


— 623 — 


McClellan’s Change of Base and Malvern Hill 

intentions of the enemy. General Porter says that the 
force opposed to General Holmes consisted of Warren’s 
brigade and the Eleventh U.S. Infantry; in all 1500 in¬ 
fantry and 30 pieces of artillery. Here was afforded an 
example of the proneness to overestimate the number of 
troops opposed to us. The Federals reported Holmes to 
have 25,000 men, and he hought himself confronted by a 
large part of McClellan’s army. That night he fell back 
to a stronger position,* thinking apparently that there would 
be an “on to Richmond” movement by the River road. He 
lost 2 killed, 49 wounded, 2 pieces of artillery, and 6 caissons. 
The guns and caissons, General Porter states, were after¬ 
ward abandoned by the Federals. General Holmes occupied 
the extreme Confederate right the next day, July 1st, but he 
took no part in the attack upon Malvern Hill, believing, 
as he says in his official report, “that it was out of the 
question to attack the strong position of Malvern Hill from 
that side with my inadequate force.” 

Mahone’s brigade had some skirmishing with Slocum’s 
Federal division on the 30th, but nothing else was done on 
that day by Huger’s division. Thus it happened that Long- 
street and A. P. Hill, with the fragments of their divisions 
which had been engaged at Gaines’s Mill, were struggling 
alone, while Jackson’s whole corps and the divisions of 
Huger, Magruder, Holmes, McLaws, and my own were near 
by. 

Jackson moved over the swamp early on the first of 
July, Whiting’s division leading. Our march was much 
delayed by the crossing of troops and trains. At Willis’s 
Church I met General Lee. He bore grandly his terrible 
disappointment of the day before, and made no allusion to 
it. I gave him Mr. Allen’s description of Malvern Hill, and 
presumed to say, “If General McClellan is there in force, 
we had better let him alone.” Longstreet laughed and said, 
“Don’t get scared, now that we have got him whipped.” 
It was this belief in the demoralization of the Federal army 

*Half a mile below the upper gate at Curl’s Neck. (See “Official 
Records,” Vol. XI., Part II., p. 908)— D. H. H. 


— 624 - 



McClellan’s Change of Base and Malvern Hill . 

that made our leader risk the attack. It was near noon 
when Jackson reached the immediate neighborhood of 
Malvern Hill. Some time was spent in reconnoitering, 
and in making tentative efforts with our few batteries to 
ascertain the strength and position of the enemy. I saw 
Jackson helping with his own hands to push Reilly’s North 
Carolina battery farther forward. It was soon disabled, 
the woods around us being filled with shrieking and ex¬ 
ploding shells. I noticed an artilleryman seated comfort¬ 
ably behind a very large tree, and apparently feeling very 
secure. A moment later a shell passed through the huge 
tree and took off the man’s head. This gives an idea of 
the great power of the Federal rifled artillery. Whiting’s 
division was ordered to the left of the Quaker road, and 
mine to the right; Ewell’s was in reserve. Jackson’s own 
division had been halted at Willis’s Church. The divisions 
of Magruder, Huger, and McLaws were still farther over 
to my right. Those of Longstreet and A. P. Hill were in 
reserve on the right and were not engaged. 

At length we were ordered to advance. The brigade 
of General George B. Anderson first encountered the enemy, 
and its commander was wounded and borne from the field. 
His troops, however, crossed the creek and took position 
in the woods, commanded by Colonel C. C. Tew, a skillful 
and gallant man. Rodes being sick, his brigade was com¬ 
manded by that peerless soldier, Colonel J. B. Jordon. 
Ripley, Garland and Colquitt also got over without serious 
loss. My five brigade commanders and myself now made 
an examination of the enemy’s position. He was found to 
be strongly posted on a command hill, all the approaches 
to which could be swept by his artillery and were guarded 
by swarms of infantry, securely sheltered by fences, ditches, 
and ravines. Armistead was immediately on my fight. 
We remained a long while awaiting orders, when I received 
the following: 

“May 1st , 1862. 

“General D. H. Hill: Batteries have been established to act upon 
the enemy’s line. If it is broken, as is probable, Armistead, who 
can witness the effect of the fire, has been ordered to charge with 
a yell. Do the same. R. H. Chilton, A. A. G.” 


— 625 — 


Battles and Leaders of the Civil War 


A similar order was sent to each division commander. 
However, only one battery of our artillery came up at a 
time, and each successive one, as it took position had fifty 
pieces turned upon it, and was crushed in a minute. Not 
knowing what to do under the circumstances, I wrote to 
General Jackson that the condition upon which the order 
was predicated was not fulfilled, and that I wanted instruc¬ 
tions. He replied to advance when I heard the shouting. 
We did advance at the signal, and after an unassisted 
struggle for an hour and a half, and after meeting with 
some success, we were compelled to fall back under cover 
of the woods. Magruder advanced at the same signal, 
having portions of the divisions of Huger and McLaws, 
comprising the brigades of Mahone, Wright, Barksdale, 
Ranson, Cobb, Semmes, Kershaw, Armistead, and G. T. 
Anderson; but he met with some delay, and did not get 
in motion till he received a second order from General 
Lee, and we were then beaten. 

The Comte de Paris, who was on McClellan’s staff, 
gives this account of the charge of my gallant division: 

“Hill advanced alone against the Federal positions . . . 

He had therefore before him MorelPs right, Couch’s division reenforced 
by Caldwell’s brigade, . . and finally the left of Kearny. The woods 
skirting the foot of Malvern Hill had hitherto protected the Con¬ 
federates but as soon as they passed beyond the edge of the forest, 
they were received by a fire from all the batteries at once, some posted 
on the hill, others ranged midway, close to the Federal infantry. The 
latter joined its musketry fire to the cannonade when Hill’s first line 
had come within range, and threw it back in disorder on the reserves. 
While it was reforming, more (Confederate) battalions marched up 
to the assault in their turn. The remembrance of Cold Harbor doubles 
the energy of Hill’s soldiers. They try to pierce the line, sometimes 
at one point, sometimes at another, charging Kearny’s left first, 
and Couch’s right . . . and afterward throwing themselves upon 

the left of Couch’s division. But, here also, after nearly reaching 
the Federal positions, they are repulsed. The conflict is carried 
on with great fierceness on both sides, and, for a moment, it seems 
as if the Confederates are at last about to penetrate the very center 
of their adversaries and of the formidable artillery which now was 
dealing destruction in their ranks. But Sumner, who commands 
on the right, detaches Sickles’s and Meagher’s brigades successively 
to Couch’s assistance. During this time, Whiting on the left, and 
Huger on the right, suffer Hill’s soldiers to become exhausted with¬ 
out supporting them. Neither Lee nor Jackson has sent the slightest 
order, and the din of the battle which is going on in their immediate 
vicinity has not sufficed to make them march against the enemy. . . 


— 626 — 


McClellan's Change of Base and Malvern Hill 

“At seven o’clock Hill reorganized the debris of his troops in 
the woods; . . . his tenacity and the courage of his soldiers have 
only had the effect of causing him to sustain heavy losses.” (Pp. 
141, 142, Vol. II.) 

Sketch of the Vicinity of Malvern Hill 
(July 1, 1862) 



The Union troops reached the field by the so-called Quaker road 
(more properly the Church road) ; the Confederates chiefly by this 
and the Long Bridge road. The general lines were approximately 
as indicated above. The Confederates on the River road are the 
troops of General Holmes, who had been repulsed at Turkey Island 
Bridge of the day before by Warren’s brigade, with the aid of the gun¬ 
boats. The main fighting was in the space between the words “Con¬ 
federate” and “Union,” together with one or two assaults upon the 


— 627 — 













Battles and Leaders of the Civil War 


west side of the Crew Hill from the meadow. Morell's and Couch's 
divisions formed the first Union line, and General Porter's batteries 
extended from the Crew house to the West house. 

Truly, the courage of the soldiers was sublime! 
Battery after battery was in their hands for a few moments, 
only to be wrested away by fresh troops of the enemy. If 
one division could effect this much, what might have been 
done had the other nine cooperated with it! General Lee 
says: 

“D. H. Hill pressed forward across the open field and engaged 
the enemy gallantly, breaking and driving back his first line; but a 
simultaneous advance of the other troops not taking place, he found 
himself unable to maintain the ground he had gained against the 
overwhelming numbers and the numerous batteries of the enemy. 
Jackson sent to his support his own division, and that part of Ewell’s 
which was in reserve; but owing to the increasing darkness, and 
the intricacy of the forest and swamp, they did not arrive in time 
to render the desired assistance. Hill was therefore compelled to 
abandon part of the ground that he had gained, after suffering 
severe loss and inflicting heavy damage upon the enemy." 

I never saw anything more grandly heroic than the 
advance after sunset of the nine brigades under Magruder’s 
orders.* Unfortunately, they did not move together, and 
were beaten in detail. As each brigade emerged from the 
woods, from fifty to one hundred guns opened upon it, 
tearing great gaps in its ranks; but the heroes reeled on 
and were shot down by the reserves at the guns, which a few 
squads reached. Most of them had an open field half a 
mile wide to cross, under the fire of field artillery in front, 
and the fire of the heavy ordnance of the gun-boats in 
their rear. It was not war—it was murder. 

Our loss was double that of the Federals at Malvern 
Hill. Not only did the fourteen brigades which were en¬ 
gaged suffer but also the inactive troops and those brought 
up as reserves too late to be of any use met many casual¬ 
ties from the fearful artillery fire which reached all parts 
of the woods. Hence, more than half the casualties were 
from field-pieces—an unprecedented thing in warfare. The 
artillery practice was kept up till nine o’clock at night, and 


*Toombs’s brigade belonged to Magruder, but had moved to my 
assistance by my order when we were hard pressed. It was not 
therefore, in the final attack made by Magruder.— D. H. H. 


—628 



McClellan's Change of Base and Malvern Hill 

the darkness added to the glory of the pyrotechnics. It 
was quite late when I had posted for the night the last of 
the reenforcements that had come up when the battle was 
over. A half hour before, an incident occurred which is 
thus related by General Trimble: 

“I proposed to General D. H. Hill to ride forward and reconnoiter 
the enemy’s position. We approached within one hundred steps 
of the enemy’s batteries, and could hear plainly the ordinary tone 
of conversation. The guns were then firing on the woods to our 
left, where the last attack had been made, at right angles to that 
part of the field we were then in. I suggested to General Hill the 
advantage of making an attack on this battery, and that it must be 
successful, as the enemy would not expect one from our position, and 
under cover of the darkness we could approach them undiscovered. 
General Hill did not seem inclined to make the movement.” 

The chivalrous' Trimble proposed to make the attack 
with his own brigade, but there were many troops now in 
the woods, and I thought that the attack would but expose 
them to a more intense artillery fire. We saw men going 
about with lanterns, looking up and carrying off the dead 
and wounded. There were no pickets out, and the rum¬ 
bling of wheels in the distance seemed to indicate that the 
retreat had begun. The morning revealed the bare plateau 
stripped of its terrible batteries. The battle of Malvern 
Hill was a disaster to the Confederates, and the fourteen 
brigades that had been so badly repulsed were much demor¬ 
alized. But there were six divisions intact, and they could 
have made a formidable fight on the 2d. 

Possibly owing to the belief that Longstreet and A. 
P. Hill were making a march between Malvern and Harri¬ 
son’s Landing, the retreat was the most disorderly that 
took place. Wagons and ambulances were abandoned; 
knapsacks, cartridge-boxes, clothing, and rifles by the 
thousand were thrown away by the Federals. Colonel 
James D. Nance, of the 3d South Carolina regiment, gathered 
925 rifles in fine condition that had been thrown away in 
the wheat-fields at Shirley, a farm between Malvern and 
Haxall’s. The fruits of the Seven Days’ fighting were the 
relief of Richmond, the capture of 9000 prisoners (includ¬ 
ing 3000 in hospitals), 52 pieces of artillery, and 35,000 


— 629 — 


Battles and Leaders of the Civil War 


stands of arms, and the destruction or capture of many 
military stores. 

I crossed the Chickahominy with 10,000 effective men. 
Of these 3907 were killed or wounded and 48 were reported 
missing, either captives or fugitives from the field. With 
the infantry and artillery detached and the losses before 
Malvern Hill, I estimate that my division in that battle 
was 6500 strong, and that the loss was 2000. Magruder 
puts his force at between 26,000 and 28,000 (I think a 
high estimate), and states his loss as 2900. 

Throughout this campaign we attacked just when and 
where the enemy wished us to attack. This was owing to 
our ignorance of the country and lack of reconnaissance 
of the successive battle-fields. Porter’s weak point at 
Gaines’s Mill was his right flank. A thorough examina¬ 
tion of the ground would have disclosed that; and had 
Jackson’s command gone in on the left of the road running 
by the McGehee house, Porter’s whole position would 
have been turned and the line of retreat cut off. An 
armed reconnaissance at Malvern would have shown the 
immense preponderance of the Federal artillery, and that 
a contest with it must be hopeless. The battle, with all 
its melancholy results, proved, however, that the Confed¬ 
erate infantry and Federal artillery, side by side on the 
same field, need fear no foe on earth. 

Both commanders had shown great ability. McClellan, 
if not always great in the advance, was masterly in retreat, 
and was unquestionably the greatest of Americans as an 
organizer of an army. Lee’s plans were perfect; and had 
not his dispositions for a decisive battle at Frayser’s farm 
miscarried, through no fault of his own, he would have 
won a most complete victory. It was not the least part of 
his greatness that he did not complain of his disappoint¬ 
ment, and that he at no time sought a scape-goat upon 
which to lay a failure. As reunited Americans, we have 
reason to be proud of both commanders. 

* * * * * * * 


— 630 — 


XIV 


“The Seven Days,” Including Frayser’s Farm* 

By James Longstreet, 

Lieutenant-General, C. S. A. 


When General Joseph E. Johnston was wounded at the 
hattle of Seven Pines, and General Lee assumed his new 
duties as commander of the Army of Northern Virginia, 
General Stonewall Jackson was in the Shenandoah Valley, 
and the rest of the Confederate troops were east and north 
of Richmond in front of General George B. McClellan's 
army, then encamped about the Chickahominy River, 100,- 
000 strong, and preparing for a regular siege of the Con¬ 
federate capital. The situation required prompt and suc¬ 
cessful action by General Lee. Very early in June he 
called about him, on the noted Nine-mile road near Rich¬ 
mond, all his commanders, and asked each in turn his opin¬ 
ion of the military situation. I had my own views, but did 
not express them, believing that if they were important it 
was equally important that they should be unfolded private¬ 
ly to the commanding general. The next day I called on 
General Lee, and suggested my plan for driving the Federal 
forces away from the Chickahominy. McClellan had a 
small force at Mechanicsville, and farther back, at Beaver 
Dam Creek, a considerable portion of his army in a strong¬ 
hold that was simply unassailable from the front. The 
banks of Beaver Dam Creek were so steep as to be impass¬ 
able except on bridges. I proposed an echelon movement, 
and suggested that Jackson be called down from the Valley, 
and passed to the rear of the Federal right, in order to 
turn the position behind Beaver Dam, while the rest of 
the Confederate forces who were to engage in the attack 
could cross the Chickahominy at points suitable for the 

*The usual spelling is Frazier or Frazer. The authority for the 
form here adopted is Captain R. E. Frayser, of Richmond.— Editors. 


— 631 — 




Battles and Leaders of the Civil War 


succession in the move, and be ready to attack the Federals 
as soon as they were thrown from their position. After 
hearing me, General Lee sent General J. E. B. Stuart on 
his famous ride around McClellan. The dashing horseman, 
with a strong reconnoitering force of cavalry, made a forced 
reconnaissance, passing above and around the Federal 
forces, recrossing the Chickahominy below them, and re¬ 
turning safe to Confederate headquarters. He made a favor¬ 
able report of the situation and the practicability of the 
proposed plan. On the 23d of June General Jackson was 
summoned to General Lee’s headquarters, and was there 
met by General A. P. Hill, General D. H. Hill, and myself. 
A conference resulted in the selection of the 26th as the 
day on which we should move against the Federal position 
at Beaver Dam. General Jackson was ordered down from 
the Valley. General A. P. Hill was to pass the Chicka¬ 
hominy with part of his division, and hold the rest in readi¬ 
ness to cross at Meadow Bridge, following Jackson’s swoop 
along the dividing ridge between the Pamunkey and the 
Chickahominy. D. H. Hill and I were ordered to be in posi¬ 
tion on the Mechanicsville pike early on the 26th ready to 
cross the river at Mechanicsville Bridge as soon as it was 
cleared up by the advance of Jackson and A. P. Hill. 

Thus matters stood when the morning of the 26th ar¬ 
rived. The weather was clear, and the roads were in fine 
condition. Everything seemed favorable to the move. But 
the morning passed and we received no tidings from Jack- 
son. As noon approached, General Hill, who was to move 
behind Jackson, grew impatient at the delay and begged 
permission to hurry him up by a fusillade. General Lee 
consented, and General Hill opened his batteries on Me¬ 
chanicsville, driving the Federals off. When D. H. Hill 
and I crossed at the Mechanicsville Bridge we found A. P. 
Hill severely engaged trying to drive the Federals from 
their strong position behind Beaver Dam Creek. Without 
Jackson to turn the Federal right, the battle could not be 
ours. Although the contest lasted until some time after 
night, the Confederates made no progress. The next day 


— 632 — 


“The Seven Days,” Including Frayser’s Farm 


the fight was renewed, and the position was hotly contested 
by the Federals until 7 o’clock in the morning, when the 
advance of Jackson speedily caused the Federals to aban¬ 
don their position, thus ending the battle.* 

It is easy to see that the battle of the previous day 
would have been a quick and bloodless Confederate victory 
if Jackson could have reached his position at the time ap¬ 
pointed. In my judgment the evacuation of Beaver Dam 
Creek was very unwise on the part of the Federal com¬ 
manders; we had attacked at Beaver Dam and had failed 
to make an impression at that point, losing several thou¬ 
sand men and officers. This demonstrated that the posi¬ 
tion was safe. If the Federal commanders knew of Jack¬ 
son’s approach on the 26th, they had ample time to reen¬ 
force Porter’s right before Friday morning (27th) with 
men and field defenses, to such extent as to make the re¬ 
mainder of the line to the right secure against assault. So 
that the Federals in withdrawing not only abandoned a 
strong position, but gave up the morale of their success, 
and transferred it to our somewhat disheartened forces; 
for, next to Malvern Hill, the sacrifice at Beaver Dam was 
unequaled in demoralization during the entire summer. 

From Beaver Dam we followed the Federals closely, 
encountering them again under Porter beyond Powhite 
Creek, where the battle of Gaines’s Mill occurred. General 
A. P. Hill, being in advance, deployed his men and opened 
the attack without consulting me. A very severe battle 
followed. I came up with my reserve forces and was pre¬ 
paring to support Hill, who was suffering very severely, 
when I received an order from General Lee to make a dem¬ 
onstration against the Federal left, as the battle was not 
progressing to suit him. I threw in three brigades oppo¬ 
site the Federal left and engaged them in a severe skirmish 
with infantry and artillery. The battle then raged with 

♦According to General Fitz John Porter, it was not Jackson’s ap¬ 
proach, but information of that event, that caused the withdrawal of 
the Union troops, who, with the exception of “some batteries and 
infantry skirmishers,” were withdrawn before sunrise on the 27th.— 
Editors . 


— 633 — 



Battles and Leaders of the Civil War 


great fierceness. General Jackson was again missing, and 
General Lee grew fearful of the result. Soon I received 
another message from General Lee, saying that unless I 
could do something the day seemed to be lost. I then de¬ 
termined to make the heaviest attack I could. The position 
in front of me was very strong. An open field led down to 
a difficult ravine a short distance beyond the Powhite Creek. 
From there the ground made a steep ascent, and was cov¬ 
ered with trees and slashed timber and hastily made rifle- 
trenches. General Whiting came to me with two brigades 
of Jackson’s men and asked me to put him in. I told him 
I was just organizing an attack and would give him posi¬ 
tion. My column of attack then was R. H. Anderson’s and 
Pickett’s brigades, with Law’s and Hood’s of Whiting’s 
division. We attacked and defeated the Federals on their 
left, capturing many thousand stand of arms, fifty-two 
pieces of artillery, a large quantity of supplies, and many 
prisoners,—among them General Reynolds, who afterward 
fell at Gettysburg. The Federals made some effort to reen¬ 
force and recover their lost ground, but failed, and during 
the afternoon and night withdrew their entire forces from 
that side of the Chickahominy, going in the direction of 
James River. On the 29th General Lee ascertained that 
McClellan was marching toward the James. He determined 
to make a vigorous move and strike the enemy a severe 
blow. He decided to intercept them in the neighborhood 
of Charles City crossroads, and with that end in view 
planned a pursuit as follows: I was to march to a point 
below Frayser’s farm with General A. P. Hill. General 
Holmes was to take up position below me on the New 
Market or River road, to be in readiness to co-operate 
with me and to attack such Federals as would come within 
his reach. Jackson was to pursue closely the Federal rear, 
crossing at the Grapevine Bridge, and coming in on the 
north of the cross-roads. Huger was to attend to the Fed¬ 
eral right flank, and take position on the Charles City 
road west of the cross-roads. Thus we were to envelop 
the Federal rear and make the destruction of that part of 


- 634 — 


“The Seven Days,” Including Frayser’s Farm 


McClellan's army sure. To reach my position south of the 
cross-roads, I had about sixteen miles to march. I marched 
14 miles on the 29th, crossing over into the Darbytown 
road and moving down to its intersection with the New 
Market road, where I camped for the night, about 3 miles 
south-west of Frayser’s farm. On the morning of the 30th 
I moved two miles nearer up and made preparation to in¬ 
tercept the Federals as they retreated toward James River. 
General McCall, with a division of ten thousand Federals, 
was at the crossroads and about Frayser’s farm. My di¬ 
vision, being in advance, was deployed in front of the ene¬ 
my. I placed such of my batteries as I could find position 
for, and kept Hill's troops in my rear. As I had twice as 
far to march as the other commanders, I considered it 
certain that Jackson and Huger would be in position when I 
was ready. After getting my troops in position I called 
upon General A. P. Hill to throw one of his brigades to 
cover my right and to hold the rest of his troops in readi¬ 
ness to give pursuit when the enemy had been dislodged. 
My line extended from near the Quaker road across the New 
Market road to the Federal right. The ground upon which 
I approached was much lower than that occupied by Gen¬ 
eral McCall, and was greatly cut up by ravines and covered 
with heavy timber and tangled undergrowth. On account 
of these obstructions we were not disturbed while getting 
into position, except by the firing of a few shots that did 
no damage. Holmes got into position below me on the New 
Market road, and was afterward joined by Magruder, who 
had previously made an unsuccessful attack on the Federal 
rear-guard at Savage's Station. 

By 11 o'clock our troops were in position and we waited 
for the signal from Jackson and Huger. Everything was 
quiet on my part of the line, except occasional firing be¬ 
tween my pickets and McCall’s. I was in momentary ex¬ 
pectation of the signal. About half past 2 o’clock artillery 
firing was heard on my left, evidently at the point near 
White Oak Swamp where Huger was to attack. I very 
naturally supposed this firing to be the expected signal, and 


— 635 — 


Battles and Leaders of the Civil War 


ordered some of my batteries to reply, as a signal that I 
was ready to co-operate. While the order to open was going 
around to the batteries, President Davis and General Lee, 
with their staff and followers, were with me in a little open 
field near the rear of my right. We were in pleasant con¬ 
versation, anticipating fruitful results from the fight, when 
our batteries opened. Instantly the Federal batteries re¬ 
sponded most spitefully. It was impossible for the enemy 
to see us as we sat on our horses in the little field, sur¬ 
rounded by tall, heavy timber and thick undergrowth; yet 
a battery by chance had our range and exact distance, and 
poured upon us a terrific fire. The second or third shell 
burst in the midst of us, killing two or three horses and 
wounding one or two men. Our little party speedily re¬ 
tired to safer quarters. The Federals doubtless had no idea 
that the Confederate President, commanding general and 
division commanders were receiving point-blank shot from 
their batteries. Colonel Micah Jenkins was in front of us, 
and I sent him an order to silence the Federal battery, sup¬ 
posing that he could do so with his long-range rifle. He 
became engaged, and finally determined to charge the bat¬ 
tery. That brought on a general fight between my division 
and the troops in front of us. Kemper on my right ad¬ 
vanced his brigade over difficult ground and captured a 
battery. Jenkins moved his brigade forward and made a 
bold fight. He was followed by the other four brigades 
successively. 

The enemy’s line was broken, and he was partly dis¬ 
lodged from his position. The batteries were taken, but 
our line was very much broken up by the rough ground 
we had to move over, and we were not in sufficiently solid 
form to maintain a proper battle. The battle was con¬ 
tinued, however, until we encountered succor from the corps 
of Generals Sumner and Heintzelman, when we were obliged 
to halt and hold the position the enemy had left. This line 
was held throughout the day, though at times, when vig¬ 
orous combinations were made against me, McCall regained 
points along his line. Our counter-movements, however, 
finally pushed him back again, and more formidable efforts 


— 636 — 


“The Seven Days,” Including Frayser’s Farm 


from our adversary were required. Other advances were 
made, and reenforcements came to the support of the Fed¬ 
erate, who contested the line with varying fortune, some¬ 
times recovering batteries we had taken and again losing 
them. Finally McCall’s division was driven off, and fresh 
troops seemed to come in to their relief. Ten thousand men 
of A. P. Hill’s division had been held in reserve, in the hope 
that Jackson and Huger would come up on our left, enabling 
us to dislodge the Federate, after which Hill’s troops 
could be put in fresh to give pursuit, and follow them down 
to Harrison’s landing. Jackson found Grapevine Bridge de¬ 
stroyed and could not reach his position; while for some 
unaccountable reason Huger failed to take part, though 
near enough to do so.* 

As neither Jackson nor Huger came up, and as night 
drew on, I put Hill in to relieve my troops. When he came 
into the fight the Federal line had been broken at every 
point except one. He formed his line and followed up in 
the position occupied by my troops. By night we succeeded 
in getting the entire field, though all of it was not actually 
occupied until we advanced in pursuit next day. As the 
enemy moved off they continued the fire of their artillery 
upon us from various points, and it was after 9 o’clock 
when the shells ceased to fall. Just before dark General 
McCall, while looking up a fragrant of his division, found 
us where he supposed his troops were, and was taken 
prisoner. At the time he was brought in General Lee hap¬ 
pened to be with us. As I had known General McCall 
pleasantly in our service together in the 4th Infantry, I 
moved to offer my hand as he dismounted. At first motion, 
however, I saw he did not regard the occasion as one for 
renewing the old friendship, and I merely offered him some 
of my staff as an escort to Richmond.*)* But for succoring 

*General Huger says, in his official report, that the road was 
very effectually obstructed.— Editors. 

fMajor W. Roy Mason, who served on the staff of General C. W. 
Field, C. S. A., gives this account of the capture of General McCall 
at Glendale, on the evening of June 30th: 

“We occupied as headquarters (at the close of the battle) the 
center of an old road that ran through a dense pine-wood which the 


■ 637 — 



Battles and Leaders of the Civil War 


forces, which should have been engaged by Jackson, Huger, 
Holmes, and Magruder, McCall would have been entirely 
dislodged by the first attack. All of our forces were within 
a radius of 3 miles, and in easy hearing of the battle, yet of 
the 50,000 none came in to cooperate. (Jackson should 
have done more for me than he did. When he wanted me 
at the Second Manassas, I marched two columns by night 
to clear the way at Thoroughfare Gap, and joined him in 
due season.) Hooker claimed at Glendale to have rolled 
me up and hurriedly thrown me over on Kearny, tennis-like, 
I suppose; but McCall showed in his supplementary report 
that Hooker could as well claim, with a little tension of the 
hyperbole, that he had thrown me over the moon. On leav¬ 
ing Frayser’s farm the Federals withdrew to Malvern Hill, 
and Lee concentrated his forces and followed them. 

On the morning of July 1st, the day after the battle at 
Frayser’s farm, we encountered the enemy at Malvern Hill, 
and General Lee asked me to make a reconnaissance and 
see if I could find a good position for the artillery. I found 
a position offering good play for batteries across the Federal 
left over to the right, and suggested that sixty pieces should 
be put in while Jackson engaged the Federal front. I sug¬ 
gested that a heavy play of this cross-fire on the Federals 
would so discomfit them as to warrant an assault by in¬ 


enemy had occupied only two hours before, and the dead and wounded 
were lying about us. General Field asked me to remain with the 
other members of the staff, and volunteered to go down to a water¬ 
course where he had seen water trickling, to fill the canteens and 
make some coffee for me, for I was much exhausted, having been 
thrown violently by a wounded horse during the battle. While Gen¬ 
eral Field was absent we saw, in the shadows, three or four men 
riding toward us, one of them being in advance and having a cloak 
thrown around him. I recognized the figure at once as that of a 
Federal officer. ‘What command is this?’ he asked. ‘General Field’s, 
sir/ was my answer. ‘General Field! I don’t know him.’ ‘Perhaps 
not, as you are evidently in the wrong place.’ 

“Fie at once turned to retreat, spurring his horse, and I gave the 
alarm. A soldier of the 47th Virginia (S. Brooke Rollins) now came 
forward and seized the bridle of the horse, saying to the rider, ‘Not 
so fast.’ The captured officer proved to be General McCall, of the 
Pennsylvania Reserves.” 

The staff officers were fired upon while attempting to ride back, 
and Captain H. J. Biddle, McCall’s adjutant-general, was instantly 
killed. Owing to the darkness the others escaped.— Editors. 


638 — 



“The Seven Days,” Including Frayser’s Farm 


fantry. General Lee issued his orders accordingly, and 
designated the advance of Armistead’s brigade as the sig¬ 
nal for the grand assault. Later it was found that the 
ground over which our batteries were to pass into position 
on our right was so rough and obstructed that of the artil¬ 
lery ordered for use there only one or two batteries could 
go in at a time. As our guns in front did not engage, the 
result was the enemy concentrated the fire of fifty or sixty 
guns upon our isolated batteries, and tore them into frag¬ 
ments in a few minutes after they opened, piling horses 
upon each other and guns upon horses. Before night, the 
fire from our batteries failing of execution, General Lee 
seemed to abandon the idea of an attack. He proposed to 
move around to the left with my own and A. P. Hill’s divi¬ 
sion, turning the Federal right. I issued my orders accord¬ 
ingly for the two divisions to go around and turn the Fed¬ 
eral right, when in some way unknown to me the battle was 
drawn on. We were repulsed at all points with fearful 
slaughter, losing six thousand men and accomplishing noth¬ 
ing. 

The Federals withdrew after the battle, and the next 
day I moved on around by the route which it was proposed 
we should take the day before. I followed the enemy to 
Harrison’s Landing, and Jackson went down by another 
route in advance of Lee. As soon as we reached the front 
of the Federal position we put out our skirmish-lines, and 
I ordered an advance, intending to make another attack, 
but revoked it on Jackson urging me to wait until the ar¬ 
rival of General Lee. Very soon General Lee came, and, 
after carefully considering the position of the enemy and 
of their gunboats on the James, decided that it would be 
better to forego any further operations. Our skirmish¬ 
lines vtere withdrawn, we ordered our troops back to their 
old lines around Richmond, and a month later McClellan’s 
army was withdrawn to the North. 

The Seven Days’ fighting, although a decided Con¬ 
federate victory, was a succession of mishaps. If Jackson 
had arrived on the 26th—the day of his own selection,—the 


— 639 — 


Battles and Leaders of the Civil War 


Federals would have been driven back from Mechanicsville 
without a battle. His delay there, caused by obstructions 
placed in his road by the enemy, was the first mishap. He 
was too late in entering the fight at Gaines's Mill, and the 
destruction of Grapevine Bridge kept him from reaching 
Frayser’s farm until the day after that battle. If he had 
been there, we might have destroyed or captured McClel¬ 
lan’s army. Huger was in position for the battle of Fray- 
ser’s farm, and after his batteries had misled me into open¬ 
ing the fight he subsided. Holmes and Magruder, who were 
on the New Market road to attack the Federals as they 
passed that way, failed to do so. 

General McClellan’s retreat was successfully managed; 
therefore we must give it credit for being well managed. 
He had 100,000 men, insisted to the authorities at Wash¬ 
ington that Lee had 200,000. In fact, Lee had only 90,000. 
General McClellan’s plan to take Richmond by a siege was 
wise enough, and it would have been a success if the Con¬ 
federates had consented to such a programme. In spite 
of McClellan’s excellent plans, General Lee, with a force 
inferior in numbers, completely routed him, and while suf¬ 
fering less than McClellan, captured over 10,000 of his men. 
General Lee’s plans in the Seven Days’ Fight were excel¬ 
lent, but were poorly executed. General McClellan was a 
very accomplished soldier and a very able engineer, but 
hardly equal to the position of field marshal as a military 
chieftain. He organized the Army of the Potomac cleverly, 
but did not handle it skillfully when in actual battle. Still 
I doubt if his retreat could have been better handled, though 
the rear of his army should have been more positively 
either in his own hands or in the hands of Sumner. Heint- 
zelman crossed the White Oak Swamp prematurely and left 
the rear of McClellan’s army exposed, which would have 
been fatal had Jackson come up and taken part in Magru- 
der’s affairs of the 29th near Savage’s Station. 

I cannot close this sketch without referring to the Con¬ 
federate commander when he came upon the scene for the 
first time. General Lee was an unusually handsome man, 


— 640 — 


“The Seven Days,” Including Frayser’s Farm 

even in his advanced life. He seemed fresh from West 
Point, so trim was his figure and so elastic his step. Out 
of battle he was as gentle as a woman, but when the clash 
of arms came he loved fight, and urged his battle with 
wonderful determination. As a usual thing he was re¬ 
markably well-balanced—always so, except on one or two 
occasions of severe trial when he failed to maintain his 
exact equipoise. Lee’s orders were always well considered 
and well chosen. He depended almost too much on his 
officers for their execution. Jackson was a very skillful 
man against such men as Shields, Banks, and Fremont, but 
when pitted against the best of the Federal commanders he 
did not appear so well. Without doubt the greatest man 
of rebellion times, the one matchless among forty millions 
for the peculiar difficulties of the period, was Abraham 
Lincoln. 

* ***** * 





— 641 — 



XV 


The Battle of Malvern Hill 

By Fitz John Porter, 
Major-General , U. S. V. 


Before the battle of Gaines’s Mill (already described 
in these pages), a change of base from the York to the 
James River had been anticipated and prepared for by Gen¬ 
eral McClellan. After the battle this change became a 
necessity, in presence of a strong and aggressive foe, who 
had already turned our right, cut. our connection with the 
York River, and was also in large force behind the intrench- 
ments between us and Richmond. The transfer was begun 
the moment our position became perilous. It now involved 
a series of battles by day and marches by night which 
brought into relief the able talents, active foresight, and 
tenacity of purpose of our commander, the unity of action 
on the part of his subordinates, and the great bravery, 
firmness, and confidence in their superiors on the part of 
the rank and file. 

These conflicts from the beginning of the Seven Days’ 
fighting were the engagement at Oak Grove, the battles of 
Beaver Dam Creek and Gaines’s Mill, the engagements of 
Golding’s and Garnett’s farms, and at Allen’s farm or Peach 
Orchard; the battle of Savage’s Station; the artillery duel 
at White Oak Swamp; the battle of Glendale (or Charles 
City cross-roads) ; the action of Turkey Creek, and the bat¬ 
tle of Malvern Hill. Each was a success to our army, the 
engagement of Malvern Hill being the most decisive. The 
result of the movement was that on the 2d of July our 
army was safely established at Harrison’s Landing, on the 
James, in accordance with General McClellan’s design. 
The present narrative will be confined to events coming 
under my own observation, and connected with my com¬ 
mand, the Fifth Army Corps. 


— 642 — 



The Battle of Malvern Hill 


Saturday, June 28th, 1862, the day after the battle of 
Gaines’s Mill, my corps spent in bivouac at the Trent farm 
on the south bank of the Chickahominy. Artillery and in¬ 
fantry detachments guarded the crossings at the sites of 
the destroyed bridges. Our antagonists of the 27th were 
still north of the river, but did not molest us. We rested 
and recuperated as best we could, amid the noise of battle 
close by, at Garnett’s and Golding’s farms, in which part of 
Franklin’s corps was engaged, refilling the empty cartridge- 
boxes and haversacks, so as to be in readiness for imme¬ 
diate duty. 

Our antagonists on the north bank of the river were 
apparently almost inactive. They seemed puzzled as to our 
intentions, or paralyzed by the effect of their own labors 
and losses, and, like ourselves, were recuperating for a re¬ 
newal of the contest in the early future; though to them, 
as well as to us, it was difficult to conjecture where that 
renewal would be made. The only evidence of activity on 
their part was the dust rising on the road down the river, 
which we attributed, with the utmost unconcern, to the 
movements of troops seeking to interrupt our already 
abandoned communications with York River. The absence 
of any indication of our intention to maintain those com¬ 
munications, together with the rumble of our artillery, 
which that night was moving southward opened the eyes 
of our opponents to the fact that we had accomplished the 
desired and perhaps necessary object of withdrawing to 
the south bank of the Chickahominy, and for the first time 
had aroused their suspicion that we were either intending 
to attack Richmond or temporarily abandon the siege, dur¬ 
ing a change of base to the James River. But the active 
spurts on the 27th and 28th of June made by the defen¬ 
ders of that city against our left created the false impres¬ 
sion that they designed to attack the Second, Third and 
Fourth Corps, and thereby succeeded in preventing an at¬ 
tack upon them. So, in order to thwart our plans, what¬ 
ever they might be, promptly on the 29th our opponents 
renewed their activity by advancing from Richmond, and 
by recrossing to the south bank of the river all their forces 


— 643 — 


Battles and Leaders of the Civil War 

lately employed at Gaines’s Mill. But at the time the main 
body of our army was beyond their immediate reach, taking 
positions to cover the passage of our trains to the new base 
and to be ready again to welcome our eager and earnest 
antagonist. 

Between 2 and 9 P. M. on the 28th, my corps was in 
motion and marched by the way of Savage Station to the 
south side of White Oak Swamp; and at the junction of 
the roads from Richmond (Glendale) to be prepared to repel 
attacks from the direction of that city, General Morell, 
leading the advance, aided General Woodbury, of the en¬ 
gineer corps, to build the causeways and bridges necessary 
for the easy passage of the trains and troops over the 
swamps and streams. Sykes and McCall followed at 5 and 
9 o’clock, respectively, McCall being accompanied by Hunt’s 
Artillery Reserve. We expected to reach our destination, 
which was only ten miles distant, early on the 29th; but, in 
consequence of the dark night and of the narrow and muddy 
roads, cut up and blocked by numerous trains and herds of 
cattle, the head of the column did not arrive until 10 A. M., 
the rear not till midnight. McCall arrived latest, and all 
were greatly fatigued. 

The enemy not having appeared at Glendale on the 
afternoon of the 29th, and other troops arriving to take 
the place of mine, General McClellan ordered me to move 
that night by the direct road to the elevated and cleared 
lands (Malvern Hill) on the north bank of Turkey Creek, 
there to select and hold a position behind which the army 
and all its trains could be withdrawn with safety. General 
Keyes was to move by a different road and form to my right 
and rear. 

Again the dangers and difficulties of night marches at¬ 
tended us, followed by the consequent delay, which, though 
fortunately it was counter-balanced by the slowness of our 
opponents in moving to the same point, endangered the safe¬ 
ty of our whole army. Although we started before dark, 
and were led by an intelligent cavalry officer who had passed 
over the route and professed to know it, my command did 


— 644 —. 


The Battle of Malvern Hill 


not reach Turkey Creek, which was only five miles distant, 
until 9 A. M. on the 30th. In fact, we were misled up the 
Long Bridge road toward Richmond until we came in con¬ 
tact with the enemy’s pickets. Then we returned and 
started anew. Fortunately I was at the head of the col¬ 
umn to give the necessary orders, so that no delay occurred 
in retracing our steps. 

Our new field of battle embraced Malvern Hill, just 
north of Turkey Creek and Crew’s Hill, about one mile 
farther north. Both hills have given name to the interest¬ 
ing and eventful battle which took place on July 1st, and 
which I shall now attempt to describe. 

The forces which on this occasion came under my con¬ 
trol, and were engaged in or held ready to enter the contest, 
were my own corps, consisting of Morell’s, Sykes’s and 
McCall’s divisions, Colonel H. J. Hunt’s Artillery Reserve 
of one hundred pieces, including Colonel R. 0. Tyler’s Con¬ 
necticut siege artillery, Couch’s division of Keyes’s corps, 
the brigades of John C. Caldwell and Thomas F. Meagher 
of Sumner’s corps, and the brigade of D. E. Sickles of 
Heintzelman’s corps. Though Couch was placed under my 
command, he was left uncontrolled by me, as will be seen 
hereafter. The other brigades were sent to me by their 
respective division commanders, in anticipation of my needs 
or at my request. 

This new position, with its elements of great strength 
was better adapted for a defensive battle than any with 
which we had been favored. It was elevated, and was more 
or less protected on each flank by small streams or by 
swamps while the woods in front through which the enemy 
had to pass to attack us were in places marshy and the tim¬ 
ber so thick that artillery could not be brought up, and even 
troops were moved in it with difficulty. Slightly in rear 
of our line of battle on Crew’s Hill the reserve artillery 
and infantry were held for immediate service. The hill 
concealed them from the view of the enemy and sheltered 
them to some extent from his fire. These hills, both to the 
east and west, were connected with the adjacent valleys 


— 645 — 


Battles and Leaders of the Civil War 


by gradually sloping plains except at the Crew house, where 
for a little distance the slope was quite abrupt, and was 
easily protected by a small force. With the exception of 
the River road, all the roads from Richmond, along which 
the enemy would be obliged to approach, meet in front of 
Crew’s Hill. This hill was flanked with ravines, enfiladed 
by our fire. The ground in front was sloping, and over it 
our artillery and infantry, themselves protected by the crest 
and ridges, had clear sweep for their fire. In all directions, 
for several hundred yards, the land over which an attack¬ 
ing force must advance was almost entirely cleared of forest 
and was generally cultivated. 

I reached Malvern Hill some two hours before my com¬ 
mand on Monday, June 30th; each division, as it came upon 
the field, was assigned to a position covering the approaches 
from Richmond along the River road and the debouches 
from the New Market, Charles City and Williamsburg roads. 
Warren, with his brigade of about six hundred men, took 
position on the lowlands to the left, to guard against the 
approach of the enemy along the River road, or over the 
low, extensive, and cultivated plateau beyond and extending 
north along Crew’s Hill. Warren’s men were greatly in need 
of rest. The brigade had suffered greatly at Gaines’s Mill, 
and was not expected to perform much more than picket 
duty, and it was large enough for the purpose designed, as 
it was not probable that any large force would be so reck¬ 
less as to advance on that road. Warren was supported by 
the 11th U. S. Infantry, under Major Floyd-Jones, and late 
in the afternoon was strengthened by Martin’s battery of 
12-pounders, and a detachment of the 3d Pennsylvania cav¬ 
alry under Lieutenant Frank W. Hess. 

On the west side of Malvern Hill, overlooking Warren, 
were some thirty-six guns, some of long range, having full 
sweep up the valley and over the cleared lands north of the 
River road. These batteries composed Captain S. H. Weed’s 
Battery I, 5th U. S. Artillery, Captain John Edward’s Bat¬ 
teries L and M, 3d U. S. Artillery, J. H. Carlisle’s Battery 
E, 2d U. S. Artillery, John R. Smead’s Battery K, 5th U. S. 


— 646 —• 


The Battle of Malvern Hill 


Artillery, and Adolph Voeglee’s, Battery B, 1st N. T. Artil¬ 
lery Battalion, with others in reserve. To these, later in 
the day, were added the siege guns of the 1st Connecticut 
Artillery, under Colonel Robert 0. Tyler, which were placed 
on elevated ground immediately to the left of the Malvern 
House, so as to fire over our front line at any attacking 
force, and to sweep the low meadow on the left. 

To General (then Colonel) Hunt, the accomplished and 
energetic chief of artillery, was due the excellent posting 
of these batteries on June 30th, and the rearrangement of 
all the artillery along the whole line on Tuesday (July 1st), 
together with the management of the reserve artillery on 
that day. 

Major Charles S. Lovell, commanding Colonel William 
Chaplan's brigade of Sykes's division, supported some of 
these batteries, and, with the brigade of Buchanan on his 
right, in a clump of pines, extended the line northward, 
near the Crew (sometimes called the Mellert) house. 

Morell, prolonging Sykes's line on Crew's Hill, with 
headquarters at Crew'§ house, occupied the right of the 
line extending to the Quaker road. To his left front, fac¬ 
ing west, was the 14th New York Volunteers, under Colonel 
McQuade, with a section of Captain W. B. Weeden’s Bat¬ 
tery C, 1st Rhode Island Artillery, both watching the Rich¬ 
mond road and the valley and protecting our left. On their 
right, under cover of a narrow strip of woods, skirting the 
Quaker road, were the brigades of Martindale and Butter¬ 
field, while in front of these, facing north, was Griffin's 
brigade. All were supporting batteries of Morell’s division, 
commanded by Captain Weeden and others, under the gen¬ 
eral supervision of Griffin, a brave and skilled artillery offi¬ 
cer.* 


*These batteries as located on Tuesday, the day of the battle, 
were those of Edwards, Livingston, Kingsbury, Ames, part of Wee¬ 
den’s under Waterman, part of Allen’s under Hyde, and Bramhall’s. 
Other batteries as they arrived were posted in reserve south of Crew’s 
Hill, and were used to replace batteries whose ammunition was ex¬ 
hausted or were thrown forward into action to strengthen the line. 

The different commands as soon as they were posted prepared 
to pass the night (June 30th) in securing the rest greatly needed both 


— 647 — 



Battles and Leaders of the Civil War 

About 3 o’clock on Monday the enemy was seen ap¬ 
proaching along the River road, and Warren and Hunt made 
all necessary dispositions to receive them. About 4 o’clock 
the enemy advanced and opened fire from their artillery 
upon Warren and Sykes and on the extreme left of Morell, 
causing a few casualties in Morell’s division. In return for 
this intrusion the concentrated rapid fire of artillery was 
opened upon them, soon smashing one battery to pieces, 
silencing another, and driving back their infantry and cav¬ 
alry in rapid retreat, much to the satisfaction of thousands 
of men watching the result. The enemy left behind in 
possession of Warren a few prisoners, two guns and six 
caissons, the horses of which had been killed. The bat¬ 
tery which had disturbed Morell was also silenced by this 
fire of artillery. On this occasion the gun-boats in the 
James River made apparent their unwelcome presence and 
gave good support by bringing their heavy guns to bear 
upon the enemy. Though their fire caused a few casual¬ 
ties among our men, and inflicted but little, if any, injury 
upon the enemy, their large shells were bursting amid the 
enemy’s troops, far beyond the attacking force, carried great 
moral influence with them, and naturally tended, in addi¬ 
tion to the effect of our artillery, to prevent any renewed 
attempt to cross the open valley on our left. This attacking 
force formed a small part of Wise’s brigade of Holmes’s di¬ 
vision. They were all raw troops, which accounts for their 
apparently demoralized retreat. This affair is known as 
the action of Turkey Bridge or Malvern Cliff.* * 


by man and beast. Later on June 30th Couch’s division of Keyes’s 
corps came up and took its place, extending Morell’s line to the 
right of the Quaker road. The greater part of the supply trains 
of the army and of the reserve artillery passed safely beyond Turkey 
Creek through the commands thus posted, the movement only ceasing 
about 4 o’clock in the afternoon.— F\ J. P. 

*Some idea may be formed from the following incident of how 
indifferent to noises or unconscious of sudden alarms one may become 
when asleep, under the sense of perfect security or from the effect 
of fatigue. For several days I had been able to secure but little sleep, 
other than such as I could catch on horseback, or while resting for 
a few minutes. During this heavy artillery firing I was asleep in the 


L 


— 648 — 



The Battle of Malvern Hill 

Our troops lay on their arms during the night, in sub¬ 
stantially the positions I have described, patiently awaiting 
the attack expected on the following day. 

McCall’s division of Pennsylvania Reserves, now under 
General Truman Seymour, arrived during the night and 
was posted just in front of the Malvern house, and was 
held in reserve to be called upon for service only in case of 
absolute necessity.* * 


Malvern House. Although the guns were within one hundred yards 
of me, I was greatly surprised some two hours afterward to learn 
that the engagement had taken place. For weeks I had slept with 
senses awake to the sound of distant cannon, and even of a musket- 
shot, and would be instantly aroused by either. But on this occasion 
I had gone to sleep free from care, feeling confident that however 
strong an attack might be made, the result would be the repulse of 
the enemy without much damage to us. My staff, as much in need of 
rest as myself, sympathized with me and let me sleep.— F. J. P. 

*This division had reached me at New Market cross-roads at 
midnight of the 29th, greatly in need of rest. This fact, and the neces¬ 
sity that a reliable force should hold that point until the whole army 
had crossed the White Oak Swamp and the trains had passed to the 
rear, compelled the assignment of McCall to the performance of that 
duty. During the afternoon of the 30th he was attacked by large 
forces of the enemy, which he several times repulsed; but he failed to 
enjoy the advantages of his success through the recklessness and ir¬ 
repressible impetuosity of his men or the forgetfulness of orders by 
infantry subordinates. They were strictly cautioned, unless unusual 
fortune favored them, not to pass through a battery for the purpose 
of pursuing a repulsed enemy, and under no circumstances to return 
in face of one, so as to check its fire. In the excitement of presumed 
success at repulsing a heavy attack, a brigade pushed after a rapidly 
fleeing foe, and was impulsively joined by its neighbors who wished 
not to be excelled in dash or were perhaps encouraged by injudicious 
orders. Passing through their own batteries as they advanced, they 
lost the benefit of their fire, as they did also when returning after 
being repulsed and pursued by the enemy’s reserves. Disregard of 
these principles at this time caused heavy losses of men, and led to 
the demoralization at a critical moment of one good volunteer bat¬ 
tery and the capture, through no fault of its commander, of one of 
the best batteries of the regular army. This battery was commanded 
by Lieutenant A. M. Randol, a brave and accomplished artillery officer 
of the regular army. This division had otherwise suffered heavily. 
At Gaines’s Mill it had lost, by capture, one of the ablest generals, 
John F. Reynolds, with other gallant and efficient officers and men, 
captured, killed or wounded. Its misfortunes culminated in the cap¬ 
ture at New Market cross-roads of McCall, the wounding of General 
George C. Meade, his able assistant, and the loss of many excellent 
subordinates. Fortunately the brave and experienced soldier, General 
Seymour, with his worthy officers, escaped to lead the survivors of 
the division to our camp, where they were welcomed by their sympa¬ 
thizing comrades.— F.J.P. 


— 649 — 



Battles and Leaders of the Civil War 


Early on Tuesday our lines were re-formed and slightly 
advanced to take full advantage of the formation of the 
ground, the artillery of the front line being reposted in com¬ 
manding positions and placed under General Griffin’s com¬ 
mand, but under Captain Weeden’s care, just behind the 
crest of the hill. The infantry was arranged between the 
artillery to protect and be protected by its neighbors, and 
prepared to be thrown forward, if at any time advisable, so 
as not to interfere with the artillery fire. 


- 650 — 


Map of the Battle of Malvern Hill, Showing, Ap¬ 
proximately, Positions of Brigades 
ano Batteries 



— 651 — 

























Battles and Leaders of the Civil War 


NOTES TO MAP, Page 651 

The Union batteries, as indicated on the map, were: 1, Martin's; 
2, Tyler’s; 3, 4, 5, 6, batteries in reserve; 7, Hunt’s reserve artillery; 
8 and 11, first and second positions of Waterman’s (Weeden’s) ; 9-9, 
Edwards’, Livingston’s, Ames’, Kingsbury’s, and Hyde’s; 10, Snow’s, 
Frank’s and Hyde’s; 11, Kingsbury’s and Seeley’s. 

On the Union side the chief variations from these positions were 
the advance of a part of Butterfield’s brigade, between Griffin and 
Couch, and the transfer of batteries from Morell to Couch. During 
the afternoon Sickles’ brigade took the place of Caldwell’s, which had 
come up to Couch’s aid and had suffered severely. Meagher advanced 
about 5 o’clock, accompanied by 32-pounders under Colonel H. J. 
Hunt, which did terrible execution. 

The Confederate brigades are placed in the order of their at¬ 
tack; those marked with an arrow were in the charges or in the front 
line after dark. It is difficult to fix the positions of the Confederate 
artillery. In general, 12 indicates Moorman’s, Grimes’, and Pegram’s; 
and 13 denotes the position of Balthis’, Poague’s, and Carpenter’s. 
In other positions the batteries of Wooding (one section under Lieu¬ 
tenant Jones), Carrington, Hardaway, Bondurant, Hart, McCarthy, 
and the Baltimore‘Light Artillery were engaged to some extent.— 
Editors. 

The road passing Willis Church and uniting, north of the West 
house, with the road to Richmond (via Darbytown road) was known 
locally as the Quaker road. Union generals and, with few exceptions, 
Confederate generals, mean that highway whenever they mention 
the Quaker road. An unused road nearly two miles farther west, 
communicating between the Long Bridge road and Charles City 
(River) road, was sometimes called the Quaker road. 

General Magruder supposed he was to take the latter road when 
ordered to move by the “Quaker road,” and ascribed to that mistake 
his delay in getting into position on the right of Jackson and Malvern 
Hill.— Editors. 


The corps of Heintzelman and Sumner had arrived 
during the night and taken position in the order named to 
the right and rear of Couch’s division, protecting that flank 
effectively toward Western Run.* They did not expect to 
be seriously engaged, but were ready to resist attack and 
to give assistance to the center and left, if circumstances 
should require it. At an early hour in the day Sumner 
kindly sent me Caldwell’s brigade, as he thought I might 
need help. This brigade I placed near Butterfield, who was 
directed to send it forward wherever it should be needed or 
called for. He sent it to Couch at an opportune moment 
early in the day. 

General McClellan, accompanied by his staff, visited 
our lines at an early hour, and approved my measures and 


* Franklin’s corps and French’s brigade of Sumner’s corps arrived 
at Malvern Hill on the morning of July 1st. During the day Frank¬ 
lin’s columns were in line of battle on the right of Sumner.— Editors. 

..J : ->■- '■ 1 • .r-"..w. 


._ 


— 652 -— 



The Battle of Malvern Hill 


those of General Couch, or changed them where it was 
deemed advisable. Though he left me in charge of that 
part of the field occupied by Couch, I at no time undertook 
to control that general, or even indicated a desire to do so, 
but with full confidence in his ability, which was justified 
by the result of his action, left him free to act in accordance 
with his own judgment. I cooperated with him fully, how¬ 
ever, having Morell’s batteries, under Weeden, posted so as 
to protect his front, and sending him help when I saw h6 
needed it. The division of Couch, though it suffered se¬ 
verely in the battle of Fair Oaks, had seen less service and 
met with fewer losses in these “Seven Days’ battles” than 
any one of my three and was prepared with full ranks to 
receive an attack, seeming impatient and eager for the fight. 
Its conduct soon confirmed this impression. Batteries of 
Hunt’s Artillery Reserve were sent to him when needed— 
and also Caldwell’s brigade, voluntarily sent to me early in 
the day by Sumner, and Sickles’s brigade, borrowed of 
Heintzelman for the purpose. 

About 10 A. M. the enemy’s skirmishers and artillery 
began feeling for us along our line; they kept up a desul¬ 
tory fire until about 12 o’clock, with no severe injury to our 
infantry, who were well masked, and who revealed but little 
of our strength or position, retaliatory firing or exposure. 

Up to this time and until nearly 1 o’clock our infantry 
were resting upon their arms and waiting the moment, cer¬ 
tain to come, when the column of the enemy rashly advanc¬ 
ing would render it necessary to expose themselves. Our 
desire was to hold the enemy where our artillery would be 
most destructive, and to reserve our infantry ammunition 
for close quarters to repel the more determined assaults 
of our obstinate and untiring foe. Attacks by brigade were 
made upon Morell, both on his left front and on his right, 
and also upon Couch; but our artillery, admirably handled, 
without exception, was generally sufficient to repel all such 
efforts and to drive back the assailants in confusion, and 
with great loss. 

While the enemy’s artillery was firing upon us General 
Sumner withdrew part of his corps to the slope of Malvern 


— 653 — 


Battles and Leaders of the Civil War 

Hill, to the right of the Malvern house, which descended 
into the valley of Western Run. Then, deeming it advisable 
to withdraw all our troops to that line, he ordered me to 
fall back to Malvern House; but I protested that such a 
movement would be disastrous and declined to obey the 
order until I could confer with General McClellan, who had 
approved of the disposition of our troops. Fortunately 
Sumner did not insist upon my complying with the order, 
and, as we were soon vigorously attacked, he advanced his 
troops to a point where he was but little disturbed by the 
enemy, but from which he could quickly render aid in re¬ 
sponse to calls for help or where need for help was appar¬ 
ent.* 

The spasmodic, though sometimes formidable attacks 
of our antagonists, at different points along our whole front, 
up to about 4 o’clock, were presumably demonstrations or 
feelers, to ascertain our strength, preparatory to their en¬ 
gaging in more serious work. An ominous silence, similar 
to that which had preceded the attack in force along our 
whole line at Gaines’s Mill, now intervened, until at about 
5:30 o’clock, the enemy opened upon both Morell and Couch 
with artillery from nearly the whole of his front, and soon 
afterward pressed forward his columns of infantry, first on 
one and then on the other, or on both. As if moved by a 
reckless disregard of life, equal to that displayed at Gaines’s 
Mill, with a determination to capture our army, or destroy 
it by driving it into the river, regiment after regimnet, and 
brigade after brigade, rushed at our batteries; but the artil¬ 
lery of both Morell and Couch mowed them down with shrap¬ 
nel, grape, and canister; while our infantry, withholding 


*On one occasion when I sent an urgent request for two brigades, 
Sumner read my note aloud, and, fearing he could not stand another 
draft on his forces, was hesitating to respond, when Heintzelman, ever 
prompt and generous, sprang to his feet and exclaimed: “By Jove! 
if Porter asks for help, I know he needs it and I will send it.” The 
immediate result was the sending of Meagher by Sumner and Sickles 
and Heintzelman. This was the second time that Sumner had se¬ 
lected and sent me Meagher’s gallant Irish brigade, and each time 
it rendered invaluable service. I had served under General Heintzel¬ 
man up to the capture of Yorktown and I ever appreciated his act 
as the prompting of a thoughtful, generous, and chivalrous nature. 
— F. J. P. 


— 654 — 



The Battle of Malvern Hill 


their fire until the enemy were within short range, scattered 
the remnants of their columns, sometimes following them up 
and capturing prisoners and colors.* 

As column after column advanced, only to meet the 
same disastrous repulse, the sight became one of the most 
interesting imaginable. The havoc made by the rapidly 
bursting shells from guns arranged so as to sweep any posi¬ 
tion far or near, and in any direction, was fearful to be- 

*Captain William B. Weeden, in a letter dated May 24th, 1885, 
says of the battle: “It was a fine afternoon, hot but tempered by a 
cooling breeze. The soldiers waited; patience, not courage, kept them 
steady. The ranks were full now; each knew that in himself he might 
be a possible victor or a possible victim by nightfall. Crew’s de¬ 
serted house, more hospitable than its owner, had furnished a luxury 
seldom enjoyed in the field. Water, not warm in the canteen but iced 
in a delf pitcher with glasses, was literally ‘handed around.’ Pick¬ 
ets and skirmishers had kept us informed of the opposing formations 
and of batteries going into position. The sharp-shooters’ bullets be¬ 
gan to thicken. Action might begin at any moment, and between 
2 and 3 o’clock it did begin. Out of the woods, puffs of smoke from 
guns and nearer the light wreaths from their shells lent new colors 
to the green of woods and fields and the deep blue sky. The mus¬ 
ketry cracked before it loudened into a roar, and whizzing bullets 
mingled with ragged exploding shells. The woods swarmed with 
butternut coats and gray. These colors were worn by a lively race 
of men and they stepped forward briskly, firing as they moved. The 
regimental formations were plainly visible, with the colors flying. It 
was the onset of battle with the good order of review. In this first 
heavy skirmish—the prelude of the main action—Magruder’s right 
made a determined attack by way of the meadow to pierce Griffin’s 
line to turn Ames’s Battery and to break the solid advantages of posi¬ 
tion held by the Union forces. 

“The brunt of the blow fell upon Colonel McQuade’s 14th N.Y. 
This was a gallant regiment which had suffered much in the rough 
work at Gaines’ Mill. The Confederate charge was sudden and 
heavy. The New Yorkers began to give ground, and it looked for 
a moment as if the disasters of Gaines’s Mill might be repeated. 
But only for a moment. The men stiffened up to the color line, charged 
forward with a cheer, and drove back the enemy. Weeden’s Rhode 
Island Battery of three-inch rifled ordnance guns had lost three pieces 
at Gaines’s Mill. The remaining guns, under command of Lieutenant 
Waterman, were stationed south and west of Crew’s fronting left 
and rearward. It was the angle of our position, and so far west 
that Tyler’s heavy guns mistook it for the enemy and fired 4-2-inch 
shells into it. One caused severe casualties. The battery was with¬ 
drawn from this dangerous range, and later in the afternoon, when 
the main action was raging, Waterman’s three guns, with two of the 
same type under Lieutenant Phillips of Massachusetts relieved Kings¬ 
bury and Hazzard’s regular batteries of Parrotts on Couch’s right. 
The service here was admirable. Waterman with only half a battery 
had a whole company of experienced gunners. When the ammunition 
gave out they were in turn relieved by a fresh battery.”— Editors. 


— 655 — 



Battles and Leaders of the Civil War 


hold. Pressed to the extreme as they were, the courage of 
our men was fully tried. The safety of our army—the life 
of the Union—was felt to be at stake. In one case the bri¬ 
gades of Howe, Abercrombie, and Palmer, of Couch’s divi¬ 
sion, under impulse gallantly pushed after the retreating 
foe, captured colors, and advantageosuly advanced the right 
of the line, but at considerable loss and great risk. The 
brigades of Morell, cool, well-disciplined, and easily con¬ 
trolled, let the enemy return after each repulse, but per¬ 
mitted few to escape their fire. Colonel McQuade, on Mo- 
rell’s left, with the 14th New York, against orders and at 
the risk of defeat and disaster, yielding to impulse, gallantly 
dashed forward and repulsed an attacking party. Assisted 
by Buchanan of Sykes’s division, Colonel Rice, with the 
44th New York Volunteers, likewise drove a portion of the 
enemy from the field, taking a flag bearing the inscription 
“Seven Pines.” Colonel Hunt, directing the artillery, was 
twice dismounted by having his horse shot under him, but 
though constantly exposed continued his labors until after 
dark. General Couch, who was also dismounted in like 
manner, took advantage of every opportunity to make his 
opponents feel his blows. 

It is not to be supposed that our men, though concealed 
by the irregularities of the ground, were not sufferers from 
the enemy’s fire. The fact is that before they exposed them¬ 
selves by pursuing the enemy, the ground was literally 
covered with the killed and wounded from dropping bullets 
and bursting shells and their contents; but they bravely 
bore the severe trial of having to remain inactive under 
a damaging fire. 

As Morell’s front ranks became thinned out and the 
ammunition was exhausted, other regiments eagerly ad¬ 
vanced; all were stimulated by the hope of a brilliant and 
permanent success, and nerved by the approving shouts of 
their comrades and the cry of “Revenge, boys!” “Remember 
McLane!” “Remember Black!” “Remember Gove!” or “Re¬ 
member Cass!” Black and McLane and Gove had been 
killed at Gaines’s Mill; Woodbury and Cass were then lying 


— 656 ^~ 


The Battle of Malvern Hill 

before them.* Colonel McQuade was the only regimental 
commander of Griffin’s brigade who escaped death during 
the Seven Days, and he was constantly exposed. 

During that ominous silence of which I have spoken, I 
determined that our opponents should reap no advantage, 
even if our lines yielded to attack, and therefore posted 
batteries, as at Gaines’s Mill, to secure against the disaster 
of a break in our lines, should such a misfortune be ours. 
For this purpose I sent Wood, Carlisle, and Smead, with 
their batteries, to the gorge of the roads on Crew’s Hill, 
from which the enemy must emerge in pursuit if he should 
break our lines; instructing them to join in the fight if 
necessary, but not to permit the advance of the foe, even 
if it must be arrested at the risk of firing upon friends. 
To these Colonel Hunt added three batteries of horse artil¬ 
lery. Though they were all thus posted and their guns 
loaded with double canister, “they were,” as Captain Smead 
reported, “very happy to find their services not needed on 
that occasion.” 

It was at this time, in answer to my call for aid, that 
Sumner sent me Meagher, and Heintzelman sent Sickles, 
both of whom reached me in the height of battle, when, if 
ever, fresh troops would renew our confidence and insure 
our success. While riding rapidly forward to meet Mea¬ 
gher, who was approaching at a “double-quick” step, my 
horse fell, throwing me over his head, much to my disbom- 
fort both of body and mind. On rising and remounting I 
was greeted with hearty cheers, which alleviated my cha¬ 
grin. This incident gave rise to the report, spread through 
the country, that I was wounded. Fearing that I might 
fall into the hands of the enemy, and if so my diary and 
' dispatch-book of the campaign, then on my person, would 
meet with the sarhe fate and reveal information to the 
injury of our cause, I tore it up, scattering the pieces to 
the winds, as I rode rapidly forward, leading Meagher into 

* Colonel Samuel W. Black, of the 62d Pennsylvania,’Colonel John 
W. McLane, of the 83d Pennsylvania, Colonel Jesse A. Gove,. of .the 
22d Massachusetts, Colonel Dwight A. Woodbury, of the 4th Mich¬ 
igan, and Colonel Thomas Cass, of ; the 9th ^Massachusetts.—- Editors. 


— 657 ^ 



Battles and Leaders of the Civil War 


action. I have always regretted my act as destroying in¬ 
teresting and valuable memoranda of our campaign. 

Advancing with Meagher’s brigade, accompanied by 
my staff, I soon found that our forces had successfully 
driven back their assailants. Determined, if possible, satis¬ 
factorily to finish the contest, regardless of the risk of being 
fired upon by our artillery in case of defeat, I pushed on 
beyond our lines into the woods held by the enemy. About 
fifty yards in front of us, a large force of the enemy sud¬ 
denly rose and opened with fearful volleys upon our advanc¬ 
ing line. I turned to the brigade which thus far had kept 
pace with my horse, and found it standing “like a stone 
wall,” and returning a fire more destructive than it re¬ 
ceived and from which the enemy fled. The brigade was 
planted. My presence was no longer needed, and I sought 
General Sickles, whom I found giving aid to Couch. I had 
the satisfaction of learning that night that a Confederate 
detachment, undertaking to turn Meagher’s left, was met 
by a portion of the 69th New York Regiment, which, ad¬ 
vancing, repelled the attack and captured many prisoners. 

After seeing that General Sickles was in a proper po¬ 
sition, I returned to my own corps, where I was joined by 
Colonel Hunt with some 32-pounder howitzers. Taking 
those howitzers, we rode forward beyond our lines, and, in 
parting salutation to our opponents, Colonel Hunt sent a 
few shells, as a warning of what would be ready to welcome 
them on the morrow if they undertook to disturb us. 

Almost at the crisis of the battle—just before the ad¬ 
vance of Meagher and Sickles—the gun-boats on the James 
River opened their fire with the good intent of aiding us, 
but either mistook our batteries at the Malvern house for 
those of the enemy, or were unable to throw their pro¬ 
jectiles beyond us. If the former was the case, their range 
was well estimated, for all their shot landed in or close by 
Tyler’s battery, killing and wounding a few of his men. 
Fortunately members of our excellent signal-service corps 
were present as usual on such occasions, and the message 
signaled to the boats, “For God’s sake, stop firing,” promptly 
relieved us from further damage and the demoralization of 


— 658 — 


The Battle of Malvern Hill 


a “fire in the rear.” Reference is occasionally seen in 
Confederate accounts of this battle to the fearful sounds 
of the projectiles from those gun-boats. But that after¬ 
noon not one of their projectiles passed beyond my head¬ 
quarters ; and I have always believed and said, as has Gen¬ 
eral Hunt, that the enemy mistook the explosions of shells 
from Tyler’s siege-guns and Kusserow’s 32-pounder how¬ 
itzers, which Hunt had carried forward, for shells from 
the gun-boats. 

While Colonel Hunt and I were returning from the 
front, about 9 o’clock, we were joined by Colonel A. V. 
Colburn, of McClellan’s staff. We all rejoiced over the 
day’s success. By these officers I sent messages to the 
commanding general, expressing the hope that our with¬ 
drawal had ended and that we should hold the ground that 
we now occupied, even if we did not assume the offensive. 
From my standpoint I thought we could maintain our posi¬ 
tion, and perhaps in a few days could improve it by advanc¬ 
ing. But I knew only the circumstances before me, and 
these were limited by controlling influences. It was now 
after 9 o’clock at night. Within an hour of the time that 
Colonels Hunt and Colburn left me, and before they could 
have reached the commanding general, I received orders 
from him to withdraw, and to direct Generals Sumner and 
Heintzelman to move at specified hours to Harrison’s Land¬ 
ing, and General Couch to rejoin his corps, which was then- 
under way to the same point.* 

*The order referred to read as follows: 

Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 9 P.M., July 1st, 1862 . 

“ Brigadier-General F. J. Porter, commanding Fifth Provisional 
Corps; — General: 

“The General Commanding desires you to move your command 
at once, the artillery reserve moving first to Harrison’s Bar. In 
case you should find it impossible to move your heavy artillery, you 
are to spike the guns and destroy the carriages. Couch’s command 
will move under your orders. Communicate these instructions to him 
at once. The corps of Heintzelman and Sumner will move next. 
Please communicate to General Heintzelman the time of your moving. 
Additional gun-boats, supplies, and reenforcements will be met at 
Harrison’s Bar. Stimulate your men by informing them that 
reenforcements, etc., have arrived at our new base. By command of 
MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN, James A. Hardie, Lieutenant- 
Colonel, A.D.C., A.A.A.G.” 


— 659 — 



Battles and Leaders of the Civil War 


These orders were immediately sent to the proper offi¬ 
cers, and by daybreak, July 2d, our troops, preceded by 
their trains, were well on their way to their destination, 
which they reached that day, greatly wearied after a hard 
march over muddy roads, in the midst of a heavy rain. That 
night, freed from care and oblivious of danger, all slept a 
long sleep; and they awoke the next morning with the clear 
sun, a happier, brighter, and stronger body of men than 
that which all the day before, depressed and fatigued, had 
shivered in the rain. 

The conduct of the rear-guard was intrusted to Colonel 
Averell, commander of the 3d Pennsylvania Cavalry, sus¬ 
tained by Colonel Buchanan, with his brigade of regulars, 
and the 67th New York Regiment. No trying trust was 
ever better bestowed or more satisfactorily fulfilled. At 
daybreak Colonel Averell found himself accidentally without 
artillery to protect his command in its difficult task of pre¬ 
venting an attack before our rear was well out of range. 
He at once arranged his cavalry in bodies to represent horse- 
batteries, and, maneuvering them to create the impression 
that they were artillery ready for action, he secured him¬ 
self from attack until the rest of the army and trains had 
passed sufficiently to the rear to permit him to retire rapidly 
without molestation. His strategem was successful, and 
without loss he rejoined the main body of the army that 
night. Thus ended the memorable “Seven Days’ battles,” 
which, for severity and for stubborn resistance and en¬ 
durance of hardships by the contestants, were not surpassed 
during the war. Each antagonist accomplished the result 
for which he aimed: one insuring the temporary relief 
of Richmond; the other gaining security on the north bank 
of the James, where the Union army, if opr civil and mil¬ 
itary authorities were disposed, could be promptly reen¬ 
forced, and from whence only, as subsequent events proved, 
it could renew the contest successfully. Preparations were 
commenced and dispositions were at once made under every 
prospect, if not direct promise, of large reenforcements for 
a renewal of the struggle on the south bank of the James, 


— 660 — 


The Battle of Malvern Hill 


and in the same manner as subsequenly brought a successful 
termination of the war. 

In the Fifth Corps, however, mourning was mingled 
with rejoicing. Greatly injured by the mishap of a cavalry 
blunder at Gaines’s Mill, it had at Malvern, with the brave 
and gallant help of Couch and the generous and chivalric 
assistance of Heintzelman and Sumner, successfully re¬ 
pulsed the foe, in every quarter, and was ready to renew 
the contest at an opportune moment. Our killed and 
wounded were numbered by thousands; the loss of the Con¬ 
federates may be imagined.* 

While taking Meagher’s brigade to the front, I crossed 
a portion of the ground over which a large column had 
advanced to attack us, and had a fair opportunity of judg¬ 
ing of the effect of our fire upon the ranks of the enemy. 
It was something fearful and sad to contemplate; few steps 
could be taken without trampling upon the body of a dead 
or wounded soldier, or without hearing a piteous cry, beg¬ 
ging our party to be careful. In some places the bodies 
were in continuous lines and in heaps. In Mexico I had 
seen fields of battle on which our armies-had been victor¬ 
ious, and had listened to pitiful appeals; but the pleaders 
were not of my countrymen then, and did not, as now, cause 
me to deplore the effects of a fratricidal war. 

Sadder still was the trying scenes in and around Mal¬ 
vern house, which at an early hour that day had been given 
up to the wounded, and was soon filled with our unfortu¬ 
nate men, suffering from all kinds of wounds. At night, 
after issuing orders for the withdrawal of our troops, I 
passed through the building and the adjoining hospitals 
with my senior officer (medical), Colonel George H. Ly¬ 
man. Our object was to inspect the actual condition of 

*It is impossible to estimate the casualties of each of these 
battles, so quickly did one follow another. Our total loss in these 
battles is recorded at 15,849, while of the Confederates sums up to 
20,135. The loss in the Fifth Corps was 7601. This does not 
include the losses of Slocum’s division and Cooke’s cavalry engaged 
with us at Gaines’s Mill, nor of Couch’s division and the brigades 
of Caldwell, Meagher, and Sickles serving with it at Malvern. 
(See pp. 314-318.)— F. J. P. 


— 661 — 



Battles and Leaders of the Civil War 


the men, to arrange for their care and comfort, and to cheer 
them as best we could. Here, as usual, were found men 
mortally wounded, by necessity left unattended by the sur¬ 
geons, so that prompt and proper care might be given to 
those in whom there was no hope of recovery. 

While passing through this improvised hospital I heard 
of many sad cases. One was that of the major of the 12th 
New York Volunteers, a brave and gallant officer, highly 
esteemed, who was believed to be mortally wounded. 
While breathing his last, as was supposed, a friend asked 
him if he had any message to leave. He replied, “Tell 
my wife that with my last thoughts were blended herself, 
my boy, and my flag/’ Then he asked how the battle had 
gone, and when told that we had been successful he said, 

“God bless the old fla-” and fell back apparently dead. 

For a long time he was mourned as dead, and it was believed 
that he had expired with the prayer left unfinished on his 
closing lips. Though still an invalid, suffering from the 
wound then received, that officer recovered to renew his 
career in the war.* 

On the occasion of this visit we frequently witnessed 
scenes which would melt the stoutest heart: bearded men 
piteously begging to be sent home; others requesting that 
a widowed mother or orphan sisters might be cared for; 
more sending messages to wife or children, or to others 
near and dear to them. We saw the amputated limbs and 
the bodies of the dead hurried out of the room for burial. 
On every side we heard appeals of the unattended, the moans 
of the dying, and the shrieks of those under the knife of the 
surgeon. We gave what cheer we could, and left with heavy 
hearts. 

At noon on the 4th of July the usual national salute 
was fired, and the different corps were reviewed. General 
McClellan, as opportunity offered, made a few remarks full 
of hope and encouragement, thanking the men in most 
feeling terms for their uniform bravery, fortitude, and 

* Afterward Brevet Major-General Henry A. Barnum.— Editors. 


— 662 — 




The Battle of Malvern Hill 

good conduct, but intimating that this was not the last of 
the campaign. 

Contrary, however, to his expectations, the Peninsular 
campaign of the Army of the Potomac for 1862 virtually 
ended on the 4th of July. From that date to August 14th, 
when the army at sundown took up its march for Fort 
Monroe, its commander was engaged in the struggle to retain 
it on the James, as against the determination of the Secre¬ 
tary of War to withdraw it to the line of the Rappahannock, 
there to act in conjunction with the Army of Virginia. 

Although General McClellan was assured, in writing, 
that he was to have command of both armies after their 
junction, he preferred, as a speedy and the only practical 
mode of taking Richmond, to remain on the James, and 
renew the contest from the south bank, for which he had 
commenced operations.* During this period he omitted 
nothing which would insure the removal of the army without 
loss of men and material. The withdrawal of the army 
changed the issue from the capture of Richmond to the 
security of Washington, transferred to the Federals the 
anxiety of the Confederates for their capital, and sounded 
an alarm throughout the Northern States. 

*It was publicly announced that Halleck would assume command 
and take the field. Pope had reason to believe that “he would 
eventually supersede McClellan” and McDowell had been so satisfied 
of his future supremacy that he confided to a friend that “he would 
be at the highest round of the ladder.”— F. J. P. 

******* 


— 663 — 



XVI 


The Army of the Potomac at Harrison’s Landing 

By George L. Kilmer, 

Company D, 27th N. Y. Volunteers 


The withdrawal of General McClellan's army from 
Malvern Hill, a position that seemed to be impregnable, 
was a surprise to the men in the ranks, and for the first time 
in the campaign they became discouraged. During July 
2d rain fell copiously, and when the columns arrived at 
Harrison’s Landing the fields were soaked and the soil was 
quickly reduced to paste by the men and trains. The 
infantry and the division wagons and batteries were drawn 
up in an immense field of standing wheat near the Harrison 
mansion, also called Berkeley. The grain was trampled 
into the soil, or laid down so as to serve under the tents 
as protection from the wet ground. Neither wood nor 
boards were to be had, • and the army was exceedingly 
uncomfortable. Transports in the James landed rations, 
which proved a great blessing, since many of the men had 
not had food in forty-eight hours. The rain continued all 
night, and the flimsy wheat floors were soon floating in 
pools of water; besides, the soil would not hold the tent- 
pins, and in the morning the tents were nearly all down, 
exposing men whose beds were sinking deeper and deeper 
into the mud and to the pelting rain. About 8 o’clock, 
while some of the men were yet asleep and others were at¬ 
tempting to get breakfast, the camp was startled by a 
sudden outburst of artillery fire, and shells came whistling 
over the plain. The shots were scattering, and seemed to 
be directed principally at the shipping. The troops were 
summoned to arms, but, as very little damage was done by 
the shells, the affair was soon turned to account as a joke. 
General J. E. B. Stuart for some days had been operating 
in the center of the Peninsula, and learning of the exposed 


— 664 — 



Army of Potomac at Harrison's Landing 

position of McClellan’s army on the James, had hastened 
there and stationed his battery near Westover Church, 
across Herring Creek, north of the landing. A few shells 
from our gun-boats caused his guns to speedily shift their 
position, and General Nathan Kimball of Shields’s division 
(just arrived from the Shenandoah), advanced and cleared 
the field after some lively skirmishing. 

The army immediately took position on the high ground 
about Harrison’s Landing, and went into camp on an in¬ 
trenched line several miles in extent. The air was filled 
with rumors about future operations. To the soldiers 
McClellan was less a hero now, perhaps than before, but 
he was more a martial leader than ever. The unusual 
strain imposed upon the men, the malarial character of the 
region around Richmond, the lack of proper nourishment, 
the want of rest, combined with the excitement of the change 
of base, and the midsummer heat prostrated great numbers. 
In my notes written at the time, it is stated that 50 of the 
regiment, about 15% of the duty men, were sick in the camp 
hospital July 24th. This was in addition to the casualties 
of 162 sustained in the “Seven Days.” According to the 
report of Surgeon Jonathan Letterman, Medical Director 
(Vol. XI., Part I., “Official Records,” pp. 210-220), about 
6000 sick were sent away soon after the army reached 
Harrison’s Landing, over 12,000 remaining in camp. On 
July 30th, the report says, there were 12,000 sick with the 
army, and of these only 2000 were able to take the field. 
Fortunately the Sanitary Commission hastened to our 
relief with tents, food, medical supplies, and competent 
nurses. 

After the departure of Stuart from Westover, July 
4th, the army did not see or hear the enemy, with a slight 
exception, until search was made for him toward Richmond, 
early in August. The exception was on the night of 
Thursday, July 31st. About midnight the whole army 
was startled by a lively cannonade and by shells flying 
over the lines, some bursting within them. The troops 
turned out under arms, and it was soon discovered that a 


— 665 — 


Battles and Leaders of the Civil War 


mild fusillade from across the James was being directed on 
the shipping and on the supply depots near the camps.* 
Comparatively little damage was done. The next day 
a Union force was thrown across the river to seize Coggins's 
Point, where the elevated ground favored that style of 
attack on our camps. The army soon became restless 
for want of work, and there was great rejoicing at the pros¬ 
pect of a forward movement. On the 2d of August, Hooker 
marched a portion of his division to Malvern Hill, and on 
the 4th extended his advance to Charles City Cross-roads, 
near Glendale. But orders came to withdraw from the 
Peninsula, so we marched to Williamsburg, Yorktown, 
Newport News, and Fort Monroe. The Fifth and Third 
Corps embarked, on August 20th and 21st, for Aquia Creek 
and Alexandria; the Sixth (August 23d and 24th), and the 
Second (August 26th), and the Fourth for Alexandria, 
except Peck’s division, which remained at Yorktown. 


*A Confederate force under General S. G. French had been sent 
out from the command of D. H. Hill, at Petersburg. General W. 
N. Pendleton reported that 1000 rounds were fired. The casalties 
in the Union camps, as reported by General McClellan, were 10 
killed and 15 wounded.— G.L.K. 

******* 


— 666 — 



XVII 


With the Cavalry on the Peninsula 

By William W. Averell, 

Brevet Major-General, U.S.A. 


In the Peninsular campaign of 1862 there were em¬ 
ployed fourteen regiments of cavalry, entire or in parts, 
and two independent squadrons (see p. 517). Considerably 
over half this force was composed of volunteers, and had 
been in existence about six months. In the regular cavalry 
three years had been regarded as necessary to transform 
a recruit into a good cavalryman. The amount of patient 
and persistent hard work required to convert 1200 untrained 
citizens, unaccustomed to the care of a horse or to his use 
under the saddle, and wholly inexperienced in the use of 
arms, into the semblance of a cavalry regiment in six months 
is known only to those who have done it. 

The topography and soil of the peninsula presented a 
most difficult field for cavalry operations. From Fort Mon¬ 
roe to Hanover Court House there was hardly a field with 
sufficient scope for the maneuvers of a single regiment of 
cavalry. After a rain the deep alluvium became, under the 
tread of horses, a bed of mortar knee-deep. The forests 
between the York and the James rivers were filled with 
tangled thickets and unapproachably morasses. The trib¬ 
utaries of the rivers, mostly deep, crooked, and sluggish, 
became more tortuous as they approach their confluence, and 
the expanse of floods is converted by evaporation into stag¬ 
nant swamps. A heavy rain in a few hours rendered these 
streams formidable obstacles. Above this dismal landscape 
the fierce rays of the sun were interrupted only at night, or 
by deluges of rains, so that men and animals were alter¬ 
nately scorched and drenched. These conditions made cav¬ 
alry operations in this region affairs of squadrons. 


— 667 — 



Battles and Leaders of the Civil War 


The cavalry had been organized into a divisoin under 
General George Stoneman, chief of cavalry, and distributed 
by assignment to the corps of the army, excepting the cav¬ 
alry reserves under General P. St. George Cooke and that 
portion which was attached to general headquarters. Dur¬ 
ing the month of the siege of Yorktown not an hour was 
lost which could be applied to cavalry instruction. Alert¬ 
ness and steadiness soon characterized our cavalrymen. No 
incident was fruitless. When grindstones were procured 
and the sabers of my regiment were sharpened at Hampton, 
it produced a similar effect upon the men. 

Few but cavalry names reached the ears of the army 
on the day of the evacuation and pursuit. Stoneman and 
Cooke, on the right, with the 1st and 6th Regulars, struck 
cavalry, infantry, batteries, redoubts, and ravines, and 
pushed their attack with audacity. Cavalrymen galloped 
around field works. We soon heard of the gallantry of 
Colonel Grier, Major Lawrence Williams, Captains Sanders, 
Davis, Baker and others in cavalry charges, and that the 
French Princes were among the first in the advance. Lieu¬ 
tenant-Colonel Grier, commanding the 1st (“Old Billy Grier, 
the bueno commandante ”), had led a charge and engaged 
two of the enemy in personal combat, wounding one and 
himself receiving a wound. Then came tidings of the dash 
of Chambliss and McLean leading Hancock’s column and 
crowding the left-center of the enemy’s line, and soon the 
3d Pennsylvania Cavalry met the enemy in the woods and 
drove him out with skirmishers and canister, and cleared' 
our left toward the James of the enemy’s cavalry under 
Stuart. During the following day, the cavalrymen were 
spectators of the battle at Williamsburg (except the 3d 
Pennsylvania actively engaged on our left) and were only 
occupied with the rather serious business of procuring food 
for the horses. 

Although pursuit was again undertaken on the morn¬ 
ing of the 6th by squadrons of the 3d Pennsylvania and 8th 
Illinois Cavalry was continued for four miles, and five 
pieces of artillery were recovered and some prisoners were 
captured, it came to a dead halt from necessity. During the 


— 668 — 


Cavalry on the Peninsula 

succeeding twenty days the cavalry swept the country in 
advance of our marching army by day and hovered around 
its bivouacs by night. 

When the army was in line about seven miles from 
Richmond, on the 25th of May, I was directed to communi¬ 
cate with the gun-boats on the James River at City Point. 
Lieutenant Davis, of the 3d Pennsylvania, with ten men, 
was selected for the duty, and he made his way along var¬ 
ious roads infested with the pickets and patrols of the 
enemy to the bank of the James, where, taking a skiff, with 
two negroes, he went on board the Galena, and commun¬ 
icated to Captain Rodgers the position of the army, and 
received from the captain a statement of the position of the 
gun-boats. < 

On the 27th, not satisfied with the picnic appearance 
of our front on our left, south of the Chickahominy, I re¬ 
ported its perilous condition to McClellan, who at once sent 
Colonel N. B. Sweitzer, of his staff, to me, and together we 
rode to the front. As a result orders were given at once 
for slashing the first, and positions for batteries and out¬ 
posts were determined,—precautions which, three days la¬ 
ter, disclosed their value in the battle of Fair Oaks. 

On the same day (27th) we were searching the ground 
away up to our right at Hanover Court House, in invita¬ 
tion to McDowell to come down from Fredericksburg. Al¬ 
most within his sight and quite within his hearing, the 
principal northern gate to Richmond was set ajar, the Vir¬ 
ginia Central and the Richmond and Fredericksburg rail¬ 
roads were destroyed. In the resultant melee about Han¬ 
over Court House, the cavalry under Emory, Royall, Law¬ 
rence Williams, Chambliss, Whiting, Harrison, and Arnold, 
and Rush’s 6th Pennsylvania, aggressively attacked infan¬ 
try, captured whole companies with arms, swept right, left, 
and rear, and generally filled the ideal of cavalry activi¬ 
ties in such a battle. 

General Lee assumed command June 1st. On the 13th 
he announced himself through his cavalry, in Stuart’s raid 
around our army. This expedition was appointed with ex- 


- 669 - 


Battles and Leaders of the Civil War 


cellent judgment, and was conducted with superb address. 
Stuart pursued the line of least resistance, which was the 
unexpected. His subordinate commanders were Colonels 
Fitz Lee, W. H. F. Lee, and W. T. Martin, all intrepid cav¬ 
alrymen. It was an easy thing to do, but being his first 
raid, Stuart was nervous, and imagining perils which did 
not exist, neglected one great opportunity—the destruction 
of our base of supplies at the White House. Had he, at 
Garlick’s, exchanged purposes with his detachment, sending 
it on the road home while he with the main body bent all 
his energies to the destruction of our base of supplies, we 
might have had something to lament even had we captured 
his command. On our side were developed many things 
to remember with pride, and one thing to regret with mor¬ 
tification. The memories are glorious that not a single 
vedette or picket was surprised, and that never was out¬ 
post duty more honorably and correctly performed than by 
Captain W. B. Royall and Lieutenant McLean of the 5th 
United States Cavalry. They met the enemy repeatedly, 
and the lieutenant gave his life and the captain was pros¬ 
trated with saber wounds in resisting Stuart’s column. The 
killing of the dashing Confederate Captain Latane and sev¬ 
eral men with the saber, and the checking of the invading 
forces for an hour attest the courage and devotion of Royall 
and his picket. We had to regret that there w T as no reserve 
to the outpost within supporting distance, and that when 
the reserve was alarmed in its camp precious time was lost 
by indirections. This raid of Stuart’s added a new feature 
to cavalry history. A similar expedition, however, had 
been projected previously. Just before the Army of the 
Potomac advanced on Manassas in March, ’62, in a confer¬ 
ence with General McClellan, it was suggested that I should 
take my brigade, consisting of the 3d and 8th Pennsylvania 
Cavalry, the first brigade of cavalry formed in the war, and 
go around the enemy, then at Manassas, destroying the 
bridge at Rappahannock Station, and that at Fredericks¬ 
burg; but the immediate movement of the enemy from 
Manassas prevented its being carried out. 


— 670 — 


Cavalry on the Peninsula 

Our general's plans were not disturbed by Stuart’s 
raid, and two days after it was over, the 3d Pennsylvania 
Cavalry crossed the Pamunkey River on our right and rear, 
ascended to the King William Court House and Ellett’s 
Mills, burned the bridge and ferry-boat, and a schooner and 
other boats, and a storehouse containing 30,000 bushels of 
grain. Scouts were pushed out many miles in quest of 
news of Jackson’s coming. This was the last extension of 
our hands toward McDowell, for Jackson came sooner than 
he was expected, on the 26th, the day upon which a general 
advance had been determined and the battle of Gaines’s 
Mill was opened. 

McClellan met and mastered the occasion. Alert, ra¬ 
diant, and cheerful, he stood out in front of his tent in his 
shirt-sleeves nearly all the day of the 26th listening to his 
army. To the north, across the Chickahominy his clipped 
right wing, environed with our cavalry, was sullenly re¬ 
tracting its lines to the position at Gaines’s Mill. Stone- 
man, with infirmities that would have kept a man of less 
fortitude in hospital, was in the saddle confronting Stuart’s 
cavalry and covering the White House Landing. 

The ensuing day was without rest for the cavalry. The 
strain of the following day to help the Fifth Corps to hold 
its ground until dark will never be forgotten, and it was 
not devoid of heroic cavalry effort. Fragments of the 
reserve under General Cooke stood massed in the valley of 
the Chickahominy, on its left flank. About 5 P.M., when 
it was evident that we were being pressed on the right and 
left of our line by all the force the enemy could bring into 
action against Porter, and that we were not likely to be 
able to resist his attack, the cavalry was moved from its 
masked position to the edge of the hill and placed in a for¬ 
mation to charge should a charge seem likely to do good. It 
was there exposed to the enemy’& fire, and must either 
retire, advance, or be destroyed. In a few minutes the 
order to charge was given to the 5th Regulars, not 300 
strong. Chambliss, leading, rode as straight as man ever 
rode, into the face of Longstreet’s corps, and the 5th Cav- 


— 671 — 


Battles and Leaders of the Civil War 


airy was destroyed and dispersed. Six out of the seven 
officers present and fifty men were struck down. Chambliss, 
hit by seven balls, lost consciousness, and when he recovered 
found himself in the midst of the enemy. The charge at 
Balaklava had not this desperation and was not better rid¬ 
den. Chambliss lay on the field ten days, and was finally 
taken to Richmond, where he was rescued from death by 
the kind care of Generals Hood and Field. In this battle 
there were two and a half squadrons of the 5th and two 
squadrons of the 1st U. S. Cavalry, three squadrons Rush’s 
Lancers (6th Pennsylvania Cavalry), and one squadron 4th 
Pennsylvania (Col. Child’s). 

Two or three weeks before this several officers of the 
3d Pennsylvania Cavalry, Newhall, Treichel, W. E. Miller, 
and others, penetrated the region between the Chickahominy 
and the James, taking bearings and making notes. Their 
fragmentary sketches, when put together, made a map 
which exhibited all the roadways, fields, forests, bridges, 
streams, and houses, so that our commander knew the 
country to be traversed through the seven days far better 
than any Confederate commander. 

On the evening of June 27th, my pickets from Tun- 
stall’s Station and other points were called in and at 6:30 
A. M., on the 28th, the regiment crossed White Oak Swamp, 
leading Keyes’s corps, and advanced to the Charles City 
road. Lieutenant Davis was again sent to communicate 
with the gun boats on the James. 

At daylight, on the 29th, Captain White’s squadron, 
with 200 infantry and 2 guns, was sent to picket and hold 
Jones’s Bridge on the Chickahominy. About 9 A. M. my 
scouts reported a regiment of the enemy’s cavalry advanc¬ 
ing in column about a mile away. Some woodland inter¬ 
vened. Between this and my position was an open field 
a quarter of a mile across. A picket was quickly posted 
at the hither edge of the wood, with orders to fire upon 
the enemy when he should come within range and then 
turn and run away, thus inviting pursuit. On my position 
two guns were already placed to enfilade the road, and a 


— 672 — 


Cavalry on the Peninsula 

few squadrons held in readiness to charge. The enemy 
came, was fired upon, and the picket fled, followed by the 
enemy in hot pursuit. Upon arriving within two hundred 
yards of our position, the picket quitted the road through 
gaps in the fences made for that purpose, thus unmasking 
the enemy’s columns; the two guns of Major West fired two 
rounds and two squadrons, led by Captains Welsh and 
Russell, of the 3d Pennsylvania, were let loose upon the 
enemy, and over 60 of his officers and men were left on the 
ground, whilst the survivors fled in great disorder toward 
Richmond. The command was the 1st North Carolina and 
3d Virginia Cavalry, led by Colonel Lawrence Baker, a 
comrade of mine in the old army. The 3d Pennsylvania lost 
1 man killed and 5 wounded. 

After this affair I galloped back to see General McClel¬ 
lan, and found him near a house south of White Oak Swamp 
Bridge. Near him were groups of a hundred officers eager¬ 
ly but quietly discussing our progress and situation. So 
soon as McClellan descried me, he came with the Prince de 
Joinville to the fence, where I was dismounted. After 
telling him all I knew and had learned from prisoners and 
scouts, I ventured to suggest that the roads were tolerably 
clear toward Richmond, and that we might go there. The 
Prince seemed to exhibit a favorable interest in my sug¬ 
gestion, but the general, recognizing its weakness, said 
promptly: “The roads will be full enough tomorrow;” and 
then earnestly, “Averell, if any army can save this country, 
it will be the Army of the Potomac, and it must be saved 
for that purpose.” The general rode to the front with me, 
and reconnoitered the ground in all directions. In the after¬ 
noon with Hay’s regiment of infantry and Benson’s battery, 
I established our outposts and pickets within one mile of 
New Market, where we were first touched with some of the 
enemy’s infantry during the night. On the 30th, there were 
battles on our center and right and having joined the Fifth 
Corps, I proceeded to Malvern Hill in the evening and rode 
over the field with Captain Colburn, my classmate and the 
favorite aide of McClellan, and made a topographical sketch 


— 673 — 


Battles and Leaders of the Civil War 


of the position, which was of some use afterward in post¬ 
ing the infantry and artillery as they arrived. 

During the night of the 30th, the general commanding 
asked me for two officers for hazardous service. Lieu¬ 
tenants Newhall and Treichel, because of their intimate 
knowledge of the country, were sent to communicate with 
our right and center, and a second time that night made 
their way for a mile and a half through the enemy’s camps. 

During the battle of July 1st (Malvern Hill) my cav¬ 
alry was deployed as a close line of skirmishers with drawn 
sabers in rear of our lines, with orders to permit no one 
to pass to the rear who could not show blood. The line 
of battle was ready and reserves of infantry and artillery 
in position some time before the enemy came in force and 
developed his attack. There were some preliminary bursts 
of artillery, but the great crash of all arms did not begin 
before 6 p.m. It lasted about two hours. The commanding 
general, with his mounted staif, was standing on the pla¬ 
teau in front of the farm house at the rear verge of the 
hill, a conspicuous group, when a round shot from the enemy 
struck the ground a few yards directly in front of him and 
threw dirt and gravel over the little group around him. 
General Porter, with whom I was riding, had just started 
toward the front when he turned and said to McClellan: 
“General, everything is all right here and you are not 
needed; if you will look after our center and right that 
would help us here more than you can by remaining.” Then 
we separated from them and rode toward our left, at Crew’s 
house. The wounded were already coming away from the 
lines. 

When the battle was over and the field had become 
quiet, the cavalry bivouacked half a mile in rear of the line 
of battle. Men and horses were too tired to do aught but 
sleep for hours. At night I found myself in the saddle 
with a cup of hot coffee held to my lips, a portion of its 
contents having scalded its way down my throat. When 
awakened I was informed by the Due de Chartres that Gen¬ 
eral McClellan desired to see me. We found him near by, 
in a little orchard by a camp fire, giving orders rapidly to 


— 674 — 


Cavalry on the Peninsula 

his general staff officers. When my turn came, McClellan 
said: 

“Averell, I want you to take command of the rearguard at day¬ 
light in the morning, and hold this position until our trains are out 
of the way. What force do you want?” 

I asked for just enough to cover the front with a strong 
skirmish line. The orders were given for Buchanan’s bri¬ 
gade of Sykes’s division, Fifth Corps, to report to me at 
daylight, and also a battery. 

At daylight the cavalry advanced toward the front. 
There was a fog so dense that we could not see a man at 
fifty paces’ distance. Colonel Buchanan was met with his 
staff returning from the front on foot, their horses being 
led. He informed me that the enemy was threatening his 
pickets, and advancing on both flanks. I asked him to halt 
his command until further orders, and galloped to the front, 
where our line of battle had been the night before. I 
could see nothing, but could hear shrieks and groans and 
the murmur of a multitude but no sounds of wheels nor 
trampling horses. I ordered the line reestablished, with 
skirmishers and a squadron of cavalry, on either flank. Col¬ 
onel Hall, with the 2d Regiment, Excelsior Brigade, also 
reported for duty, and took position in the line. The bat¬ 
tery not having reported some cavalry was organized into 
squads resembling sections of artillery, at proper intervals, 
behind the crest. By this time the level rays of the morn¬ 
ing sun from our right were just penetrating the fog, and 
slowly lifting its clinging shreds and yellow masses. Our 
ears had been filled with agonizing cries from thousands 
before the fog was lifted, but now our eyes saw an appall¬ 
ing spectacle upon the slopes down to the woodlands half 
a mile away. Over five thousand dead and wounded men 
were on the ground, in every attitude of distress. A third 
of them were dead or dying, but enough were alive and 
moving to give to the field a singular crawling effect. The 
different stages of the ebbing tide are often marked by 
the lines of flotsam and jetsam left along the seashore. So 
here could be seen three distinct lines of dead and wounded 
marking the last front of three Confederate charges of the 


— 675 — 


Battles and Leaders of the Civil War 

night before. Groups of men, some mounted, were grop¬ 
ing about the field. 

As soon as the woodland beyond, which masked the 
enemy, could be clearly seen, I offered battle by directing 
the infantry lines to show on the crest, the sham sections 
of artillery to execute the movements of going “into battery, 
action front,” and the flank squadrons to move toward the 
enemy until fired upon. All these details were executed 
simultaneously at the sound of the trumpet. The squad¬ 
rons had not proceeded three hundred yards when they were 
fired upon and halted. At the same time, a horseman from 
among those on the field approached our line with a white 
flag. An aide was sent to meet and halt him. The Con¬ 
federate horseman, who was an officer, requested a truce of 
two hours in which to succor their wounded. I was about 
to send a demand that his request be put in writing when 
I reflected that it would be embarrassing for me to reply 
in writing so word was sent to him to dismount and wait 
until his request had been submitted to the commanding 
general. In the meantime the scattered parties of the en¬ 
emy withdrew hastily from the field to the woods, and there 
was some threatening desultory firing on my flanks, killing 
one man and wounding another. After waiting thirty min¬ 
utes, word was sent to the officer with the flag that the 
truce was granted, and that their men could come out with¬ 
out arms and succor their wounded. I had no idea that the 
flag was properly authorized, else there would have been 
no firing on my flanks, but time was the precious thing I 
wished to gain for our trains which crowded the bottom¬ 
lands below Malvern. My squadrons were withdrawn to 
the line, the infantry lay down, while officers took position in 
front of the line to prevent conversation with the enemy. In a 
few minutes thousands of men swarmed from the woods and 
scattered over the field. I kept myself informed by couriers of 
the movements of our army and trains, and had already 
sent officers to reassure our rear of its security and also to 
bring me back a battery of artillery. Captain Frank with 
his battery responded. I sent a request to General Wes- 
sells, commanding Keyes’s rear brigade, to select a good 


— 676 — 


Cavalry on the Peninsula 

position about two miles in my rear in; case I should need 
a checking force when the time for withdrawal should come. 
That excellent soldier had already chosen such a position and 
established his brigade in line of battle. 

When the quasi-truce had expired, at the sound of the 
trumpet the line resumed its attitude of attack, and the offi¬ 
cer with the flag again appeared with a request that the truce 
be extended two hours. After a reasonable wait, answer was 
returned that the time was extended but that no further 
extension would be granted. I had come on the line at 
4 A. M., and these maneuvers and truces had consumed the 
time until after 9 o'clock. The Army of the Potomac was then 
at its new base on the James, and all its trains were safely 
on the way there, with Keyes’s corps some miles below in 
my rear awaiting the enemy. So when the extended truce 
had expired, my command, with the exception of the cav¬ 
alry, had left the field. Our dead and wounded, about 2500 
in number, had been cared for during the night. Not above 
a dozen bodies could be found on our field during the truce, 
and these were buried. Twelve stalled and abandoned 
wagons were destroyed, and two captured guns which could 
not be removed were spiked and the carriages were broken. 
The Bd Pennsylvania Cavalry, which had led the 
Army of the Potomac across White Oak Swamp, now saw 
its last serviceable man safe beyond Malvern Hill, before 
it left that glorious field, about 10 A. M., July 2d. A heavy 
rainstorm wa v s prevailing. When everything movable was 
across Turkey Bridge it was destroyed by-my rear squad¬ 
ron. My command passed through Wessells’s lines about 
noon, and the lines of General Naglee a little later. Every¬ 
thing was now quiet and in good order, and the 3d Penn¬ 
sylvania proceeded to camp at Westover after dark. 

The 8th Pennsylvania Cavalry under Colonel D. McM. 
Gregg, had scoured the left bank of the Chickahominy, on 
the 28th, and had swum the river to the right bank, rafting 
its arms across at Long Bridge. He subsequently picketed 
the front of our center and right on the 30th, and on July 
1st and 2d—an extremely important service. The 4th Penn¬ 
sylvania Cavalry, after its efficient service, at and about 


— 677 — 


Battles and Leaders of the Civil War 


Gaines's Mill, during the day and night of the 27th of June, 
performed similar duties with General McCall at Charles 
City road on the 30th. The 11th Pennsylvania, Colonel 
Harlan, which, on the 13th, had covered the White House 
Landing during Stuart’s raid, on the 28th, joined Stone- 
man on similar duty, and retired with him. 

Colonel Farnsworth, 8th Illinois, after his active par¬ 
ticipation in covering our right wing on the 26th, and guid¬ 
ing trains and maintaining steadiness of lines on the 27th, 
guided Keyes’s corps to the James River below Malvern, 
on the 29th, and assisted the 8th Pennsylvania in covering 
that corps on the 30th and 1st of July. The 2d U. S. Cav¬ 
alry and McClellan Dragoons, under Major Pleasonton, 
escorted Colonel B. S. Alexander of the corps of Engineers, 
on the 29th, to Carter’s Landing, on the James. Captains 
Norris and Green, of the 2d, performed scouting service 
in the direction of the Chickahominy and Charles City Court 
House, after the arrival of the regiment on the James. And 
so ended the first lesson of the cavalry service of the Army 
of the Potomac.* 

Near the White House, on the morning of the 29th of 
June (at the very time that the 3d Pennsylvania Cavalry 
was repelling the 1st North Carolina and 3d Virginia Cav¬ 
alry at Willis Church, south of the Chickahominy), Stuart 
received a note from General Lee asking for his impressions 
in regard to the designs of the Union Army. He replied 
that there was no evidence of a retreat down the Williams¬ 
burg road, and that he had no doubt that it was endeavor¬ 
ing to reach the James. On the 30th, while we were es¬ 
tablishing our advance on Malvern Hill, Stuart, north of 
the Chickahominy, was directing his cavalry columns to¬ 
ward the bridges of that river behind us. Had the dispo¬ 
sition of his forces been reversed at the outset, and had he 
with his main body gone to Charles City road and ob¬ 
structed and defended the crossings of White Oak Swamp, 

*The total losses of our cavalry reported in the Seven Days’ bat¬ 
tles was 234; that of the Confederates 71, of which number 61 were 
credited to the 3d Pennsylvania Cavalry at Willis Church, on the 
29th of June.— W.A.A. 


— 678 — 



Cavalry on the Peninsula 

he could have annoyed and perhaps embarrassed our move¬ 
ments. Finally, had his cavalry ascertained on July 1st, 
any time before 3 P. M., that the center and right of our 
lines were more vulnerable and favorable to attack than 
the left, the enemy need not have delivered the unsuccessful 
and disastrous assault on Malvern Hill, but, while main¬ 
taining a strong demonstration at that point, might have 
thrown two or three corps upon our center below Malvern 
with hopes of dividing the Union army. Undoubtedly 
Gregg and Farnsworth, with the 8th Pennsylvania and 
8th Illinois Cavalry, would have successfully prevented the 
reconnaissance of our center and right, but that it was not 
attempted was a discredit to Stuart’s cavalry. 

At Harrison’s Landing, General Stoneman having taken 
sick-leave and General Cooke having been relieved, on 
the 5th of July I was appointed acting Brigadier-General 
and placed in command of all cavalry of the Army of 
the Potomac, and at once issued orders organizing it into 
a cavalry corps, and the history of cavalry brigades was 
begun. Stoneman, returning the same day, resumed com¬ 
mand, and I took the First Brigade, composed of the 5th 
United States, the 3d and 4th Pennsylvania, and the 1st 
New York Cavalry. 

Active scouting followed in the direction of Richmond 
and up the Chickahominy. On the 3d of August I crossed 
the James, with the 5th United States and 3d Pennsylvania 
Cavalry, to explore the ways to Petersburg, encountering 
the 13th Virginia Cavalry in a charge led by Lieutenant 
McIntosh, of the 5th United States, supported by Captain 
Miller, of the 3d Pennsylvania. The enemy was driven 
over seven miles, and his camp and supplies destroyed. 

All the successes and sacrifices of the army were now 
to be worse than lost—they were to be thrown away by the 
withdrawal of the army from the Peninsula, instead of re¬ 
enforcing it. 


— 679 — 


XVIII 


The Rear-Guard at Malvern Hill 

I.—By Henry E. Smith, 
Brevet-Major , U. S. A. 


Referring to the retreat from Malvern Hill, July 2d, 
General McClellan gives Keyes’s corps the credit of furnish¬ 
ing the entire rear-guard. According to the report of Col¬ 
onel Averell, of the 3d Pennsylvania Cavalry, the rear¬ 
guard was made his command and consisted of his regi¬ 
ment of Heintzelman’s corps, First Brigade of Regular 
Infantry, consisting of the 3d, 4th, 12th, and 14th Infan¬ 
try, of Porter’s corps, and the New York Chasseurs, of 
Keyes’s corps. The “Official Records,” Vol. XI., Part II., 
p. 235, confirm this statement. In the same volume, p. 193, 
will be found Keyes’s official report, but no mention of 
Averell. In fact, Averell was the rear-guard to Turkey 
Bridge and a mile beyond that point, where he found Gen¬ 
eral Wessells of Keyes’s corps. The official report of Fitz- 
John Porter, Sykes, amd Buchanan all speak of Averell as 
having covered this retreat. The writer was a first lieu¬ 
tenant in the 12th Infantry, and in command of Company 
D, First Battalion, at Malvern Hill, and remembers distinct¬ 
ly that the First Brigade of Regulars slept on the field on 
'the night of July 1st in line of battle. We were surprised 
the next morning to find that the entire army had retreated 
during the night, leaving Averell with his small command 
as a rear-guard to cover the retreat, which was done in the 
masterly manner stated by General McClellan, but by Aver¬ 
ell, and not by Keyes. 

United Service Club, 
Philadelphia, May 25th, 1885 . 

II.—By Erasmus D. Keyes, 

Major-General, U. S. V. 

A few days ago, in Switzerland, my attention was called 
to a communication in the August (1885) number of u The 

— 680 — 



The Rear-Guard at Malvern Hill 


Century ,” p. 642, which falsifies history. It is under the 
heading, “The Rear-Guard After Malvern Hill;” and is 
signed Henry E. Smith. Mr. Smith asserts that it was Gen¬ 
eral Averell who commanded the rear-guard, and that to 
Averell, and not to Keyes, belongs the credit which General 
McClellan gives the latter in his article. Mr. Smith cites 
authorities for his statements, and refers to the “Official 
Records of the Rebellion,” Vol. XI, Part II, p. 235, and to my 
report, p. 193, same volume, in which he says there is “no 
mention of Averell.” It is not unreasonable to suppose that 
Mr. Smith had read General McClellan’s and my reports, 
since he refers to them, but it is certain that he discredits 
both, and that he rejects my claim to approval unceremoni¬ 
ously (see p. 435). General McClellan says, in his book, 

“Report - of the Army of the Potomac,” etc., p. 

273: 

“The greater portion of the transportation of the army having 
been started for Harrison’s Landing during the night of the 30th 
of June and the 1st of July, the order for the movement of the troops 
was at once issued upon the final repulse of the enemy at Malvern 
Hill. The order prescribed a movement by the left and rear, General 
Keyes’s corps to cover the maneuvre. It was not carried out in de¬ 
tail as regards the divisions on the left, the roads being somewhat 
blocked by the rear of our trains. Porter and Couch were not able 
to move out as early as had been anticipated, and Porter found it 
necessary to place a rear-guard between his command and the enemy. 
Colonel Averell, of the 3d Pennsylvania Cavalry, was intrusted with 
this delicate duty. He had under his command his own regiment and 
Lieutenant-Colonel Buchanan’s brigade of regular infantry and one 
battery. By a judicious use of the resources at his command, he de¬ 
ceived the enemy so as to cover the withdrawal of the left wing 
without being attacked, remaining himself on the previous day’s 
battlefield until about 7 o’clock of the 2d of July. Meantime Gen¬ 
eral Keyes, having received his orders, commenced vigorous prepara¬ 
tions for covering the movement of the entire army, and protecting 
the trains. It being evident that the immense number of wagons and 
artillery pertaining to the army could not move with celerity along a 
single road, General Keyes took advantage of every accident of the 
ground to open new avenues and to facilitate the movement. He 
made preparations for obtructing the road after the army had passed, 
so as to prevent any rapid pursuit, destroying effectually Turkey 
Bridge, on the main road, and rendering other roads and approaches 
temporarily impassable, by felling trees across them. He kept the 
trains well closed up, and directed the march so that the troops could 
move on each side of the road, not obstructing the passage, but being 
in good position to repel an attack from any quarter. His' disposi¬ 
tions were so successful that, to use his own words, ‘I do not think 
that more vehicles or more public property were abandoned on the 
march from Turkey Bridge than would have been left, in the same state 


■ 681 — 



Battles and Leaders of the Civil War 


of the roads, if the army had been moving toward the enemy, in¬ 
stead of away from him’—and when it is understood that the car¬ 
riages and teams belonging to this army, stretched out in one line, 
would extend not far from forty miles, the energy and caution neces¬ 
sary for their safe withdrawal from the presence of an enemy vastly 

superior in numbers, will be appreciated.Great credit must be 

awarded to General Keyes for the skill and energy which character¬ 
ized his performance of the important and delicate duties intrusted 
to his charge.” 

The above extract defines General Averell’s duties on 
the field of Malvern, and gives him credit, and it is equally 
distinct in reference to me, but General McClellan’s article 
is vague in its expressions regarding the same subjects. 
As Mr. Smith’s article is historically erroneous, I trust you 
will consider it just to give place to this explanation, and to 
the following account of “The Rear-Guard after Malvern 
Hill.” 

After the battle of Malvern Hill, which was fought on 
the 1st of July, 1862, the army retired to Harrison’s Land¬ 
ing. Late in the evening of that day I received orders from 
Adjutant-General Seth Williams to command the rear¬ 
guard. I spent nearly the whole night making preparatory 
arrangements; dispatched a party to destroy Turkey 
Bridge; selected twenty-five expert axe-men under Captain 
Clarke, 8th Illinois Cavalry, with orders to chop nearly 
through all the large trees that lined the road below the 
Bridge. All my orders were well executed, and within fif¬ 
teen minutes after the tail of the column passed, the bridge 
was destroyed without blowing up, and the road blocked be¬ 
yond the possibility of passage by wheels and cavalry, and 
made difficult for infantry for several hours. 

The force composing the rear-guard consisted of Peck’s 
division of infantry and four batteries of artillery of my 
own corps, Gregg’s 8th Pennsylvania Cavalry and Farns¬ 
worth’s 8th Illinois Cavalry. Averell’s regiment of cavalry 
was also designated in a dispatch sent me by Adjutant Gen¬ 
eral Williams, and he may have taken part below the bridge, 
but I do not remember to have seen him during the day. 

The danger to the trains arose from the fact that the 
narrow country roads were insufficient £n number, and 
their composition was mostly clay, which was soon con- 


— 682 — 


The Rear-Guard at Malvern Hill 


verted into mud by the torrents of rain which fell nearly the 
whole day, and from the liability to attack on the flank. 
The main road was skirted with woods on the left the en¬ 
tire distance, which is about seven miles from Turkey 
Bridge to Harrison's Landing. The opposite side of the 
main road was open, and the columns of troops could move 
parallel with the wagons. When General W. F. Smith came 
along at the head of his division, I was opposite an open¬ 
ing in the woods at the highest point of the road. Smith 
exclaimed to me: “Here’s a good place for a battle!” 

“Would you like to have a fight?” said I. “Yes; just here, 
and now!” While the columns of troops were moving 
alongside the trains I felt no apprehension but after they 
had all passed there still remained in rear not less than five 
hundred wagons struggling in the mud, and it was not above 
ten minutes after the last vehicle had entered the large 
field bordering the intended camp when the enemy appeared 
and commenced a cannonade upon us. Fortunately I had 
in position Miller’s and McCarthy’s batteries, and they 
replied with such effect that the attack was discontinued. 

The anxiety at headquarters was such that I was au¬ 
thorized, in case of necessity, to cut the traces and drive 
the animals forward without their loads. Nothing of that 
kind was done, and we saved all the wagons except a small 
number that broke down and were as necessarily aban¬ 
doned as a vessel in a convoy would be after it had sunk in 
the ocean. 

About the middle of the day I received a note from 
headquarters at Harrison’s Landing, of which the follow¬ 
ing is a copy: 

General: I have ordered back to your assistance all the cav¬ 
alry that can be raised here. It is of the utmost importance that we 
should save all our artillery, and as many of our wagons as possible; 
and the commanding general feels the utmost confidence that you will 
do all that can be done to accomplish this. Permit me to say that 
if you bring in everything you will accomplish a most signal and 
meritorious exploit, which the commanding general will not fail to 
represent in its proper light to the Department. 

Very respectfully, 

R. B. March, 

Chief of Staff. 

July 2d. 

Brigadier-General Keyes. 

— 683 — 


Battles and Leaders of the Civil War 


General McClellan came out half a mile and met me. 
I was engaged sending forward sheaves of wheat to fill the 
ruts in the road near camp, which were so deep that in 
spite of all efforts to fill them, about 1200 wagons were 
parked for the night under guard outside. The general 
appeared well satisfied with what had been done by the 
rear-guard, and after all the proofs cited above, it is scarce¬ 
ly probable that he made a mistake in the name of its com¬ 
mander. 

Blangy, Seine-Inferieure, France, August 20, 1885. 




A*. 


— 684 — 


XIX 


The Administration in the Peninsular Campaign 

By Richard B. Irwin, 

Lieutenant-Colonel and Assistant Adjutant-General , U.S.V. 


The views entertained by General McClellan as to the 
manner and extent to which his plans and operations on 
the Peninsula were interfered with or supported by the 
Government having been fully set forth by him in these 
pages, it is now proper to show, as far as this can be done 
from the official reports, how the case must have pre¬ 
sented itself to the President and the Secretary of War. 

Appointed on the 25th of July, 1861, immediately after 
Bull Run, to the command of the shattered and reduced 
forces then gathered about Washington, at one time not 
exceeding 42,000 all told, General McClellan was rapidly 
reenforced, until on the 15th of March, 1862, he had under 
his command within the division or department of the Poto¬ 
mac 203,213 men present for duty. The field-artillery was 
increased from 30 guns to 520; to these had been added a 
siege train of nearly 100 heavy guns. From these mater¬ 
ials he organized the Army of the Potomac. 

In the last days of October General McClellan pre¬ 
sented to the Secretary of War a written statement of his 
views as to the conduct of operations, in which, after re¬ 
presenting the Confederate forces in his front at not less 
than 150,000, his own movable force at 76,285, with 228 
guns, and the force required for active operations as 150,- 
000 men, with 400 guns, he recommended that all operations 
in other quarters be confined to the defensive, and that all 
surplus troops be sent to reenforce the Army of the Poto¬ 
mac. 

“A vigorous employment of these means [he proceeds] will, in 
my opinion, enable the Army of the Potomac to assume successfully 
this season the offensive operations which, ever since entering upon 


— 685 - 



Battles and Leaders of the Civil War 


the command, it has been my anxious desire and diligent effort to 
prepare for and prosecute. The advance should not be postponed 
beyond the 25th of November, if possible to avoid it. 

“Unity in councils, the utmost vigor and energy in action are 
indispensable. The entire military field should be grasped as a 
whole, and not in detached parts. One plan should be agreed upon 
and pursued; a single will should direct and carry out these plans. 
The great object to be accomplished, the crushing defeat of the rebel 
army (now) at Manassas, should never for one instant be lost sight 
of, but all the intellect and means and men of the Government poured 
upon that point.” 

On the 1st of November, 1861, the President, “with the 
concurrence of the entire Cabinet/’ designated General Mc¬ 
Clellan “to command the whole army” of the United States. 
No trust approaching this in magnitude had ever before 
been confided to any officer of the United States. 

Everywhere the armies remained inactive. For seven 
months the Army of the Potomac was held within the de¬ 
fenses of Washington. Its only important movement had 
resulted in the disheartening disaster of Ball’s Bluff. The 
Confederates, with headquarters at Manassas, confronted 
them with an army, represented by General McClellan, on 
the faith of his secret-service department, as numbering at 
least 115,500, probably 150,000, but now known to have at 
no time exceeded 63,000.* The Potomac was closed to 
navigation by Confederate batteries established on its banks 
within twenty-three miles of the capital. Norfolk, with its 
navy-yard, was left untouched and unmenaced. The loyal 
States had furnished three-quarters of a million of soldiers, 
and the country had rolled up a daily increasing war debt 
of $600,000,000. There is no indication that General Mc¬ 
Clellan appreciated, or even perceived, the consequences 
that must inevitably follow the loss of confidence on the 
part of the people, as month after month passed without 
action, and without success in any quarter, or the position 
in which, under these circumstances, he placed the Presi¬ 
dent with respect to the continued support of the people 
and their representatives, by withholding full information 
of his plans. In his “Own Story” he tells how he refused 


*Of which only 44,563 were at Manassas. 


— 686 — 



Administration in the Peninsular Campaign 

to give this information when called upon by the President 
in the presence of his Cabinet. 

The President having, on the 31st of January, ordered 
the movement of all the disposable force of the Army of 
the Potomac, for the purpose of seizing a point on the rail¬ 
road beyond Manassas Junction, General McClellan on the 
same day submitted his own plan for moving on Richmond 
by way of Urbana, on the lower Rappahannock. On the 
8th of March, yielding to General McClellan’s views, sup¬ 
ported by the majority of his division commanders, the 
President approved the Urbana movement, with certain 
conditions; but on the 9th the Confederates evacuated Ma¬ 
nassas, and thus rendered the whole plan inoperative. On 
the 13th, upon General McClellan’s recommendation, sup¬ 
ported by the commanders of all four of the newly consti¬ 
tuted army corps, the President authorized the movement 
by Fort Monroe, as it was finally made. 

McClellan expected to take with him to the Peninsula 
146,000 men of all arms, to be increased to 156,000 by a 
division to be drawn from Fort Monroe. On the 31st of 
March, the President informed him that he had been obliged 
to order Blenker’s division of about 10,000 men,* with 18 
guns, to Fremont. “I did this with great pain,” he says, 
“knowing that you would wish it otherwise. If you could 
know the full pressure of the case, I am confident you would 
approve.” 

The council of corps commanders had annexed to their 
approval among other conditions, the following: 

“Fourth, that the force to be left to cover Washington shall be 
such as to give an entire feeling of security for its safety from men¬ 
ace. . . . NOTE.—That with the forts on the right bank of the 
Potomac fully garrisoned and those on the left bank occupied, a cover¬ 
ing force in front of the Virginia line of 25,000 men would suffice 
(Keyes, Heintzelman, and McDowell). A total of 40,000 men for the 
defense of the city would suffice. (Summer.)” 

Upon this point the President’s orders were: 

“1st. Leave such a force at Manassas Junction as shall make it 
entirely certain that the enemy shall not repossess himself of that posi¬ 
tion and line of communication. 2d. Leave Washington secure.” 


*General McClellan’s figures. The latest return, Feb. 28th, showed 
8396 for duty.— R. B. 1. 


- 687 — 



Battles and Leaders of the Civil War 


On the 1st of April, as he was on the point of sailing, 
General McClellan reported from his headquarters on board 
the steamer Commodore, the arrangements he had made to 
carry out these provisions, and at once set out for Fort 
Monroe without knowing whether they were satisfactory 
to the Government or not. They were not. General Mc¬ 
Clellan had arranged to leave 7,780 men at Warrenton, 10,- 
859 at Manassas, 1,350 on the Lower Potomac, and 18,000 
men for the garrisons and the front of Washington, to be 
augmented by about 4,000 new troops from New York. 
The President, deeming this provision wholly insufficient 
for the defense of the capital, ordered McDowell with his 
corps of 33,510 men and 68 guns to remain and charged 
him with the duty of covering and defending Washington. 

This led to a telegraphic correspondence, thus charac¬ 
terized in the President’s letter to General McClellan, dated 
April 9th: 

‘‘Your dispatches complaining that you are not properly sus¬ 
tained, while they do not offend me, pain me very much.” 

Then, after again explaining the detachment of Blen- 
ker and the retention of McDowell, Mr. Lincoln concludes 
with these noteworthy admonitions: 

“I suppose the whole force which has gone forward to you is with 
you by this time; and if so, I think it is the precise time for you 
to strike a blow. By delay, the enemy will steadily gain on you,— 
that is, he will gain faster by fortifications and reenforcements than 
you can by reenforcements alone. 

“And once more, let me tell you, it is indispensable to you * that 
you strike a blow! I am powerless to help this. You will do me the 
justice to remember I always insisted that going down the bay in 
search of a field instead of fighting at or near Manassas, was only 
shifting, and not surmounting a difficulty; that we would find the 
same enemy and the same or equal intrenchments at either place. 
The country will not fail to note—is noting now—that the present 
hesitation to move upon an intrenched enemy is but the story of 
Manassas repeated. 

“I beg to assure you that I have never written or spoken to you in 
greater kindness of feeling than now, nor with a fuller purpose to 
sustain you, so far as in my most anxious judgment I consistently 
can. But you must act.”* 


*Original italicized. 


— 688 — 



Administration in the Peninsular Campaign 

On the 11th of April, Franklin’s division was ordered 
to the Peninsula, in response to General McClellan’s earnest 
renewal of his request. 

General McClellan estimates his force before Frank¬ 
lin’s arrival at 85,000, apparently meaning fighting men, 
since the returns show 105,235 present for duty on the 13th 
of April. On the 30th, including Franklin, this number was 
increased to 112,392. General McClellan also estimated 
the Confederate forces at “probably not less than 100,000 
men, and possibly more,”* “probably greater a good deal than 
my own.”f We now kno(w that their total effective strength 
on the 30th of April was 55,633 of all arms. When the 
Army of the Potomac halted before the lines of the War¬ 
wick, Magruder’s whole force was but 11,000. General 
McClellan estimated it at only 15,000, and his own, con¬ 
fronting it, at the same period, at 53,000. 

The plan of a rapid movement up the Peninsula having 
resolved itself into an endeavor to take Yorktown by regu¬ 
lar approaches in front, leaving its rear necessarily open, 
General McClellan thus describes the result: 

“Our batteries would have been ready to open on the morning of 
the 6th of May at latest; but on the morning of the 4th it was dis¬ 
covered that the enemy had already been compelled to evacuate his 
position during the night.” 

The effect of these delays on Mr. Lincoln’s mind is 
curiously indicated by his telegram of May 1st: 

“Your call for Parrott guns from Washington alarms me, chiefly 
because it argues indefinite procrastination. Is anything to be 
done?” 

Then followed the confused and unduly discouraging 
battle of Williamsburg; the attempt to cut off the Confeder¬ 
ate retreat by a landing at West Point came to nothing; 
and on the 20th of May, the Army of the Potomac, having 
moved forward 52 miles in 16 days, reached the banks of 
the Chickahominy. There it lay, astride of that sluggish 
stream, imbedded in its pestilential swamps, for thirty-nine 
days. 


♦Telegram to Stanton, April 7th, 1862. 
•{•Telegram to Stanton, May 5th, 1862. 


- 689 - 



Battles and Leaders of the Civil War 


On the 31st of May, at Fair Oaks, Johnston failed, 
though narrowly missing success, in a well-meant attempt 
to crush McClellan's forces on the right bank of the swollen 
stream before they could be reenforced. On the 1st of 
June the Confederate forces were driven back in disorder 
upon the defenses of Richmond, but the damage suffered by 
the Union forces on the first day being over-estimated, and 
their success on the second day insufficiently appreciated, 
or inadequately represented, and no apparent advantage 
being taken of them, the general effect was to add to the 
discouragement already prevailing. 

Reenforcements continuing to be urgently called for, 
Fort Monroe with its dependencies, reporting 9,277 for 
duty, was placed under General McClellan's orders; McCall’s 
division, with 22 guns, was detached from McDowell, and 
arrived by water 9,514 strong on the 12th and 13th of 
June; while McDowell, with the rest of his command, was 
ordered to march to join McClellan by land; this move¬ 
ment was, however, promptly brought to naught by Jack¬ 
son’s sudden incursion against Banks in the Shenandoah. 

Meanwhile, the flow of telegrams indicated an ever- 
increasing tension, the Executive urging to action, the 
General promising to act soon, not acting, yet criticising 
and objecting to the President's orders to him and to others. 
On the 25th of May the President said: 

“I think the time is near when you must either attack Richmond 
or give up the job and come to the defense of Washington.” 

McClellan replied: 

“The time is very near when I shall attack Richmond.” 

Then, June 10th, he says: 

“I shall be in perfect readiness to move forward to take Rich¬ 
mond the moment that McCall reaches here and the ground will ad¬ 
mit the passage of artillery.” 

June 14th: 

“If I cannot control all his (McDowell’s) troops I want none of 
them, but would prefer to fight the battle with what I have, and let 
others be responsible for the results.” 


- 690 — 


Administration in the Peninsular Campaign 

On the 18th: 

“After tomorrow we shall fight the rebel army as soon as Provi¬ 
dence will permit. We shall await only a favorable condition of the 
earth and sky and the completion of some necessary preliminaries.” 

While appealing to the President when some of his 
telegrams to the Secretary remained for a time unanswered, 
General McClellan allowed Mr. Stanton’s cordial assurances 
of friendship and support to pass unnoticed. 

At last, on the 25th, General McClellan advanced his 
picket lines on the left to within four miles of Richmond, 
and was apparently preparing for a further movement, 
though none was ordered, and the next day, as at Manassas 
and Yorktown and Fair Oaks, his adversary once more took 
the initiative out of his hands. Jackson had come from 
the Valley. 

As soon as this was known, on the evening of the 
25th, General McClellan reported it to Mr. Stanton, adding 
that he thought Jackson would attack his right and rear, 
that the Confederate force was stated at 200,000, that he 
regretted his great inferiority in numbers, but was in no 
way responsible for it, and concluded: 

“I will do all that a general can do with the splendid army I have 
the honor to command, and if it is destroyed by overwhelming num¬ 
bers can at least die with it and share its fate. But if the result of 
the action which will probably occur tomorrow, or within a short time, 
is a disaster, the responsibility cannot be thrown on my shoulders; 
it must rest where it belongs.” 

The battle of Gaines’s Mill followed, where, on the 
27th, one-fifth of the Union forces contended against the 
whole Confederate army, save Magruder’s corps and Huger’s 
division; then the retreat, or “change of base,” to the 
James, crowned by the splendid yet unfruitful victory of 
Malvern; then a month of inaction and discussion at Har¬ 
rison’s Landing. 

At 12:20 A. M., on the 28th of June, General McClel¬ 
lan sent a long telegram, of which these sentences strike 
the key-note: 

“Our men [at Gaines’s Mill] did all that men could do . . . 
but they were overwhelmed by vastly superior numbers, even after I 
brought my last reserves into action. ... I have lost this battle 


Battles and Leaders of the Civil War 

because my force is too small. < . . The Government must not and 
cannot hold me responsible for the result. I feel too earnestly to¬ 
night. I have seen too many dead and wounded comrades to feel 
otherwise than that the Government has not sustained this army. 
. . . If I save this army now, I tell you plainly I owe no thanks to 

you or to any other persons in Washington. You have done your 
best to sacrifice this army.”* 

On reaching the James River, General McClellan re¬ 
ported the he had saved his army, but it was completely 
exhausted and would require reenforcements to the extent 
of 50,000 men. On the 3d of July, he wrote more fully 
from Harrison’s Landing, then saying that ‘‘reenforce¬ 
ments should be sent to me rather much over, than much 
less, than 100,000 men.” He referred to his memorandum 
of the 20th of August, 1861. That memorandum called 
for 273,000 men. General Marcy, his chief-of-staff, who 
bore this dispatch to Washington, telegraphed back: 

“I have seen the President and Secretary of War. 10,000 men 
from Hunter, 10,000 from Burnside, and 11,000 from here have been 
ordered to reenforce you as soon as possible. Halleck (who had been 
originally called on for 25,000 men which he had reported he could 
not spare) has been urged by the President to send you at once 10,000 
men from Corinth. The President and Secretary speak very kindly 
of you and find no fault.” 

The dispatches of the President and Secretary of War 
breathe the same spirit: 

“Allow me to reason with you a moment (wrote Mr Lincoln on 
the 2d of July, adding that he had not fifty thousand men who could 
be sent promptly). If, in your frequent mention of responsibility, 
you have the impression that I blame you for not doing more than 
you can, please be relieved of such impression. I only beg that in 
like manner you will not ask impossibilities of me. If you think you 
are not strong enough to take Richmond just now, I do not ask you 
to try just now. Save the army, material and personnel, and I will 
strengthen it for the offensive again as fast as I can. The gover¬ 
nors of 18 States offer me a new levy of 300,000 which I accept.” 

On the 5th Mr. Stanton wrote that he had nominated 
all the corps commanders for promotion. 

*’ ;) i ■ 

“The gallantry of every officer and man in your noble army shall 
be suitably acknowledged. General Marcy will take you cheering 
news. Be assured that you shall have the support of this Depart¬ 
ment and the Government as cordially and faithfully as ever was 

_ -:iv ) rseafl Is-rU .> v .O 

''♦.Original not italicized. These words are omitted in the dis¬ 
patch as printed in the report of the Committee on the Conduct of 
War.— R. B. I. 


— 692 — 



Administration in the Peninsular Campaign 


rendered by man to man, and if we should ever live to see each 
other face to face, you will be satisfied that you have never had from 
me anything but the most confiding integrity.” 

The next day Mr. Stanton followed this by a personal 
letter, couched in still warmer terms. 

“No man (he wrote) had ever a truer friend than I have been 
to you, and shall continue to be. You are seldom absent from my 
thoughts, and I am ready to make any sacrifice to aid you. Time 
allows me to say no more than that I pray Almighty God to deliver 
you and your army from all perils and lead you on to victory.” 

General McClellan’s reply was long, cold and formal. 
He reviewed their past relations, and alluded to the Secre¬ 
tary’s official conduct toward him as “marked by repeated 
acts done in such manner as to be deeply offensive to.my 
feelings, and calculated to affect me injuriously in public 
estimation.” 

“After commencing the present campaign [he continued], your 
concurrence in the withholding of a large portion of my force, so 
essential to the success of my plans, led me to believe that your mind 
was warped by a bitter personal prejudice against me. Your letter 
compels me to believe that I have been mistaken in regard to your 
real feelings and opinions, and that your conduct, so unaccountable to 
my own fallible judgment, must have proceeded from views and 
motives which I did not understand.” 

The campaign had failed. The President visited Har¬ 
rison’s Landing to see for himself what was to be done 
next. Then General McClellan handed him his well-known 
letter, “upon a civil and military policy covering the whole 
ground of our national trouble.” He called Mr. Stanton’s 
attention to this letter, in the reply we have just cited, 
and told him that for no other policy would our armies 
continue to fight. This must have been the last straw.* 
On one point, however, he was in accord with the Presi¬ 
dent. He wound up by recommending the appointment of 
a commander-in-chief of the army who should possess the 
President’s confidence. On the 11th General Halleck was 
appointed. 

On the 26th General Halleck arrived at General Mc¬ 
Clellan’s camp. He reports that McClellan: 


*Confirmed by Chase and Welles.— R. B. I. 



Battles and Leaders of the Civil War 


“ . . . expressed the opinion that with 30,000 reenforcements he 
could attack Richmond, with a good chance of success.” I replied that I 
was authorized by the President to promise only 20,000 and that if 
he could not take Richmond with that number we must devise some 
plan for withdrawing his troops from their present position to some 
point where they could unite with those of General Pope without ex¬ 
posing Washington. . . . He . . . the next morning informed me 

he would attack Richmond with the reenforcements promised. He 
would not say that he thought the probabilities of success were in 
his favor, but that there was a chance, and he was ‘willing to try it.’ 

“With regard to the force of the enemy he expressed the opin¬ 
ion that it was not less than 200,000.” 

The orders for the removal followed. 

“There was, to my mind,” General Halleck says, “no alternative.” 
I have taken the responsibility of doing so and am to risk my repu¬ 
tation on it.” 

' Upon whatever side, if upon either, of these many- 
sided controversies, history shall at last adjudge the right 
to be, upon whatever shoulders and in whatever degree 
the burden of blame shall finally rest, certain it is that no 
fair account of these operations can ever be written with¬ 
out taking note of these delays, whereby the initiative was 
transferred to the adversary; of these disasters, these un¬ 
productive victories, this ceaseless flow of telegrams, sur¬ 
charged with the varying words of controversy, criticism, 
objection, reproach; and of the inevitable effect of all these 
causes combined, in weakening the confidence of the Presi¬ 
dent and in undermining his authority and influence, 
which, however, to the last were exerted to uphold the 
general of his first choice at the head of his greatest army* 


— 694 — 


FIFTY YEARS 
IN CAMP AND FIELD 


Diary of Major-General Ethan Allen Hitchcock, U. S. A. 


Edited By 

W. A. CROFFUT, Ph. D. 


G. P. PUTMAN’S SONS 
New York and London 
The Knickerbocker Press 


Copyright, 1899 
By 

W. A. Croffut 






Hitchcock 


******* 

‘‘At New York, I finally determined to say by note to 
the Secretary that if, with his knowledge of my broken 
health, I could be useful in the way he had pointed out, he 
might announce my acceptance of the commission if not too 
late, and order me to report to him. That was done and 
I reached here this morning—March 15 (1862). On re¬ 
porting to the Secretary, almost without a word of preface 
he asked me if I would take McClellan’s place in command 
of the army of the Potomac !* I was amazed and told him 
at once that I could not. He spoke of the pressure on the 
President, and said that he and the President had had the 
greatest difficulty in standing out against the demand that 
McClellan be removed. 

“He then asked me if I would allbw him to put me at 
the head of the Ordnance Department, and remove General 
R. This surprised me almost as much as the other offer, 
and was entirely unlike anything I had anticipated and I 
declined. 

“He then took me to President Lincoln and introduced 
me. I was civilly received. Secretary Seward was present 
and some dispatches were read—reports from the army, etc. 

“The President took a letter out of his pocket and read 
it as a sample, he said, of what he was exposed to. It was 
anonymous, marked ‘urgent,’ and called on him to ‘remove 
the traitor McClellan’—using the most extravagant lan¬ 
guage of condemnation. Judge Blair, Postmaster-General, 
came in and asked for a brigadier-general’s commission for 
a relation of his wife. 

“I offered to go, but Mr. Lincoln detained me till the 
others went. He then expressed the wish to have the ben¬ 
efit of my experience: said he was the depository of the 
power of the Government and had no military knowledge. 
I knew his time was important and shortly left him. 

*The tardy engineer, McClellan, had now marched upon Manassas. 


— 697 — 



Fifty Years in Camp and Field 

“Now—what is to come of this? I want no command, 
I want no department; I came to be at hand for ‘contingent 
service’, and must adhere to my purpose. General Scott, 
whom I saw in New York told me I could be very useful 
here. He even said that I ought to be in command of the 
army, but that was impossible. 

“I urged the Secretary to extend General Halleck’s 
command over the whole valley of the Mississippi, and this 
has been done at once, putting Buell under his orders. 

“On the whole, I am uncomfortable. I am almost afraid 
that Secretary Stanton hardly knows what he wants him¬ 
self.* 

“Washington, Monday evening , March 17, 1862. A 
tolerably quiet day, closing with the most tremendously 
threatening cloud I have ever had come near to me. 

“How shall I describe it? 

“First of all, this morning in an interview with the 
Secretary of War, I declined his offers of a high station 
(two or three of them) and finally asked him if he would 
allow 7 me to be placed under his own orders as a staff offi¬ 
cer, to render such service as I might be capable of. 

“He asked me to write the order myself and he would 
sign it. I wrote a simple order and he signed it and handed 
it to the Adjutant-General, with directions to distribute it. 

“He then asked me to take a seat in his private council 
room, where I remained most of the day. Towards even¬ 
ing he came in, and shutting the door behind him, stated 
to me the most astounding facts, all going to show the 
astonishing incompetency of General McClellan. I cannot 
recite them: but the Secretary stated fact after fact, until 
I felt positively sick —that failing of the heart which ex¬ 
cludes hope. 

“I do not wonder, now, that the Secretary offered even 
me the command of this Army of the Potomac, which, he 

* During this week an army board, of which General Hitchcock was 
President, decided that the safety of Washington required the reten¬ 
tion of its front of one corps of the army. The President thereupon 
kept McDowell’s corps between the city and Richmond. 


— 698 — 



Hitchcock 


says, is 230,000 strong. If mentally capable, I am physically 
unable to enter upon such responsibility. 

“The Secretary is immensely distressed and with rea¬ 
son : he is dreadfully apprehensive of a great disaster, which, 
also, is not improbable. What can I do in this case? 

“When the evening had set in we separated, the Secre¬ 
tary asking me to be at the office early. But to what pur¬ 
pose? I cannot now, on a sudden, improvise a campaign, 
having had nothing to do with the army now in the field. 
Truly, I am heart-sick. 

“Washington, March 23, Sunday. My intercourse be¬ 
comes confidential, without design on either side, apparently. 
I have corroborated his opinions of certain persons without 
aiming to do so and before I knew what he thought. I 
wrote to him from Baltimore (on my way to N. Y.) that 
I would not be in haste to assign Fremont to a command, 
urging as a reason, that he was the willing idol of a party 
whose design is to pervert the constitutional power of the 
government to revolutionary purposes. It happened to be his 
own opinion, I found, on returning. 

“Today the Secretary asked me very abruptly what I 
thought of the Blairs.* I told him and found that my 
estimate agreed with his.” 

On April 2d, at the request of the Secretary, General 
Hitchcock drew up complete regulations for the govern¬ 
ment of officers in charge of prisoners of war, which were 
enforced to govern the actions of the Union army through¬ 
out the Rebellion. 

“Washington, April 22, 1862. On the 13th I went 
down to McClellan’s camp on the Peninsula, before York- 
town, and remained there one day. I had a full conversa¬ 
tion with him in which he explained his contemplated plan 
for taking Yorktown. From Fortress Monroe I went on 
board the little Monitor that disabled and beat off the 
Merrimac, visited Goldsboro’s flagship, etc.” 

*In his diary General Hitchcock writes “President Lincoln tells me 
that the Secretary and General Blair are not on speaking terms.” 


— 699 — 



Fifty Years in Camp and Field 

When he returned to Washington he reported to the 
President and Secretary Stanton, but does not record any 
result or even conversation on the subject. It having been 
reported at this time that Secretary Stanton was soon to 
vacate his place, General Hitchcock was urged for Secre¬ 
tary of War by newspapers in different Northern cities, 
the Boston Courier following his nomination with, “There 
is not in our army a more accomplished officer—eminently 
national in his feelings, a powerful writer, and a gentleman 
of large experience, of vigorous mind, and of great execu¬ 
tive ability.” Then came more trouble for Secretary Stan¬ 
ton, and the account of it is carefully written in ink: 

“Washington, April 29, 1862. Yesterday I handed 
in the resignation of my commission of Major-General of 
volunteers. Thus: 

“On Saturday, the 26th, the Secretary became for the 
first time a little impatient towards me. I had often seen 
him in such a mood towards others—towards General Rip¬ 
ley and General Thomas, and once even towards General 
Meigs, and at one time he spoke very abruptly to General 
Totten—all members of the Army Board. I had resolved 
that I would not permit it towards myself. 

“On Saturday he suddenly seemed to think that he had 
no one around him to give him opinions on military sub¬ 
jects, and at length he exclaimed: ‘It is very extraordinary 
that I can find no military man to give opinons. You 
give me no opinions!’ he added. The particular subject 
he had been speaking of was the position of General Banks. 
Now I had given him a very definite opinion on that very 
point two or three days before, and, without giving way to 
the least excitement, I asked him to look at the map, and 
pointed out what I thought and what I had said. I then 
briefly adverted to several opinions which I had given from 
time to time since I came here. 

“After the conversation ceased, and the Secretary went 
to another room, I wrote a letter of resignation, designing 
to hand it in the next morning. As that was Sunday, I 
deferred it to yesterday morning. He no sooner received 


— 700 — 


Hitchcock 


it from the Adjutant-General, who told him it was because 
of something he had said on Saturday, than he came to the 
Adjutant-General’s room, where I had remained, and we 
had a scene of it. He declared in the most emphatic man¬ 
ner that he had no intention of wounding my feelings: that 
he knew he had faults of temper, etc.; that he was oppressed 
with a sense of responsibilities, to which he knew he was 
not equal, etc. 

“The first thing he said, however, was, ‘You don’t wish 
to ruin me!’ ‘Certainly not!’ I cried. ‘If you send in that 
paper,’ said he, ‘you will destroy me!’ ” 

The Secretary cried out in exclamations of self-re¬ 
proach and lamentation and besought the General in humili¬ 
ating terms not to proceed to such extremities. This appeal 
he repeated several times with visible emotion. 

“I tried my best to stop him, assuring him that I had 
no intention of doing him any injury; that I could not see 
how my going away could affect him; that if he thought it 
would, I would destroy the paper. In the end, we went up 
to his room together, and I put the paper in the fire before 
his face. An hour or two afterwards he became more 
calm, and I took occasion to tell him many things which I 
hope will serve him. His idea that my resignation would 
destroy him was not from the loss of my supposed services, 
but because he knows his reputation for acting on impulse 
and he knows that my withdrawal would be construed to 
his disadvantage.” 

During the next few weeks, General Hitchcock’s physi¬ 
cal afflictions returned upon him, and almost disabled him. 
He served as the military advisor and assistant of President 
Lincoln and Secretary Stanton whenever he could go in 
the office. 

“New York, May 21, 1862. Again sent in my resig¬ 
nation as Major-General on the 15th inst. I could not per¬ 
suade the Secretary to accept it, and could not require it 
against his wishes. He told me to take a leave of absence, 
recruit my strength, and return when I felt sufficiently 
recovered. I told him (the truth) that I am positively 


— 701 — 


Fifty Years in Camp and Field 

ashamed to be in receipt of the pay and emoluments of a 
major-general and render no adequate service on account 
of disability. He proposed some nominal duty, as an in¬ 
specting duty to look into the conditions of prisoners of war, 
but declined to make an order. 

“New York, May 21. By this time I have discovered 
the whole country has begun to look upon me as the ‘Mili¬ 
tary Adviser’ of the Secretary of War. This is very dis¬ 
tasteful to me because it seems to make me responsible for 
those very movements which I have disapproved. In reply 
to requests by Secretary Stanton and Mr. Lincoln I made 
several important recommendations to both, which were 
ignored and disaster followed. Finally, when some troops 
were ordered out of the Shenandoah Valley against my ur¬ 
gent advice, and Stonewall Jackson made a successful raid 
on Banks and swept the Valley, I insisted upon resigning 
rather than, any longer, be put in a false position. Neither 
the Secretary nor the President would accept my resigna¬ 
tion although I offered thrice.” 

On May 28th, General Hitchcock wrote an elaborate 
letter to General Scott explaining his relation to affairs and 
protesting that he was made to bear responsibility for 
movements which he had expressly condemned in advance. 
He and General Thomas had been appointed by the Presi¬ 
dent to report as to the number of men required to defend 
Washington. They reported that 25,000 men were needed, 
whereas only 10,000 were present in the forts. Thereupon 
the President withheld a part of McDowell’s corps from 
McClellan’s army. General Hitchcock’s repeated advice, 
however, that Blenker’s division of Bank’s corps should be 
withheld from Fremont for the defense of the city was ig¬ 
nored, and two months later the disaster occurred which he 
had predicted. 

“New York, June 1, 1862. A few days ago I wrote 
a private note to Secretary Stanton calling his attention to 
my resignation and requesting him to announce its accep¬ 
tance. I told him I had made a trial of several days’ change 
of atmosphere as he had suggested, but did not feel strength- 


— 702 — 


Extract 


ened to the point of making another experiment in Wash¬ 
ington. I received a note from him yesterday, in which he 
refers to my ill health in very kind terms, but says that 
the President apprehends that acceptance of my resigna¬ 
tion at this time might be misunderstood and might even 
be injurious to the public interests. He urges that I take 
an unlimited leave of absence till recovered. 

“The injury apprehended, of course, is a public sus¬ 
picion that I am dissatisfied with the conduct of the war— 
and this would be in some degree true. I was dissatisfied 
with General McClellan’s movement to Yorktown. I re¬ 
peatedly urged the President not to permit the Shenandoah 
Valley to be uncovered. He persisted, however, and Banks 
was driven out of it by Stonewall Jackson and across the 
Potomac.” 


* 


— 703 — 






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THE LIFE AND LETTERS 
OF 

GEORGE GORDON MEADE 

MAJOR-GENERAL, U. S. A. 


BY 

GEORGE MEADE 

Captain and Aide-de-Camp and Brevet Lt. Col., 
United States Army 


Edited by 

GEORGE GORDON MEADE 


VOLUME I 


New York 

CHARLES SCRIBNERS’ SONS 
1913 


Copyright 1913, by 
Charles Scribners’ Sons 
Published May, 1913 
















Extract 


******* 

Camp near the Chickahominy, 
June 17, 1862. 

Today we hear very heavy firing in the direction of 
Fort Darling on the James River, and we presume the gun¬ 
boats are engaging the batteries on the river; though I un¬ 
derstood from Commodore Dahlgren whom I met at Fred¬ 
ericksburg that the gunboats could not pass the obstruc¬ 
tions in the river at Fort Darling, the enemy having pretty 
much destroyed the navigation, which it would take a long 
time to correct by removing the vessels and rocks, etc., 
which have been sunk and thrown in. I learned very little 
at headquarters yesterday. I think McClellan is await¬ 
ing the arrival of all his reinforcements, before pushing 
his lines any farther forward, or making any grand attack. 
In the meantime the enemy is busily at work fortifying all 
the approaches to the city, and without doubt will make a 
most vigorous and desperate resistance to our advance. Mc¬ 
Clellan, I understand, is in good spirits and confident of 
success, which I most sincerely trust he may attain. Our 
division remains where it was first posted, just behind the 
Chickahominy at the railroad crossing, where it is under¬ 
stood we will remain for a few days, as it is a good posi¬ 
tion for defending the railroad, and from whence we can 
readily be sent to reinforce any part of the line that may be 
suddenly attacked. From what I can gather, the taking 
of Richmond will be the work of time, by our slowly but 
gradually and surely advancing until we get near enough 
to make a final assault. In this operation we shall, of 
course, have frequent skirmishes, and now and then big 
battles, like the recent one at Fair Oaks, or Seven Pines, as 
it is sometimes called, where they thought they had a fine 
chance to cut off our left wing, isolated from the rest of 
the army by the sudden rising of the Chickahominy. Un¬ 
fortunately for their calculations, our bridges stood the 
freshet, and our communication was not cut off, enabling us 
to meet their attack and repulse it. 


— 707 — 


Life and Letters of George Gordon Meade 


Camp near New Bridge , Va., 
June 18, 1862. 

Late last night orders came for our division to march 
at early daylight this morning, which we did, arriving here 
about 11 A. M., and relieving Slocum’s (formerly Frank¬ 
lin’s) division, being thus posted on the extreme right flank 
of our army and in the front. The enemy are in plain view 
of our picket line, we holding here the left bank of the 
Chickahominy, and they the opposite one. There is quite 
a wide bottom and swamp between the two banks, but our 
respective pickets are within musket range of each other. 
But shots are not exchanged unless there is a collection on 
either side, looking like an advance or a working party. The 
“New Bridge” as it is called, you have doubtless seen men¬ 
tioned and referred to in the newspapers. It is the bridge 
by which one of the main roads into Richmond crosses the 
Chickahominy. We hold the approaches on this side, the 
enemy on the other. They are throwing up earthworks 
to prevent our crossing and all the afternoon our batteries 
have been shelling their working parties, and they have 
been shelling our batteries, with I fancy no damage on either 
side. The “New Bridge” is only five miles from Richmond 
and from the high grounds near our camp we can plainly 
discern the spires of Sacred City. Tomorrow Reynolds and 
Seymour go to Mechanicsville, which is a little higher up 
the river and about four and a half miles from the city. 
Immediately adjoining our camp we have Fitz-John Porter’s 
corps, in which General Morell now commands a division. 
Stonewall’s division of cavalry is also in our vicinity, as 
well as Sykes’s brigade of regulars. Willie* has been with 
me all the afternoon. He looks very well—better than he 
did at Alexandria. 

Did you see in the papers of the 12th the instructions of 
Joe Johnston to Stonewall Jackson? I hope you have, for 
they most singularly confirm my expressed views of the 
object of Jackson’s raid. Johnston tells him that anything 
he can do, either to prevent reinforcements reaching Mc- 

*William Sergeant, brother of Mrs. Meade. 


— 708 — 




Extract 


Clellan or to withdraw any portion of his force, will be of 
inestimable service; suggests his attacking either McDowell 
or Banks—whichever he thinks most practicable—and says 
it is reported McDowell is about advancing on Richmond, 
which he, Johnston, thinks extremely probable. You see 
how T completely Jackson succeeded in carrying out these, by 
paralyzing McDowell’s force of forty thousand men, through 
the stupidity of the authorities at Washington becoming 
alarmed, and sending McDowell on a wild-goose chase after 
a wily foe, who never intended to be caught in a trap, and 
was prepared to back out so soon as his plans proved suc¬ 
cessful. I must do McDowell the justice to say that he 
saw this himself, but no protest on his part could shake 
the strategy of the War Department. 

We are so near the enemy that we hear their* bands 
distinctly at tattoo and parade. On our side no drums, 
bugles or bands are allowed, except to announce the ap¬ 
proach of the enemy. I can hardly tell you how I felt this 
afternoon, when the old familiar sound of the heavy firing 
commenced. I thought of you and the dear children—of 
how much more I have to make me cling to life than during 
the Mexican War; I thought, too, of how I was preserved 
then and since in many perilous times through God’s mercy 
and will, and prayed He woud contine His gracious pro¬ 
tection to and in His own good time to restore to me, or if 
this was not His will and it was to be decreed that I was to 
be summoned, that He would forgive me, for His Son’s sake, 
the infinite number of sins, I have all my life been commit¬ 
ting. You see, I do not shut my eyes to the contingencies of 
the future but I look upon them with a hopeful eye and a 
firm reliance on the mercy of my Heavenly Father. It is now 
10 o’clock at night, dark and rainy. All is quiet in both camps 
and the immense hosts arrayed against each other are, doubt¬ 
less, quietly and peacfully sleeping, unless some one with 
thoughts like those I have expressed has a disturbing con¬ 
science. 


— 709 — 


Life and Letters of George Gordon Meade 

Camp near New Bridge, Va., 
June 20, 1862. 

Today we have had a little excitement. Our camp is 
on the edge of a small strip of woods that fringes the Val¬ 
ley of the Chickahominy. The enemy occupy the heights 
on the opposite side, where they are busily throwing up 
fortifications, to dispute our advance. Our people very 
foolishly, as I thought, undertook to interrupt their work 
by shelling their works. For a day or two they were quite 
quiet and let us have it all our own way, but this morning 
they opened on us with heavy guns at long range, and pretty 
soon gave us evidence that two could play at this game. 
Their fire was at first directed against our batteries, but my 
men, notwithstanding I had cautioned them to stay in camp 
and nob expose themselves to the view of the enemy, would 
rush through, the woods into the open ground beyond, to 
stare about like idiots. The enemy, seeing the crowd, soon 
ascertained our position, and moving one of their long-range 
guns, began throwing shot and shell right into our camp, 
scattering the curious gentlemen and giving them a pretty 
good scare. Fortunately no one was hurt, though the shell 
fell all around. I went in amongst them and remonstrated 
with them for* their disobedience of orders, which had 
brought this on them, and after letting them stand the fire 
till they were pretty well subdued, I moved the camp to 
another position, and all has since been quiet. 

Camp near New Bridge, Va., 
June 22, 1862. 

I yesterday rode over to headquarters and saw McClel¬ 
lan. While with him Franklin and Baldy Smith came in, 
and I had a very pleasant visit. McClellan has been a 
little under the weather, but is now well and looks very well 
and is in good spirits. He talked very freely of the way in 
which he had been treated, and said positively that had not 
McDowell’s corps been withdrawn, he would long before 
now have been in Richmond. Last night we heard 
from a deserter that we were to be attacked today. We 


— 710 — 


Extract 


were all under arms before daybreak, but everything has 
been quiet up to this moment. (9 a.m.) 

I suppose you have heard of William Palmer’s death. 
They seemed to be quite shocked at it at Headquarters, 
as he had left only about a week ago, sick, but not considered 
dangerously so. Poor fellow! His death makes me a Ma¬ 
jor of Topogs. 


Camp near New Bridge , Va., 
June 2U, 1862. 

We have been in a pleasant state of excitement for the 
last twenty-four hours, under the impression that the 
enemy were disposed to attack our right flank in force, in 
which case the first onset would be received by our division. 
The result of this little expectation is our being under 
arms before daylight (3 A.M.) till nightfall and the almost 
total destruction of one’s rest at night by constant and 
frequent orders, messages, etc., occurring from hour to 
hour. The trouble about the whole thing is that the men 
become wearied with these constant stampedes, as they are 
called, and it becomes more and more difficult to get them 
out at any prescribed time, they saying, “Oh, it’s the old 
cry of wolf!” and I am really afraid we shall carry out the 
old fable, and when the wolf does come, be unprepared. 
I don’t intend, however, that such shall be the case with 
my command, and am making myself very unpopular by in¬ 
sisting on the utmost vigilance and requiring all hands 
to be up and ready by daylight every morning, whether 
we have a stampede or not. 

Last evening Reynolds made a reconnaissance of 
the enemy’s position, driving in their pickets, stirring them 
up generally and making them display their force. I think 
he had two or three men wounded in the affair. This morn¬ 
ing all seems quiet, though late last night it was the im¬ 
pression of the superior officers on our side that we 
should be attacked. Too be sure, there was a very heavy 
fall of rain during the night, overflowing the Chickahom- 
iny Swamp, and most probably preventing any attack, had 
they designated making one. 


— 711 — 


Life and Letters of George Gordon Meade 


Camp near New Bridge, Va ., 
June 26, 1862. 

Everything is quiet on our part of the line. Yesterday 
Heintzelman, on the left, made an advance, which of 
course was disputed, resulting in brisk skirmishing, with 
some loss in killed and wounded on both sides. Heintzel¬ 
man gained his point, however, and maintained it. We 
were under arms all day ready to take part in a general 
action, if one should result. In the meantime, the batteries 
opposite to us, have been throwing their shot and shell at 
us, but without inflicting any injury. There is a report 
that the great “Stonewall” Jackson with his army has left 
Gordonsville and is coming to Richmond, to turn our right 
flank. His withdrawal from the Valley of Virginia would 
indicate weakness of the army here, for he would never 
leave so important a field, and where he had been doing 
good service, unless it was a matter of great importance 
to strengthen their Richmond army. This report, in con¬ 
nection with the fact that they keep up a great drumming 
and bugling in front of us, to make us believe they are in 
great force, leads me to doubt whether their army is as 
strong as represented, and whether they do actually out¬ 
number us, as some believe. 

I yesterday rode to the extreme right of our lines, 
where our cavalry are stationed, watching the whole coun¬ 
try, to apprise us of any advance. At one of the outposts, 
Reynolds, whom I was accompanying on a tour of inspec¬ 
tion, sent for the officer in command of the detachment to 
give some instructions, when I found he was our old neigh¬ 
bor, Benoni Lockwood, who seemed really glad to see me. 
The adjutant of the Fourth Pennsylvania Cavalry, now 
serving with our division, is your relative, Will Biddle. 
The health of the army, at least of our division, is very 
fair—some little billious attacks and diarrhoea, but nothing 
serious. We have an abundance of good food; no army in 
the world was ever better supplied and cared for than ours 
is, all reports to the contrary notwithstanding. 

* * * * * * * 


— 712 — 


LIFE 

AND CAMPAIGNS 


OF 

LIEUT. GEN. 
THOMAS J. JACKSON 

(Stonewall Jackson) 


BY 

PROF. R. L. DABNEY, D.D. 

Of the Union Theological Seminary, Va. 


Illustrated With Steel Portrait and 
Eleven Diagrams 

(Right of translation reserved 
by the author) 


New York 

BLELOCK & COMPANY 
19 Beekman St. 

NATIONAL PUB. CO. 

Richmond, Virginia, and Philadelphia, Pa. 

1866 

















Dabney 


* ****** 

On the evening of June 17th, General Jackson began 
to move his troops from Mount Meridan, and leaving orders 
with his staff to send away the remainder the next morning, 
he went to the town to set the new brigades in motion. No 
man in the whole army knew whither it was going. Gen¬ 
eral Ewell, the second in command, was only instructed to 
move toward Charlottesville, and the rest were only ordered 
to follow him. Two marches brought them to the neigh¬ 
borhood of the latter town, where General Jackson rejoined 
them, and confiding to his chief of staff the direction of his 
movement, with strict injunctions of secrecy, departed by 
railroad, to hold a preliminary conference with General Lee 
in Richmond. He directed that an advanced guard of cav¬ 
alry should precede the army continually, and prohibit all 
persons, whether citizens or soldiers, from passing before 
them toward Richmond. A rear-guard was to prevent all 
straggling backward, and when they encamped, all lateral 
roads were to be guarded, to prevent communication be¬ 
tween the army and country. 

But on reaching Gordonsville, whither the brigade of 
General Lawton had gone by railroad, he was arrested for 
a day by a groundless rumor of the approach of the enemy 
from the Rappahannock. Then, resuming the direction of 
the troops, he proceeded to a station called Frederickshall, 
fifty miles from Richmond, where he arrested his march to 
give the army its Sabbath rest. No general knew better 
than he, how to employ the transportation of a railroad in 
combination with the marching of an army. While the 
burthen trains forwarded his stores he caused the passenger 
trains to proceed to the rear of his line of march, which was 
chosen near the railroad, and take up the hindmost of his 
brigades. These were forwarded, in a couple of hours, a 
whole day's march; when they were set down, and the trains 
returned again, to take up the hindmost and give them a 
like assistance. 


— 715 — 


Life and Campaigns of Stonewall Jackson 


After a quiet Sabbath, the General rose at 1 o'clock A. M. 
and mounting a horse, rode express with a single courier, 
to Richmond. A few miles from his quarters, a pleasing 
evidence of the fidelity of his pickets was presented to him. 
He endeavored to pass this outpost, first as an officer on 
military business and then as an officer bearing important 
intelligence for General Lee. But the guard was inexor¬ 
able, and declared that his instruction from General Jack- 
son especially prohibited him to pass army men* as well as 
citizens. The utmost he would concede was, that the cap¬ 
tain commanding the picket should be called and the appeal 
made to him. When he came, he recognized the General; 
who praising the soldier for his obedience to instructions, 
bound them both to secrecy touching his journey. Having 
held the desired interview with the Commander-in-Chief, 
he returned the next day to the line of march pursued by 
his troops, and led them, the evening of June 25th to the 
village of Ashland, twelve miles north of Richmond. 

To understand the subsequent narrative, the reader 
must have a brief explanation of the position of the two 
great armies. The Chickahominy River, famous for the 
adventures and capture of Captain John Smith, in the child¬ 
hood of Virginia, is a sluggish stream of fifteen yards' width, 
which flows parallel to the James, and only five miles north 
of Richmond. It is bordered by extensive meadows, which 
degenerate in many places into marshes, and its bed is miry 
and treacherous; so that it constitutes an obstacle to the 
passage of armies far more formidable than its insignificant 
width would indicate. During this year, especially the 
excessive rains and repeated freshets had converted its 
little current into an important stream, its marshes into 
lakes, and its rich level cornfields into bogs. But at the 
distance of half a mile from the channel, the country on each 
side rises into undulating hills, with farms interspersed ir¬ 
regularly among the tracts of forest, and the coppices of 
young pine. General McClellan, taking his departure from 
the White House, on the Pamunkey, and using the York 
River Railroad as his line of supply, had pressed his vast 
army to the east and north of Richmond. Its two wings, 


— 716 — 


Dabney 

placed like the open jaws of some mighty dragon, the one 
on the north and the other on the south of the Chickahominy, 
almost embraced the northeast angle of the city. To con¬ 
nect them with each other, he had constructed three or four 
elaborate bridges across the stream, with causeways leading 
to them, and along the length of the valley by which he 
hoped to defy both mire and floods. On both sides, his front 
was so fortified with earthworks, abattis, and heavy artil¬ 
lery, that they could not be assailed, save with cruel loss. 
These works, on his left were extended to the front of the 
battle-field of Seven Pines, and on his right to the hamlet 
of Mechanicsville; which, Seated upon the north bank of the 
Chickahominy, six miles from Richmond, commanded the 
road thence to Hanover Court House. 

The Confederate army, under the immediate order of 
General Robert E. Lee, confronted McClellan and guarded 
the course of the Chickahominy, as high as the half sink 
farm, northwest of Richmond, where Brigadier-General 
Branch, of Major A. P. Hill’s division, was stationed within 
a few miles of Ashland. General Lee, after the battle of 
Seven Pines, had fortified his front, east of Richmond, in 
order that a part of his forces might hold the defensive 
against the Federal army; while, with the remainder, he 
attempted to turn its flank north of the Chickahominy. To 
test the practicability of this grand enterprise, and to ex¬ 
plore a way for General Jackson’s proposed junction, he 
had caused General J. E. B. Stuart, of the cavalry to make 
his famous reconnaissance of the 12th of June; in which 
that daring officer had marched a detachment of cavalry 
from north to south around McClellan’s whole rear, and 
had discovered that it was unprotected by works, or by 
proper disposition of forces, against the proposed attack. 

The conception of the Commander-in-Chief is thus de¬ 
veloped in his own general order of battle, communicated 
to General Jackson. He was to march from Ashland on 
the 25th of June, to encamp for the night, west of the Cen¬ 
tral Railroad, and to advance at three A. M., on the 26th, 
and turn the enemy’s works at Mechanicsville, and on Bea¬ 
ver Dam Creek, a stream flowing into the Chickahominy a 


— 717 — 


Life and Campaigns of Stonewall Jackson 

mile in the rear of that hamlet, where he had a powerful 
reserve entrenched. Major-General A. P. Hill was to cross 
the Chickahominy, to the north side of the meadow bridges, 
above Mechanicsville, and associating to himself Branch’s 
brigade, which was to advance as soon as the march of Gen¬ 
eral Jackson opened a way for it, was to sweep down against 
the enemy’s right. As soon as the Mechanicsville bridge 
should be uncovered, Longstreet and D. H. Hill were to 
cross, the latter to proceed to the support of Jackson and 
the former to that of A. P. Hill. The four commands were 
directed to sweep down the north side of the Chickahominy, 
toward the York River railroad; Jackson on the left and 
in advance, Longstreet nearest the river and in the rear. 
Huger and Magruder were to hold their positions south of 
the Chickahominy, against any assault of the enemy, to 
observe him closely, and to follow him should he retreat. 
General Stuart, with his cavalry, was thrown out on Jack¬ 
son’s left, to guard his flank, and give notice of the enemy’s 
movements. 

The evening of June 25th found the army of General 
Jackson a few miles short of their appointed goal—at Ash¬ 
land—instead of the line of the Central Railroad. The diffi¬ 
culties of handling so large a force with inexperienced sub¬ 
ordinates, concurred with the loss of the bridges on his 
direct line of march (lately burned by order of the Fed¬ 
eralists) to delay him this much. No commander ever 
sympathized more fully with the spirit of Napoleon’s an¬ 
swer, when he replied to one of his marshals, in view of a 
similar combination of his armies for a great battle: “Ask 
me for anything but time.” Jackson’s ardent soul, on fire 
with the grandeur of the operations before him, and with 
delight in their boldness and wisdom and chafing at the 
delays of blundering and incompetent agents, forbade rest 
or sleep for him on this important night. He deliberately 
devoted the whole of it to the review of his preparations, 
and to prayer. Rations were to be distributed and pre¬ 
pared by the men for three days. The leaders of the dif¬ 
ferent divisions, encamped around Ashland, were to be in¬ 
structed in their routes, so that the several commands might 


— 718 — 


Dabney 

take their places in the column without confusion or delay. 
After all his staff were dismissed for a short repose; he still 
paced his chamber in anxious thought or devoted to wrest¬ 
ling with God the intervals between the visits of his officers. 
In the small hours of the night, two of the commanders of 
these divisions came to suggest that he should move the 
army by two columns on parallel roads, instead of by one. 
He listened respectfully, but requested that they await his 
decision until morning. When they left him, the one said 
to the other: “Do you know why General Jackson would 
not decide upon our suggestion at once ? It was because he 
has to pray over it, before he makes up his mind.” A 
moment after, the second returned to Jackson’s quarters to 
fetch his sword, which he had forgotten; and, as he en¬ 
tered, found him upon his knees! praying, doubtless, for 
Omniscient guidance in all his responsible duties, for his 
men, and for his country. 

Notwithstanding his efforts, the army did not move 
until after sunrise; when, all being ready, it advanced in 
gallant array toward the southeast, crossed the Central 
Railroad, and, meeting here and there the vigilant cavalry 
of General Stuart, which came in from the left at the cross¬ 
roads approached the Pole-Green Church, a century before 
sanctified by the eloquence of the Rev. Samuel Davies, at 
4 o’clock in the afternon. Jackson was now abreast of the 
enemy’s right flank at Mechanicsville, and but a few miles 
north of it. Between him and the church was the Totto- 
pottamoy, a little stream which still bears its Indian title. 
The pickets of McClellan occupied the opposite bank, and 
had destroyed the light wooden bridge, and obstructed the 
road beyond with prostrate trees. The Texas brigade of 
Hood, which was in front, deployed a few skirmishers, who 
speedily cleared the opposing bank with their unerring 
rifles; and the woods beyond was shelled by one of Whit¬ 
ing’s batteries while the bridge was rapidly repaired. This 
initial cannonade was intended to observe the additional 
purpose of a signal, by which the Confederates before Me¬ 
chanicsville might be advertised of his presence. 


— 719 — 


Life and Campaigns of Stonewall Jackson 

For many hours the brigades of A. P. Hill had been 
patiently awaiting the expected sound, before the enemy's 
works. They now pressed forward, and a furious cannon¬ 
ade opened on both sides. General Hill, supported by Rip¬ 
ley's brigade, of D. H. Hill's division, speedily carried the 
little village, with the field-works and camp of the enemy, 
while the latter retired a mile to the eastward, to their 
stronger lines upon Beaver-Dam Creek. Jackson’s advance 
would in due time have turned this position, as it had Me- 
chanicsville, and would thus have given to the two Hills an 
easy conquest; but the presence of the Commander-in-Chief 
and the President of the Confederate States upon the field, 
with their urgency that the place should be carried without 
delay, impelled them to the attack. The heroic troops pressed 
up to the stream, and held the nearer bank throughout the 
night, but could effect no lodgment within the hostile works; 
and thus, at nine o'clock, the cannonade died away, and 
the opposing forces lay down upon their arms, after a bloody 
and useless struggle. As General Jackson's forces passed 
the Pole-Green Church, and went into camp a little below, 
at Hundley's Corner, the sound of the guns and the roar of 
the musketry told them that the gigantic struggle had begun. 

Thus opened the seven days’ tragedy before Richmond. 
The demeanor of its citizens during the evening of June 26th, 
gave an example of their courage, and their faith in their 
leaders and their cause. For many weeks, the Christians 
of the city had given themselves to prayer; and they drew 
from heaven a sublime composure. The spectator passing 
through the streets saw the people calmly engaged in their 
usual avocations, or else wending their way to the churches, 
while the thunders of the cannon shook the city. As the 
calm summer evening descended, the family groups were 
seen sitting upon their door-steps, where mothers told the 
children at their knees, how Lee and his heroes were now 
driving away the invaders. The young people promenaded 
the heights north of the town, and watched the distant shells 
bursting against the sky. At one church, a solemn caval¬ 
cade stood waiting; and if the observer had entered, saying 
to himself: “This funeral reminds me that Death claims all 


— 720 — 


Dabney 

seasons for his own, and refuses to postpone his dread rites 
for any inferior horrors,” he would have found a bridal cou¬ 
ple before the altar. The heart of old Rome was not more as¬ 
sured and steadfast when she sold at full price in her Forum 
the fields on which the victorious Carthaginian was en¬ 
camped. 

During the night, detachments of the enemy approached 
General Jackson’s camp at Hundley’s Corner, but were 
checked by Brockenborough’s battery, and the 1st Mary¬ 
land, 13th Virginia and 6th Louisiana regiments. At an 
early hour, the troops were put in motion, and speedily 
crossed the higher streams of the Beaver-Dam, thus turning 
the right of the enemy’s position. The way was now 
opened, by their retreat, for the advance of General D. H. 
Hill, who crossing Jackson’s line of march, passed to his 
front and left. The evacuation of the lines of Beaver-Dam 
also soon followed. At the dawn of day, the contest between 
the Federal artillery there, and that of General A. P. Hill 
had been resumed; but perceiving the divisions of General 
Jackson approaching their rear, the enemy retreated pre¬ 
cipitately down the Chickahominy towards Cold Harbor, 
pursued by Generals A. P. Hill and Longstreet, burning vast 
quantities of army stores, and deserting many uninjured. 
As General Jackson approached Walnut Grove Church, he 
met the Commander-in-Chief; and while he halted his col¬ 
umn to receive his final instructions from him, the gallant 
division of A. P. Hill filed past, in as perfect array as 
though they had been unscathed of battle. General Lee 
presuming that the Federalists would continue to withdraw, 
if overpowered, toward the York River Railroad and the 
White House, directed General Jackson to proceed, with 
General D. H. Hill, to a point a few miles north of Cold 
Harbor, and thence to march to that place, and strike their 
line of retreat. The roads led thither, the one direct, the 
other circuitous. The latter, which passed first eastward, 
and then southward, was the one which offered the desired 
route for General Jackson; for the former would have con¬ 
ducted him to ground in the rear of the retreating army, 
already occupied by General A. P. Hill. General Jackson 


— 721 — 


Life and Campaigns of Stonewall Jackson 


had selected young men of the vicinage, found in a company 
of cavalry near him, for guides. When he asked them the 
road to Cold Harbor, his habitual reticence, in this instance 
too stringent, withheld all explanation of his strategic de¬ 
signs. They therefore naturally pointed him to the direct 
and larger road, as the route to Cold Harbor. After march¬ 
ing for a mile and a half, the booming of cannon in his 
front caught his ear, and he demanded sharply of the guide 
near him: “Where is that firing?” The reply was, that 
it was in the direction of Gaines’s Mill. “Does this road 
lead there?” he asked. The guide told him that it led by 
Gaines’s Mill to Cold Harbor. “But,” exclaimed he, “I do 
not wish to go to Gaines’s Mill. I wish to go to Cold Harbor, 
leaving that place to the right.” “Then,” said the guide, 
“the left-hand road was the one which should have been 
taken; and had you let me know what you desired, I could 
have directed you aright at first.” Nothing now remained, 
but to reverse the column, and return to the proper track. 
It was manifest that an hour of precious time must be lost 
in doing this, while the accelerated firing told that the battle 
was thickening in front, and every heart trembled with the 
anxious fear lest the irreparable hour should be lost by the 
delay. But Jackson bore the same calm and assured coun¬ 
tenance, and when this fear was suggested to him, he re¬ 
plied : “No, let us trust that the providence of our God will 
so overrule it, that no mischief shall result.” Nor was he 
mistaken in this confidence; for the time thus allowed to 
General D. H. Hill enabled him to reach the desired point 
of meeting north of Cold Harbor, just in front of Jackson, 
and brought them into precise conjunction. They then 
turned to the right and moved directly toward the supposed 
position of the enemy, with the division of Hill in front, 
followed by those of the Ewell, Whiting, and Jackson in the 
order of their enumeration. After passing Cold Harbor, 
and arresting at that spot a few Federal carriages, they 
perceived the enemy about a half mile southward, drawn 
up in battle array, and fronting to the north. General Jack- 
son, with a numerous suite, rode forward to observe their 
position; and at his suggestion a battery from Hill’s divi- 


— 722 — 


Dabney 

sion was posted opposite to them. But before they began 
to fire, several Federal batteries opened upon them a furious 
cannonade, by which the Generals were speedily driven to 
a distant part of the field, and the Confederate guns were 
silenced, after a gallant but unequal contest of half an hour. 

It was not two o’clock in the afternoon. The firing 
west of Cold Harbor told that General A. P. Hill was fully 
engaged with the enemy there. In fact, he was fighting 
single-handed, the whole centre of the opposing host. For 
a time, General Jackson held his troops back in the margin 
of the woods looking toward the highway, and along the 
line of their march, in the hope that the enemy, retreating 
before Generals A. P. Hill and Longstreet, would expose 
their flank to a crushing blow from him. But the firing on 
his right began evidently to recede, showing that Hill, in¬ 
stead of driving the savage game into his toils, was giving 
way before their overpowering numbers. He then deter¬ 
mined to bring his whole infantry into action. Assigning 
to General D. H. Hill the extreme left, he placed General 
Ewell’s division next him, and sent orders to Generals Whit¬ 
ing and Lawton, and to the Brigadiers of his own original 
division, which brought up the rear, to form for battle along 
the road by which they were marching, and then moving in 
echelon, beginning on the left, to feel for the position of the 
enemy and engage him. The topography was unknown to 
Jackson and to his subordinates, the forests forbade a con¬ 
nected view of the country, and no time was left for recon¬ 
naissance. Nothing remained, therefore, but to move to¬ 
ward the firing, and engage the foe wherever he was found. 

The expectations that the Federalists would continue 
their retreat, when hard pressed, toward the White House, 
was erroneous. Their commander proposed to himself an¬ 
other expedient: to concentrate his troops on the south of the 
Chickahominy, and relinquishing his connections with the 
York River, to open for himself communications with the 
River James below Richmond, now accessible to his fleets 
up to Drewry’s Bluffs. Accordingly, his present purpose 
was to stand at bay upon the northern bank of the former 
stream, until he could withdraw his troops across it in safety. 


— 723 — 


Life and Campaigns of Stonewall Jackson 

He chose, for this end,' a strong position covering two of 
his military bridges, and confronting with a convex array, 
the Confederates who threatened him from the north and 
west. His right, or eastern wing occupied an undulating 
plateau protected in front by thickets of pine and the rude 
fences of the country, and presenting numerous commanding 
positions for artillery. In front of that wing a sluggish 
rivulet, speedily degenerated into a marsh, thickset with 
briers and brushwood, stretched away to the east, afford¬ 
ing a seeming protection to that flank. An interval of a 
few hundred yards in front of his right w 7 as unprotected 
by any such obstruction; but the fields were here swept by 
a powerful artillery. And as his line passed westward, an¬ 
other rivulet commenced its course, and flowed in front of 
his whole centre and left wing, in an opposite direction to 
the first until, merging itself into Powhite Creek, it passed 
into the Chickahominy above. His centre was enveloped in 
a dense forest, which, with the marshy stream in front, pre¬ 
cluded the use of artillery by the assailants. His lef*t was 
posted in a belt of woodland, which descended with a steep 
inclination from the plateau to a deep and narrow gully, 
excavated for itself by the rivulet. Three formidable lines 
of infantry held this hill-side, the first hidden in the natural 
ditch at its bottom, the second behind a strong barricade of 
timber a little above, and the third near the top. The brow 
of the eminence was crowned with numerous batteries, 
which screened by the narrow zone of trees, commanded 
every approach to the position. Last, a number of heavy 
rifled cannon upon the heights south of the Chickahominy, 
protected the extreme left, and threatened to enfilade any 
troops advancing across The open country to the attack. 
These formidable dispositions were only disclosed to the 
Confederates by their actual onset, so that maneuvers was 
excluded, and the only resort was the stubborn courage and 
main force. And it was only on General Jackson’s extreme 
left that the Confederate artillery could find any position, 
from which the enemy could be reached effectively. The 
front upon which these two great armies were to contend 
was less than three miles in extent. Hence, as the brigades 


— 724 — 


Dabney 

of Longstreet and A. P. Hill from which the Confederate 
right, and of D. H. Hill and Jackson from the left, moved 
into the combat on convergent radii, they formed, in many 
places, an order of battle two or three lines deep; and those 
first engaged were supported by those which arrived later. 

The road along which General Jackson drew up his line 
for battle, made with the enemy’s front an angle of forty 
or fifty degrees. Hence, the troops toward the right had 
the longer arc to traverse, in reaching the scene of combat, 
and all were required to incline toward their left, in order 
to confront the enemy. General D. H. Hill, on the Con¬ 
federate left, moved first, and was soon furiously engaged. 
For two or three hours he struggled with the enemy with 
wavering fortunes, unable to rout them, but winning some 
ground, which he stubbornly held against a terrible artillery 
and musketry fire. General Ewell moved next, with one 
brigade upon the left, and two upon the right of the road 
which led from Gaines’s Mill toward the Federal left. Cross¬ 
ing the marsh, he ascended the opposing hill-side, and en¬ 
gaged the enemy in the forest. Before their terrific fire, 
General Elzey, commanding his left brigade, fell severely 
wounded, and Colonel Seymour, commanding the Louisiana 
brigade of Taylor, was slain. Whole regiments were killed, 
wounded, or scattered under this leaden tempest; but still 
their dauntless General rallied his fainting men, repaired 
his line, and held all his ground against the double and 
triple lines of the enemy; until just as his ammunition was 
exhausted welcome success arrived under General Lawton. 

One cause of delay in the arrival of the remaining 
troops has already been seen, in the larger space which they 
were required to pass over in order' to reach the enemy. 
Another, and a more dangerous one, arose out of a fatal 
misconception of General Jackson’s orders by his messenger. 
Communicating to all the commanders in the rear of Ewell 
the plan for their advance he had concluded by instructing 
them to await further orders before engaging the enemy. 
But another officer of the staff, comprehending better the 
General’s true intentions, and the urgency of the occasion, 
corrected the error, and at length moved the remaining 


— 725 — 


Life and Campaigns of Stonewall Jackson 

brigades into action. Their leaders could learn nothing of 
the country, to which they were all strangers; and their 
movements were partially concealed from each other by the 
numerous tracts of coppice and forest. Hence, instead of 
advancing toward the enemy in parallel lines, they uncon¬ 
sciously crossed each other; and several of them, at last, 
went into action far aside from the points at which they 
were expected to strike. But the providence of God to 
whom their General ever looked, guided them aright to the 
places where their aid was most essential. 

The Stonewall Brigade, under General Winder, was 
next the last in the line of march, and should therefore have 
formed almost the extreme right of General Jackson’s battle. 
Their General, so soon as he comprehended the error of the 
instructions which held him inactive, advanced with chiv¬ 
alrous zeal. But his neighbors on the left, with whom he 
should have connected his right, having already passed out 
of sight in the thickets, he had no other guide than the din 
of the battle. Feeling his way rapidly toward this he passed 
transversely from right to left, across the ground over 
which the corps had already swept, and found himself behind 
the struggling line of D. H. Hill. This indomitable soldier 
was just devising, with his two Brigadiers, Garland and 
Anderson, upon his left, a daring movement, to break the 
stubborn resistance of the Federalists. Garland proposed 
to swing around their extreme right with his brigade; and, 
taking them in reverse, to charge with the bayonet, 
while the rest of the division renewed their attack in front. 
One formidable obstacle existed; a hostile battery at that 
extremity of the field threatened to enfilade his ranks while 
marching to the attack. To obviate this danger, Hill de¬ 
termined to storm the battery with five regiments; but only 
one—that of Colonel Iverson, of North Carolina—arrived 
at it. He was severely wounded; and, after ten minutes, 
his men were driven from it by overpowering numbers; but 
this interval, during which its guns were silenced, was de¬ 
cisive. For meantime, Winder had advanced the famed 
Stonewall Brigade, in perfect order; had rallied to him all 
the shattered regiments of Elzey and Hill which he found 


— 726 — 


Dabney 

lurking under cover, or waging a defensive struggle; and 
now swept with an imposing line and a thundering cheer 
across the whole plateau occupied by the enemy’s right. 
Garland and Anderson dashed simultaneously upon their 
flank; the contested battery was in an instant captured a 
second time; and the whole wing of the Federal army, with 
their reinforcements, hurled back into the swamps of the 
Chickahominy. There they broke into a scattered rabble in 
the approaching darkness, and crouched behind the trees, 
or found their way across the stream to their friends. This 
brilliant movement, with simultaneous successes upon other 
parts of the field, decided the day. Nowhere were the panic 
and confusion of the beaten army more utter than here. The 
fields which were the scene of this terrific struggle com¬ 
posed the farms of two respectable citizens, named Maghee. 
The one of these farthest in the Federal rear was spectator 
of their rout. Regiments sent over to McClellan to support 
the wavering battle were seen to pause, even before they 
came under fire; to break without firing a musket; and to 
throw away their arms, and fly to the swamps. As ord¬ 
nance wagons and ambulances galloped toward the scene 
of action, they were arrested by the frantic fugitives, who 
snatched the animals from them, and, mounting two or three 
on each, fled toward the bridge, leaving ammunition and 
wounded comrades to their fate. One officer was seen, de¬ 
lirious with terror, with his hat in one hand, and his empty 
scabbard in the other, screaming as he ran: “Jackson is 
coming! Jackson is coming!” Indeed the baseness of the 
Northern soldiery was shown by the fact that, throughout 
this battle, it was usually the supporting regiments in the 
rear, unscathed as yet, which gave way first; while the re¬ 
sistance was sustained by the old United States regulars of 
Sykes and Porter in the front. In the volunteer regiments, 
the “will of the majority,” which was usually a determina¬ 
tion to retire at the critical moment, was sometimes ex¬ 
pressed against the authority of the officers by a formal 
popular vote. To the entreaties of their commanders their 
answers were: “We’re tired out fighting;” “Got no more 
ammunition;” “Guess the rebels will be down to them bridges 


— 727 — 


Life and Campaigns of Stonewall Jackson 

soon.’' And so they broke away, and the rout was propa¬ 
gated from the rear to the front. 

The two other brigades of Jackson’s old division, the 
2d and 3d Virginia, under the lead of Colonels Cunningham 
and Fulkerson, also advanced with spirit as soon as they 
received correct orders. Having met messengers from the 
Commander-in-Chief, and General A. P. Hill, they obtained 
more correct guidance, and advanced to the Confederate 
right. The second brigade supported Brigadier^General 
R. H. Anderson, near General Longstreet’s extreme right. 
Just as they arrived, the troops of Anderson were giving 
ground momentarily before the enemy. Colonel Cunning¬ 
ham proposed to take the front, and give him an opportunity 
to reform behind his lines; but the gallant Carolinain in¬ 
sisted upon completing his own work. The shout was raised; 
“Jackson’s men are here,” and his regiments answering 
with a cheer, rushed forward again, and swept all before 
them, leaving to the Virginians little more to do than to 
fire a parting volley. In like manner, the third brigade 
reinforced the line of A. P. Hill, near the centre, but only 
arrived in time to see the enemy give way before Whiting’s 
division, which had come earlier to its help. As Colonel 
Fulkerson advanced to relieve these wearied and decimated 
troops of the labors of the pursuit, the retreating enemy 
fired a last volley, by which he was mortally wounded. In 
him General Jackson lost an able and courageous subordi¬ 
nate, who had proved himself equal to every task imposed 
upon him. Had he lived, the highest distinction must have 
crowned his merits; for his judgment, diligence and talent 
for command, were equal to his heroic courage. 

Just before the three original brigades of Jackson, had 
marched the Georgia brigade of Lawton, nearly four thou¬ 
sand strong. The time had now come for them to fight their 
maiden battle. As they advanced towards the enemy’s 
centre, they unconsciously crossed the line of march just 
before pursued by General Whiting, and passing under a 
severe fire from a battery upon the plateau near Maghee’s 
they crossed the marsh, and entered the wood in rear of 
General Ewell, passing between two regiments which had 


— 728 — 


Dabney 


retired from the contest after exhausting their ammunition. 
Here the brigade was thrown into line, and advanced firing, 
with imposing force. Their appearance was most timely; 
for the shattered remnant with which Ewell still stood at 
bay were firing their last rounds of cartridges. As the 
grim veteran saw this magnificent line.of 3500 bayonets 
sweeping through the woods, he waved his sword with en¬ 
thusiasm and shouted; “Huzza for Georgia!” Lawton, re¬ 
ceiving directions from him, pressed forward with a steady 
advance, drove the enemy's centre from the woods, into the 
open fields, nearer the river, and connecting with D. H. 
Hill and Winder on his left, assisted them in sweeping the 
Federalists at nightfall into the swamps. 

But the most brilliant achievement of the day was re¬ 
served for the division of General Whiting, consisting of 
the Mississippi brigade of Colonel Law, and the Texan bri¬ 
gade of General Hood. In Jackson’s initial order of battle, 
they filled the space between Ewell and Lawton, thus being 
the third division, counting from the left. Whiting, after 
being sorely embarrassed by the confused and erroneous 
instructions received, was properly informed of General 
Jackson’s wishes, and put his two brigades in motion. Be¬ 
fore they had advanced far, he met the Commander-in-Chief, 
who directed him to the part of the field held, at the begin¬ 
ning of the battle, by A. P. Hill. Passing through the 
forest from which this General had already driven the en¬ 
emy, he emerged into a broad, open field, in front of that 
ravine and gully, which have already been described as 
covering the left centre, and left of the Federal army. Far¬ 
ther toward the Confederate right, Longstreet was bringing 
up his division simultaneously, to storm this desperate line; 
and, after other brigades had recoiled, broken by a fire under 
which it seemed impossible that any troops could live, was 
just sending in his never-failing reserve, Pickett’s veteran 
brigade. These troops, after advancing heroically over the 
shattered regiments of their friends, within point blank 
range of the triple lines before them, unfortunately paused 
to return the fire of the concealed enemy. The entreaties 
of their officers to charge bayonets were unheard amidst 


— 729 — 


Life and Campaigns of Stonewall Jackson 

the terrific roar of musketry. It was as they stood thus, 
decimated at every volley, unable to advance, but too cour¬ 
ageous to flee, that the brigades of Hood and Whiting were 
launched against the Federal lines on the left. The charge 
may be best described in the language of General Jackson 
himself: 

“Advancing thence, thru a number of retreating and 
disordered regiments, he came within range of the enemy's 
fire; who concealed in an open wood, and protected by breast¬ 
works, poured a destructive fire, for a quarter of a mile, 
into his advancing line, under which many brave officers 
and men fell. Dashing on with unfaltering step, in the 
face of these murderous discharges of canister and mus¬ 
ketry, Gen. Hood and Col. Law, at the heads of their re¬ 
spective brigades, rushed to the charge with a yell. Moving 
down a precipitous ravine, leaping ditch and stream, clam¬ 
bering up a difficult ascent, and exposed to an incessant and 
deadly fire from the entrenchments, these brave and deter¬ 
mined men pressed forward, driving the enemy from his 
well-selected and fortified position. 

“In this charge, in which upwards of a thousand men 
fell, killed and wounded, before the fire of the enemy, and 
in which 14 pieces of artillery and nearly a regiment were 
captured, the Fourth Texas, under the lead of General Hood, 
was the first to pierce these strong-holds and seize the guns." 

The shouts of triumph which rose from our brave 
men as they, unaided by artillery, had stormed this citadel 
of their strength, were promptly carried from line to line, 
and the triumphant issue of this assault, with the well-di¬ 
rected fire of the batteries, and successful charges of Hill 
and Winder upon the enemy’s right, determined the for¬ 
tunes of the day. The Federalists, routed at every point, 
and aided by the darkness of the night escaped across the 
Chickahominy. 

The next morning, as Jackson inspected this position, 
and saw the deadly disadvantages under which the Texans 
had carried it, he exclaimed; “These men are soldiers in¬ 
deed !’’ Here, and in front of Pickett’s charge near by, all 
the Confederate dead were on the north side of the gorge. 


— 730 - 


Dabney 

Just as soon as the enemy saw them determined to advance, 
in spite of their fire, and the first line was dislodged from 
the channel of the rivulet in front, the other two lines in¬ 
continently fled from their barracados, although well able 
still to have repulsed the shattered assailants twice over; 
nor did the artillery hold their ground with more firmness 
upon the brow of the ascent. But now, as the troops of 
Longstreet and Whiting drove the throng of their foes from 
cover into the open fields, they speedily reaped a bloody 
revenge for all previous losses. The Federal infantry, re¬ 
signing all thought of battle, fled across the fields or huddled 
together in the open vales, where the furious Confederates 
mowed them down by hundreds. The Federal artillery 
flying to another position a few hundred yards in the rear, 
opened upon retreating friends and advancing foes, dis¬ 
tinguished nothing in the gathering gloom; and as the vic¬ 
tors rushed upon the guns again, they drove before them 
as a living shield, a confused herd of fugitives, whose bodies 
received the larger part of the volleys of canister. 

During the afternoon, General Jackson, with his es¬ 
cort, occupied a position near Cold Harbor, where five roads 
met, in the rear of his left centre. Ignorant of the delay 
which had kept his reserves for two hours out of the strife, 
and of its unlucky cause, he grew more and more anxious 
as the sun approached the horizon, and the sustained firing 
told him that the enemy was nowhere broken. Sending 
first for Stuart, he suggested to him a vigorous charge of 
cavalry; but this was relinquished as impracticable. His 
gigantic spirit was manifestly gathering strength, and its 
rising tides were chafing stormily against their obstacles. 
Riding restlessly to and fro to the different points of in¬ 
terest, he issued his orders, in a voice which rdng with the 
deadly clang of the rifle, rather than the sonorous peal of 
clarion. Cheek and brow were blazing with the crimson 
blood, and beneath the vizor of his old drab cap, his eye 
glared with a fire, before which every other eye quailed. But 
a half hour of sunlight now remained. Unconscious that 
his veteran brigades were but now reaching the ridge of 
battle, he supposed that all his force had been put forth, and 


— 731 — 


Life and Campaigns of Stonewall Jackson 


(what had never happened before) the enemy was not 
crushed. It was then that he dispatched messengers to all 
the commanders of his divisions, with these words: “Tell 
them this affair must hang in suspense no longer; sweep 
the field with the bayonet.” The officers darted away with 
their messages; but before they reached the line, the ringing 
cheers, rising from every side of the smoking woods, told 
that his will was anticipated and the day was won. At 
this sound, no elation lighted up his features, but subduing 
the tempest of his passion, he rode calmly forward, to di¬ 
rect the pursuit of the enemy. 

In this battle, Gen. Jackson employed little artillery. 
Upon his wing a few of the batteries of D. H. Hill were put 
in action at the extreme left, with small effect at first, upon 
the enemy’s fire. Later in the day, Major Pelham, of Stu¬ 
art’s horse-artillery, whose splendid courage Jackson then 
first witnessed took position in front of Cold Harbor, with 
two guns, and engaged the Federal batteries which ob¬ 
structed the movements of Hill. One of his pieces was 
speedily disabled; but with the other, he continued the un¬ 
equal duel to the close of the day. At sunset, the batteries 
upon the extreme left were reinforced by those of Courtenay 
and Brockenborough. Thirty guns now opened upon the 
retreating enemy, and contributed much to his final discom¬ 
fiture. 

In the battle of Chickahominy, the Confederates used 
almost forty thousand men, of whom twenty thousand 
belonged to the command of General Jackson, exclusive 
of the division of D. H. Hill, temporarily associated with 
it. General McClellan asserted that he had but thirty-six 
thousand men engaged. The length of his triple lines of 
battle, and the superior numbers met by the Confederates at 
every point, show that if this statement was correct, it ex¬ 
cluded the reserves engaged at the close of the day; and if 
a similar subtraction were made on the other side, their 
numbers also would be reduced far below that amount. 
General Lee declared that the principal part of the Federal 
army was engaged. When it is remembered that this force 
embraced all of their regulars, and that the adroit use of 


— 732 — 


Dabney 

the position selected by McClellan debarred the Confederates 
from the employment of artillery, while it exposed them on 
both wings to that powerful implement of war, their 
victory will be received as a glorious proof of their prowess. 
They captured twenty-five pieces of artillery, and more than 
four thousand prisoners; while the field showed that the 
carnage among the Federalists was considerably heavier 
than than among the patriots. The victory was purchased by 
a loss of five hundred and eighty-nine men killed on the field, 
two thousand six hundred and seventy-one wounded, and 
twenty-four missing, in Jackson’s corps. In the other divi¬ 
sions engaged, the loss was also heavy. Several circum¬ 
stances made the price paid for the splendid advantages of 
this achievement, heavier than it might have been, and the 
fruits more scanty. Of these, the one most worthy of the at¬ 
tention of the Confederates, because susceptible of a remedy, 
was the lack of a competent general staff, by which the 
plans of the Commander-in-Chief might be carried out with 
accuracy, and unity of action secured. Next, it should be 
remarked, that the generals were possessed of no topograph¬ 
ical surveys, and were therefore compelled to maneuver 
their troops without any acquaintance with the ground, in 
an intricate country, obscured by woodlands, and devoid 
of any elevated points of view. The whole space over which 
Jackson’s troops moved was occupied by a succession of 
thickets of pine, and insignificant farms; so that scarcely 
anywhere did two brigades move in view of each other, and 
an advance of a quarter of a mile invariably hid them from 
view. It was vain therefore, for the General to depend 
upon his own eyes; and with a scanty and ill-organized 
staff, he had no means of knowing, for a considerable time, 
whether his orders were executed or not. 

On the morning of Saturday, June 28th, there was 
not a Federal soldier in arms north of the Chickahominy. 
The two bridges by which McClellan had retreated were 
jealously guarded by his sharpshooters, and by command¬ 
ing batteries upon the southern heights, which forbade 
their passage save at an expense of blood too great to be 
contemplated. Ewell’s division, with the cavalry of 


— 733 — 


Life and Campaigns of Stonewall Jackson 


Stuart, marched, early in the morning, for the York River 
Railroad; which they occupied without opposition, at Dis¬ 
patch Station. The enemy thereupon retreated to the 
south side of the river, and burned the railroad bridge, 
while General Ewell destroyed a part of the track. Stuart, 
pursuing a detachment of cavalry toward the White House, 
found all the stations in flames, including the dwelling and 
farm buildings of General Lee, at the latter place, and a 
vast amount of military stores destroyed. It was not man¬ 
ifest from the enemy’s own act, that this line of retreat 
was finally surrendered. Two other alternatives remained 
to him: one was to cross the Chickahominy below, by the 
Williamsburg road and the neighboring ways; the other, 
to turn to the river James. To prevent the adoption of 
the former, General Ewell was ordered to guard Bottom’s 
Bridge, the next below the railroad, while the cavalry 
watched the lower course of the stream. To resist the 
latter, General Holmes’s division was directed to watch the 
roads leading toward the James, with a portion of the cav¬ 
alry, while Generals Magruder and Huger guarded his 
front, and stood prepared to press the Federalists upon the 
first appearance of retreat. The Confederate forces upon 
the north bank of the Chickahominy remained there until 
their purposes were developed. 

McClellan, although still superior to Lee in numbers 
and materiel of war, was not in a situation which might 
well excite his solicitude. His vast army, cut off from its 
established line of supplies, must either move at once or 
starve. Before him, and on both his flanks, was a deter¬ 
mined and victorious foe. Behind him was a forest coun¬ 
try, possessing few good roads, and intersected by sluggish 
water-courses, which the unprecedented rains had this 
year converted into swamps. But the forests were, in 
another aspect, his friends; for they concealed his designs 
and prevented the watching of his movements. One vig¬ 
orous day’s march, moreover, would bring him to his pow¬ 
erful fleet, which would give him a secure refuge and the 
needed supplies. Saturday evening, there was manifest 
signs of movement behind the Federal entrenchments, and 


— 734 — 


Dabney 

Sunday morning they were abandoned and the bridges 
across the Chickahominy were broken down. General 
Longstreet now marched to the south side by the New 
Bridge; but the Grapevine Bridge opposite General Stone¬ 
wall Jackson’s position was so destroyed that the pioneers 
consumed nearly the whole day in repairing it. Late in 
the afternoon, the Stonewall Brigade, with the General and 
his staff, passed over, and inspected the country. At the 
Trent farm near by were extensive bowers,' ingeniously 
woven of cedar boughs, which had surrounded the head¬ 
quarters where McClellan had recently resided, in a village 
of canvas, provided with every appliance of luxury. Here 
also was his telegraph office, whence lines diverged to each 
corps of his army and to Washington, with the floor lit¬ 
tered with the originals of these fictitious despatches, with 
which his Government was wont to delude its people. A 
little farther, General Jackson found the forces of General 
Magruder, with the Commander-in-Chief, watching the 
retreating enemy; and, it was agreed, after consultation, 
that the evening was too far advanced for an effective 
movement, and that General Jackson should return to his 
bivouac, and commence his march in pursuit at dawn the 
next morning. As he rode across the fields this evening, 
he witnessed a spectacle of inexpressible grandeur. The 
attention was attracted toward the east by the roar of an 
invisible railroad train, which seemed to be rushing toward 
the Chickahominy, far beyond the distant woods, with a 
speed which was constantly accelerated until it became 
frightful. Suddenly, as the beholders were speculating 
upon the cause of this sound, a vast pillar of white smoke 
was seen to spring upwards into the sky, which rose high¬ 
er and higher, and continually unfolded itself from within, 
in waves of snowy vapor, until it filled that quarter of the 
heavens. And, a moment after, the atmosphere, slower 
than the sunbeams, brought to the ear an astounding ex¬ 
plosion, in which a multitude of nearly simultaneous thun¬ 
der-claps were mingled into a roar louder than cannon. 
The explanation was learned afterwards. The retreating 
foe had loaded a train with a vast bulk of ammunition, and, 


— 735 — 


Life and Campaigns of Stonewall Jackson 

firing the engine to its most intense heat, had launched it 
from Savage’s Station without a guide, with a slow match 
lighted. Just as it plunged into the Chickahominy at the 
chasm where the bridge had lately been, the powder 
caught; and ammunition, engine, and carriages were blown 
into one huge wreck. 

This was not the only form of destruction which the 
Federalists employed to prevent their enemies from profit¬ 
ing by the spoils. Their industry in attempting to demol¬ 
ish was equal to the haste of their flight. The whole 
country was full of deserted plunder; and this, indeed, was 
equally true of the tracts over which they had been driven 
on the north side of the river, from Mechanicsville down¬ 
ward. Army wagons and pontoon trains, partially burned 
or crippled; mounds of grain and rice, and hillocks of 
mess-beef smouldering; tens of thousands of axes, picks, 
and shovels; camp-kettles gashed with hatchets; medi¬ 
cine-wagons with their drugs stirred into foul medley; and 
all the apparatus of a vast and lavish host, encumbered 
the roads; while the mire under foot was mixed with blan¬ 
kets lately new, and overcoats torn in twain from the waist 
up. For weeks afterwards, the agents of the army were 
busy gathering in the spoils; while a multitude of the 
country people found in them partial indemnity for the 
ruin of their farms. Great stores of fixed ammunition 
was saved, while more was destroyed. 

Scarcely had General Jackson returned to the north¬ 
ern bank, when a rapid outbreak of firing told that General 
Magruder had attacked the enemy near Savage’s Station. 
Here were the last entrenchments behind which McClellan 
could stand at bay. By a vigorous attack in flank and 
front, he was driven out of them just at sunset, and pur¬ 
sued for a short space with great slaughter. The sound 
of this combat kindled again in Jackson’s heart the fire of 
battle, and as he lay down under the open sky for a short 
repose, he gave orders that everything should be ready to 
move in pursuit at the earliest dawn. At midnight, how¬ 
ever, a sudden shower awoke him, and finding himself wet 
through, he determined to sleep no more, but to precede 


— 736 - 


Dabney 

the troops to the position of General Magruder in order to 
have time for fuller conference. When the head of his 
column composed again of the division of D. H. Hill, 
reached the scene of the evening’s combat, the General was 
found drying himself by a camp-fire. Without procuring 
any food or refreshment, he now advanced through the 
troops of Magruder, and took the old highway which led to 
Williamsburg. When the station near Savage’s came in 
view, a city of canvas was seen upon a distant hill-side, glit¬ 
tering in the morning sun. This was a vast field-hospital 
of McClellan, where twenty-five hundred sick and wounded, 
with their nurses, had been left by him to the care of the 
Confederates. General Jackson, having sent a suitable 
officer to receive the submission of these, advanced rapidly 
upon the enemy’s traces. At every step the Federal strag¬ 
glers issued from the thickets, and submitted themselves 
as prisonexs of war, until a thousand additional men were 
sent to the rear. A vast drove of mules deserted by the 
Federal army, was gathered from the woods. Every hut 
and dwelling near the roadside was also converted into a 
refuge for the wounded, whose numbers showed the san¬ 
guinary nature of the struggle of the previous evening. 
An officer congratulating the general upon the great num¬ 
ber of his prisoners, said jocularly, that they surrendered 
too easily, for the Confederacy would be embarrassed with 
their maintenance. He answered, smiling: “It is cheaper 
to feed them than to fight them.” 

Before reaching White Oak Swamp, an inconsiderable 
stream which crossed the road, he diverged toward the 
right in the direction of the courthouse of Charles City 
County, pursuing still the wrecks of the enemy’s flight. 
It now became manifest that he had relinquished all thought 
of a retreat toward the river James. To explain the sub¬ 
sequent movements, the disclosure of McClellan’s plans, 
still doubtful to the Confederate commander, must be a 
little anticipated. His purpose was to collect his army and 
all its apparatus upon the bank of the James, at some point 
below the mouth of the Appomattox: where the greater 
width and depth of the stream would enable his great fleets 


■ 737 — 


Life and Campaigns of Stonewall Jackson 

to approach him with convenience, and maneuver for his de¬ 
fence. To disencumber the roads leading directly thither, 
and leave them free for the march of his columns, he sent 
his whole baggage trains down the way which Jackson had 
now reached, leading from the neighborhood of Savage's 
Station on the railroad, to Charles City Court House. Hav¬ 
ing followed this route until they were effectually pro¬ 
tected, they made their way across this thoroughfare, to the 
deep water at Harrison’s Landing. To protect them, Frank¬ 
lin’s corps was stationed on the eastern bank of White 
Oak Swamp; and when Jackson reached it, he stubbornly 
contested its passage with him during the whole of Mon¬ 
day, June 30th. On the other hand, the corps of Keyes, 
from McClellan’s left, with the beaten troops of Porter, 
were rapidly marched to Malvern Hill, a range of highlands 
accessible by the shortest march from the southern end of 
the Federal line, and overlooking at once the river James, 
and the New Market, or river road, which leads from the 
city of Richmond down its northern side. The object of 
this movement on the part of McClellan, was to protect his 
communications with the deep water from an advance 
down the New Market road, 'which he had good reason to 
fear. The remainder of his great army was massed on 
Monday midway between the White Oak Swamp and Mal¬ 
vern Hill, under Generals Heintzelman and McCall, to watch 
the roads going eastward; by which the Confederates 
might insinuate themselves between his right and left, and 
pursue his baggage trains. These judicious dispositions, 
made in a forest country, and chiefly by night marches, 
were not immediately disclosed in all their details to the 
Confederate leader. But his troops were now directed, 
with a masterly and comprehensive foresight, to meet every 
contingency, in such sort that had all his purposes been car¬ 
ried out, the adroit concealments of his adversary would 
have been in vain. Major General Holmes was ordered to 
cross from the south bank of the James river, which he had 
been left to guard, on the 29th, and march down the New 
Market road, to prevent the enemy from reaching the water. 
He did not approach Malvern Hill until the 20th, when he 


— 738 — 


Dabney 

found it already powerfully occupied by the enemy under 
Keyes and Porter, crowned by a formidable artillery and 
flanked by gunboats in the river. Early on the 29th Major 
Generals Longstreet and A. P. Hill were directed to cross 
the Chickahominy at the New Bridges, and march eastward 
by the Darby-town road, a highway parallel to the New 
Market road, and north of it. Major Generals Huger and 
Magruder were directed to press the enemy in front, by the 
road leading direct from Richmond to Charles City; while 
Jackson was to advance rapidly upon the left and the south 
side of the Chickahominy, and endeavor to attain the ene¬ 
my's rear. 

Longstreet and A. P. Hill, who moved first on the 29th, 
first came up with the enemy’s centre, upon the 30th, posted 
a little below the termination of the Darby-town road. 
Magruder, who advanced by the same road, was diverted 
by a request of General Holmes for reinforcements; and, 
thus unfortunately, was turned aside from the centre, 
where a fatal blow was practicable, toward the heights of 
Malvern Hill, which were now unassailable; and did not re¬ 
trace his steps until the day was decided. But General 
Huger still remained to support the attack of Longstreet 
and Hill upon the right; and General Jackson, on the other 
hand, if able to force his passage across White Oak Swamp, 
would have found himself upon the enemy’s flank and rear. 
Such was the attitude of the respective parties at mid-day 
of June 30th. 

When Jackson approached the stream last named, at 
this hour, he found in the fields near it, extensive camps 
deserted, and full of spoils, and another field-hospital 
crowded with wounded. The hills descended by long and 
gentle declivities on both sides toward the little water¬ 
course, and the meadows along its margin were soft and 
miry from the recent rains. On the Confederate side, the 
right of the road was occupied by the open fields of an ex¬ 
tensive farm, and the left by a dense forest of pines. On 
the side occupied by Franklin, the fields extended far both 
to the right and left of the highway; but the low margin 
of the stream opposite the Confederate right was covered 


— 739 — 


Life and Campaigns of Stonewall Jackson 

by a belt of tall forest, in full leaf, which effectually 
screened all the Federal left from view. But the hills on 
their right were occupied by fifteen or twenty cannon in 
position, and were black with long lines of infantry. Gen¬ 
eral Jackson, riding, as was his wont, with the advanced 
guard, no sooner saw the ground than he halted his army, 
and ordered twenty-eight guns to be brought up, by a lit¬ 
tle vale through the fields on his right, just deep enough to 
hide them effectually from the enemy's view. These, al¬ 
though upon his right wing, were directed to the batteries 
of the Federalists opposite his left. At a preconcerted sig¬ 
nal, the guns, ready shotted, were now moved forward 
upon the brow of the eminence, and opened their thunders 
upon the enemy. So sudden and terrible was the revelation^ 
they scarcely made an effort to reply, but galloped away, 
leaving two or three rifled pieces behind them; while the 
ranks of infantry melted swiftly into the woods far in their 
rear. After a little, several batteries upon the enemy's 
left, concealed behind the belt of forest, began to reply to 
this fire; and, from this time, the two parties kept up a de¬ 
sultory artillery-duel during the day. But as each was in¬ 
visible to the other, much damage was neither given nor 
received. 

The General now advanced a section of artillery near 
the crossing of the stream, which speedily drove the Fed¬ 
eral sharpshooters from the opposite bank and trees; and 
he ordered over the cavalry regiment of Colonel Munford. 
They found the wooden bridge broken up, and its timbers 
floating—a tangled mass—in the waters. But just above 
was a deep and narrow ford, which they passed over, fol¬ 
lowed immediately by the General. They scoured, with 
drawn sabers, over the ground lately occupied by the Fed¬ 
eral right wing, noted the deserted cannon, and picked up 
a few prisoners. But the enemy's left, behind the long 
screen of forest, was found standing fast, while they were 
bringing both artillery and infantry into position to com¬ 
mand the crossing. Colonel Munford therefore passed 
down the stream to his left, and, finding a spot where it was 
practicable, returned to his friends without loss. Jackson, 


— 740 — 


Dabney 

upon observing this, advanced the divisions of D. H. Hill 
and Whiting into the pine wood on his left, detailed a work¬ 
ing party to act with their support, and attempted to re¬ 
pair the bridge, with the purpose of forcing his way by a 
simultaneous advance of his infantry and artillery. But 
the men could not be induced to labor steadily, exposed to 
the skirmishers of the enemy; and the attempt was aban¬ 
doned. The remainder of the afternoon was spent in en¬ 
deavors to discover some way, on the right or the left, by 
which the vexatious stream could be crossed, and the ene¬ 
my's position turned; but the roads were so effectually ob¬ 
structed with fallen trees, that no hope appeared of remov¬ 
ing them in time to fight a battle that evening. The troops 
were then withdrawn out of reach of the enemy's shells, 
and bivouacked, to await a more propitious morning. On 
this occasion it would appear, if the vast interests depend¬ 
ent on General Jackson's cooperation with the proposed at¬ 
tack upon the center were considered, that he came short 
of that efficiency in action for which he was everywhere 
else noted. Surely the prowess of the Confederate infan¬ 
try might have been trusted, for such a stake as Lee 
played for that day, to do again what it had so gloriously 
done, for a stake no greater, on the 27th; it might have rout¬ 
ed the Federal infantry and artillery at once, without the as¬ 
sistance of its own cannon. Two columns, pushed with de¬ 
termination across the two fords at which the cavalry of 
Munford passed over and returned—the one in the centre, 
and the other at the left—and protected in their onset by 
the oblique fire of a powerful artillery so well posted on the 
right, would not have failed to dislodge Franklin from a po¬ 
sition already half lost. The list of casualties would in¬ 
deed have been larger than that presented on the 30th, of 
one cannoneer mortally wounded. But how much shorter 
would have been the bloody list filled up the next day at 
Malvern Hill? This temporary eclipse of Jackson's genius 
was probably to be explained by physical causes. The labor 
of the previous days, the sleeplessness, the wear of gigan¬ 
tic cares, with the drenching of the comfortless night, had 
sunk the elasticity of his will and the quickness of his in- 


■ 741 — 


Life and Campaigns of Stonewall Jackson 

vention, for the once, below their wonted tension. And 
which of the sons of men is there so great as never to ex¬ 
perience this? The words which fell from Jackson's lips, 
as he lay down that night among his staff, showed that he 
was conscious of depression. After dropping asleep from 
excessive fatigue, with his supper between his teeth, he 
said: “Now, gentlemen, let us at once to bed, and rise with 
the dawn, and see if tomorrow we cannot do something!” 
Yet he found time, amidst the fatigues of this day, to write 
to Mrs. Jackson, with a heart full of piety and of yearn¬ 
ing for domestic happiness: 


“Near White Oak Swamp Bridge, 
“June 30th. 

“An ever kind Providence has greatly blessed our efforts and 
given us great reason for thankfulness in having defended Richmond 
as he has.” 

“I hope that our God will soon bless us with an honorable peace, 
and permit us to be together at home, in the enjoyment of domestic 
happiness.” 

Meanwhile, Generals Longstreet and A. P. Hill, after 
confronting the enemy’s powerful centre until 4 o’clock P.M., 
heard firing upon the Charles City road, which they sup¬ 
posed indicated the near approach of Huger. The former 
placed a battery in position and discharged it against the 
enemy to give notice of his presence. The Federalists 
replied, and the old war-horse, whose mettle forbade his 
ever declining the gage of battle, rushed to the contest. None 
of his expected supports came up; and the advantage of 
position and numbers was wholly with his adversaries. But 
after a sanguinary conflict, he drove them from their whole 
line save at one point, and captured many prisoners, in¬ 
cluding a general of division, several batteries, and some 
thousands of small arms; when night arrested the furious 
struggle. This action has been known as the battle of Fra¬ 
zier’s farm. So near did its issue bring the enemy’s left 
wing to destruction, even without the expected assistance 
of Jackson, Huger, and Magruder, that when it closed, at 
dark, the victorious troops of Longstreet were, uncon¬ 
sciously, within sight of the cross road by which Franklin 


— 742 — 


Dabney 

was required to march his corps, in the rear of the Federal 
centre, in order to reach the appointed place of concentra¬ 
tion at Malvern Hill. Nay, the cornfields beyond that road 
were ploughed up with Longstreet’s cannonshot. What 
then might not the triumph have been, if the intended co¬ 
operation had been given ? As soon as the night grew quiet, 
Franklin, informed of his critical position, moved off from 
White Oak Swamp, glided silently behind the shattered 
ranks which still confronted Longstreet, and retired, with 
them, to the protection of McClellan’s lines at Malvern Hill. 
When the morning dawned, there was nothing in front of 
Jackson save the forsaken cannon of the enemy, and they 
had deserted to Longstreet a field ghastly with multitudes 
of their slain and wounded. His wearied troops, with those 
of A. P. Hill, were drawn off to seek the needed repose, and 
Magruder took his place. 

General Jackson putting his corps in motion at an early 
hour, July 1st, with Whiting’s division in front, crossed 
the White Oak Swamp; and, a little after, turning south, 
marched upon the traces of the enemy toward Malvern Hill. 
As he approached Frazier’s Farm, a Confederate line of 
battle was seen a little distance from the right of the road, 
with their skirmishers upon the opposite side, looking east¬ 
ward. These were the forces of Magruder, which had re¬ 
lieved those of Longstreet during the night. Jackson passed 
between the line and the skirmishers lustily cheered by them, 
and pursued the enemy swiftly. The road now plunged 
into an extensive woodland, with the Willis’ Church upon 
the right hand, filled with the wounded of both armies. 
After advancing for a mile and a half through this forest, 
the General’s suite was suddenly greeted with a volley of 
rifle-balls from the Federal outpost, and a moment after, 
by a shower of shells. Retiring to a safer spot, he now 
ordered up his troops, and prepared to attack. His re¬ 
connaissance showed him the enemy most advantageously 
posted upon an elevated ridge in front of Malvern Hill, 
which was occupied by several lines of infantry partially 
fortified, and by a powerful artillery. In short, the whole 
army of McClellan, with three hundred pieces of field ar- 


— 743 — 


Life and Campaigns of Stonewall Jackson 


tillery, was now, for the first time, assembled on one field, 
determined to stand at bay, and contend for its existence, 
while the whole Confederate army was also converging 
around it, under the immediate eye of the Commander-in- 
Chief and the President. The war of the giants was now 
about to begin, indeed! before which the days of Gaines’s 
Mill and Frazier’s Farm were to pale. The position of the 
Federalists had been selected by McClellan himself, with 
consummate skill. His line fronted north, covering the river 
road behind it, and presenting a convex curve toward the 
Confederates. His right was covered by a tributary of 
Turkey Creek, and his left by the fire of his gunboats, which 
threw their monstrous projectiles beyond his whole front. 
The ground occupied by him dominated by its height over 
the whole landscape; and nowhere in his front was there 
a spot, where artillery could be massed to cope with his on 
equal terms. For, the country before him was not only of 
inferior altitude, but covered with woods and thickets, save 
within a few hundred yards of his own lines. And here, 
the open fields sloped gently away, offering full sweep to his 
murderous fire; while this approach was only reached, be¬ 
fore his right and centre, by struggling across the treacher¬ 
ous rivulet in front. 

General Lee now assigned the left to Jackson and the 
right to Magruder, supported by Huger and Holmes. Long- 
street and A. P. Hill with their wearied divisions, were held 
in reserve. The only spot where open ground appeared in 
opposition to the enemy’s, was upon Jackson’s extreme left. 
Here an extensive farm, belonging to a gentleman named 
Poindexter, indented the forests, and its luxuriant wheat 
fields, partially reaped, descended to the stream from which 
the Federal position rose on the opposite side. This field 
offered the only ground for the maneuvering of artillery. 
After an examination of it, General Jackson ordered a few 
batteries to enter it from the cover of the woods, and en¬ 
gage the enemy. But the number of guns directed against 
them by him was too great; and after a short contest, they 
retired crippled. The batteries of Poague and Carpenter 
from the Stonewall Brigade, and of Balthis from the divi- 


— 744 - 


Dabney 

sion of Whiting, were then ordered forward, and by ap¬ 
proaching the enemy more nearly, found a position which, 
though of inferior altitude, offered some shelter. Here they 
maintained a stubborn and gallant contest with the numer¬ 
ous batteries opposed to them during the remainder of the 
day, and barred the way to the advance of the enemy's in¬ 
fantry. The infantry of Whiting was now disposed upon the 
left, the brigade of Colonel Law concealed in the tall wheat 
of the field, and that of General Hood in the adjoining forest, 
while the 3d Virginia brigade, of Jackson’s division, com¬ 
manded by General Hampton, supported the guns. The 
centre was occupied by the Louisiana brigade of Taylor, 
and the right by D. H. Hill. The reserve was composed of 
the remainder of the division of Ewell, and the brigades of 
Lawton, Winder and Cunningham. These dispositions were 
completed by 2 o’clock P.M., and the General anxiously 
awaited the signal to begin. But the corps of Magruder, 
moving after Jackson’s and delayed by a misconception of 
the route, was later in reaching its position. Instructions 
were sent by General Lee, that the onset should begin upon 
the right, with the brigades of Magruder, and that when 
D. H. Hill heard the cheer with which they charged the 
enemy, he should attack with the bayonet, to be followed 
immediately by the leaders upon his left. To approach the 
Federal centre, Hill was compelled to emerge from the for¬ 
est, and cross an open field, where he suffered a preliminary 
loss of no small amount from their artillery. His own 
batteries had been left in the rear, their ammunition ex¬ 
hausted; and the Confederate artillery sent to his support 
was advanced, piece-meal, only to be crippled in detail and 
driven from the field. Fording the rivulet, however, in 
despite of his losses, he found a partial shelter for his divi¬ 
sion under a body of woodland within four hundred yards 
of the enemy’s front. Accompanied by General Jackson, 
he then made a more particular examination of the ground, 
and found himself confronted by two or three lines of in¬ 
fantry and batteries, w 7 hose murderous fire commanded 
every approach. Five o’clock had now arrived, when sud¬ 
denly Hill heard a mighty shout upon his right, followed 


- 745 - 


Life and Campaigns of Stonewall Jackson 


by an outburst of firing. Regarding this as doubtless the 
appointed signal, and the beginning of Magruder’s charge 
under a storm of artillery and musketry, the first line 
of the enemy was forced, and their guns were compelled to 
withdraw to avoid capture; but the other points of the line, 
unoccupied by a simultaneous attack, advanced reinforce¬ 
ments to them; and Hill was beaten off, after inflicting and 
suffering a severe loss. Jackson reinforced him, by sending 
the brigades of Trimble, Winder, Lawton and Cunningham, 
but the difficulties of the position, the approaching darkness, 
and the terrific fire of the enemy, prevented their doing 
more than holding their ground, and maintaining an un¬ 
certain conflict. 

As sunset approached, and after the attack of Jackson 
was checked, Magruder at length got his troops into posi¬ 
tion, and advanced with similar results. Much heroism 
was exhibited by his men, some ground was won from the 
enemy, a bloody loss was inflicted upon them, and received 
in his own command. At these attacks, the fire of the 
Federal artillery, which had been heavy, became inexpres¬ 
sibly furious. Along their whole line, whether assailed or 
not, their countless field-pieces belched forth their charges 
of flame with an incessant din, which was answered back 
by the hoarser bellowings of the gunboats in the rear. Wher¬ 
ever the eye turned, it was met by a ceaseless stream of 
missiles shrieking and crashing through the forest. A moon¬ 
less night descended on the turmoil, and the darkness was 
lighted up for miles with the glare flashing across the 
heavens, as when two thunder clouds illuminate the adverse 
quarters of the horizon with sheet lightning. Beneath the 
fitful lines of light danced amidst the dark foliage, showing 
where the stubborn ranks of infantry piled their deadly 
work; and the roar of the musketry filled the intervals of 
the mightier din with its angry monotone; while a fierce 
yell from time to time told of some hardly won vantage 
ground gained by the Confederates. At ten o’clock the 
battle died away; for the Federalists were silently with¬ 
drawing from the field, under the friendly veil of the dark¬ 
ness. Indeed, much of the cannonade was doubtless in- 


— 746 — 


Dabney 

tended to cover this retreat; and no sooner had it sunk into 
silence, than the rumbling of the multitude of wheels began 
to tell that the artillery was withdrawing from a field which 
was already abandoned by their infantry. The Confed¬ 
erates lay down upon their arms where the battle had 
ceased, in many places within a few paces of the opposing 
pickets, and during the night they saw the lanterns flitting 
over the field, where they were busy removing the wounded. 

When the battle had ceased thus, General Jackson re¬ 
tired slowly and wearily to the rear, to seek some refresh¬ 
ment and rest. In the midst of a confused multitude of 
wagons and stragglers, his faithful servant had prepared 
a pallet for him upon the ground; and here, after taking 
a morsel of food, he lay down and slept. At one o’clock 
his division commanders awoke him, to report the condi¬ 
tion of their forces, and receive instructions for the mor¬ 
row. None of them knew, as yet, those signs of retreat 
and discomfiture, which the advanced pickets were observ¬ 
ing; they only knew what they had suffered in their own 
commands. Their imaginations were awe-struck by the 
sights and sounds of the fearful struggle, and every repre¬ 
sentation which they gave was gloomy. At length, after 
many details of losses and disasters, they all concurred in 
declaring that McClellan would probably take the aggres¬ 
sive in the morning, and that the Confederate army was in 
no condition to resist him. Jackson had listened silently, 
save as he interposed a few brief questions, to all their 
statements; but now he replied, with an inexpressible dry¬ 
ness and nonchalance: “No, I think he will clear out in 
the morning.” These words reveal one element of his power 
and greatness. Such was the clearness of his military in¬ 
tuitions, and the soundness of his judgment, such the stead¬ 
fastness of his spirit, that he viewed every fact soberly, 
without distortion or exaggeration. His excited fancy 
played no tricks with his understanding. Dangers never 
loomed into undue proportions before his steady eye. Hence, 
in the most agitating or even appalling circumstances, his 
conclusions were still correct. Such they proved to be now; 
for when morning dawned upon the battle-field, McClellan 


— 747 — 


Life and Campaigns of Stonewall Jackson 

was gone indeed, leaving every evidence of precipitate re¬ 
treat. 

The battle of Malvern Hill was technically a victory 
for the Confederates, for they held the field, the enemy’s 
killed and wounded, and the spoils; while the Federalists 
retreated precipitately at its close. But, practically, it was 
rather a drawn battle; because the loss inflicted on them 
was probably no greater than that of the assailants; and, 
especially, because the enemy would have retired to the 
same spot, and at the same time, if no assault had been 
made. The loss of Jackson’s corps was three hundred and 
seventy-seven killed, and one thousand seven hundred and 
forty-six wounded, with thirty-nine missing. The larger 
part of this bloodshed was in the division of D. H. Hill. 
The divisions under command of General Magruder lost 
about two thousand nine hundred men, killed and wounded. 

The struggle for the possession of the Confederate 
capital was not closed. The results of Lee’s victories were, 
indeed far leSs than the overweening hopes and expecta¬ 
tions of the people; for Richmond was agitated with daily 
rumors that the Federal army was wholly dissipated; and, 
then, that it was about to surrender in a body. But, in 
the language of the Commander-in-Chief, “Regret that more 
was not accomplished, gives way to gratitude to the Sover¬ 
eign Ruler of the universe for the results achieved.” The 
siege of Richmond was raised; and the object of a cam¬ 
paign, which had been prosecuted, after months of prepara¬ 
tion, at an enormous expenditure of men and money, com¬ 
pletely frustrated. More than ten thousand prisoners,— 
including officers of rank,—fifty-two pieces of artillery, and 
upwards of thirty-five thousand stand of small arms were 
captured. The stores and supplies of every description, which 
fell into our hands, were great in amount and value; but 
small in comparison with those destroyed by the enemy. 
His losses in battle exceeded our own, as attested by the 
thousands of dead and wounded left on every field; while 
his subsequent inaction shows in what condition the sur¬ 
vivors reached the protection to which they fled.” 


— 748 — 


Dabney 

But yet, the same exalted authority has declared, that, 
under ordinary circumstances, the Federal army should 
have been destroyed.” While that which was effected is 
creditable to the Confederates, yet the ruin of the enemy 
was within the scope of probability; and might have been 
effected by them, by a higher degree of skill and effort. It 
is therefore of interest to the student of the military art, to 
learn what were the obstacles and blunders which prevented 
the fullest success. Of these, some were unavoidable; and 
among these latter must be reckoned a large part of the 
ignorance concerning the movements of McClellan, and the 
proper direction to be taken by the Confederates, by which 
General Lee found himself so much embarrassed. There 
were no topographical surveys of the country, and all the 
general officers were strangers to it. It was a country of 
numerous intricate roads, of marshy streams, and of forests. 
Hence every march and every position of the enemy was 
enveloped in mystery until it was disclosed in some way at 
the cost of the Confederates; and every movement made 
by them in pursuit was in some degree tentative. 

Among the unavoidable difficulties may, perhaps, be 
also ranked that which was, directly or indirectly, the fruit¬ 
ful parent of every miscarriage. The army was not suffi¬ 
ciently instructed, either in its officers or its men, for its 
great work. The capacity to command, the practical skill 
and tact, the professional knowledge, the devotion to duty, 
which make the efficient officer, do not come in a day; and 
few are the natures which are capable of learning them to a 
high degree. When the Confederate Government attempted 
to produce extempore officers of all grades for armies so 
great, out of people who had been reared in the pursuits of 
peace, it could only be partially successful. The company and 
field officers competent to instruct and govern their men thor¬ 
oughly and to keep them to their colors amidst the confu¬ 
sion of battle and the fatigues of forced marches, were far 
too few for the regiments to be commanded. There was not 
enough Brigadiers who knew how to maneuver a brigade 
quickly or vigorously; nor enough Major-Generals able to 
handle a great mass of troops. Hence that deficiency in the 


— 749 — 


Life and Campaigns of Stonewall Jackson 


functions of the Staff which has been already explained, by 
reason of which the commander was ever in imperfect com¬ 
munication with his forces, and was never certain that his 
wishes were properly conveyed to all of them, or that he 
was possessed of their whole situation when out of his sight. 
Through so imperfect a medium perfect unison in action 
could never be gained, upon a theatre like that of Malvern 
Hill, extended over miles of wooded country, and including 
the convergent masses of several separate armies. It was 
from these causes the bungling combinations proceeded, upon 
every important field of this brief campaign. Enough offi¬ 
cers always maneuvered their commands so slowly as to 
compel the Commander-in-Chief to let slip critical hours, 
and to wear away the day which should have been employed 
in attacking and pursuing. Thus it was ever: at Mechan- 
icsville, at Cold Harbor, at Savage’s Station, at Frazier’s 
Farm, and especially at Malvern Hill; the prime of the day 
was spent in waiting for somebody, or getting into posi¬ 
tion; the battle, which should have been the business of 
that prime, was thrust into the late afternoon; and when 
the bloody victory was won, no time remained to gather in 
its fruits fully by a vigorous pursuit. 

The event also taught, what no forecast, perhaps, would 
have foreseen, that a more efficient employment of cavalry 
upon the enemy’s flanks would have put the Commander- 
in-Chief in earlier possession of essential information. It 
has been seen that General Stuart, after his return from the 
White House, was directed to remain upon the north side 
of the Chickahominy, guarding the Long Bridge, and the 
other crossings below; and that he only rejoined the army 
the night of July 1st. He should rather have been re¬ 
quired to cross the Chickahominy immediately and press 
as closely upon the line of the enemy’s actual operations, 
let it be where it might, as was possible. He would thus 
have equally fulfilled the purpose of his stay upon the north 
side, to ascertain that they did not retire toward Yorktown 
by the lower roads; and he would probably have discovered at 
once, their real movement. It afterward appeared, that 
the whole baggage train of McClellan, with numerous strag- 


4 


— 750 — 


Dabney 


glers, passed nearly to Charles City Court House, by a road 
parallel to the Chickahominy and only a few miles distant 
from it, on the 29th of June. Had this fact been reported 
to General Lee by the first of July it might have thrown 
a flood of new light upon the momentous question, which 
he was required that day to decide: must McClellan be 
attacked in his almost impregnable position or not? It 
was known that he was assembling all the corps of his army 
at Malvern Hill; that his gunboats had ascended thither; 
that he was beginning to entrench himself there. Was it 
his purpose to convert this spot into a permanent entrenched 
camp, to defend it from all such assaults as* he had just 
experienced on the Chickahominy, by his engineering skill; 
to provision it from his ships, and thus to establish him¬ 
self again within fifteen miles of Richmond, upon a base 
which General Lee’s wisdom taught him to be a better one 
than that which he had lost? If this was his design, then 
it was imperative that he should be dislodged; and the more 
speedily it was attempted the less patriot blood would it 
cost. For if he were permitted to fix himself here, all the 
toil and loss of the glorious week would be trains to another 
spot, and that he stood upon Malvern Hill with nothing 
but his ammunition, and the supplies of a day; and it be¬ 
came probable that he would retreat from this place, whether 
he were attacked or not; that he would retreat whither his 
trains had preceded him, and that he was only standing at 
bay for a short time, to secure the privilege of that retreat. 
The question thus assumed a new aspect, whether it were 
better to assail him on his chosen ground, at such a cost 
of blood, or to wait for a fairer opportunity as he with¬ 
drew. 

If it were granted that McClellan ought to have been at¬ 
tacked at once, on his ground, much yet remains in the man¬ 
agement of the battle on the Confederate side, which, though 
excused, cannot be justified. The attack was made in detail, 
first at one point, and then at another, instead of being sim¬ 
ultaneous. Had the corps of Jackson and Magruder 
charged simultaneously, with the devoted gallantry which 
a part of each exhibited, the Federal lines would doubtless 

— 751 — 


Life and Campaigns of Stonewall Jackson 

have given way, and a glorious success would have rewarded 
the Confederates without any greater expenditure of blood 
than they actually incurred. But it is worthy of question 
whether McClellan’s advantage of position could not have 
been neutralized. Malvern Hill is upon the convexity of 
a sharp curve in the river James, which just below that 
neighborhood, flows away toward the south, while the river 
road pursues still an easterly course. If McClellan moved 
eastward, he must either forsake the coveted help of his 
gunboats or, to continue near the water, he must leave he 
highlands, and descend to a level region commanded from 
the interior. * These facts seemed to point to the policy of 
extending the Confederate left, until his egress by the river 
road was so violently threatened as to compel him to weaken 
his impregnable front. The great body of forest, which 
confronted his centre, might have been safely left to the 
guardianship of a skirmish line; for their weakness would 
have been concealed by the woods, and the enemy was, on 
that day, in no aggressive mood. A powerful mass of ar¬ 
tillery and infantry displayed beyond their extreme right, 
would probably have produced the happiest effects. Last 
the tardy and indirect pursuit which followed the battle, 
was the least excusable blunder of all. The two days which 
were allowed to McClellan proved the salvation of his army. 
But what are all these criticisms more than an assertion in 
different form, of the truths that all man’s works are im¬ 
perfect, and that every art must be learned before it is 
practised ? When it is remembered that the South had very 
few professional soldiers, that the men who formed the vic¬ 
torious army of Lee were, the year before, a peaceful multi¬ 
tude occupied, since their childhood, in the pursuits of hus¬ 
bandry, and that half the brigades into which they were 
organized had never been under fire before the beginning 
of the bloody week, the only wonder will be that the con¬ 
fusion was not worse, and that the failures were not emi¬ 
nent courage of the people, and their native aptitude for war. 

It is a fact worthy of note in this narrative, that the 
fire of the gunboats, so much valued by the Federals and 
at first so dreaded by the Confederates, had no actual in- 


— 752 — 


Dabney 

fluence whatever in the battle. Their noise and fury doubt¬ 
less produced a certain effect upon the emotions of the as¬ 
sailants ; but this was dependent on their novelty. The loss 
inflicted by them was trivial when compared with the rav¬ 
ages of the field artillery, and it was found chiefly among 
their own friends. Far more of their ponderous missiles 
fell in their own lines, than in those of the Confederates. 
Indeed, a fire directed at an invisible foe, across two or 
three miles of intervening hills and woods, can never reach 
its aim, save by accident. Nor is the havoc wrought by the 
larger projectiles proportioned to their magnitude. Where 
one of them explodes against a human body, it does indeed 
crush it into a frightful mass, scarcely cognizable as human 
remains. But it is not likely to strike more men, in the 
open order of field operations, than a shot of ten pounds; 
and the wretch, blown to atoms by it, is not put hors du 
combat more effectually, than he whose brain is penetrated 
by half an ounce of lead or iron. The broadside of a mod¬ 
ern gunboat may consist of three hundred pounds of iron, 
projected by thirty or forty pounds of powder. But it is 
fired from only two guns. The effect upon a line of men 
is therefore but one-fifteenth of that which the same metal 
might have had, fired from thirty ten-pounder rifled guns. 

In conclusion, a statement of the numbers composing 
the two armies in this great struggle, is necessary to esti¬ 
mate its merits. Under the orders of General Lee there 
were, at its beginning, about seventy-five thousand effective 
men, including the corps brought to his aid by General 
Jackson. McClellan confidently represented the numbers 
opposed to him as much larger than his own; but the habi¬ 
tual exaggerations of his apprehensive temper were patent, 
even to his own Government. He states that his own force 
was reduced to eighty thousand effective men. It must be 
remembered that during the campaign before Richmond, 
the motives of McClellan’s policy dictated a studied depre¬ 
ciation of his own numbers. In the returns given by him¬ 
self in another place, his effective force present for duty is 
set down at one hundred and six thousand men, inclusive 
of the garrison of Fortress Monroe under General Dix. 


— 753 — 


Life and Campaigns of Stonewall Jackson 


Halleck declared, in his letter of Aug. 6th, that McClellan 
still had ninety thousand men at Berkeley, after all his 
losses! These McClellan had estimated at fifteen thousand, 
how truthfully may be known from this: that he places the 
men lost by desertion and capture under six thousand, 
whereas the Confederates had in their hands more than ten 
thousand prisoners; and the woods of the peninsula were 
swarming with stragglers. Whatever may have been his 
numerical superiority, it is indisputable that every advan¬ 
tage of equipments, arms, and artillery was on his side. 

But the arrival of General Jackson brought a strength 
to the Confederates beyond that of his numbers. His fame 
as a warrior had just risen to the zenith; while all the other 
armies of the Confederacy had been retreating before the 
enemy, or at best holding the defensive with difficulty, his 
alone had marched, and attacked, and conquered. A dis¬ 
aster had never alighted on his banners. His assault was 
regarded by friends and foes as the stroke of doom, and 
his presence gave assurance of victory. Hence, when the 
army before Richmond learned that he was with them, they 
were filled with unbounded joy and confidence, while their 
enemies were struck with a corresponding panic. 

******* 


— 754 — 


MILITARY MEMOIRS OF 
A CONFEDERATE 


A CRITICAL NARRATIVE 


BY 

E. P. ALEXANDER 


Brigadier-General in the Confederate Army, 
Chief of Artillery, Long street's Corps. 


With Sketch Maps By The Author. 


New York 

CHARLES SCRIBNER’S SONS 
1912 














• 





# 







































































Yorktown and Williamsburg 

[EXTRACT] 

McClellan at Fortress Monroe—Johnston Goes to Yorktown—Reor¬ 
ganization—Dam No. 1—Yorktown Evacuated—Retreat from 
Yorktown—Battle of Williamsburg—Early’s Attack—Hancock’s 
Report—Casualties—Eltham’s Landing. 

In the latter part of March, the Confederate signal lines 
began to report the movement of a great army down the 
Potomac, and it was soon discovered that it was being con¬ 
centrated at Fortress Monroe. On April 5, some five divi¬ 
sions of Federal infantry, with cavalry and artillery, from 
that point, approached the Confederate lines across the 
Peninsula at Yorktown. These were held by General Ma- 
gruder, whose force at the time was only about 13,000 
men. They occupied a line about 12 miles in length—partly 
behind the Warwick River, and partly protected by 
slight earthworks. Another opportunity as good as that 
offered McDowell at Bull Run was here offered to McClellan, 
who could have rushed the position anywhere. He con¬ 
tented himself, however, with some cannonading and sharp¬ 
shooting. Of course, he was still under the Pinkerton de¬ 
lusion as to the enemy’s strength. Magruder, who was ex¬ 
pecting reinforcements, made the bravest possible display; 
exhibiting the same troops repeatedly at different points. 
It was just at this juncture, when a great success was in 
McClellan’s grasp, had he had the audacity to risk some¬ 
thing, that the news reached him that Lincoln had taken 
from him McDowell’s 37,000 men. This, doubtless, had its 
effect in discouraging him and leading him to resort to 
siege operations against Yorktown instead of attempting 
to pass the position by main force. 

Meanwhile, Johnston had been summoned to Richmond, 
and had advised Davis that a defence of Yorktown involved 
great risk, and at the best could gain no important result. 
He advocated its abandonment, and the concentration at 
Richmond of all forces from Virginia to Georgia. With 


— 757 — 


Military Memoirs of a Confederate 

these McClellan’s force should be attacked when it came 
near Richmond. 

A conference was called, which included Lee, Long- 
street, G. W. Smith, and the Secretary of War, Randolph. 
It was advocated by Lee, and finally determined, that John¬ 
ston should risk making all the delay possible at Yorktown. 
This was a safe conclusion to reach, only in view of the 
cautiousness of McClellan. 

Johnston had already begun sending some reinforce¬ 
ments to Magruder, and had brought a large part of his 
army near Richmond. About April 15 he went to York¬ 
town, taking Smith’s and Longstreet’s divisions, which gave 
him a total force of 55,633. 

In the whole course of the war there was little service 
as trying as that in the Yorktown lines. There was much 
rain and the country was low and flat, so that the trenches 
were badly drained and would frequently be flooded with 
water. The general flatness left no cover in rear of the 
lines. The enemy’s rifle pits were within range and view 
at many points, and the fire of the sharpshooters with tel¬ 
escopic rifles was incessant, and that of artillery was often 
severe. At many important points, the crowded ranks in 
the trenches had to either sit or crouch behind the parapet 
in water up to their knees, from daylight until darkness 
permitted one to rise upright or to step outside of the 
trench. The only rest at night was to sleep in the univer¬ 
sal mud and water. Although the men in the worst loca¬ 
tions were relieved as often as possible, an unusual amount 
of sickness resulted. General D. H. Hill wrote in his official 
report: 

“Our revolutionary sires did not suffer more at Valley Forge 
than did our army at Yorktown, and in the retreat from it. Not¬ 
withstanding the rain, mud, cold, hunger, watching and fatigue I 
never heard a murmur or witnessed an act of insubordination. The 
want of discipline manifested itself only in straggling which was and 
still is the curse of our army. This monstrous evil can only be cor¬ 
rected by a more rigid government and a sterner system of punish¬ 
ment than have yet been introduced into our service.” 

During our stay here a reorganization of the army took 
place. The majority of our troops had enlisted for a year 
in the spring of 1861. It was now necessary to reenlist 


— 758 — 


Yorktown and Williamsburg 

them for the war. Congress had enacted that reenlistment 
furloughs should be given to a few men at a time, and that 
a reelection of officers should take place in each regiment. 
This feature was very detrimental to the standard of good 
discipline. 

During the whole of the siege there was but one af¬ 
fair of any consequence, and it is of interest principally as 
indicating the great improvement wrought in the Federal 
troops by the discipline which had been given them during 
the fall and winter. 

On April 16, a Federal reconnaissance was made by 
W. F. Smith’s division, of a position on our lines called Dam 
No. 1. Here our entrenchment, at the upper part of War¬ 
wick Creek, was protected by inundations. Just below 
Dam No. 1, the inundation from No. 2 was only about waist 
deep and perhaps 100 yards wide, thickly grown up with 
trees and undergrowth. These facts were discovered by a 
bold reconnaissance under cover of a heavy fire. Four 
companies of the 3d Vermont were ordered to cross the in¬ 
undation and develop what we had on the other side. 

They made their advance very handsomely, fording the 
overflow, and actually got possession of our line of infantry 
parapet some 20 yards on the farther side. This was oc¬ 
cupied at the time by only a picket line of the 15th N. C., 
Colonel McKinney, the rest of the regiment being at work 
upon a second line 200 yards in the rear. McKinney 
promptly formed his regiment and moved forward to drive 
the enemy out, but was killed, and his men repulsed in con¬ 
fusion, the enemy fighting from the far side of our parapet. 
Presently, however, the brigade commander, Howell Cobb, 
arrived and, as the enemy was not reinforced, after holding 
their ground for perhaps a half hour, they retreated, losing 
83 men, out of 192 who crossed the stream. The entire cas¬ 
ualties of the Federals were 165. The casualties of the 
15th N. C. were 12 killed and 31 wounded. 

It was plain from this affair that the fighting we would 
soon have to face was to be something better than that of 
1861. 


■ 759 — 


Military Memoirs of a Confederate 

Meanwhile McClellan was preparing for Yorktown a 
terriffic bombardment by which he hoped to wreck our wa¬ 
ter batteries so that his fleet could pass us. Siege bat¬ 
teries mounting 71 guns, including two 200-pounder rifles 
and five 100-pounders, and several 13-inch mortars were 
being rapidly mounted. On May 1 his 100-pounder rifles 
opened fire, and by May 6 he expected all the other batteries 
to be able to join in. But Johnston had never intended 
to risk siege operations at this point and at sundown on 
May 3 put his army in motion toward Richmond. His 
heavy guns were fired actively all the day before, and until 
midnight, when the artillerists spiked them and withdrew. 

I recall that night’s march as particularly disagreea¬ 
ble. The whole soil of that section seemed to have no bot¬ 
tom and no supporting power. The roads were but long 
strings of guns, wagons, and ambulances, mixed in with 
infantry, artillery and cavalry, splashing and bogging 
through the darkness in a river of mud, with frequent long 
halts when some stalled vehicle blocked the road. The men 
from the nearest ranks would swarm in to help the jaded 
horses pull the vehicle out. Meanwhile, everything in the 
rear must halt and wait, and so it went on all night—a 
march of one or two minutes, and halt for no one could 
guess how long. The average time made by the column 
was under a mile an hour. 

Our movement was not discovered by the enemy until 
after daylight on the 4th. His cavalry was at once started 
in pursuit, and these were followed during the day by five 
divisions of infantry under Smith, Hooker, Kearney, Couch, 
and Casey, the whole under command of Sumner. Besides 
these, Franklin’s division was loaded upon transports dur¬ 
ing the day, and early on the 6th sailed up the York to in¬ 
tercept us near West Point. Two other divisions, Sedg¬ 
wick’s and Richardson’s, were also to have been sent by 
water, and McClellan remained in Yorktown to see them 
loaded and despatched. But the fighting next day at Wil¬ 
liamsburg proved so severe that he rode to the front and 
had both divisions to follow him. 


- 760 - 


Yorktown and Williamsburg 

Near Williamsburg, Magruder had, some months be¬ 
fore, selected a line of battle across the Peninsula, fotir or 
five miles long, on which he had at a few places some slight 
intrenchments with slashings of timber in front, and, about 
the centre, an enclosed fort of some size, called Fort Ma¬ 
gruder. 

As the rear of our column came into Williamsburg 
during the afternoon of the 4th, the enemy's cavalry sud¬ 
denly appeared so near to this fort, that Semmes' tired in¬ 
fantry brigade had to be taken at the double quick to 
occupy it, and a sharp skirmish was fought before sundown. 
McLaws reinforced Semmes with Kershaw and two bat¬ 
teries, and we captured one of the enemy's guns, stuck in 
the mud, ten horses being unable to get it off. After dark 
Kershaw and Semmes were relieved by Anderson's and Pry¬ 
or's brigades of Longstreet’s division. 

That night we stayed at Williamsburg, and it poured 
rain all night. About 2 A.M., the leading divisions were 
pushed forward. Johnston was anxious to get his troops 
ahead to meet the forces he expected McClellan to send by 
water to West Point. 

To hold the enemy in check at Williamsburg, Long- 
street retained his whole division of six brigades as a rear¬ 
guard. Soon after daylight on the 5th, the enemy devel¬ 
oped their presence before Pryor and Anderson. Hooker's 
and Smith's Federal divisions had reached the field about 
dark on the 4th. 

The fighting began with fire upon our lines from ar¬ 
tillery and skirmishers, and gradually increased in volume. 
The whole of Longstreet's division was brought up, and 
advanced upon the enemy in the edge of the wood, where it 
captured one of his batteries. Toward noon, when it be¬ 
came evident from the slow progress of the marching col¬ 
umns that the enemy would have to be held off until night, 
Johnston returned to the field and the division of D. H. Hill, 
which had only advanced a short distance from Williams¬ 
burg, was brought back as a reserve. One of its brigades, 
Early’s, was divided, two regiments sent into the fight on 


— 761 — 


Military Memoirs of a Confederate 


our right, and the other four sent out in observation beyond 
our left flank. 

D. H. Hill and Early both went with this left column, 
and got into trouble from a little superfluous aggressiveness. 

On the extreme right of the Federals, Gen. Hancock 
had discovered some vacant intrenchments—part of Ma- 
gruder’s old line, before mentioned. With five regiments, 
parts of two brigades, and 10 guns, he occupied a command¬ 
ing ridge, and opened artillery toward the Confederate 
lines. Early, on lower ground and in the woods, could not 
see Hancock’s position, but suggested an attack to Hill. 
Hill approved but referred the question to Johnston. John¬ 
ston, who had left the battle entirely to Longstreet’s direc¬ 
tion, referred it to the latter. Longstreet very properly 
refused to give permission, as we fought only to cover our 
retreat up the Peninsula, and it was assured. But this 
message taken to Hill did not satisfy him. He was a 
brother-in-law of Stonewall Jackson and was a soldier of 
the same type. He visited Longstreet in person, and Long- 
street now weakly yielded to his appeal. Rains’ brigade 
had meanwhile been brought up behind Early’s, and it 
would have been possible to organize an attack, which 
might have routed Hancock. But Hill, to lose no time, 
began the formation of the four regiments for the charge. 
The distance to be traversed was over half a mile, much 
of it wood and swamp. Hill placed the four regiments in 
a line of battle extending through a wood, with Early 
leading the two left regiments, while he led the two right. 
But Early mistook one of Hill’s commands to his own wing 
for the order to charge, and he led off at once with his 
left regiment, the 24th Va., which had open ground before 
it. Hill’s extreme right regiment, the 5th N. C., also had 
open ground in front, and, soon becoming aware that a 
charge had begun, it also advanced without orders. Hill, 
tangled in wood and swamp, with the two centre regiments, 
could do nothing. After passing the wood between them, 
the two outside regiments could see each other and the 
Federal guns, now scarcely 500 yards distant in front. 
These guns immediately opened a severe fire of shell and 


— 762 — 


Yorktown and Williamsburg 

canister. The 5th N. C. obliqued to its left to close the 
wide gap between them and both advanced to the charge, 
reserving their fire generally until within 150 yards of the 
enemy. A large portion of Hancock’s infantry lay con¬ 
cealed behind the crest of the ridge until the two regiments, 
now with ranks disorganized by their advance, were within 
30 yards, when the Federals raised and fired, advancing 
over the crest and continuing the fire for 15 or 20 rounds. 

Hancock says in his official report: 

‘‘The plunging fire from the redoubt, the direct fire from the 
right and the oblique fire from the left were so destructive that, after 
it had been ordered to cease and the smoke arose, it seemed that no 
man had left the ground unhurt who had advanced within 500 yards 
of our line. 

“The enemy’s assault was of the most determined character. 
No troops could have made a more resolute charge. The 5th North 
Carolina was annihilated. Nearly all of its superior officers were 
left dead or wounded on the field. The 24th Virginia suffered greatly 
in superior officers and men.” 

Gen. Early, Col. Terry, and Lt.-Col. Hairston of the 24th 
Va. all fell severely wounded, and the regiment lost: killed 
30, wounded 93, missing 66, total 190. In the 5th N. C. Lt.- 
Col. Badham was killed, and the regiment lost “about fifty 
per cent” of its members, but no official report was made. 

Hancock reported his losses in the affair as: killed, 10, 
wounded 88, missing 31, total 129. This affair about ter¬ 
minated the fighting. It had rained nearly all day, and on 
our right Longstreet simply kept back the enemy’s advance 
by fire, and by threatening their flanks. 

The total Federal casualties as reported were: killed 
456, wounded 1410, missing 373, total 2239. The Confed¬ 
erate casualties (reported by Longstreet only) were: offi¬ 
cers 102, men 1458, total 1560. We captured 12 guns of 
which five were brought off, five were chopped down with 
axes, and two had to be left, as neither horses or axes were 
available. We also brought off about 400 prisoners. 

As far as possible the wounded were brought into 
Williamsburg and soon after dark our march was resumed 
over roads now even worse than any we had had before. 
I rode with Johnston’s staff, and late in the forenoon of May 


— 763 — 


Military Memoirs of a Confederate 

6th we were at Barhamsville, and the greater part of the 
army was halted and resting in the vicinity. 

It had been a special feature of McClellan’s strategy 
that on our retreat from Yorktown we should be inter¬ 
cepted at Eltham’s landing by a large force. But our battle 
at Williamsburg had proved a double victory, for it had 
prevented Franklin’s division from being reenforced so as 
to be either formidable or aggressive. It arrived at the 
mouth of the Pamunkey at 5 p.m. on the 6th. During the 
night it disembarked and next morning reconnoitered its 
vicinity and took a defensive position, sending Newton’s 
and Slocum’s brigades through a large wood to examine the 
country beyond. 

On the far edge of that wood about 9 A.M. their skir¬ 
mishers ran into those of Hood’s and Hampton’s brigades 
of Whiting’s division, which were there to see that our 
trains passed without interruption. 

The Federals fell back and were followed until they 
were under the protection of Franklin’s intrenched camp, 
and all our trains passed unmolested. 

The Federals reported: killed 48, wounded 110, miss¬ 
ing 28, total 186. 

The Confederate loss was but 8 killed, and 40 wounded, 
and they captured 46 prisoners. There was no further 
effort to interfere with our retreat. This was continued 
at leisure until the 9th, when we halted on the north bank 
of the Chickahominy. 


— 764 — 


Seven Pines or Fair Oaks 

Drury’s Bluff—The Situation—Attack Planned—Johnston’s Plan 
Changed—Johnston’s Problem—Battle of Seven Pines or Fair 
Oaks—A Misunderstanding—Longstreet’s Mistake—Huger De¬ 
layed—Huger Unjustly Blamed—Signal Given—Hill’s Battle in 
Brief — Losses -— Reenforcements — Reports—Wilcox’s Report— 
Couch’s Position — Johnston’s Battle — Whiting’s Advance — A 
Second Attack—Johnston Wounded—G. W. Smith in Command— 
Smith’s Battle, June—The Confederates Withdraw—Lee Placed 
in Command—Resume—Staff and Organisation—Artillery Ser¬ 
vice—Davis and Johnston. 

Meanwhile, Norfolk had now been evacuated by our 
forces, which were withdrawn at first to Petersburg and 
then to Richmond. Our ironclad, the Virginia (the old 
Merrimac), drawing too much waster to ascend the James, 
had been blown up. This river was now open to the Federal 
fleet, except for some hurriedly built batteries at Drury's 
Bluff, about six miles below Richmond, covering obstructions 
made of a row of piles and some sunken schooners. 

On May 15 the fleet, which included three ironclads, 
the Monitor, Galena, and Naugatuck, attacked the batteries, 
but was repulsed with 25 killed and wounded, and consider¬ 
able injury to some of the vessels. Until that time John¬ 
ston had contemplated fighting on the north of the Chicka- 
hominy, but he now decided to concentrate his army nearer 
Richmond, and on May 17 it was all encamped within three 
of four miles to the east of the city. 

The situation had grown very threatening; for Mc¬ 
Dowell’s army, still at Fredericksburg with 31,000 men, 
had again been assigned to McClellan. He only awaited the 
arrival of Shields, marching to join him with 11,000 men, 
before advancing. 

If it was now in Johnston’s power to do anything to 
save Richmond, it must be done before McDowell arrived. 
It was not likely that McClellan would himself seek battle 
when such a large reenforcement was near. Johnston s 
only chance, therefore, lay in taking the offensive. He had 
no such works to rely upon as the Federals had around 
Washington. There were, indeed, a few small enclosed 


— 765 — 


Military Memoirs of a Confederate 


forts, erected during the first year of the war, each armed 
with a few of the smooth-bore guns of that day, but they 
were located too near the city limits to have any value. 

The lines in which we afterward fought were but light 
infantry trenches with occasional barbette batteries, usually 
thrown up by the troops under emergency. 

The enemy soon followed us and established a line of 
battle, upon which at different points earthworks began 
to appear. 

His right flank, on the north bank of the Chickahominy, 
rested upon Beaver Dam Creek, a strong position which 
Johnston’s engineers had selected for our own left flank, 
before we left Yorktown, when Johnston contemplated 
fighting on that bank. Thence, the Federal line extended 
southeast along the Chickahominy some three miles to New 
Bridge. Then, crossing this stream, it bent south and ran 
to White Oak Swamp, where the left rested, giving about 
four miles on the south side in a line convex toward Rich¬ 
mond, and scarcely six miles away to its nearest point. 

In observation of McDowell at Fredericksburg was 
Gen. J. R. Anderson at Hanover Junction with about 9,000 
men; and near Hanover C. H. was Branch’s brigade, about 
4,500. Johnston directed that thesb forces should be drawn 
behind the Chickahominy, on our left, and united into a 
new division under A. P. Hill. Before this could be ac¬ 
complished, however, Branch was attacked by Morell’s divi¬ 
sion and Warren’s brigade of Porter’s corps, and was forced 
back with a loss of about 300 killed and wounded, and 700 
prisoners, the enemy reporting 62 killed, 223 wounded, and 
70 missing, total 355. 

At Fredericksburg McDowell’s column was at last 
joined by Shields, who had been detached from Banks in 
the Valley, and on May 26 McDowell was put in motion. In 
the forenoon of the 27th notice of his advance reached 
Johnston, who at once recognized that he must now attack 
before McDowell could unite with McClellan. 

The latter had moved so cautiously as to offer no fav¬ 
orable opportunity until his last move which had put his 
army astride of the Chickahominy. That presented as fair 


— 766 — 


Seven Pines or Fair Oaks 


a chance as Johnston could expect. So he immediately de¬ 
termined to attack on the 29th. As McDowell was ap¬ 
proaching behind the enemy’s right, his strongest effort 
would be made to crush that flank. On the 28th Johnston 
got his troops into position to attack at dawn on the 29th. 
Three of his seven divisions (Whiting’s, A. P. Hill’s and D. 
R. Jones’s) were to attack Porter’s corps at Beaver Dam. 
The other four divisions on the south side of the Chicka- 
hominy (McLaws’s, Longstreet’s, D. H. Hill’s, and Huger’s) 
would be held in observation, ready to cross when Porter’s 
corps was driven back. Everything was in readiness by 
sundown on the 28th, when further news was received. 
McDowell had suddenly stopped his advance, and his troops 
seemed to be falling back toward Manassas. What had 
happened was that Jackson had again broken loose in the 
Valley and defeated Banks at Strasburg on May 23, and at 
Winchester on May 25, and was moving on the Potomac, 
as will be told more fully in a later chapter. 

This had created a panic at Washington, for rumor had 
magnified Jackson’s forces greatly, and McDowell, just in 
the nick of time for us, had been turned back for the de¬ 
fense of the capital. 

Johnston was glad of a respite, and an opportunity 
to consider as an alternative an attack upon McClellan’s 
left. The strength of the position at Beaver Dam Creek, 
made any direct attack very dangerous, and to turn it would 
consume time. To attack the enemy’s left was certainly a 
safer proposition. On the south side his force was smaller 
and was much more easily gotten at. And while it was 
already partially fortified by abattis and trenches, quickly 
constructed in flat and wooded country, yet they had had 
time to do but little. Longstreet urged going on with the at¬ 
tack for which the troops were already in position, but John¬ 
ston decided to withdraw the troops north of the Chickahom- 
iny during the night of the 28th, and to have reconnais¬ 
sances made to discover the location and strength of the ene¬ 
my’s position on the south side. Accordingly, on the 29th, and 
again on the 30th, one or two brigades were advanced and 
drove in the enemy’s pickets on our extreme right flank, 


— 767 — 


Military Memoirs of a Confederate 


developing his presence and that he was fortifying. This 
being reported to Johnston by D. H. Hill soon after noon 
on the 30th, Hill was informed in reply that “he would 
lead an attack upon the enemy next morning. ,, 

There was nothing to gain by further delay; for, by 
the arrival at Richmond of Huger’s division from Norfolk 
on the 29th, Johnston now had all the force possible to get. 
His problem was to defeat four divisions of the enemy, 12 
brigades fortified, and crush them before assistance could 
cross the Chickahominy to their relief. If he could do this 
quickly his chance was good to involve in the defeat also 
some of the reenforcements the enemy would be sending 
across the bridges. He had seven divisions, 27 brigades, 
numbering about 60,000 infantry and artillery. The four 
divisions to be attacked numbered about 37,000. Consider¬ 
ing the morale of our men, which will appear more fully 
after a description of the battle, the proposition was an 
easy one, if only we could succeed in bringing our fighting 
strength to bear in the right places and at the right times. 
But just there lay our greatest difficulty and weakness. 
Our army was not yet organized into corps, our divisions 
were often too large, and our staff service, by which in¬ 
formation and orders were disseminated, was insufficient 
in amount and deficient in technical training and experience. 
Johnston was endeavoring to remedy some of these evils by 
assigning his ranking officers, G. W. Smith, Longstreet, 
and Magruder, to command two or more divisions each, 
which he called wings and centre, but such temporary ar¬ 
rangements are always more apt to mar than to promote 
unity of action. And our general himself was impatient 
and unmindful of small detail. Let us now have the story of 
what happened. 

To use the slang expression, it was “up to” Johnston 
to play and in a conference with Longstreet during the 
afternoon of May 30, the battle for the next day was planned 
in accordance with the intimation given D. H. Hill about 
noon. 

The conference was prolonged by the coming up of a 
violent rain-storm, scarcely, second to any in violence, ac- 


— 768 — 


Seven Pines or Fair Oaks 

cording to my recollection that I saw during the war. Over 
three inches of rain must have fallen in the first two hours, 
and it kept up more or less, until late at night. It was 
hoped that this rain would make our task easier by render¬ 
ing the Chickahominy impassable for reenforcements to 
the enemy. Indeed, it did have this effect, but not until 
the night of the day after the rain. The immediate effect 
was only to make all our marchings and maneuvers slower 
and more difficult, and the flat swampy country of much of 
the battle-field was entirely inundated. 

During this afternoon—prolonged by the rain-storm— 
Johnston gave verbal instructions to Longstreet as to the 
battle of the next day, and it is hard to imagine how any 
serious misunderstandings of such a simple movement could 
have taken place in a conversation prolonged for hours. 
One would need to have heard the whole of it to tell how it 
arose. But Johnston afterward recognized the fact that it 
had occurred, and wrote to G. W. Smith that the misunder¬ 
standing, “may be my fault, as I told you at the time.” 
Smith, however, denies recollection of any such telling. 

Johnston intended to have the battle begun at an early 
hour by D. H. Hill’s division of four brigades, three of which 
were already in position, in the front line, on our extreme 
right on the Williamsburg road. Rodes was on picket on 
the Charles City road, not far off, and, unfortunately, 
Johnston’s plan included his being relieved and joining his 
division before the attack was begun. Any preliminary 
movement, however simple it may appear, will usually turn 
up fated to cause unexpected delay. Rodes is ordered to be 
relieved by a brigade of Huger’s division, of three brigade?, 
now in camp on the north bank of Gilliss Creek, near Rich¬ 
mond. This is ordered at an early hour to go down the 
Charles City road and relieve Rodes, after which it will 
guard and protect Hill’s right flank and render it aid if 
opportunity offers. 

Longstreet’s division of five brigades is in camp on 
the Nine Mile road nearest the Chickahominy on our left. 
Johnston’s plan is that it shall march straight down that 
road, perhaps three miles, pass our line of battle, here 


— 769 — 


Military Memoirs of a Confederate 

held by Magruder’s division, form line of battle, and listen 
for the sounds of battle begun by D. H. Hill’s attack upon 
Casey’s division, which will be within a mile or two of his 
front and right. He will be in a position to take Casey on 
the right flank and with Hill’s four brigades, having abun¬ 
dant force, can hope to make short work of it. 

Meanwhile, Whiting’s division of five brigades (con¬ 
sidered a part of Smith’s wing) had been a part of the 
attack proposed two days before, and were still encamped 
farther up the Nine Mile road. After Longstreet left John¬ 
ston’s headquarters the rain having slacked, the latter 
sent word to Smith to order Whiting to march down the 
Nine Mile road early in the morning and take position at 
our line of battle behind Longstreet, to further reenforce 
him in the battle. 

Smith came in person, some five miles, arrived at 4:30 
A.M., and now first learned of the proposed attack, and had 
it all explained. Johnston proposed to make his own head¬ 
quarters on the Nine Mile road where he could observe any 
efforts of the enemy to cross the Chickahominy. It would 
have been much wiser to have first visited the right and 
seen his battle started. The whole Confederate plan at 
Bull Run had gone astray for the, lack of this precaution, 
and now it turned out that Longstreet had understood him 
either to order or to consent that his division was to be 
marched across from the Nine Mile road to the Williams¬ 
burg road and to go into action behind D. H. Hill’s divi¬ 
sion. It will soon appear how utterly this wrecked and 
ruined Johnston’s excellent and simple plan. How the mis¬ 
understanding occurred has never been explained, for nei¬ 
ther Johnston or Longstreet in their official reports or other 
writings ever gave any explanation or even admitted openly 
that a mistake was made. But Johnston induced G. W. 
Smith to change his official report, to avoid its being made 
public therein. The official reports also disclose that on 
that day Longstreet was anxious to have Huger’s division 
recognized as under his command, although Huger was the 
senior officer. Possibly Longstreet made some request of 
Johnston for authority over Huger, and Johnston in com- 


- 770 — 


Seven Pines or Fair Oaks 

plying may have thoughtlessly used some expression which 
Longstreet interpreted as permission to go to the right. But 
the whole history of this battle remains a monument of 
caution against verbal misunderstandings. 

Longstreet’s division was early upon the road, and it 
soon developed that its route to the Williamsburg road cut 
off and blocked the prescribed marches of both Whiting’s 
and Huger’s divisions as they respectively came up. 

After some delay, Whiting sent a note to Johnston’s 
headquarters, complaining that his march was obstructed 
by Longstreet. Johnston, supposing only that Longstreet 
was preceding Whiting down the Nine Mile road, as ordered 
to do, answered to that effect, and G. W. Smith, who was 
still with Johnston, sent an aide, Capt. Beckham, down the 
Nine Mile to overtake Longstreet and learn the cause of 
any delay. Beckham followed this road to Magruder’s line, 
and, not finding Longstreet, guessed that he had gone across 
to the Williamsburg road. So he sent back a note saying 
that he would continue his search in that direction. 

When this note was shown Johnston about 9 A.M., he 
was still so convinced that Longstreet was upon the Nine 
Mile road that he despatched his aide-de-camp, Lieut. Wash¬ 
ington, down the same road to find him. 

Washington pushed his investigation so far as to follow 
the Nine Mile road into the enemy’s pickets where he was 
captured about 10 A.M. His capture, and his disturbed man¬ 
ner when some firing was soon after heard, convinced Gen. 
Keyes that an attack was on foot, and Keyes was accordingly 
alert and prepared. 

Meanwhile, Longstreet’s column, having delayed Whit¬ 
ing on the Nine Mile road for two or three hours (for the 
column took its wagons along), found itself next blocking 
the column of Huger at Gilliss Creek. The creek was bank 
full from the rain. Longstreet says: 

“The delay of an hour to construct a bridge was preferred to 
the encounter of more serious obstacles along the narrow lateral road 
flooded by the storm. As we were earlier at the creek, it gave us 
precedence of Huger’s division, which had to cross after us.” 


— 771 — 


Military Memoirs of a Confederate 

As Longstreet knew that one of Huger’s brigades must 
relieve Rodes’s brigade, on the Charles City road, and let 
it rejoin Hill’s division before the battle could commence, 
it would have saved much to waive this precedence at least 
for one brigade. 

Colston, commanding one of these brigades, wrote as 
follows of this occasion: 

“A little brook near Richmond was greatly swollen, and a long 
time was wasted crossing it, on an improvised bridge, made of planks, 
a wagon midstream serving as a trestle. Over this the division passed 
• in single file, you may imagine with what delay. If the division 
commander had given orders for the men to sling their cartridge 
boxes, haversacks, etc., on their muskets and wade, without breaking 
formation they could have crossed by fours with water up to their 
waists, and hours would have been saved. When we got across we 
received orders to halt on the roadside until Huger’s division passed 
us. There we waited five or six hours.” 

He had just passed Huger, and now he waits for Huger 
to pass him! 

When one contemplates the fact that there was a com¬ 
manding officer, hoping to win a great victory, than at his 
headquarters within two miles of this spot, where nine 
brigades were thus wasting the precious hours passing 
and repassing each other, the whole performance seems 
incredible. And when it is further said that six of these 
brigades were lost, with their commander, and that the 
staff of the general was seeking them at that moment, high 
and low, miles away along the picket line, it is almost ludi¬ 
crous. And any friends of Huger may be excused for 
finding even a tragic side to the situation. For when the 
whole affair was over, and had ended in defeat, Johnston and 
Longstreet laid the entire blame upon Huger. I give as 
illustrations two quotations from Johnston, and there were 
equally disparaging statements by Longstreet. 

“General Longstreet, unwilling to make a partial attack 
instead of the combined movement which had been planned, 
waited from hour to hour for Huger’s division.”—“Had 
Huger’s division been in position and ready for action when 
those of Smith, Longstreet and Hill moved, I am satis¬ 
fied that Keyes’s corps would have been destroyed instead 
of being merely defeated. Had it gone into action even 


— 772 — 


Seven Pines or Fair Oaks 

at four o’clock the victory would have been much more 
complete.” 

After the battles were over and Johnston was recover¬ 
ing from his wound, Huger made vain effort to have the 
injurious statements corrected and applied for a Court of 
Inquiry. This was promised by the War Department, but 
it was to be held “as soon as the state of the service will 
permit.” The state of the service never permitted, and 
the court was never held. 

About 1 P.M., however, Rodes’s brigade was relieved 
on the Charles City road, and hurried to join the other 
three brigades under Hill, who had fretted greatly under 
the delay. He started his two brigades on the left of the 
road as soon as he saw Rodes approaching. 

The formation was Garland’s brigade on the left of 
the road, followed by G. B. Anderson; Rodes’s brigade on 
the right, followed by Rains. Each brigade marched in 
column until the enemy were met, when it formed line. The 
rear brigades formed about 300 yards behind the leading 
ones. 

In Johnston’s Narrative, he states that “Longstreet 
as ranking officer of the three divisions to be united near 
Hill’s camp was instructed verbally to form his own and 
Hill’s division in two lines crossing the Williamsburg road 
at right angles and to advance to the attack in that order.” 
But the circumstantial evidence is overwhelming that on 
the morning of the battle, Johnston was expecting Long- 
street to be in position on the Nine Mile road, and to sup¬ 
port Hill’s attack upon the Williamsburg road by his attack 
down the Nine Mile. That was the only quick way of 
bringing his large force into proper action, and it is hard 
to see how the two divisions could have failed to crush the 
enemy in their front. 

It is no wonder that Johnston said when he found out 
where Longstreet was, that he wished the troops were all 
back in their camps, for the victory was surely his if he 
could play his game correctly. 

It was being started badly. It was on a front of only 
two brigades, supported by two in a second line, while nine 


— 773 — 


Military Memoirs of a Confederate 

other brigades encumbered the one good road leading to 
the battle. From a glance at the field one might now con¬ 
fidently predict the outcome. 

It is D. H. Hill’s division, about 8,500 strong, excellent 
troops, and there is not living a more honest fighter than 
D. H. Hill. They will first meet Casey’s division, of about 
equal strength, partly fortified with trenches and abattis. 
Behind Casey are three other divisions holding two other 
lines partly intrenched. Hill may carry the first line and 
even have some success against the second. But, by that time, 
he will be worn out, and the daylight will be gone before 
enough of the nine brigades (those behind him) can be 
gotten to him in force to cut any figure. The fight on this 
road cannot amount to more than a bloody draw, prolonged 
until night. 

That is what anyone, knowing the conditions might 
have predicted, and that is just what happened. To follow 
all the details is useless, but the list of casualties, and some 
brief descriptions of incidents will give a good idea of the 
fighting. 

The Confederate reports of casualties, particularly in 
battles fought during active campaigns, are far from be¬ 
ing full, and are not all uniform in their shape and detail. 
Complete figures, therefore, for the whole division cannot 
be given. 

Of Rains’s brigade, the official report only states that 
its losses were one-seventh of the force. The reports show 
that this brigade was employed in a flank movement around 
the enemy’s left which it executed successfully, but did not 
repeat it. Hill expressed disappointment and says that 
Rains might have saved Rodes’s brigade from suffering 
500 casualties.* Rains fought on the left. Had Long- 

*Rains was a graduate of West Point of class of 1827, and was 
now fifty-nine years of age. He had had some Indian fighting in 
Florida, and had been wounded, but he was not in the Mexican War. 
He was an expert and enthusiast upon explosives, and, soon after 
the action at Seven Pines, he was relieved of his brigade, and as¬ 
signed to the Torpedo Bureau, which was organized for submarine 
defence of our rivers and harbors. 


- 774 — 



Seven Pines or Fair Oaks 


street’s division that morning not gone astray, all of its 
brigades would have been on the enemy’s flank, and have 
had similar chances. The other three brigades reported 
their strength and losses as follows: 


Seven Pines, May 31, 1862 


Position 

Brigade 

Present 

Killed 

Wounded 

Missing 

Total 

Per cent 

Front right 

Rodes 

2200 

241 

853 

5 

1099 

50 

Front left 

Garland 

2065 

98 

600 

42 

740 

37. 

Rear left 

Anderson, 
G. B. 

1865 

149 

680 

37 

866 

47 

Totals 


6130 

488 

2133 

84 

2705 

44 


This record shows great fighting power, and will com¬ 
pare favorably for a half-day’s fighting of an equal body of 
men, with any records of the war. 

At Waterloo, the losses were: Allies 20 per cent, French 
34 per cent, British regulars 29 per cent. At Balaklava, 
the Light Brigade (600) lost 49 per cent. 

On the Federal side the battle was opened by Casey’s 
division, moderately well fortified with trenches, batteries, 
and abattis, and soon supported by Peck’s brigade of Couch’s 
division. These four brigades were finally routed from 
their first line by the Rains’s flank movement. They then 
fell back upon the second intrenched line, where they united 
with Couche’s two remaining brigades. Rains’s brigade 
now dropped out of the fight. 

The three other brigades pushed their attack upon the 
enemy’s second line, which was now being reenforced by 
Kearny’s division, but Hill received also a reenforcement 
of R. H. Anderson’s brigade, which he divided. Two regi¬ 
ments under Jenkins he sent to the left and the remainder 
under Anderson to his right. A little later also he received 
two regiments, the 11th Ala. and the 19th Miss., of Wilcox s 
brigade. With this help the second line was carried. Four 
Federal regiments and a battery retreated north toward the 
Chickahominy unpursued. The remainder fell back slowly 
and night put an end to the fighting. Kemper’s brigade 
also arrived, brought by Longstreet to Hill’s aid. It came 
upon the field, but too late to take effective part. On the 


— 775 — 















Military Memoirs of a Confederate 

Federal side Hooker’s division also came up as the fighting 
ceased. 

Hill’s division was now worn out, and Longstreet re¬ 
lieved it from the seven idle brigades still left on the Charles 
City and Williamsburg roads. 

Hill’s forces during the battle had averaged about 
four brigades, for R. H. Anderson had come up, after Rains 
dropped out with a loss of only 14 per cent. Anderson’s 
losses are not given, but they were severe and probably 
equalled the average of Hill’s. Jenkin’s official report says: 

“We never fought twice in the same place, nor five 
minutes in one place, and steadily on the advance; were un¬ 
der fire from 3 P.M. to 7:40 P.M. The service we did will 
be evidenced by our list of killed and wounded. In my two color 
companies out of 80 men who entered, 40 were killed or 
wounded, and out of 11 in the color guard 10 were shot 
down, and my colors, pierced by 9 balls, passed through four 
hands without touching the ground.” 

The following shows a comparison of the total casual¬ 
ties of Hill’s part of the battle, as nearly as they can be 
ascertained including the three brigades already given: 


Casualties, Hill’s Battle, Williamsburg Road, May 31, 1862 



Division 

Strength 

Killed 

Wounded 

Missing 

Total 

Keyes’s Corps 

Casey 

8,500 

177 

927 

325 

1429 

Keyes’s Corps 
Heintzelman’s 

Couch* 

8,500 

195 

773 

127 

1095 

Kearny 

8,500 

193 

816 

82 

1091 

Federal 

Total 

25,500 

565 

2516 

534 

3615 

Confederate 

Total! 

12,000 

608 

2751 

156 

3515 


The Confederates captured 10 guns, 5,000 muskets, and 
about 400 prisoners. The following extracts from official 
reports give an idea of the fighting. Rodes writes: 

“The total number of men carried into action was about 2,200. 
The aggregate number present at camp was, however, 2,587. The 
6th Ala. lost nearly 60 per cent of its aggregate force. Some of 
its men were drowned after having been wounded, as. they fought at 


*This includes 12 killed, 45 wounded, 12 missing, total 69, which 
occurred in Johnston’s battle on the left. 

fThis omits Kemper, who was not seriously engaged. 


— 776 — 



















Seven Pines or Fair Oaks 


times in a swamp in which the water was from six inches to two 
feet in depth. The right company of the 6th Alabama was thrown 
back at right angles to the line of battle by Col. Gordon, to protect 
his rear, and engaged the enemy at such close quarters that its brave 
commander, Capt. Bell, after having fallen wounded mortally, was 
able to use his revolver, with effect upon the enemy. The company 
fought with great heroism. Its loss was 21 killed and 23 wounded 
out of a total of 55 (80 per cent).” 

It remains to say a few words of the movements of the 
unengaged troops on the Williamsburg and Charles City 
roads. Longstreet at 3:30 P.M. placed Wilcox in charge 
of his own, Pryor's, and Colston's brigades, and ordered him 
to follow and support Huger. Soon after this order was 
modified and Wilcox was ordered to precede Huger. But, 
having moved to the front, he was soon countermarched 
and ordered to return to the Williamsburg road, and then 
to follow that road to the front. He had retraced his steps 
about a mile when his fourth order again reversed his direc¬ 
tion. He was now to follow down the Charles City road, keep¬ 
ing abreast of the firing which was heavy. And soon a fifth 
order came, of which Wilcox writes in his report: 

“Again orders were received in writing to move across to the 
Williamsburg road, following country roads and paths through woods 
and fields, a guide being furnished to conduct the command. The 
intervening distance between the two roads was low and flat, and in 
many places covered with water, at one point waist deep. The 
march was of necessity very slow. It was about 5 P.M. when the 
head of the column reached the Williamsburg road. 

It was at this time that the 11th Ala. and 19th Miss, 
of Wilcox’s brigade were sent into the action, as has already 
been told. Later, these brigades with the others of Long- 
street's and Huger, which were brought up, relieved the 
troops which had been so heavily engaged. 

So terminated what should properly be called “D. H. 
Hill’s Battle" for the whole, as we shall see, embraced three 
minor battles, at different times and places, and under dif¬ 
ferent commanders. Hill's battle was fought principally 
against Keyes’s corps; and we have seen that Couch with 
four regiments and a battery retreated northward toward 
the Chickahominy. 

Here he soon found friends. Sumner's corps on the 
north side of the river had been formed about 1 P.M., and 


— 777 — 


Military Memoirs of a Confederate 


moved toward two recently constructed roadways and 
bridges across the Chickahominy. At 2:30 P.M. orders 
to cross were received, and Sumner, having two roads, was 
able to cross quite rapidly. The river was high and rising, 
and by nightfall and until next morning the stream was im¬ 
passable. 

Now we enter upon the second, which may be called 
“Johnston's Battle.” 

It has been told how his original plans were destroyed 
by Longstreet’s taking his division to the Williamsburg 
road. It must have been near eleven o'clock when John¬ 
ston learned where Longstreet was, and realized that it was 
too late to get the troops back for the day. He hesitated 
whether to wait and prepare for the morrow or to go on 
and unfortunately decided to let it go on. He took no 
measures to supply the place on the Nine Mile road of the 
six brigades of Longstreet. Whiting’s five brigades, how¬ 
ever, were at hand. Three of them, Whiting's, Hood’s and 
Pettigrew’s, were at the fork of the Nine Mile and New 
Bridge roads; Hatton’s and Hampton’s in reserve near by. 

Toward noon Johnston left his headquarters, which 
were on the Nine Mile road about three miles from Rich¬ 
mond, and took his position at a house near the fork of the 
Nine Mile and New Bridge roads. His intention now was 
to send Whiting’s division down the Nine Mile road to co¬ 
operate with D. H. Hill’s attack down the Williamsburg 
road. 

By coincidence of bad luck, his right wing having lost 
several hours in the morning, his left wing lost about three 
hours in the afternoon. The signal for Whiting’s advance 
was to be the sound of Hill’s musketry on the Williams¬ 
burg road, two miles southeast, through a wooded country. 
This musketry began about one o’clock, and was heard in 
the Federal lines, five miles northeast; also near Richmond 
five miles west; but was not audible two miles to the north¬ 
west at the position occupied by Whiting’s division and by 
Gen. Johnston.* 

*Such phenomena, called acoustic shadows, are of common occur¬ 
rence and are to be expected upon every battle-field, in some direction; 
especially in wooded localities. Here the intervening ground was mod¬ 
erately wooded. The artillery could be distinguished, but the amount 
of it was not great. 


- 778 — 



Seven Pines or Fair Oaks 


Longstreet reports having sent a message, upon the 
capture of Casey’s first line, but it was not received, and 
Johnston’s first knowledge of the battle came about four 
o’clock, from an officer whom he had sent at three to inves¬ 
tigate and report. 

Soon after 4 P.M. Whiting’s five brigades were put in 
motion, with Hood in front. Hood was directed to leave 
the Nine Mile road to his left and to push over toward the 
York River Railroad, and find Hill’s troops, while the re¬ 
maining brigades moved down the railroad. Already there 
had been upon the railroad all day Pickett’s brigade of Long- 
street’s division, sent there by Longstreet before the be¬ 
ginning of the action, “to report any advance of the enemy 
up that road.” It is remarkable that Longstreet contented 
himself with this, and did not utilize this road as a route 
of advance for some of his many brigades. Besides his 
own six he could have called on some of Huger’s three, and 
have led a strong attack down the railroad, turning Casey’s 
right flank. An opportunity for one of the most brilliant 
strokes in the war was here overlooked and lost. Soon 
after five o’clock, Whiting’s four rear brigades had straight¬ 
ened out upon the Nine Mile road, with Whiting’s own bri¬ 
gade in front near Fair Oaks Station, when a battery 
opened fire upon the column from its left. 

It was the battery with four regiments of Couch’s 
division, which had been cut off from Casey’s second line 
and had retreated northward, unpursued, toward the Sum¬ 
ner bridges. Here it had met Sedwick’s division of Sum¬ 
ner’s corps and Richardson’s division was not far away. 
Johnston was riding with Whiting when the Federal bat¬ 
tery opened fire, but supposing the Chickahominy to be 
impassable, he thought that there could be no great force 
there, and Whiting was ordered to charge the position with 
his brigade. Near the Chickahominy the ground was roll¬ 
ing, and the enemy’s guns secured fine positions. For fully 
800 yards the Confederate advance was exposed to fire. 

The reception which it met, however, made it speedily 
apparent that the errand upon which it had been sent was 
much beyond the dimensions of a brigade. 


— 779 — 


Military Memoirs of a Confederate 

Johnston was impatient, and directed the attack to be 
renewed at once by all the brigades present. Hood’s bri¬ 
gade might have been recalled, and several batteries of 
artillery, not far off, could have found positions against 
the two batteries the enemy presently had in action. But 
a very hurried formation of the three remaining brigades— 
Hatton’s, Hampton’s and Pettigrew’s—was made, and the 
attack was renewed without bringing up artillery, although 
there was much of it near. It was met by Sedgwick’s divi¬ 
sion and Abercrombie’s four regiments, and received a 
bloody repulse, to which the enemy’s artillery contributed 
largely, having a fair sweep and no artillery opposing them. 
Hatton was killed, Pettigrew wounded and captured, and 
Hampton wounded. 

The casualties of the division for the day were reported 
as follows: 


Johnston’s Battle 

Strength 

Killed 

Wounded 

Missing 

Total 

Hood’s Brigade 

1922 


13 


13 

Hampton’s 

Whiting’s (Law) 

2225 

45 

284 


329 

2398 

28 

286 . 

42 

356 

Pettigrew’s 

2017 

47 

240 

54 

341 

Hatton’s 

2030 

44 

187 

13 

244 

Total Confederate ' 

1 10592 

1640 

1110 

109 

1283 

Sedgwick’s Eivision 

8000 

62 

282 

3 

347 

Abercrombie’s Brigade 

2000 

12 

45 

12 

69 

Total Federal 

10000 

74 

327 

15 

416 


Before sundown Johnston recognized that his attack 
was a failure and he was about to arrange that his troops 
should sleep on their arms and renew the fight at dawn, 
when he received two wounds. The first was a flesh wound 
in the shoulder from a musket ball, and the second, a few 
moments later, was a blow in the chest from a heavy frag¬ 
ment of shell, knocking him from his horse. He was 
placed in an ambulance and started toward his headquar¬ 
ters, but suffered such pain from the motion caused by the 
fearful roads that a litter had to be substituted. He was 
incapacitated for service until the middle of November, 
when he was assigned to the principal command of the 
army in the west. 


— 780 — 
















Seven Pines or Fair Oaks 

G. W. Smith succeeded Johnston in the command, and 
the action of the next day is therefore to be called “Smith’s 
Battle.” It is sometimes stated in Confederate accounts, 
that this day offered the Confederates their best opportunity 
to crush the enemy, because it is supposed that the Chicka- 
hominy was not entirely impassable. This is a mistake. 
The railroad bridge had been repaired, and covered with 
plank, and was always available for infantry and horses, 
though not for vehicles. By 8 A.M. June 1, the Federal 
engineers had built a pontoon bridge at the site of the New 
Bridge, but it was under Confederate fire, and the ap¬ 
proaches to it were impassable during the flood. By noon 
Sumner’s upper bridge was again practicable for infantry, 
and by dark the lower one. By morning, June 1, there¬ 
fore, the Federal army was practicably safe from any Con¬ 
federate attack. It had six divisions on the ground and a 
good line of battle, extending across the railroad nearly 
parallel to the Nine Mile road, with its left flank retired 
and protected by White Oak Swamp. The only chance of 
a successful assault by the Confederates would have been 
with a heavy artillery fire upon the obtuse angle where 
Sedgwick’s line bent back to connect with the other divi¬ 
sions. The condition of the ground, as well as the unor¬ 
ganized state of the Confederate artillery service, made 
such an attack impossible and no effort at it seems to have 
been made. Late at night, May 31, Longstreet reported 
to Smith, and received orders to attack in the morning 
from the Williamsburg road northward, Smith proposing 
to take up the battle, with Whiting and other troops, when 
it was well developed. 

It is easy to see that the Federals had nothing to fear 
from anything the Confederates were likely to do. 

Early in the morning there was some sharp firing 
at many points along the line, where daylight brought into 
view troops and skirmishers which had been posted after 
dark; and, in accordance with Smith’s instructions, four 
of Longstreet’s brigades—Pickett’s, Armistead’s, Pryor’s, 
and Colston’s—and two of Huger’s, Mahone’s, and Armi¬ 
stead’s, advanced upon the enemy’s position, which ran 


— 781 — 


Military Memoirs of a Confederate 

largely through the woods. There resulted a number of 
more or less severe affairs at different points, which were 
waged with varying fortunes for some hours. The bri¬ 
gades which had been engaged the day before were held in 
reserve near the captured redoubt. Meanwhile, with day¬ 
light, the enemy’s position of the afternoon before, oppo¬ 
site Whiting, showed itself strengthened by intrenchments, 
and Smith thought there was evidence of additional re¬ 
enforcements being sent from the north side. So the battle 
in Whiting’s front was not renewed. Longstreet, too, soon 
began to call for reenforcements. The following notes were 
received from him in quick succession: 

“June 1st. Yours of today received. The entire army seems 
to be opposed to me. I trust that some diversion may be made in 
my favor during these attacks, else my troops cannot stand it. The 
ammunition gives out too easily.” 

“10 A.M., June 1. Can you reenforce me? The entire army 
seems to be opposed to me. We cannot hold out unless we get help. 
If we can fight together, we can finish the work today, and Mac’s 
time will be up. If I can’t get help, I fear that I must fall back.” 

On receipt of these notes, Smith ordered 5,000 men to 
be withdrawn from Magruder’s force along the Chicka- 
hominy, above New Bridge, and sent to Longstreet, but 
meanwhile D. H. Hill, seeing that the fighting was accom¬ 
plishing nothing, sent orders withdrawing the troops to the 
line of the night before. This was done rapidly at some 
points, and more slowly at others, but the enemy made no 
marked advance, and the action soon died out, it being now 
about 11 a.m. 

About 1:30 P.M. President Davis arrived at Smith’s 
headquarters, and informed him that Lee had been assigned 
to the command of the army, and Lee himself soon ar¬ 
rived. The party then rode aver to Hill’s position, whence 
Magruder’s troops, which had arrived, were ordered back 
to the Chickahominy. After dark orders were received by 
Hill from Longstreet for all troops to return to their camps 
within the Confederate lines. In his official report, Hill 
says: “The thirteen brigades were not got together until 
near midnight . . . We regained our own intrenchments 
near sunrise.” The moon that night was about five days 
old. 


— 782 — 


Seven Pines or Fair Oaks 


The official reports do not show separately the casual¬ 
ties either of this last action or of Hill's battle on the 31st, 
though those of Johnston's battle are given by both sides. 
But Kearney’s division and some of Longstreet's brigades 
were engaged both on the 31st and the 1st, and, on the 
latter day, two of Huger's. The totals of the whole affair, 
as nearly as can be estimated, are shown in the following 
table, averaging where exact figures are wanting: 


Total Casualties, Seven Pines or Fair Oaks 


Battle 


Engaged 

Killed 

Wounded 

Missing 

Total 

Hill’s 

Confederate 

11642 

608 

2751 

156 

3515 

May 31 

Federal 

18000 

565 

2516 

534 

Y3615 

Johnston’s 

Confederate 

10592 

164 

1010 

109 

1283 

May 31 

Federal 

10500 

74 

327 

15 

416 

Smith’s 

Confederate 

14136 

208 

988 

140 

1336 

June 1 

Federal 

17000 

151 

751 

98 

1000 

Aggregate 

Confederate 

36370 

980 

4749 

405 

6134 


Federal 

45500 

790 

3594 

647 

5031 


“When Gen. Lee came back he told me that Gen. Johnston pro¬ 
posed on the next Thursday, to move against the enemy as follows: 
Gen. A. P. Hill was to move down the right flank and rear of the 
enemy; Gen. G. W. Smith, as soon as Hill’s guns opened, was to cross 
the Chickahominy at the Meadow; Bridge, attack the enemy in flank, 
and by the conjunction of the two it was expected to double him up. 
Then Longstreet was to cross on the Mechanicsville bridge, and attack 
him in front. From this plan the best results were hoped for by 
both of us.” 

The “next Thursday" was May 29. In the Records 
appear no signs of battle until May 27. On that day news 
came that McDowell was starting south from Fredericks¬ 
burg. Johnston immediately ordered troops into position 
for the attack at dawn on the 29th. But, as has been told, 
on the 28th, he received news of McDowell’s recall north. 
That night he countermanded the battle orders, and had 
the troops withdrawn under cover of darkness from all ad¬ 
vanced positions. 

The President’s narrative goes on: 

“On the morning of the day proposed, I hastily despatched my 
office business and rode out toward the Meadow Bridge to see the 
action commence. On the road I found Smith’s division halted, and 
the men dispersed in the woods. Looking for some one from whom 
I could get information, I finally saw Gen. Hood, and asked him the 


— 783 — 


















Military Memoirs of a Confederate 

meaning of what I saw. He told me that he did not know anything 
more than that they had been halted. Riding on to the main road, 
which led to the Mechanicsville bridge, I found Gen. Longstreet 
walking to and fro in an impatient, it might be said, fretful manner. 
Before speaking to him, he said his division had been under arms 
all day waiting for orders to advance, and that the day was now so 
far spent that he did not know what was the matter. Thus, ended 
the offensive-defensive programme from which Lee expected much, 
and of which I was hopeful.” 

But two days afterward, May 31, the President rode 
out again, late in the afternoon, and when on the Nine Mile 
road, heard firing in the direction of Seven Pines. Mr. 
Davis writes: 

“As I drew nearer I saw Gen. Whiting with part of Gen. Smith’s 
division file into the road in front of me; at the same time I saw Gen. 
Johnston ride across the field from a house before which Gen. Lee’s 
horse was standing.* I turned down to the house and asked Gen. 
Lee what the musketry firing meant. He replied by asking whether 
I had heard it, and being answered in the affirmative, he said he 
had been under the impression himself; but Gen. Johnston had as¬ 
sured him that it could be nothing more than an artillery duel. It 
is scarcely necessary to add that neither of us had been advised of 
a design to attack the enemy that day.” 

It seems clear from this narrative that Gen. Johnston 
entirely disregarded the letter of May 21st, so far as it 
required him to acquaint the President with his proposed 
programme of operations. The verbal message conveyed 
by Lee, that he proposed to attack north of the Chicka- 
hominy on the 29th, may serve to acquit him of literal dis¬ 
obedience; but the change of programme was neither no¬ 
tified beforehand, or explained afterward, nor was any no¬ 
tice given of the attack at Seven Pines on the 31st, although 
there was ample opportunity to do so. 

It is not probable, however, that Johnston intended 
his course to be one either of disrespect or disobedience. It 
had its source, doubtless, in his aversion to detail, or to 
committing himself as to what he proposed to do, when 
he was fighting a superior force and was really waiting for 
opportunities to turn up. 


" Among the staff-officers who saw this incident, it was believed 
that Gen. Johnston saw Mr. Davis approaching, .and that he sought 
to avoid a meeting by mounting quickly and riding rapidly to the 
extreme front, where he remained until he received his wounds. I 
was a witness of the scene. 


—■- 784 — 



Seven Pines or Fair Oaks 


It must be admitted that at Seven Pines our prospects, 
had Johnston not been wounded, would have been dismal. 
Besides the lack of cordial relations between the President 
and Johnston, the latter’s effort to handle the army in battle 
had been an utter failure. His orders were given, he says, 
“for the concentration of 23 of our 27 brigades against 
McClellan’s left wing.” Yet nowhere were ever over four 
brigades in action at one time. No complaint is made of 
any disobedience, slowness, or nonperformance, by any offi¬ 
cer, except Huger, and the facts in his case distinctly re¬ 
lieve him from any blame whatever. Indeed, it is almost 
tragic the way in which he became the scapegoat of this 
occasion, the true history of which is even yet not generally 
understood. Gen. Smith, in 1891, published all the facts 
for the first time with documentary proof. 


— 785 — 


Seven Days’ Campaign — The Attack 

Lee in Command—Ives Predicts Lee’s Audacity—Lee’s Plan—Mc¬ 
Clellan’s Delay—Lee’s Opportunity—Lee’s Order—Stuart’s Raid 
—Intimations to the Enemy—Conference of Officers—Jackson’s 
First Failure—Jackson’s March—Stuart and Trimble—Branch 
Moves—A. P. Hill Moves—Battle of Mechanicsville—Porter’s Re¬ 
treat—A. P. Hill’s Advance—Gaines’ Mill Position-—The Chances 
—Jackson at Cold Harbor—Porter’s Account—Hill’s Account— 
Lee’s Account—Jackson Ordered in—General Advance—Enemy’s 
Escape—Casualties—Remarks. 

When Gen. Lee on June 1, 1862, took command of the 
Army of Northern Virginia, he brought with him his per¬ 
sonal staff, Col. R. H. Chilton, Adjutant, Col. A. L. Long, 
Military Secretary, and Majs. Taylor, Venable, Marshall and 
Talcotts, as Aides. He retained the chiefs of all depart¬ 
ments—Corley, as Quartermaster, Cole as Commissary, 
Guild as Medical Director, and myself as Ordnance Officer— 
and all matters of routine went on as before. 

The chances of a successful campaign against Mc¬ 
Clellan had increased greatly when Johnston fell, wounded, 
as has been already told. Johnston had proposed the con¬ 
centration at Richmond of a large force, to be drawn from 
points farther south. Lee would be able to bring this about 
more effectively, occupying, as he had done, the position of 
Military Adviser to the President. He had, as yet, never 
commanded an army, and his accession to his present com¬ 
mand did not at once inspire popular enthusiasm. His 
only active service had been in West Virginia, where he was 
Department Commander in the fall of 1861. This cam¬ 
paign had generally been considered a failure, but should 
have been recognized as a success, for there had been at 
least no loss of men, nor any serious reverse. It was 
absurd for the Confederacy to seek to occupy so extensive 
and mountainous a country as West Virginia, so close to 
the great state of Ohio, and with a population strongly 
favoring the Federal cause. It was impossible to supply 
our armies over their long and difficult roads. Mountain 
barriers in that section not only gave the country to the 
Federals, but proclaimed peace. This came to be recog- 


— 786 — 


Seven Days' Campaign—The Attack 

nized after one campaign. With this for a result, and no 
battles having been fought, an idea arose that he would 
not be an. aggressive commander. This was strengthened 
when Lee’s first care was to select a line of battle and be¬ 
gin to fortify it. To some of the amateur critics, who 
wrote for the public press, this seemed little better than a 
confession of cowardice. 

The Richmond Examiner , edited by Pollard, was con¬ 
spicuous in the bitterness of its attacks. Through some 
of these I chanced upon an interview which impressed me 
very forcibly at the time, and which proved to be quite a 
prophetic estimate of Lee as a commander. It came 
about as follows: On the staff of the President was Col. 
Joseph C. Ives, a graduate of West Point in the class of 
’52. He was born in New York and appointed from Con¬ 
necticut, but had married in the well-known Semmes fam¬ 
ily of Georgia and Alabama, and had joined his fortunes 
with the south. He served on the staff of President Davis 
during the whole of the war. While in no way conspicu¬ 
ous, he impressed all who met him as particularly intel¬ 
lectual, and as an unusually accomplished officer. 

When Lee had been in command about two weeks, I 
had a long ride with Ives about our lines, one afternoon, 
during which he referred to these newspaper attacks and 
asked if I thought they in any way impaired the confidence 
of the army in Lee. I had seen no such effect and told 
him so, and then went on to say: “Ives, tell me this. We 
are here fortifying our lines, but apparently leaving the 
enemy all the time he needs to accumulate his superior 
forces, and then to move on us in the way he thinks best. 
Has Gen. Lee the audacity that is going to be required for 
our inferior force to meet the enemy’s superior force—to 
take the aggressive and to run risks and stand chances?” 

Ives’s reply was so impressive, both in manner and 
matter, that it has always been remembered as vividly as 
if today. He reined up his horse, stopped in the road, and 
turning to me, said: “Alexander, if there'is one man in 
either army, Confederate or Federal, head and shoulders 
above every other in audacity, it is Gen. Lee! His name 


— 787 — 


Military Memoirs of a Confederate 

might be Audacity. He will take more desperate chances 
and take them quicker than any other general in this 
country, North or South; and you will live to see it, too.” 

It is needless to say that I did live to see it many times 
over. But it seems even yet, a mystery how, at that time, 
Ives or President Davis or any other living man had di¬ 
vined it. No one could meet Lee and fail to be impressed 
with his dignity of character, his intellectual power, and 
his calm self-reliance; but all those qualities might be 
recognized without deducing from them, also, the exis¬ 
tence of such phenomenal audacity, except by an inspira¬ 
tion of genius. 

The principal feature of Lee’s proposed plan had long 
been the bringing down of Jackson from the Valley to 
attack the enemy’s right wing. Even before Jackson had 
extricated himself from the pursuit of his enemies on June 
8, Lee had written him to set on foot the arrangements 
to mislead the enemy as to his intentions. 

The arrangements adopted were both elaborate and 
effective. Not only were all sorts of exciting false rumors 
set on foot throughout the Valley, but Whiting’s division, 
from before Richmond, and Lawton’s large brigade—arriv¬ 
ing from Georgia nearly 4,000 strong—were sent by rail from 
Richmond to Staunton about June 11, to create the im¬ 
pression that Jackson’s raid was about to be repeated with 
a much larger force. Meanwhile, Jackson’s force was 
marched again to the Shenandoah near Port Republic, about 
the 11th, after Shields and Fremont had fallen back to the 
neighborhood of Strasburg. Here Jackson took five days 
of rest preparatory to the movement upon Richmond. 

During most of this period, by all the rules of the 
game, McClellan was in default for not attacking. He 
had come within arm’s length but allowed the initiative to 
Lee. McDowell had been taken from him, so that he had 
nothing to gain by waiting, while his enemy had the op¬ 
portunity both of reenforcement and of fortification. Lee, 
was indeed, doing his utmost in each direction. McClellan 
seemed to have been subconsciously aware that he ought 
to attack, and that his advantage was being lost by every 


— 788 — 


Seven Days’ Campaign—The Attack 

day's delay; for his reports to Washington represented his 
army, from day to day, as being only held back from a 
general advance by waiting for some slight additional ad¬ 
vantage, which a day or two would bring. 

On June 2, which was his best opportunity, he was 
only waiting for the water to fall in the Chickahominy. 
On June 7, he was waiting for McCall’s division (about 
10,000 strong) which arrived' on the 12th and 13th. On 
June 16th he was waiting for two days to let the ground 
harden. On June 18 the general engagement might begin 
at any hour. On June 25, “the action will probably occur 
tomorrow, or within a short time.” And at last he was 
right, for Lee began it on the 26th, and during the interval, 
since June 2, the advantage had shifted from McClellan’s 
side to Lee’s. 

As the game and the players now stood, the game 
was Lee’s for a great success—the greatest ever so fairly 
offered to any Confederate general. His strategy had been 
good and had been carried through without a flaw. Jack¬ 
son’s entire army, reenforced by Whiting’s division and 
Lawton’s brigade, had been brought down secretly from 
the Valley, and, on the night of June 25, was encamped at 
Ashland within 13 miles of Mechanicsville. It was about 
18,500 strong. Meanwhile, Lee had drawn together, avail¬ 
able for battle, around Richmond, about 65,000 other troops, 
and had fortified his lines on the southeast between the 
Chickahominy and the James, enough to make them quite 
secure with half his force. McClellan’s right flank was 
but a single corps, Porter’s not over 30,000 strong, and 
separated from the Federal centre by the Chickahominy 
River and about four miles of distance. Under these cir¬ 
cumstances, with even fairly good tactics, Porter’s corps 
should have been practically destroyed, and with it the 
Federal line of supply from the York River. That once 
accomplished, the capture or destruction of the remainder 
of McClellan’s army, during their retreat to the James 
River-, would have been an easier task than the first. 

All this was in the game which Lee set out to play, on 
June 26, and the stakes were already his if his execution 


— 789 — 


Military Memoirs of a Confederate 

were even half as good as his plan. At the beginning there 
was every promise that it would be. Two days before, a 
confidential order had been issued to general officers and 
heads of departments, which is given in part, in contrast 
with Johnston’s method, as developed at Seven Pines. 

“General Orders No. 78. 


“Headquarters in the Field, 

“June 2b, 1862. 

“Gen. Jackson’s command will proceed tomorrow from Ash¬ 
land toward the Stark (or Merry Oaks) Church, and encamp at 
some convenient point west of the Central Railroad. Branch’s bri¬ 
gade of A. P. Hill’s division will also to-morrow evening, take posi¬ 
tion on the Chickahominy near Half-Sink. 

“At three o’clock Thursday morning, 26th Inst, Gen. Jackson will 
advance on the road leading to Pole Green Church, communicating 
his march to Gen. Branch, who will immediately cross the Chicka¬ 
hominy and take the road leading to Mechanicsville. 

“As soon as the movements of these columns are discovered, 
Gen. A. P. Hill, with the rest of his division, will cross the Chicka¬ 
hominy near Meadow Bridge and move direct upon Mechanicsville. 

“To aid his advance the heavy batteries on the Chickahominy 
will, at the proper time, open upon the batteries at Mechanicsville. 
The enemy being driven from Mechanicsville and the passage across 
the bridge opened, Gen. Longstreet, with his division and that of 
Gen. D. H. Hill, will cross the Chickahominy at or near that point, 
Gen. D. H. Hill moving to the support of Gen. Jackson, and Gen. 
Longstreet supporting Gen. A. P. Hill. The four divisions keeping 
in communication with each other and moving en echelon on sep¬ 
arate roads if practicable, the left division in advance, with skir¬ 
mishers and sharp-shooters extending their front, will sweep down 
the Chickahominy and endeavor to drive the enemy from his posi¬ 
tion above New Bridge, Gen. Jackson bearing well to his left, turn¬ 
ing Beaver Dam Creek, taking the direction toward Cold Harbor. 

“They will then press forward toward the York River Railroad, 
closing upon the enemy’s rear and forcing him down the Chicka¬ 
hominy. Any advance of the enemy toward Richmond will be pre¬ 
vented by vigorously following his rear and crippling and arresting 
his progress. ...” 

But one grave error had been committed. Among 
the preparations which Lee had made for the occasion had 
been a forced reconnaissance of the enemy’s rear, which was 
made by his cavalry commander, Stuart, between June 11 
and 15. Stuart with about 1,200 men and two guns, pass¬ 
ing well behind the enemy’s right, had gotten into his rear 
and discovered that his right flank did not extend for any 
distance northward from the Chickahominy and rested on 
no natural obstacle. But the expedition could not safely 


— 790 — 


Seven Days' Campaign—The Attack 

return, Stuart thought, by the route taken in going. He 
determined, therefore to make the circuit of the Federal 
army, crossing the Chickahominy below by a bridge which 
he expected to find. 

In this he was disappointed, but with great resource 
he got safely across, partly by swimming, and partly by 
rebuilding a bridge, and brought off his guns and a few 
prisoners. 

But this raid, though ordered by Lee and handsomely 
conducted, had one unfortunate effect. It would have been 
much better to have obtained the necessary information 
by scouts. It seriously alarmed McClellan for his rear. 
But for it the probabilities are that he never would have 
given the subject any thought, and he would certainly not 
have been prepared with a fleet of loaded transports on hand 
when he was, soon after, forced to change his base to Har¬ 
rison’s Landing on the James River. It is hard to esti¬ 
mate the difference in the result, had McClellan been taken 
by surprise on this occasion and been forced, perhaps, to 
retreat down the Peninsula. On the whole, therefore, the 
eclat of our brilliant raid cost us much more than its re¬ 
sults were worth. Where important strategy is on foot, 
too great care can scarcely be used to avoid making any such 
powerful suggestions to the enemy as resulted in this case. 

It is interesting to note that the enemy got no inti¬ 
mations of what was going on until June 24. On that day 
a deserter from Jackson’s force was brought in. After 
trying in vain to pass himself off as a Union prisoner, es¬ 
caped from Jackson, he had told of Jackson’s march and 
its supposed intent to attack McClellan’s flank. 

McClellan wired the story to Stanton, and also sent out 
two negroes to go along the railroad and investigate, but 
Stuart’s pickets were too vigilant for the negroes to pass them. 
Stanton gave some credence to the deserter’s story, but it 
cut small figure among the rumors which McClellan was 
receiving from his detective bureau. He believed that 
Beauregard had arrived and that Lee now had 200,000 men. 

On June 25 he made his first forward movement by 
advancing the skirmish-lines of several brigades and taking 


— 791 — 


Military Memoirs of a Confederate 

up a portion of the neutral ground in front of our picket 
lines, near the Williamsburg road. Sharp skirmishing en¬ 
sued and lasted all day, the Federal losses being reported as 
about 700, and our own about 400. The affair was called 
Orchard or Oak Grove Skirmish. 

Before issuing order of battle No. 75, Lee had on June 
23 Longstreet, A. P. Hill, D. H. Hill and Jackson, to meet 
in conference at his headquarters to arrange all details. 
Longstreet had asked Jackson to fix the date on which the 
attack should be made. The latter named June 25. Long¬ 
street suggested that he allow more time, and the 26th was 
agreed to. 

When summoned to this meeting by Lee on Saturday, 
June 21, Jackson was near Gordonsville. He started on a 
freight train bound to Richmond, but left the train before 
midnight that night at a station where he spent Sunday, 
attending church twice.* At midnight he set out on horse¬ 
back for the conference at Richmond about 50 miles away, 
arriving about 3 P.M. 

Had he kept on the freight train to Richmond he would 
have arrived early Sunday morning. His brigades on the 
march also kept Sunday in camp. It was usually the gen¬ 
eral's custom to keep account of Sundays spent in fighting 
or marching, and to make up for each by a week-day rest, and 
sermons, at the earliest opportunity. 

On the march from Gordonsville the railroad was uti¬ 
lized for the infantry as far as could be done, by picking 
up the rear brigades and carrying them forward. Artillery 
and cavalry marched all the way. 

On Tuesday morning, June 24, Jackson's infantry, was 
at Beaver Dam Station, on the Virginia Central road, about 
18 miles from Ashland, where they were expected to en¬ 
camp that night, and about 25 miles from the Virginia Cen¬ 
tral R.R. near the Stark Church, whence order No. 75 re¬ 
quired Jackson to march at 3 A.M. Thursday, June 26. 

We now enter upon the story of performances. The 
orders governing the beginning of the action were simple 

*Henderson says it was Frederick Hall, other reports say Louisa 
C. H. 


— 792 — 



Seven Days’ Campaign—The Attack 

and explicit. Every officer must have realized the supreme 
importance of time, even without the hint given by Lee 
in his order fixing the hour of Jackson’s march at 3 A.M. 

It is, therefore, a great surprise to see that instead of 
crossing the Virginia Central R.R. at 3 A.M. on the 26th, 
they do not begin to cross it until 10 A.M. on that date. 
That is practically a whole day late, because, with the dis¬ 
tance still to be traversed it will be too late to commence 
the great battle intended, in time to win it and gather the 
fruits of victory. 

Had Jackson pushed his march to Ashland on the night 
of the 24th, about 18 miles from Beaver Dam, as Lee’s 
order contemplated, he would have had only six miles to 
march on the 25th, and his men would have been in excellent 
condition to set out at 3 A.M. on the 25th, with less than 
10 miles to go to reach the enemy. The result of crossing 
the Central R.R. at 10 A.M. was to fight the battle a day 
late and at Gaines’s Mill, three miles nearer McClellan’s 
main army, thus losing the opportunity to cut off Porter’s 
corps at Beaver Dam. This opportunity, the cream of the 
whole campaign, was lost by Jackson’s not demanding of 
his troops better marching on the 24th and 25th. 

His biographers have found many excuses for him, but, 
however good or bad these excuses may be, they will not 
be dwelt upon here for two reasons: 

First—The object of the narrative is neither praise 
nor blame, but only that military students may realize, 
more fully than they could without such an example, the in¬ 
finite value of hours when a battle is on foot, and how 
easily hours may be lost. 

Second—The excuses of the biographers will best be 
given after finishing the whole story; for, unfortunately, 
this loss of the first day is not the only, nor is it the worst, 
failure of Jackson during these Seven Days, to come to time 
as was expected of him. He nowhere, even distantly, ap¬ 
proached his record as a soldier won in his every other 
battle, either before or afterward. As one reads of his 
weak and dilatory performance day after day, and recalls 
what he had always been before, and always was afterward, 


— 793 — 


Military Memoirs of a Confederate 

one feels that during these Seven Days he was really not 
Jackson. He was a different individual. He was under 
a spell. Nothing he had to do was done with the vigor 
which marked all the rest of his career. 

Crossing the Central R.R. at 10 A.M. on the 25th, he 
marched but eight miles farther that day, going into biv¬ 
ouac about five o’clock, at Hundley’s Corner. He was here 
in easy reach of Porter’s rear and in full hearing of the 
heavy cannonading and musketry going on at Mechanics- 
ville, which will be told of presently. 

He describes the march, as follows, in his official report: 

“Pursuing the Ashcake road we crossed the Central R.R. about 
10 A.M. Approaching the Totopotomoy Creek, the Federal picket 
crossed to the south side of the stream, and partially destroyed the 
bridge, and, by felling trees across the road farther on, attempted 
to delay our advance. After the Texas skirmishers had gallantly 
crossed over, Reilly shelled the woods for the purpose of driving the 
enemy from it, in order that we might safely effect a lodgment, 
beyond the creek. Whiting rapidly repaired the bridge and the 
march was resumed. That night the three divisions bivouacked near 
Hundley’s Corner. ... We distinctly heard the rapid and continued 
discharges of cannon, which announced the engagement of Gen. A. 
P. Hill with the extreme right of the enemy.” 

Gen. Stuart, in his official report, says: 

“At Dr. Shelton’s we awaited the arrival of Gen. Jackson, send¬ 
ing a squadron in advance to seize and hold the bridge at the Toto¬ 
potomoy. The enemy, anticipating us, had torn up the bridge, and 
held the opposite bank, and obstructed the road, without, however, 
making any determined stand. Capt. W. W. Blackford, Corps of 
Engineers, assigned to duty with my command, set about repairing 
the bridge, and in a half-hour, with the details furnished him, the 
bridge was ready. Passing Pole Green Church, Gen Jackson’s march 
led directly toward the crossing of Beaver Dam Creek opposite Rich¬ 
ardson’s. Reaching that point he bivouacked for the night.” 

Gen. Trimble, in his official report, writes: 

“On the 26th we moved, with the army, from Ashland in a 
southern direction, passing to the east of Mechanicsville, in the after¬ 
noon, and at 4 P.M. distinctly heard the volleys of artillery and 
musketry in the engagement of Gen. Hill with the enemy. Before 
sundown the firing was not more than two miles distant, and, in my 
opinion, we should have marched to the support of Gen. Hill that 
evening.” 

Now we will go back to the Chickahominy where 
Branch’s brigade some eight miles above the rest of A. P. Hill’s 
division at Meadow Bridge is under arms and expecting to 


— 794 — 


Seven Days' Campaign—The Attack 

receive the signal to advance not later than 4 A.M. It does 
not come until after 10 o’clock. As soon as it was received, 
Branch crossed the Chickahominy and moved toward Me- 
chanicsville, the enemy’s pickets falling back before him. 

At one point the road pursued by Branch approached, 
within a short distance, a road upon its left, which was be¬ 
ing followed by Ewell’s column, and the two generals had 
a brief meeting, but there was no other communication be¬ 
tween the columns until the next day. Meanwhile, since 
an early hour in the morning, the divisions of A. P. Hill at 
Meadow Bridge, and of D. H. Hill and Longstreet at the 
Mechanicsville bridge, two miles below, had been under 
arms and anxiously awaiting the sound of Jackson’s guns. 

President Davis was on the ground, having ridden out 
from Richmond, not only to see, but anxious to participate 
in, the coming battle. A few siege guns had been mounted 
on the low bluffs along the Chickahominy Valley, and they 
were now manned for use, in case our crossing at the 
Mechanicsville bridge was resisted. But hour after hour 
passed, and there came no sound of conflict from the direc¬ 
tion of Jackson’s advance. 

At 3 P.M., A. P. Hill, of his own motion, decided to 
wait for Jackson no longer. It is strange that he should 
have taken this responsibility without orders from Lee, 
who was within two miles, and who, it seems, would not 
have approved it. Henderson states that, “A message from 
Lee, ordering Hill to postpone all further movement, arrived 
too late.”* Doubtless Lee wished, now, to make a fresh 
start on the morrow, as Johnston had wished at Seven 
Pines. 

The enemy made slight resistance to Hill’s advance, 
and fell back through Mechanicsville to his works behind 
Beaver Dam Creek, opening the road to Longstreet’s and 
D. H. Hill’s divisions. A. P. Hill’s division moved so rap¬ 
idly that it arrived at Mechanicsville a mile and a half 
ahead of Branch’s brigade, No advantage was gained, 
however, by thus anticipating the coming up of Jackson. 

*Hend. II., 16. 


— 795 — 



Military Memoirs of a Confederate 

The enemy held, behind Beaver Dam Creek, an intrenched 
position quite impregnable to assault. 

It had not been intended to attack it with infantry, but 
to'threaten it with artillery,, while Jackson passed to the 
rear and cut off the enemy's retreat. 

Already Jackson, in spite of his slow march and the 
time wasted at Totopotomoy Creek, was within three miles 
of the enemy’s line of retreat and with no force opposing 
him, but a few cavalry. But here he stopped his march, 
which had only been about 13 miles that day, and went into 
bivouac regardless of the roar, not only of artillery, but, pres¬ 
ently, of musketry also, appealing to him from Mechanicsville. 
For with haste and poor judgment Davis, Lee, Longstreet, 
and the two Hills, not content to merely cannonade the 
enemy in his position, were beginning to wreck whole bri¬ 
gades of infantry, as must now be told. 

The position was one in which good troops could re- 
pplse treble their numbers if assailed in front, but it was 
easily turned. Jackson, three miles off to the northeast, 
was already in easy reach of Porter’s line of retreat, and 
had but to push his advance a mile or two, and Porter 
would have been compelled to retreat precipitately or be 
caught in a trap. 

On the 26th of June, in the latitude of Richmond, the 
sun rises at 4:38 A.M. and sets at 7:27 P.M., and twilight 
lasts until about 8:30 PM. There was no moon. As already 
told, Gen. Jackson arrived at Hundley’s Corner at 4:30 P.M. 
and went into bivouac there for the night, after having 
marched from Ashland about 11 miles off in an air line, and 
perhaps 12 to 14 by the roads traversed. 

At Mechanicsville the firing commenced at three o’clock, 
and rapidly grew heavy. It was at first a long-range duel 
with the Confederate siege-guns on the Chickahominy, and 
then with the field-batteries accompanying Confederate 
brigades as they came up. A. P. Hill’s five brigades of 
infantry were also put into action as soon as they could be 
formed, and advanced within range of the enemy’s in¬ 
trenched lines, when they opened fire both of artillery and 
infantry. Thus the battle was maintained until dark. Mean- 


— 796 — 


Seven Days' Campaign—The Attack 

while as the hours of daylight were closing, under urgent 
messages from Lee and President Davis, two regiments of 
Ripley’s brigade of D. H. Hill’s division were launched in 
a direct charge on perhaps the very strongest point of the 
whole Federal position. A more hopeless charge, was never 
entered upon. They were the 1st N. C. and the 44th Ga., 
raw regiments, which had never before been under fire. 
Their behaviour illustrated the morale inspiring the army. 
Had they been given anything to do which it was possible 
to do, they would have done it, and become seasoned vet¬ 
erans in their first battle. 

They dashed across a wide plain through a storm of 
musketry, shells, and canister, and some even went across 
Beaver Dam and into the entangled shashing close under 
the Federal lines. There they were killed until their bodies 
lay, as a Federal account described it, “as thick as flies in 
a bowl of sugar,” before the survivors realized the trap 
into which they had been sent, and got back as best they 
could. 

The 1st N. C. suffered 142 casualties, including all 
three field officers and the adjutant. The 44th Ga. lost 
335, including its Col. and Lt.-Col.—a regimental loss 
seldom equalled in so short a time. The total casualties 
of this battle were about 1350 and included 14 field officers. 
The Federals reported their loss as 361. 

Porter, in his report, says that only during the night, 
by reports from scouts and outposts, did the Federals be¬ 
come aware of the close proximity of Jackson’s force, and 
it was recognized at once that McClellan’s army was in a 
very critical condition. He writes: 

“But for the conception of the idea of a flank move¬ 
ment, changing our base by the left flank to the James 
River, our position would have left but one alternative—a 
hasty abandonment of our attack on Richmond, and a 
retirement by the way we had advanced.” 

This conception, as before told, had been developed 
two weeks before by Stuart’s raid, and it had not only been 
developed, but what was much more important, already 
transports had been loaded and many important prepara- 


— 797 — 


Military Memoirs of a Confederate 

tions for carrying it into execution had been made in 
advance. The matter was decided in McClellan's mind 
during that night, though no orders were issued. Porter's 
corps was ordered to withdraw to a strong position upon 
the north bank of the Chickahominy in close connection 
with the rest of his army. 

This position, about three miles in rear of Beaver Dam, 
had already been noted and selected by the Chief Engineer, 
Gen. Barnard. 

Porter, however, remained in his intrenched position 
until daylight, and then began to withdraw down the 
Chickahominy in good order, carrying with him guns of posi¬ 
tion which had been posted along the Chickahominy. The 
Confederate batteries reopened their fire at dawn, and, the 
Federal rear-guard replied heavily for over two hours. 
Had Jackson’s corps made an early start, and been pushed 
as Jackson was wont to push, before and after this Seven 
Days' spell, he would have struck Porter’s corps, on the 
flank as it marched toward Cold Harbor. But the advance 
was so late and slow that when at last, about eight o'clock, 
it appeared in rear of Porter's position, having marched 
about three miles, the last Federal soldier had withdrawn, 
and Jackson's artillery fired by mistake into the head of 
Hill’s advancing column. The trap was sprung, but the 
bird had flown. 

Gen. Gregg gives the following account: 

“Early in the morning of the 27th, I received orders from Gen. 
A. P. Hill, to take the advance with the 2d Brigade and to drive the 
enemy from their position on Beaver Dam Creek at Ellison’s Mill. 
The brigade advanced to the attack. Slight resistance was made 
here by the enemy, and the passage of the stream, which presented 
a strong natural obstacle, was gained. Many Confederate soldiers, 
wounded or killed, in a preceding unsuccessful assault, lay in the 
road toward the crossing of the creek, and had to be moved aside to 
allow the passage of our artillery. A small bridge, broken up by 
the enemy, had also to be repaired. This was toward eight o’clock 
in the morning. Crossing Beaver Dam Creek, the brigade advanced 
along the road among piles of knapsacks and other property, and 
burning stores abandoned by the enemy, with skirmishers—out to the 
front and left. Coming into the edge of an open field, Capt. Cor¬ 
dero’s company, 1st S. C. deployed as skirmishers, were fired on by 
artillery in front and Lt. Heise and a soldier were wounded. Capt. 
W. T. Haskell’s company of the same regiment, advancing in open 


— 798 — 


Seven Days’ Campaign—The Attack 

order, discovered that the forces meeting us in front from the left., 
were those of Maj.-Gen. Jackson, and entered into communication 
with them so as to avoid the risk of future mischiefs.” 

At last then, the morning half gone, the four Confeder¬ 
ate divisions were united and within three miles of the 
enemy. Porter had gone into the position selected behind 
Boatswains’ Creek, with three divisions of infantry, six 
regiments of cavalry, and 20 batteries, in all about 27,000 
men and 80 guns. The position was naturally strong, and it 
was being strengthened hourly with abattis and rifle-pits. 

Its development covered only about two miles of convex 
front. Its left flank rested on the open Chickahominy 
bottom, where heavy batteries from the south side secured 
it from being turned. Its right flank was its weak point, 
its protection there being only tangled thickets which also 
covered much of the front. Where this was lacking were 
generally three lines of infantry, partially under cover, and 
abundant artillery so placed that its fire was over the heads 
of the infantry. His force was enough to cover his front 
six deep. Two bridges gave connection to the south side, 
and over them, during the action, McClellan sent Slocum’s 
division (9,000) of Franklin’s corps with two batteries, and 
French’s and Meagher’s brigades of Sumner’s corps as re¬ 
inforcements—say about 14,000 men. Porter himself was, 
perhaps, the hardest opponent to fight in the Federal army. 
No one in it knew better how to occupy and prepare his 
ground for defense, or was more diligent to do it; and in 
his corps were concentrated all of the regular regiments of 
the old Federal army. 

To attack such a position was no easy proposition, and 
Lee’s force, checked and 1,300 weakened by the ill-advised 
affair at Mechanicsville, had no margin to spare over the size 
of its task. Indeed, had McClellan reenforced Porter as 
he should have done, with a whole corps, he might have won 
a great victory. But he allowed himself to be imposed upon 
by the demonstrations made by Magruder and Huger, under 
orders from Lee, and neither attacked with his left, nor 
strengthened his right sufficiently. He weakly left the ques¬ 
tion of sending reenforcements to his four corps com- 


Military Memoirs of a Confederate 


manders. Franklin sent Slocum’s division, and Sumner 
sent French’s and Meagher’s brigades, but Keyes and Heint- 
zelman reported that they could spare nothing. 

As it was, therefore, the fight should result in Lee’s 
favor by a reasonable margin, provided it was well-man¬ 
aged and its force not squandered in partial attacks. But 
this took place to an extent perilously near losing the battle. 
It did lose the precious hours of daylight necessary to gather 
any fruits of victory, and made the victory much more 
bloody than it need have been. The importance of time 
should have been appreciated and the march pushed to 
locate the enemy’s new position and develop it with strong 
skirmish-lines. Then, at the most favorable points, our 
utmost strength should have been marshalled and concen¬ 
trated for simultaneous assaults of; infantry, supported 
upon each flank by concentrations of batteries. It was but 
waste of time and blood to launch any small assault against 
that position, as had been done at Beaver Dam. 

The fact that we finally carried the position by a gen¬ 
eral charge, after the repulse of many partial ones, shows 
that our men were good enough and that we had enough of 
them to have made a success early in the afternoon, had our 
energies been first concentrated for the effort. 

During the morning of the 27th, the Confederates moved 
with a slowness only to be understood by remembering 
the inexperience in handling such large bodies, of many 
of our generals and staff officers. By noon, however, we 
had developed the enemy’s position. On our left Jackson 
was at Cold Harbor with four divisions, his own, Ewell’s, 
Whiting’s, D. H. Hill’s and Lawton’s large brigade in ad¬ 
dition. A. P. Hill, with Longstreet in reserve, confronted 
their left. 

Porter, in the Century, writes: 

“The advance column of these troops (Jackson’s) came a little 
earlier than those under Longstreet and A. P. Hill, but were more 
cautious, and, for some hours, not so aggressive.” 

What happened was this: D. H. Hill’s division, cross¬ 
ing the Chickahominy behind A. P. Hill, had been pushed 
out to the left by Lee’s battle order and brought up behind 


— 800 — 


Seven Days* Campaign—The Attack 

and in support of Jackson’s forces early on the 27th. But 
in the slow marching of the morning, D. H. Hill, with 
characteristic aggressiveness, had managed to pass Jack¬ 
son’s force and to take the lead. On approaching Cold 
Harbor and discovering the enemy’s position, Hill at once 
moved his division up to the edge of the swamp held by 
the enemy upon the other side, and opened upon them 
with a battery. His battery was quickly answered by 10 
guns, and after a brief action was withdrawn, crippled. Just 
at that juncture came orders from Jackson withdrawing 
Hill into some woods in rear, where the head of Jackson’s 
long column was already standing halted. In his official 
report, Jackson thus explains his object in this maneuver: 

“Soon after, Gen. A. P. Hill became engaged, and being un¬ 
acquainted with the ground, and apprehensive, from what appeared 
to me to be the respective positions of the Confederate and Federal 
forces engaged that, if I then pressed forward, our troops would be 
mistaken for the enemy and be fired into, and hoping that Gen. A. P. 
Hill and Longstreet would drive the Federals toward me, I directed 
Gen. D. H. Hill to move his division to the left of the road, so as to 
leave between him and the wood on the right of the road (from which 
he is withdrawing D. H. Hill), an open space across which I hoped 
the enemy would be driven. Thus arranged, it was in our power to 
distinguish friend from foe in case the enemy should be driven as 
expected.” 

It is not necessary to comment upon this too elaborate 
explanation of how more than a half of Lee’s army was 
paralyzed for three hours, just on the verge of battle, 
further than to say that the inaction, and the excuse for it, 
are both unlike anything ever seen in Jackson before or 
after these Seven Days. D. H. Hill was withdrawn about 
2 P.M. It was about 2:30 P.M. when A. P. Hill’s advance, 
pressed as rapidly as he was able to bring up his six bri¬ 
gades, developed into a battle. . 

Porter, in “Battles and Leaders,” further describes the 
fight made by this single division (about 12,000 men) which 
had had, only the evening before, sharp losses at Ellison’s 
Mill. 


“Soon after 2 P.M., A. P. Hill’s force, between us and New 
Cold Harbor, again began to show an aggressive disposition, inde¬ 
pendent of its own troops on its flanks, by advancing from under 
cover of the woods in lines well-formed and extending, as the contest 
progressed from in front of Martin’s battery to Morell’s left. 


— 801 — 


Military Memoirs of a Confederate 

“Dashing across the intervening plains, floundering in the 
swamps, and struggling against the tangled brushwood, brigade after 
brigade seemed to almost melt away before the concentrated fire of 
our artillery and infantry; yet the others pressed on, followed by 
supports as dashing and brave as their predecessors, despite their 
heavy losses and the disheartening effect of having to clamber over 
many of their disabled and dead, and to meet their surviving com¬ 
rades rushing in great disorder from the deadly contest. For nearly 
two hours the battle raged, extending more or less along the whole 
line to our extreme right. 

“The fierce firing of artillery and infantry, the crash of the shot, 
the bursting of shells, and the whizzing of bullets, heard above the 
roar of artillery and volleys of musketry, all combined, was some¬ 
thing fearful. 

“Regiments quickly replenished their exhausted ammunition 
by borrowing from more bountifully supplied and generous com¬ 
panions; some withdrew temporarily for ammunition, and fresh regi¬ 
ments took their places, ready to repulse, sometimes to pursue, their 
desperate enemy, for the purpose of retaking ground from which we 
had been pressed, and which it was necessary to occupy in order to 
hold our position.” 

It is to make one almost sick of regret to read of such 
desperate valor so lavishly wasted upon an impossible effort, 
while three times as many men stood by and looked on. A. 
P. Hill’s account of it in his official report is as follows: 

“The incessant roar of musketry and deep thunder of artillery 
told that the whole force of the enemy was in my front. Branch be¬ 
coming hard pressed, Pender was sent in to his relief. Field and 
Archer were also directed to do their part in this murderous contest. 
Braxton’s battery, accompanying Archer, had already opened. They 
were ordered to turn the enemy’s left. These two brigades under their 
heroic leaders, moving across the open-field, met the enemy behind 
an abatis and strong intrenchments at the base of a long wooded hill, 
the enemy being in three lines on the side of this declivity, its crest 
falling off into a plateau, and this plateau studded with guns. 

“My front now presented a curved line, its convexity toward the 
enemy. Desperate but unavailing attempts were made to force the 
enemy’s positions. The 14th S. C., Col. McGowan (having hurried 
up from picket duty on the other side of the Chickahominy and arriv¬ 
ing in the thickest of the fight) on the extreme left, made several 
daring charges. The 16th N. C., Col. McElroy, and 22nd Lt.-Col. 
Gray, at one time carried the crest of the hill, and were in the enemy’s 
camp, but were driven back by overwhelming numbers. The 35th 
Ga., Col. Thomas, also drove through the enemy’s line like a wedge, 
but it was all of no avail. Gregg and Branch fought with varying 
success, Gregg having before him the vaunted Zouaves and Sykes’s 
regulars. Pender’s brigade was suffering heavily, but stubbornly 
held its own. Field and Archer met a withering storm of bullets, but 
pressed on to within a short distance of the enemy’s works, but the 
storm was too fierce for such a handful of men. They recoiled and 
were again pressed to the charge, but with no better success. These 
brave men had done all that any soldiers could do. Directing their 
men to lie down, the fight was continued and help awaited. From 
having been the attacking, I now became the attacked, but stubbornly, 
gallantly, was the ground held. My division was thus engaged fully 


— 802 — 


Seven Days’ Campaign—The Attack 

two hours before assistance was received. We failed to carry the 
enemy’s lines, but we payed the way for the successful attacks after¬ 
ward, in which attacks it was necessary to employ the whole of our 
army on that side of the Chickahominy. 

“About four o’clock reenforcements came up on my right from 
Gen. Longstreet, and later, Jackson’s men on my right and center and 
my division was relieved of the weight of the contest. It was then 
continued on more equal terms, and finally the extreme left of the 
enemy’s line was most gallantly carried by Hood’s brigade. 

“At seven o’clock the General-in-chief, in person, gave me an 
order to advance my whole line and to communicate this order as far 
as I could to all commanders of troops. This was done and a general 
advance being made, the enemy were swept from the field and the 
pursuit only stopped by nightfall, and the exhaustion of our troops. 
The batteries of Crenshaw, Johnson, Braxton, and Pegram were ac¬ 
tively engaged, Crenshaw and Johnson pretty well knocked to pieces. 
Pegram, with indomitable energy and earnestness of purpose, though 
having lost 47 men and many horses, at Mechanicsville, had put his 
battery in condition for this fight also.” 

Lee’s official report of this battle was not written until 
eight months afterward, during which period Jackson’s 
great military genius had manifested itself undimmed by 
any spell; and with increasing brilliancy on the fields of 
Cedar Mountain, Second Manassas, Harper’s Ferry, Sharps- 
burg, and Fredericksburg. There was, most wisely and 
properly, every disposition to ignore and forget the disap¬ 
pointments felt during the Seven Days, and the facts are 
glossed over with but brief and, as it were, casual mention, 
but they are plainly apparent. 

Lee by no means designed that A. P. Hill should alone 
engage the whole of Porter’s force. He had had a personal 
interview with Jackson during the morning, and he knew 
that the head of his column was at Cold Harbor before 2 P. M. 
He expected it to immediately envelop and to turn Porter’s 
right. He says that Hill— 

“Immediately formed his line nearly parallel to the road toward 
McGehee’s house, and soon became hotly engaged. The arrival of 
Jackson'on our left was momentarily expected, and it was supposed 
that his approach would cause the extension of the enemy’s line in 
that direction. Under this impression Longstreet was held back until 
this moment should commence.” 

Hill went into action anticipating that Jackson’s whole 
force would almost immediately be demonstrating or at¬ 
tacking upon the enemy’s right flank. Why were they not? 
The head of the column was up, but it was hidden from the 


— 803 — 


Military Memoirs of a Confederate 

enemy’s view in the woods, and its whole length, stretching 
for miles back, was simply standing idle in the road. Had 
the divisions even been closed up and disentangled from 
ordance wagons, artillery, and ambulances, and massed near 
Cold Harbor, the time would not have been entirely wasted, 
but this was not done. Stern necessity at length, forced 
Lee to call upon Longstreet’s division to aid Hill (A. P.). 
Three brigades were advanced within musket range as sup¬ 
ports, but held back from the charge while the remaining 
three were held near at hand and ready for action. At 
length, probably about 4:30, aroused to action both by the 
receding sounds of A. P. Hill’s battle, and by urgent mes¬ 
sages from Lee, Jackson sent D. H. Hill’s division back into 
the wood from which he had withdrawn it before two 
o’clock. He also sent a staff-officer to his other divisions 
with instructions, quoted by Henderson, as follows: 

“The troops are standing at ease along our line of march. Ride 
back rapidly along the line, and tell the commanders to advance 
instantly in echelon from the left. Each brigade is to follow as a 
guide, the right regiment of the brigade on the left, and to keep within 
supporting distance. Tell the commanders if this formation falls at 
any point, to form line of battle and move to the front, pressing to 
the sound of the heaviest firing, and attack the enemy vigorously 
wherever found. As to artillery, each commander must use his dis¬ 
cretion. If the ground will at all permit, tell them to take in their 
field batteries and use them. If not, post them in the rear.” 

That the troops were still standing halted along the 
line of march appears in the official reports, as well as in the 
time consumed before they were able to make their power 
felt in the battle. This required from one to two hours. 

Winder, commanding Jackson’s division, reports: 

“Left bivouac near Totopotomoy Creek at about 5 A. M., being 
in the rear of the column, except one brigade. The march was slow 
and tedious (about seven miles during the whole day). Firing was 
heard on the right. Between 4 and 5 P. M., I received orders from 
Gen. Ewell to move the brigade from the column filing to the right 
through a wood and swamp, to the point where I heard the heaviest 
fire.” 


Lawton’s official report says: 

“In the order of march toward the battle-field on that day my 
brigade brought up the rear of Gen. Jackson’s army, and was, there¬ 
fore, the last to engage the enemy. I had remained at a halt for 
several hours, more than two miles from the point where the brigade 


— 804 — 


Seven Days’ Campaign—The Attack 

afterwards entered the field, and was not ordered forward until nesfr- 
ly 5 P. M. I then marched rapidly on, retarded much by the artillery 
and ambulances which blocked up the narrow road.” 

While Jackson's troops were being brought up, the noise 
of battle waned, until an ominous silence seemed to possess 
the field as the sun drew near the horizon. Then the storm 
arose again and soon swelled to a magnitude never before 
heard on this continent. 

It was about 7 o'clock when at last D. H. Hill, Ewell, 
Lawton and a part of Winder were all hotly engaged in the 
swampy tangle in front of the Federal right, and, though 
in great confusion, were making headway through it, and 
several Confederate batteries were returning the Federal 
fire. Opposite their left, Whiting’s two brigades had just 
arrived, being directed by Lee as they approached from 
Cold Harbor, and two of Winder’s brigades were also close 
at hand. A. P. Hill’s brigades, though much diminished, were 
still holding their lines, and Longstreet was all in position. 

It was, practically, anybody’s fight. A fresh division to 
Porter would have easily held his lines until night. It might 
even have enabled him to make an effective counterstroke, 
though the natural obstacles behind which his lines were 
located, offered but one or two possible opportunities. Two 
fresh brigades, French’s and Meagher’s were enroute to 
him, but were yet too far off to lend any aid. 

But Lee, at last, was putting forth his whole strength. 
He issued orders for an advance of every command, re¬ 
gardless of the troops upon its right or left. A general ad¬ 
vance was made, not simultaneous in its beginnings, but 
pressed to success by Whiting’s two brigades supported by 
Longstreet’s on our extreme right, by Lawton’s and Winder’s 
brigades in the centre, and by D. H. Hill with Garland’s and 7 
parts of Ripley’s and Rodes’s brigades upon our left. 

Had it been made two hours earlier, the fruits of the 
victory would have been important. As it was, they were so 
trifling as scarcely to be worth mention. Porter fell back 
in fairly good order under cover of his superior artillery, 
and our artillery could not be gotten forward across the 
swamps. Blessed night, for which the defeated pray, had 


— 805 - 


Military Memoirs of a Confederate 

lei? down her mantle while the firing was still severe, and 
before we could even feel fully assured of our victory. 
Under its friendly cover, and the protection of the French 
and Meagher brigades, by 4 A. M. the whole Federal army 
had crossed the Chickahominy, damaging the bridges be¬ 
hind them, and leaving us, as the fruits of victory, but 22 
guns, 2836 prisoners, and about 10,000 small-arms. 

The Federal casualties were reported as: killed 894, 
wounded 3107, missing 2836, total 6837: 

The Confederate casualties cannot be exactly divided, 
but I estimate the total losses of the different divisions for 
this battle, as follows: 

A. P. Hill’s division,_6 brigades, 2688 

Longstreet’s division,_6 brigades, 1883 (Only 5 engaged) 

D. H. Hill’s division,_5 brigades, 1423 

Whiting’s division,_2 brigades, 1017 

Ewell’s division,_3 brigades, 764 

Jackson’s division,_3 brigades, 91 (Only 1 engaged) 

Lawton’s division,_1 brigades, 492 

26 8358 

The heavy character of much of the fighting is shown by 
some of the regimental losses, although in many instances 
the reports give only the total casualties for the Seven Days, 
and do not distinguish between the battles. The charge by 
Whiting’s two brigades, under Hood and Law, was notable 
for being driven home on the first effort, without halting to 
open fire. The 4th Tex., the first regiment to enter the ene¬ 
my’s works, lost 44 killed and 203 wounded. There was no 
thicket or obstruction to seriously check the advance at this 
portion of the field, and part of the ground traversed was 
exposed to but little artillery fire. 

Trimble, of Ewell’s division, made the following obser¬ 
vations in his official report: 

“The subjoined list of killed and wounded best shows the severity 
of the conflict, and a comparison of those of different regiments fairly 
illustrates the superiority of a rapid charge over a standing fight, not 
only as the best mode of securing victories, but doing it with smaller 
loss. The 15th Ala. and 21st Ga., numbering 1315 men stood, under 
a destructive fire for an hour or more, returning the enemy’s volleys 
all the time, and advanced half a mile, with only fragments of com¬ 
panies at the close of the day. Their loss in killed and wounded was 
251 men. The 16th Miss., and 21st N. C., numbering 1244 men, passed 
under as hot a fire an equal distance in 15 minutes, losing in killed 
and wounded 85 men.” 


— 806 — 






Seven Days’ Campaign—The Attack 

Briefly, it may be said that it seems to have been left in 
the hands of the division commanders until it was nearly 
lost. Only at the last moment was the hand of the general 
in command revealed. But had Jackson’s march that morn¬ 
ing been pushed with the fierce swiftness natural to him on 
such occasions, and had he, during A. P. Hill’s attack, thrown 
his whole force upon McClellan’s right, a comparatively easy 
victory would have resulted. As has been stated, the ene¬ 
my’s right flank was his weakest point. It was not found. 
D. H. Hill would have attacked it even before A. P. Hill’s 
battle, had not Jackson stopped and withdrawn him, instead 
of reenforcing and pushing him, as it was naturally expected 
that Jackson would do—although no man ever needed push¬ 
ing less than D. H. Hill. In the Century War Book, he wrote 
of this occasion: 

“Had Jackson’s command gone in on the left of the road running 
by the McGehee House, Porter’s position would have been turned and 
the line of retreat cut off.” 


— 807 — 


Seven Days’ Campaign The Pursuit 

June 28—June 29—Magruder’s Report—Jackson’s Report—Lee’s Re¬ 
port—Lee to Magruder—Savage Station—June 20—Waiting in 
Vain for the Signal—Holme’s Division—Huger’s Division— 
Wright Meets Jackson—Huger’s Report—Jackson, June 29—Lee 
to Magruder—Jackson, June 30—White Oak Swamp—Franklin’s 
Report—Jackson’s Account—The Cannonade—Munford’s Letter 
—Hampton’s Crossing—Franklin’s Comments—D. H. Hill’s Ex¬ 
planation—Battle of Frazier Farm—Bayonet Fighting—A Suc¬ 
cessful Ruse—Lee’s Report. 

The day after the battle, Saturday, the 28th, was given 
to the care of the wounded, the burial of the dead, and the 
collection of the scattered troops. During the night Mc¬ 
Clellan had begun his retreat to the James, ordering Keyes, 
with the 4th Corps, to cross White Oak Swamp and take 
position to cover the passage of his trains, which were put 
in motion early on the 28th. On the 28th, also, the troops 
which had fought under Porter on the 27th were sent for¬ 
ward across White Oak Swanp. 

On the Confederate side it was not yet clear what the 
enemy would do. Ewell’s and Jackson’s divisions had not 
been seriously engaged, and Ewell’s was sent down the 
Chickahominy about seven miles to Despatch Station, to see 
if they showed any disposition to cross the stream and re¬ 
treat down the Peninsula. Stuart’s cavalry followed the 
railroad toward White House. Bottom’s bridge was found 
burned, and the next morning, White House was also burned 
and evacuated. On Sunday morning, the 29th, the enemy’s 
intrenchments opposite Magruder and Huger were found 
abandoned, and his camps and depots were being burned. It 
was then apparent that his destination was the James River, 
and Lee, no longer hesitating, issued orders to his whole 
army for a vigorous pursuit. His best chance, that of de¬ 
stroying Porter’s corps, had been lost; but his adversary was 
on foot in the woods, encumbered with enormous trains 
which he would try to defend, and there should be oppor¬ 
tunities to overwhelm him in detail, and unprotected by 
breastworks. 

Magruder, immediately behind the enemy on the Wil¬ 
liamsburg road, was ordered to pursue down that road. 


— 808 — 


Seven Days' Campaign—The Pursuit 

Huger, on the Charles City road, was ordered down that 
road. From the battlefield of the 27th, A. P. Hill and Long- 
street were ordered to cross the Chickahominy at New 
Bridge, and passing in rear of Magruder and Huger to 
move by the Darbytown, the next road to the right. Ewell 
from Despatch Station was to rejoin Jackson. Jackson, 
with the largest force, was directed to pursue by the shortest 
and most direct route. He was to cross the Chickahominy 
over the Grapevine bridge, across which Porter had retreat¬ 
ed, and which he had partially torn up, and to press directly 
upon McClellan's rear with his whole force. This comprised 
his own three brigades under Winder, Ewell's three, D. H. 
Hill’s five, Whiting’s two, and Lawton’s one—in all 14 bri¬ 
gades, nearly 25,000 strong. 

Looking back upon the course of events, it is interesting 
to inquire wherein lay the weakness of this order, apparent¬ 
ly so simple and obvious in its execution. Yet the pursuit, 
from this moment, was bootless and a failure. It did cap¬ 
ture a few guns and prisoners, but it paid for them in blood 
a price far beyond their value. There were two ways in 
which Lee might have pursued. One is that just set forth. 
The recommendation of that method is that it seemed to 
reach the enemy with his largest forces by the shortest roads. 
But, per contra, is the consideration that on the shortest 
roads will be found the enemy’s most formidable rear-guards 
and obstructions. With energetic lieutenants these may be 
overcome; but the chance exists whether the proper leaders 
will be at the right places. The alternate course would have 
been to leave the direct pursuit over the obstructed roads, 
and against the enemy’s rear-guards, to but two divisions,— 
those of Magruder and Huger,—while Lee himself with 
Jackson, Longstreet, and A. P. Hill moving swiftly around 
the rear by good roads, and reenforced by Holmes, put the 
bulk of his army, flushed with its recent victory, directly 
across McClellan’s path near Malvern Hill. 

Not only would it count for a great deal that all the divi¬ 
sions should be under the personal eye of the commander, 
but there was strong probability that Lee might be able to 
force upon McClellan the disadvantage of having to take the 


— 809 — 


Military Memoirs of a Confederate 


offensive. On this occasion, as it turned out, Jackson was 
still under his “spell,” and did nothing. Lee, having gone 
with Longstreet and A. P. Hill, lost touch of all three,— 
Jackson, Magruder and Huger,—and entirley failed to get 
any service from them for the two critical days, the 29th 
and 30th. 

The orders for the pursuit were given soon after sun¬ 
rise on Sunday, the 29th. Magruder had not entirely ab¬ 
sorbed Lee’s confidence that McClellan did not have in him 
the risking of a counterstroke. He knew that there were on 
the south side fully 60,000 Federals, and that between them 
and Richmond there were not but 25,000 Confederates. His 
official report thus describes the. situation: 

‘‘I received repeated instructions during Saturday night from Gen. 
Lee’s headquarters enjoining upon my command the utmost vigilance, 
directing the men to sleep on their arms, and to be prepared for what¬ 
ever might occur. These orders were promptly communicated by me 
to the different commanders of my forces, and were also transmitted 
to Gen. Huger on my right. I passed the night without sleep and in 
superintendence of their execution. Had McClellan massed his whole 
force in column and advanced against any point in our line * * * * 
though the head of his column would have suffered greatly, its mo¬ 
mentum would have insured him success. His failure to do so is the 
best evidence that our wise commander fully understood the character 
of his opponent. 

“Our relief was therefore great when intelligence reached us al¬ 
most simultaneously from Col. Chilton, and one of my staff, that the 
enemy, whose presence had been ascertained, as late as 3:30 A. M., 
had evacuated his works and was retreating. 

“Col. Chilton, who rode into my camp on Sunday morning, hurried 
off to see Gen. Lee on the Nine Mile road, and I gave, while riding 
with him, the necessary orders to put in motion my whole command, 
which extended over a distance of some miles, directing Gen. Griffith’s * 
brigade, which was nearest to the road, to advance at once from the 
centre, and ordering Gen. Jones’s division, in advancing, to incline 
toward Fair Oaks Station, as I had been informed that Maj.-Gen. 
Jackson had crossed, or was crossing, the Grapevine bridge, and would 
operate down the Chickahominy. Having overtaken Gen. Lee, we 
rode together down the Nine Mile road, and the general informed me 
of the plans which he had adopted for the pursuit of the enemy. 
They were as follows: Longstreet’s division was to have crossed the 
New Bridge and to take position on our extreme right, so as to inter¬ 
cept the enemy in his attempt to reach James river; Huger’s division 
to march down the Williamsburg road on my right flank, and Maj.- 
Gen. Jackson’s division, which he stated had crossed or was crossing 
the Grapevine bridge, over the Chickahominy, was to operate down 
that river on its right bank, while my own command would press him 
vigorously in front. 

“At Fair Oaks Station * * * Gen. Lee, having repeated his in¬ 
structions, left the ground. * * * 


— 810 — 


Seven Days* Campaign—The Pursuit 

“I also despatched a staff-officer toward Grapevine Bridge, some 
three miles off, to ascertain the position of Maj.-Gen. Jackson’s troops, 
which I had supposed from the statements above given had already 
crossed * * * In the meantime, Maj. Bryan, the staff-officer who had 
been sent by Maj.-Gen. Jackson, returned with his (Jackson’s) engi¬ 
neer, Lt. Boswell, who reported that Maj.-Gen. Jackson was compelled 
to rebuild the bridge, which would be completed in about two hours. 
Maj. Bryan reported that Maj.-Gen. Jackson had crossed but a small 
portion of his infantry, not more than three companies, over the brok¬ 
en bridge.” 

It is plain from this narrative that Lee’s orders to Jack- 
son to pursue by the Grapevine bridge road, above referred 
to, contemplated immediate performance on Jackson’s part, 
and were given at an early hour on Sunday, the 29th. The 
name Grapevine, applied to this bridge, was taken from a 
ford of the Chickahominy well known in the neighborhood, 
and reached by a country road which crossed the swamp 
by the ford. In building a bridge the Federals utilized the 
road, and built the bridge near it, but without disturbing the 
ford, which was practicable at this time, the river being 
low, even while waiting to repair the bridge. 

Meanwhile, too, New Bridge and another bridge, three- 
quarters of a mile above it, were opened by Lee’s order on 
Saturday, the 28th. The extra distance, which would have 
been involved in marching from the battlefield to Savage 
Station by the New Bridge instead of by the Grapevine route, 
was only about three miles. But this was Sunday, and Jack- 
son gave it strict observance. The greater part of his troops 
remained in camp all day and until after midnight Sunday 
night. Then they made a start at, or before 2:30 A. M. His 
official report entirely ignores the receipt of any orders from 
Gen. Lee, but says: 

“The 28th and 29th were occupied in disposing of the dead and 
wounded and repairing Grapevine bridge over the Chickahominy, 
which McClellan’s forces had used in their retreat and destroyed in 
their rear. During the night of the 29th we commenced crossing the 
Chickahominy, and on the following morning arrived at Savage 
Station.” 

Lee in his official report, written as told, eight months 
later, accepts the excuse of Grapevine Bridge, as follows: 

“Jackson’s route led to the flank and rear of Savage Station, but 
he was delayed by the necessity of reconstructing Grapevine bridge. 
Late in the afternoon, Magruder attacked the enemy with one of his 


— 811 — 


Military Memoirs of a Confederate 

three divisions (two brigades each), and two regiments of another. 
A severe action ensued, and continued about two hours, when it was 
terminated' by night. The troops displayed great gallantry, and in¬ 
flicted heavy loss upon the enemy; but, owing to the lateness of the 
hour and the small force employed, the result was not decisive, 
and the enemy continued his retreat under cover of darkness, leaving 
several hundred prisoners with his dead and wounded, in our hands.” 

This was the insignificant outcome of the day, and in his 
reference to Jackson’s delay and to the lateness of the hour 
and the small force engaged, one may easily read that he 
had hoped to have had a very different story. 

After giving Magruder his orders, but unfortunately 
without waiting to see that Jackson failed to arrive, Lee had 
gone over to the Charles City road, where Huger was ad¬ 
vancing, and thence he passed on to the Darbytown road to 
join A. P. Hill and Longstreet. Soon after being left alone, 
finding that Jackson was not near, Magruder became alarm¬ 
ed at a demonstration of the enemy’s rear-guard, and sent 
such urgent calls for aid to Huger that the latter halted two 
of his four brigades, and marched back with them to Seven 
Pines. This lost for his division the cream of the day. Here 
he discovered the needlessness of Magruder’s alarm, and, 
getting urgent messages from Lee, he returned to the 
Charles City road, marched down it until he found the ene¬ 
my’s pickets late in the afternoon, and went into bivouac. 

Lee was much disappointed that evening at the lack of 
results, and wrote Magruder the following note:* 

“General, I regret much that you have made so little progress 
today in the pursuit of the enemy. In order to reap the fruits of our 
victory the pursuit should be most vigorous. I must urge then again 
to press on his rear, rapidly and steadily. We must lose no more time 
or he will escape us entirely.” 

This note had also a postscript which will be quoted 
presently in another connection. 

Magruder had only brought into action two brigades, 
Kershaw’s and Semmes’s, and a half of Barksdale’s. The 
force engaged against him had been Sumner’s corps, and 
Smith’s division of Franklin’s. Heintzelman’s corps had 
also been present in the morning, but in the afternoon it had 
crossed White Oak Swamp at Brackett’s ford. The remain- 


*0. R. 13, 687. 


— 812 — 



Seven Days' Campaign—The Pursuit 

ing nine Federal brigades were, doubtless, too heavy a task 
for Magruder with only six but had Jackson with his 14 
brigades been present in the morning, the enemy should 
have been routed. Doubtless Magruder should have em¬ 
ployed twice the force he did engage, and taken chances. His 
two and a half brigades were overmatched, though they 
fought until dark, losing over 400 men and capturing pris¬ 
oners from each of the three divisions opposed to them. They 
reported next morning 400 dead left by the enemy on the 
field, but such reports are always overestimated. 

Jackson arrived in person at Magruder’s headquarters 
near Savage Station at 3:30 A. M. on Monday, the 30th, and 
informed Magruder that his troops would be up soon after 
daylight. 

During the night, the entire Federal force had crossed 
the White Oak.Swamp and McClellan had accomplished one- 
half his retreat safely. He had had only about 16 miles to. 
traverse, and his trains were now upon the last half of it, 
with his army well concentrated to protect his flank. With 
one more day his column would be so shortened that no ex¬ 
posed flank would be left, and his whole army could be united 
in the rear of the train. 

This was therefore, the critical day. Serious blows had 
threatened the Federals on the 26th at Beaver Dam, on the 
27th at Gaines Mill, and on the 29th at Savage Station; but 
all had been escaped by bad handling on the part of the Con¬ 
federates. Now a final opportunity was oifered to repair all 
shortcomings, and every condition seemed favorable. 
Holmes’s division, 6000 strong, with six batteries, had been 
brought from south of the James River, and was at New 
Market at 10 A. M. on the 30th. Longstreet with his own 
and A. P. Hill’s divisions, had bivouacked on the Darbytown 
road, the night before, and this morning they moved into 
the Long Bridge road, and soon found the enemy’s line cov¬ 
ering Charles City cross-roads at Frazier’s Farm or Glen¬ 
dale, and extending down the Quaker road toward Malvern 
Hill. These three divisions, 14 brigades, numbered about 
23,000 men. 


- 813 - 


Military Memoirs of a Confederate 

In addition to these, Lee, early on the 30th, had with¬ 
drawn Magruder’s six brigades, now about 12,000 strong, 
from Savage Station, and brought them down the Darby- 
town road within striking distance by 2 p.m. and had halted 
them at that hour near Timberlake’s store. 

Huger’s four brigades, about 9000 men, were advancing 
down the Charles City road, and were expected to open the 
action on this part of the field at an early hour. Either his 
guns or Jackson’s would be the signal for Longstreet and A. 
P. Hill to take up the battle. 

Meanwhile, Jackson, only four miles off in an air line, 
but all of 15 miles by the public roads,—the only ones gen¬ 
erally well-known—was confidently expected to make up 
for his'non-appearance of the day before by an early and 
very vigorous one this morning, assaulting the enemy’s rear¬ 
guard with his 14 brigades, 25,000 strong, and emulating 
the reputation he had made in the Valley. Thus, with 44,- 
000 men, all close at hand upon the enemy’s flank, and Stone¬ 
wall Jackson with 25,000 in his rear, fortune seemed at 
last about to smile broadly for once upon the Confederate 
cause. Unknown to us, another circumstance was rarely in 
our favor. The Federal army was temporarily without a 
head. On the 29th, 30th, and July 1, McClellan, on each day, 
left his army without placing any one in command during 
his absence, while he did engineer’s duty, examining the lo¬ 
calities toward which he was marching. Had the Confeder¬ 
ates accomplished their reasonable expectations, the criti¬ 
cism of McClellan would have been very severe. 

On the Confederate side, Lee, with Longstreet, and 
Hill, in a field of broom-grass and small pines, waited im¬ 
patiently for the signal. 

He was so close in rear of his line of battle that men and 
horses among the couriers and staff were wounded by ran¬ 
dom shots. For quite a time, too, President Davis and his 
staff were present, in conference with the generals, while 
missiles grew more frequent and wounded men begun to 
come in from the front. 

For hours we stood there waiting—waiting for some¬ 
thing which never happened. Every minute that we waited 


— 814 — 


Seven Days' Campaign—The Pursuit 

was priceless time thrown away. Twelve o'clock came and 
the previous day was half gone. One o'clock, two o'clock, 
three o’clock followed. Even four o'clock drew near, and 
now, whatever was started, would be cut short by night. 
Our great opportunity was practically over, and we had not 
yet pulled a trigger. We had waited for either Huger or 
Jackson or both to begin, and neither had begun. As Beaure¬ 
gard, at Bull Run, had sent word to Ewell to begin, and then 
had gone to the center and waited; as Johnston, at Seven 
Pines had given orders to Hill and Longstreet about begin¬ 
ning, and then gone to the left and waited; so now, Lee, hav¬ 
ing given orders beforehand to both Jackson and Huger, had 
passed on to the right and was waiting; and in every case 
the opportunity passed unimproved. 

Briefly, this is what had happened, beginning with the 
extreme right column under Holmes, which, with Magru- 
der’s column, was to support Longstreet's right: 

The river road from New Market to Harrison's Landing 
passed under and around Malvern Heights, between them 
and the river. From a point on this road, perhaps a mile and 
a half from the river, across low, flat ground, one could see 
a considerable expanse of the Malvern Heights, 1000 yards 
off across the meadows on the left; and over these heights 
were passing many of the 5000 wagons composing McClel¬ 
lan's. trains. No target is more attractive to an artillerist 
than his enemy’s wagon train, and six rifled guns of Holmes’s 
were sent down in the meadows to fire upon these wagons. 
Lee also saw the position, and approved the attack, and di¬ 
rected Holmes to bring up his whole division to support 
the guns. But no sooner did the six guns open than they 
were replied to by 30 of the heaviest rifles of the Federal 
Artillery Reserve, which, escorted by only about 1500 infan¬ 
try Fitz John Porter, had just arrived on Malvern Heights to 
occupy the position. The fierce fire of this great battery 
was quickly aided by the fire of heavy guns from the gun¬ 
boats in the James—lying in Turkey Bend, and directing 
their fire by wigwag signals between their mastheads—and 
the Federals on the Heights. The six guns were quickly 
wrecked. Two caissons were exploded, and so many horses 


- 815 - 


Military Memoirs of a Confederate 

killed that the guns were with difficulty withdrawn. No fire 
is so appalling to unseasoned troops as that of heavy artillery 
received in a thick wood where every shot cuts limbs and 
smashes trees around them, even though the actual damage 
from it may be trifling. Holmes’s whole division concealed 
in the woods in the vicinity of the six guns engaged was now 
exposed to such a fire, converging from opposite quarters. 
There was but one thing to do, and that was to get away. 
Some commands, especially among the infantry behaved 
well, and withdrew in perfect order; some were thrown into 
confusion, and among some cavalry commands and light ar¬ 
tillery stampede took place. Two guns which had not been 
engaged were entangled in the woods and abandoned, and 
many men were run over and injured. Altogether the con¬ 
fusion was so great that Lee directed Magruder’s six bri¬ 
gades to march to Holmes’s support, though they could have 
done no good, as there was nothing for them to attack or 
defend. 

Thus, Holmes and Magruder, 18,000 men, were diverted 
from the real work of the day. This was just about to 
begin when this side issue of the cannonade of Malvern Hill 
was ventured upon. The total casualties in Holmes’s ‘divi¬ 
sion (including 15 wounded among the six guns) were two 
killed and 40 wounded, besides some injured in the stampede. 

Let us next turn to Huger’s division. On Sunday, the 
29th, the division made but a very short distance down the 
Charles City road for two reasons. Two of its brigades 
were called back, and had some miles of extra marching 
and countermarching in the hot sun by Magruder’s false 
alarm when he found that he was not supported by the 
proximity of Jackson, as has been already told. 

The other two brigades thought it imprudent to pass 
any road on their left leading across White Oak Swamp, un¬ 
til it had been reconnoitefed as it was known that a large 
force of the enemy was still on the other side. 

At the first of these crossroads, a force of the enemy 
was discovered attempting to cross to the south side. It was 
driven back and the resulting skirmish consumed the day. 


— 816 — 


Seven Days’ Campaign—The Pursuit 

It seems strange that Lee, though at no great distance 
on the next day (the 30th) should have still failed to see 
Huger, and either to bring him to the battle, which was wait¬ 
ing for his arrival, or to order it to proceed without him. 
But there is no intimation in the reports of any communica¬ 
tion ; nor, in Huger’s proceedings, of any consciousness that 
important action was waiting upon him. 

At another swamp crossing, called Fisher’s, Huger’s 
column, Monday morning, discovered that the enemy’s 
forces on the opposite side had been withdrawn. Wright’s 
brigade was then ordered to investigate. He crossed the 
swamp with his brigade and got into the deserted camps of 
the enemy on the north side, picking up a few prisoners and 
finding some abandoned stores. 

By 2:30 P. M. he had made his way entirely across to the 
main road where Jackson, as is yet to be told, with his 14 
brigades was standing at bay at the main crossing, called 
the White Oak Bridge. Jackson seems to have taken no special 
interest in Wright’s arrival, though it proved that at least one 
unobstructed crossing of the swamp was within three miles. 
Jackson ordered Wright to return along the edge of the 
swamp, to look for crossings as he went, and if he found 
one, to try and force it; but he sent neither staff-officer to 
bring back a report, or reenforcements to aid if any favor¬ 
able point should be found. Apparently, he was satisfied to 
remain where he was and to do only what he was doing— 
nothing. Wright started back, and at one and a half miles 
came to Brackett’s Ford, a well-known road, across which 
a large part of the Federal forces had crossed during the 
night, and which they had then obstructed by cutting down 
trees and destroying a small bridge. Pushing two com¬ 
panies of skirmishers through the swamp, Wright captured 
the enemy’s picket force on the south side, but saw, beyond 
the picket, a force of the enemy, with artillery, too strong 
for his brigade, so he withdrew. Continuing his march 
along the edge of the swamp another mile and a half, he 
found a cow trail which led him across it about three- 
fourths of a mile below his crossing of the morning, and 
here he encamped. The occupation of Huger’s other bri- 


— 817 — 


Military Memoirs of a Confederate 

gades, during the day is given as follows in his official re¬ 
port: 

“The troops bivouacked in their position while it was 
dark, and resumed the march at daylight (Monday, June 
30). Mahone advanced cautiously, captured many prison¬ 
ers, and killed some cavalry scouts, one bearing an order to 
Kearny to retire and keep a strong battery of artillery with 
his rear-guard. After passing Fisher’s house, we found 
the road obstructed by trees felled all across it. Gen. Ma¬ 
hone, found it best to cut a road around the obstructions. 
For such work we were deficient in tools. The column was 
delayed while the work was going on, and it was evening 
before we got through and drove off the workmen who were 
still cutting down other trees. As we advanced through 
the woods and came to an open field on high ground (P. 
Williams on map), a powerful battery of rifled guns opened 
on us. Gen. Mahone disposed his troops and advanced a 
battery of artillery, Moorman’s, and a sharp artillery fire 
was kept up for some time. The enemy’s fire was very se¬ 
vere and we had many men killed and wounded. List of 
casualties sent herewith (25 killed, 53 wounded, total 78). 
I went to the front and examined the position. I withdrew 
most of our guns, and only kept up a moderate fire. On our 
left the White Oak Swamp approached very near. The right 
appeared to be good ground, and I determined to turn the 
battery by moving a column of infantry to my right. It 
was now dark.” 

It seems incredible that this division, within four miles 
-of Lee could have been allowed to spend the whole day in 
a mere contest of axemen, wherein the Federals with the 
most axes, had only to cut them down, and the Confederates, 
with the fewest, to cut up and remove. The result could 
scarcely have been doubtful. Our army at this time com¬ 
pared with an organized and disciplined army about as a 
confederacy would compare with a nation. Each division 
was an allied but independent command, rather than a part 
of a single army. 

This will be even more evident in the story of Jackson’s 
column, now to be told. His command had always before 


— 813 — 


Seven Days’ Campaign—The Pursuit 

acted alone and independently. Lee’s instructions to him 
were very brief and general in supreme confidence that the 
Jackson of the Valley would win even brighter laurels on 
the Chickahominy. The shortest route was assigned to him 
and the largest force was given him. Lee then took himself 
off to the farthest flank, as if generously to leave to Jack- 
son the opportunity of the most brilliant victory of war. 

His failure is not so much a military as a psychological 
phenomenon. He did not try and fail. He simply made no 
effort. The story embraces two days. He spent the 29th 
in camp in disregard of Lee’s instructions, and he spent the 
30th in equal idleness at White Oak Swamp. His 25,000 
infantry practically did not fire a shot in the two days. 

Here is the story: It has already been related that 
early Sunday morning, Lee, coming from Jackson’s di¬ 
rection, told Magruder that Jackson had been ordered to 
pursue, and was even then supposed to be crossing the 
Chickahominy. Magruder was also ordered to attack the 
enemy, and he and his lieutenants soon sent messengers to 
establish communication with Jackson. Later, Magruder 
received a severe shock in the following note from Gen. 
Jones, commanding one of his three divisions, of two bri¬ 
gades each: 

“Maj-Gen. Magruder: 

“My line is formed to the left and somewhat to the front of Gen. 
Cobb. * * * I do not think it prudent for me to attack with my small 
force, unless there be a simultaneous attack all along our lines. I 
will keep a good lookout on my left. I had hoped that Jackson would 
have cooperated with me on wry left , but he sends me word that he 
cannot, as he has other important duty to perform .* 

“Respectfully, D. R. Jones, 

“Brig.-Gen.” 

This note, taken in connection with the withdrawal of 
the two brigades which Huger had sent, depressed Magruder 
very much. Later in the evening he received some encour¬ 
agement. Maj. Taylor, of Lee’s staff, bearing a message, 
arrived, hunting for Jackson. Upon being told that Jack- 

*13 W. R., 675, incorrectly dated June 28. On the 28th the 
retreat of the enemy was not known, and there were no orders to at¬ 
tack, or for Jackson to cross the Chickahominy. The situation is that 
of the 29th. The italics are mine. 


— 819 — 



Military Memoirs of a Confederate 


son had been “ordered elsewhere,” as Magruder loosely 
quoted his message to Jones, Taylor did not hesitate to say 
that there must be some mistake. As he did not know the 
country, and Magruder had upon his staff a Chaplain Allen 
who did know it, the message for Jackson was instrusted to 
Allen, and Taylor returned to Lee. But Lee’s note that night 
to Magruder, already quoted (p. 138) contained a post¬ 
script, as follows: 

“P. S. Since the above was written I learn from Maj. Taylor that 
you are under the impression that Gen. Jackson has been ordered 
not to support you. On the contrary, he has been directed to do so, 
and to push the pursuit vigorously.” 

It scarcely needs the corroboration of Lee’s word that 
upon his discovery of McClellan’s retreat, and his putting 
the rest of his army in motion with orders to press the ene¬ 
my, he must have given similar orders to Jackson; and his 
statement to Magruder, that Jackson was even then cross¬ 
ing at Grapevine bridge, and his sending Taylor later with 
a message to Jackson, show that he believed his orders were 
being executed. 

The explanation of Jackson’s message to Jones is clear 
in the light of his regard for the Sabbath, and from the 
particular expression used. He mentions no physical ob¬ 
stacle nor any other demand upon his troops, who, indeed, 
are all resting quietly in their camps, but the “important 
duty” to be performed seems to concern himself rather 
than his command, and to be entirely personal in character. 
Evidently, Jackson excused not only himself, but his troops 
also, because it was Sunday. He certainly considered at¬ 
tendance upon divine service an “important duty” of the 
first magnitude. He confidently believed that marked re¬ 
gard for the Sabbath would often be followed by God’s 
favor upon one’s secular enterprises. If so, why not upon 
a battle or a campaign? We have seen even Lincoln share 
the same belief when he stopped the advance of McDowell 
from Fredericksburg on Sunday, and thus broke up Mc¬ 
Clellan’s campaign, as has been told (see page 101). 

The rebuilding of Grapevine bridge was not a serious 
matter. Lee clearly anticipated no delay there whatever. 


— 820 — 


Seven Days’ Campaign—The Pursuit 

Jackson’s engineer, early Sunday morning, reported that 
it would be finished in two hours. There was a ford close 
by, and other bridges within a few miles, but most*of Jack¬ 
son’s troops spent the entire day in camp. 

His early start next morning would seem to promise 
more vigor in the performance for that day, but its history 
does not bear out the promise. It was but seven miles from 
the bivouacs which his men left about 2:30 A. M. to White 
Oak Bridge where they went into bivouac at night. No ob¬ 
stacle to a swift march existed, but the earliest arrival 
noted in the reports is at 9:30 A. M. by Col. Crutchfield of 
the Artillery. Jackson himself puts it later. 

White Oak Swamp rises between the Charles City 
and the Williamsburg road near where the Confederate 
lines crossed them, five miles from Richmond. The 
course of the stream is southeast, almost parallel to that of 
the Charles City road for about six miles. Then it turns 
and runs directly toward the Chickahominy some three 
miles away. Just above this bend was Brackett’s Ford, and 
about a mile below it was the main road crossing at which 
Jackson arrived about 9:30 A.M., Monday. The stream it¬ 
self was a small creek, averaging 10 to 15 feet wide and six 
inches deep, with sandy bottom. The swamp was merely a 
flat area densely grown up in trees and bushes, more or less 
wet in places, but generally with firm footing. Small farms 
and settlements were scattered along its edges, and residents 
and cattle had many paths in and through it. It was widest 
near its source, where the country was flatter. Near the 
bridge the country was rolling and the swamp grew narrow. 
Four crossings above the bridge were known to the natives, 
—Chapman’s (or Goodman’s), Jourdan’s, Fisher’s and 
Brackett’s,—and one below called Carter’s; but besides these 
were many less-known paths. 

The road crossing was held by Franklin, who thus de¬ 
scribes the operations of the day in his official report: 

“About noon I was directed by the commanding general to 
assume command at the position guarding the crossing of the swamp, 
and repaired there at once. I found that a terrific cannonade had 
been opened by the enemy upon the divisions of Gen. Smith and Gen. 
Richardson and the brigade of Gen. Naglee. The two latter had been 


— 821 — 


Military Memoirs of a Confederate 


placed under my command by the commanding general. The casualties 
in Richardson’s division were quite numerous, but I have received no 
report of the action from him. In Gen. Smith’s division and in Gen. 
Naglee’s brigade the number lost was insignificant. 

“The enemy kept up the firing during the whole day and crossed 
some infantry below our position, but he made no very serious attempt 
to cross during the day, and contented himself with the cannonading 
and the firing of his sharp-shooters. Nightfall having arrived and the 
wagons having all disappeared, I took the responsibility of moving 
my command to the James River, by a road to the left which had not 
been much used, and arrived at headquarters safely about daylight.” 

The infantry referred to by Franklin as having crossed 
were only D. H. Hill’s skirmish-line. No effort was made 
to cross anything more. Jackson’s own account of the 
day is as follows: 

“About noon we reached White Oak Swamp, and here the enemy 
made a determined effort to retard our advance, and thereby prevent 
an immediate junction between Gen. Longstreet and myself. We found 
the bridge destroyed and the ordinary place of crossing commanded 
by their batteries on the opposite side and all approach to it barred 
by detachments of sharp-shooters concealed in a dense wood close by. 
A battery of 28 guns from Hill’s and Whiting’s artillery was placed by 
Col. Crutchfield in a favorable position for driving off or silencing 
the opposing artillery. About 2 P. M. it opened suddenly upon the 
enemy. He fired a few shots in reply and then withdrew from that 
position, abandoning part of his artillery. Capt. Wooding was im¬ 
mediately ordered near the bridge to shell the sharp-shooters from the 
woods, which was accomplished and Munford’s cavalry crossed the 
creek, but was soon compelled to retire. It was soon seen that the 
enemy occupied such a position beyond a thick intervening wood on 
the right of the road as enabled him to command the crossing. Capt. 
Wooding’s batteries turned in the new direction. The fire so opened 
on both sides was kept up until dark. We bivouacked that night near 
the swamp. 

“A heavy cannonading in front announced the engagement of 
Gen. Longstreet at Frazier’s Farm and made me anxious to presa 
forward, but the marshy character of the soil, the destruction of the 
bridge over the marsh and creek, and the strong position of the enemy 
for defending the passage prevented my advancing until the following 
morning. During the night the Federals retired.” 

Considered as an excuse for Jackson’s inaction during 
the whole day this report is simply farcical. 

It appears from subordinate reports that the long delay 
between the arrival of the head of Jackson’s column and 
the opening of his 28 guns was caused by cutting a road to 
enable the guns to be kept concealed while getting position. 
Concealment here was of little value and the time thus lost 
by the artillery, and the sending across of Munford’s cavalry 
at the road crossing, illustrate the prominent feature of 


— 822 — 


Seven Days’ Campaign—The Pursuit 

Jackson's conduct during the whole Seven Days,—to wit: 
a reluctance to bring his infantry into action. Here infan¬ 
try alone could accomplish anything, but only cavalry and ar¬ 
tillery were called upon. He could have crossed a brigade 
of infantry as easily as Munford’s cavalry, and that brigade 
could have been the entering wedge which would split apart 
the Federal defence and let in the 13 brigades which fol¬ 
lowed. The bridge, whose destruction is mentioned, was 
not necessary to a crossing. It was only a high-water 
bridge with a ford by it which was preferably used except in 
freshets. Now the floor of the bridge, made of poles, had 
been thrown into the ford but Munford’s cavalry got 
through without trouble, and infantry could have swarmed 
across. 

The cannonade, which was kept up during all the rest 
of the day, was not only a delusion, but a useless burning 
both of daylight and ammunition, for it was all random 
fire. The Federal and Confederate artillery could not see 
each other at all. They could scarcely even see the high- 
floating smoke clouds of each other’s guns. They fired by 
sound, at a distance of three-quarters of a mile, across a 
tall dense wood, until they exhausted their ammunition. 
One Federal battery reported the expenditure of 1600 
rounds. The noise was terrific, and some firing was kept 
up until nine o’clock at night, but the casualties on each 
side were naturally but trifling. Only one Confederate bat¬ 
tery, Rhett’s, mentions any, and it reported but two killed 
and five wounded. 

No reconnaisance was made for other crossings, even 
of Brackett’s over which much of the Federal force had 
passed, until Wright’s brigade arrived and was sent back, 
as has been told. Meanwhile, two other crossings available 
for infantry were discovered within a very short distance 
below, and were both at once reported to Jackson by the 
officers discovering them, Col. Munford, commanding his cav¬ 
alry, and Gen. Hampton, commanding the 3d Brigade of 
Jackson’s division. I have in possession letters from Mun- 
ford to Hampton, and from Hampton to myself, giving the 
following details. 


— 823 — 


Military Memoirs of a Confederate. 


I have already quoted from Jackson's report that his 
cavalry sent across the creek at first, was forced to retire. 
Col. Munford in a letter to Gen. Hampton, dated Mar. 23, 
1901, writes: 

“At the battle of White Oak Swamp, after Col. Crutchfield’s ar¬ 
tillery had disabled one gun, and driven the cannoneers from the bat¬ 
tery which commanded the crossing at the old bridge at White Oak 
Swamp, Gen. Jackson directed me to cross the creek, with my regi¬ 
ment, at the ford and to secure the guns in front of us. The enemy’s 
sharp-shooters were stationed in rear of the building overlooking 
the ford; and as soon as we neared the abandoned battery of the ene¬ 
my, these sharpshooters, and another battery stationed in the road at 
the edge of the woods, and commanding the road and the ford over 
which we had passed, opened a furious fire upon us, and I was forced 
to move a quarter of a mile lower down the creek, where I found a 
cow path which led me over the swamp. But enroute, I found 
where Gen. Franklin’s troops had been located, having now changed 
front. They had left a long line of knapsacks and blankets, from 
which I allowed my men to take what they pleased; and among their 
things were many late newspapers from Washington, which I de¬ 
spatched by a courier to Gen. Jackson, giving him full information of 
what I had seen and how and where I had crossed. 

“Thirty-nine years is too long a time to attempt to say what I 
wrote him, but I know that I thought, all the time, that he could have 
crossed his infantry where we recrossed. I had seen his infantry cross 
far worse places, and I expected that he would attempt it. 

“We remained near where we recrossed all day, with a vidette on 
the other side of the swamp. He put his sharp-shooters in on the 
right of the ford and made no attempt to cross where we recrossed. 

“Why, I never understood. 

“Yours sincerely, 

“Thomas T. Munford.” 

All the crossings so far described were paths already 
marked by use of men and cattle, but another opportunity 
was discovered and brought to Jackson's notice by Hamp¬ 
ton, who was an expert woodsman and hunter. While the 
infantry stood idly by and the useless cannonade went on, 
nothing was more natural to Hampton than a personal 
reconnaissance in front. He found a crossing and the flank of 
the enemy’s infantry line. He returned and reported it to 
Jackson. In the last year of his life he wrote out the story 
as given below. He has only omitted from it, modestly, the 
fact that, when he reported to Jackson his discovery, he 
begged permission to take his brigade across immediately 
and attack it. This request was at first put off by the order 
to go and build a bridge. After the bridge was reported fin¬ 
ished, the whole matter was silently ignored, as his narra¬ 
tive described. 


— 824 — 


Seven Days’ Campaign—The Pursuit 

Hampton’s narrative is as follows: 

‘We left the Chickahominy on Monday morning, June 30, 
though my impression is that the Grapevine bridge could have been 
used on Sunday, and at any rate there was a good ford of the stream 
below the bridge near the road followed by the retreating enemy. 
Early on the morning of Monday we reached the White Oak crossing, 
my brigade being in advance; and about the same time the 2d Va. 
Cav. under Col. Munford came up. This regiment had accompanied 
Gen. Jackson from the Valley covering his advance. 

“We found a large hospital tent on the brow of the hill overlook¬ 
ing the crossing of the small stream over which a little bridge of poles 
had been made. The enemy had pulled off the poles and, thrown them 
in the stream above the bridge, and a battery of four guns on the op¬ 
posite hill commanded the causeway and the ford of the stream. Gen. 
Jackson ran up some guns and soon silenced those of the enemy, dis¬ 
abling one of them. The battery was withdrawn, and Gen. Jackson 
accompanied by the regiment of cavalry crossed with a view, I suppose, 
of capturing the disabled gun, or of ascertaining the position of the 
enemy—none of whom were in sight, except those manning the gun. 
In a few minutes the General returned alone, while Munford took his 
regiment a short distance down the stream where he crossed without 
difficulty. As there were no further hostile demonstrations where 
we were, I placed my brigade in a pine forest and, desiring to ascertain 
the character of the ground in front of us, I rode to the edge of the 
swamp, accompanied by Capt. Rawlins Lowndes, and my son Wade, 
who was serving on my staff at that time. The swamp was compara¬ 
tively open, the ground not at all boggy, and we soon struck the 
stream. 

“This was very shallow, with a clear sandy bottom, and not more 
than 10 or 15 feet wide. Crossing this, we soon came in sight of the 
open land opposite our position. 

“We could see a very wide and deep ravine in which was a line 
of Federals lying down in line of battle, and evidently expecting if 
any attack was made upon them, it would be from the open field below 
the ford of the stream. In this event their position would have been 
very strong. 

“Withdrawing without attracting their notice, I returned across 
the swamp and gave to Gen. Jackson all the facts stated above. 

“He asked if I could make a bridge across the stream to which I 
replied that I could make one for the infantry, but not for artillery, 
as cutting a road would disclose our position. He directed me to make 
the bridge. Ordering a detail of my men to cut some poles where they 
were standing and to carry them into the swamp, a bridge was made 
in a few minutes. I then again reconnoitered the position of the 
enemy whom I found perfectly quiet—unsuspecting. On my return 
to our side of the swamp, I found Gen. Jackson seated, on a fallen 
pine alongside of the road that led down to the ford, and seating my¬ 
self by him, I reported the completion of the bridge and the exposed 
position of the enemy. He drew his cap down over his eyes which 
were closed, and after listening to me for some minutes, he rose with¬ 
out speaking, and the next morning we found Franklin with the rest of 
the Federal troops concentrated on Malvern Hill. 

“While we were waiting at the White Oak crossing we heard the 
noise of Longstreet’s battle at Frazier’s Farm, and Capt. or Maj. 
Fairfax of Longstreet’s staff came with a message from the general 
to Gen. Jackson. Though I heard this message, I cannot recall it. * * * 
In speaking to Gen. Lee in 1868 on this subject, he expressed the 


— 825 — 


Military Memoirs of a Confederate 

greatest surprise at my account of this matter, and he said that he 
never understood why the delay had occurred. * * * 

“Gen. Jackson was too great a soldier and I was too much at¬ 
tached to him to venture to criticise his actions or his plans, but it 
seems to me that everything which throws light on the plans of our 
great chief, Gen. Lee, should go down in history. I believe that if 
Franklin, who opposed us at White Oak, could have been defeated, 
the Federal army would have been destroyed. * * * 

“Yours truly, 

“Wade Hampton.” 

Much comment suggests itself, but little is needed: 
Who fought with Lee can picture to himself without emotion 
what might have happened had the Jackson of the Valley had 
the opportunity presented to him which Gen. Hampton has 
described as offered in vain to the Jackson of the Chicka- 
hominy. 

Franklin, commanding the Federal force here opposed 
to Jackson, wrote of this occasion as follows (Battles and 
Leaders, II., 381) : 

“Jackson seems to have been ignorant of what Gen. Lee expected 
of him, and badly informed about Brackett’s Ford. When he found 
how strenuous was our defense at the bridge, he should have turned 
his attention to Brackett’s Ford, also. A force could have been as 
quietly gathered there as at the bridge; a strong infantry movement 
at the ford would have easily overrun our small force there, placing 
our right at Glendale, held by Slocum’s division, in great jeopardy, 
and turning our force at the bridge by getting between it and Glen¬ 
dale. In fact, it is likely that we should have been defeated that day, . 
had Gen. Jackson done what his great reputation seems to have made * 
it imperative he should have done.” 

D. H. Hill (who was Jackson’s brother-in-law) writing 
in the Century of this occasion many years after the war, 
says: 

“Our cavalry (Munford’s regiment) returned by the lower ford 
and pronounced it perfectly practicable for infantry; but Jackson did 
not advance. Why was this? It was the critical day for both com¬ 
manders, but especially for McClellan. With consummate skill he had 
crossed his vast train of 5000 wagons, and his immense parks of 
artillery, safely over White Oak Swamp, but he was more exposed 
now than at any time in his flank march. Three columns of attack 
were converging on him and a strong corps was pressing upon his 
rear. Escape seemed impossible for him, but he did escape. * * * Gen. 
Lee, through no fault in his plans, was to see his splendid prize slip 
through his hands. Longstreet and A. P. Hiil struck the enemy at 
Frazier’s Farm (or Glendale) at 3 P. M. and both being always ready 
for a fight, immediately attacked. * * * There were 5 divisions within 
sound of the firing and within supporting distance, but not one of 
them moved. *' * * Maj. Dabney, in his life of Jackson, thus comments 
on the inaction of that affair: ‘On this occasion it would appear, if 


— 826 — 


Seven Days' Campaign—The Pursuit 

the vast interests dependent upon Gen. Jackson’s cooperation with 
the proposed attack upon the centre were considered, that he came 
short of the efficiency in action for which he was elsewhere noted.’ 

“After showing how the crossing of White Oak might have been 
effected, Dabney adds: ‘The list of casualties might have been longer 
than that presented on the 30th, of one cannoneer wounded, but how 
much shorter would have been the bloody list filled up the next day 
at Malvern Hill? This temporary eclipse of Jackson’s genius was 
probably to be explained by physical causes. The labor of the previ¬ 
ous days, the sleeplessness, the wear of gigantic cares, with the 
drenching of the comfortless night, had sunk the elasticity of his will 
and the quickness of his invention, for the nonce, below their wonted 
tension.’ ” 

D. H. Hill does not comment upon this explanation, but 
it will not bear examination. For two days Jackson and his 
command had been quietly in camp; and his lapse from 
duty, while culminating only on June 29 and 30, in fact dated 
from the very first of the Seven Days. Hill submits his own 
explanation of the matter as follows: 

“I think that an important factor in this inaction was Jackson’s 
pity for his own corps, worn out by long and exhausting marches, and 
reduced in numbers by its numerous sanguinary battles. He thought 
that the garrison of Richmond ought now to bear the brunt of the 
fighting.” 

This last expression is but another form of a rumor 
which to my knowledge, had private circulation at the time 
among the staff-officers of some of the leading generals. It 
was reported that Jackson had said that “he did not intend 
that his men should do all the fighting.” 

Jackson’s troops (his own and Ewell’s divisions) had 
had a sharp campaign in the Valley, but the rest of the 
army at Yorktown, Williamsburg and Seven Pines had suf¬ 
fered just as many hardships, and done even more severe 
fighting, as the casualties will attest. There were no 
arrears to be made up. The total killed and wounded of 
Jackson’s six brigades in the Valley campaign from Kerns- 
town (March 23) to Port Republic (June 9) were but 
2311. Three brigades—Rodes’s, Garland’s, and G. B. An¬ 
derson’s of D. H. Hill’s division—had had killed and 
wounded the first day at Seven Pines 2621. During the 
Seven Days they lost 2277 more, while Jackson’s six bri¬ 
gades lost but 1152. 


- 827 - 


Military Memoirs of a Confederate 

It is only natural and right that every division com¬ 
mander should feel both pity and affection for his own 
men, but to manifest either by shirking battle is no real kind¬ 
ness to them, apart from the tremendous consequences to 
the army and the nation. 

We may now return to Lee, Longstreet and A. P. Hill 
at Frazier’s Farm or Glendale, where we left them wait¬ 
ing vainly for the sounds of battle from Huger and Jack- 
son. Between three and four o’clock the enemy, aware of 
their proximity, unwisely increased the fire of one of their 
batteries. Longstreet ordered Jenkins, second to none in 
either courage or ambition, to charge it. Jenkins charged 
the battery and got possession, but was attacked by the 
infantry in support. This brought on the battle at once, 
though not in the best shape; for, instead of one simul¬ 
taneous attack by the whole force, more time was wasted, 
and the brigades came in in piecemeal. A very desperate 
fight ensued, and lasted until long after dark, with varying 
fortunes. There were present but the two Confederate di¬ 
visions, 12 brigades, which had borne the brunt of the 27th 
at Gaines Mill, and had lost 4,300 men out of 22,000 engaged. 
They were taking the aggressive against Kearny’s, McCall’s 
and Hooker’s divisions (about 25,000 men), carefully 
posted, with some protection and obstructions. 

A fourth division, Sedgwick’s, was in reserve in a 
second line behind McCall, and a fifth, Slocum’s, was near 
on the right, each over 8000 strong. Almost the whole 
of these 40,000 troops took part in the battle. Within an 
hour’s march were Richardson’s and Smith’s divisions and 
Naglee’s brigade, 23,000 more, which could have been 
called in if needed. It goes without saying that while the 
Confederates might have more or less success, at the be¬ 
ginning, depending upon the cooperation of their brigades, 
only the approach of night could prevent their being finally 
repulsed and driven from the field, with losses propor¬ 
tionate to the persistence of their attacks. 

No more desperate encounter took place in the war; 
and nowhere else, to my knowledge, so much actual per- 


— 828 — 


Seven Days’ Campaign—The Pursuit 

sonal fighting with bayonet and butt of gun. Randol’s 
battery, over which it began, was taken and retaken sev¬ 
eral times. Once, when in possession of the 11th Ala. regi¬ 
ment of Wilcox’s brigade, it was charged by McCall’s Pa. 
reserves, and after a desperate bayonet fight on each side 
fell back to adjacent woods, leaving the guns deserted, but 
under fire from both sides. Wilcox’s report gives illustra¬ 
tions of the character of the fighting: 

“Capt. W. C. Y. Parker had two successive encounters with Fed¬ 
eral officers, both of whom he felled with his sword, and beset by- 
others of the enemy, he was severely wounded, having received two 
bayonet wounds in the breast and one in his side, and a musket ball 
breaking his left thigh. 

“Lt. Michie had a hand-to-hand collision with an officer, and 
having «just dealt a severe blow upon his adversary, he fell, cut 
over the head with a sabre-bayonet from behind, and had afterward 
three bayonet wounds in the face and two in the breast,—all severe 
wounds which he survived, however, for three days.” 

A little later, Field’s brigade of Hill’s division, in a 
counter-charge again had bayonet fighting and drove Mc¬ 
Call’s line back for a half-mile and held the ground until the 
captured guns were carried safely to the rear. Severe 
fighting continued to take place until after dark. The 
enemy became so aggressive that Lee felt it necessary to 
send for Magruder’s six brigades which had been unwisely 
marched to reenforce Holmes, and which had lost distance 
and time by confusion of roads and guides. These unfor¬ 
tunate troops, which had been marching all day, were now 
marched and countermarched until long after midnight, so 
that they were thoroughly exhausted when they reached, 
the field, and were put in front of those who had been 
equally worn out in the desperate fighting. Meanwhile a 
ruse which had been practised seems to have been success¬ 
ful in bringing the pressure of the enemy’s fresh battalions 
to an end. A. P. Hill thus describes it: 

“About dark the enemy were pressing us hard along our whole 
line, and my last reserve, Gen. J. R. Anderson, with his Ga. Bri¬ 
gade, was directed to advance cautiously and be careful not to fire on 
our friends. His brigade was formed in line, two regiments on each 
side of the road, and, obeying my instructions to the letter, received 
the fire of the enemy at 70 paces before engaging themselves. Heavy 
reenforcements to the enemy were brought up at this time, and it 
seemed that a tremendous effort was being made to turn the for- 


— 829 — 


Military Memoirs of a Confederate 

tunes of the battle, the volume of fire that, approaching, rolled along 
the line, was terrific. Seeing some troops of Wilcox’s brigade, with 
the assistance of Lt. Chamberlayne and other members of my staff, 
they were rapidly formed, and being directed to cheer long and 
loudly moved again to the fight. This seemed to end the contest, and 
in less than five minutes all firing ceased*and the enemy retired.” 

In this battle the losses of Longstreet’s division were 
about 2600 and in A. P. Hill's about 1700; total 4300. The 
Federal losses are not given separately, but were, doubt¬ 
less, not very unequal. McCall was captured, riding into 
our lines by mistake, and we also secured 18 guns, besides 
some prisoners, and the gleanings of the field in small arms. 

Lee, an example for all time of restraint in expressing 
personal feeling, wrote in his report of this battle: 

“Could the other commands have cooperated in this action, the 
result would have proved most disastrous to the enemy.” 

I have often thought that in his retrospect of the war 
no one day of the whole four years would seem to him more 
unfortunate than June 30, 1862. It was, undoubtedly, the 
opportunity of his life, for the Confederacy was then in 
its prijme, with more men available than ever before or 
after. And at no other period would the moral or the physi¬ 
cal effect of a victory have been so great as upon this occa¬ 
sion. 


— 830 — 


The Escape Battle of Malvern Hill 

Enemy’s New Position—Line Formed 1 —Pendleton’s Artillery—Ar¬ 
tillery Combats—Whiting’s Reports—Sumner Seeks Cover— 
Lee’s Reconnaissance-—Lee Misled—Attack Begun—Wright’s 
Report—Semmes and Kershaw—D. H. Hill’s Report—Toomb’s 
Report—Casualties—Lee’s Report—Stewart Shells a Camp— 
McClellan Writes—Stuart’s Report—Attack Abandoned—Casual¬ 
ties—An Artillery Raid—The South Side—Our Balloon. 


Next morning (Tuesday, July 1) we began to pay the 
penalty for our unimproved opportunity of the day before. 

Of course, the enemy was gone, and about three miles 
down the road we came upon his whole army, now united 
and massed, upon Malvern Hill. 

This position is a high plateau stretching north from 
the lowlands along the valley of James River, over which 
it dominates in high steep hills, with Turkey Run on the 
west, and Western Run on the east. It is about a mile wide 
and, for two miles from the river, is open land, rolling and 
sloping toward the north where it ends in a heavy forest, 
intersected by marshy streams, with only one good road 
leading through the forest out upon the plateau. The Rev. 
L. W. Allen, already mentioned as on the staff of Magruder, 
was a native of this section, and had described to D. H. 
Hill its striking features, noting,— 

“Its commanding height, the difficulties of approach, its am- 
phitheatrical form and ample area, which would enable McClellan 
to arrange his 350 field guns, tier above tier, and sweep the plain 
in every direction.” 

Hill writes in the Century Magazine : 

“Jackson moved over White Oak Swamp on July 1, Whiting’s 
division leading. Our march was much delayed by the crossing of 
troops and trains. At Willis’s Church I met Gen. Lee. He bore 
grandly his terrible disappointment of the day before, and made no 
allusion to it. I gave him Mr. Allen’s description of Malvern Hill 
and presumed to say, ‘If Gen. McClellan is there in force, we had 
better let him alone.’ Longstreet laughed and said, ‘Don’t get 
scared, now that we have got him whipped.’ ” 

Reconnaissance, ordered by Longstreet on the right, 
found a position favorable if we could employ a heavy 
force of artillery. A hill across Turkey Creek on the west 


— 831 — 


Military Memoirs of a Confederate 

gave ground whence 40 or more guns could enfilade the 
enemy’s batteries and lines of battle. A wheat-field to the 
northeast gave positions whence a hundred guns could cross 
fire with them. Could we mass and open two such bat¬ 
teries, and follow their fire by a simultaneous charge of 
heavy column, we would have a chance of winning a vic¬ 
tory. Lee ordered the plan carried into effect. Meanwhile, 
a line of battle had been formed through the woods and 
fields. Whiting was on the left with three bridgades (one 
of Jackson’s under Hampton, and two of his own). D. H. 
Hill came next with five, then two of Huger’s, six of Ma- 
gruder’s, and two more of Huger’s, including Ransom’s, de¬ 
tached from Holmes’s division. The remainder of Holmes’s 
was held on the river road, and was not engaged. Long- 
street and Hill were in reserve behind Magruder; and Ewell’s 
and Jackson’s own division, behind Jackson. The enemy’s 
batteries kept up a severe fire through the woods and along 
the roads and the gunboats in the James participated for 
some hours with their heavy guns, until at length some 
shells burst prematurely over their own lines, when their 
fire was ordered to cease. 

The order to charge the enemy’s lines was, however, 
not made absolute. Magruder, Huger, and D. H. Hill, with 
their 14 brigades were notified as follows about noon: 

“July 1, 1862. 

“Batteries have been established to rake the enemy’s line. If 
it is broken, as is probable, Armistead, who can witness the effect 
of the fire, has been ordered to charge with a yell. Do the same. By 
order of Gen. Lee. 

“R. H. Chilton, A. G. C.” 

The charge, therefore, was made to depend upon our 
being able to inaugurate and conduct with success an ar¬ 
tillery duel of some magnitude. 

Pioneers were sent to open a road to the left, and it 
was expected that artillery would act upon both flanks; 
but here our organization broke down. Gen. Pendleton, 
Lee’s Chief of Artillery, had a large artillery reserve, or¬ 
ganized in four battalions of several batteries each, includ¬ 
ing our best rifled guns; but he was not able to bring a 


- 832 — 


The Escape—Battle of Malvern Hill 


single one of his batteries into action. His official report 
of the day is as follows: 

“Tuesday, July 1, was spent by me in seeking, for some time, 
the commanding general, that I might get orders, and, by reason of 
the intricacy of routes, failing in this, in examining positions near 
the two armies, toward ascertaining what could be best done with a 
large artillery force, and especially whether any position could be 
reached whence our large guns could be used to good purpose. These 
endeavors had, of course, to be made again and again under the 
enemy’s shells; yet no site was found from which the large guns 
could play upon the the enemy without endangering our own troops, 
and no occasion was presented for bringing up the reserve artillery. 
Indeed, it seemed that not one-half of the division batteries were 
brought into action on either Monday or Tuesday. To remain near 
by, therefore, and await events and orders in readiness for what¬ 
ever service might be called for, was all that I could do. Here again 
it was my privilege to be thrown with the President, he having ar¬ 
rived some time after nightfall at the house near the battlefield 
where I had just before sought a resting-place.” 

Between the lines one can but read a disappointing 
story. Pendleton did not find Lee all day long, nor did any 
orders from Lee find him. He implies that his reserve 
artillery was not expected to go in until all the division bat¬ 
teries were first engaged. The division batteries were not 
organized into battalions, and, acting separately, were 
easily overpowered when brought out, one by one, in the 
face of many guns already in position. Pendleton’^ battal¬ 
ions of from three to six batteries each, would have stood 
much better chances; and while there were not many places, 
there were two extensive ones, in either of which all of 
these battalions could have been used—Poindexter's field, 
and the position on Magruder’s right, to which Lee made 
the pioneers open a road. As matters were, our whole re¬ 
serve artillery stood idle all day. 

Pendleton graduated at West Point in 1830, one year 
after Lee. He resigned in 1833, and entered the ministry 
in 1837. In 1861, he returned to military life, and was 
appointed Chief of Artillery of the Army about Oct., 1861, 
under Gen. Johnston. His command did little during the 
Seven Days, and Col. Brown, commanding his largest bat¬ 
talion, in his report mentions “the greatest superabundance 
of artillery and the scanty use that was made of it." 

Col. Cutts, commanding another battalion, also re¬ 
ported : 


— 833 — 


Military Memoirs of a Confederate 


“My own small command (seven guns) was assigned a place 
near the battle-field of Tuesday, the 1st inst., and although I am 
sure that more artillery could have been used with advantage in this 
engagement, and also that my company could have done good service, 
yet I received no orders; therefore, I have not had the honor to par¬ 
ticipate in any of the many engagements for the protection of our 
capital.” 

Several field-batteries were brought in, one or two at a 
time, upon both flanks, but each was quickly overwhelmed. 
The artillery under D. H. Hill, which had been engaged, at 
White Oak Swamp the afternoon of the 30th, had entirely 
exhausted its ammunition and been sent to the rear to re¬ 
plenish. In the demand for guns, A. P. Hill sent two of his 
batteries, Davidson’s and Pegram’s. Pegram had been en¬ 
gaged in every battle, beginning with Mechanicsville. In¬ 
cluding Malvern Hill, he had 60 casualties, out of 80 men, 
and was only able to man a single gun at the close. This 
fighting, the artillery part of the action, began about noon 
and continued until about half-part three o’clock. D. H. 
Hill thus described that in his front,— 

“Instead of ordering up 100 of 200 pieces of artillery to play on 
the Yankees, a single battery, Moorman’s, was ordered up, and 
knocked to pieces in a few minutes. One or two others shared the 
same fate of being beat in detail. Not knowing how to act under 
the circumstances, I wrote to Gen. Jackson that the firing from our 
batteries was of the most farcical character.” 

Whiting, on Hill’s left, says: 

“To our left was a very large wheat-field which afforded a good 
view of the enemy’s position, and fair opportunities for artillery. 
Batteries were ordered up * * * * The first battery ordered into 
Poindexter’s field found itself exposed to a vastly superior cross-fire 
and was soon compelled to retire with loss. Balthis’s battery, better 
posted and better covered by the ground, fought well and continued 
the action until their ammunition was exhausted. Other batteries 
were ordered up. Our gunners replied with spirit, but from want 
of ammunition the contest was too unequal, and I caused them suc¬ 
cessively to withdraw. This cross-fire was excessively severe upon 
the supporting troops.” 

Of the artillery fighting on the right flank, Gen. Ar- 
mistead reported: 

“By a reconnaissance first made by Col. E. O. Edmonds of the 
38th Va. * * * * I found that the enemy were in, near and around 
Crew’s house, and that the hill in front of the ravine we occupied 
was a good position for artillery. It was asked for, and Capt. Peg¬ 
ram’s and Grimes’s batteries were sent. The fire was a terrible one 


— 834 — 


The Escape—Battle of Malvern Hill 

and the men stood it well. The enemy must have had 30 or 40 piepes 
opposed to ours and of superior calibre. No men could have behaved 
better than Capts. Pegram and Grimes. They worked their guns 
after their men were cut down, and only retired when entirely dis¬ 
abled. I sent for more artillery repeatedly.” 

These extracts sufficiently illustrate the character of 
the fighting during the hours devoted in theory to bringing 
a heavy enfilading and cross-fire of artillery to bear upon 
the enemy in his crowded position. The one advantage 
which we had was that all our shots were converging to¬ 
ward his centre, and stood fair chances of finding some of 
his troops, even when they missed their special targets. 
And, thin, scattered, and meagre as our artillery fire was, 
—“almost farcical/' as D. H. Hill pronounced it, and di¬ 
rected entirely at the enemy's batteries, its effect upon his 
infantry lines was such that Summer withdrew his whole 
corps from their positions, and took refuge under the crest 
of the hills nearest the river, and he ordered Porter also to 
withdraw. Porter reports that he 

. . . “protested against such a movement as disastrous to us, adding 
that as the major-general commanding had seen and approved my 
disposition, and also Gen. Couch’s, I could not change without his 
order, which could soon be obtained if desirable. He desisted and 
the enemy was soon upon us, compelling him to recall his own corps.” 

How eloquent is this episode of what might have been 
the effect of bold and energetic use, early in the day, not 
only of our large artillery reserve, but of all our brigade 
and division batteries, brought in under their protection, 
as might have been done under efficient management. 

As it was, this inefficient artillery service so discour¬ 
aged the prospects of an assault that before three o'clock 
Lee abandoned his intention to assault. Longstreet was in¬ 
formed* but no notice was sent to other generals, as there 
seemed to apparent need. The aggressive efforts had grown 
gradually weaker, and by three o'clock the firing on both 
sides had almost ceased. 

*Hjs report says,—“A little after 3 P. M., I understood that we 
would not be able to attack the enemy that day, inasmuch as his 
position was too strong to admit of it.” 


— 835 — 



Military Memoirs of a Confederate 

• Shortly before this, Lee had taken Longstreet and 
ridden over to our left in .search of some route by which 
the enemy’s position could be turned. 

This should have been done early that morning, not 
by Lee in person, but by staff-officers under cavalry es¬ 
corts. Jackson, on the left flank, had with him a fair 
supply of staff, and Munford’s regiment of cavalry. In 
the Valley he would have done it without waiting for orders. 
By a movement inaugurated that day, a force might easily 
have reached the high ground known as Evelington Heights, 
overlooking Westover (of which there will be more to tell 
later), or any nearer point threatening the ene’my’s line 
of retreat, where a Confederate force in position might 
compel the enemy to take the offensive at a disadvantage. 

A short reconnaissance induced Lee to order Long- 
street at once to move his own division and Hill’s to the 
left: Longstreet had rejoined his troops and was putting 
them in motion, when, to his surprise, he heard the sounds 
of battle break forth. He thought the enemy had taken 
the offensive, and that Magruder would soon be calling for 
reenforcements. His two divisions were, therefore, moved 
up to secure the right flank, though they did not become 
engaged. 

Longstreet, in his narrative states that the battle was 
precipitated by accident, but this is a mistake. It was be-, 
gun by a direct order from Lee given hastily under the in¬ 
fluence of a misapprehension of fact, which occurred as 
follows: 

When Sumner withdrew his corps under the cover of 
the hills, as has been told in the quotation from Porter, 
the movement was observed from our left by Whiting. He 
reported to Lee that the enemy were withdrawing both 
trains and troops. About the same time, a body of the 
enemy’s skirmishers being advanced in front of Armi- 
stead’s brigade, was attacked and easily driven back by three 
of his regiments. These followed the fugitives a short dis¬ 
tance and occupied advanced ground, in a swale which 
afforded some shelter. This affair was considered a sue- 


— 836 — 


The Escape—Battle of Malvern Hill 


cess, and it was also reported to Lee as he was returning 
from his reconnaissance with Longstreet. Had Sumner’s 
movement, and the advance and easy retreat of the Federal 
skirmishers, been planned as a ruse to decoy us into a 
charge, its success would have been brilliant. That part of 
our plan which had called for a tremendous preliminary 
cannonade was forgotten. Lee believed that his enemy was 
retreating and about to escape him, and he hastened to 
send a verbal order to Magruder through Capt. Dickinson 
of Magruder’s staff, who wrote the order as follows: 

“Gen. Lee expects you to advance rapidly. He says it is re¬ 
ported the enemy is getting: off. Press forward your whole line 
and follow up Armistead’s .success.” 

Under Magruder’s orders, the advance was commenced 
by Wright’s Ga., and La. brigade, followed by Mahone’s 
Va. brigade, both of Huger’s division. These two brigades 
formed our extreme right, and went into action only about 
2500 strong, many stragglers having been lost from the 
ranks in the marchings and skirmishes of the three pre¬ 
vious days. 

To the left of Wright, was Armistead of Huger’s divi¬ 
sion, followed by Cobb’s and Semmes’s brigades. In sup¬ 
port of these were all the rest of Magruder’s and Huger’s 
10 brigades, Ransom, of Holmes’s division, being also tem¬ 
porarily attached to Huger. Farther to the left came D. 
H. Hill’s five brigades. Magruder’s brigades consumed a 
little time in developing a full roar of musketry, but no 
sooner was it heard than D. H. Hill’s division was also put 
in. 

Fitz-John Porter, in Battles and Leaders, thus de¬ 
scribes the opening of the battle from the Federal point of 
view: 

“The spasmodic, though sometimes formidable, attack of our 
antagonists, at different points along our whole front, up to about 
four o’clock were, presumably, demonstrations or feelers preparatory 
to their engaging in more serious work. An ominous silence, sim¬ 
ilar to that which had preceded the attack in force at Gaines’ Mill, 
now intervened, until, at about 5:30 o’clock, the enemy opened upon 
both Morell and Couch with artillery from nearly the whole of his 
front, and soon after pressed forward in columns of infantry, first 
on one, then on the other, or on both. 


— 837 — 


Military Memoirs of a Confederate 


“As if moved by a reckless disregard of life equal to that dis¬ 
played at Gaines Mill, with a determination to capture our army or 
destroy it by driving us into the river, brigade after brigade rushed 
at our batteries; but the artillery of both Morell and Couch mowed 
them down with shrapnel, grape, and canister, while our infantry, 
withholding their fire until the enemy were in short range, scat¬ 
tered the remnants of their columns, sometimes following them up 
and capturing prisoners and colors.” 

One can scarcely read the full story of this charge 
without believing that, made early in the day with the aid 
of all our reserve artillery on the flanks and of the 22 bri¬ 
gades of infantry who were spectators, we might, by main 
force, have crushed the enemy’s army as it stood. Porter 
himself, who was practically in command of the field, and 
the most accomplished of the Federal corps commanders, 
records that, at one period of the action, as he rode to bring 
up reenforcements, he felt such apprehensions of soon be¬ 
coming our prisoner, that he took from his pocket and tore 
up his “diary and despatch book of the campaign.” 

That the ground was less unfavorable for an assault 
from our right flank appears from the reports of Wright 
and Mahone, whose small force was not driven back at all, 
but made a lodgment and held their ground all night. Gen. 
Wright reports as follows: 

“At 4:45 o’clock I received an order from Gen. Magruder 
through Capt. Henry Bryan, one of his staff, to advance immedi¬ 
ately and charge the enemy’s batteries. No other troops had yet 
come upon the field. I ordered my men forward, and, springing 
before them, led my brigade, less than 1000 men, against a force I 
knew to be superior in the ratio of at least 20 to 1. Onward we 
pressed, warmly and strongly supported by Gen. Mahone’s brigade, 
under a murderous fire of shot, shell, canister and musketry. At 
every step my brave men fell around me, but the survivors pressed 
on until we had reached a hollow about 300 yards from the enemy’s 
batteries on the *right. Here I perceived that a strong force had 
been sent forward on our left, by the enemy, with a view of flank¬ 
ing and cutting us off from our support, now more than 1000 yards 
in our rear. I immediately threw the left of the 3d Ga. a little back 
along the upper margin of the hollow, and, suddenly changing front 
of the regiment, poured a galling fire upon the enemy, which he 
returned with spirit, aided by a fearful direct and cross-fire from 
his batteries. Here the contest raged with varying success for more 
than three-quarters of an hour; finally the line of the enemy was 
broken and he gave way in great disorder. 

“In the meantime, my front, supported by Gen. Mahone, had 
been subjected, to a heavy fire of artillery and musketry, and had 
begun to waver, and I feared I would be compelled to fall back. 
Just at this moment firing was heard far away to our left, and soon 


— 838 — 


The Escape—Battle of Malvern Hill 


we saw our columns advancing upon the enemy’s centre. This di¬ 
verted a portion of the enemy’s fire from us, and* I succeeded in 
keeping my men steady. We had now approached within a few 
hundred yards of the enemy’s advanced batteries, and I again gave 
the order to charge, which was obeyed with promptness and alacrity. 

“We rushed forward, up the side of the hill under the brow 
of which we had been for some time halted, and dashing over the 
hill, reached another hollow or ravine immediately in front of, and, 
as it were, under the enemy’s guns. This ravine was occupied by a 
line of Yankee infantry posted there to protect their batteries. Upon 
this we rushed with such impetuosity that the enemy broke in great 
disorder and fled. * * * * 

“The firing had now become general along the left and centre 
of our line, and night setting it, it was difficult to distinguish 
friend from foe. 

“Several of my command were killed by our own friends, who 
had come up on our immediate left, and who commenced firing long 
before they came within range of the enemy. This firing upon us 
from our friends, together with the increasing darkness, made our 
position peculiarly hazardous, but I determined to maintain it at all 
hazards, as long as a man should be left to fire a gun. The fire was 
terrific now,' beyond anything I had ever witnessed,—indeed, the 
hideous shrieking of shells through the dusky gloom of closing night, 
the loud and incessant roll of artillery and small-arms, were enough 
to make the stoutest heart quail. Still my shattered little command, 
now reduced to less than 300, with about an equal number of Gen. 
Mahone’s brigade, held our positions under the very muzzles of the 
enemy’s guns, and poured volley after volley with murderous preci¬ 
sion into their serried ranks. * * * * 

“Just at this time a portion of Col. Ramseur’s 49th N. C. regi¬ 
ment, having got lost upon the field, was hailed by me and ordered 
to fall in with my brigade. A strong picket was advanced all around 
our isolated position, and the wearied, hungry soldiers threw them¬ 
selves upon the earth to snatch a few hours’ rest. Detachments were 
ordered to search for water and administer to our poor wounded 
men, whose cries rent the air in every direction. Soon the enemy 
were seen with lanterns, busily engaged in moving their killed and 
wounded, and friend and foe freely mingled on that gloomy night in 
administering to the wants of wounded and dying comrades. * * * * 

“Early on the morning of July 2, Gen. Ewell rode upon the 
field and coming to the position where my men lay, I reported to 
him and was relieved from further watching on the field. * * * * 
My loss in this engagement was very severe, amounting to 55 killed, 
243 wounded, and 64 missing (total 362). I have no means of deter¬ 
mining the loss of the enemy, though I am satisfied it was very 
heavy.” 

Gen. Mahone reports that his brigade carried into ac¬ 
tion 1226 and lost 39 killed, 164 wounded, and 120 missing 
(total 323). 

Wright’s report gives a clear idea of the fighting upon 
our right flank. Next, on the left, Semmes and Kershaw 
also made, perhaps, the farthest advance of the attack* 
actually getting among the enemy’s guns, where lay the 


— 839 — 


Military Memoirs of a Confederate 


body of a handsome young Louisiana officer, next morn¬ 
ing, the farthest jetsam of the red wave which had stained 
all the green fields of our advance. Both of these brigades 
had been forced to fall back, not so much from the fire of 
the enemy in their front, as from that of their friends far¬ 
ther on the left, advancing on converging lines in the dusk. 
There were more troops concentrated in the forest in a 
small space than could be well handled, even in daylight; 
and the plateau over which their charge was to be made, 
when they got free of the wood, was so bare of shelter, and 
swept by such fire of musketry and artillery, that not a 
single brigade faced it long without being driven back. 
The official reports show that in the storm and smoke 
around them single brigades often thought themselves to 
be the only ones engaged. 

D. H. Hill, whose advance was across the plateau, thus 
describes the attack by this division: 

“While converging with my brigade commanders, shouting was 
heard on our right, followed by the roar of musketry. We all agreed 
upon, and I ordered my division to advance. This, as near as I 
could judge, was about an hour and a half before sundown. * * * * 

“The division fought heroically and well, but fought in vain. 
Garland, in my immediate front, showed all his wonted courage and 
enthusiasm, but he needed and asked for reenforcements. I sent 
Lt.-Col. Newton, 6th Ga., to his support, and, observing a brigade 
by a fence in our rear, I galloped back to it and found it to be that 
of Gen. Toombs. I ordered it forward to support Garland, and ac¬ 
companied it. The brigade advanced handsomely to the brow of 
the hill, but soon retreated in disorder. Gordon, commanding Rodes's 
brigade, pushed gallantly forward and gained considerable ground, 
but was forced back. The gallant and accomplished Meares, 3d 
N. C., Ripley's brigade, had fallen at the head of his regiment, and 
that brigade was streaming to the rear Colquitt's and Anderson’s 
brigades had also fallen back. Ransom’s brigade had come up to 
my support from Gen. Huger. It moved too far to the left and be¬ 
came mixed up with a mass of troops near the parsonage on the 
Quaker road, suffering much and effecting little. Gen. Winder was 
sent up by Gen. Jackson, but he came too late, and also went to the 
same belt of woods near the parsonage, already overcrowded with 
troops. Finally Gen. Ewell came up, but it was after dark, and 
nothing could be accomplished. I advised him to hold the ground 
he had gained and not to attempt a forward movement.” 

Gen. Toombs's account of the advance of his brigade 
will give some idea of the confusion of commands upon 
the field after the battle was in full tide: 


— 840 — 


The Escape—Battle of Malvern Hill 


“Accordingly, I advanced rapidly in line of battle through the 
dense woods, intersected by ravines, occasionally thick brier patches, 
and other obstructions, guided only by the enemy’s fire in keeping 
direction, frequently retarded and sometimes broken, by troops in 
front of me, until the command reached the open field on the elevated 
plateau immediately in front of, and in short range of the enemy’s 
guns. Here, coming up with a portion of the troops which I was 
ordered to support, I halted my line for the purpose of rectifying 
it and of allowing many of the troops whom I was to support, to pass 
me and form. These objects were but imperfectly accomplished by 
me, as well as by the rest of the troops within my view, from the 
great confusion and disorder in the field—arising much from the 
difficulties of the ground over which they had to pass, and in part 
from the heavy fire of grape and canister and shells, which the 
enemy’s batteries were pouring in upon them. But, having accom¬ 
plished what could be done of this work, I ordered my brigade to ad¬ 
vance. It moved forward steadily and firmly until it came up with 
the troops in advance, who had halted. I then ordered it to halt, 
and ordered the men to lie down, which they did, and received the 
enemy’s fire for a considerable time, when an order was repeated 
along my line, coming from the left, directing the line to oblique to 
the left. This order I immediately and promptly countermanded as 
soon as it reached the part of the line where I stood, and arrested it 
in part. I saw that the immediate effect of the movement was to 
throw the troops into the woods and ravines on the left of the plateau, 
and necessarily throw them into great confusion. * * * * 

“In the meantime Gen. Kershaw came into the field with his bri¬ 
gade, near one of my regiments, the 2d Ga., which still remained in 
very good order; and my adjutant, Capt. Du Bose, proposed to him 
to unite that, and some other companies of other regiments, with his 
command in the attack on the enemy’s batteries, to which he as¬ 
sented; and this command, under Cols. Butt and Holmes, accom¬ 
panied by Capt. Du Bose and Maj. Alexander (my quartermaster 
who acted as one of my aides on the field) advanced with Gen. Ker¬ 
shaw’s brigade beyond the edge of the wood into the open field, but, 
under the destructive fire of the enemy’s cannon and small-arms, 
wavered and fell back into the road skirting the pine thicket. * * * * 
“My losses were very severe, the total being 194 killed and 
wounded, out of about 1200 carried into action. I am happy to add 
that the disorders which did arise were due rather to the difficulties 
of the ground, and the nature of the attack, than from any other 
cause, and that as far as my observation went, they extended to all 
troops engaged on the plateau in front of the enemy’s guns. This is 
further evidenced by the fact that at roll-call next morning, over 
800 of my command answered to their names, leaving under 200 un¬ 
accounted for, many of whom soon made their appearance.” 

There is no doubt that the entire force which had been 
engaged was wrecked for the time being, and that, had 
the enemy been in position for a counterstroke, the frag¬ 
ments could have made but little opposition. But A. P. Hill 
and Longstreet were close in rear, and Whiting's, Jackson’s 
and Ewell’s divisions were on the left, and Holmes a few 
miles off on the right. The enemy, moreover, having sent 


— 841 — 


Military Memoirs of a Confederate 

ahead of all of their trains, were now very low both in am¬ 
munition and provisions, and could scarcely have ventured 
anything serious. 

Whiting’s division had suffered 175 casualties in its 
two brigades, and 19 in Hampton’s brigade, from the 
enemy’s artillery fire, while lying in support of our artillery 
in Poindexter’s field. Including with these the looses in 
Jackson’s and Ewell’s divisions and Lawton’s brigade, the 
casualties were 599. In Magruder’s division the casualties 
were 2014, and in Huger’s, including Ransom’s brigade, 
1609. In Rode’s, Colquitt’s and Ripley’s brigades of D. H. 
Hill’s division, the casualties were making 889, a total, so 
far of 5111. The other two brigades, Anderson’s and Gar¬ 
land’s, report only their total casualties for the campaign as 
863 and 844, a total of 1707. A half, 854, is a moderate 
estimate for their losses at Malvern. 

This would make our total losses 5965 or more; those 
of the dnemy could scarcely have reached 2000, but the cas¬ 
ualties of different battles are not separated. 

Of Jackson’s part in this action there is very little to 
be said. He took no initiative, though complying promptly 
with orders or requests as received. But ha"d he been the 
Jackson of the Valley, being on the left flank that morning, 
he would have turned Malvern Hill by his left, and taken 
position commanding the road somewhere beyond Turkey 
Creek. Malvern should not have been attacked; only the 
enemy observed and held by Longstreet, while Jackson got 
a position which they would be forced to assault. 

Lee’s report sums up the subsequent operations, briefly 
as follows: 

“On July 2, it was discovered that the enemy had withdrawn 
during the night, leaving the ground covered with his dead and 
wounded, and his route exhibiting abundant evidence of precipitate 
retreat. The pursuit commenced, Gen. Stuart with his cavalry in 
the advance, but a violent storm which prevailed throughout the 
day greatly retarded our progress. The enemy, harassed and fol¬ 
lowed closely by the cavalry, succeeded in gaining Westover and 
the protection of his gunboats. He immediately began to fortify 
his position, which was one of great natural strength, flanked on 
each side by a creek, and the approach to his front commanded by 
the heavy guns of his shipping in addition to those mounted in his 
intrenchments. It was deemed inexpedient to attack him, and in view 


— 842 — 


The Escape—Battle of Malvern Hill 

of the condition of our troops, who had been marching and fight¬ 
ing almost incessantly for seven days, under the most trying circum¬ 
stances, it was determined to withdraw in order to afford them the 
repose of which they stood so much in need.” 

One episode of the pursuit, however, is worthy of 
note. On July 2, but little progress was made by the in¬ 
fantry, owing to the heavy rain-storm, but Stuart's cav¬ 
alry (which had recrossed the Chickahominy by fording 
at Gorge Bridge on the afternoon of July 1) followed the 
enemy and endeavored to shell his columns wherever op¬ 
portunity offered. About 5 P. M. the last of these columns 
had arrived at its destination on the James River, Harri¬ 
son’s Landing,—a peninsula about four miles long by one 
and a half mile wide, formed by Herring Creek on the 
northeast, running for that distance nearly parallel to the 
James before emptying into it. At its head a small inlet 
from the river on the southwest left but a narrow front 
exposed to attack. 

But, across Herring Creek, an extensive plateau called 
Evelington Heights dominates the upper part of this pen¬ 
insula so that if held by artillery the enemy would be 
forced to attack at a disadvantage—the creek being im¬ 
passable for some distance above. During Wednesday 
night, Stuart, received a report from Pelham, commanding 
his artillery, describing this position and recommending its 
being seized. He forwarded the report to Lee, through 
Jackson, and early on the 3d, with a few cavalry and a 
single howitzer, nearly out of ammunition, he ran off a 
Federal squadron and took possession of the heights. It 
is a pity that there was any ammunition, for Stuart writes 
that— 

“the howitzer was brought in action in the river road to fire 
upon the enemy’s camp below. Judging from the great commotion 
and excitement below, it must have had considerable effect.” 

It did have considerable effect of a most unfortunate 
kind for us. It awaked the enemy to instant appreciation 
of the fact that it was essential for him to hold that ground, 
and that it behooved him to take it before we brought up 
any more force. A military lesson is to be learned from 


— 843 — 


Military Memoirs of a Confederate 

the result, to wit, that dangers lurk in excess of en¬ 
terprise as well as in its deficiency. In this campaign our 
cavalry affords two instances, Stuart’s zeal, without neces- 
ity, led him to make the circuit of McClellan’s army, June 
11-15. The result was that McClellan was prepared to 
change his base to the James River as soon as he found Lee 
threatening his communications. Now, the temptation to 
shell a camp and wagon trains loses to our army its last 
chance to take a position which would compel the enemy to 
assume the offensive. One howitzer could, of course, ac¬ 
complish nothing but to alarm the enemy, and precipitate 
their attack. 

When Stuart opened fire, he thought that both Long- 
street and Jackson were near. In fact, neither was within 
miles. Jackson had been sent in direct pursuit, being near¬ 
est the most direct roads, and his troops having been least 
engaged during the Seven Days. Two of the four brigades 
of his own division had been so little exposed as to have 
had together but two killed and 26 wounded, in the whole 
campaign. His 3d brigade, Winder’s had had but 75 cas¬ 
ualties at Gaines Mill, and 104 at Malvern Hill. Lawton’s 
brigade, and Ewell’s and Whiting’s divisions, had only been 
severely engaged at Gaines Mill. 

Longstreet, with A. P. Hill’s and his own divisions, 
was on the 2d moved around the field of battle to Poindex¬ 
ter’s house, and on the 3d was sent by roads to. the left of 
Jackson. By mistake of the guides he was conducted too 
far to the left, and only reached Evelington Heights about 
dark on the 3d; Jackson’s troops came up at the same time 
by the direct road. 

Jackson’s official report says: 

“On the morning of the 3d, my command arrived near the land¬ 
ing and drove in the enemy’s skirmishers,” but the date is shown 
by all other reports to be a clerical error for the 4th. 

Had Stuart not opened fire, the enemy would not have 
disturbed him that day. During it McClellan wrote to the 
Secretary of War, as follows: 


— 844 — 


The Escape—Battle of Malvern Hill 


“I am in hopes the enemy is as completely worn out as we are. 
He was certainly very severely punished in the last battle. The 
roads are now very bad. For these reasons I hope we shall now 
have enough breathing space to reorganize and rest the men, and 
get them into position before the enemy can attack again. * * * * It 
is, of course, impossible to estimate, as yet, our losses, but I doubt 
whether there are today more than 50,000 men with their colors.” 

By the next morning 21 Confederate brigades had ar¬ 
rived and would have been upon Evelington Heights had 
Stuart not forced the enemy to come over and oceupy them. 
McClellan’s 50,000 men could then have had the task of 
removing them. 

Stuart thus describes his resistance: 

“I held the ground from 9 A. M. till 2 P. M., when the enemy had 
contrived to get one battery into position on this side the creek. The 
fire was, however, kept up until a body of infantry was found ap¬ 
proaching by our right flank. I had no apprehension, however, as 
I felt sure Longstreet w-as near by, and, although Pelham had but 
two rounds of ammunition left, I held out, knowing how important 
it was to hold the ground till Longstreet arrived. 

“The enemy’s infantry advanced, apd his battery kept up its 
fire. I just then learned that Longstreet had taken the wrong road 
and was then at Nance’s shop, six or seven miles off. Pelham fired 
his last round, and the sharpshooters, strongly posted in the skirt 
of woods bordering the plateau, exhausted every cartridge, but had 
at last to retire. * * * * The next day, July 4, Gen. Jackson’s com¬ 
mand drove in the enemy’s advanced pickets. I pointed out the 
position of the enemy, now occupying, apparently in force, the plateau 
from which I shelled their camp the day before, and showed him the 
routes by which the plateau, could be reached, to the left, and sub¬ 
mitted my plan for dispossessing the enemy and attacking his camp. 
This was subsequently laid before the commanding general.” 

From the Federal reports it appears that the enemy 
occupied the heights on the afternoon of July 3 with Frank¬ 
lin’s division. The next morning Longstreet was up with 
his own and A. P. Hill’s division and two brigades 
of Magruder’s. Jackson was also up with his own, 
Ewell’s, Whiting’s, and L>. H. Hill’s divisions. Lee did not 
reach the field until noon, and, as Longstreet ranked Jack- 
son, he ordered the enemy’s pickets driven in and prepara¬ 
tion made for an attack. 

A favorable opportunity was presented to regain the 
Evelington Heights by main force. They were occupied 
by but one division, and, being across Herring Creek from 
the rest of the Federal army, it could not have been rapidly 


— 845 — 


Military Memoirs of a Confederate 

reenforced. There would have been very small risk in mak¬ 
ing the effort so earnestly urged by Stuart, for McClellan 
would never have dared a counterstroke, had we failed. 
The enemy’s gunboats could have rendered little assistance, 
as their own camps and lines intervened. Briefly, the 
game seems to have been worth the candle, and it should 
have been played. 

Jackson’s troops, however, were in front, and Jack- 
son protested against the attack, saying that the troops 
were not in proper condition, ajid asking for delay until 
Lee should reach the field. To this Longstreet consented, 
and when Lee arrived, Jackson’s arguments prevailed, and 
the attack was given up. It was entirely unlike Lee, and 
he must have reluctantly yielded to Jackson’s persuasion. 
Evidently Jackson was still not the Jackson of the Valley. 

The next day the troops were moved back toward Rich¬ 
mond, and the campaign was ended. 

The total casualties of the two armies for the Seven 
Days were: 

Confederate: killed 3286, wounded 15,909, missing 946, total 20,141 
Federal: killed 1734, wounded 8,062, missing 6053, total 15,849 

Including the Federal wounded, we took about 10,000 
prisoners and captured 52 guns and about 35,000 muskets. 
We lost two guns in the stampede in Holmes’s division. 

For a week after McClellan had established himself 
at Westover, he neglected to occupy the opposite bank of 
the James. As the fire of the gunboats commanded it, he 
could do so at pleasure, but as long as he did not, it was 
much better for us that he should not. Again, however, 
the temptation to shell a camp proved irresistible, and Lee 
was persuaded to authorize an expedition for the purpose 
under Pendleton’s supervision. 

On July 12 some 47 rifled guns were collected, posi¬ 
tions chosen, and ranges marked for night firing. After 
midnight they opened fire upon the Federal transports, 
wharves, and camps, and used up their small supplies of 
ammunition in a random cannonade. The enemy replied in 
like fashion, both from the shore and from gunboats. Of 


— 846 — 


The Escape—Battle of Malvern Hill 


course, there was much commotion in the Federal camps, 
but the actual damage done was trifling. Some 40 cas¬ 
ualties are reported among the Federals, and two or three 
among the Confederate artillerists. 

The next day the Federals established themselves on 
the South Side. The strategic advantages of a position 
astraddle of the James River have already been referred to 
(page 61, Chap. Ill) but they were not yet generally ap¬ 
preciated. Fortunately for us, Lincoln and Halleck recalled 
McClellan and his army to Washington without ever real¬ 
izing them; although McClellan had tried hard to impress 
them upon his superiors. Fortunately too, for us, Gen. S. 
G. French, in command at Petersburg, saw and appreciated 
the threat of the position, and imjmediately began the con¬ 
struction of a line of intrenchments about that city. These 
intrenchments, in 1864, defeated some attempts at sur¬ 
prise; and at last enabled Beauregard with two divisions, 
to withstand the attack of Grant’s whole army, between 
June 15 and 18 of that year. 

My personal duties during the Seven Days were the 
supervision and distribution of our ammunition supplies. 
Our organized division supply trains and brigade wagons 
worked smoothly and no scarcity was felt anywhere. 

In addition to these duties, I was placed in charge of a 
balloon which had been manufactured in Savannah by Dr. 
Edward Cheves, and sent to Gen. Lee for use in reconnoit- 
ering the enemy’s lines. It was made from silk of many 
patterns, varnished with gutta-percha car-springs dis¬ 
solved in naptha, and inflated at the Richmond Gas Works 
with ordinary city gas. 

I saw the battle of Gaines Mill from it, and signalled 
information of the movement of Slocum’s division across 
the Chickahominy, to reenforce Porter. Ascensions were 
made daily, and when the enemy reached Malvern Hill, the 
inflated balloon would be carried down the river and ascen¬ 
sions made from the deck of a boat. Unfortunately, on 
July 4 y —the boat—the Teaser, a small armed tug—got 
aground below Malvern Hill on a falling tide, and a large 


— 847 — 


Military Memoirs of a Confederate 

Federal gunboat the Maritanza, came up and captured both 
boat and balloon, the crew escaping. 

We could never build another balloon, but my experi¬ 
ence with this gave me a high idea of the possible efficiency 
of balloons in active campaigns. Especially did we find, 
too, that the balloons of the enemy forced upon us constant 
troublesome precautions in efforts to conceal our marches. 

As affording a bird’s-eye view of our organization and 
of the forces engaged in the different actions, and the 
severity of the conflicts, a table of Confederate division 
casualties is attached, showing as accurately as can be 
determined, the losses of each action. The total Federal 
losses in killed and wounded (excluding prisoners) is also 
approximately divided for the principal actions as nearly 
as records permit. 


Division Casualties, Seven Days Before Richmond 


DIVISIONS 

j No. of Brigades 

Mechanicsville 

Gaines Mill 

Savage Station 

Frazier’s Farm 

Malvern Hill 

Other Affairs 

TOTALS 

Wliit.ing's Div. 

2 


1017 



175 


1192 

Jflpksnn’s Div. 

3 


91 



117 


208 

Lawton’s Div. 

1 


492 



75 


667 

Ewell’s Div. 

4 


764 



223 


987 

D. H. Hill’s Div. 

5 

586 

1423 



1743 

15 

3767 

MAGRUDER’S Corps 









D. R. Jones’ Div. 

2 





425 

455 

879 

McLaw’s Div. __ 

' 2 



357 


315 


672 

Magruder’s Div. _ 

2 

mill 

:::::: 

84 


874 

9 

967 

Longstreet’s Div._ 

6 


1883 


2555 



4483 

Hngpr’s Div 

3 





1137 

” _ 394 

1531 

A. P. Hill’s Div._ 

6 

764 

2688 


750 

8 

4210 

Holmes’s Div. 

3 





499 

178 

677 

Pendleton’s Art. 







2 

2 

Stuart’s Cav. _ 







71 

71 

Totals -- 








10 Divisions _ _ _ - 

39 

1350 

8358 

441 

3305 

5590 

1124 

20168 

Federal losses (killed 









and wounded only) 


361 

4001 

400 

2034 

2000 

1000 

9796 


—R1S— 











































OFFICIAL RECORDS 


OF THE 

UNION AND CONFEDERATE 
NAVIES 

IN THE 

WAR OF THE REBELLION 


PUBLISHED UNDER THE DIRECTION OF 

The Hon. JOHN D. LONG, Secretary of the Nayy, 

by 

Superintendent Naval War Records 

AND 

MR. ROBERT H. WOODS 


By Authority of an Act of Congress Approved July 31, 1894 


SERIES I—VOLUME 7 

NORTH ATLANTIC BLOCKADING SQUADRON 
From March 8 to September 4, 1862 


WASHINGTON: 
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 
1898 






















































































































































* 














Telegrams and Letters 


[Telegram] 


Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 
Camp Winfield Scott, May 2, 1862 — 9:U5 p. m. 


I think we will be ready for you on Monday, or at latest Tuesday 
night. Will it be possible for you to run up here to-morrow or Sunday 
for an hour or two to arrange final movements? I think your vessel 
should not make its appearance here by daylight, but arrive after dark 
and run through before daybreak. With the aid of the Navy, I think 
a glorious success awaits us. 


Captain John Rodgers, 

U. S. S. Galena , Hampton Roads. 


G. B. McClellan, 

Major-General. 


Letter from Flag-Officer Goldsborough, U. S. Navy, to Major-General 

McClellan, U. S. Army, regarding vessels off Yorktown, Va. 

U. S. Flagship Minnesota, 
Hampton Roads, May 3, 1862. 

Sir: The wooden gunboats may, and probably can, pass the bat¬ 
teries of a dark and otherwise suitable night without being sunk, but 
it must be borne in mind that the move takes them away from their 
supplies of ordnance, fuel, etc., and that they may possibly be com¬ 
pelled to repass them. Smith may not have such a night on the one 
after you open, particularly considering the present stage of the 
moon. 

I was greatly in hopes that before the gunboats should be invited 
to run the gauntlet, Gloucester Point battery would have been turned 
and taken. Then matters would have presented themselves to my 
mind in a much more favorable light. Just as the enemy’s forces are 
pressed at Yorktown, so will the desire increase to get the Merrimack 
and consorts off there, and the more cautious I must be about sending 
vessels away from this; they have been threatening us for several 
days past. Seven vessels of ours are already off Yorktown, and this, 
you are aware, is the full number originally agreed upon between us 
in our conferences as sufficient to answer ends, as then understood; 
but, if events will permit, I will increase the number between now and t 
next Monday night, and as largely as I can consistently with my duty. 

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant, 

L. M. Goldsborough, 

Flag-Officer. 

Major-General Geo. B. McClellan, 

Near Yorktown, Va. 


851 — 




War of the Rebellion 


Letter from Major-General McClellan, U. S. Army, to Commander 
Smith, U. S. Navy, regarding movements of the enemy. 

May 4, 1862. 

[Sir:] I learn that a large part of the rebel force marched to 
Bigler’s Mill, on the York River, last night, to take sail from there to 
West Point, [Va.]. It is of the first importance to my operations 
that some of your gunboats hurry up to West Point to destroy the 
transportation and report to me the state of affairs. 

Franklin’s division will be ready to go up under convoy of the 
other gunboats as soon as I can hear from the river. 

Geo. B. McClellan, 
Major-General, Commanding. 

Commodore Smith, 

Commanding Fleet. 


[Telegram] 

Headquarters Army Potomac, May U, 1862. 

We have taken Yorktown. I will need the gunboats to move up 
York River. 

G. B. McClellan, 

Major-General. 

Flag-Officer L. M. Goldsborough. 


Letter from Flag-Officer Goldsborough, U. S. Navy, to Major-General 
McClellan, U. S. Army. 

U. S. Flagship Minnesota, 
Hampton Roads, Virginia, May U, 1862. 

With my whole heart I do most cordially congratulate you on your 
brilliant and important achievement. The gunboats shall accompany 
you up York River. 

L. M. Goldsborough, 

Flag-Officer. 

Major-General G. B. McClellan, 

Commanding Army of the Potomac, etc., near Yorktown, Va. 


[Telegram] 

Headquarters Army Potomac, May u, 1862. 


If it appears that West Point is not strongly held, I would suggest 
pushing the Galena and some gunboats up the James River. 


Hon. G. V. Fox. 


G. B. McClellan, 

Major-General. 


— 852 — 





Telegrams and Letters 


[Telegram] 


Headquarters Army Potomac, May 4 , 1862. 


The enemy having evacuated Yorktown, General McClellan has no 
need of the Galena on York River. He would like you to send up 
James River immediately, as far as possible, to harass the enemy as 
much as may be in your power. 


Commodore Goldsborough. 


J. J. Astor, 

Colonel and Aid-de-camp. 


[Telegram] 

• May 4, 1862. 

Bigler’s Wharf is burning. There are no batteries for 12 miles 
up the river. I have sent a steamer to burn the railroad bridge over 
Pamunkey River. 

Smith* 

Major-General McClellan. 


[Telegram] 

May 4, 18£2. 

Steamer Chocura has returned from West Point, [Va.]. No ob¬ 
structions or batteries on the river. No guns or troops at West Point. 
White flag at that place and at other points on the river. The frames 
of two large vessels building at West Point. 

W. Smith. 

Major-General McClellan. 


Cooperation of the Navy with the Army in the operations against 
Yorktown, Va., May 4 to 7, 1862. 

Report of Commander Smith, U. S. Navy, transmitting report of Lieutenant Patterson, 

U. S. Navy. 


U. S. S. Wachusett, 
Yorktown, Va., May 5, 1862. 

Sir: About 7 o’clock yesterday morning we saw an American 
ensign floating over one of the rebel redoubts at Yorktown, and a few 
minutes afterwards I received from General McClellan a telegraphic 
dispatch saying, “Yorktown is in our possession; please run up and 
help us in communicating with Gloucester,” and requesting me to send 
some of the boats up York River to reconnoiter and seize schooners. 

The squadron was immediately underway and stood up the river. 
When near Gloucester I sent Master Whitehead, of this ship, to hoist 


— 853 — 





War of the Rebellion 


the American flag at that place. I then dispatched the Corwin, Lieu¬ 
tenant Commanding Phelps, and Currituck, Acting Master Shank- 
land, to reconnoiter up York River to the distance of 10 or 12 miles; 
the other vessels anchored at this place. 

We found only one small schooner, which had been abandoned; all 
other vessels had gone up the river; some few were still in sight, but 
at a considerable distance. 

At 11 a. m. I received a dispatch from General McClellan re¬ 
questing me to send two boats to reconnoiter as far up as West Point, 
and let the rest escort Franklin’s division, which was to go by water. 
I directed Lieutenant Commanding Patterson in the Chocura. to proceed 
up the river to West Point, taking with him the Corwin (which had 
not yet returned), and to send back the Currituck. 

At 2 p. m. the Currituck returned, and her commander reported 
that he had been about 12 miles up the river; that Bigler’s Wharf, 10 
miles above here, was burning, and he had not seen any batteries on 
the banks. Just as the Currituck returned I received a dispatch from 
General McClellan saying it was of the first importance that some of 
the boats should hurry up and destroy the transportation. I therefore 
dispatched the Currituck, with orders to go up the river and if possi¬ 
ble destroy the railroad bridge over the Pamunkey River, and then 
telegraphed to General McClellan to inform him of what I had done. 

At 4 p. m. I received another dispatch from General McClellan, 
requesting me not to burn the bridge, but to save it if possible. I im¬ 
mediately dispatched Lieutenant Commanding Henry in the Sebago 
up the river, with orders, when he should meet the Corwin returning 
here, to send her back in pursuit of the Currituck and prevent the 
burning of the bridge. 

At 8 p. m. Lieutenant Commanding Patterson, in the Chocura, 
returned and reported that he had been to West Point; that he had 
not found any batteries or soldiers at that place, or at any other 
point on the river, but found there a white flag flying, and saw white 
flags flying at many places as he went up the river. I enclose a copy 
of his report. 

At 9:30 p. m. Lieutenant Commanding Henry, in the Sebago, 
returned, having met the Corwin and sent her in pursuit of the 
Currituck. 

The Sebago towed down a small schooner and launch captured by 
the Corwin, having on board four deserters from the rebel camp and 
five men belonging to small vessels in the transport service, all of 
whom had given themselves up to the steamer, and whom I have to-day 
transferred to the provost marshal; also ten negroes who had given 
themselves up and whom I have transferred to Colonel Ingalls, at 
Yorktown. 

This forenoon General Franklin’s division are arriving and 
anchoring here, preparatory to a start up the river to-morrow morn¬ 
ing. We will accompany therrf. 

The Corwin and Currituck have not yet returned. 

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant, 

W. Smith, 

Commanding U. S. S. Wachusett, 

Flag-Officer L. M. Goldsborough, 

Comdg. North Atlantic Blockading Squadron, Hampton Roads . 


— 854 — 



Insert this Opposite Page 854 of the Peninsular Source Book 

Abstract log of the U. S. S. Wachusett 

May 4.—At 7:00 A.M. discovered the national flag flying ovex; a 
battery near Yorktown. At 7:40 received a dispatch from General 
McClellan, stating that Yorktown was in possession of the national 
forces. At 8:30 got underway with the rest of the fleet and steamed 
up the river toward Yorktown. Sent the second cutter ashore with 
Master Whitehead to hoist the Union flag on Glouchester Point; he 
did so and returned to the ship. The Corwin and Currituck proceeded 
up the river. The Marantanza went up a short distance and re¬ 
turned with a rebel schooner. At 11:15 sent second cutter ashore with 
Lieutenant Fleming and a guard of marines to occupy Gloucester 
Point. At 6:10 P.M. got underway and dropped down the river nearer 
Gloucester Point. At 9 the Sebago returned to her anchorage with 
a prize schooner. At 9 the second cutter returned from Gloucester 
Point with our marines, the officer in charge having delivered the 
forts to Colonel Stryker. In the forts at Gloucester were the follow¬ 
ing pieces or ordnance, all spiked: In the forts on the heights: Rifled 
guns, —; Dahlgren guns, IX inch, —; 42 pounder carronades, —; 32 
pounder 27 cwt, —. In the water battery, —. In the batteries were 
found abundance of shot, grape, and unloaded shell. The ammunition, 
or part, has been poured into the wells inside the works. But few 
arms were found, and those of the poorest kind, fowling pieces gen¬ 
erally. In the water battery were three furnaces for heating shot; 
they had been filled with shot and left; some of the shot were hot 
when Lieutenant Fleming took possession. 

May 7.—Off West Point. At 1:15 P.M. Went to quarters and 
fired six shell from Xl-inch guns and some from rifled guns. Drove 
the enemy who had attacked General Franklin from their position. A 
large number of troops arrived. 












































. 




















- "• 

- - - V. . . ‘ • » . - • 
















































Telegrams and Letters 


[Enclosure] 

U. S. Steam Gunboat Chocura, 

Off Yorktown, Va., May U, 1862. 

Sir: I have the honor to report that in obedience to your order 
of this morning I left Gloucester Point at noon, and at 1:30 was joined 
by Lieutenant Commanding Thomas S. Phelps in the Corwin. 

We proceeded up York River, prepared for action, but found 
every house deserted, apparently, except by females and negroes; a 
white flag was displayed as we approached. 

Bigler’s Wharf we found burning at each end, and in the im¬ 
mediate vicinity, from two buildings, hospital flags were flying. 
Zantzinger’s wood and coal wharf, above Bigler’s, and on the opposite 
side, is destroyed in several places. 

On reaching West Point the narrow, intricate channel and shoal 
water prevented my approaching in this vessel as near as I would 
have wished, and it was too late to do so in boats, but I could easily 
distinguish the frames of two vessels (apparently intended for gun¬ 
boats) on fire, and partially consumed. 

Near the point is a small water battery with three embrasures 
which was deserted, and I think without any armament. Here also a 
white flag was displayed. 

There are no obstructions in the channel of the river, nor batteries 
on its banks. 

Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 

T. H. Patterson, 
Lieutenant , Commanding. 

Commander W. Smith, 

U. S. S. Wachusett, off Yorktown, Va. 


Report of Commander Smith, U. S. Navy, forwarding reports of Lieutenant Phelps 
and Acting Master Shankland, U. S. Navy. 

U. S. S. Wachusett, 

West Point, York River, May 7, 1862. 

Sir: On the afternoon of the 5th instant there was considerable 
fighting between our forces and the rebels about 6 miles above York¬ 
town. At 8 p. m. General McClellan sent an aid to request me to send 
two of the gunboats off the mouth of Queen’s Creek, about 6 miles up 
the river, to shell the rebels, who, it was thought, were endeavoring to 
turn his flank. I immediately dispatched Lieutenant Commanding 
Nicholson with the Marblehead and Lieutenant Commanding McCann 
with the Maratanza to perform the duty. Before the gunboats 
reached the station the firing had ceased, and at 9:30 p. m. General 
McClellan telegraphed to General Franklin that our troops were 10 
miles from Yorktown. 

At 7 a. m., on the 6th, the transports conveying General Frank¬ 
lin’s division began to move up the river to West Point, under the 
escort of this ship, the Chocura, and Sebago. At 1:15 p. m. I anchored 
here with a part of the transports and the remainder of them arrived 
in the course of the afternoon. The landing of the troops was im¬ 
mediately begun, and is still going on; we are assisting them. I found 


— 855 — 



War of the Rebellion 


here the steamer Corwin, Lieutenant Commanding Phelps, and Curri¬ 
tuck, Acting Master Shankland. From these officers I received re¬ 
ports, of which I forward herewith copies. 

The prisoners were delivered to the provost-marshal at Yorktown. 

Last evening I sent the Currituck up the Pamunkey River to 
endeavor to capture some schooners reported to be there. She re¬ 
turned this morning, and her commander made me a report of his 
proceedings, of which I enclose herewith a copy. 

About 1 p. m. to-day some of the enemy opened fire from some 
field-pieces, placed on a hill on the left flank of the camp. Our vessels 
immediately commenced shelling them, and in few minutes they 
retired, no damage having been done to our people. 

I sent Lieutenant Commanding Phelps in the Corwin up the Mat- 
tapony River to-day to learn something of a party of rebels reported to 
be crossing that river. He returned this evening and reports that he 
went up the river 26 miles and ascertained that about 4,000 rebels 
passed last night across at Dunkirk Bridge. Soldiers were deserting 
rapidly; white flags were flying on the banks. 

A deserter who came in last night reports that 40,000 rebels are in 
the neighborhood. 

We have several prize vessels, all of them small and of little value. 
What disposition shall I make of them? 

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant, 

W. Smith, 

Commanding U.S. Gunboat Wachusett. 

Flag-Officer L. M. Goldsborough, 

Comdg. North Atlantic Blockading Squadron, Hampton Roads. 


[Enclosure No. 1J 


U. S. S. Corwin, 

West Point, Va., May 5, 1862. 

Sir: I deem it necessary to place before you as early as prac¬ 
ticable the following items of information which I obtained from pris¬ 
oners who appear to be friendly to the Union, and who, as they state, 
were forced to serve the rebels against their wishes, viz: 

Eight feet of water can be carried up the Masapony [Mattapony] 
River to about 5 miles above Walkertown [Walkerton], but this river 
has been closed by sinking.several schooners in the channel a short 
distance above West Point. 

In the Pamunkey, 9 or 10 feet can be carried to the railroad 
bridge, but they have fifty vessels, mostly schooners, which they com¬ 
menced to sink on yesterday near a place called the White House, or 
at Indian Town. 

The rebels are prepared to destroy the railroad bridge, having 
saws and combustibles ready for this purpose. 

The enemy are falling back upon the Chickahominy near Rich¬ 
mond, where they are fortified, etc.; also they intend to make a stand 
between Fredericksburg and Richmond, probably at the junction of 
the Virginia Central and Fredericksburg railroads, or near Chester¬ 
field, and from Yorktown back to the Warwick and Williamsburg. 


— 856 — 




Telegrams and Letters 


General Johnston is supposed to have 125,000 men on the peninsula 
and has fallen back where he can escape being cut up by the naval 
forces. 

This was decided upon in a council of war held at Yorktown on his 
taking command. 

A new ironclad steamer superior to the Virginia, to be called the 
Brandywine, was launched at Norfolk some eighteen days since (to 
be commanded by Captain Pegram) and is thought to be nearly ready. 
There have been also several other gunboats fitted for service. 

The channel near the naval hospital at Norfolk, Va., is obstructed 
nearly all the way across, leaving only room sufficient for the Vir¬ 
ginia to pass through, and the old frigate United States is in readi¬ 
ness to be sunk in the gap if necessary. 

I am informed that six gunboats (partially built) and the York 
River light-boat were destroyed on yesterday. 

I am respectfully, your obedient servant, 

Thos. S. Phelps, 

Lieutenant, U. S. Navy, Commanding. 

Captain Wm. Smith, 

Comdg. Div. North Atlantic Blockading Squadron, York River. 

Additional, and I believe reliable: 

General Johnston and General Magruder are falling back to Han¬ 
over Court-House, [Va.], 13 miles from Richmond, to take up their 
line of defense on the Chickahominy. About 4,000 of the enemy have 
endeavored to cross the Mattapony River in this vicinity, but were 
prevented by the presence of our force, and they are pushing farther 
up the country. There are at present about 2,000 within 3 miles of us. 

Some distance back inland, on the south side of the river (during 
the night), we observed the camp fires of the enemy, extending about 
a mile in length. 

I am, respectfully, 

T. S. Phelps. 


[Enclosure No. 2] 


U. S. S. Corwin, 

West Point, York River, Virginia, May 5, 1862. 

Sir: I respectfully report that in obedience to your order of the 
4th instant, accompanied by the Currituck, Captain Shankland, I pro¬ 
ceeded up York River at full speed, white flags being displayed on the 
north bank as we advanced; when near King’s Creek, discovered a 
company of the rebel cavalry on the south side of the river, who were 
driven off by ou¥ shells, and it is believed that three saddles were 
emptied. Continuing on, discovered Bigler’s Wharf to be on fire, and 
two schooners, one sloop, and a launch, loaded with stores and officers’ 
effects, endeavoring to escape. Succeeded in capturing one schooner 
and the launch, when the others were abandoned and fired by the 
rebels and were destroyed. 

Having reached the town of Cappahosic, where white flags were 
displayed, and feeling that my instructions would not warrant a 
farther advance to westward, I turned the vessels downstream in¬ 
tending to secure the various schooners at anchor which we had passed. 


— 857 — 



War of the Rebellion 


After capturing a small sloop, Captain Patterson arrived and 
directed me to cover his steamer while he made a reconnoissance near 
West Point. When that duty was accomplished we again started down 
the river, capturing another schooner, and when near Bigler’s Wharf 
I met the Sebago, Captain Henry, who delivered your instructions to 
prevent the Currituck from destroying the railroad bridge, which duty 
I was enabled successively to accomplish. 

On my arrival at West Point at 9:30 p. m. Captain Shankland 
reported that he had landed, taken possession, and hoisted the Ameri¬ 
can flag. 

Six white men were captured in the prizes; one I retained to act 
as pilot and the others I sent to you by Captain Henry, as they had 
information of importance to communicate which I deemed necessary 
for you to have at the earliest moment. 

I am, respectfully, your obedient servant, 

Thomas S. Phelps, 
Lieutenant, U S. Navy, Commanding. 

Commander Wm. Smith, U. S. Navy, 

Comdg. Division of North Atlantic Blockading Squadron, 

U. S. S. Wachusett. 


U. S. S. Maratanza, 

Off West Point, May 7, 1862. 

Sir: About 11:15 this morning, hearing the sound of heavy firing 
in the rear of this place, I proceeded on board the Wachusett for the 
purpose of finding means to join my command, which I had passed on 
my way to report to you and to receive your instructions. 

About half past 11 General Franklin telegraphed for the assist¬ 
ance of the gunboats, stating that he was attacked by a large force of 
the enemy and wanted immediate support. At this time the Maratanza 
was anchored about 2J miles below, engaged in towing off the Marble¬ 
head. 

Receiving your orders to go aboard the Maratanza and bring the 
vessel into action, I proceeded at once in your gig for this purpose. 
Immediately upon getting on board I weighed anchor, cleared for 
action, and, when abreast of and as close to the position of the enemy 
as we could get, I opened fire with the 100-pounder Parrott, about 
which time the Sebago also opened. The fire was kept up for about 
three-quarters of an hour (this vessel remaining under way) with 
terrible and telling effect upon the enemy, whose fire soon began to 
slacken, and they commenced retreating. At 2:22 p. m. ceased firing 
and anchored. 

It is the generally received opinion, so I gather from the officers 
and men composing General' Franklin’s command, that the accurate 
and destructive fire of the gunboats was greatly instrumental in saving 
the army from serious reverse and disaster. I found the use of the 
army signals on this occasion invaluable. 

Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 

T. H. Stevens, 
Lieutenant, Commanding. 

Commander Wm. Smith, 

Comdg. U. S. S. Wachusett, and Senior Officer Present. 


— 858 — 



Telegrams and Letters 


[Telegram] 

Headquarters Department Potomac, May 5, 1862. 

Sir: Your communication* of to-day just received. West Point 
is not occupied by the enemy, so that, important as it is to me to send 
vessels up James River, of course defer to your judgment. I will com¬ 
municate further after I return from the front. 

Geo. B. McClellan, 

Major-General. 

Flag-Officer L. M. Goldsborough, 

Hampton Roads. 


[Telegram] 


Navy Department, 

Washington, May 7, 1862. 

The Department desires to afford every possible aid to the 
movements of General McClellan, and endeavor to harass the retreat 
of the rebels whenever they can be reached by gunboats. 

Gideon Welles, 
Secretary of Navy. 

Flag-Officer L. M. Goldsborough, 

Hampton Roads. 


Order of the President of the United States to Flag-Officer Goldsbor¬ 
ough, U. S. Navy, regarding the sending of gunboats up the James 
River. 

Fort Monroe, Va., May 7, 1862. 

Sir: Major-General McClellan telegraphs that he has ascertained 
by a reconnoissance that the battery at Jamestown has been abandoned, 
and he again requests that gunboats may be sent up the James 
River. 

If you have tolerable confidence that you can successfully eontend 
with the Merrimack without the help of the Galena and two accompa¬ 
nying gunboats, send the Galena and two gunboats up the James River 
at once. 

Please report your action on this to me at once. I shall be found 
at General Wool’s headquarters. 

Your obedient servant, 

A. Lincoln. 

Flag-Officer Goldsborough. 


*Not found. 


- 859 - 





War of the Rebellion 

Letter from the Secretary of the Treasury to Flag-Officer Goldsbor- 
ough, U.S. Navy, regarding the sending of gunboats up the James 
River . 

May 7, 1862. 

Dear Commodore: The President has read me the note he has 
addressed to you. Should it result in your sending the Galena, as in¬ 
dicated, may I ask the favor, unless you think it really injudicious, of 
letting the Stevens [Naugatuck ] go with the Galena. 

Yours truly, 

S. P. Chase, 

Secretary of the Treasury. 


Letter from Flag-Officer Goldsborough, U. S. Navy, to the Secretary of 
the Treasury, regarding the sending of gunboats up the James 

U. S. Flagship Minnesota, 
Hampton Roads, Virginia, May 7, 1862 — 9:30 p. m. 

My Dear Sir: I really do think it injudicious, for various reasons 
which I will explain to you hereafter, to send the Stevens with the 
Galena, but, if you insist upon it, of course, she shall go. 

Most truly and faithfully, yours, 

L. M. Goldsborough. 

Hon. S. P. Chase, 

Fortress Monroe. 


Order of Flag Officer Goldsborough, XJ. S. Navy, to Captain Rodgers , 
U.S. Navy, commanding U.S.S. Galena, to proceed with gunboats 
up the James River. 

U. S. Flagship Minnesota, 
Hampton Roads, May 7, 1862. 

Sir: Proceed with the Galena, Aroostook, and Port Royal up the 
James River, and with them do all that may be in your power to assist 
the army under command of Major-General McClellan, and endeavor 
to harass the retreat of the rebels wherever they can be reached. 
Inform the commanders of the Aroostook and Port Royal that it is my 
orders that they accompany you with their respective vessels, and act 
implicitly under your instructions. It is the desire of the President of 
the United States that the expedition should start at once, to-night. 

In the discharge of this highly important duty I, of course, leave 
all details entirely to your own discretion, in which I have every con¬ 
fidence. 

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant, 

L. M. Goldsborough, 

Flag-Officer . 

Commander John Rodgers, 

U. S. S. Galena, Hampton Roads, Virginia. 


—860 




Telegrams and Letters 


• [Telegram] 

McClellan’s [Headquarters], June 15, 1862. 

Have you not two more light-draft gunboats that you can send up 
the York River? It is important that more gunboats should be there to 
protect the transports, etc. 

G. B. McClellan, 

Major-General. 

Flag-Officer Goldsborough. 

P. S.—General Dix please forward. 


LTelegram] 

U.S. Flagship Minnesota, 

Norfolk, Va., June 16, 1862. 

Every available gunboat of light draft that I now have at my com¬ 
mand is up either the James or York River. I may have a couple more 
in a day or two, and then I will endeavor to accommodate you. 

L. M. Goldsborough. 

Major-General McClellan. 


[Telegram] 

Fort Monroe, June 16, 1862 — 3:30 p. m. 

Major-General McClellan desires me to request you to send with¬ 
out delay two additional gunboats to White House, where their services 
are much needed. Please send reply that I may communicate it to 
Major-General McClellan by telegraph. 

John A. Dix, 

Major-General. 

Flag-Officer Goldsborough. 


Letter from Lieutenant-Colonel Ingalls, U. S. Army, to Captain Mur¬ 
ray, U.S . Navy, requesting reconnoissance up the Pamunkey River 
by U. S. S. Currituck. 

White House, Va., June 16, 1862. 

Captain : The General Commanding the Army has sent Colonel 
[William W.] Averell with the Third Pennsylvania Cavalry, and Cap¬ 
tain Hildt, two companies, Regulars, across the river to-night at this 
point, to scout up the peninsula between the Pamunkey and Matta- 
pony, as far as Ellet’s warehouse. 


— 861 — 





War of the Rebellion 


I 


Colonel Averell is anxious that you will direct the Currituck .to 
ascend the river to-night as high as possible and return to her pres¬ 
ent berth to-morrow, in order to keep attention from his column and at 
the same time to perform any service that may suggest itself to the 
captain. 

Very truly, 

Rufus Ingalls, 

Lieutenant-Colonel, Aid-de-Camp, Quartermaster. 

Captain Murray, 

Commanding the Fleet, Present. 


Report of Commander Gillis, U. S. Navy, of affairs up the James River, 

Virginia. 

U. S. Steam Sloop Wachusett, 

James River, Virginia, June 17, 1862. 

- Sir : I respectfully forward several communications for your con¬ 
sideration. Acting Lieutenant Commanding Behm desires to see you 
in relation to some of his crew whose term of service has expired. He 
has taken on board here such articles on requisition as could be fur¬ 
nished; will supply from Brandywine deficiencies. 

I sent the Monitor to relieve the Galena at Sturgeontown. On pas¬ 
sage down the Galena was fired at from bluffs above Turkey Island. 
She returned yesterday to shell the place. The Port Royal accompan¬ 
ied her and returned same evening; she is taking in stores here. We 
are awaiting arrival of coal vessel by Island Belle. 

The Galena returned this morning. Shortly after she had 
anchored our vessels were opened upon from the bluff at City Point (at 
9:45 a. m.) by artillery and small arms. We returned the impertinent 
attack with shell and shrapnel, silenced and drove back the guerrilla 
rebel force. 

It is thought necessary, to make the trial trip for speed of Galena, 
that she should have her coal bunkers filled, and to go down to where 
there may be sufficient water and reach of river to test her speed 
fairly, which will be attended to so soon as coal is procured. 

Herewith please find Lieutenant Commanding Beaumont’s report 
on examination and destruction of enemy’s works along the James¬ 
town [Back?] River, as directed by you. 

I feel quite unwell, therefore excuse my brief report of state of 
affairs here. 

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant, 

John P. Gillis, 

Commander, Comdg. Naval Force, James River, Virginia. 

Flag-Officer L. M. Goldsborough, 

Comdg. North Atlantic Blockading Squadron, Norfolk, Va. 




— 862 — 



Telegrams and Letters 

Order from Flag-Officer Goldsborough, U. S. Navy, to Acting Master 
Hays, U. S. Navy, commanding U. S. S. Morse, to proceed to duty in 
York River, Virginia. 

U. S. Flagship Minnesota, 
Norfolk, Va., June 19, 1862. 

Sir: With as little delay as possible you will proceed up York 
River, Virginia, with the U. S. S. Morse under your command, and 
report to Lieutenant Commanding T. H. Patterson, commanding the 
U. S. S. Chocura, and senior naval officer on the river, for duty in pro¬ 
tecting the transports on the Pamunkey and otherwise assisting the 
operations of the army, as may be directed. 

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant, 

L. M. Goldsborough, 

Flag-Officer. 

Acting Master Commanding Peter Hays, 

Commanding U. S. S. Morse, Hampton Roads, Virginia. 


Letter from the Assistant Secretary of the Navy to Flag-Officer Golds¬ 
borough regarding proposed destruction of railroad bridge at Peters¬ 
burg. 

Private.] Near Hampton Roads, June 20, \_1862']—11 a.m. 

My Dear Flag-Officer: I received your note with a long growl 
just as I was leaving Washington, and I sent it to Sedgwick and 
Grimes. There is every disposition in the country and Congress to do 
full justice to the Navy, and if the present admiral bill fails in the 
Senate it will be because Navy officers are at work doctoring it. They 
could never pull together is the reason; the Army (a unit) go ahead in 
general legislation. 

The President sent me down to enquire about the possibility of 
destroying the Petersburg railroad bridge. I endeavored to avoid this 
journey, as all the navy bills are before the Senate and House, and I 
feel the deepest interest in them; however, I had to go, so I took the 
Yankee and went directly to City Point, arriving last night at 11:30 
p. m. I returned this morning and proceed directly to Washington 
without going on shore at the fort, unless we are detained to coal. I 
should have called up to Norfolk to see you but for the bills, so you 
must excuse the irregularity for the public good. I stayed three hours 
with Gillis and Rodgers, and left at 3:30 a. m. this day.* 

******* 

Of course I said nothing except to get their opinion about the 
possibility of destroying the bridge. Neither seemed to know much 
about the Appomattox, but Rodgers promises to make all possible en¬ 
quiries. I told them the Government would pay $25,000 or even $50,000 
to have the bridge destroyed. The President considers it of vital im¬ 
portance, and wishes every exertion made to accomplish it immediately. 
My own opinion is that the chances are better with Rodgers than any¬ 
one else. Jenkins will take Gillis’s place, but though a most accom- 


* Matter omitted of a personal nature. 


— 863 — 




War of the Rebellion 


plished officer, he is but one above Rodgers, who has already borne the 
“burden and heat of the day,” and should hardly have anyone to step in 
over him at the last moment. I think you had better write a confidential 
letter to the Department, stating that every exertion will be made to 
destroy this bridge and that a competent force for any emergency is 
placed under Commander Rodgers, which will obviate any mention of 
the matter first in letters from the Department. There is another 
bridge at Swift Creek, 3 miles north of Petersburg, which may answer 
the purpose, unless it is a short one and can be easily replaced. The 
value of this communication destroyed (to our cause) can not be ex¬ 
pressed in words or money, provided it is done before McClellan fights. 
Are you all ready to dash at Caswell? I ask it because Farragut is 
calling for these gunboats and hesitates to attack Fort Morgan with¬ 
out more force. 

Regretting that I am not able to see you, 

Truly, yours, 

G. V. Fox. 

Flag-Officer Goldsborough. 


Order of the Secretary of the Navy to Flag-Officer Goldsborough, U. S. 
Navy, regarding the use of the submarine propeller for the destruc¬ 
tion of the Petersburg Bridge. 

Confidential] ' Navy Department, June 21, 1862. 

Sir: As far as is practicable, you will keep secret the movements 
of the submarine propeller recently from Philadelphia, and take into 
consideration the propriety of her being used on the Appomattox 
River to operate against the Petersburg Bridge. 

Very respectfully, etc., 

Gideon Welles. 

Flag-Officer L. M. Goldsborough, 

Comdg. North Atlantic Blockading Squadron, Norfolk, Va. 


Report of Flag-Officer Goldsborough , U. S. Navy, regarding plans for 
destruction of the railroad bridge at Petersburg, Va. 

U.S. Flagship Minnesota, 

Norfolk, Va., June 21, 1862. 

Sir: I have the honor to submit to you herewith a copy of a con¬ 
fidential letter I have just addressed to Commander Rodgers, in effect, 
with regard to the destruction of the railroad bridge at Petersburg. 
Money may bring about its destruction, but, from my knowledge of the 
existing state of things thereabouts, I doubt whether any mere naval 
force we may employ will be able to do so. 

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant, 

L. M. Goldsborough, 

Flag-Officer, Comdg. North Atlantic Blockading Squadron. 

Hon. Gideon Welles, 

Secretary of the Navy, Washington, D. C. 


— 864 — 




Telegrams and Letters 


I Enclosure] 

Confidential] U. S. Flagship Minnesota, 

Norfolk, Va., June 21, 1862. 

Sir: You will return to this place without delay with the Wachu- 
sett under your command, turning over to Commander Rodgers all the 
orders, instructions, and papers received from me or your predecessor 
with regard to the vessels or management of affairs up James River. 

Say to Commander Rodgers that the President of the United 
States is especially anxious to have the railroad bridge at Petersburg 
destroyed, if possible, and that I wish him to accomplish the object, if 
it can be done. If it can not be done by a force, or rather, if it can 
be done sooner and more certainly by resorting to the use of money, he 
is hereby authorized to use any amount, not exceeding $50,000, that 
may be necessary for the purpose. North of Petersburg, at Swift 
Creek, there is another bridge. If it is not short, and therefore easily 
replaced, its destruction might answer the purpose of cutting off the 
enemy’s retreat in that direction in case the bridge at Petersburg can 
not be destroyed. If, however, both can be destroyed, so much the 
better. A submarine propeller for clearing the obstructions, etc., in 
James River will be sent to Commander Rodgers the moment she ar¬ 
rives here from Philadelphia. She is now hourly expected, and she, 
perhaps, may be used to great advantage in destroying the bridges in 
view. 

In mentioning the above large sum of money as a reward for any 
person or persons who will destroy the bridge at Petersburg, it is done 
rather to impress the great desire of the Department upon the subject 
than hnder the supposition that more, comparatively, than a moderate 
part of it will be necessary to be given. Still, if success can not be 
secured otherwise, the whole amount can be applied. All of the above 
that relates to the bridges in view, both you and Commander Rodgers 
will regard as confidential; for, unless secrecy be observed, the under¬ 
taking will probably prove a failure and the party employed detected. 

Give either this paper or a copy of it to Commander Rodgers, and 
enjoin upon him to lose no time in getting the work it bespeaks done. 
It is of the utmost importance that it should be accomplished before 
the next fight comes off between General McClellan and the rebel army. 

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant, 

L. M. Goldsborough, 

Flag-Officer, Comdg. North Atlantic Blockading Squadron. 

Commander J. P. Gillis, U. S. Navy, 

Commanding TJ. S. S. Wachusett, James River, Virginia. 


Letter from Flag-Officer Goldsborough, U. S. Navy, to the Assistant 
Secretary of the Navy, regarding the railroad bridge at Peters¬ 
burg, Va. 

U. S. Flagship Minnesota, 

Norfolk, Va., June 21,1862. 

My Dear Sir: As far back as the 24th of last month I called at¬ 
tention to the Appomattox railroad bridge at Petersburg, etc., as you 
will perceive by the copy I send you herewith of a letter I then wrote 

—865— 


♦ 



War of the Rebellion 


to Commander Smith. I also send you his statement of a reconnois- 
sance up the Appomattox. Force—naval force—won’t answer there, 
but dollars may. The river is obstructed and defended, and Peters¬ 
burg is kept garrisoned. I have kept myself as well posted as possi¬ 
ble with regard to the Appomattox, Chickahominy, etc., for I long 
since perceived the immense advantage that would result to our cause 
by destroying the railroad bridge at Petersburg. 

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant, 

L. M. Goldsborough, 

Flag-Officer, Commanding North Atlantic Blockading Squadron. 

Hon G. V. Fox, U. S. Navy, 

Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Washington, D. C. 


Report of Commander Rodgers, V. S. Navy, giving reason why railroad 
bridge at Petersburg, Va., can not be destroyed. 

U. S. S. Galena, 

Off City Point, June 22, 1862. 

Sir : I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of 
the 21st instant in regard to burning the railroad bridge at Peters¬ 
burg, Va. * 

The subject had already engaged my attention, and I met the 
following difficulties: 

The gunboats can not send a boat on shore without danger of an 
ambush. Every movement is carefully watched by armed men. We 
are not able to communicate with the inhabitants except with danger 
to them and to us. 

I have concluded that in Norfolk or at Fortress Monroe, where free 
intercourse can be had with Union men, citizens of Virginia, must be 
sought the agents for this work. The Appomattox, scarcely wider 
than a canal, has its channel obstructed by vessels and lighters sunk 
in the bottom of the river. It runs through banks which absolutely 
command any rowboats upon its waters. We can not approach by 
steamers, and rowboats would be destroyed. 

When I last heard from Petersburg, about a month ago, by two 
deserters, there were some 6,000 or 7,000 troops there under General 
Huger. If I see any opportunity of carrying out the subject of your 
letter, I shall zealously do so. 

Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 

John Rodgers, 

Commander. 

Flag-Officer Louis Goldsborough. 

Commanding North Atlantic Blockading Squadron. 




— 866 — 



Telegrams and Letters 


[Telegram] 

McClellan’s Headquarters, June 23, 1862. 

Quite a number of vessels loaded with provisions and forage will 
leave the Pamunkey River within a day or two for James River. The 
general commanding desires that these vessels be convoyed up the 
James and be placed in charge of the gunboats now in that river near 
City Point, or in some secure place near there. 

Stewart Van Vliet, 

Brigadier-General. 

Flag-Officer Goldsborough. 


[Telegram] 

McClellan’s [Headquarters], June 2J+, 1862. 

Have the gunboats which I asked you for some days since, and 
which you expected soon, yet arrived and been sent to the White 
House? It is a matter of great importance that this additional pro¬ 
tection should be given to our depots at the earliest practicable mo¬ 
ment. 

Geo. B. McClellan, 

Major-General. 

Captain Goldsborough, 

Flag-Officer. 


[Telegram] 


Norfolk, June 25, [1862]. 

Your telegram* dated the 23d was received last night. Its word¬ 
ing was so mandatory that I desire to ask you if it is intended as an 
order from your general commanding to me? 

L. M. Goldsborough. 

Brigadier-General Van Vliet. 


[Telegram] 


U. S. Flagship Minnesota, 

Norfolk, Va., June 25, 1862. 


Enquire at the White 
have yet reached there. 


House whether two additional gunboats 

L. M. Goldsborough, 

Flag-Officer. 


Major-General McClellan. 


*See telegram at top of this page. 


— 867 — 






War of the Rebellion 


[Telegram] 

McClellan’s Headquarters, June 25, [1862] — 3:30 p.m. 

(Received June 26.) 

Your telegram just received. I am sorry that you should consider 
my telegram as mandatory, as it was certainly not so intended. The 
commanding general merely desired your cooperation in carrying out 
an important duty. The general is now in front, where a sharp fight is 
going on, or I should submit your telegram to him to be answered. 

Stewart Van Vliet, 

Brigadier-General . 

Flag-Officer Goldsborough. 


[Telegram] 

[U.S.S.] Galena, June 25, 1862. 

Dispatch received; night. Gunboats and false attack on City Point 
and on battery above barriers part of plan. Otherwise rowboats would 
be destroyed. Nothing else can get there. Four thousand troops in 
vicinity of Petersburg, and pickets everywhere. Execution must be 
prompt or a division would come from Richmond. Positive official 
information showing bridge 250 feet long; private, from 50 to 80 
(about 50) high. The banks above command our decks. Men, screened 
by trees, fire and disappear before we can reply. An intolerable an¬ 
noyance. Horse artillery put nine shot through the Jacob Bell and 
got off before assistance could arrive. We can fight when needed, but 
we can not be in the narrow part of the river idle. 

Panther,* on right or west bank of river, has heavy guns. Both 
sides must be taken before we can work at removing obstructions. 

John Rodgers. 

Major-General George B. McClellan. 


[Telegram] 


McClellan’s Headquarters, June 26, 1862 — 1:20 a.m. 


I am informed that the two additional gunboats ordered to the 
White House have arrived at that place. 

Geo. B. McClellan, 
Major-General, Commanding . 


Flag-Officer Goldsborough. 


* Cipher; probably for battery. 


• 868 — 





Telegrams and Letters 


[Telegram] 

Fort Monroe, June 26, 1862. 

Please notify Flag-Officer Goldsborough that there are now here, 
waiting for a convoy up James River, three tugboats, each with four 
schooners in tow. One more steamer with four schooners is momen¬ 
tarily expected. 

C. W. Thomas, 

Captain, etc., [Assistant Quartermaster']. 

Captain Ludlow. 


[Telegram] 

McClellan’s Headquarters, June 26, 1862 — 10:20 a.m. 

Captain Rodgers informs me that he can leave his flotilla for a 
day or two without detriment and would like to communicate pesonally 
with me. Will you do me the favor to give him the permission to come? 

Geo. B. McClellan, 

Major-General. 

Commodore Goldsborough, 

Flag-Officer. 


Letter from Flag-Officer Goldsborough, U. S. Navy, to Major-General 
. McClellan, U. S. Army. 

U. S. Flagship Minnesota, 

Norfolk, Va., June 26, 1862. 

Commander Rodgers is under orders from me to execute an ex¬ 
ceedingly important and delicate duty, requiring his whole attention. 
He must therefore undervalue his services, or the object to be ac¬ 
complished, if he thinks that he can, before that duty is discharged, 
leave his station for a day or two without detriment. Before consent¬ 
ing to his proposition to visit you, I must hear further from him. 

L. M. Goldsborough, 

Flag-Officer. 

Major-General McClellan. 


[Telegram] 

McClellan’s [Headquarters], June 26, 1862 — 2:1+5 p.m. 

I have the honor to forward the following telegraphic correspond¬ 
ence between Flag-Officer Goldsborough and one of my staff-officers: 

Headquarters Army of the Potomac, June 23. 

Quite a number of vessels loaded with provisions and forage will 
leave Pamunkey River within a day or two for James River. The 


— 869 — 





War of the Rebellion 


general commanding desires that these vessels be convoyed up the 
James River and be placed in charge of the gunboats now in that 
river near City Point or at some secure place near there. 

Stewart Van Vliet, 

Brigadier-General. 

Flag-Officer Goldsborough, 

Commanding Naval Station, Fort Monroe. 


Norfolk, June 25. 

Your telegram dated the 23d was received last night. Its word¬ 
ing was so mandatory that I desire to ask you if it is intended as an 
order from your general commanding to me? 

L. M. Goldsborough. 

Brigadier-General Van Vliet. 


Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 

Camp Lincoln, June 25, 1862. 

Your telegram just received. I am sorry that you should consider 
my telegram as mandatory, as it was certainly not intended. The 
commanding general merely desired your cooperation in carrying out 
an important duty. The general is now in front, where a sharp fight 
is going on, or I should submit your telegram to him to be answered. 

Stewart Van Vliet, 

Brigadier-General. 

Flag-Officer Goldsborough, 

Norfolk. 

I would state that it was not my intention to give an order to 
Flag-Officer Goldsborough, but merely to request his cooperation in 
carrying out a measure, upon the success of which the safety of this 
army might depend. As the flag-officer appears so ready to take ex¬ 
ceptions to my requests, I beg that he may receive positive orders not 
only to convoy these supply vessels up James River, but also to coop¬ 
erate with this army so far as is in his power. 

G. B. McClellan, 
Major-General, Commanding. 

Hon. G. Welles, 

Secretary of the Navy. 


[Telegram] 

Washington, June 26, 1862 — 9:10 p. m. 

(Received 10 p. m.) 

General McClellan has forwarded the telegraphic correspondence 
between yourself and General Van Vliet, requesting that a convoy 
should be given certain transports. While the Department does not 


— 870 — 





Telegrams and Letters 


approve the tone and address of General Van Vliet’s dispatch, it de¬ 
sires that you will not let it interfere with the public service, but that 
you will order a convoy for the transports to City Point, and that you 
will cordially cooperate with the army in its onward movements. 

Very respectfully, 

Gideon Welles. 

Flag-Officer Goldsborough, 

Commanding North Atlantic Squadron. 


[Telegram] 

Headquarters Army of the Potomac, June 26, 1862. 

Dispatch received. I take it for granted that Commander Rodgers 
will execute the service you alluded* to before he visits me. On my 
return from the field yesterday I saw your reply to General Van Vliet. 
I regret your complete misunderstanding of the meaning of General 
Van Vliet’s telegram, and can not understand how you could possibly 
draw from it the inference you did. I did send copies to Secretaries of 
Navy and War, with the request that orders may be given to you that 
will insure a prompt compliance with such reasonable requests as I 
may make. The case of the provision transports in James River is a 
matter of vital importance to the safety of this army, and you will 
please pardon me for saying that I do not think this is a time for 
searching for points of etiquette, and that the tone of your dispatch 
surprises me exceedingly. It has ever been my endeavor to treat you 
with the utmost deference and politeness, but my situation is at pres¬ 
ent too serious to permit me to stand on trifles. I again request that 
the request made in my name by General Van Vliet in regard to trans¬ 
ports in James River may be complied with. It is a matter of vital 
importance and may involve the existence of the army. 

Very respectfully, 

Geo. B. McClellan, 
Major-General, Commanding. 

Flag-Officer Goldsborough. 


Letter from Flag-Officer Goldsborough, U. S. Navy, to Major-General 
McClellan, U. S. Army, regarding convoy of transports. 

U. S. Flagship Minnesota, 

Norfolk, Va., June 27, 1862. 

Sir: I telegraphed you yesterday with the view of letting you 
distinctly understand that, despite the exceptionable tone of General 
Van Vliet’s telegram upon the subject of convoy, etc., I was perfectly 
willingly to do, with pleasure, everything in my power to further every 
reasonable and practical wish you might express toward accomplishing 
the great national object you have in hand. This, to my apprehension, 


*See p. 869. 


— 871 — 





War of the Rebellion 


is a matter not only paramount to every other consideration that can 
for the moment be presented to the mind of either of us, but one that 
should make every other sink into significance in our estimation. So 
I regard it, and so I shall govern myself accordingly. But I must be 
addressed in a different and more becoming tone than that assumed by 
General Van Vliet. I am your equal in rank, and assuredly it can not 
possibly be proper in him to address me precisely as he would have 
done an inferior, to serve upon me quite a peremptory notice without 
knowing whether I could comply with it or not, rather than a request 
for cooperation, if it could be afforded. 

When I replied to General Van Vliet I was fully under the im¬ 
pression that you could not have seen his telegram, and so expressed 
myself to those about me. You have thought proper, however, virtu¬ 
ally to approve it, and to say that you can not understand how I could 
possibly draw from it the inference I did. The paper speaks for itself, 
and I regret that our notions of conventional military propriety 
should differ so widely. You further inform me that you had sent 
copies of the telegrams to the Secretaries of Navy and War, with the 
request that orders may be given to me that will insure a prompt com¬ 
pliance with such reasonable requests as you may make. To this I have 
not the slightest objection to offer, provided you are not to be the ex¬ 
clusive judge in the premises, that your requests bp properly preferred, 
and that the means of compliance be at my command. 

The Secretary of the Navy informs me by telegraph this morning 
that the Department does not approve the tone and address of General 
Van Vliet’s dispatch, and you may thus perceive how it is likely to 
strike the minds of others. 

But enough of this. Let me repeat to you that I yearn for your 
success, and that I will do, most cheerfully and cordially, all in my 
power to assist you. I am in heart your friend and wellwisher. 

Convoy has been given to your transports the best I could possibly 
command, and protection will be extended to them. 

With the hope that you will inculcate a more grateful tone on the 
part of those under your command in addressing me than that used by 
General Van Vliet, 

I am, your very obedient servant, 

L. M. Goldsborough, 

Flag-Officer. 

Major-General McClellan, 

Commanding Army of the Potomac , near Richmond , Va. 


[Telegram] 

Norfolk, June 27, 1862—11 a. m. 

(Received 12:50 p. m.) 

I beg the Department to be assured that I will not permit the igno¬ 
rance or impertinence of any army afficer to interfere for a moment 
with my duty to the Government. I am well aware of the crisis at Rich¬ 
mond, and of the absolute necessity of prompt cooperation on my part 
with General McClellan. Immediately on the receipt of General Van 
Vliet’s telegram, notwithstanding its exceptionable tone and address, 
I took measures to carry out everything it required, and at the earliest 


— 872 — 



Telegrams and Letters 


possible moment gave orders accordingly. I had supposed, in address¬ 
ing General Van Vliet upon the subject of his telegram, that General 
McClellan knew nothing of its wording, but as it now appears to have 
met his approval, I beg to express the hope that the War Department 
will enjoin upon him the propriety of inculcating better official manners 
of addressing me as his equal in rank; and, last of all, not permitting 
an officer under his command to address me as a subordinate and refuse 
to confer upon me the denomination given me by law. General McClel¬ 
lan, as I understand from one of his telegrams to me, wishes the Navy 
Department to give me such orders as will secure a prompt compli¬ 
ance with any reasonable request he may make—he, of course, to be 
the exclusive judge of reasonableness. This, in effect, is asking to 
put the vessels of this squadron subject to his disposition. There is, I 
regret to say, an evident disposition on the part of various army officers 
to override and disparage [those] of the Navy, and it is high time a 
stop should be put to a feeling at once so ridiculous and puerile. I 
scarcely need add that all the wishes of the Department about convoy, 
etc., have been fully anticipated, and that I will most cordially and 
cheerfully cooperate with the Army on all occasions to crush the 
enemy. I only demand to be treated with the respect due to my rank, 
position, and responsibilities. 

L. M. Goldsborough, 

Flag-Officer. 


Hon. Gideon Welles, 

Secretary of the Navy. 


/ 

[Telegram] 

McClellan’s [Headquarters], June 27, 1862. 

(Received 1:20 p. m.) 

I have ordered vessels with supplies to be sent up James River, as 
it may be very important for us. I will thank you to give any aid in 
your power to forward and protect these vessels to the vicinity of your 
gunboats, where they will be protected from the enemy’s guns. 

Geo. B. McClellan, 

Major-General 

Captain Goldsborough, 

Flag-Officer. 


[Telegram] 

U. S. Flagship Minnesota, 
Norfolk, Va., June 27, 1862 — 3:1^0 p. m. 

Sir: In reply to your telegram of this date, just received, I beg to 
assure you that I will, with great pleasure, give every aid in my power 
in forwarding and protecting the vessels to which you allude. 


— 873 — 




War of the Rebellion 


By the mail of to-day I wrote you a letter. I beg also to congratu¬ 
late you and my friend General Hooker on gaining the point you had 
in view so completely two days ago. 

L. M. Goldsborough, 

Flag-Officer. 

Major-General McClellan, 

Headquarters Army of the Potomac. 


[Telegram] 

McClellan’s [Headquarters], June 27, 1862. 

(Received 8 p. m.) 

Will you do me the favor to send two light-draft gunboats at once 
up the Chickahominy as far as they can go? The enemy have pressed 
us heavily to-day, and we may have to fall back upon James River. 

Geo. B. McClellan. 

Captain Goldsborough, 

Flag-Officer. 


[Telegram] 

Norfolk, June 27, 1862 — 9:30 p. m. 

Sir: I will dispatch a tug instantly up James River, with orders 
for the two light-draft gunboats to go up the Chickahominy without a 
moment’s delay. 

L. M. Goldsborough, 

Flag-Officer. 

Major-General McClellan. 


[Telegram] 


Norfolk, June 27, 1862. 

Sir: It is sometimes difficult to get dispatches to you in haste. 
Will you please have some arrangement made which will insure the 
prompt delivery of your telegrams? 

Very respectfully, 

Richard O’Brien, 

In Charge of Telegraph. 

Flag-Officer Goldsborough. 


— 874 — 





Telegrams and Letters 


[Telegram] 

Hdqrs. Department of Potomac, June 27, 1862. 

(Received 12 o’clock midnight.) 

I desire that you will send some light-draft gunboats at once up 
the Chickahominy as far as possible, and also that you will forthwith 
instruct the gunboats in the James River to cover the left flank of this 
army. I should be glad to have the gunboats proceed as far up the 
river as may be practicable, and hope they may get up as far as the 
vicinity of New Market. We have met a severe repulse to-day, having 
been attacked by vastly superior numbers, and I am obliged to fall 
back between the Chickahominy and the James. I look to you to give 
me all the support you can in covering my flank, as well as in giving 
protection to my supplies afloat in James. 

G. B. McClellan, 

Major-General . 

Flag-Officer Goldsborough. 


Letter from Flag-Officer Goldsborough, U. S. Navy, to Major-General 
McClellan, U. S. Army, regarding his title and rank and the relative 
rank of officers in the Navy and Army. 

Private] U. S. Flagship Minnesota, 

Norfolk, Va., June 27, 1862. 

Dear Sir: I am neither particularly fastidious about unimpor¬ 
tant concerns nor prone to verbo-casuistry, but there is a matter to 
which I wish to invite your attention and ask for its correction, be¬ 
cause it is just that I should do so. Of late your transcriber, I sup¬ 
pose, of telegrams, is in the habit of addressing me “Captain Golds¬ 
borough, flag-officer.” This is quite as unnaval as it would be unmili¬ 
tary if I were to address one of your generals with the lineal rank of 
captain or major in the Army as Captain or Major Blank, brigadier 
or major-general. The act of Congress entitled “Act to amend an act 
entitled an act to promote the efficiency of the Navy,” approved Janu¬ 
ary 16, 1857, section 5, declares “that captains in command of squad¬ 
rons shall be denominated flag-officers.” This, I take it, is quite enough 
for me to say to you upon the subject; but for the better understand¬ 
ing of your transcriber, I beg to add that my official and legal address 
is Flag-Officer L. M. Goldsborough. In this way I am always addressed 
by the Navy Department, by every officer in the Navy, and by every 
one else possessing a correct knowledge of my position. 

I may as well also state that, under date of October last, I re¬ 
ceived from the Navy Department a communication informing me that, 
by decision of the President, flag-officers in the Navy were to rank with 
major-generals in the Army. General Scott, I know, was consulted 
about this decision and concurred in its propriety. 

Very truly and faithfully, your obedient servant, 

L. M. Goldsborough. 

Major-General McClellan. 


— 875 — 



War of the Rebellion 


Report of Commander McKinstry, U. S. Navy, regarding convoy of 
steamers for the Army. 

U. S. S. Dacotah, 
Hampton Roads, June 27, 1862. 

Sir: On arriving at this anchorage at 5:30 a. m. I communicated 
with Captain [C. W.] Thomas, U. S. Army, who states that the 
steamers required for towing can not be here until to-morrow. 

Whenever the convoy is ready I shall proceed to execute your 
order. 

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant, 

J. P. McKinstry, 

Commander. 

Flag-Officer Goldsborough, 

Comdg. North Atlantic Blockading Squadron, off Norfolk. 


[Telegram] 

Norfolk, June 28, 1862—1 a.m. 

Just received your second telegram* upon the subject of the 
light-draft gunboats going up the Chickahominy and covering the 
left flank of your army. Without a moment’s delay instructions shall 
be communicated to Commander Rodgers to comply immediately with 
all you desire. 

L. M. Goldsborough, 

Flag-Officer. 

Major-General McClellan. 


War Department, 

Washington, June 28, 1862 — 2:U5 p. m. 

Enemy has cut army communication with White House and is 
driving Stoneman back on that point. Do what you can for him with 
gunboats at or near that place. General McClellan’s main force is 
between the Chickahominy and the James River; also do what you can 
to communicate with him and support him there. 

A. Lincoln. 

Flag-Officer L. M. Goldsborough. 


[Telegram] 

Fort Monroe, June 28, 1862 — 3:30 p.m. 

I beg to acknowledge receipt of your telegram to-day. I knew of 
General McClellan’s position last night and sent up orders for gunboats 
to go up Chickahominy to protect the General’s left flank and guard 


*See p. 874. 


— 876 — 






Telegrams and Letters 


vessels with supplies. General Dix and myself will do everything in 
our power to communicate with General McClellan and to keep a com¬ 
munication with him open up the James River. 

L. M. Goldsborough, 

Commodore. 

Hon. Abraham Lincoln. 


Report of Commander Rodgers, U. S. Navy, of failure to burn the 
bridge at Petersburg and of movements of vessels in the James River. 

U. S. S. Galena, 

Off City Point, June 29, 1862. 

Sir: We failed to burn the bridge. The vessel got aground be¬ 
fore we arrived at the point where the boats could leave. 

I have not time at present to make a detailed report, having just 
returned to the vessel and being about to get underway. 

The Island Belle, tug, is still aground. I have given orders should 
she not get off at this tide to burn her and retire. I think she will 
be got off, but if not, we can not spare the force at present to guard 
her. She is on Gilliam’s Bar, in the Appomattox. 

I take up James River the Galena, Monitor, Aroostook, and Ma¬ 
haska. I leave the Port Royal and the Maratanza and Southfield to 
guard the army transports in James River and our own supplies in 
schooners. 

I have sent the Jacob Bell and Delaware up the Chickahominy. 
The Satellite will follow them this evening. 

Any vessel going above this point should be well protected against 
musketry. 

The Port Royal has only a single day’s coal. Please send a supply. 

I have the honor to be, your obedient servant, 

John Rodgers, 

Commander. 

Flag-Officer L. M. Goldsborough, 

Commanding North Atlantic Blockading Squadron. 


Instructions from Flag-Officer Goldsborough, U. S. Navy, to Com¬ 
mander Rodgers, U. S. Navy, regarding army transports and the 
submarine propeller. 

U. S. Flagship Minnesota, 

Norfolk, Va., June 29, 1862. 

Sir: The army transports up the James River are to be anchored 
where and protected as you may direct. They are entirely subject to 
your orders in these matters. Use, therefore, your own sound discre¬ 
tion in the premises. 

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant, 

L. M. Goldsborough, 

Flag-Officer. 

Commander John Rodgers, U. S. Navy, 

Comdg. Galena and Senior Officer in James River, Virginia. 

******* 


- 877 - 





War of the Rebellion 


P. S. No. 2.—I have suggested to the army authorities at Fort 
Monroe that their transports should string themselves along between 
Jamestown Island and Harrison’s Bar, and not to proceed above the 
latter point until further orders. In all there are some four hundred 
and odd, but my idea, is that no more of them than are absolutely 
necessary should be placed in the James River at any one time. I have 
ordered four of the seven gunboats in York River to quit there and 
come to Fort Monroe for the purpose of convoying and protecting the 
army transports. 

L. M. G. 

June 30, 1862. 


[Telegram] 


Washington, June 29, 1862 — 3:30 p. m. 


Send me by telegraph copy of General McClellan’s dispatch to you 
at 12:30 Friday night, and also any later dispatches. 


Flag-Officer L. M. Goldsborough. 


Gideon Welles, 
Secretary of the Navy. 


[Telegram] 

U. S. Flagship Minnesota, 
Norfolk, June 29, 1862—6 p. m. 

(Received at Washington 8 p. m.) 

The following is a copy of General McClellan’s dispatch* to me on 
Friday night at 12 o’clock, since which time nothing from him has 
reached me. All his requests were promptly complied with, as you 
will perceive by copies of letters from Commander Rodgers, forwarded 
to you by the mail of to-day. 

Commodore Goldsborough. 

Gideon Welles, 

Secretary of the Navy. 


[Telegram] 

Headquarters Department Virginia, June 29, 1862. 

General Stoneman has arrived at Williamsburg. Everything has 
gotten off from White House in safety. Colonel Ingalls has reached 
Yorktown with 400 transports for James River; he wishes gunboats 
to convoy them up. What can be done? He will 'be here at 8 this 
evening. 

John A. Dix, 
Major-General. 

Flag-Officer Goldsborough. 


*See p. 875. 


— 878 — 






Telegrams and Letters 


[Telegram] 

Fort Monroe, June 29, 1862 — 10:20 p.m. 

(Received at Washington 10:30 p. m.) 

If you can send me any suitable vessels to assist in convoying 
army transports up the James River I wish you would do so immedi¬ 
ately. The number of transports is very large, and I can not take any 
of vessels up the James River away from there. The lighter the draft 
the better. 

Commodore Goldsborough. 

G. V. Fox, 

Assistant Secretary Navy. 


Letter from the Secretary of the Navy to Flag-Officer Goldsborough, 
U.S. Navy, regarding cooperation with the army and movements 
of vessels. 

Navy Department, June 30, 1862. 

Sir: Your telegram in answer to mine of yesterday, communcat- 
ing General McClellan’s dispatch to you, has been received. I sent to 
you by request of the President, who desired to see the dispatch, as we 
supposed it later than anything we had received from him. 

In the emergency now upon us I have never questioned that you 
would lend your efforts to aid and cooperate with the army. It is 
essential that our whole strength and efforts should be put forth. The 
crisis is in every respect important. 

The Yankee and A. C. Powell leave Washington to-day, the Tioga 
leaves Boston to-morrow, and the Adirondack will leave New York in 
two or three days, all directed to report at Hampton Roads, and the 
Wachusett has been directed to wait events at and near Richmond. 

I am, respectfully, your obedient servant, 

Gideon Welles. 

Flag-Officer L. M. Goldsborough, 

Commanding, etc., Norfolk, Va. 


Report of Commander Rodgers, V. S. Navy, regarding affairs up the 

James River. 

Private] U.S. Gunboat Galena, 

Off City Point, June 30, 1862. 

Sir: The army is, much of it, on the James River banks, just 
above City Point. It is safe. 

I hope you will keep the machine for blowing up vessels safely out 
of the way of falling into the enemy’s hands. It should not be suffered 
to run about these waters. 

I have sent a letter to General McClellan containing suggestions in 
regard to the selection of a site for a base of military operations on 
James River. 


—879 




War of the Rebellion 


I do not think it can be above City Point, without that point 
should be held by our own army, and scarcely above Fort Powhatan. 

I fear the guns on the banks of the James River have not been as 
effectually destroyed as could be wished. They should be so broken 
as to be useless. I scarcely think this has been done. I would sug¬ 
gest, as the gunboats now here have quite as much as they can do, the 
propriety of sending, should it meet your views, a force of marines as 
large as you can get, and some of the larger steamers to do this work 
thoroughly. If those batteries should be reestablished, we shall not 
hear the last of it. By interrupting the train of supplies, the army 
might be much impeded. Have a report as to manner and extent 
of destruction. 

The army is on the river banks. General Keyes and Colonel Alex¬ 
ander breakfasted with me. Communication is fully established. 

Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 

John Rodgers, 

Commander. 

Flag-Officer L. M. Goldsborough, 

Commanding North Atlantic Blockading Squadron. 

If I have taken a liberty in thus writing, I beg you to tell me, and 
I will not do so again. 


Report of Commander Rodgers, U. S. Navy, that the army has fallen 
back and rests on James River. 

[U. S. S.] Galena, 

Above City Point, July 1, 1862. 

Sir: The army has fallen back and rests upon James River. 

We need in this vicinity all the gunboats we can get as soon as 
possible. Yesterday, I hear, we did good service in shelling the rebel 
army. 

I have the honor to be, your obedient servant, 

John Rodgers. 

Flag-Officer L. M. Goldsborough, 

Commanding North Atlantic Blockading Squadron. 


Letter from Major-General McClellan, U. S. Army, to Flag-Officer 
Goldsborough, U. S. Navy, requesting every available gunboat sent 
to James River. 

Headquarters Army of Potomac, 

James River, July 1, 1862. 

Sir: I would most earnestly request that every gunboat or other 
armed vessel suitable for action in the James River be sent at once to 
this vicinity, and placed under the orders of Commander Rodgers, for 
the purpose of covering the camps and communications of this army. 

May I urge that not an hour be lost and that you telegraph to the 
Navy Department reporting the request I make. 


- 880 — 




Telegrams and Letters 

If this is illegible, I must offer as an excuse the extreme exhaus¬ 
tion under which I am laboring. 

Very truly, yours, Geo. B. McClellan, 

Major-General, Commanding. 

Flag-Officer L. M. Goldsborough, 

Commanding North Atlantic Squadron. 


Letter from Commander Rodgers, U. S. Navy, to Flag-Officer Golds¬ 
borough, U. S. Navy, requesting gunboats and ammunition to be sent 
up James River. 

U. S. S. Galena, 

Above City Point, July 1 , 1862. 

Sir: The enemy presses the army; it rests upon the James River 
and needs all the support which gunboats can give. Please send all 
of them which you can spare. Please also send up ammunition imme¬ 
diately, 8 and 9-inch shell, 100-pound [er] rifle shell, and powder. 

I am desired by General McClellan, who is on board going some 2 
oj 3 miles down the river on a reconnoissance, to say, on his part, that 
he will be obliged to you for any gunboat assistance which you can fur¬ 
nish. No firing at present moment. 

Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 

John Rodgers, 
Commander, U. S. Navy. 

Flag-Officer L. M. Goldsborough, * 

Commanding North Atlantic Blockading Squadrpn. 


Report of Commander Rodgers, U.S. Navy, regarding affairs up the 

James River. 


Private] [U. S. S.] Galena, 

Off Harrison*s Bar, July 1, 1862. 

Sir: The army is in a bad way; the gunboats may save them, but 
the points to be guarded are too many for the force at my disposal. I 
presume you will have to send some one to outrank me. To save the 
army, as far as we can, demands immediately all our disposable force. 
Fort Powhatan is a most important point; it should be strongly 
guarded. City Point commands the channel past it; that demands a 
strong force of gunboats to insure the passage of supplies. Each end 
of the encampment on the river banks demands a force of gunboats. 
We shelled the enemy with good effect, I hear, yesterday. 

Please send ammunition immediately—8 and 9 inch shells, 100- 
pound [er] rifle; cartridges for the 9-inch rifles and the 100-pound [er] 
wanted. 

The general (General McClellan) has come down here in this ves¬ 
sel to make a reconnoissance for the position of a new camp. 

The use for more gunboats is pressing and immediate. 

The army, continually pressed by largely superior numbers and 
fresh troops, falls back continually, in good order. The fighting has 
been continual; the losses very great. We fall back in admirable order, 
disputing every inch of the way. 


— 881 — 




War of the Rebellion 


If, as I hope, we can get the army on a plain upon the river bank, 
and then protect each flank by gunboats, it can have time for rest. I 
think Harrison’s Bar offers these advantages. 

Captain McKinstry and some other force may be directed, if you 
choose, to guard Fort Powhatan. The channel there passes within 
100 yards of the bluffs. 

The fort is out of shape, but the main part of the labor of con¬ 
structing it remains. Its position is formidable. It was selected in 
1812 because it is so formidable. Guns may be placed in position in 
a night. It should be well guarded. 



Now, if ever, is a chance for the Navy to render most signal 
service, but it must not delay. 

Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 

John Rodgers. 

Flag-Officer L. M. Goldsborough, 

Commanding North Atlantic Blockading Squadron. 


Order from Flag-Officer Goldsborough, U. S. Navy, to Lieutenant 
Henry, U.S. Navy, to give convoy and protection to army trans¬ 
ports. 

U. S. Flagship Minnesota, 

Norfolk, Va., July 1 , 1862. 

Sir: On your arrival at Hampton Roads you will inform Colonel 
Ingalls or Captain Tallmadge, U. S. Army, quartermaster at Fort 
Monroe, that you are ready to afford convoy and protection to any army 
transports he may wish to send up James River. On his designating 
those he may wish you to take in charge, you will proceed with them 
up that river to the point or place he will mention, and on reaching it, 
should you find naval vessels on hand to protect them properly, you 
will leave them there and return to Hampton Roads for further ser¬ 
vice of the sort. 


— 882 — 









Telegrams and Letters 


Afford every protection in your power in all cases to the trans¬ 
ports placed under your charge. 

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant, 

L. M. Goldsborough, 

. Flag-Officer. 

Lieutenant Commanding E. W. Henry, 

Commanding U. S. S. Sebago, Hampton Roads, Virginia. 


(Copies of the above order sent to Lieutenant Commanding J. C. 
Chaplin, commanding Commodore Barney; Acting Master Peter Hays, 
U. S. S. Morse; Acting Master W. F. Shankland, jr., commanding 
U. S. S. Currituck. 


[Telegram] 

Fort Monroe, July 1, 1862 — 11:10 a.m. 

We want your spare gunboats up the James River; also the three 
at West Point should fall back to Yorktown at once. The enemy are at 
New Kent Court-House. 

John A. Dix, 
Major-General. 

Commodore Goldsborough. 


[Telegram] 

Fort Monroe, July 1 , 1862 — 2:30 p.m. 

Under date of yesterday, I have a letter* from Commander Rod¬ 
gers, in which he says: 

The army is, much of it, on the James River banks just above 
City Point. It is safe. General King [Keyes] and Colonel Alexander 
breakfasted with me. Communication is fully established. 

General McClellan’s headquarters are at Turkey Bend. He him¬ 
self was on board the Galena yesterday. I have sent the Dacotah and 
Wachusett to Hardy’s [Harden’s] Bluff to destroy the guns there ef¬ 
fectually, and also at Day’s Point, if possible. The former vessel re¬ 
turned yesterday afternoon from convoying a number of transports 
up the James River, and it was my intention to send her back with 
another; but owing to a report that the enemy was probably trying to 
get two guns in batteries at Hardy’s [Harden’s] Bluff, I determined 
to send her off this morning, as stated. There are no guns at Fort 
Powhatan, up to my last accounts. It is even doubtful whether any 
were ever there, judging from the appearance of the place, which is 
overgrown with high grass. 

Commodore Goldsborough. 

Hon. Gideon Welles, 

Secretary of the Navy. 


*See p.'879-80. 


• 883 — 





War of the Rebellion 


[Telegram] 

Norfolk, July 1, 1862. 

Do me [the] favor to telegraph to Yorktown on the receipt of this 
and direct one of your officers to communicate with the three gunboats 
at West Point, [Va.], and say to them that it is my orders they fall 
back at once to Yorktown. 

L. M. Goldsborough, 

Flag-Officer. 

General Dix. 


[Telegram] 

Letter from Major-General Dix, U.S. Army, to Lieutenant Henry, U. 
S. Navy, requesting convoy for transports. 

Fort Monroe, July 1, 1862. 

Please let the Jacob Bell, the Yankee, and Commodore Barney go 
up the river to-night. We have sent a large number of transports. I 
will find service for you to-morrow. 

Respectfully, yours, 

John A. Dix, 
Major-General. 

Captain Henry, 

Commanding Sebago. 


[Telegram] 

Fort Monroe, July 2, 1862—2 p.m. 

I have just received under date of yesterday the following dis¬ 
patch* from General McClellan, addressed to me. 

******* 

Also the following is the substance of dispatchf from Commander 
Rodgers, bearing same date and sent by same opportunity. 

******* 

I scarcely need a,dd that I am doing everything in my power to 
afford the assistance required, and am here for the purpose of expe¬ 
diting matters. The Jacob Bell, Morse, Barney, and Yankee have al¬ 
ready gone up the James River. The Currituck leaves immediately, 
and so, too, with the Sebago. The Baltimore goes up in an hour or 
two with ordnance stores. I wish the Department to rest assured that 
nothing shall be wanting on my part. 

Commodore Goldsborough. 

Hon. Gideon Welles, 

Secretary of the Navy. 


*See p. 880-81. 
fSee p. 881. 


— 884 — 





Telegrams and Letters 


[Telegram] 


Washington, July 3, 1862—2 a. m. 


Would it be considered very important for you to have some of the 
mortar vessels sent to you from the Gulf of Mexico? 


Flag-Officer Goldborough. 


Gideon Welles, 
Secretary Navy. 


[Telegram] 

U. S. Flagship Minnesota, 

Norfolk, Va., July 3, 1862. 

I do not consider it very important to have some of the mortar 
vessels in the Gulf sent here at this time. They could not possibly 
reach here in season to assist General McClellan. If they were al¬ 
ready here they might, perhaps, be used to advantage. 

No news has reached me from either General McClellan or Com¬ 
mander Rodgers since that I telegraphed you yesterday from Old 
Point. 

L. M. Goldsborough, 

Flag-Officer. 

Hon. Gideon Welles, 

Secretary of the Navy, Washington City, 


Instructions from Flag-Officer Goldsborough, U. S. Navy, to Com¬ 
mander Rodgers, U.S. Navy, regarding cooperation with the army 
on the James River. 

U. S. Flagship Minnesota, 

Norfolk, Va., July 3, 1862. 

Sir: The Dacotah, Commander McKinstry; Wachusett, Com¬ 
mander Jenkins; Sebago, Lieutenant Henry; Commodore Barney, Lieu¬ 
tenant Chaplin; Morse, Acting Master Hays; Yankee, Lieutenant Gib¬ 
son; and Currituck, Acting Master Shankland, are all now up James 
River. These, together with the vessels originally there, will, I do 
most sincerely trust and hope, be able to save our army. The steamer 
Baltimore, Acting Master Mitchell, left Fort Monroe last evening with 
a full supply of the ordnance stores you required by your letters of the 
1st instant. I ordered her to put those stores on board the ordnance 
schooner you have up James River and then return. If you want 
more, or, indeed, anything else, let me know. 

I directed the Sebago to guard carefully Fort Powhatan. If she is 
not enough for the purpose, you must detail another to assist her. It is 
also very important to my mind that a vessel should be kept constantly 
at Jamestown Island to prevent the enemy from getting guns in bat¬ 
tery there. Attend to this, if you please. 

In case you should want more coal than I have sent you, borrow it 
from the Army. 


— 885 - 




War of the Rebellion 


Keep me fully informed of all movements of moment. The most 
intense excitement prevails at Washington and all over the country, 
and the President and Secretary of the Navy wish to be kept as fully 
advised as possible of every turn in our affairs. 

Say to General McClellan that, agreeably to his request, I tele¬ 
graphed his note to me of the 1st to the Navy Department. 

I am hourly expecting the Tioga. She sailed three days ago from 
Boston. The moment she arrives I will send her, too, up James River. 

This I send to you by the Stepping Stones. 

Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 

L. M. Goldsborough, 

Flag-Officer. 

Commander John Rodgers, 

Commanding U. S. S. Galena, James River, Virginia. 


[Telegram] 

Norfolk, July U, — 12:80 p. m. 

No news of any kind from up James River up to this hour. I 
augur favorably from this, as Commander Rodgers is directed to keep 
me informed of all events of importance. Am told that both the Pres¬ 
ident and yourself are naturally very anxious to know at the earliest 
moment possible all that transpires of serious occurrence. All the 
guns at both forts on Day’s Point and Hardy’s [Harden’s] Bluff I 
have had burst or broken—rendered entirely useless. Seventeen gun¬ 
boats in all are at the scene of action, and another, the Coeur de Lion, 
will go up the river to-night. She came down to be repaired. The 
Tioga has not arrived. Orders await her at Fort Monroe to go up 
the James River without a moment’s delay. 

Commodore Goldsborough. 

Hon. Gideon Welles, 

Secretary of the Navy. 


Report of Commander Rodgers, U. S. Navy, regarding affairs in James 
River, enclosing sketch giving position of gunboats. 

U. S. S. Galena, 

Off Harrison’s Bar, July U, 1862. 

Sir: Everything is quiet and goes on finely. I send a sketch of 
the position of the gunboats. The army is in high spirits. They are 
entrenching their front and by noon will be thoroughly ready for all 
comers. 

I feel anxious about the navigation. I fear that the enemy may 
occupy the bluffs which command the channel below us. This would 
be inconvenient, at the least. 

The enemy are at Haxall’s, above City Point. They sent up a 
balloon this morning, but it remained up only a few moments. The 
Monitor and Maratanza will make a reconnoissance this evening in 
that direction. 

If Captains McKinstry and Jenkins are in charge of the river 
below this, I can bring more vessels here to guard our flanks. 


- 886 - 




Telegrams and Letters 


At present there are eight only, two up the river, four down, and 
the Galena and Port Royal as a reserve, to throw their force where 
needed. The Stepping Stones I shall use to carry orders. 

This is the present arrangement of the vessels, or was this morn¬ 
ing. The Monitor and Maratanza have gone above City Point on a 
reconnoissance: 

At west end of base, opposite Jordan’s Point— Maratanza, Yankee, 

2 . 

At east end of base, opposite Windmill Point— Aroostook, Monitor, 
Southfield, Currituck, 4. 

Reserve, to move to either end of base— Galena, Port Royal, Step¬ 
ping Stones, tug, 2. 

Total [at base], 8, tug, 1—9. 

Guarding navigation below— Mahaska, Commodore Barney, Dra¬ 
gon, tug, Sebago, Morse, 5. 

At Jamestown Island —Jacob Bell, 1. 

Up Chickahominy— Delaware, Satellite, 2. 

I have not seen the Dacotah nor the Wachusett. These powerful 
vessels will, if they remain below, allow the Mahaska and Morse to 
move up here. 

It is now too late, I hope, for the enemy to attack the army here 
with any chance of success. The troops are in good spirits and every¬ 
one seems confident. 

Respectfully, your obedient servant, John Rodgers, 

Commander. 

Flag-Officer L. M. Goldsborough, 

Commanding North Atlantic Blockading Squadron . 


[Enclosure] 

SKETCH OK POSITION OF GUNBOAT* ON JAMES RIVER. 


* 



— 887 — 
















♦ 





























































' 





















































FOUR YEARS 


WITH THE 

ARMY OF THE POTOMAC 


BY 

REGIS DE TROBRIAND 

BREVET MAJOR-GENERAL, U. S. VOLS. 


TRANSLATED BY 

GEORGE K. DAUCHY 

LATE LIEUTENANT COMMANDING TWELFTH NEW 
YORK BATTERY LIGHT ARTILLERY, 

U. S. VOLS. 


WITH PORTRAIT AND MAPS 


BOSTON 

TICKNOR AND COMPANY 
211 Tremont Street 

1889 






* 





* 


























CHAPTER IX 


Apprenticeship of the War 

Siege of Yorktown—Attack on Lee’s mill—The Harwood farm— 
Amongst the sharpshooters—The man hunt—Visit of the general- 
in-chief—Faults of administration—A black snake mayonnaise— 
Marching-out of the Confederate troops—The enemy abandons his 
positions—Evacuation of Yorktown. 

The Virginian peninsula, as is well known, is formed 
by the course, nearly parallel, of the James and York rivers, 
which both empty into the Chesapeake. Ten miles above 
the mouth of the York, upon the right hand, is situated the 
small fortified town of Yorktown, which owes its first cele¬ 
brity to the capitulation of Lord Cornwallis, in 1781, after 
a siege in which Marquis Lafayette took a brilliant part. 
In the month of April, 1862, the Confederates had extended 
and completed the defences so as to command with their 
artillery the ground between the town and the small river 
called the Warwick. The latter rises about a mile and a half 
from Yorktown towards the south, emptying into the James, 
thus crossing the peninsula, whose breadth at that point is 
only ten or twelve miles. This was a natural obstacle, which 
th£ enemy had already improved by raising the water at 
the fords, by means of dams, and covering the more exposed 
positions by protected batteries. At the time of our arrival 
Magruder’s Corps, which opposed us, had, at the most,* ten 
thousand men. 

If a vigorous attack had been made at the time of our 
first approach, nothing could have prevented our forcing a 
passage at some point. Broken anywhere, the line could 
not have been held an instant, and Yorktown, pressed on all 
sides, would have been ours in a few days. Unhappily, only 
a too long delayed, feeble, and isolated attack was made. 
Too long delayed, because it. was not made till the 16th, 
eleven days after our arrival; isolated, because only a few 
companies of Vermont troops were used; unskilful, because 
the point chosen for assault was precisely the one most 
strongly fortified, the one which offered the most difficulties, 


- 891 — 


Army of the Potomac 

and consequently the least chances of success. The result 
was that our force fought bravely, but uselessly, for more 
than an hour, in the rifle-pits captured from the enemy, and 
that it ended in being driven back to the river with consid¬ 
erable loss. 

The companies sacrificed in that unfortunate affair be¬ 
longed to the division of General W. F. Smith, who acted 
on direct orders from General McClellan. General Keyes 
disclaimed any responsibility for it, saying openly that he 
had not even been informed of it beforehand, although the 
troops engaged belonged to his corps. 

From the very first, the majority of the generals had ad¬ 
vised forcing the Warwick lines without delay. The com¬ 
mander-in-chief, engineer officer in all his instincts, pre¬ 
ferred digging ditches, opening parallels, and placing bat¬ 
teries around Yorktown. The former asked simply to beat 
the enemy by the power of an irresistible superiority; the 
latter wished to reduce the place by the scientific method, so 
dear to special schools. Such being the fact, is it far out of 
the way to suspect that he ordered the attack of Lee’s mill 
less with the resolution to make it successful than with the 
thought of demonstrating, by its want of success, the super¬ 
iority of his other plans? Quod erat demonstrandum. 

However that might have been, the siege was resolved 
upon; the army sat down accordingly, and Magruder was 
able*to await without danger, and receive without hurry, 
the reenforcements he needed. 

Peck’s brigade was on the extreme left of the army, 
near the mouth of the river, opposite Mulberry Island, where 
the enemy had quite a strong garrison. The Warwick, be¬ 
fore emptying into the James, describes at this point a sharp 
turn, around a point of land which, from its sharp turn, 
made a salient angle in the enemy’s defensive line. This 
position ws assigned to the Fifty-fifth. 

On our side, the bank was higher, which gave our sharp¬ 
shooters some advantage. On the other hand, the enemy 
had two batteries, which commanded all the ground which 
we occupied, and whose fire would have troubled us very 


— 892 — 


Apprenticeship of the War 

much if it had not been for large woods which hid our tents 
from the eyes of the Confederates. These woods extended 
along the water, and covered the point of the triangle, leav¬ 
ing some cultivated land at its base only, in the midst of 
which was the Harwood farm. An excellent position to 
accustom our men to fire. It was in our examination of this 
ground that we first heard the enemy’s balls whistle, and on 
the establishment of our pickets that we first fired on the 
enemy. 

At nightfall, the rations having been two days behind, 
I sent twenty-five men, under command of a lieutenant, to 
the farm buildings, with an order to bring away every sus¬ 
picious person they found there, and also to report if they 
found anything which could answer the place of our missing 
rations and forage. They found the house completely aban¬ 
doned, but abundantly provided with provisions. The 
farmer, it appeared, kept a country store. He had left 
there a large amount of excellent salt provisions, flour, 
cheese, sugar, etc. He had corn in his barns, cattle in his 
stables, fowls in his barnyard. The detachment returned 
loaded with the booty, which was distributed equally 
amongst the companies, and for several days the regiment, 
independent of the commissary, lived as in the land of co- 
cagne, in the midst of abundance and table delicacies such 
as were never seen in camp before, and such as we never 
saw again. 

Unfortunately, this godsend lasted but a very short 
time. The next morning the news was spread through the 
neighboring regiments, and in the afternoon a large num¬ 
ber of visitors was attracted to the store. The first comers 
crept towards it stealthily; then, as the battery of Mulberry 
Island showed no signs of life, those coming afterwards 
boldly crossed the field without any precaution, until the 
house was full from cellar to garret. That, it appeared, was 
what the enemy was waiting for. 

All at once, the battery was crowned with smoke; the 
cannon thundered. A first shot made a hole in the roof, 
another went completely through the house, at the third 


— 893 — 


Army of the Potomac 

shot the house was vacant. It was amusing to see how 
quickly this was accomplished. The intruders rushed out 
crowding together, some by the door, some out of the win¬ 
dows, bounding over the sills, leaping fences and ditches— 
all hurrying towards the woods, with a celerity hastened by 
the shells, which happily made more noise than they did 
damage. 

It was probably one of these disappointed foragers who, 
to revenge himself for the fright he had had, set fire to the 
building that same evening. At midnight there was left 
but a pile of smoking ruins. 

During that time, along the bank of the river, the 
musket firing was kept up. Six companies were disposed 
in the woods, each one furnishing the pickets to cover its 
front. The four others, held in reserve, sent out during the 
night the number of men necessary to guard the open field 
and to make the rounds. 

Between us and the enemy the river was only forty to 
fifty yards wide. As I have said, on our side the bank was 
abrupt and wooded, except on the road to a bridge, which 
was destroyed, and of which there remained only a few piles. 
On the enemy’s side the land was flat and marshy to the foot 
of a little hill, which rose a short distance back, where we 
could see some earthworks behind an abatis of large trees. 

During the night the fire ceased on both sides, and the 
skirmishers were relieved under cover of the darkness. Noth¬ 
ing could be seen, but conversation was carried on between 
the two lines, very rarely with anything abusive in it. It 
was for the most part an exchange of soldiers’ banter. Bull 
Run and Ball’s Bluff were the subject on the part of the 
rebels, to which our side replied, Laurel Hill, Donelson, 
Roanoke, Newburn. 

To these federal victories there were soon added others 
of more importance, for during the month of April the Con¬ 
federates were beaten at Shiloh, in Tennessee, after a bloody 
battle of two days, where their general, A. S. Johnston, was 
killed; and New Orleans was surrendered to Admiral Far- 
ragut, after a naval battle in which he had forced the pas- 


— 894 — 


Apprenticeship of the War 

sage of the lower Mississippi, destroyed the enemy’s flotilla, 
and compelled Forts Jackson and St. Philip to surrender. 

When the news of these successes arrived at the camp 
before Yorktown, chance brought in front of the Fifty-fifth 
New York the Fifth Louisiana, which called itself “The 
Louisiana Tigers,” so that Frenchmen were firing at each 
other across the river, and each evening, at the same hour, 
the retreat that the Parisians heard upon the Place Ven- 
dome was heard on the banks of the Warwick, in the oppos¬ 
ing lines. Of course the nightly colloquies were in French. 
The capture of New Orleans and of Baton Rouge, the capi¬ 
tal of the State put a damper on the spirits of the “Louisiana 
Tigers,” and they thereafter replied to banter only by gun¬ 
shots. 

In the night the enemy crossed the swamps, to come 
and crouch near the water in the high grass behind some 
dead trees or some hillocks where they remained concealed 
during the day. With us, the men chose the best positions, 
sheltered by great roots, or behind stones, which permitted 
them to see without being seen. 

When the day broke, everything was quiet and motion¬ 
less on both banks, where nothing betrayed the presence of 
man. It was, however, the hour when the eyes, sharpened 
by the hunter’s instinct, examined the smallest inequalities 
of the land, and carefully searched the grass and bushes for 
a mark. 

On both sides the game was played with patience and 
a rare cunning, in the first place to find out the precise point 
where the adversary was concealed, and afterwards to put 
a ball through him. The most ingenious strategems were 
resorted to in order to draw the fire of the opponent upon 
some false appearance, and, at the same time, compel the 
man firing to show himself. Two rapid discharges were 
heard; two puffs of white smoke appeared and disappeared 
in a moment; but nothing was visible, only perhaps a 
wounded man dragged himself into the bushes, calling for 
aid, or a dead body was growing cold in a pool of blood. 


— 895 — 


Army of the Potomac 


Of all known kinds of hunting, that of man by man is 
certainly the most exciting. It is superior to all others, in 
being a strife between intelligences of the same nature, 
with equal arms and equal dangers. Thus the powers both 
of mind and body are put in play, and are developed with an 
ardor curious to study. 

One morning I went out to one of our advanced rifle- 
pits to try and examine the nature of the works on which 
the enemy had been industriously laboring the whole pre¬ 
ceding night. A few steps from there I saw a young soldier 
lying motionless, flat on the ground, a man of mild and in¬ 
offensive nature. His disposition was in accordance with 
his physical appearance, and he would have been averse to 
killing even a sheep. But the man chase had transformed 
him. With his head covered with leaves, and at the level of 
the earth, he had crept out there with his eyes intently fixed 
upon a single point of the swamp, watching as a wild beast 
of prey watches for his concealed victim. His loaded gun 
was pushed out in front of him, looking like a stick lying 
on the stones, but really directed under his hand, upon the 
bunch of rushes which absorbed his attention. 

He heard my step, and, without changing his position 
or turning his head, he simply made a motion with his hand, 
which said distinctly: “Do not come up behind me; you 
will give him the alarm.” I left him in that position, where 
he remained, I think, two or three hours, never tiring of his 
watch, never discouraged at waiting. At last the bunch of 
rushes moved; a shot was fired from it; but the marksman 
had shown himself. Almost immediately he bounded back¬ 
wards and fell writhing in the high grass, while the other 
one leaped lightly into the rifle-pit, crying out with an air 
of triumpt, “I hit him!” “Bravo! well done!” said his com¬ 
rades, somewhat jealous of so good a shot. 

Whatever may be said, war responds to an instinct 
which nature has put into the heart of man. Instead of be¬ 
ing a violation of an order of things divinely established, it 
is much rather the normal obedience to one of the mysteri¬ 
ous laws which govern humanity, and preside fatally over 


— 896 — 


Apprenticeship of the War 


the development of its destiny. Explain the fact as you 
will, the human race, ever since it has existed, has never 
ceased to have its internecine combats, and has never 
ceased to multiply. The shedding of blood must be then a 
necessary condition of equilibrium in its propagation. And 
my good young man, who would not have given a fillip to a 
child, was, in killing his fellow-man con amove , only the hum¬ 
ble but striking manifestation of what are called the “work¬ 
ing ways of Providence/’ 

This kind of drill in firing, whose usefulness I have 
heard discussed often, has incontestable advantages. Better 
than any other, it perfects the soldier in the use of arms of 
precision; it familiarizes him readily and without effort to 
danger, and finally it gives a tone to his character by the 
habitual application of his individual faculties to the com¬ 
mon work: that is, to do the greatest possible amount of 
damage to the enemy, with the least sacrifice to ourselves. 
On this account I encouraged my men, although others did 
differently. 

On the front of the neighboring brigade, they watched 
each other peacefully across the river. They lay around in 
the shade, or in the sunshine; going and coming in perfect 
security. Those who liked fishing threw their lines in the 
stream, and, instead of being man-hunters, became fisher¬ 
men. On that part of the lines, the service of advanced 
posts was an eclogue in action. 

On the other hand, along our part of the line, the artil¬ 
lery was soon put into play. The enemy brought into action 
some rifled guns, whose conical projectiles burst in the pines 
around my last company. To guard against these, a sen¬ 
tinel was posted specially to watch that battery. At every 
shot fired, as soon as he saw the smoke, he cried, Look out! 
and the men hid behind the trees until the shell burst. In 
that way the enemy burnt a great deal of powder for noth¬ 
ing. However, they very nearly gave us a hard blow. 

The general-in-chief having expressed his intention of 
examining for -himself the position occupied by the Fifty- 
fifth, his visit was announced to me by a staff officer, and 


— 897 — 


Army of the Potomac 

the companies were promptly put under arms. Soon, in¬ 
deed, General McClellan came through the forest, accom¬ 
panied by Generals Keyes and Peck, and followed by a num¬ 
erous staff. They stopped first near the Zouaves, who were 
the farthest to the rear, and, tempted by the opportunity for 
observation offered by the open fields, they advanced a few 
steps out of the woods. The enemy, who was always on the 
lookout for our movements, saw that it was evidently a 
group of superior officers. He pointed his rifled guns with 
a great deal of care and fired. Two shells came one after 
another, whistling a well known air, and burst with a re¬ 
markable precision over our visitors, who reentered the 
woods without going farther along the line, putting off the 
promised visit to another day, which never came. 

I regretted this contretemps. I would not have been 
sorry to have had the general-in-chief see with his own 
eyes what we had to endure from the negligence or inca¬ 
pacity of the quartermasters. Not an officer in the Fifty- 
fifth had a tent. For my part, I slept on the ground, at the 
foot of a tree, under the doubtful shelter of a double rubber 
blanket stretched upon a stick, and fastened down at the 
four corners by stakes. Worse yet, all my baggage had been 
left at Newport News, and, though we were only twelve or 
fifteen miles from there, we waited for it in vain day after 
day. More than two weeks passed before it was sent to us. 

Rations were distributed to the soldiers very irregu¬ 
larly. The means of transportation, they told us, were 
wanting, and the roads were abominable. However, they 
had no great distance to go. The general depot was but a 
few miles back of our lines, on the navigable head of the 
Poquosin, where the transports could come without diffi¬ 
culty. As to the bad roads, that was provided for every¬ 
where by corduroy. 

The corudroy is a sort of rough floor, formed by small 
sticks resting on sleepers, and covered over with a light 
layer of leaves, mixed with earth. In a forest country, this 
is a quick and easy way to establish good means of com¬ 
munication for the artillery and wagons. Wherever we 


— 898 — 


Apprenticeship of the War 

stopped during the war, we constructed stretches of 
this kind of road. They last a long time, require very little 
repair, and are of continual utility, especially in a rainy sea¬ 
son. 

In front of Yorktown, what we were most in want of 
was much less the material than proper administration. The 
quartermasters and commissaries wanted experience, in¬ 
struction, and too often honesty. As to staff officers, pro¬ 
perly so called, they were not equal to the performance of 
their duties. They were generally young men recommended 
to the generals, to whom they were attached more by their 
family connections and their position in life than by their 
ability. If they had been drawn from the regular army, the 
service would have been much the gainer, but the officers of 
the regular army who could be spared from their regiments 
were employed in the engineer service, or held higher com¬ 
mands among the volunteers. 

On the 16th of April I sent a report to headquarters of 
the division, to recommend the placing of a battery on a 
point which commanded the course of the river, and which 
would be very useful to facilitate the crossing, or to repel 
an attack, in case the enemy should attempt an offensive 
movement against the left of our line. General Couch came 
' himself to examine the position. The plan was approved by 
the chief of artillery, and orders given in consonance. But 
the works proceeded so slowly, for want of proper supervis¬ 
ion, that they were not yet finished when the Confederates 
evacuated Yorktown. One day the tools were wanting, and 
the men were sent back to their quarters; the next day it 
had been forgotten to detail the men, after the tools were 
sent. These shortcomings of the staff gave rise to frequent 
complaints; but it seemed as though no one knew how to 
remedy the evil. 

The siege, however, took its course, and the cannonade 
became more and more continuous along the Third Corps 
front. In our front hostilities were limited to the exchange 
of shots between the picket lines. A few pieces of field artil¬ 
lery had been put in position behind the parapets; but with 


— 899 — 


Army of the Potomac 

the injunction to use them only in case of an attack by the 
enemy, who profited by it to collect the provisions and for¬ 
age stored in some farm buildings which we could have de¬ 
stroyed in a quarter of an hour. 

At this time a great deal of consideration was shown 
for the Confederates, which was the more singular in that 
they showed very little for us. The smoke of our fires no 
sooner showed where our tents were pitched than imme¬ 
diately a few shells were thrown at the place, which com¬ 
pelled the men to withdraw one or two hundred yards back, 
in the midst of the woods, to cook their meals. But in our 
front, out of rifle shot, the officers of the enemy collected 
openly, in a small farmhouse, which answered them for an 
observatory. We saw them from morning to night, nonchal¬ 
antly smoking their cigars on the piazza and attending to 
business without being disturbed. I could never get the use 
of a couple of cannon to knock down that country seat. 

The latter half of April passed away without other inci¬ 
dent than that of sending a few wounded men to the hos¬ 
pital. I had no other occupation than the daily routine of 
service, and no other distraction than the visits, which were 
quite numerous on account of the position the regiment oc¬ 
cupied. I thus had the opprtunity to accompany General 
Sumner to our advanced posts. His corps brought our force 
up to more than a hundred thousand men. 

❖ * 

During the last days of the month the enemy appeared 
to strip his works of men and guns. To feel of him, we 
sent him a dozen shots, to which he did not reply. During 
the night of the 29th, he withdrew his advanced posts in 
front of Smith’s division. On the 30th he unmasked quite 
an important movement of troops on Mulberry Island. 

In the afternoon, a column composed of three regiments 
of infantry, a regiment of cavalry, and a battery of artil¬ 
lery, commenced to march along the edge of the woods which 
border the James, and finished by crossing the flat open 
land in front of the Harwood farm, five or six hundred yards 


— 900 — 


Apprenticeship of the War 

from a small work, where we had two pieces of artillery. 
The route they followed made a bend around a house, which 
was the nearest point to us. Twenty horsemen came there 
first, as if to reconnoitre our position, and, seeing we re¬ 
mained motionless, they dismounted and were soon joined 
by a group of officers, who installed themselves in the farm¬ 
house, while the infantry continued defiling peacefully under 
our noses. 

During this time I sent message after message to Gen¬ 
eral Peck asking permission to open fire, of which the lieu¬ 
tenant commanding the artillery did not dare to take the 
responsibility, in view of the positive orders he had re¬ 
ceived to reply only to an attack. General Peck referred the 
matter to General Couch. Some aids came by turns to see 
what was passing, and returned to make their report. Mean¬ 
while, time was going on, and the enemy continued his 
march without being interrupted. 

He could not have had any choice of roads, whatever 
was the object of his movement, or he would not have thus 
openly exposed his troops; for our two guns were enough to 
break up his column, without counting the artillery, which 
could have been sent in a few minutes to stop his advance 
entirely, and throw him back into the woods and swamps, 
from which he had emerged. But no. The only order I 
received was -to double my pickets, at the very time when 
the enemy was withdrawing his. 

The troops which we had so benevolently allowed to 
pass established themselves a little further off, in a large 
wood, where, when night came on, they troubled themselves 
no more about lighting their fires than if we had been at 
Tenallytown. Then only was it decided to give them a few 
shots, and then their fires were extinguished. During the 
night they embarked on some boats sent to receive them. 
In the morning they had disappeared. 

Thus the enemy retired from Mulberry Island. This 
was an indication at least: but it did not appear that any 
importance was attached to this fact at headquarters. The 


— 901 — 


Army of the Potomac 

next morning, the 1st of May, everything remained as 
before. 

The 2d of May, in the morning, the regiment received 
its pay for the months of January and February, when a 
negro, having swum across the river, came to confirm to us 
the report of the evacuation by the enemy of all that portion 
of his line which was in front of us. I sent him immediately 
to General Peck, but heard nothing more from it. 

I state this fact, which is not without some importance, 
to prove that upon the left of our lines we had been held 
motionless two days before abandoned positions and works 
evacuated by the enemy. If Couch’s division and after him 
Smith’s had been thrown across the Warwick, whose cross¬ 
ing by us was no longer disputed, we would most probably 
have succeeded in cutting off the retreat of the garrison of 
Yorktown, and in capturing a part of the force which still 
showed itself in front of the Third Corps. 

Success would then have had a very different meaning, 
for a city captured is a victory, a city evacuated a deception. 

I have never known if the information reached head- 1 
quarters of the general-in-chief. It might not be impossible 
that during these two days the fugitive who brought it to 
us did not get any farther than the headquarters of the 
Fourth Corps. All I have ever learned about it is that, be¬ 
fore the Congressional committee on the conduct of the war, 
General Keyes alluded to it in very vague terms. “The ene¬ 
my,” he said, “had for a day of two made preparations to 
retreat, as I learned from a negro, withdrawing his artil¬ 
lery from Griffen’s Landing on the James, and, as I think, 
from other points on the Yorktown side.” Not a word about 
the brigade which we had seen depart on April 30, nor of 
sending the negro to army headquarters. 

On the 3d of May, in the evening, the enemy opened a 
violent fire on the right of our lines, which he continued 
without intermission the greater part of the night. This 
was to deceive us as to his movements, and he succeeded so 
well that our batteries were forbidden to reply for fear of 
spoiling a formidable bombardment, which was about to be 


— 902 — 


Apprenticeship of the War 


opened on the 6th. Labor in vain. After so much work and 
so long preparations, the rebels, whom we thought we held 
tight, slipped between our fingers. The morning of the 4th 
they left Yorktown without hindrance, leaving behind them 
only some empty tents and seventy guns of large calibre, 
which they had not been able to carry away. 


— 903 — 


CHAPTER X 


The First Battle—Williamsburg 

Pursuit—The enemy attacked at Williamsburg-—He attacks Hooker’s 
division—Peck’s brigade the first to receive it—The Fifty-fifth 
under fire—Critical moment—Attack repulsed—Reenforcements 
arrive—Engagement of General Hancock—General McClellan’s 
report—Advice of General Couch—A walk on the field of battle 
—Burial of the dead—Visit to the wounded—The amputated— 
The prediction of a Georgia captain. 

The pursuit began at once. General Stoneman was sent 
with the cavalry to put to flight the enemy, whose rearguard 
he came up with in the afternoon before Williamsburg. 
But there he ran against a series of redoubts which barred 
the road, and he was compelled to halt and await the arrival 
of the infantry. 

The latter had also been put in motion in the morning, 
the Third Corps by the Yorktown road, and the Fourth by 
the Warwick, the two roads coming together before reach¬ 
ing Williamsburg. At the point of juncture the enemy had 
thrown up a bastioned work called Fort Magruder. 

Couch’s division crossed the river at Lee’s mill, where 
for the first time we comprehended with what deadly hatred 
towards us the Confederates were filled. 

The road we followed was sown with murderous snares. 
There were cylindrical bombs, with percussion fuses care¬ 
fully concealed, buried so as to leave the capsule level with 
the ground. The step of a man or horse upon it was suffi¬ 
cient to explode it, and it was always fatal. Sometimes the 
bomb was covered by a piece of board, inviting the tired 
soldier to sit down. Whoever yielded to the temptation never 
rose again. A few bodies, torn and blackened with powder, 
showed us the result of that invention of the South. But 
as soon as we were on our guard it ceased to be destructive, 
and the greater part of the projectiles, dug up, went to in¬ 
crease our stock of artillery ammunition. We continued the 
march, almost without intermission, nearly all the after¬ 
noon, meeting nothing but abandoned camps. The few tents 


— 904 — 


The First Battle—Williamsburg 


we found still standing were slashed with the sabre, so that 
they might be of no use to us. Tired, footsore, hungry, we 
reached our camping ground late, where the rain prevented 
us from having a night of rest. 

In the morning, May 5, at seven o’clock, we renewed 
our march forward. The rain had not stopped during the 
night, and it continued to pour down all day. The heavens 
were hid by one of those thick curtains of gray clouds, be¬ 
hind which it seemed as if the sun were forever extin¬ 
guished. The roads were horrible, if we could call roads the 
great mud-holes where the teams struggled, and the cannon 
and caissons, buried to the axles, were with difficulty drawn 
out of one deep rut, only to fall immediately into another. 

However, the cannon were heard firing uninterruptedly 
at Williamsburg, indicating a serious engagement. The ad¬ 
vance had evidently met with a vigorous resistance. They 
might need reenforcements, we must hurry forward. And 
we pushed on the best we could, through an ocean of mud, 
amongst the mired teams, in the midst of an inevitable dis¬ 
order, which left behind many stragglers. As each one took 
his way by the road the least impracticable, it ended by the 
regiments, the brigades, and even the divisions becoming 
mingled in inevitable confusion. Whenever I reached a 
favorable place, I made a short halt of a few minutes, to 
rally my scattered companies and give the laggards time 
to rejoin us. Then we again started on, following the route 
of the One Hundred and Second Pennsylvania, with which 
General Peck had taken the advance. 

Behind us marched General Kearney, leading the head 
of his division, which came from Yorktown. His ardor had 
found means of passing all the troops which were ahead of 
him. He urged on our stragglers, and told me that Hook¬ 
er’s division, having marched during the night to join Stone- 
man, must have had the whole rearguard of the enemy on 
his hands. 

Soon an aid of General Peck brought me the order to 
pass by Casey’s division, which had halted, I do not know 
why, in a large open field, near a brick church. The sound of 


— 905 — 


Army of the Potomac 


the cannonade did not diminish. At this point, Kearney’s 
division turned to the left to come into line by a crossroad 
less encumbered. 

A little further along, I met Captain Leavit-Hunt, aid 
of General Heintzelman, who had been ordered to hurry for¬ 
ward reenforcements. He informed me that the conjec¬ 
tures of Kearney, as to Hooker, were correct; that Hooker, 
strongly opposed by superior forces, had lost ground, after 
a desperate contest of more than four hours, during which 
no assistance had been sent to him. 

The Prince de Joinville, in his turn, passed by me with¬ 
out stopping, urging me to hurry forward. He was mounted 
on an English horse and covered with mud from head to 
foot. He was hurrying to Yorktown to endeavor to bring 
up General McClellan, who, ignorant of what was passing 
at Williamsburg, had not yet started. 

In the absence of the general-in-chief, General Sumner 
and General Keyes lost time in consulting as to what was to 
be done. The former was senior in rank, but the latter alone 
had any troops within reach, and, between the two, no meas¬ 
ure was taken, and Hooker lost not only his position but 
some of his guns. 

When I led my troops out on the farm where that idle 
conference was going on, the Count de Paris and the Duke 
de Chartres, recognizing the uniform of the regiment, came 
on foot to meet me. I did not have time either to stop or to 
dismount; they did me the honor of accompanying me in 
this manner for several minutes across the furrows, to ex¬ 
plain to me the position of affairs, and to wish me success. 

“Everything is going to the devil,” said the Duke de 
Chartres to me. “There is nobody here capable of com¬ 
manding, and McClellan is at Yorktown. As several aids 
have not been able to induce him to come, my uncle has gone 
himself to look for him, knowing well that without him 
nothing will be done as it should be.” 

General Peck was on the edge of a strip of woods, which 
was all that separated us from the enemy. Learning that, 
on account of our hurried march, and the difficulties of the 


906 — 


The First Battle—Williamsburg 

road, I had left behind me half of my men, he ordered a halt 
of ten minutes, to rest those who had come up, and to give 
the others a chance to join us. In fact, the greater part of 
the regiment were in the ranks before it went into action. 
It was then about one o’clock in the afternoon. 

The road on which we were left the woods in front of 
Fort Magruder in the midst of an oblong plain, which the 
enemy had fortified with a series of redoubts. As this was 
the narrowest point of the peninsula, the position would 
have been a good defensive one, if one were master of the 
two rivers. But the evacuation of Yorktown had opened one 
of them to our gunboats, and the other had been defended 
only by the Merrimac, whose destruction would in a few 
days be involved in the taking of Norfolk. The Williams¬ 
burg-line, then, was not tenable by the Confederates. They 
thought so little of opposing us there that the greater part 
of their army had already passed on, when the attack of 
Stoneman compelled them to return, in order to delay our 
pursuit, and cover their rearguard. The fortified works 
proved to be very fortunately placed for them, so they 
occupied a part of them, and made particularly good use of 
Fort Magruder. 

Peck’s brigade, the first to come to the aid of General 
Hooker, was promptly deployed along the edge of the wood 
facing the enemy. The Fifty-fifth was on the left, resting 
its right on the road, on the other side of which the One 
Hundred and Second Pennsylvania formed the centre, and 
the Ninety-eighth a little further on the right. The Ninety- 
third was in the second line, and the Sixty-second New York 
was held in reserve on the other side of the woods. 

In front of us stretched an abatis of trees twenty to 
twenty-five yards deep, then a broad, open field, crossed par¬ 
allel to our front by another road, which ours joined in front 
of Fort Magruder. On the other side of the crossroad the 
fields were bordered, at a distance of two or three hundred 
yards, by a wood, from which Hooker’s left had been dis¬ 
lodged after a long and deadly conflict, and from which the 


- 907 - 


Army of the Potomac 

enemy, encouraged by a first success, was reforming for a 
new attack, whose shock we were about to receive. 

My orders were to support the right of General Hooker; 
but it had fallen back into the interior of the woods, taking 
us, I suppose, for a brigade of Kearney’s division, expected 
every moment to relieve it. I had also to cover a battery of 
artillery advanced into the field, where, in fact, we found 
it, but abandoned in a mud-hole, where the horses had been 
killed or drowned in their harness. 

We had hardly time to notice these details, when, at the 
signal of a group of officers emerging at a gallop from Fort 
Magruder, the enemy’s line started out of the woods with 
loud yells, and marched straight for us. When they had ad¬ 
vanced half-way I opened upon them a fire by file, which 
promised well, while the One Hundred and Second fifed a 
volley with its entire second rank. I do not know what 
harm we did them, but they continued to advance rapidly, 
with increased cries. 

There was in front of my left a natural opening in the 
abatis, toward which two battalions of the enemy directed 
their course, with the evident intention of making it their 
especial point of attack. Unhappily, the company which was 
posted in front of that point was the worst commanded, 
and the one on which I could least depend. I had my eyes 
on it when it received its first volley. Alas! it did not even 
wait for a second. A man in the rear rank turned and started 
toward me. And like a flock of sheep after the leader, the 
rest followed in the twinkling of an eye. Almost imme¬ 
diately the next company gave way, then the third. The 
Zouaves, thus finding themselves left alone, broke in their 
turn and fell back; and, what is most shameful, some offi¬ 
cers ran away with their men and even without them. The 
Ninety-third, in forming the second line could not stop the 
runaways. They broke through the ranks and disappeared 
in the woods—the cursed woods, which tempted the cowards 
by an easy refuge, and upon which, instead of rain, I wished 
at that moment to see fall fire from heaven. 


— 908 — 


The First Battle—Williamsburg 


However, in the breaking of the left, a handful of brave 
men, non-commissioned officers and soldiers, remained im¬ 
movable. Posted behind the trees, they held firm, and en¬ 
deavored to cover the opening by a rapid and well directed 
fire, under the command of Major Yehl, who gave them the 
example of a courageous coolness. Some officers, taken by 
surprise and led away by the current, stopped of their own 
accord, or retired slowly, rather hesitating than frightened, 
and as if seeking to find out what they ought to do. In 
spite of the density of the thicket, where my horse ad¬ 
vanced with difficulty, I was soon amongst them. At my 
voice they stopped and formed around me. I gathered in 
this way a hundred, and led them quickly into line. But at 
the moment when I reformed them in front of the fatal open¬ 
ing, a strong volley broke them a second time. 

The enemy had then advanced to the end of the abatis, 
and rushed into the passage which he thought open to him. 
In the midst of the smoke I saw six or eight gray-jackets ad¬ 
vance to within a few steps of us. Are we about to be swept 
away? No. This time the men whom I led back under fire 
had not fled. The most of them had only taken shelter be¬ 
hind the neighboring trees, and from there directed a well 
sustained fire upon the assailants, whom the fire of my cen¬ 
tre companies struck obliquely. Those nearest to us were 
killed or wounded, and the others fell back in front of the 
abatis. 

My right had not yielded. On that side Lieutenant- 
Colonel Thourout, an old lieutenant of the French ^rmy, 
passed back and forth encouraging the men. Captains Four, 
Battais, Demaizure, Meyer, were brave officers, who kept 
their men in position without effort, for, when the officers 
set the example, the soldiers, sustained by confidence in their 
superiors and spurred on by pride, fight well. So it can be 
truly said that soldiers are what their officers make them. 

Four, who commanded the first company, had learned 
war in the Chasseurs of Vincennes. Standing on the trunk 
of a tree, he directed the fire of his men upon each point 
where the enemy penetrated the abatis. Battais, abandoned 


— 909 — 


Army of the Potomac 

by his two lieutenants and a dozen men who had followed 
them, continued ordering as if on drill, with the tenacity 
of a Breton. The Irish company fought under the command 
of its senior sergeant, without troubling itself about the ab¬ 
sence of its officers. The Zouaves, having rallied now, did 
their duty, with their first lieutenant, St. James, at his past. 
Finally, the remains of the three broken companies grouped 
upon the left had amongst them a second lieutenant named 
Prost. This brave man, having seen everything around 
him fleeing, disdained to leave, and remained at his post until 
the last, although he had but a dozen left him to command. 

When I could see clearly for myself how matters stood, 
through the smoke which floated over the whole line, in the 
midst of the rolling of the small arms and the bursting of 
the shells among the trees, I breathed as a man would 
breathe rescued from the water where he was drowning. 
The flag of the regiment had not receded. Our honor was 
safe; the rest was nothing. 

Perhaps it is too much to say it was nothing. For if 
we had succeeded in holding the enemy on the edge of the 
abatis and prevented his passing at the point where, he had 
twice, unavailingly, attempted it, not the less did my left 
rest in the air. Let the enemy try to pass one or two hun¬ 
dred yards farther along and there was nothing to prevent 
his entering the woods and striking me in the flank and 
rear, in which event my only chance was in a change of front 
to the rear,—a maneuver always delicate but nearly imprac¬ 
ticable in the forest, especially with troops who fought in 
line for the first time. So I kept going to the left to exam¬ 
ine, with an intentness mingled with anxiety, that part of 
the deep and silent wood where nothing could be seen, 
neither friends nor enemies. The question was: “Which will 
show themselves first ?” 

What a tumult! The whole edge of the woods on fire; 
the musketry rolling uninterruptedly from one end of the 
line to the other, the balls striking the trees like hail and 
bounding amongst the branches; two batteries of artillery 
firing as fast as possible; the shells tearing the branches of 


— 910 — 


The First Battle—Williamsburg 

the trees and filling the woods with their explosions; shrap¬ 
nel bursting in the air like petards;—such were the instru¬ 
ments of the diabolical concert. 

If all of these had done a,s much damage as they made 
noise, the affair would have been quickly decided; happily, 
it was quite otherwise. The reality was much less terrible 
than the appearance. It is true that some men fell here and 
there, not to rise again; that others, covered with blood, 
limped or were carried back a short distance to the foot of 
a tree, where two surgeons dressed their wounds temporar¬ 
ily. But after all, the number was quite small. The mis¬ 
siles of the enemy, directed upon the interior of the woods, 
which they probably supposed to be full of troops, passed 
over our heads without doing us any harm. As to the infan¬ 
try, troubled by the abatis which covered us, they fired too 
hifih. 

When the boldest of the enemy sprang forward amongst 
the fallen trees and tried to get through them to reach us, 
impeded in their movements, held in a net work of branches, 
they furnished a good mark for our men and soon disap¬ 
peared. A large number entered there never to go out 
again. 

On the other side of the road, the abatis, not so thick 
or broad, rendered the attack apparently easier. The road 
itself forked to pass around a clump of trees. The principal 
attack was made there after the first shock which broke my 
left. It there struck the Ninety-third Pennsylvania (Col¬ 
onel MacCarter), posted on both sides of the road and the 
One Hundred and Second Pennsylvania (Colonel Rawlins), 
entirely to the right of the road. The welcome received was 
the warmest. A terrible fire, at a distance of fifty feet, broke 
the enemy’s ranks and compelled him to fall back in disor¬ 
der. 

The engagement lasted about an hour, when, for the 
first time, firing was heard on my left. I could perceive 
nothing yet, but the fire became more and more vigorous in 
that part of the woods. No more doubt. Kearney had ar¬ 
rived. Hurrah for Kearney! 


— 911 — 


Army of the Potomac 

His division, after leaving us near the brick church 
where Casey’s division was calmly taking its coffee, had fol¬ 
lowed a road less obstructed but much longer than the direct 
one by which we had come. Berry’s brigade now came into 
line. Colonel Poe of the Second Michigan had come through 
the woods to see for himself who we were and where we 
were. He had no difficulty in recognizing the red kepis, and 
advanced his regiment on our left. One may imagine if 
Berry’s brigade was welcome. It could not have been more 
so even if I could have foreseen that it would be the first 
brigade I would be called on to command. 

From that time the enemy could do nothing more than 
keep up his fire, which he did until twilight. Between four 
and five o’clock more reenforcements reached us. Devens’ 
brigade took position in our rear, followed by Casey’s divis¬ 
ion which General Keyes had finally gone himself to find. 
When my ammunition was exhausted the Sixty-second New 
York relieved me. At ten minutes past five o’clock by the 
watch, the last gun was fired from Fort Magruder. A little 
later the musketry fire ceased with the day, and the rain 
only continued to fall on the living and on the dead. 

While on the left we thus stopped the offensive 
return of the enemy, the following is what happened on the 
right. On that side the rebels had not occupied the redoubts 
thrown up east of Fort Magruder lengthwise of the narrow 
plain, protected at that point by a marshy creek running 
through thick woods. At its extremity, the plain termin¬ 
ated in a steep bank, at the foot of which a long road trans¬ 
formed the creek into a pond. There was a formidable re¬ 
doubt at that point. As it swept the road for its # whole 
length, a regiment with a few guns would have sufficed to 
stop an army corps. But the enemy had put there neither 
a gun nor a man. 

Hooker had sent a reconnoissance in that direction in 
the morning. The colonel commanding, meeting no enemy 
anywhere, informed General Hancock, who* commanded a 
brigade in Smith’s division, of that fact. On that informa¬ 
tion Sumner decided in the afternoon to send forward some 


— 912 — 


The First Battle—Williamsburg 


force in that direction, and Hancock, passing rapidly over 
the road, ascended the hill at the foot of the vacant battery 
and advanced into the plain unexpectedly. Two redoubts, 
both unoccupied, were near by. He put a force in them, and, 
as he had taken a battery with him, he put two guns in the 
nearest and took two with him to the edge of the woods, 
with which he drove out, without trouble, the feeble garri¬ 
son from a third work. 

This attack gave the alarm to the Confederates, who, 
not expecting us from that direction, had given General 
Hancock plenty of time to make his dispositions. 

When they recognized the danger, Early was promptly 
detached to retake the redoubts and throw us back into the 
swamp. But Hancock was ready to receive him. He allowed 
them first to advance in line of battle, behind a swell of the 
ground. When they were well uncovered, he welcomed 
them with a deadly fire at short range; then, at the moment 
when he saw their line shaken, he charged them vigorously, 
and remained master of the field of battle, which in their 
flight they abandoned to him, covered with dead and 
wounded. The night coming on prevented Hancock from 
pursuing further the advantage of this short but brilliant 
engagement. 

What was General McClellan doing in the meanwhile? 
He had finally decided to leave Yorktown, at the urgent so¬ 
licitation of Governor Sprague and the Prince de Joinville, 
and had reached Williamsburg—when everything was over. 
One need not be very much surprised, then, that, knowing 
nothing himself of what had happened, but in a hurry to give 
an account of the battle, he had sent a despatch at ten o'clock 
in the evening, the errors of which bordered on the ridicu¬ 
lous. 

At the very instant when the enemy, abandoning his 
position, hastily resumed his retreat toward Richmond, he 
wrote: “I have Joe Johnston in front of me with a large 
force, probably much greater than mine , and very strongly 
intrenched. I will, at least, try to hold them in check here. 
The total of my force is, without any doubt, inferior to that 


— 913 — 


Army of the Potomac 

of the rebels, who still fight well; but I will do all I can with 
the troops I have at my disposal.” 

Now, what was the number of the troops which Gen¬ 
eral McClellan had under his orders? One hundred and 
twelve thousand three hundred and ninety-two (112,392) 
men present for duty,—so it appears in the official report, 
signed by his own hand, sixteen days before. At Williams¬ 
burg, the Third and Fourth Corps together amounted to 
sixty-eight' thousand two hundred and nineteen (68,219) 
men. The Confederates had not one-half that number in 
front of us. 

The next morning, the enemy having disappeared, the 
general celebrated our success in a very different tone. Now, 
“the victory is complete.” Only, it is Hancock who has 
gained it. “He took two redoubts.” In his delight, the gen- 
eral-in-chief forgets that they were not defended. “He re¬ 
pulsed Early’s brigade in a real bayonet charge. He took a 
colonel and one hundred and fifty prisoners, killing at least 
two colonels, as many lieutenant-colonels, and many soldiers. 
The brilliant fight of Hancock resulted in turning the left 
of the enemy’s works, who abandoned his position during 
the night, leaving all his sick and wounded in our hands. 
Hancock’s success was gained with a loss not exceeding 
twenty, killed and wounded.” 

This was an error. Hancock had lost more. But would 
it not apear from this report that Hancock was the only one 
who had been engaged ? As to Hooker, he hardly mentioned 
him. “I do not know exactly what our loss is; but I fear 
Hooker lost considerable on our left.” This is all. Not a 
work about Kearney, nor of Peck. And yet Hooker’s divis¬ 
ion had fought for six hours with a desperation, shown by 
a loss of about seventeen hundred men. Peck’s brigade, the 
first to arrest the enemy’s success, had lost 124 men, and 
Kearney’s division about three hundred. Was the general- 
in-chief ignorant of this ? Or were those accessories invisi¬ 
ble to him, on account of the brilliant achievement of the 
capture of two unoccupied redoubts, and of a real charge— 
with the bayonet? 


— 914 — 


The First Battle—Williamsburg 


The regiment passed the night in a field of mud—a mis¬ 
erable night. Since the second day before, we had made a 
hard march, fought fairly, eaten little, and slept not at all. 
Fires were kindled, which were kept up with difficulty on 
account of the rain, and around which we endeavored to 
pass the time by detailed accounts of all the incidents of the 
day. 

At two o’clock in the morning, General Couch had the 
kindness to come in person and compliment me on the part 
we had taken in the battle. I was not disposed to accept 
more than what rightfully belonged to us. 

“General,” I said, “I thank you for the praises you 
have been so kind to express to me for the brave men, offi¬ 
cers and soldiers, who surround me. They deserve them. 
But here is but two-thirds of my regiment. The remainder 
ran away at the first fire, and I do not know what has be¬ 
come of them. Among these last are eight or ten officers 
who have acted like cowards; I wish to get rid of them as 
soon as possible, and I propose to ask today for a court-mar¬ 
tial, that justice may be done.” 

The general drew me aside to reply to me. Smiling, 
he said: “My dear colonel, you take the matter too much 
to heart. It is not at all surprising; and what has happened 
to you has happened to others I could cite to you, but who 
will say nothing about it. Do as they do; believe me, it is 
best. A court-martial is not possible at this moment, and, 
if it were, I would persuade you not to ask for one. The 
first fire has an unlooked-for effect on the nerves of many 
men, against which their inexperience is futile to fortify 
them. Surprised at the first encounter, they will be pre¬ 
pared at the second and will come out of the action as brave 
as any others. It is right to give those who have failed to¬ 
day an opportunity to repair their fault on the next occa¬ 
sion. If the thing occurs a second time, I will be the first 
to ask you to take severe measures. Until then, let us keep 
our family secrets and do our best.” 

General Couch was right. He judged wisely, as the 
conduct of the whole regiment soon proved, at the battle 
of Fair Oaks. 


— 915 — 


Army of the Potomac 

The enemy retreated quietly, without being pursued. 
The roads were in such a horrible condition that he had to 
abandon five pieces of artillery and several wagons in the 
mud-holes. What would have been the result, then, if we 
had followed him up closely ? But General McClellan showed 
himself in no more hurry to take Richmond than he had been 
to take Yorktown; and as he had allowed Magruder’s divis¬ 
ion to fortify and receive reenforcements on the Warwick 
where he could have easily captured it, so now he allowed 
Johnston’s army to go and prepare for the defence of the 
Confederate capital without even attacking his rear-guard. 
Thus we had three entire days of leisure at Williamsburg 
to lie around in the sun and brush up our arms to the sound 
of military music, which celebrated our indolent glory by 
playing from morning till night “Yankee Doodle,” “Hail, 
Columbia,” and other patriotic airs. 

I profited by the delay to visit the field of battle, where 
several detachments passed the day of the 6th in burying 
the dead. Not an exhilarating spectacle. And yet, to be 
sincere, I could not help feeling a little disappointed in find¬ 
ing only fifteen dead in the abatis behind which we had 
fought. Three hours of firing and sixteen thousand cart¬ 
ridges expended to kill fifteen men and put perhaps a hun¬ 
dred and fifty hors de combat! But the rebels had found 
even that loss too much, and so that must console us for 
not having done more. 

Where Hooker’s division had fought our loss was much 
greater than theirs. On the open ground, and especially on 
the sides of the road, lay many of the dead from Sickles’ 
New York brigade. Further along in the wood, where the 
attack had begun, the New Jersey brigade had left the 
thicket full of dead. 

Everywhere those who had been killed outright had 
retained, when fallen, the position in which death had struck 
them standing. 

During the battle, Captain Titus, brigade quartermas¬ 
ter, having gone forward to the right of the Fifty-fifth, saw 
a Confederate soldier crawling into the abatis. He picked 


— 916 — 


The First Battle—Williamsburg 

up a musket, fallen from the hands of a man killed or 
wounded, and shot him just as He was taking aim at one of 
our men. The next morning we found him stretched out 
on his back with both arms in the position of taking aim. 
The captain’s ball had passed through his heart. 

, The cannon which the enemy had not been able to carry 
off were buried in the mud to the axles. The two wheel 
horses were literally drowned in the liquid mud, their heads 
half buried. The others, killed by balls, mingled their blood 
with that of some artillerymen who had endeavored to re¬ 
lease them by cutting the harness. 

Human remains frightfully mutilated gave evidence 
here and there that the cannon had also done its part in the 
bloody work. One of these lay at the foot of a fence with 
nothing of the head left, but the face like a grinning mask. 
The remainder, crushed by a ball, adhered to the rails in 
bloody blotches. Strange curiosity, which by a natural 
impulse leads us toward the horrible—which led me there 
upon the field of battle, and which attracts you, also, you 
who read these lines, since your imagination completes the 
picture of which this is a sketch. 

You will not hesitate, no more than I did, to step on 
the edge of these broad trenches, carelessly dug to-day by 
those for whom others will dig trenches elsewhere, perhaps 
in a year, perhaps in a month, perhaps to-morrow. The first 
to depart on the long journey lie stretched out before us, 
side by side, with marble features, glassy eyes, and in their 
torn and bloody uniforms. The comrades who will follow 
them hasten to finish their duty without philosophizing on 
the skull of poor Yorick, whose infinite witticisms but yes¬ 
terday enlivened the bivouac. A layer of men and a layer 
of earth. The ditch filled, it is covered over with a little 
hillock, to provide for settling. Then they depart, leaving 
to a few friendly hands the pious care of marking a name 
and a date on small boards aligned at the head of the head, 
where no one will come to read them. 

******* 


— 917 — 


CHAPTER XI 


Days of Suffering 

Forward march—Engagement at West Point—Subject for discontent 
—Dinner at headquarters—Fight of a new kind—The bull and 
the Newfoundland dog—The death of Bianco—Virginia planta¬ 
tions—Marsh fever—The Turner house—Delirium—Manna in the 
desert—Anxieties—Battle of Fair Oaks—First days of conval¬ 
escence—Departure for the north. 

On Friday, May 9, the Fourth Corps at last moved, 
followed by the Third. The Second, having remained at 
Yorktown, embarked there for West Point, at the place 
where the Pamunkey and the Mattapony unite to form the 
York River. One would naturally suppose that the last 
three days had been actively employed in arranging an ad¬ 
vantageous concentration of the army, in getting together 
and completing the material for transportation, in assuring 
the regular service of the supply department,—in fine, in 
taking every possible measure to repair the lost time by a 
rapid advance. The days were long, the sun hot, the roads 
dried while you were looking at them. But nothing could 
hasten the methodical slowness of the general-in-chief, and 
our daily marches were those of the tortoise. We did not 
reach New Kent Court House until Tuesday the 13th, the 
fifth day after starting, and we did not leave there till the 
16th, two days later. The distance is twenty-eight miles, 
two ordinary marches. 

The enemy was not the cause of these delays. He 
thought only of continuing his retreat; we did not come 
across him, keeping ourselves at a respectful distance from 
his rearguard. 

General Franklin alone, having arrived at West Point 
on the 7th by transport, and thus threatening with his divi¬ 
sion the flank of the Confederates, who were marching by 
at a distance of two or three miles, had an engagement with 
them, the importance of which was much exaggerated by 
the imagination of General McClellan. The most advanced 


— 918 — 


Days of Suffering 


regiments were thrown back and kept near the river, and 
Johnston continued his march without being further trou¬ 
bled. 

When it was known in the army of what little impor¬ 
tance was the pretended battle of West Point, it began to be 
perceived what partialities the general-in-chief would show 
towards his particular friends. He had already cut out new 
commands for them by reducing the army corps to two divi¬ 
sions each. Great discontent was manifested. Not that the 
army took to heart the transfer of such or such a division 
from one command to another. That was an affair for the 
generals. But Hooker’s division was deeply wounded by 
the injustice of which it had been a victim in the telegraphic 
bulletins upon the Williamsburg fight. The same senti¬ 
ment prevailed in Kearney’s division and in Peck’s brigade. 
Personally, Hooker was incensed; Kearney protested vigor¬ 
ously; Peck complained against the injustice. As to the 
subaltern officers and soldiers, their discontent found vent 
in murmurs and epigrams. 

Another grievance, more generally felt because it di¬ 
rectly touched the soldier, was the excess of precaution and 
the severity of orders to preserve from injury any object, 
even the smallest, belonging to the rebels. Not a farm¬ 
house, not a cottage, not a negro, but was furnished with 
a guard on our approach, by the troops of General Andrew 
Porter, especially ordered, not to protect the persons and 
the furniture, which ran no danger, but to watch over the 
farmyards, the stables, the forage, the wells, and even the 
fences. 

I have seen our men, covered with dust and overcome 
by the heat, try in vain to get water from wells overflowing, 
from which stringent orders drove they away, because the 
supply of water for a rebel family might be diminished. I 
have also seen them, covered with mud and shivering with 
the rain, prevented by orders of the general-in-chief from 
warming themselves with the fence rails of dry wood which 
were ready at their hands, because the cattle of a rebel 


— 919 — 


Army of the Potomac 

farmer might get out and eat the grass in his fields, while 
he was rebuilding his fences. 

In the first case, the soldier had to go a long distance 
to fill his canteen with warm and muddy water from a pool 
or creek. In the second, he had to cut down trees and use 
the green wood, hard to burn, not fit to dry himself by, and 
hardly answering to boil his coffee. 

And it must not be imagined that the people, treated 
with such great consideration, were in the least grateful 
for it. They were animated with such irreconcilable hatred 
against us that they did not give themselves the trouble to 
dissemble. The women would sometimes even take advan¬ 
tage of their immunity to boast of their enmity. They were 
so many spies, whom we were guarding. Everything they 
heard, everything they could get out of any one was re¬ 
ported to the enemy as soon as possible. The horses, cattle, 
hogs, which we were so scrupulously compelled to respect, 
were sent on the first occasion to the Confederates, so that 
the Yankees might not profit by them. 

When the army was before Richmond, letters of these 
enemies, whom we treated as friends, were intercepted. 
They were full of exact information as to the location of our 
pickets and the disposition of our forces. They designated 
also the farms where, under our safeguard, provisions were 
reserved for the Confederates, as soon as they could send 
for them. It is true that the Richmond papers, which were 
filled every day with invectives against us, showed them¬ 
selves more courteous towards our general, whom they called 
“the only gentleman in his army.” It can be seen that 
they had very good reason to feel so. 

So the soldier lived poorly, having no way to add to the 
insufficient rations, which were furnished quite irregularly. 
On two occasions the coffee failed us, which, of all privations, 
is the one the soldier feels the most. The means of trans¬ 
portation are still incomplete, it was said. And the quarter¬ 
masters incompetent, might have been added without in¬ 
justice. 


— 920 — 


Days of Suffering 

On the general’s staff they possibly were ignorant of 
these things, for evidently they did not suffer from the want 
of anything. Near New Kent Court House, my bivouac be¬ 
ing near the army headquarters, I profited by it to make a 
call on two of my friends, who kept me to dinner. It was an 
excellent dinner; certainly they were not in want of the 
means of transportation. The fare was of the, best, and we 
had a certain mixture of Bordeaux and iced champagne, 
which still lingers in my grateful memory. 

I finished my evening in the tent of the Orleans princes, 
who, influenced by their surroundings, appeared to me to 
see things somewhat differently from what they really were. 
At headquarters they had but one bell, and consequently 
only one sound was heard—praises of McClellan. 

* * * * * * * 


— 921 — 










V 











































































































THE BATTLE 
OF WILLIAMSBURG 

AND THE CHARGE OF THE TWENTY- 
FOURTH VIRGINIA OF EARLY’S 
BRIGADE 


BY 

Colonel R. L. Maury 


From 

SOUTHERN HISTORICAL SOCIETY PAPERS 
1880 





















































■ 






















































































































. 





































. ■ < r . O ' , : ■ ■ ' .' • 


















































The Battle of Williamsburg and the Charge of the 
Twenty-fourth Virginia of Early’s Brigade 

By Colonel R. L. Maury 


The Immortal Twenty-fourth .—The Yankee General Hancock 
said that the Fifth North Carolina and the Twenty-fourth Virginia, 
for their conduct in battle before Williamsburg, ought to have this 
word inscribed upon their banners. The Twenty-fourth in the fight 
of yesterday vindicated its title to this honor. * * Richmond Enquirer , 
June 2, 1862. 

s|c «$• sfc 

The Twenty-fourth Virginia infantry was one of the 
very first organized of the Virginia regiments. It was com¬ 
posed of companies raised in the mountain counties of South¬ 
west Virginia, and as General Early was its first colonel, it 
was, particularly in the first days of the war, often spoken 
of as Early’s regiment. It was formed in June, 1861, at 
Lynchburg, and proceeded forthwith to Manassas, where 
its Colonel was soon given a brigade, to which this regiment 
was attached. 

He * * 

At odd times, when the army of Northern Virginia 
was inactive, the brigade of which this regiment formed 
a part—and which, from its earliest engagements, seemed 
to have attracted the attention of its commanders and 
gained their special confidence—went to Suffolk, North Car¬ 
olina and Drury’s Bluff in successful quests of glory and re¬ 
nown. After it was reorganized in 1862, Kemper commanded 
it, and Pickett was its Major General until the sad disaster 
at Five Forks (1865). 

At Yorktown, Early held the lines just outside the vil¬ 
lage. Outnumbered as the Confederates were, the inces¬ 
sant duty necessarily imposed upon them ifi picketing, skir¬ 
mishing and constant watching by night and day without re¬ 
lief, was wearing and arduous in the extreme. The weather 


— 925 — 



Battle of Williamsburg 


was wet, the troops without shelter, the trenches full of mud 
and water and the supplies but scant. This exposure and 
hardship, greater than they had ever borne and so differ¬ 
ent from their snug quarters at Manassas, was quickly fol¬ 
lowed by sickness and disease, so that during the three 
weeks in the Yorktown trenches the seven hundred muskets 
of the Twenty-fourth Virginia were reduced to something 
like five hundred effectives. 

On the retreat to Williamsburg, commencing the night 
of May 3d, Early’s brigade was the rear guard—and the 
Twenty-fourth, being the left regiment, brought up the rear 
of all—the most fatiguing place, as every soldier knows, of 
the whole line of march. 

All this was truly an ill preparation for the desperate 
charge to be set before them soon; but let it not be forgot¬ 
ten in reckoning the glory of their deeds. 

The horrible roads are well remembered even now by 
all who passed them on that dark and rainy night. There 
had been constant rains for weeks and ceaseless use of 
every highway all the while. The mud and water were an¬ 
kle and sometimes knee deep, and the infantry were often 
called to help the weary horses drag wagons and artillery 
from holes and ruts in which the wheels had sunk up to the 
very axles. So the march was tedious and dragging and 
slow. The men fell asleep on the wayside as they halted 
for a moment, and sometimes not a mile in an hour was 
made. Thus morning found them scarcely half way to Wil¬ 
liamsburg (fourteen miles), and midday had long gone by 
ere the" rear passed through the gray old town, and, weary 
and jaded, were allowed to take whatever of rest a halt in 
an open field a mile or so beyond and a tentless bivouac in 
the pelting rain might afford. Supperless but not to sleep 
they lay upon the soaking ground that night, and without 
breakfast, weary, wet and hungry, but jolly in spirits, they 
are ready at daylight to resume their march. 

General Johnston had no intention of tarrying at Wil¬ 
liamsburg, nor was the place defensible, for the enemy now 
had control of both James and York rivers on either flank 
and intended to push Franklin’s division (30,000), kept on 


— 926 — 


Charge of the Twenty-fourth Virginia 

transports below Yorktown so as to move in a minute, rap¬ 
idly up the York to West Point in the vain hope of getting 
in our rear. Our orders were that Magruder should not 
halt at all and that the other divisions should take up their 
march to the Chickahominy at early dawn—Longstreet be¬ 
ing in the rear. So Smith moved on at day, then the trains 
followed, and Hill’s infantry were filing into the road when 
orders came to halt and then to return to town. 

The enemy’s van had come up and was disposed to skir¬ 
mish with the rear guard—fresh troops were arriving every 
moment—there was no time to wait to deliver a regular 
battle, for Franklin was already sailing up the York—but 
our trains were not well away and ’twas deemed prudent for 
Hill to tarry as Longstreet might need aid; doubtless, too, 
General Johnston was not unwilling to turn and deal the 
enemy a blow to show how little demoralization his back¬ 
ward movement created, and how, though in retreat, his 
men were quite as ready and as able to fight as when on a 
victorious advance. 

Thus Hill’s trains went on, but his infantry and some 
artillery returned to Williamsburg and the former stacked 
their arms upon the college green and passed the day in 
waiting and expectancy, while the rain still fell and fell. 

Longstreet was being pressed more vigorously, the 
skirmish was becoming a fight just beyond the town and 
could be distinctly heard by all, and wounded and ambu¬ 
lances and prisoners passed frequently by. Every one looked 
for orders to the front each moment; amid such scenes and 
sounds the tension of expectation and excitement was more 
intense; meantime evening, dark, gloomy and cloudy, drew 
slowly on, when, suddenly, about three o’clock galloped up 
the looked for courier. “Move quickly to the support of 
Longstreet,” said he. 

And now were seen a series of blunders by generals 
which, as often after, the priceless lives of our gallant sol¬ 
diers were sacrificed to correct, and which in this brilliant 
Williamsburg charge caused the useless slaughter of the 
very flower of Early’s brigade—for though it need never 
have been made, yet it ought to have been a grand success, 


— 927 — 


Battle of Williamsburg 


and to have resulted in the easy capture of Hancock’s whole 
command, had due precaution been taken before commenc¬ 
ing the attack and proper skill displayed in arranging, con¬ 
ducting and supporting it after it had commenced. To make 
this clear one should recall the surrounding circumstances. 

The prudent forethought of General J. B. Magruder, 
who, with his troops, had so successfully held the lines from 
Yorktown to Mulberry island since the war began, had 
caused the construction of a cordon of redoubts just below 
Williamsburg, running entirely across the Peninsula from 
Queen’s creek of York to James river. Commencing near 
Saunders pond on the York side near where the road crosses 
it, this line runs northwest for a mile or more, in which 
space are three redoubts; then due west some three hun¬ 
dred yards, passing another to Fort Magruder with several 
outlying smaller works, and thence westwardly in an ir¬ 
regular course, skirting a stream and swamp, some two miles 
more, passing six redoubts to the road leading to Allen’s 
wharf on James river. The center of this line was Fort 
Magruder, a large, well constructed closed earthwork, lo¬ 
cated about one mile from Williamsburg on the main road 
running down the Peninsula, which, just beyond, falls into 
Yorktown and the Warwick roads. 

The redoubts to the right, on the James river side, were 
all occupied by Longstreet’s division, which relieved Hill— 
guarding the rear of the 4th—and whose obvious duty was 
to cover all the lines on which the enemy could advance. 
But this was not done; for on the morning of the 5th none 
of these left works were occupied in force, and only one or 
two of the nearest even with pickets.* 

Thus the left of the Confederate line of works, like that 
of the English at Preston Pass, was undefended, and one of 
the few passes across the swamps stretching along its front 
remained entirely open to the enemy. The redoubt con¬ 
structed expressly to guard this passage seems not to have 

*See Colonel Bratton’s statement, Southern Historical Papers, 
June, 1879, page 299. General Anderson says in his report: “My not 
occuying these redoubts was perhaps a mistake, but I did not under¬ 
stand Longstreet’s orders to include them.” 


— 928 — 



Charge of the Twenty-fourth Virginia 

been considered worth a thought in the morning, when it 
could have been occupied without a loss, while in the even¬ 
ing time the lives of hundreds of the best soldiers were 
thrown away in a fruitless attempt to regain it. 

Why were these redoubts not occupied? They were 
constructed for just such an occasion; for it was well known 
that the Yorktown lines would have to be evacuated sooner 
or later. General Johnston, in his narrative, pages 122-4, 
says he knew nothing of them, and so does Longstreet, and 
Hill, and Anderson, although they were all charged with 
their defense. Each is in sight from the other, and all are 
in a continuously open space. McLaw’s, of Longstreet’s divi¬ 
sion, who occupied this part of the line the afternoon before 
with Kershaw’s and Semmes’ brigades, knew of them, for 
Colonel Marigny, with his Tenth Louisiana, occupied this 
very work (see McLaw’s report of the battle of Williams¬ 
burg) until relieved by R. H. Anderson. Colonel Bratton, of 
the Sixth South Carolina, of Anderson’s brigade, whose regi¬ 
ment was posted near the glacis of Fort Magruder, knew 
of them; for he reported them unoccupied [see narrative 
—Southern Historical Society Payers, June 1879.] It would 
be interesting to know to whom he made this report. He 
also saw the Yankees later in the day take possession of that 
on the extereme left. Moreover, all the army had entered 
this entrenched line at Fort Magruder, and when preparing 
to defend it, surely common prudence, not to say ordinary 
generalship, should have suggested the importance of ascer¬ 
taining the position of its flanks; and it should not have 
been presumed, as seems to have been done, that so skilful 
a soldier as General Magruder had constructed but half a 
line of fortifications. And, indeed, the Commanding Gen¬ 
eral knew from the time he went to Yorktown, or very soon 
thereafter, that his army would soon withdraw (see John¬ 
ston’s narrative, page 116), and this was the only road. It 
was apparent too, that at or about Williamsburg would be 
the first halt, and it was to be expected that the enemy’s 
van would come up with our rear here. If ’twas “prudent 
to construct these works” [Johnston’s narrative], would 
it not also have been prudent to ascertain their location ? 


— 929 — 


Battle of Williamsburg 


But it is even stranger how Longstreet could have re¬ 
mained in ignorance of them, for they were in actual sight 
from Fort Magruder, where he must have been on both the 
4th and 5th. As McLaws occupied them on the 4th, why did 
not Anderson, who relieved him, occupy all the posts he 
occupied? Who relieved Marigny’s Tenth Louisiana and 
how came that relief to be withdrawn afterwards? Can it 
be that Bratton, who was posted on the Confederate left on 
the 4th and 5th, relieved Marigny, who occupied this posi¬ 
tion, and that he was also in fault in not having occupied 
this left redoubt also? But all these mistakes, growing out 
of ignorance or carelessness, might have been avoided had 
General Magruder been assigned to the defense of the rear 
on that day, for he and his troops were perfectly familiar 
with the whole country—they had been stationed here all 
the previous autumn and winter, and had themselves laid 
out and built these very fortifications. 

As the Confederate army entered these lines about noon 
of the 4th, Longstreet, who led the van, and, by usual rou¬ 
tine, would be in the rear next day, halted just within, while 
the remainder of the forces marched on past Williamsburg. 
In the afternoon the enemy’s van appeared, driving in the 
cavalry, and McLaws, with Semmes’ and Kershaw’s bri¬ 
gades, went back to these lines, and the Yankee van re¬ 
tired. That evening McLaws was relieved, as already said, 
by R. H. Anderson, commanding the brigades of Anderson 
and Pryor. In the morning, after much skirmishing, with¬ 
out advantage to the enemy, he appeared on the right in 
force under Hooker, attacking with spirit, but though rein¬ 
forced by Kearney, he was pressed back, driven and almost 
routed.* Here was fighting pretty much all day, but night 
found Longstreet holding his position, while the enemy 
seemed cured of any desire to again molest the Confederate 
rear.f 

^Testimony before Congressional Committee on Conduct of War. 
Part I pages 353-566. 

f On the retreat the van of to-day is the rear guard of to-morrow. 
Such was the custom of the Army of Northern Virginia—and Long¬ 
street having led the first day, was rear guard the second. Was he 
in front at starting because General Johnston had found him, as after- 


—- 930 — 



Charge of the Twenty-fourth Virginia 

Sumner, with 30,000 men, had also come up early on 
the 5th, but had sat quietly down across the Yorktown road, 
just out of sight and range. Although in command—for 
McClellan seems to have considered that position for the 
general-in-chief on a pursuit was fifteen miles in rear, and 
had remained below Yorktown*—he took no part in what 
was going on around him; and though importuned for aid 
by both Hooker and Kearney, who were “almost routed,” he 
declined to part with a man; and when Hancock, finding the 
empty redoubt on the left, ventured into it, he actually com¬ 
manded him to return. In fact, he seems to have forgotten 
that he was in pursuit of what was described as a flying and 
demoralized enemy, and though himself in command, and 
holding the van, his chief object on finding the foe seems to 
have been to let him well alone. 

Not so Hancock, one of his subordinates, who was made 
of sterner stuff, and who had other views of the duties of 
pursuers of a flying foe; for on the morning of the 5th, be¬ 
tween 10 and 11 o’clock, leaving Sumner at Whittaker’s, full 
half a mile or more from the nearest Confederate line, he 
takes his own brigade and part of Naglee’s—five regiments 
—and ten guns, in all probably over 4,000 men and 
learning that one of the redoubts on the extreme 
left of the Confederate line was unoccupied, he 
crosses Saunders’ pond and marches into it, and 
then, in the language of the Comte de Paris, “seeing no 
enemy, he fearlessly proceeded to march into the next.” But 
on approaching it, he perceives Bratton, with part of his 
Sixth South Carolina, preparing to oppose him, whereupon, 


wards General Lee did, “slow to move,” and therefore started him 
first? Possibly, for the evacuation of the Yorktown lines had been 
ordered on a previous night, and D. H. Hill had moved out bag and 
baggage at the appointed time for a mile or more, but was then halted 
until nearly day, and then ordered back to his former position. For¬ 
tunately the enemy had not discovered his absence—a bit of rare good 
luck not to have been expected. It was then currently reported that the 
waiting had been for Longstreet, and as he had not moved out in time 
for the army to get well away before dawn, it was necessary to re¬ 
turn. 

*Evidence of Governor Sprague and others before Congressional 
Committee on Conduct of War. 


931 — 



Battle of Williamsburg 


although in far greater force, he halts, falls back, and 
calls for aid. But Sumner seems to have been in no mood 
to detain the “flying foe,” and orders Hancock to retire. The 
latter, well knowing the lucky prize he had found, deter¬ 
mined to stay; so falling back from the “fearless advance,” 
spoken of by the Comte de Paris, to the redoubt he first oc¬ 
cupied, he makes his dispositions for a stand, and Bratton, 
with commendable care, that might well have been imitated 
that day by others of higher rank, extends a line of pickets 
from his main body across Hancock’s front and into the 
woods beyond. The latter gets his guns into battery, and 
occasionally throws a chance shot or shell here and there 
at a venture, but with little damage, if any. Thus the day 
wore on. Towards evening, this artillery fire becoming some¬ 
what annoying to Fort Magruder, ’tis said, although Han¬ 
cock showed no signs of making use of the position he had 
stumbled upon, which, in fact, was the key to the entire 
Confederate line, and opened to the enemy a road to Wil¬ 
liamsburg, as well as Longstreet’s rear, D. H. Hill and Early, 
anxious to have a share in the day’s work, asked and obtained 
leave to assault General Hancock and drive him away. There 
appears to have been no necessity for this, however, for 
Hancock’s fire had done no damage all day, and was not 
more harmful now—the fighting was well-nigh over—and 
he himself was preparing to fall back for the night. (See 
Hancock’s report, battle of Williamsburg.) The Confeder¬ 
ates had beaten off every attack made upon them, and the 
whole line was to be abandoned before morning. Neverthe¬ 
less leave was given, with a charge from General Johnston 
“to be careful.” 

Forthwith Hill brings his command to the front. 
Early’s brigade, eager for the first of a hundred battles, com¬ 
ing from the college green at the double-quick through the 
narrow streets of the old historic town, where the cheers 
and tears of the women and the maidens at the doors and 
windows waving adieux as they passed so quickly by, and 
the unaccustomed sight of dead, wounded and prisoners 
brought up from the field to which they were hurrying, the 


— 932 — 


Charge of the Twenty-fourth Virginia 

rapid motion, the galloping of artillery, couriers and staff, 
with all the burning excitement of the approach to battle, 
sent the blood coursing through their veins, which tingles 
even now but the memory of it all flushes the cheek and 
brightens the eye, though eighteen long years have passed 
away. 

The brigade hurries half a mile or more down the 
Yorktown road, files short to the left, passes through a 
newly plowed, soft and muddy field half a mile further, and 
forming into the line behind a wood, which screens from 
sight all beyond, breathless, hot and heavy of foot from 
rapid motion over such a ground, halts and prepares to 
load. Thus formed, it consists of the following regiments, 
counting from the right: The Fifth and Twenty-third North 
Carolina, commanded respectively by Colonels Duncan K. 
McRae and Hoke; and the Thirty-eighth and Twenty-fourth 
Virginia, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Powhatan B. 
Whittle and Colonel William R. Terry; the Twenty-fourth 
Virginia being thus on the left, and the Fifth North Caro¬ 
lina on the right. This brigade is assigned to the attack, 
and the remainder of the division—the brigades of Rodes, 
Featherston and Rains, with the second company of Rich¬ 
mond howitzers—is held in reserve close by. Major-Gen¬ 
eral D. H. Hill will lead and takes special charge of the 
right wing, the two North Carolina regiments; and the 
Virginians, of the left, will be led by General Early. 

Regardless of the rule which places commanding officers 
in rear of the line in a charge, Early, with his staff, takes 
position in front of his old regiment, the Twenty-fourth, 
and its field-officers, all mounted, do likewise. The order 
is given to load and then to fix bayonets—and the guns are 
loaded and the bayonets fixed. In a few words, Early, ad¬ 
dressing his men, says they are to assault and capture a 
battery “over there” pointing to the woods—and grimly 
adding, that their safest place, after getting under fire, will 
be at the very guns themselves, advises all to get there as 
quickly as possible. Expectation is on tiptoe, and many a 
gallant heart, in generous emulation, resolves to be the first 
to reach these guns. With only these few moments to halt 


— 933 — 


Battle of Williamsburg 

to regain breath, the order is given to march, and the line 
moves forward.* 

The generals did not know the position of the redoubt 
to be attacked, nor even its exact direction from where the 
line was formed; yet no skirmishers were thrown forward 
to discover it, nor was any proper reconnaissance made.f 
The latter might easily have been done, for from the point 
where Bratton was with the Sixth Carolina, he had a view 
of the whole field, and his pickets extended from his redoubt 
into the woods whence Early’s brigade was soon to emerge. 
But these ordinary precautions do not seem to have been 
thought of, and the Major-General, arranging his forces to 
attack a strong enemy in a strong position, only to be ap¬ 
proached across a large open boggy field (in his report he 
says it was half a mile wide), without knowledge of their 
numbers or location, and without reconnaissance or skir¬ 
mishers, sounded the charge and ordered the advance. The 
disposition of the supports were made with equal lack of 
skill, for the three additional brigades and the battery of 
artillery, as brave and gallant soldiers as ever fired a gun, 
though close at hand, were never brought upon the field at 
all, and the attack failed for want of their aid. They were 
ample for the purpose, for they outnumbered the foe, and 
were quite sufficient to have captured General Hancock and 
his five regiments and ten guns, one and all, who were far 
in advance of General Sumner, and who could only retreat 
by a narrow road over Saunders’ pond. 

From all this want of generalship, skill and care, arose 
great confusion and greater misfortune. Not knowing ex¬ 
actly the location of tlie point of attack, it was scarcely pos¬ 
sible that the line of battle would be properly arranged with 

*This little halt was even briefer for the writer and his part of 
the regiment than for the other portions of the brigade. In the run 
down from Williamsburg, the line had become opened and much ex¬ 
tended. The Twenty-fourth Virginia was in the rear, and the writer's 
part of it in rear of all; so that when the halt was made, and line of 
battle formed, it was the last to get into position, and had barely time 
to load before the march forward began. 

fColonel Bratton’s narrative, Southern Historical Society Papers , 
June, 1879, pages 299-300. Colonel McRae’s narrative, Southern His¬ 
torical Papers , August, 1879, page 364. 


— 934 — 



Charge of the Twenty-fourth Virginia 

regard to it, and so it happened; for when at last it came in 
sight of the enemy, instead of the center being opposite the 
point attacked, as it should have been, with the line moving 
directly upon it, the extreme left (the left of the Twenty- 
fourth Virginia) was opposite the battery, and the remain¬ 
der of the brigade away off to the right, and moving in a 
direction across the enemy's front. These sturdy old mus-. 
keteers—some of whom were not inapt military scholars, 
and by dint of comparing notes, careful observatipn, and an 
occasional book or two, had learned as well how a battle 
should be set in order as many a general officer—understood 
from the advance being thus commenced without skirmish¬ 
ers, and from General Early's little address before starting, 
that they were as close upon the position to be attacked as 
could be, that the charge commenced then and there, that 
the battery to be taken was just over the wood, a hundred 
yards distant perhaps, and that they would fall upon the 
foe in a moment. 

With this impression upon their minds, it was difficult 
to restrain the impatient valor and, restlessness of the 
men as they moved off, but still they advanced across the 
field steadily, and, preserving their alignment well, though 
in more rapid step, they entered the woods. Here the miry 
ground, the dense and tangled undergrowth, dripping with 
wet, and the large fallen timber, somewhat impaired the 
line, which increasing excitement, running higher every mo¬ 
ment, which was thought would bring them under fire, ren¬ 
dered it difficult for the officers to correct. Still every one 
pressed forward with all the strength he had left; there was 
no halting, only greater speed, though every moment less 
breath and more fatigue. But no enemy is seen yet. They 
have left the field whence they started, they have traversed 
the tangled woods down the hill, across a country road, into 
the forest again and up another slope, but heavy, weary, 
breathless, and almost broken down, and still no foe is 
found, although half a mile and more has been passed. But 
now light appears ahead, the trees are thinner and a large 
open field is seen towards the right and in front. It is 
there that the redoubt and battery of the enemy must be. 


— 935 — 


Battle of Williamsburg 


The glorious Virginians press forwards towards it, and in a 
moment more are on the edge of the opening, seeing before 
them, like a picture, the cordon of Confederate redoubts 
stretching away to Fort Magruder; that on the extreme 
left, directly in face of the left of the Twenty-fourth Vir¬ 
ginia, is occupied by the enemy, whose entire force of five 
regiments and ten guns are well advanced in the field di¬ 
rectly in front of it. As yet the Confederates have not 
been noticed. Ah, why were not these brave spirits marched 
quietly to this point and formed, where all could have been 
seen and clearly understood the work before them, then in¬ 
deed would it have been done, and well done, and done quick¬ 
ly. 

The enemy is seen for the first time; for the first time 
is seen the battery to be taken. His line faces farther to the 
southwest, while the advance is from the west. Owing to 
the unfortunate manner in which the attack was arranged, 
the Twenty-fourth alone sights the enemy, is much nearer 
to him, and issues from the woods some time before any 
other part of the brigade. Immediately upon seeing the 
Yankees they spring forward into the open with renewed 
energy, and remembering the address of Early, who is rid¬ 
ing just before them, they press heartily onwards to lose not 
a moment in closing with those ten guns and four thous¬ 
and muskets of General Winfield Hancock. 

But the wild advance, at such a foolish speed, and over 
such a heavy ground, had brought disorder on the line. The 
two middle regiments are not to be seen, and do not issue 
from the woods during the entire action, while the right 
regiment, Colonel McRae’s, does not reach the open until 
the Twenty-fourth Virginia had been well engaged for some 
time and was driving the enemy back; and when it does en¬ 
ter the field, ’tis far to the right where no enemy was, and, 
in fact, in rear of Bratton’s line. 

Thus, as it leaves the woods, the Twenty-fourth Vir¬ 
ginia, alone and unsupported, with both flanks in the air, 
finds itself confronted by ten guns, defended by five regi¬ 
ments of infantry, with a strong redoubt in the rear. Cling¬ 
ing instinctively to the skirt of the woods bordering the 


— 936 — 


Charge of the Twenty-fourth Virginia 

field on its left flank, so as to mask its weakness as well 
as might be, and opening out its files as far as possible to 
cover the foe’s five regiments, these fearless mountaineers 
break at once into the double-quick and charge with a wild 
cheer that thrills through every heart. At once they are 
heavily engaged. In opening their files, several of the largest 
companies on the right became detached, and mistaking 
the redoubt held by Bratton for the objective point, rushed 
towards it.* But the remainder go straight on, and the 
brunt of the affair falls upon the left wing, led by the 
writer, they being closest to and moving directly upon the 
foe, and receiving fire from both front and flank. The ad¬ 
vanced force delivered a steady volley at most uncomfor¬ 
tably short range and then give way, retreating towards 
the redoubt. As they retire, the guns, which have already 
been hurried back, again open; and these Virginians, but 
a portion of the Twenty-fourth regiment, weary and breath¬ 
less, already shattered by shot and shell, received Hancock’s 
whole fire of musketry, shell, grape and canister, as, press¬ 
ing over the field with undaunted courage, they approach 
nearer and nearer the foe. None halt or hesitate, but all 
push forward with a vigor hardly to be paralleled and now' 
with a silence that would do honor to the first veterans on 
record, though to many ’tis their first fight. A spirit of 
death or victory animates every bosom; and mindful of 
Early’s advice, each one anxious to be the first at these 
guns, they still press on, not so quickly, perhaps, as they 
would have done had they not have been exhausted by their 
run through field and forest, but still without delay, and the 
enemy all the while gives way before them, though some of 
his regiments tarry longer than others. 

The leaden hail was fearful, it poured in from front 
and either flank, and for the first time was heard the barbar- 

*This separation furnishes the explanation of part of Colonel 
Bratton’s somewhat involved account of this affair in the Historical 
Society Papers for June, 1879. He speaks of the “Twenty-fourth 
regiment” and of “Early’s regiment” as if they were two regiments, 
mistaking these companies thus separated for distinct regiment. The 
officer he speaks of as Lieutenant-Colonel Early was doubtless the gal¬ 
lant Sam. Henry Early, of General Early’s staff.—R.L.M. 


— 937 — 



Battle of Williamsburg 


ous explosive bullet which the Yankees introduced and used. 
The artillery, too, was well served, and soon both grape and 
canister were cutting through the wheat with a terribly 
suggestive sound, carrying down many a brave spirit, and 
men and officers fell dead and wounded on every side. Yet 
the advance is maintained; down a slope first, and up again 
on the further side—still on and on. The regiment soon 
finds that it is alone; it knows that “some one has blun¬ 
dered,” and marvels that the supports are nowhere seen, 
and that the Major-General, with part of his brigade, does 
not appear. Still none falter or cast a look behind. They 
are pressing the enemy wdl back, though receiving deadly 
wounds meantime, for his attention is engrossed by this 
attack, and the Virginians are drawing his whole fire. Gray¬ 
haired old Coltraine, of Carrol, that gallant, staunch old 
soldier, is well in front, his colors already pierced with many 
a bullet, and men and officers press quickly on unchecked 
by the murderous fire directed upon them. The ground 
is soft and yielding, the wheat half knee high, drenched 
with rain, clings heavily to the legs, and many trip and 
stumble and sometimes fall. The flag staff is shattered, but 
Coltrain grasps the staff and cheerily waves the silken folds 
in front. Away to the right is seen the gallant Fifth North 
Carolina coming up at the double-quick to our aid, led by 
that preaux chevalier, Colonel Duncan McRae, his horse 
briskly trotting in advance. A cheer bursts forth and all 
take heart and still press forward. But the Virginians are 
much nearer the redoubt, and the enemy, regardless of the 
approaching supports, still concentrate all their fire upon 
this devoted band, and with terrible effect. Early’s horse 
has been shot, and in another moment he himself receives 
a wound, the effect of which his bended form still shows. 
Terry, too, that gallant leader, ever in the van of many an 
after battle, has gotten the first of frequent shots full in 
the face, and the dauntless Hairston also goes down des¬ 
perately wounded; so the writer, then but a youth, finds him¬ 
self for the first time in command of his regiment, and the 
only mounted officer there.* Captains Jennings and Ha- 

*The Fifth North Carolina, with all its mounted officers, had not 
yet gotten up to the more advanced position of the Twenty-fourth Vir¬ 
ginia. 

- 938 -^ 



Charge of the Twenty-fourth Virginia 

den, and Lieutenant Mansfield, too, the bravest of all 
these braves, lie dead upon the ground. Lieutenant 
Willie Radford, soldier and scholar, has freely given 
up his young life, so full of bloom and promise, in de¬ 
fense of home and dear native land, and lies with his 
face up to heaven, and his feet to the foe, his noble 
brow, so lately decked with University honors, now pale 
and cold in death, and his Captain (afterwards Lieutenant- 
Colonel Bently), ever present in the field from Manassas 
even to Appotomattox, fell bleeding by his side many yards 
in front of their company, and Captain Lybrock and Lieu¬ 
tenant Shockley, too, fall wounded to the earth. But no 
pause is made. Ten minutes—fifteen—have passed while 
they cross that field of blood, and every other man is down. 
But the supports are approaching; not all the rest of the 
brigade, as was expected—or a part of the division, fresh 
and in order—but only a single regiment, the gallant Fifth 
North Carolina, who, seeing what odds the Virginians were 
fighting, had, as soon as it emerged into the field and found 
no enemy confronting them, sought leave to march towards 
the firing and were now hastening to an awful destruction 
in their zeal to share that glorious field. The enemy, too, 
fall back more quickly as they see reinforcements coming 
up, and run into and behind the redoubt, to which they have 
all retreated now. Confusion has seized upon them.there, 
for the Virginians are within twenty yards and show no 
signs of halting. The fire of the enemy slackens, and as 
their assailants reach the fence of substantial rails with 
a rider, ceases entirely. The order to their artillery to 
“cease firing” and “limber up” is distinctly heard, and some 
of the guns are actually run off; the infantry, too, are in 
great tumult, their bayonets seem tangled and interlocked, 
some run into the fort, many make off to the rear, and voices 
calling to others to halt and stand steady are clearly heard. 
In a word, General Winfield Hancock’s five regiments and 
ten guns have been attacked and driven in by a single Vir¬ 
ginia regiment, and are now on the point of being routed. 

As the Twenty-fourth gains the fence just spoken of, 
the enemy having ceased firing entirely, it pauses a moment 


— 939 — 


Battle of Williamsburg 


to breathe and reform its scattered line, preparatory to a 
last dash—no man thinks of turning back, for the enemy is 
retreating before them—and here, too, now are their gal¬ 
lant comrades fresh and eager for a share in the strug¬ 
gle. While the men were in the act of climbing this fence, 
the writer seeing a gap where his horse could pass, Adju¬ 
tant McRae communicated to him General Hill’s order to 
retire immediately; whereupon anticipating that the enemy 
would reform and open with terrible effect at such short 
range as soon as the backward movement was perceived, the 
regiment was obliqued into the woods upon which its left 
flank rested, and, retiring thus under cover, came off with¬ 
out further damage. 

Not so its gallant comrades, who, having advanced with 
but little loss, and just rectified their alignment behind the 
fence, were now in perfect line right under the enemy’s 
guns. Their retreat was across a broad, open field; and as 
they faced about, the foe, quickly rallying and reforming, 
more than five or six times their number, hurled shot and 
shell through their devoted ranks with awful destruction. 
The retreat was the signal for slaughter, and, as Colonel 
McRae says, the regiment “was scarcely harmed at all till 
the retreat began”—the loss was desperate in a few mo¬ 
ments afterwards. [Southern Historical Society Papers , 
August , 1879, page 362.] Before they recrossed that fear¬ 
ful field, the best blood of all the Old North State fed the 
fresh young wheat at their feet, and a hundred Carolina 
homes were cast into direful mourning and distress. 

And all for what? Had the regiments been allowed 
to go on, the redoubt would have been captured without 
further loss, and held until some one had thought of rein¬ 
forcing them with part of the three remaining brigades of 
the division, or with the other two regiments of their own 
brigade, all of whom were within a thousand yards. If 
McRae had not come up, and by sending his Adjutant back, 
furnished the Major-General with a ready messenger, by 
whom to order the troops to retire, it seems that the Twen¬ 
ty-fourth regiment would have been left, as already had 
been done, to press forward alone until it reached the works, 


— 940 — 


Charge of the Twenty-fourth Virginia 

into which a few might have gotten, as they afterwards did 
at Gettysburg, in the great charge of Pickett’s division, 
where, by a singular coincidence, the line attacked was in 
charge of this same General Hancock. Then, as at Williams¬ 
burg, a handful left to dash themselves to atoms upon the 
enemy’s entrenchments, while abundant support, stood 
quietly by and watched the fruitless onslaught. 

Well, indeed, might friend and foe write highest lau¬ 
dations of so gallant a charge, rarely equalled, and never 
surpassed, in all the resplendent record of that ever glo¬ 
rious army. The blow thus delivered, at the very opening 
of that memorable campaign, not only stunned the enemy 
—who never attacked again on the Peninsula,—but fur¬ 
nished the whole army with an inspiring example, which 
could not but have an admirable effect. 

The glowing language of General Hill’s report has al¬ 
ready been cited. Colonel (now General) Bratton, who was 
an eye-witness of the whole affair [although he seems to 
have had but a confused recollection of the regiments en¬ 
gaged], says: “The Twenty-fourth Virginia meantime 

emerged from the wood nearer the enemy than my redoubt, 
and moved in fine style upon them. * * * I have never on 
any field, during the war, seen more splendid gallantry ex¬ 
hibited that on that field at Williamsburg.” [Southern His¬ 
torical Society Payers, June, 1879, pages 301-2 .] And a 
Captain of her Majesty’s Scotch Fusileers, who was in 
Hancock’s redoubt, and saw the charge, made himself 
known the next day to Dr. George T. Harrison, Surgeon of 
the Twenty-fourth, left at Williamsburg to attend the 
wounded, saying that he did so because he understood the 
Doctor belonged to the Twenty-fourth Virginia, and he de¬ 
sired to tell him that during his entire Crimean experience, 
he had never seen more gallantry displayed upon a field of 
battle. 

Nor were the foes unwilling to declare their admiration 
or to testify to the impression made upon them by these 
dashing soldiers. 

General Hancock declared that they should have “im¬ 
mortal” written upon their banner forever; and although he 


- 941 — 


Battle of Williamsburg 


had, as already said, five regiments of infantry and ten 
guns—4,000 men—he called loudly and frequently for rein¬ 
forcements, which, to the extent of three brigades (Smith’s 
two and Naglee’s), General McClellan sent him immediately 
after his arrival from the rear.* The latter considered this 
action the most important of the entire battle. He made it 
the chief subject of his first two telegrams to Lincoln, pro¬ 
nouncing Hancock’s conduct brilliant in the Extreme (his 
loss was only twenty). And in his official report, written 
more than a year afterwards, he characterized it as one of 
the most brilliant engagements of the war, and declared 
that General Hancock merited the highest praise. So far 
from pressing the Confederates, as he had boasted he would 
do, after this day’s work he sat quietly down in the ancient 
borough of Williamsburg, while these same “demoralized 
and flying” Confederates sauntered up to the Chickahom- 
iny at their leisure, pausing on the route to reorganize their 
regiments whose period of service had expired, and to elect 
their officers. Nor did General McClellan ever again try the 
experiment of attacking General Johnston’s men. 

A few days after (May 9, 1862), the following animated 
account of the charge appeared in the columns of the New 
York Herald: 

* * * “From the sharp fire of our skirmishers in the woods on 

our left, came the first information of a movement in that direction, 
and thus put all on the alert. * * * The fire grew hotter in the 
woods, and in a few moments, at a point fully half a mile away from 
the battery, the enemy’s men began to file out of the cover and form in 
the open field. It was bold and proved an expensive way to handle 
men. Wheeler opened his guns on the instant, and the swath of dead 
subsequently marked the course of that brigade across the open field 
began at that spot. At the same moment our skirmishers in the field 
began their fire. Still the enemy formed across the opening with 
admirable rapidity and precision, and as cooly too as if the fire had 
been directed elsewdiere, and then came on at the double-quick step 
in three distinct lines,f firing as they came. All sounds were lost for 
a few moments in the short roar of the field-pieces, and in the scat¬ 
tered rattle and rapid repetition of the musketry. Naturally their 


*It is noteworthy, that although McClellan’s army was in pur¬ 
suit of a retiring foe, he himself, instead of being in the van, re¬ 
mained below Yorktown, nearly twenty miles away, during the entire 
fight.—R.L.M. 

fA mistake, for the Twenty-fourth Virginia was the only regi¬ 
ment making the attack from this point,—R.L.M. 


— 942 — 



Charge of the Twenty-fourth Virginia 


fire could do us but little harm under the circumstances, and so we 
had them at a fair advantage and every nerve was strained to make 
the best of it. Still they came on. They were dangerously near. 
Already our skirmishers on the left had fallen back to their line, and 
those on the right had taken cover behind the rail fence leading from 
the house to the woods, whence they blazed away as earnestly as ever. 
Yet the guns are out there, and they are what these fellows want, in 
the next instant the guns are silent. For a moment, in the confusion and 
smoke, one might almost suppose the enemy had them, but in a mo¬ 
ment more the guns emerge from the safe side of the smoke cloud, and 
away they go across the open field to a point near the upper redoubt, 
where they are again unlimbered and play away again. Further back 
also go the skirmishers.* And now for a moment the rebels had the 
partial cover of the farm and out-buildings, but they saw that they 
had all their work to do over, and so came on again. Once more they 
are in the open field, exposed to both artillery and musketry, but this 
time the distance they have to go is not so great, and they move 
rapidly. There is thus another dangerous line of infantry; they are 
near to us, but we are also near to them. Scarcely a hundred yards 
are between them and the guns,f when our skirmish line became 
silent. The lines of the Fifth Wisconsin and the Thirty-third New 
York formed up in close order to the right of the battery, the long 
range musket barrels came level, and one terrible volley tore through 
the rebel line. In a moment more the same long range of muskets 
came to another level, the order to charge with the bayonet was given, 
and away went the two regiments with one glad cheer. ‘ Gallant as 
our foes undoubtedly were, they could not stand that. But few bri¬ 
gades mentioned in history have done better than that brigade did. 
For a space, generally estimated at three-quarters of a mile, they had 
advanced under the fire of a splendidly served battery, and with a 
cloud of skirmishers stretched across their front, whose fire was very 
destructive, and if, after that, they had not the nerve to meet a line 
of bayonets that came towards them like the spirit of destruction in¬ 
carnate, it need not be wondered at. 

******* 


“This was the fight of the day—a fight that was in itself a hard 
fought and beautiful battle—a-battle in which each side must have 
learned to respect the courage of the other, and which shed glory on 
all engaged in it. Different statements have been made as to the ene¬ 
my’s force. * * * It is probable that there were two brigades, or 
part of two. One of them was Early’s, and comprised the Fifth 
North Carolina and the Twenty-fourth Virginia regiments and a 
Georgia regiment, and the dead were found on the field in the uni¬ 
form of the Louisiana Tigers. It would probably be safe to state 
their force as three thousand.”$ 


*The “skirmishers” here spoken of are evidently the maifi body 
itself. See General Hancock’s official report of the arrangements of 
his regiments.—R.L.M. * 

fThe artillery, after retiring, had unlimbered again in rear of 
the redoubt.—R.L.M. 

JThe Twenty-fourth Virginia did not carry as many as six hun¬ 
dred into that charge. The force of the Fifth North Carolina was 
about the same.—R.L.M. 


— 943 — 



Battle of Williamsburg 


In General Hancock’s official report, it is stated that 
the retiring regiments abandoned upon the field one of their 
battle-flags, which his men found and brought in; but it 
was not the Twenty-fourth’s colors; for trusty old Coltraine 
never lost his grasp upon his precious charge, and having 
borne it proudly aloft as well in the advance as in the re¬ 
treat, it to-day droops sadly in the library in the capitol at 
Richmond, faded, tattered and pierced with many a bullet, 
but pure and unpolluted by touch of hostile hand. 

In his first dispatch to Lincoln, General McClellan 
states that Hancock had repulsed Early’s brigade by a real 
charge with the bayonet, and this statement is again and 
again repeated, until Mr. Swinton, generally accurate, am¬ 
plifies upon it thus: “A few of the enemy who approached 
nearest the fort were bayoneted ”—[Army of the Potomac , 
Swinton , page 116 ]—and he adds a note: “This is official.” 
Rather a doubtful verification, seeing the exceeding great 
difference in those days between facts and official accounts 
thereof. 

Now, doubtless, by all the laws of war, five regiments 
and ten guns, drawn in line on ground of their own selection, 
when attacked by a single regiment in the open and unsup¬ 
ported, instead of giving back and retreating (some by or¬ 
ders and some without), or even “feigning to retreat,” as 
Mr. Swinton says (page 116), should have held their ground, 
and when the venturesome regiment came up, quietly taken 
them prisoners—or, perhaps, they might have sallied out 
and captured it as it advanced. And similarly when this 
numerous force, abandoning the position they had chosen, 
and “feigning to retreat,” had run into and behind the re¬ 
doubt they were set to defend, five regiments and ten guns 
should not have allowed two, with unsupported flanks, to 
apprQach them within twenty or thirty yards, and utterly 
silence their fire, without giving them a taste of cold steel. 

But so in fact it was. And in answer to General Mc¬ 
Clellan and Mr. Swinton and others, the writer hereof, who 
led the charge of “those who approached nearest the fort 
who himself approached it as near, or nearer, than any other 


— 944 — 


Charge of the Twenty-fourth Virginia 

of the assailants, and there remained for several minutes; 
who being mounted had ample opportunity of seeing all 
that transpired in front; who entered the field as soon as 
any of his regiment, and left it later than all except those 
poor fellows who lay upon the sod, affirms that so far from 
any bayonet charge having been made upon the Twenty- 
fourth Virginia, that, as already stated, its advance was 
steady and uninterrupted from the commencement of the 
action till it reached the fence, and was ordered to retire; 
that during that advance the enemy was driven all the while 
before it, till they reached their redoubt, and that, in fact, 
the latter never advanced a foot while the regiment re¬ 
mained upon the field. Any charge made by them, there¬ 
fore, must have been after the Twenty-fourth had retired; 
and if, as Mr. Swinton says, any of those who approached 
nearest the fort were bayoneted, it must have been after 
they were dead, wounded or prisoners. 

The only approach to the use of the bayonet which the 
writer saw or heard of on that day (and his opportunities 
for knowing all that occurred there were of the best), was 
when Private Kirkbride, of Carrol, frantic at the fall of his 
brother, ran down a Federal officer (a captain of the Fifth 
Wisconsin), and was about to plunge his bayonet into him. 
Hearing the earnest call of the officer for quarter, across 
the field above the din of the battle, and seeing that there 
was no time to spare if the man was to be saved, the writer 
galloped to where he was, shouting to Kirkbride to hold. 
The officer begging to surrender, tendered his sword, and un¬ 
buckling the belt, with scabbard and pistol, asked that he 
might be put under guard forthwith, but was told there 
was no time to tarry for his pistol, and no men to spare for 
his guard, and he had better get to the rear; and Kirkbride 
and his companion hastened on. This occurred but a short 
time before the fence was reached and the order was given 
to retire, so that the Federal soon found himself with his 
friends again, some of whom (General Hancock himself 
among them, it is believed) sent the writer soon after, by 
exchanged prisoners, hearty acknowledgments and thanks 
for saving their comrade’s life. 


— 945 — 


Battle of Williamsburg 


General McClellan, with his usual exaggeration when 
counting Confederate soldiers, reported that Hancock had 
captured two Colonels, two Lieutenant-Colonels, and killed 
as many more. As a matter of fact, he captured none, and 
the only field-officer killed was the heroic Budham, Lieuten¬ 
ant-Colonel of the Fifth North Carolina, a very imperso¬ 
nation of courage itself. They claimed to have killed the 
writer also; but in this, as in many other statements, they 
were greatly in error. 

Richard L. Maury, 

Late Colonel Twenty-fourth Virginia Infantry. 


— 946 — 


MILITARY HISTORY 


THE PENINSULA CAMPAIGN, 

1862 


ILLUSTRATIVE SOLUTIONS 

BY 

COLONEL C. H. LANZA 

Field Artillery 


NOTE: The Approved Solutions are reprinted and issued as a guide. 


ABBREVIATIONS USED: 


Alex: 
Aver: 

B & L: 
CP: 

CW: 
Long: 
O’Brien: 
MOS: 
NR: 
OOH: 
RR: 

SHS: 
Trob: 


Memoirs of a Confederate, by Alexander. 

History of the 3d Pa. Cavalry, by Averill. 

Battles and Leaders of the Civil War. 

History of Civil War, Count of Paris. 

Commission on Conduct of War. 

Manasas to Appomattox, Longstreet. 

Telegraphing in Battle, O’Brien. 

McClellan’s Own Story. 

Rebellion Records, Navy Department. 

Autobiography of Gen. O. O. Howard. 

Rebellion Records, War Department. 

Proceedings of the Southern Historical Society. 
Trobriand, Four Years with the Army of the Potomac. 





















t 





























/ 








r 













* 


V. 



















<• 































The Union Advance on April 4 and 5, 1862 

(See Cram’s Map and Geo. Sur. Map) 


1. The object of this advance was the 
capture of Yorktown, with the Confederate 
troops there stationed. 

2. McClellan had available for this 
operation, about 58,000 men and 100 guns 
of the Army of the Potomac, camped in 
the vicinity of Hampton and Newport 
News. There was a shortage of wagon 
transportation for part of this command. 
Some 30,000 additional troops were enroute 
to Hampton by water from Alexandria. 
General Wool with more than 10,000 
troops protected the Army base at Fort 
Monroe and Hampton. 

3. The troops present consisted of 
three corps, the II, III and IV. 

4. McClellan's knowledge of the ter¬ 
rain he was to operate over, was obtained 
from officers stationed at Fort Monroe 
during the past winter. The results of the 
observations made by them was embodied 
in a map, known as Cram’s Map, a copy of 
which appears in the Civil War Atlas, ac¬ 
companying the Rebellion Records. The 
copy of the map in the Atlas is not the 
same as the one submitted to General Mc¬ 
Clellan ; according to notes, the map in the 
Atlas is a corrected copy. Whether the 
corrections were made before General Mc¬ 
Clellan’s orders had been issued for April 
4th, is not known. 

5. This map was inaccurate, but ap¬ 
pears to have been accepted at the time 
without question. It showed one road 
available for the advance to Yorktown and 


12 RR 8 

14 RR 64, 66, 68 

MOS 257 


12 RR 7, 9, 227, 

358 

14 RR 53, 73, 394, 
403 

MOS 249, 266 
2 CP 8 

2 B & L 108, 109, 
189 

1 CW 315, 428, 442 


14 RR 33 
12 RR 9 


13 RR 8, 152 
XVIII RR Atlas 
MOS 253, 256 

2 CP8 
2 CW 393 

14 RR 22 


14 RR 37, 42, 43, 
46, 403 

MOS 253, 256, 264, 
289 

2 B & L 109 
2 CP 6 
107 RR 564 
1 CW 17, 346, 429 


— 949 — 


The Peninsula Campaign 


a second road leading to Williamsburg. 
There were connecting roads, and for 
some parts of the distance, roads were 
doubled. The map did not show any 
streams of importance to be crossed, ex¬ 
cept at Big Bethel, and at Howard's 
Bridge, at both of which places fords were 
indicated. The map was supplemented by 
reconnaissances pushed as far as Big 
Bethel and the Halfway House, 4 miles be¬ 
yond; and towards Young's Mill. The 
orders for these reconnaissances limited 
their extent to the points mentioned, with 
the idea of inducing the enemy to believe 
that the Federals intended to operate 
against Norfolk. 

6. The distances from camps near 
Hampton were according to available 
maps: 


To Big Bethel _7 miles 

Howard’s Bridge_11 ” 

Yorktown_18 ” 

Young’s Mill_12 ” 

Warwick C. H_ 1U ” 

Halfway House, west 
of Yorktown_26 ” 


2 CP 

Geo Sur Maps 
13 RR 405 
Recon. by author 


12 RR 7, 265, 267 
14 RR, 37, 42 
MOS 249, 257 
107 RR 564 
2 B & L 109 
1 CW 17, 346, 428, 
567 


7. All roads were dirt roads and after- 
rains became difficult for wheeled traffic. 

8. The terrain was low, but undulat¬ 
ing, in places heavily wooded, with dense 
underbrush. Streams had usually marshy 
borders, which in turn were lined by banks 
30 to 40 feet high. 

9. According to reports made and ac¬ 
cepted by General McClellan the Confeder¬ 
ate troops around Yorktown under Ma- 
gruder numbered 15,000 to 20,000, and 
information had been received that York¬ 
town was surrounded by earthworks in its 
immediate vicinity, with a number of 


— 950 — 








Union Advance on April 4 and 5, 1862 

small works at points between Yorktown 
and Fort Monroe. It was understood that 
numerous strong batteries had been con¬ 
structed, commanding the water ap¬ 
proaches to Yorktown from both that 
point, and from Gloucester Point .opposite. 

10. The U. S. Navy controlled the en- Atlas rr 

12 RR 8 

trance of the York River, but it was unable mos 264, 267 

2 B & L 266 

to send ships past Yorktown, whose bat¬ 
teries located on cliffs 60 to 70 feet high, 
above the water, together with batteries at 
Gloucester point, dominated all marine ap¬ 
proaches to that place. 

11. The Confederates also held Nor- 12 rr 8 

107 xvJlv 57Oj 00 

folk, in which was their ironclad, the Vir- 2 b & l 109 

1 CW 6 o2 

ginia, or Merrimac. While there was no 
material obstacle to the Navy ascending 
the James River, as far as Drury’s Bluff 
near Richmond, the possibility that the 
Merrimac with other Confederate gun¬ 
boats might cut off the retreat of such 
forces, prevented any such attempt being 
considered by General McClellan. 

12. McClellan planned to use both m 0 s R 259 14 RR 63 
available roads in his advance, and issued 

his orders on April 3d. 

13. The right column consisting of \\ ^ 
Averill’s cavalry and Porter’s division was 107 RR 563 
directed to march at 6:00 A.M. on Big 
Bethel, over the New Market and the New 
bridges. In his report, McClellan states 

that he did not expect any serious opposi¬ 
tion at Big Bethel. From here but one 
road led towards Yorktown and it was ap¬ 
parently left to Porter as to how his two 
columns were to be united. After passing 
here the column was to proceed to How¬ 
ard’s Bridge, and capture Ship Point, us- 


— 951 — 


The Peninsula Campaign 


12 RR 9 
14 RR 63 


12 RR 9 
14 RR 63 


12 RR 227, 9 


MOS 260 
12 RR 285, 292, 
293, 294, 297, 299, 
300, 358 
14 RR 66 
107 RR 81 


ing such part of the force as might be 
necessary. Camp for the night was fixed 
as at Howard’s Bridge. 

14. Hamilton’s division was ordered 
to follow Porter’s on the New Bridge Road 
at 7:00 A.M., proceeding also to Howard’s 
Creek. The time fixed for Hamilton’s 
movement was not apparently calculated 
according to the march lengths of the 
troops in front of him, but was guess 
work. This is true also of other troops 
ordered to march on April 4th, and 5th. 

15. The left column which consisted of 
Smith’s Division with the 5th Cavalry, and 
followed by Couch’s Division, was ordered 
to march at 6:00 A.M. by the James River 
Road to Young’s Mill, where the leading 
division was to camp, the rear division 
camping at Fisher’s Creek. 

16. The reserve was ordered to march 
at 8:30 A.M. to Big Bethel. Sedgwick’s 
Division marched in front of the reserve. 
Army Headquarters camped with the re¬ 
serve. 

17. The position assigned the reserve 
was approximately equally distant from 
the heads of the two columns at Howard’s 
Bridge and Young’s Mill and about oppo¬ 
site the center of the line. Roads led to 
both these places. As the flanks of the 
division rested on impassable obstacles, 
placing the reserve provisionally opposite 
the center, was warranted as being near 
the point which, if it gave way, would 
most endanger the Union Army. 

18. Both columns reached their desti¬ 
nations on the 4th, although the right col¬ 
umn was delayed by felled trees, and a 


— 952 — 


Union Advance on April 4 and 5, 1862 


broken bridge at Big Bethel, and did not 
get into camp until after 5 :00 P.M. 

19 . There were no engagements of 12 rr 285,292, 
consequence on April 4th, nothing being 14 rr 67 
seen of the enemy except small parties 1 cw 632 
which retired as the Union Army ad¬ 
vanced. Ship Point was found abandoned. 


20. Although both columns were given 
cavalry which was available for reconnais¬ 
sance, neither column appears to have em¬ 
ployed its cavalry for this purpose. 

21 . The orders for the 5th provided a 12 rr 9 
continuation of the movements of the left 
column through Warwick Court House, to 

the Half-Way House, west of Yorktown. 

This column, consisting of two divisions 
of about 20,000 men, was to occupy the 
hill and ridge near the Half-Way House 
to prevent an escape of the Confederate 
garrison from Yorktown, and to prevent 
reinforcements reaching Yorktown. 


22. The right column was ordered to 
march at the same hour, 6:00 A.M., to a 
point about two and three-fourths miles 
from Yorktown, to a position in readiness. 


12 RR 9 
14 RR 69 


23. According to the maps in Mc¬ 
Clellan’s possesion, the left column had 
fourteen miles to march, and the right 
column about four. Both columns started 
at the same time, although the one having 
the longer march to make, was the one 
upon whose arrival in position in time, the 
success of the proposed movement de¬ 
pended. 

24. The approximate relative 
strengths of the two columns are 20,000 
each, with a reserve of 10,000 men in rear 
of the right column. Apparently McClel- 


— 953 — 


MOS 260 
12 RR 9 


12 RR 10, 286, 

288, 292, 295, 297, 
299, 302, 303, 304, 
305, 339, 403 
107 RR 81 
MOS 261 


12 RR 300, 358 
14 RR 69 


12 RR 10, 13, 306, 
339 

14 RR 70 
MOS 289 


The Peninsula Campaign 

lan thought that the 30,000 men available 
for the attack on Yorktown would cause 
the enemy to attempt to escape towards 
Richmond, and that the 20,000 men at the 
Half-Way House would be sufficient to pre¬ 
vent such an attempt to escape. 

25. It should be noted that the force 
ordered to the Half-Way House had a de¬ 
fensive mission after its arrival. They were 
not to attack the enemy, but to prevent his 
moving along the Yorktown-Richmond 
Road. It is questionable whether this dis¬ 
position would have been as successful as 
an order for both columns to attack York¬ 
town simultaneously. 

26. The right column moved forward 
towards Yorktown slowly. A heavy rain, 
which started at 7:00 A.M. and lasted until 
11:00 A.M., seriously interfered with the 
progress of the artillery and wagons. Mor- 
rel’s Brigade led the column, and encount¬ 
ering the enemy in his works about York¬ 
town, the artillery opened fire about 10:30 
A.M. The infantry deployed later about 
noon, made a leisurely reconnaissance, ex¬ 
changed fire with the rebel troops, result¬ 
ing in the loss of a few men on each side. 
Morrel was supported by a small amount of 
artillery, and later by part of Martindale’s 
Brigade, but no serious attempt was made 
to assault the Confederate works. 

27. The left column moving at 6:00 
A.M. reached Lee’s Mill about 11:00 A.M., 
the march being impeded by the rain 
storm that retarded the march of the right 
column. 

28. Enemy’s skirmishers were driven 
in at 11:00 A.M. and an hour later the 
Union advance came to a halt at the War- 


— 954 — 


Union Advance on April 4 and 5, 1862 


wick River, in face of enemy intrench- 
ments, found on the opposite bank. 

29. By reason of dams the Warwick 
River was unfordable, and was bordered 
by woods and swamps, and both the river 
and the Confederates were a surprise to 
the Federals. As a result the advance 


12 RR 11, 307, 
318, 359 
MOS 254 
2 B & L 170 
14 RR 72 
2 CP 7 
1 CW 428 
1 OOH 211 


stopped with only a slight exchange of fire 
with the Confederates. 


Comments 

30. McClellan’s orders of April 3d and 
4th are defective according to modern stan¬ 
dards in that: 

(a) Information concerning enemy is 
lacking. 

(b) No mission is assigned to the Army. 

(c) No instructions are given for recon¬ 
naissance. 

(d) No instructions for trains. 

(e) Post of Commanding General not 
stated. 

31. The prime causes for failure of mos R 257 87 
the Union Advance to achieve success was 2 B & l ios 
misinformation both as to the enemy’s 

forces and as to the topography of the 
country. With regard to the topography 
of the country, there appears to be no 
reason why reconnaissance should not have 
been made on April 2d or 3d and also on 
the 4th to definitely establish the correct¬ 
ness of available maps. There was cavalry 
at hand for this purpose, two regiments, 
having been disembarked by April 2d. Such 
a reconnaissance ought to have discovered 
the Warwick River line which would'have 
given a clearer idea of the enemy’s force 
and dispositions. McClellan’s statement 
that reconnaissances were limited in order 
not to alarm the enemy, was not a good 


- 955 - 


The Peninsula Campaign 


reason, in view of the fact that the con¬ 
centration of Federal troops in and about 
Hampton, was in itself sufficient to attract 
Confederate attention. 

32. A cavalry reconnaissance could 
have been supplemented by an infantry re¬ 
connaissance in case the enemy’s front was 
covered by advanced posts. Such recon¬ 
naissances should have secured informa¬ 
tion concerning the strength and disposi¬ 
tions of the enemy, and the character of 
the terrain. The neglect to make such 
reconnaissances resulted in the advance of 
the Federals on April 4th and 5th, being 
surprised both by the terrain and by the 
forces of the enemy. 

12 rr 264 , 267 3 3. The information as to the enemy’s 

strength was obtained from Allen Pinker¬ 
ton’s reports. Pinkerton was a profes¬ 
sional detective and in charge of the Secret 
Service, and furnished reports on the Con¬ 
federate dispositions at Yorktown and 
Gloucester Point. This information was 
stated to have been obtained from a person 
evidently a spy, from a deserter, and from 
a colored man. The information which is 
quite extensive, dated prior to February 1, 
1862. The extent of some of the informa¬ 
tion furnished leads to a suspicion that it 
was either untrue, or was knowingly dis¬ 
seminated by the enemy for his own pur¬ 
poses. Spies are often untrustworthy, de¬ 
serters can seldom be relied upon for in¬ 
formation outside of their own command, 
and negro slaves would not ordinarily be a 
good source of information on important 
military matters. 

34. Besides defects of execution in 
McClellan’s plans, their success depended 


— 956 — 


Union Advance on April 4 and 

on the enemy remaining quietly in York- 
town while McClellan marched around and 
cut off communication with their base. 
Such a plan seldom succeeds. While Mc¬ 
Clellan had a great deal of imagination, as 
shown by the numerous plans which he at 
various times initiated, he had very little 
imagination as to what his opponent 
would do, and he seldom foresaw his op¬ 
ponent’s moves. 

35. After the skirmishing of April 
5th, it was evident that the Confederates 
had fortified a line across the Peninsula 
from Yorktown following the Warwick 
River. 

36. McClellan’s own estimate of the 
enemy’s forces were that there were from 
15,000 to 20,000 against his 58,000. If the 
enemy held the whole line from Yorktown 
to Lee’s Mill, they would not be strong at 
any one point, and yet no attempt was 
made to pierce the Confederate lines, and 
the Federal troops stopped without strik¬ 
ing a blow. 

37. The Confederate forces available 
to occupy this line, which was about eight 
miles long, were inadequate for an obsti¬ 
nate defense. It would seem that had Mc¬ 
Clellan attacked boldly the Confederate line 
could have been pierced. There were am¬ 
ple troops under McClellan’s command to 
have made serious attacks at several places, 
and a penetration of the enemy’s front at 
one point would have compelled an aban¬ 
donment of the entire line. 

38. Rut instead of proceeding boldly 
with his original plan, McClellan aban¬ 
doned it on the first difficulty appearing, 
stopped his advance, and commenced a 
new plan of campaign. 


5, 1862 


12 RR 7 
14 RR 76 
1 CW 346, 360 


1 CW 347, 319, 
320 


- 957 — 


The Confederate Estimate of the Situation 


May 3, 1862 

14 rr 438,448, l. The Confederate forces in the pen- 

460, 484 , . 

insula on this date consisted of four divi¬ 
sions as follows: 

Magruder 
Longstreet 
D. H. Hill _ 

G. W. Smith 
Stuart’s Cav. 


55,633 ” 


17,302 men 
.13,816 ” 

.12,634 ” 

.10,592 ” 

. 1,289 ” 


12 RR 11, 13, 16, 
17, 229, 300, 318, 
338, 359, 363, 405, 
412 

2 CP 6 


with 56 pieces of artillery exclusive of 
siege guns in permament works. Gen¬ 
eral Joseph E. Johnston was in command. 

Of these troops, D. H. Hill commanded 
in Yorktown, Magruder held the right of 
the Warwick River line, Longstreet held 
the center. Smith was in rear towards 
Williamsburg in reserve. 

2. The Warwick River was a small 
wooded stream flowing through swamp 
country, which had been dammed at points 
forming unfordable inundations in the 
river bottom. These dams which were the 
only ready means of crossing the stream 
were protected by redans, and the inter¬ 
vals were filled by light trenches. York¬ 
town was an inclosed work with consider¬ 
able artillery, some of it firing over the 
York River, closing that stream, with the 
assistance of batteries at Gloucester Point, 
to the Federal Navy. A detached battery 
was near Mulberry Point on the James 
River, but this was not relied upon to close 
that stream. That mission was left to the 
Confederate Navy at Norfolk which had 
the Merrimac, or Virginia, with some un- 


— 958 — 








The Confederate Estimate of the Situation 


armored gunboats available for this pur¬ 
pose. 

3. The Warwick River position was an 
important one for the Confederates. It 
was as good a line, possibly as any, to de¬ 
fend Richmond from McClellan’s Army, 
and at the same time close the York River 
and James River to the Federal Navy. 
These two rivers were used by the Confed¬ 
erates as lines of supply and enabled them 
to be partly independent of the poor roads 
that led from the rear of their position 
through Williamsburg to Richmond. 

4. It was well understood by the Con¬ 
federates that should the Warwick River 
line be abandoned, the York River would 
at once be opened to the Union Navy, who 
would then be able to move troops by water 
to any point as far inland as West Point. 
This would make it impossible to occupy 
a new line across the Peninsula in case of 
a withdrawal, unless a retreat was carried 
west of West Point. This, in turn, would 
open the James River to the Union Navy, 
which, when its forces occupied its north 
bank, might disregard the threat of the 
Merrimac at Norfolk, and the Federals 
would then be able of acting towards Nor¬ 
folk by crossing the James River. As Nor¬ 
folk had only a small garrison, it would be 
impracticable to defend it against an at¬ 
tack from McClellan’s army and although 
the garrison might escape, the very valu¬ 
able stores at Norfolk would undoubtedly 
be lost, as would also the major part of the 
Confederate Navy, which was also in that 
harbor. 

5. The abandonment of the Warwick 
River line was not therefore to be lightly 


14 RR 399 


14 RR 395, 399, 

430, 433, 459, 473, . 
477, 485, 488, 490, 

12 RR 275, 405, 

412 

2 B & L 204 


14 RR 436, 437, 
461, 469 

12 RR 18, 230, 314 


— 959 — 


The Peninsula Campaign 


Alex. 66 

1 CW 347, 429 

2 B & L 204 
2 CP 13 


14 RR 431, 439, 
441, 450, 451, 456, 
464, 463, 473, 479, 
491, 471, 475, 478 
12 RR 275, 346, 
408, 409, 414, 411 
Alex. 64 
2 B & L 204 


14 RR 463 
12 RR 275, 412 


considered, but was a serious undertaking 
to be carried out only if unavoidable. There 
was opposed to Johnston's army, the Army 
of the Potomac under McClellan, which 
consisted of about 100,000 men but was re¬ 
ported to the Confederates as being as 
much as 200,000. But the Federal army 
was better equipped and had superior ar¬ 
tillery to anything that the Confederates 
possessed. It was known that McClellan 
had been constructing siege batteries, 
mounting large guns opposite Yorktown 
since about April 17th, and some of these 
guns, 100 and 200-pound Parrotts, had 
fired on May 1st and, although no one had 
been hit by these large projectiles, they 
were evidence of what was going to hap¬ 
pen when the bombardment really started. 

6 . To the superior Federal artillery, 
the Confederates could oppose only smaller 
guns in smaller numbers, and for these 
there was a deficiency of ammunition, most 
of the guns having less than 65 rounds 
available, quite insufficient for prolonged 
counter preparation fire. Remaining in 
the works subject to superior bombard¬ 
ment was only delaying an evacuation 
which, if carried out under pressure of the 
enemy, might be disastrous. The troops 
were already becoming worn out by long 
hours of trench duties. 

7. An attack by the Confederates on 
the Union lines was considered. The War¬ 
wick River dams constructed to prevent 
Union assaults on the Confederate lines 
were an equal obstacle to Confederate as¬ 
saults on the Federal lines. Attacks by 
either side would have to be made on com¬ 
paratively narrow fronts and the superior 


— 960 — 


The Confederate Estimate of the Situation 


forces of the Union army indicated that 
the probable result of Confederate attacks 
would be fatal. 

8 . The consideration of all the factors 
in the case indicated that although the 
abandonment of the Warwick River line 
was to be delayed as long as possible, as in¬ 
volving the certain destruction of much 
property and a large part of the Confed¬ 
erate navy, it had better be done under 
favorable circumstances by a voluntary re¬ 
tirement made in as short a time as possi¬ 
ble before the Federal siege batteries were 
ready to open fire. 

9. There were available for the re¬ 
treat two roads, one each from Yorktown 
and Lee’s Mill which united southeast of 
Williamsburg about 12 miles distant. Near 
Williamsburg a provisional line of defense 
had already been constructed, extending 
from the head of College Creek to the head 
of Queens Creek. These two creeks had 
their head waters on either side of a small 
plateau about 2,000 yards across and this 
plateau, across which the main road led 
was closed by Fort Magruder. There were 
also some small redoubts scattered along 
the banks of the two creeks, which creeks 
had been dammed to assist in their defense. 
The Confederate reserve under G. W. 
Smith, was already near Williamsburg, 
available to defend this line if necessary. 

10. The James and York Rivers could 
be relied upon to withdraw the sick and 
wounded and some stores, but the amount 
of river transportation available would not 
permit of the troops being withdrawn in 
this manner. It was necessary that the 
latter retire by the two available roads. 


14 RR 473, 477 
12 RR 275 


RR Atlas 
2 CP 15 
Alex. 66 
2 B & L 205 


14 RR 400 


— 961 -- 


The Peninsula Campaign 


12 RR 275 

11. It was desirable that the retreat 
be made as rapidly as possible until the vi¬ 
cinity of Richmond had been reached, in 
order to avoid the possibility of the retreat 
being intercepted by Federal troops landed 
at West Point. It was possible to withdraw 
the troops during several successive nights, 
but with the risk that if the retreat was 
discovered by the enemy, the remaining 
troops might be completely lost. Provided 
the roads were capable of withdrawing the 
entire force in one night, the latter pro¬ 
cedure ran the least danger of serious in¬ 
terference by the enemy. 

12 . Provided the march was made in 
good order, and contact with the enemy 
was broken, and the rear covered by a suit¬ 
able rear guard, the one available road 
from Williamsburg could be utilized day 
and night and if so used, would have en¬ 
abled all of Johnston's army to have 
cleared West Point by the night of May 
5th-6th. 

14 RR 485, 486, 
487, 489, 492 

12 RR 275 

2 B & L 204 

13. General Johnston's decision was to 
withdraw on the night of May 3d-4th by 
both roads, and march as rapidly as possi¬ 
ble to west of West Point, some 30 odd 
miles distant. 


— 962 — 


The Confederate Retreat from Yorktown 

May 3-7, 1862 

1. The Confederate forces prior to the Jf^eoi 276, 405, 
retreat from Yorktown, were disposed ^ 0 § R 3 ^f9* 683 
along the line Warwick River-Yorktown- 1 cw 583,585 
Gloucester Point and consisted of four 
corps, known as right, center, left and re¬ 
serve and some detached troops. The 
strength of this command and their posi¬ 
tions were as follows:— 


Left (D. H. Hill)-11,515 men 

Center (Longstreet)_13,816 ” 

Right (Magruder)_17,302 ” 

Reserve (G. W. Smith)_10,592 ” 

Cavalry (Stuart)_ 1,289 ” 

Gloucester Pt. (Crump)_1,119 ” 


Total _55,633 ” 


General Joseph E. Johnston was in 
command. 

2. The roads available for retreat ? R aum 

1 OOH 217 

were: 2 cp 14 

(a) Yorktown-Williamsburg Road; 

(b) Lee’s Mill-Williamsburg Road, 
which joined the road from Yorktown 
about a mile southeast of Williamsburg. 

A road from Wynn’s Mill connected 
with the above two roads, respectively 
near the Half-Way House about three miles 
west of Yorktown, and near Lebanon 
Church about three miles north of Lee’s 
Mill. Water transportation was also avail¬ 
able for sick, wounded and some of the 
stores. 

3. From Williamsburg there was but ^ AtIa * 
one road available toward Richmond. All 
roads were dirt roads and difficult for 
wheeled traffic, after rains. 

— 963 — 










The Peninsula Campaign 


12 RR 275 
Alex 67 
1 CW 206 


12 RR 275, 411 
14 RR 491 


12 RR 601 
2 CP 13 
Alex 65 


14 RR 485, 487, 
488, 489, 492 


4. It was General Johnston’s intention 
to retreat toward a point west of West 
Point, as any halt east of West Point was 
liable to endanger the safety of his army, 
should the Federals, as he anticipated, 
move up the York River in boats and land 
between his command and his base at 
Richmond. As West Point could be reached 
in a few hours by the Federal Navy, it was 
important that the Confederate command 
withdraw secretly from Yorktown, obtain¬ 
ing as much of a start as practicable, and 
secondly, that the march be conducted with 
energy, as the total distance to be marched 
toward Richmond past West Point was 
some 50 miles. 

5. The morale of the Confederate 
troops was not of the best; they had 
suffered physically from exposure in the 
trenches. Sickness was prevalent. 

6. The Federals had opposed to Gen¬ 
eral Johnston’s army, a superior force be¬ 
lieved to consist of 120,000 men or more, 
with superior equipment; and in addition, 
they had a powerful navy, able to operate 
on both the York River and James River, 
on the flanks of Johnston’s army as soon 
as the abandonment of the Warwick River- 
Yorktown line became known to them. 

7. Under these circumstances, Gen¬ 
eral Johnston issued his orders for the 
retreat on May 2, 1862. This order pro¬ 
vided that the artillery with the heavy 
guns would be withdrawn from the lines 
as soon as practicable after sunset, and 
sent at once to Williamsburg. The infan¬ 
try were to follow, leaving pickets to con¬ 
tinue demonstrations until midnight, 
when they also were to be withdrawn. 


— 964 .— 


The Confederate Retreat from Yorktown 


General Hill at Yorktown was directed to 
continue artillery fire from the heavy 
guns, which were not to be abandoned un¬ 
til midnight. 

8. Magruder’s command was given 
the right of way on the Lee’s Mill-Wil- 
liamsburg road. Longstreet was to fol¬ 
low him on the same road from the vicini¬ 
ty of Lebanon. D. H. Hill and two bri¬ 
gades of the reserve was given the York- 
town-Williamsburg Road. No instructions 
are given in this order as to how com¬ 
mands would utilize the single road lead¬ 
ing into and through Williamsburg, but 
it appears that for this short distance, 
columns were doubled, and this was prob¬ 
ably generally understood. Generals 
Longstreet and Magruder were ordered to 
furnish a rear guard of one brigade with 
one battery to cover their retirement. The 
army reserve was charged with covering 
with three brigades and two batteries, 
the retirement of D. H. Hill. Crump’s de¬ 
tachment at Gloucester was to retire inde¬ 
pendently north of the York River. This 
it did without molestation. 

9. In addition, Stuart’s cavalry was 
ordered to hold their position until after 
daylight and thereafter to keep in touch 
with the enemy. 

10. Although General Johnston’s for¬ 
mal order for the retirement did not cover 
in full, movements of trains, it appears 
that these were started to the rear on the 
morning of May 2d, thereby obtaining a 
considerable start, although in the condi¬ 
tion of the roads, none too much. 

11. May 2d, General Johnston’s or¬ 
der for the retirement was amended by in- 


14 RR 489, 491 
MOS 319 
Long. 68 


12 RR 444, 489 


14 RR 486, 487, 
488, 489 
2 CP 14 
1 CW 660, 284 
12 RR 457 
38-SHS-Alexander 


12 RR 275 

Early’s (D. H. Hill) 
Autobiography 66 


— 965 — 


The Peninsula Campaign 


12 RR 589, 602 
14 RR 492 


12 RR 18, 456, 
602 

1 CW 348 


Oeo Sur Map 

12 RR 444, 589, 590, 

596 

X-SHS-Alexander 
8 -SHS-Maury 
22-SHS-105, 107, 

RR 90 
Alex 66 


12 RR 444, 589 
MOS 319 
2 CP 15 


structions to postpone the retreat 24 
hours. This decision was probably caused 
by the slow movement of the trains. 

12. It would appear that the artillery 
commenced to withdraw about'7:00 P.M., 
May 3d, which would be just after dark. 
The quantify of this artillery was not 
very great and under the orders, the infan¬ 
try should have commenced to withdraw 
immediately afterwards, probably by 8:00 
P.M. 

13. The heavy artillery in Yorktown 
continued its demonstrations as directed 
until midnight, when the artillerymen 
spiked their pieces and withdrew, and at 
about the same time, their buildings and 
certain property in Yorktown that had not 
been moved, were set on fire and 
destroyed. 

14. The march to camping grounds 
near Williamsburg required an average 
march of the troops along the roads of 
about thirteen miles. It took considera¬ 
ble time to cover this distance due to the 
simultaneous withdrawal of all commands 
from all parts of the lines and the fact 
that the available roads all finally con¬ 
verged into one, with the further fact that 
the troops in many cases had field trains 
with them, which in the darkness, fre¬ 
quently got stalled. The main roads soon 
became congested with troops and trains, 
and the average rate of advance was only 
about one mile an hour. 

15. Longstreet’s command, which was 
to follow in rear of Magruder’s from Le¬ 
banon Church, near B. M. 82 on the Geo. 
Sur. Map, did not clear that point until 
nearly daylight on the 4th, and it was 

— 966 — 


The Confederate Retreat from Yorktown 


about 5:30 A.M., when they cleared Blows 
Mill Run. 

Longstreet’s command was the last 
to arrive at Williamsburg, which point 
the tail of his column reached about 2:00 
P.M., showing an average marching rate 
of about one mile an hour from Blow’s 
Mill Run. 

16. General Hill remained personally 
in Yorktown until about midnight, when 
he proceeded to Williamsburg, arriving 
there about 5:00 A.M. but the rear brigade 
of his command did not reach the same 
point until noon. 

17. Stuart with the cavalry, had in 
the meantime established a line 'across 
the peninsula from Blows Mill Run to Black 
Swamp. At the latter place, about 1:00 
P.M. a Confederate force consisting of a 
few guns and about a squadron of cav¬ 
alry, was quickly driven in by Stoneman’s 
Union cavalry and the same force was 
again driven in near Brumwell’s Mill on 
Whitteman’s Swamp about 2:00 P.M. 

18. While the resistance of the Con¬ 
federate cavalry, due to their small num¬ 
bers, did not, in these two small skir¬ 
mishes, suffice to delay the Federals more 
than about 15 minutes at each place, this 
was sufficient to enable the Confederates 
at Williamsburg to become aware of the 
Federal pursuit, with the result that Gen¬ 
eral Johnston ordered Semmes’ brigade, 
which had entered Williamsburg about 
1:00 P.M., to retrace its steps and occupy 
Fort Magruder about one mile and a half 
southeast of Williamsburg. Johnston 
probably heard the firing at Black Swamp, 
and understood what was happening. 


12 RR 602 
8 SHS 281 
22 SHS 106 
X SHS 32 


12 RR 275, 424 , 
426, 427, 431, 434, 
444 


12 RR 441, 446 


- 967 - 


The Peninsula Campaign 


Alex 66 
2 CP 15 

12 RR 19, 275, 424, 
426, 431 
MOS 323 


12 RR 19, 424, 426, 
431 

1 OOH 219 


12 RR 19, 424, 427, 
433, 434, 444 


12 RR 19, 433, 435, 
444 


12 RR 275, 441 
107 RR 87 
Alex 57 
2 B & L 195 
Long 72 


19. Fort Magruder had been con¬ 
structed some time previous, through the 
foresight of General Magruder, at the 
head of a clearing which covered the one 
road leading into Williamsburg, at a point 
where the road crossed a low ridge, from 
which two deep, swampy streams led in 
opposite directions respectively to Queen 
Creek, a tributary of the York River, and 
to College Creek, a tributary of the James 
River. 

20. This fort was* supplemented by 
a series of redans, stretching across the 
peninsula from near Queens Creek toward 
College Creek. 

21. The Confederate cavalry at Blows 
Mill was not attacked by Union cavalry, 
but its retreat by the direct road to Wil¬ 
liamsburg was cut off after the action at 
Whitteman’s Swamp by a column of Un¬ 
ion cavalry under General Emory, sent 
by General Stoneman, across to the Lee’s 
Mill-Williamsburg road to get contact 
with Federal infantry supposed to be ad¬ 
vancing along this road. 

22. This Federal cavalry, finding Con¬ 
federate cavalry and some horse artillery 
between it and the Federal infantry, af¬ 
ter a cavalry action occurring probably 
between Grove and Booth on the Geo. Sur. 
Map, forced the latter across country to 
the James River, where it subsequently 
retired to Williamsburg by a beach road 
along the James River. 

23. General Johnston, aware of the 
Federal cavalry pursuit, the sound of 
firing being a warning, ordered Kershaw’s 
brigade to reenforce Semmes. These bri¬ 
gades were part of Magruder’s corps, but 


— 968 — 


The Confederate Retreat from Yorktown 


belonged to different divisions. McLaws, 
a division commander, was assigned, to 
command the rear guard, and by his or¬ 
ders, Manly’s and McCarthy’s batteries 
were also turned back and joined the rear 
guard. 

24. Johnston’s orders for the retreat 
provided for rear guards for his various 
columns, all of which were ordered to 
Williamsburg. But no halt order was is¬ 
sued, and all except Stuart’s rear cavalry 
marched in on Williamsburg not knowing 
whether they were to stop there for the 
night or continue on. The rear guards 
thus marched by the important position 
at Fort Magruder, and had to be ordered 
back, when the sounds of firing indicated 
the Federals were coming up. They 
reached this position just in time, and 
occupied the works on the flanks of Fort 
Magruder after the Union cavalry had 
come into line opposite them. 

25. About 3:00 P.M., the Union cav¬ 
alry attacked Fort Magruder and endeav¬ 
ored to envelop its left, but the attack 
was repulsed by the troops ordered up, 
which successively came into line during 
the progress of the engagement. 

26. There were no further actions 
on this day between the Union and Con¬ 
federate troops. 

27. Later on the 4th, General John¬ 
ston ordered Longstreet, who had camped 
west of Williamsburg, to relieve the 
brigades of Semmes and Kershaw, and 
Longstreet sent Anderson’s and Pryor’s 
brigades, with Macon’s, Garrett’s and 
McCarthy’s batteries to form a new Con- 


12 RR 442, 445 


12 RR 424, 425, 
428, 431, 442, 590 
Alex 67 


12 RR 564, 580, 
590 

Alex 67 
Long 72 


— 969 — 


The Peninsula Campaign 


12 RR 275, 443 
Long 72 


12 RR 275, 435, 
481, 602, 564 
Alex 67 
Long 74 


Alex 67 
2 B & L 203 
12 RR 564 


13 RR 368, 565, 572, 
586, 602, 607 
Alex 67 
Long 77 


12 RR 275 


federate rear guard on the afternoon of 
the 4th. 

28. General Magruder’s troops con¬ 
tinued their march from Williamsburg on 
the night of the 4th-5th and cleared that 
town that night. Longstreet’s command 
bivouacked just northwest of Williams¬ 
burg on the night of May 4th-5th. 

29. During the night of the 4th-5th, 
it rained heavily, and in rain and deep 
mud, G. W. Smith’s corps at about 5:30 
A.M., on the 5th, followed Magruder on 
the road toward Richmond. He was to 
be followed by D. H. Hill’s division as 
soon as the road became available for 
their use. Due, however, to the heavy 
rain, the march of the retreating troops 
was slow and by noon, it became evident 
that it would be impossible for the Con¬ 
federates to all clear Williamsburg that 
day. 

30. In the meantime, the Federals 
had attacked Longstreet’s troops near 
Fort Magruder, and the action had so far 
developed by noon that it was necessary 
for Hill’s troops to be sent in to assist 
Longstreet. The fight that ensued, known 
as the battle of Williamsburg, was suc¬ 
cessful for the Confederates, in that they 
repulsed all attempts of the Union forces 
to break their lines. 

31. Johnston, who was at Williams¬ 
burg, realized that the rear guard would 
have to fight off any advancing Federals 
in order to save his trains, and a good 
part of his command, and he personally 
watched the fight. 

32. Under cover of this rear guard 
action, G. W. Smith reached Barhamsville 


— 970 — 


The Confederate Retreat from Yorktown 


and Magruder, the Diascund Bridge on 
the afternoon of the 5th and camped at 
those places for the night. 

33. There was no further fighting at 
Williamsburg and Longstreet and D. H. 
Hill, in the order named, both marched 
away unopposed during the night of the 
5th-6th, and early on the 6th, covered by 
Stuart’s cavalry. The withdrawal of the 
Confederate troops from Fort Magruder 
and adjacent works began about 7:00 P.M. 
and was noted by Federal troops, as 
early as 1:30 A.M., on the 6th, but no ef¬ 
fort was made to attack, and no advance 
was made until daylight. About 5:30 A.M. 
on the 6th, Union troops took posses¬ 
sion of the Confederate entrenchments 
defending Williamsburg, which by then 
had been completely abandoned, and fol¬ 
lowed the Confederate rear guard, then in 
sight, through that town. Union cavalry 
pursued cautiously for some six miles fur¬ 
ther, after which the Confederates pro¬ 
ceeded unmolested towards Barhamsville, 
in the vicinity of which by morning of the 
7th, their whole army was concentrated. 
The Confederate losses at Williamsburg 
were about 1200, and some 400 wounded 
were abandoned for lack of transporta¬ 
tion. 

34. The Confederate retreat on the 
6th was over horrible roads, and with cold, 
tired and hungry troops. Straggling was 
enormous, and many wagons had to be 
destroyed or abandoned through inability 
to move them through the slush and mud. 
There was at this time an excellent oppor¬ 
tunity for a vigorous pursuit led by the 
cavalry, but it was not done; instead Mc¬ 
Clellan prepared to attack. 

— 971 — 


12 RR 275, 496, 

575, 605, 23, 460, 586, 
588, 593, 597, 600 
14 RR 684 
MOS 334, 339 
Alex 69 

1 CW 584, 430 

2 B & L 206 
Long 72, 78 


12 RR 605, 23, 425, 
436, 454 
MOS 339 
Alex 69 

1 CW 583 

2 B & L 275, 429 
2 CP 25 

12 RR 247 
14 RR 506 
Long 79 
Trob 204 
Aver 48, 51 


The Peninsula Campaign 


12 RR 138, 139 
Alex 69 
1 CW 622 
MOS 172 


12 RR 276, 605, 
619, 618, 621, 623, 
626, 627, 628, 629, 
631, 632 
MOS 337 
Alex 69, 70 

1 CW 622 

2 B & L 206, 276 
14 RR 152, 506 


Alex 70 


35. Franklin's Federal division ar¬ 
rived by water off West Point, about noon 
on the 6th, commenced landing about 4:00 
P.M., and completed its landing during the 
ensuing night. Sedgwick’s division ar¬ 
rived at the same place on May 7th. 

36. There was no opposition to 
Franklin’s landing on the 6th, although it 
was observed by patrols from G. W. 
Smith’s corps. But on the 7th, as it was 
imperative to the safety of the Confed¬ 
erate retreat to prevent Federal forces 
from West Point blocking the road to¬ 
wards Richmond, Smith ordered Whiting’s 
division of his corps to attack the Feder- 
als. An infantry fight in the woods fol¬ 
lowed. The Federals were not driven back, 
but they failed to advance and the Con¬ 
federate retreat was not irtferfered with 
by them. 

37. There was no further interfer¬ 
ence after this date with the Confederate 
retreat. 


— 972 — 


The Union Estimate at 7:00 

May 4, 1862 

1. The mission of the Federal forces 
early on the morning of May 4, 1862, was 
the capture of Yorktown preparatory to 
an advance on Richmond. 

2. There were available for this pur¬ 
pose, according to the returns of April 
30th the following troops: 


lid Corps (Sumner) _19,054 

Hid Corps (Heintzelman)_34,633 

IVth Corps (Keyes)_33,586 

Franklin’s division _ 11,332 

Cavalry Division, Hdq., etc._13,787 


Total present for duty_112,392 


In addition there were 5,850 present 
on special duty, sick, etc. 

3. The Hid Corps was in line opposite 
Yorktown, IVth Corps on the left, with the 
lid Corps in the center. Franklin’s Division 
had just landed from transports. It had 
recently arrived from Alexandria, and it 
had been intended to disembark it on the 
north side of the York River, to attack 
Gloucester Point from the rear. Due to 
the shallowness of the water the disem¬ 
barkation had not yet been found prac¬ 
ticable. 

4. A considerable number of batteries 
had been constructed by the Union forces 
opposite Yorktown and the bombardment 
of the Confederate works at that point was 
to have started about the night of May 
5th-6th. 

5. McClellan was informed by his Se¬ 
cret Service that the Confederates in and 
about Yorktown numbered at least 100,000 
to 120,000 men. 

— 973 — 


A.M. 


12 RR 12, .17 


14 RR 130 

1 CW 323, 283 

2 B & L 437 


Atlas XVII-2 
12 RR 12, 18, 110 
134 

2 CP 12 


12 RR 18, 319, 272, 
314 

2 CP 12 
MOS 286 

1 CW 429 

2 B & L 437 


12 RR 11, 267, 268 








The Peninsula Campaign 


12 RR 11, 12, 229, 
318 

107 RR 576, 583 
1 CW 320, 598 


* 


12 RR 389, 338, 
339, 423 
2 CP 8 
MOS 291 
107 RR 83 
2 B & L 267 


12 RR 11, 16, 17 
MOS 263, 267, 272, 
274 

MOS 274, 289 


MOS 288 
107 RR 591 
14 RR 131, 312 
12 RR 313, 318, 
319, 348, 398 
2 CP 13 
Alex. 66 

1 CW 283, 284, 567 


6. The Confederates had held an en¬ 
trenched line extending from Yorktown 
across the Peninsula, following the wooded 
Warwick River, which had been dammed at 
several points, causing inundations in the 
low river bottom. Each dam was defended 
by a redan, or redoubt. This line was 
eight to nine miles long. 

7. There was a detached Confederate 
post at Gloucester Point, which with the 
batteries at Yorktown closed the York 
River to the Union Navy. Norfolk was 
also still held by the Confederates, and 
sheltered the Merrimac, or Virginia; and 
some smaller vessels, and the James River 
was unavailable to the Union Navy, due to 
the presence of these vessels which made 
occasional sorties. 

8. McClellan considered the Confed¬ 
erate position exceedingly strong, and with 
the large garrison which he believed to be 
occupying them, he had determined to at¬ 
tack it by siege operations to avoid hope¬ 
less attacks and heavy useless losses. 

9. It was confidently expected by Mc¬ 
Clellan that after the bombardment had 
commenced, the place would soon fall. It 
had not been anticipated that the enemy 
would avoid the bombardment by with¬ 
drawing. Yet it appears that the possibil¬ 
ity of withdrawal should have been clearly 
seen and provided for, and indications of a 
Confederate retreat were not lacking. On 
the night of May 2d-3d, the enemy’s quiet¬ 
ness was so noticeable as to suggest a re¬ 
treat by him on that night; on the morning 
of May 3d, the enemy was observed burn¬ 
ing his barracks; and on the night of May 
3d-4th, until about midnight, the Confed- 


— 974 — 


The Union Estimate at 7:00 A.M. 


erates opened a heavy artillery fire which 
appeared to be at random. As on previous 
occasions, McClellan while very attentive 
to his own moves, failed to divine the prob¬ 
able moves of the enemy. 

10. Word was received at McClellan’s 
headquarters during the night of May 3d- 
4th, that fire and suspicious noises were 
being heard from Yorktown. By daylight 
the front line troops knew from deserters 
that the enemy had gone from their front, 
and small parties by 5:30 A.M. reached 
the Confederate entrenchments, finding 
them completely evacuated. The opening 
of the approach to Yorktown was at once 
started by front line troops, and by 7:00 
A.M. the road to Yorktown was open. 

11. McClellan appears himself to have 
learned of the Confederate retreat by 4:00 
A.M. or a little later, from telegraphic re¬ 
ports of information received from a de¬ 
serter; and the first information was rap¬ 
idly corroborated by other reports from 
along the front. The Navy observed the 
evacuation of Yorktown by 5:30 A.M. and 
at once occupied the Yorktown-Gloucester 
channel. 

12. McClellan’s information of the 
country through which the Confederates 
were retreating was limited to the maps in 
his possession, of which Cram’s map is a 
sample. The maps showed two main roads 
available for the Confederate retreat, one 
from Yorktown and the other near the 
James River, and these, unless destroyed, 
were available for a pursuit. 

13. In addition, the abandonment of 
Yorktown opened the York River to the 


12 RR 398, 399, 
400, 233, 313, 348, 
349, 401, 402 
Alex. 66 
MOS 288 
2 B & L 194 
1 CW 284 


O’Brien, 84 
12 RR 283 
7 NR 310 


1 RR Atlas 
XVIII-1 


— 975 — 


The Peninsula Campaign 


Federal Navy, and enabled pursuing troops 
to be sent by water as far as West Point. 

12 rr 234, i9, 526, 14. The general rule for a pursuit is 

to advance rapidly on a broad front, uti¬ 
lizing cavalry and horse artillery to the 
maximum. McClellan could therefore be 
expected to send his mounted troops at 
once overland by the two available roads 
after the retreating enemy, to be followed 
by infantry and artillery. The opening of 
the York River, and the absence of a hos¬ 
tile navy, made it possible to send other 
pursuing troops to West Point, which if 
reached in time might offer an opportunity 
to oppose the head of the retreating force. 
All of these movements were ordered by 
McClellan, although under the excitement, 
and unexpectedness of the situation, at 
intervals after 7:30 A.M. The measures 
adopted were correct, but their execution 
was tardy. 

i f ;w 431 15. A pursuit by water up the James 

River was not practicable, under the condi¬ 
tions believed to exist on the morning of 
May 4, due to the Federal Navy being un¬ 
willing to operate on that river, as long as 
the Merrimac was still in Norfolk harbor. 

16. Had the Confederate retreat been 
foreseen, and been provided for, many Con¬ 
federates might have been captured. The 
cessation of the enemy’s fire about mid¬ 
night, the explosions and fires seen there¬ 
after, which attracted the attention of the 
front line troops, should have led to recon¬ 
naissance patrols, in force if necessary, be¬ 
ing sent out to determine the situation. By 
daylight, 5:00 A.M., the Confederate re¬ 
treat should have been definitely estab¬ 
lished, and the Union pursuit at once 
started. 

— 976 — 


The Union Cavalry Pursuit 

May 4th, 1862 


1. About 8:00 A.M., on May 4th, Gen- \\ gg 

eral Stoneman received an order from fcwafs 429 
General McClellan to pursue the retreat¬ 
ing Confederate columns on the Yorktown- 
Williamsburg Road. 

2, Due to the unexpectedness of the J 2 c ® R ig 51 ’ 466 ’ 667 

Confederate retreat, the troops were not 1 cw 569 
. , Aver 32 
prepared to pursue promptly, rations not 

having been issued, trains being absent, 
so that the cavalry although in part 
warned by General Heintzelman as early 
as 8:00 A.M. as to the probability of its 
being called upon to pursue, did not ac¬ 
tually start until after considerable delay. 


3. The head of the main body of the 423, 427, 

cavalry started from Yorktown about 820 
noon. They probably started from their 1 cw 566 
camps about 11:00 A.M. Stoneman’s com¬ 
mand consisted of four batteries of horse 

artillery, the 1st and 6th U. S. Cavalry, 

3d Pennsylvania Cavalry, 8th Illinois Cav¬ 
alry and Barker’s Illinois squadron. There 
does not appear to have been any order 
of march issued by General StQneman, 
but the troops seem to have taken posi¬ 
tion in column in the order in which they 
arrived at Yorktown. This was an easy 
way of determining position of the troops. 

4. General Cooke with the 1st and 6th it 7 RR 43 4 f 4 ’ 4 426 ’ 
Cavalry and Gibson’s horse battery com- 2 3 b R & 2 ^ 5 429 
posed the advance guard, and probably 

left Yorktown about 11:30 A.M. General 
Emory with Barker’s squadron and the 
3d Pennsylvania Cavalry formed the main 


— 977 — 


The Peninsula Campaign 


12 RR 19, 424 
MOS 320 
1 CW 568 


Geo Sur Map 
12 RR 424, 425 
MOS 320 
1 OOH 219 
1 CW 568 


Geo Sur Map 
12 RR 424, 426, 
427, 431, 434 


12 RR 19, 424, 426, 
431 

2 B & L 194 


body. The 1st squadron of the 1st Cav¬ 
alry formed the advanced party. 

5. General Stoneman’s orders were to 
pursue and harass the rear of the retreat¬ 
ing enemy and if possible to cut off a 
Confederate rear guard supposed to be 
on the Lee’s Mill-Yorktown Road. General 
Stoneman was advised that Hooker’s divi¬ 
sion would follow him promptly in support, 
and that the cavalry was to cooperate 
with Smith’s division on the Lee’s Mill 
road in cutting off the hostile rear guard. 

6 . The advance proceeded rapidly 
without incident until the advance party 
reached Black Swamp about 1:00 P.M., 
where the rebel pickets were first met. A 
short fire action followed when General 
Cooke, pushing to the front, ordered the 
horse battery to bring up three guns, 
which entering into action and firing a 
few shells, caused the enemy to retreat. 

7. Advance was then resumed until 
about 2:00 P.M., another short action sim¬ 
ilar to the preceding one took place near 
Burnwell’s Mill at Whitteman’s Swamp. 
The Confederates being driven from this 
position, the advance proceeded until 
about 3:00 P.M. it arrived on the plateau 
about three-fourths of a mile southeast 
of Fort Magruder, where it came to a 
halt in view of that work, and of Confed¬ 
erate troops in its vicinity. 

8 . Fort Magruder lay at the end of 
a cultivated plain about one-half mile 
across. The Fort was surrounded by a wa¬ 
ter ditch nine feet wide and deep, and had 
a parapet six feet high and nine feet thick. 
The length of the interior crest was about 
600 yards. There were supporting rifle 


— 978 — 


The Union Cavalry Pursuit 


pits in front of this work and redoubts to 
the right and left. It was a formidable 
position for cavalry to attack. 

9. General Cooke, commanding the 
advance, estimated the enemy force as a 
regiment of cavalry, a battery of artillery 
and three regiments of infantry. Although 
such a force was larger than his own, he 
proposed to attack it and this decision was 
supported by General Stoneman, who him¬ 
self arrived on the field shortly after con¬ 
tact with the enemy had been secured. 

10. All of Gibson’s battery, six pieces, 
was brought up, three pieces at a time, 
and placed across the road about 400 
yards southeast of road fork 87 (G. S. 
Map). Due to woods and creeks on each 
side, the available space to deploy cav¬ 
alry in was so small that not exceeding 
300 troopers of the 1st Cavalry could be 
placed in line. The remainder of the force 
was held in reserve half a mile in rear to 
cover a contemplated retreat should Hook¬ 
er’s infantry fail to arrive. This reserve 
was probably posted near road fork 85 (G. 
S. Map). 

11. A fire fight now took place in 
front of Fort Magruder, lasting about 40 
minutes. Results were indecisive, the Con¬ 
federates becoming steadily stronger as 
they deployed more troops, and the Fed¬ 
eral cavalry being too weak to force a 
Confederate retirement. The losses from 
enemy artillery and rifle fire were becom¬ 
ing considerable and General Stoneman 
decided to withdraw his troops. 

12. On account of the mud the bat¬ 
tery had difficulty in withdrawing, and one 
piece and several caissons were aban T 


12 RR 424, 426 
MOS 321 


12 RR 424, 426 
MOS 321 


12 RR 20, 184, 424, 
426, 428, 431, 442 
107 RR 85 

MOS 321 
1 OOH 219 

13 RR 245 


12 RR 20, 428, 429, 
432, 442, 445, 446 
2 CP 17 


- 979 - 


The Peninsula Campaign 


12 RR 20, 424, 427, 
433, 428, 439, 436, 

440, 444 
MOS 321 
2 CP 17 


12 RR 20, 425, 438, 
439, 442, 456, 464 
MOS 322 


do’ned. The enemy's cavalry attempted to 
capture the entire battery, but were pre¬ 
vented by two mounted charges by the 
1st Cavalry, who captured an enemy stan¬ 
dard and some prisoners. 

13. In the meantime, four squadrons 
of the 6th Cavalry had been sent about 
3:10 P.M. to the right in an attempt to 
turn the enemy's left. This force crossed 
the ravine, probably about 3:45 P.M., 
near the head of Jones Pond (see G. S. 
Map), the banks of which were heavily 
wooded and caused the column to move by 
twos and by files, resulting in their being 
unable to deploy from the plateau on the 
west side of this ravine in face of Con¬ 
federate troops of all arms found there. 
They, therefore, withdrew, suffering losses 
from Confederate carbine and rifle fire 
while recrossing the ravine. Confederate 
cavalry followed across, but were them¬ 
selves in turn unable to deploy from the 
wooded ravine, and were driven back 
to the west side. 

14. This ended the fight for this day, 
so far as the cavalry main body was con¬ 
cerned. General Stoneman withdrew his 
forces a few hundred yards and took up 
a defensive position about 4:00 P.M. He 
sent for and expected assistance from 
Hooker’s division with which he proposed 
to renew the attack upon the Confeder¬ 
ate's rear guard, but he was informed that 
this division had been cut off by Smith's 
division, who was marching his troops in 
front of it. Stoneman knew nothing as 
to Smith's presence and as to what his 
orders were, and did not feel that he could 
count upon him, so he waited for General 


— 980 — 


The Union Cavalry Pursuit 

Hooker who arrived on the field about 4:00 
P.M. but stated that his division was two 
miles behind with the road in between 
crowded with troops. 

15. About 4:30 P.M. General Sumner 2 cp is 
arrived, and announced that he had been 5 n RR 20, 425, 451 ’ 
detailed to assume command. He decided 

to attack, using Smith’s division, the 
leading one, which had just arrived. About 
this time, Generals Heintzelman and 
Keyes also arrived. Smith’s division was 
deployed, but the lines became confused 
in the dense woods, and darkness coming 
on, the troops were ordered to stop and 
lie on their arms. 

16 . There was a side reconnaissance 12 rr 19, 424 ,427, 
made by the Union cavalry under Gen- mos 321 

eral Emory, who after the action at Whit- 
teman’s Swamp was ordered by General 
Stoneman about 2:00 P.M. to take Ben¬ 
son’s horse battery, the 3d Pennsylvania 
regiment and Barker’s Illinois Squadron 
and move by a wood road, probably via 
81, 92 and 85, on the Geo. Sur. Map, 
from Whitteman’s Swamp to the Lee’s 
Mill-Williamsburg road to cut off hostile 
troops retreating over it, and to gain 
contact with Smith’s division which was 
expected to be on that road, and not on 
the same road as General Stoneman’s com¬ 
mand already was on. This operation of 
General Emory’s was probably made in 
compliance with orders from General Mc¬ 
Clellan to cut off the hostile forces sup¬ 
posed to be in front of Smith’s division. 

17 . This command soon after it got 12 rr 433, 435, 

. 444 , 574 

started, probably about 2:20 P.M. had its 
advance party driven in by a mounted 
charge made by some of Stuart’s cavalry, 


- 981 — 


The Peninsula Campaign 


12 RR 428, 433, 
465 

MOS 322 
2 CP 17 
1 CW 569 


12 RR 433, 435 
1 CW 569 


made in column of fours in the road. The 
Confederate attack was stopped by two 
squadrons, dismounted to fight on foot, 
and supported by the horse battery in the 
center. The advance was then resumed 
until the Lee’s Mill-Williamsburg road 
was reached, probably near Booth. The 
Confederate cavalry under Stuart with¬ 
drew to the James River and subsequent¬ 
ly retired along that stream toward Wil¬ 
liamsburg. 

18. Emory not finding Smith, sent 
back for infantry support, to Stoneman 
who requested General Hooker to furnish 
one, but due to congestion of roads, no in¬ 
fantry reached Emory until that night. In 
the meantime, Emory quietly waited, pro¬ 
bably near road fork 66 (Geo. Sur. Map) 
while Smith, with whom Emory had been 
ordered to cooperate, marched over to the 
Yorktown-Williamsburg road, from which 
Emory had started. 

19. Hooker’s division which was sup¬ 
posed to be following Stoneman, finding 
themselves cut off by Smith’s troops, 
marched later across to the Lee’s Mill- 
Williamsburg road, and at 10:00 P.M. at 
night on the 4th, one of his brigades 
passed Emory’s forces, the balance of 
Hooker’s troops following on the morning 
of the 5th. 


— 982 — 


The Union Advance on Williamsburg 

May 4th, 1862 


1. The evacuation of Yorktown and 
the Warwick River line by the Confeder¬ 
ates during the night of May 3d-4th was 
discovered by the Federal troops between 
3:30 A.M. and 5:30 A.M. on the 4th and 
by the latter hour small bodies of Feder- 
als had commenced to occupy the empty 
trenches opposite them. 

2 . General Smith, who was stationed 
opposite the left center of the line, with¬ 
out waiting for orders, repaired the dam 
on his front, sending over infantry under 
General Hancock followed by the 4th 
Squadron, 5th Cavalry, under Chambliss 
about 7:00 A.M. These troops were or¬ 
dered to reconnoiter to the front. 

3. About 7:30 A.M. this cavalry re¬ 
ported that they had found a hostile rear 
guard of infantry and cavalry in their 
front. This information was telegraphed 
to General McClellan, and the cavalry was 
ordered by Smith to retire, by reason of 
the insufficient number of supporting 
troops then across the dam, but artillery 
was ordered forward in support and 
crossed the dam about 8:00 A.M. 

4. Smith’s troops which had ad¬ 
vanced under Hancock had moved hastily 
and many of them were without rations. 

5. On the right General Heintzelman, 
commanding opposite Yorktown, aware 
of the enemy’s retreat, also issued orders, 
probably about 8:00 A.M. to the 3d Penn¬ 
sylvania Cavalry and to Hooker’s and 
Kearney’s divisions to prepare to march. 


12 RR 313, 348, 
349, 398, 400, 401, 
402, 403, 534, 556, 
557 

1* OOH 217 
1 CW 568, 19, 284 


12 RR 18, 440, 526, 
534, 549 
1 OOH 217 


12 RR 526, 534, 
556 

MOS 320 
14 RR 137 


12 RR 451, 534 


12 RR 456 


— 983 — 


The Peninsula Campaign 


12 RR 136 
O’Brien 84 

1 OOH 217 

2 CP 16 

1 CW 568* 19 
14 RR 151, 331 


12 RR 19, 526 
14 RR 135 
MOS 319 
1 CW 19, 429 


6 . While these measures were being 
taken by the front line troops, at General 
McClellan’s Headquarters, the news of 
the Confederate retreat came as a sur¬ 
prise. It had not been expected and when 
it occurred, it was a shock, both to Gen¬ 
eral McClellan and to his staff. There were 
no correct maps and considerable confus¬ 
ion resulted. Generals came to make sug¬ 
gestions as to what ought to be done, but 
without success prior to about 7:45 A.M., 
when McClellan suddenly decided to pur¬ 
sue with part of his force, apparently as a 
result of the message from Smith. 

7. The measures then taken by Gen¬ 
eral McClellan and his staff were of a piece¬ 
meal nature. Orders were issued separate¬ 
ly for successive movements, without re¬ 
lation to each other, and seemingly when¬ 
ever the idea seemed to strike the indivi¬ 
dual issuing the order. 

8 . The orders first issued commenced 
with one to the cavalry to pursue and 
harass the rear guard of the retreating 
enemy, and if possible, to cut off his rear 
guard or that portion of it which had taken 
the Lee’s Mill-Williamsburg road. This 
order was issued probably about 8:00 A.M. 
and appears based on the information re¬ 
ceived from Smith. At about the same 
time, orders were sent to Smith not to en¬ 
gage the enemy, as arrangements had been 
made for cutting them off. 

9. This last order was not a good one, 
for it could hardly be expected that the 
enemy would remain quietly in place 
while the cavalry surrounded them, unless 
forced to do so by an attack holding them 
to their position. This order called for 


—984 


The Union Advance on Williamsburg 

the same kind of a maneuver as General 
McClellan had in mind for April 5th, when 
he had purposed sending a column of some 
20,000 men to the same Half-Way House 
with the view to cutting off a retreat 
which he assumed the Confederates at 
Yorktown would make under threats of 
an attack in front. 

10 . The maps in General McClellan's 12 rr 152 
possession for the territory occupied by 

the Confederate forces and of which 
Cram's map was one of the principal ones, 
were inaccurate, and the importance of 
the Half-Way House to' McClellan’s mind 
can be understood on examining this map. 

The order was a hastily issued order, based 
apparently on Smith’s message as to 
hostile infantry and cavalry being in front 
of him, and the sudden idea, that this 
force might be surrounded and captured. 

11 . At about the same time that or- 14 rr 315 
ders were issued to Stoneman to pursue 1 cw 429 
towards Williamsburg, a message was 

sent to General Sumner, directing him to 
have Richardson’s and Sedgwick’s divi¬ 
sion of his corps held in readiness to march 
without trains, which would follow later. 

These troops were in the center of the 
line, and had no available roads for an ad¬ 
vance to the front, and if sent to the flanks 
would naturally follow in rear of troops . 
already located there. A calculation of 
the time it would take for other troops 
to clear the road for these two divisions, 
shows that the warning order to the JId 
(Sumner’s) Corps was premature, and the 
same is true if it had been the intention 
to move these divisions by water, in view 
of orders given shortly afterwards, direct- 


— 985 — 


The Peninsula Campaign 



12 RR 185, 451, 
549, 557, 562 
2 CP 16 
1 CW 569, 348 


14 RR 139 

12 RR 19, 519, 424, 
425, 434 
1 CW 359, 429 
Aver 


12 RR 19, 450, 511, 
516, 558, 560 
14 RR 135, 139, 198 
1 CW 442 


12 RR 557, 558, 
511 

1 CW 568 


ing Franklin's division to board transports 
first. The II Corps divisions did not ac¬ 
tually move until the 5th. 

12. Due to the Confederate retreat 
not having been foreseen, the field trains 
of the Federal troops were not ready to 
pursue and many trains were absent, en- 
route to or at the depots, and they were 
not immediately available. Others that 
were near the troops were not loaded, not 
having the required quantity of stores at 
hand for this purpose. The result was 
that the pursuingjnfantry in part pursued 
without rations. This was especially so, 
in the case of troops from the divisions 
of Smith, Couch and Casey, who moved 
out early in the morning. 

13. Probably near 7:15 A.M. orders 
had been sent to General Sumner, who 
was in command of the left wing, consist¬ 
ing of the lid and IVth Corps, to occupy 
Lee's Mill atid to reconnoiter towards 
Groves Wharf and the Half-Way House, 
with a force specified as to consist of two 
brigades of infantry, cavalry, and three 
batteries of artillery. 

14. Pursuant to this order, one bri¬ 
gade each from Couch's and Casey's divi¬ 
sions of Keyes' 4th Corps, a part of the 
5th Cavalry, and probably three batteries, 
started out about 9:00 A.M. and reconnoi- 
tered slowly and cautiously in the direc¬ 
tions ordered. These troops left on a half 
hour's notice, and by order went without 
tents, blankets or rations. 

15. The brigade of Casey’s division 
sent out was under General Naglee, and 
about 2:00 P.M. its head was in the vicini¬ 
ty of Halstead’s Point in advance of other 


— 986 — 


The Union Advance on Williamsburg 


troops, but was stopped by order from 
General Sumner. Further advances later 
on that day which were attempted, were 
prevented by other troops blocking the 
road and given precedence by orders of 
Generals Sumner and Heintzelman. The 
balance of Couch's and Casey's divisions 
appear to have followed a short distance 
in rear of the leading brigade. 

16. About 8:30 A.M. on the 4th, or¬ 
ders were given in person to General 
Heintzelman, commanding the 3d Corps, 
to send Hooker’s division to follow the 
cavalry as far as the Half-Way House, 
from which point he was to act, to cut 
off the supposed retreating Confederate 
forces in the vicinity of Lee's Mill-Wil- 
liamsburg road. General Heintzelman 
was also directed to prder General Porter 
to occupy Yorktown, and soon afterwards 
was ordered to have Kearney’s division 
prepare to march, as General Heintzel¬ 
man had already directed Hooker and 
Kearney to prepare to march, and it is pos¬ 
sible that these orders of General McClel¬ 
lan were based on knowledge of this. 

17. Hooker's division was delayed in 
its,start due to waiting for detachments 
on duty in the trenches, and at the base 
at Cheeseman's Creek, and was not ready 
to start until about 1:00 P.M. General 
Heintzelman marched with the division, 
under orders which he understood directed 
him to take charge of the entire pursuit. 

18. McClellan next issued orders 
about 9:00 A.M. to General Franklin to 
re-embark his division on transports, with 
a view of moving under naval escort on 
that day to West Point to occupy that place 


12 RR 19, 456 
MOS 320 
14 RR 136 
1 CW 348 


12 RR 456, 457 
1 CW 19, 298, 576 
MOS 298 


12 RR 136, 234, 

614, 618, 621 

14 RR 133, 134. 141, 

143 

107 RR 597 

MOS 320, 335, 336, 

352 

7 NR 811. 312 
1 CW 429, 621 


— 987 — 


The Peninsula Campaign 


as a base from which to intercept the Con¬ 
federate retreat towards Richmond. But 
the transports were not assembled at 
Yorktown until the next morning, 
and then General McClellan held his final 
orders for the movement until late on the 
5th. It was at that time too late in the 
day to start, as there were but 
few river pilots available and night navi¬ 
gation was considered impracticable, and 
the expedition did not finally sail until 
the morning of the 6th. While McClellan 
had originally intended that Franklin 
should occupy West Point on the 4th, 
upon finding this could not be done, the 
further delay was probably occasioned by 
anxiety as to the outcome of the battle 
in progress at Williamsburg. But this 
delay gave the Confederates the time they 
needed, and Franklin’s move to West Point 
failed to intercept the enemy’s retreat 
past that place. 

14 rr 137 19. About 11:00 A.M. a request was 

3i4 ’ ’ sent to the Navy to have two gunboats 

reconnoiter as far as West Point. This 
reconnaissance was made and completed 
by 2:00 P.M., resulting in information be¬ 
ing received that for twelve miles up^the 
York river no batteries could be seen, and 
that Bigler’s wharf was burning. 

12 rr 526.423.433, 20. Smith’s advance was made to the 

2 4 cp i6 Yorktown-Williamsburg road. He had 

seized the bridge over Skiff Creek about 
11:30 A.M. finding it damaged by fire, 
and impracticable for mounted men, or 
artillery. This bridge was on the Lee’s 
Mill-Williamsburg road, and was the nat¬ 
ural line of advance for the left of the 
Federal force, but Smith possibly failed 


— 988 — 


The Union Advance on Williamsburg 


to realize this, and thought it was a minor 
road. A comparison of the Geological 
Survey Map with Cram's Map, which is 
what Smith seems to have had, indicates a 
probability that Smith passed Lebanon 
Church going north in the belief that he 
was still on the Lee’s Mill-Williamsburg 
Road. 

21. About 11:30 A.M., General Mc¬ 
Clellan issued orders to Sumner to advance 
with the. 5th Cavalry, Smith’s and Couch’s 
division, and Casey’s division, if neces¬ 
sary. None of these divisions belonged to 
Sumner’s corps. His own two divisions 
had been ordered to be held in readiness 
to reenforce the right. Sumner received 
this order about noon, which further di¬ 
rected an attack should the enemy retreat. 

22. In the meantime Smith, receiving 
the order of about 8:00 A.M. not to engage 
the enemy, finding the enemy was slowly 
retreating, and consisted of cavalry only, 
allowed his troops to follow cautiously, but 
avoiding any engagement. The 5th Cavalry 
by 11:30 A.M., reached a point about a mile 
south of the Yorktown-Williamsburg road, 
and by noon Hancock’s infantry reached 
Lebanon Church (near B. M. 82, Geo. Sur. 
Map). In these positions, the troops were 
halted, by peremptory orders sent by Sum¬ 
ner, until about 2:30 P.M., when Sumner 
himself arriving on the field, pursuant to 
new orders just received by him, directed 
Smith’s advance to be resumed. 

23. Stoneman’s cavalry finally start¬ 
ed from Yorktown on the pursuit ordered 
about noon, and moved rapidly, and with¬ 
out opposition, along the direct road to 
Williamsburg until they arrived, about 


MOS 299, 300 
12 RR 450 
14 RR 135 
1 CW 430 


12 RR 444, 526, 
534, 558 


12 RR 19, 424, 426, 
427, 434, 444 
MOS 320 


- 989 — 


The Peninsula Campaign 


12 RR 19, 20, 424, 
426, 427, 431, 434, 
436, 439, 440 
14 RR 134, 135 
107 RR 85 


12 RR 234 
14 RR 136 


14 RR 136 
1 CW 430 


2:00 P.M., near Black Swamp, where they 
came in contact with and engaged the Con¬ 
federate rear cavalry. 

24. Stoneman arrived opposite Fort 
Magruder about 3:00 P.M. and soon after 
attacked this place, resulting in considera¬ 
ble fighting by the Union cavalry and 
horse artillery on one side against the Con¬ 
federate troops of all arms, partly en¬ 
trenched, opposite them. There was also 
some fighting between minor detachments 
of Federal and Confederate cavalry. 

25. The filing resulting from these 
actions was distinctly heard at Army Head¬ 
quarters and caused more or less alarm, 
resulting in orders to Porter’s Division of 
Heintzelman’s Hid Corps to prepare to fol¬ 
low Hooker towards Williamsburg. 

26. As the firing continued, General 
McClellan decided that there were still not 
enough troops moving forward, and in¬ 
structions were sent to General Sumner 
about 2:00 P.M. to move at least two, and 
if necessary three divisions toward Wil¬ 
liamsburg and try to turn the enemy’s po¬ 
sition. Sumner appears to have received 
this order about 2:30 P.M., and at once 
started Smith’s division forward and pro¬ 
ceeded personally in advance, as stated in 
paragraph 22. 

27. It will be noted that Hooker, and 
probably later Kearney’s and Porter’s Di¬ 
visions were to follow the cavalry on one 
road while two other divisions were or¬ 
dered to pursue on the Lee’s Mill-Williams- 
burg road. In addition, Smith was in be¬ 
tween these points with his troops near 
Lebanon Church, which on the Geological 
Survey Map, is near BM 82. 


— 990 — 


The Union Advance on Williamsburg 

28. Smith resumed his march about 12 RR 526 > 534 . 
3:00 P.M., and entered the York town-Wil¬ 
liamsburg road about 3:30 P.M. in ad¬ 
vance of Hooker’s troops. All roads were 

found in bad condition, being full of ruts 
and wheel holes. 

29 . About 2:00 P.M. General McClel- 7 nr 311 
lan sent another message to the Navy, 
stating it was of the first importance that 

some of the boats should hurry up and de¬ 
stroy the enemy transportation, and in ac¬ 
cordance with this request, a gunboat was 
sent up the York River, with orders to 
destroy if possible the railroad bridge 
over the Pamunkey river. 

30. About 4:00 P.M., General McClel- 7 nr 311 
lan sent another dispatch to the Navy re¬ 
questing that the railroad bridge over the 
Pamunkey be not destroyed, but on the 
contrary saved. It is possible that McClel¬ 
lan in his dispatch of 2:00 P.M., did not in¬ 
tend to include railroad bridges under the 

term “enemy transportation,” and his lat¬ 
er message was sent to correct a misinter¬ 
pretation of his wishes. 

31. Gunboats sent in pursuance of the ^ R 311 » 313 - 
foregoing requests returned by 9:30 P.M. 
reporting no batteries or soldiers at West 

Point. They also reported that informa¬ 
tion had been received that the Confeder¬ 
ates were falling back to Hanover Court 
House, to defend the line of the Chicka- 
hominy, that about 4,000 of the enemy had 
been prevented by the gunboats from 
crossing the Mattapony, and that about 
2,000 of the enemy were within three miles 
of West Point. 

32. Hooker’s Division following Stone- J 2 6 RR 6 20 » 6 4 31 « 452 * 
man’s cavalry reached the vicinity of Hal- 2 ^ 1 ^ 6 ^ 6 348 


— 991 — 


The Peninsula Campaign 


12 RR 457, 464, 
465 

1 CW 348 

2 B & L 196 


12 RR 433, 464, 
465, 472, 526 

1 CW 568, 576, 
298 

2 B & L 196 


12 RR 20, 451, 452, 
456, 464, 511 
2 CP 14, 16 
1 CW 348, 576 


stead’s Point (Geo. Sur. Map) probably 
after 4:00 PM. Here they ran into Smith’s 
Division, then crossing into the road. 

33. While enroute towards the front, 
Heintzelman, probably about 4:30 P.M., 
met Hooker, who had preceded him, re¬ 
turning, and at his request, Hooker re¬ 
ceived authority to march his division to 
the Lee’s Mill-Williamsburg road, via 
Cheesecake Church. This march appears 
to have been made via a cross road, prob¬ 
ably near 79, 72,*85 and 84 on the Geologi¬ 
cal Survey Map, and commenced after 
5:00 P.M., proceeding very slowly. 

34. Hooker intended to march to the 
Williamsburg battlefield that afternoon, to 
attack the Confederate right the same 
evening, in conjunction with an attack on 
the enemy’s left by Stoneman and Smith. 
But due to Smith’s troops not clearing the 
road before about 7:00 P.M. Hooker’s divi¬ 
sion did not renew their march until that 
hour. And in the dark, rainy night, over 
dirt roads cut up by large masses of troops, 
with men exhausted by an already long 
march and loss of sleep, and labor in the 
trenches during the preceding night, it be¬ 
came impracticable to continue on, and be¬ 
tween 10:00 P.M. and 11:00 P.M., the divi¬ 
sion was halted along the road, to get what 
rest it could, preparatory to marching for¬ 
ward again at daylight. The leading ele¬ 
ment of the division halted probably near 
Grove (Ge. Sur. Map) about 11:00 P.M., 
having passed General Emory’s cavalry 
enroute. 

35. General Sumner arrived opposite 
Fort Magruder about 4:30 P.M. and there 


— 992 — 


The Union Advance on Williamsburg 


met Stoneman and learned of his repulse. 
Heintzelman and Keyes, arrived a little 
later. After a short consultation, General 
Sumner decided to attack at once. General 
Heintzelman had come up, and about 5:00 
P.M. met Generals Stoneman, Sumner, W. 
F. Smith, Hancock, Keyes and Brooks. At 
the conference which ensued, General Sum¬ 
ner, who was the senior, announced the 
assumption of command by him of all 
troops in the field in compliance of General 
McClellan’s orders to him, superseding 
similar orders claimed to have been re¬ 
ceived by Heintzelman. The orders for 
General Sumner to assume command were 
undoubtedly issued later than the orders 
Heintzelman states he received. 

36. The head of Smith’s division about 
5:30 P.M. came up, and in accordance with 
Sumner’s orders, commenced to deploy 
about 6:00 P.M. But the lines became con¬ 
fused in the dense woods, and darkness 
coming on, the attack was abandoned, the 
troops bivouacking in the woods about 
8:00 P.M., many without overcoats or 
blankets. 

37. About 8:00 P.M. it commenced to 
rain heavily, making the roads already in 
bad condition, almost impassable, and in¬ 
terfering with the rest of the tired troops. 

38. Couch’s and Casey’s divisions had 
followed their advanced brigades pursuant 
to orders from General McClellan issued 
probably after 2:00 P.M., but due to the 
congestion on the roads, advanced only to 
the neighborhood of the Half-Way House, 
where they bivouacked for the night. As 
some of the troops were without baggage 
or rations, they were sent back for them. 


12 RR 20, 451, 

456, 527, 534, 549, 
556 

MOS 322 
2 CP 18 
1 CW 569 


1 CW 361 

12 RR 21, 234, 435, 
456, 481, 520 
MOS 322 

2 CP 18 


12 RR 511, 512, 
516, 185 
1 CW 442, 600 
602 


— 993 — 


4 RR 139 


The Peninsula Campaign 

39. Kearney's division advanced in 
rear of Hooker, some three miles from 
Yorktown, on the afternoon of the 4th, and 
there bivouacked for the night. 

Comments 

1. The orders for pursuit were is¬ 
sued tardily and piecemeal—a connected 
pursuit covering a logical movement of 
so much of the army as it was practicable 
to move over existing roads was what 
should have been given. Part of the pur¬ 
suit could well have been by water, and 
part by land. 

2. Instead of such an order, succes¬ 
sive orders were issued to various units 
of the command, finally resulting in the 
cavalry, and four divisions, over 40,000 
men, trying to move over one road to 
Williamsburg in one afternoon. Naturally 
but one division got through. 

3. Part of the road conjestion was 
due to the Lee’s Mill-Williamsburg road 
being considered impracticable for 
mounted troops. As Sumner’s troops, three 
divisions, who would naturally have used 
this road, did not care to advance without 
their artillery, they moved to the road as¬ 
signed to the cavalry and Hooker’s divi¬ 
sions. 

4. The failure to repair the bridge 
over Skiff Creek, which was only partly 
destroyed, was a serious error, the results 
of which were felt by the Federal troops 
for days. 

5. But the main fault was the failure 
to foresee the probability of a pursuit 
being required, resulting in no plan being 
prepared in advance for such a contin- 


— 994 — 


The Union Advance on Williamsburg 

gency, and in the troops not being in read¬ 
iness to move forward properly equipped 
without considerable delays, when the ne¬ 
cessity for this advance arose. 

6 . The troops which moved out early 12 rr 451 , 557 . 
in the morning, Smith’s, Couch’s and Ca- 1 cw 569 
sey’s division, moved in part without ra¬ 
tions, shelter tents or blankets. On the 

other hand, Stoneman’s cavalry and 
Hooker’s division, which did not complain 
of lack of subsistence or shelter, did not 
get started until about noon or later. 

7. The orders issued by McClellan in 
the morning prevented an energetic pur¬ 
suit by Smith, who was the only one pre¬ 
pared to move promptly, and gave the 
Confederates about four hours’ time, which 
they needed badly. As it was, the Con¬ 
federates reached Williamsburg only an 
hour or so before the Federal cavalry 
arrived opposite Fort Magruder. 

8. Except for the delay in starting, 1 cw 398.570 
the action of the Union cavalry on May* 

4th appears to have been generally vigor¬ 
ous and suitable. It made a determined 
attempt to carry out its mission. There 
was, however, a failure to make cavalry 
reconnaissances during the afternoon of 
the 4th, which, had they been made, might 
have resulted in correcting the inaccurate 
maps in the Union possession, and might 
have avoided some of the confusion which 
resulted from the combined use of inac¬ 
curate maps, which caused a large conges¬ 
tion of troops on the Yorktown-Williams- 
burg road. Such reconnaissances as were 
made by engineer officers, do not appear to 
have resulted in desired information be¬ 
ing available in time. 


— 995 — 


The Peninsula Campaign 

9. Certainly, General Emory's forces, 
after reaching the Lee’s Mill-Williams- 
burg road should not have stopped and 
waited for General Smith to find him. He 
should have scouted vigorously in all direc¬ 
tions and located General Smith, at the 
same time never losing contact with the 
enemy’s cavalry. 

10. Had Hooker’s or Smith’s division 
been able to support the Union cavalry at 
Fort Magruder, ffn the afternoon of the 
4th, there was a possibility that the place 
might have been captured, opening a way 
for a serious attack on the Confederate 
troops conjested about Williamsburg. 

11. But owing to the late hour at 
which the advance started, ignorance of 
the country, poor maps, and bad condition 
of the roads, the infantry arrived too late 
on the 4th to attack on that date. 

12. The Confederate retreat also ex¬ 
hibits faults. Failure to calculate march 
‘distances, and to appreciate the condition 
of the roads, led to a road congestion, 
which might have resulted in heavy losses 
had the Federal pursuit started earlier. 

13. The failure to direct a line of re¬ 
sistance to be held by the rear guard to 
cover Williamsburg was a serious faulty 
which was, however, corrected in time, by 
countermarching a part of the troops at 
Williamsburg. 

14. Other comments applicable to this 
campaign have been given in the narrative 
account. 

THE END 


— 996 — 





































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THE GENERAL SERVICE SCHOOLS 


LIBRARY RULES 
(Extract ) 

2. Authorized text-books, books of reference and 
current periodicals will not be issued, except upon 
special authority from the Commandant. 

3. Officers, and others entitled to take books from 
the Library, will sign a “book check” for books 
borrowed which will be returned to borrower when 
the books are returned to the Library. 

5. All books taken from the Library must be re¬ 
turned within one month, and books in general de¬ 
mand will not be renewed. 

6. The Librarian will at once report to the Sec¬ 
retary all cases of losses or of books damaged while 
in the hands of borrowers. 





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